

DECLASSIFIED

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*** Current Classification ***

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

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<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 74TEHRAN07512

FILM= D740249-0783

DATE= 08 SEP 74

TYPE= TE

FROM= TEHRAN

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= STATE

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= ~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

ORIGPCLASS= n/a

EO= N/A

SUBJECT= IRAN COPES WITH FLOOD OF KURDISH REFUGEES SUMMARY: IRANIAN RED LION
AND SUN SOCIETY ESTIMATES SOME

REFERENCE= n/a

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= KURDS, REFUGEE RELIEF, FLOODS

TAGS= PINT, PFOR, SREF, IZ, IR

RELEASE

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9302996 15/FPC/CDR Date 1/2/97

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PAGE 01 TEHRAN 07512 081216Z

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ACTION NEA-16

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 IO-14 ISO-00 SAM-01 SR-02 ORM-03 SCS-03

SCA-01 ACDA-19 AID-20 SWF-02 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07

H-03 INR-11 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01

SP-03 SS-20 USIA-15 HEW-08 DRC-01 NIC-01 MC-02 OMB-01

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R 081135Z SEP 74
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5064
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
ZEN AMCONSUL TABRIZ
USINT BAGHDAD
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

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E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PINT, PFOR, SREF, IZ, IR

SUBJECT: IRAN COPES WITH FLOOD OF KURDISH REFUGEES

SUMMARY: IRANIAN RED LION AND SUN SOCIETY ESTIMATES SOME 73,000 KURDISH REFUGEES NOW BEING SHELTERED AND FED IN SOME 9 CAMPS IN NORTHWESTERN IRAN. (AMCONSUL TABRIZ BELIEVES TOTAL NOT OVER 50,000 - SEE TABRIZ 20) TWO OF THESE CAMPS BEING EQUIPPED WITH PERMANENT BUILDINGS INTO WHICH REFUGEES WILL MOVE BEFORE WINTER BEGINS. CONGRESSMAN WILLIAM BRAY, ACCOMPANIED BY EMBASSY, CONSULATE AND MAAG OFFICERS, VISITED A PERMANENT AND A TENT CAMP SEPTEMBER 7. GROUP IMPRESSED BY EFFICIENT ORGANIZATION AND LEVEL OF SERVICES PROVIDED. NO OFFICIAL PLEA FOR US ASSISTANCE MADE. END SUMMARY.

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1. REPRESENTATIVE WILLIAM BRAY, ON PRIVATE VISIT TO IRAN, OBTAINED PERMISSION SEE KURDISH REFUGEE CAMPS SEPTEMBER 7, ACCOMPANIED BY EMBASSY AND MAAG OFFICERS AND AMCONSUL TABRIZ. GUIDE WAS DR. (AND GENERAL) ERFANI, DIRECTOR RED LION AND SUN SOCIETY FOR WEST AZERBAIJAN. _

2. ZIVEH CAMP, LOCATED NEAR BORDER WITH TURKEY, IS BOTH TENT CITY AND PERMANENT CAMP. TENT CITY SHELTERS 8,000 KURDISH REFUGEES, OF WHOM 5,000 ARE CHILDREN AND 1,500 WOMEN. ALL CAME FROM PIRANSHAHR, WHICH IS STAGING AREA. TENTS WELL SPACED AND SANITARY PRECAUTIONS GOOD. 14-BED HOSPITAL AVAILABLE, STAFFED WITH 3 DOCTORS, 8 NURSES. SCHOOLS, TRAINING CENTER FOR CRAFTS, SPORTS FIELD, GENERAL STORE PROVIDED. FOOD ISSUED IN BULK AND REFUGEES COOK FOR THEMSELVES. SOME 25 MASONRY AND STEEL STRUCTURES BEING BUILT IN PERMANENT CAMP, WHICH WILL HAVE CAPACITY OF 12-15,000. ABOUT THIRD OF THEM HAVE ROOFS ON AND SOCIETY INSISTS CONSTRUCTION WILL BE FINISHED BEFORE WINTER COMES.

3. AQ BULAQ CAMP, SOUTH OF ZIVEH, IS TENT CITY OF 6,000 REFUGEES. THIS TEMPORARY CAMP WAS BUILT JUST OVER TWO MONTHS AGO, AND INHABITANTS WILL MOVE TO ZIVEH STRUCTURES FOR WINTER. ALTHOUGH MORE SPARTAN THAN ZIVEH CAMP, THIS WAS EQUALLY WELL LAID OUT AND CLEAN. SOME INHABITANTS EMPLOYED IN PUBLIC WORKS PROJECTS TO STAVE OFF BOREDOM AND EARN POCKET MONEY.

4. OTHER RED LION AND SUN CAMPS IN WESTERN AZERBAIJAN: NALIWAN (7,000 REFUGEES); KOLTEH, NEAR SARDASHT (7,000), AND RABAT (TO BE PERMANENT CAMP WITH 12,000). CAMPS IN KERMANSHAHAN PROVINCE ARE SARYAS (13,000) AND MARIWAN (4,000).

5. KURDISH DEMOCRATIC PARTY MEMBERS INTRODUCED TO GROUP IN REZAIIEH CLAIMED SOME 5,000 REFUGEES A DAY WERE ARRIVING IN IRAN, WHILE ALMOST 250,000 MORE WERE WAITING ON IRAQI SIDE OF BORDER. AS TURKS HAD CLOSED BORDER WITH IRAQ AND SYRIA HAD REFUSED TO TAKE REFUGEES, THEY SAID, IRAN WAS ONLY HOPE AND HAD RESPONDED WELL TO HUMANITARIAN NEEDS. (ERFANI IMPLIED THAT THERE WAS SOME SELECTIVITY EXERCISED AND ONLY ABOUT 100,000 MORE WOULD BE ALLOWED IN.) ONE KDP MEMBER
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CLAIMED IRAQIS HAD USED CLUSTER BOMB UNIT WEAPONS AGAINST KURDS. HE SAID 60 PERCENT OF CASUALTIES WERE WOMEN AND CHILDREN.

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6. GOVGEN DEHESTANI TOLD GROUP HE HAD JUST VERIFIED KILLING OF 15 IRANIANS AT KOHNEH LAHIJAN, FIVE KILOMETERS FROM IRAQI BORDER. BOMBING ATTACK BY FOUR PLANES OCCURRED ABOUT 0830 HOURS AND VILLAGE ON PLAIN, NOT IN HILLS; FACTORS WHICH CONVINCED DEHESTANI ATTACK WAS DELIBERATE. SOVIET MARKINGS VISIBLE ON TAIL FINS OF AT LEAST ONE OF THE FOUR BOMBS DROPPED DURING ATTACK.

7. COMMENT: ERFANI CONDUCTED LOW-KEY FACTUAL BRIEFING WHICH POINTED UP IMPRESSIVE ACCOMPLISHMENTS. PLAIN-CLOTHES SECURITY PERSONNEL INHIBITED CONTACT WITH REFUGEES EXCEPT WHEN ERFANI INTERVENED. BRAY ALLOWED TO PHOTOGRAPH CAMPS. ONLY HINT OF NEED FOR US ASSISTANCE WAS MADE BY KDP MEMBER BUT NOT PICKED UP BY SOCIETY OFFICIALS, WHO APPEAR PROUD TO BE DOING JOB WITH OWN RESOURCES. THIS CONTRASTS WITH EDITORIALS IN TEHRAN PRESS CRITICIZING ICRC AND UN FOR NOT OFFERING TO ASSIST IRAN WITH REFUGEE PROBLEM.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE 920393

IS/FPC/CDR 128

Date. 9/18/96

PAGE 01

STATE 059633

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CIAE-00 EB-00 NEA-06 ARA-00 NSAE-00 COME-00 L-03
EAP-00 STR-17 INRE-00 JUSE-00 SCT-02 E-01 /057 R

DRAFTED BY: IO/T/HTP:JAALLITTO

APPROVED BY: IO:SLVOGELGESANG

AF/RA:JGARDNER

EAP/RA:BMALKIN

EB/TRA/AVP:GGGRIFFITHS

IO/T:JABUCHE

NEA/NGA:RCLARKE

ARA/PPC:VBROD NEA/RA:MSCHELAND

EUR/RPE:GTDELAWIE

IO/T/HTP:NABOYER

L/EBC:SWITTEN

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TO AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY BRASILIA IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE

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AMEMBASSY ACCRA IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY NAIROBI IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY MEXICO IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY LAGOS IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE

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AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY BERN IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM IMMEDIATE

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TEXT OF TELEGRAM 89STATE 059633

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INFO JCS WASHDC 0000
SECDEF WASHDC 0000
IO COLLECTIVE
AMCONSUL MONTREAL
AMEMBASSY PANAMA
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
USINT HAVANA
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
FAA WASHDC
DEPT OF TRANSPORTATION

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FOR USREP ICAO, FODAG, UNEP, UNVIE, UNESCO OBSERVER

E.O. 12356: DECL OADR
TAGS: AORC, EAIR, PREL, ICAO, XX
SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR DEMARCHES ON IRAN AIR 655

REF: MONTREAL 0355

1.(C) THE DEPARTMENT AGREES WITH THE U.S. MISSION TO ICAO
THAT DEMARCHES ON THE ISSUE OF IRAN AIR FLIGHT 655 ARE
NECESSARY (SEE REFTTEL).

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2.(C) THEREFORE, ACTION ADDRESSEES ARE REQUESTED TO MAKE
A DEMARCHE, USING THE TALKING POINTS BELOW, TO AN
APPROPRIATE LEVEL OF THE HOST GOVERNMENT BEFORE MARCH 8.
THE PURPOSE OF THIS DEMARCHE IS TO EXPLAIN THE WITHDRAWAL
OF THE U.S. NOTICE TO AIRMEN (NOTAM) IN THE PERSIAN GULF
AND TO SEEK SUPPORT FOR THE U.S. DURING THE ICAO COUNCIL
DISCUSSION OF IRAN AIR 655, WHICH WILL BEGIN MARCH 13 IN
MONTREAL.

3.(U) TALKING POINTS

- ON MARCH 13 THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION
ORGANIZATION (ICAO) COUNCIL IS EXPECTED TO RESUME
CONSIDERATION OF THE ACCIDENTAL SHOOTDOWN OF IRAN AIR

FLIGHT 655 ON JULY 3, 1988.

-- IT WOULD BE PREMATURE TO JUDGE THE TECHNICAL
RECOMMENDATIONS WHICH WILL EMERGE FROM THE ICAO AIR
NAVIGATION COMMISSION (ANC), BUT THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT IS FULLY SUPPORTIVE OF EFFORTS TO IMPROVE
PROCEDURES TO PREVENT SUCH ACCIDENTS IN THE FUTURE.

-- FOR EXAMPLE, THE U.S. WILL WITHDRAW ITS NOTICE TO
AIRMEN (NOTAM) FOR THE GULF AREA ON MARCH FIRST SINCE

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TEXT OF TELEGRAM 89STATE 059633

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HOWEVER, DANGER STILL EXISTS IN THE AREA, THE U.S. HAS REQUESTED ALL STATES THAT CONTROL FLIGHT INFORMATION REGIONS IN THE GULF AREA TO PROMULGATE NOTAMS WITH CERTAIN INFORMATION RELEVANT TO THE SAFETY OF INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION. IT IS OUR HOPE AND EXPECTATION THAT THOSE STATES WILL COMPLY WITH THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER ANNEXES 11 AND 15 OF THE CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION AND WILL PROMULGATE THAT INFORMATION ON OR BEFORE MARCH 1.

- THE INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE INCIDENT CLEARLY

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DEMONSTRATE THAT IRAN AIR FLIGHT 655 WAS SHOT DOWN AS A RESULT OF MISTAKEN IDENTIFICATION AS IT APPROACHED AN . ACTIVE COMBAT ZONE.

-- THE UNITED STATES DEEPLY REGRETS THIS TRAGIC ERROR AND HAS OFFERED TO PROVIDE COMPENSATION, ON AN EX GRATIA BASIS, TO THE FAMILIES OF THE VICTIMS.

- THE UNITED STATES IMMEDIATELY LAUNCHED ITS OWN INVESTIGATION OF THE INCIDENT, AND ALSO COOPERATED FULLY WITH ICAO IN ITS INVESTIGATION. THE U.S. INVESTIGATION REPORT WAS MADE PUBLIC AND IS AVAILABLE AS AN APPENDIX TO THE ICAO REPORT.

-- THE U.S. OBJECTIVE IN COUNCIL DISCUSSIONS IN MARCH WILL BE TO AVOID POLEMICS AND NOT TO APPORTION BLAME FOR THE INCIDENT, BUT RATHER TO FOCUS ON WHAT STEPS CAN BE TAKEN TO AVOID SUCH TRAGIC ACCIDENTS IN THE FUTURE.

-- WE HOPE FOR THE SUPPORT AND UNDERSTANDING OF YOUR REPRESENTATIVE DURING COUNCIL DISCUSSION OF THE INCIDENT.

4. (S) PLEASE REPORT REACTIONS TO THE DEPARTMENT (SLUGGED FOR IO/T AND EB/TRA/AVP) AND MONTREAL (SLUGGED FOR THE U.S. MISSION TO ICAO).

5. (S) FYI, THE DEPARTMENT IS DRAFTING INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE U.S. DELEGATION TO THE MARCH 13 COUNCIL MEETING.

THERE WILL BE A SECOND DEMARCHE REQUEST MADE TO ACTION ADDRESSEES WITHIN THE NEXT TEN DAYS PROVIDING MORE SPECIFIC INFORMATION ON THE POSITION WHICH THE U.S. WILL TAKE AT THE MEETING AND THE SUPPORT WE SEEK FROM OTHER

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PAGE 05 STATE 059633

COUNCIL MEMBERS. ARMACOST

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*** Current Classification ***

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

RELEASE

DOC_NBR= 74TEHRAN07134

FILM= D740234-1160

DATE= 25 AUG 74

TYPE= TE

FROM= TEHRAN

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= STATE
DIA

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= ~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

ORIGPCCLASS= n/a

EO= N/A

SUBJECT= IRAN DETAILS ADDITIONAL BORDER VIOLATIONS BY IRAQ

REFERENCE= TEHRAN 6788

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= PRESS COMMENTS, BORDER INCIDENTS

TAGS= PFOR, IR, IZ

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PAGE 01 TEHRAN 07134 251315Z

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ACTION NEA-16

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 IO-14 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-11

L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 SS-20

USIA-15 SAM-01 SAJ-01 ACDA-19 DRC-01 /153 W
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R 251230Z AUG 74
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7899
USINT BAGHDAD
DIA WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, IR, IZ

SUBJECT: IRAN DETAILS ADDITIONAL BORDER VIOLATIONS BY IRAQ

REF: TEHRAN 6788

1. FOREIGN LANGUAGE AND IRANIAN PRESS AGUST 25 COVERED IN SOME
DETAIL IRAQI BORDER VIOLATIONS SAID TO HAVE OCCURRED BETWEEN AGUST
14-23. FIRST INCIDENT MENTIONED WAS IRAQI ARTILLERY AND MORTAR
ATTACK NEAR QASR SHIRIN AUGUST 14. NEXT DAY IRAQIS ALLEGEDLY
ATTACKED YAKKESHAN OUTPOST IN SAME AREA, KILLING CHILD IN BORDER
VILLAGE AND DAMAGING LIVESTOCK AND HOMES. ON AUGUST 17 IRAQI PLANES
ARE SAID TO HAVE DROPPED LEAFLETS IN WEST AZERBAIJAN, KURDISTAN AND
KHUZISTAN PROVINCES URGING IRANIANS TO REVOLT AGAINST GOVERNMENT.
AUGUST 18, IRAQI ARTILLERY ALLEGEDLY SHELLED IRANIAN BORDER POST
OF BORJ AHMADI NEAR QASR SHIRIN. FOLLOWING DAY THREE FARMERS WERE
REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN KILLED IN VILLAGE OF ALQAIEH, KHUZISTAN,
ALTHOUGH

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PAGE 02 TEHRAN 07134 251315Z

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ANOTHER PAPER GAVE DATE AS AUGUST 21. AUGUST 23, IRAQI SHELLING OF QESHQEH BORDER POST SOME 40 MILES SOUTH OF QASR SHIRIN IS REPORTED TO HAVE RESULTED IN A FIVE-HOUR EXCHANGE OF FIRE WITH IRANIAN BORDER GUARDS.

2. COMMENT: TARDY PRESS REPORTING OF THESE EVENTS AND MINOR INCONSISTENCIES BETWEEN PRESS STORIES SUGGEST THIS IS CAMPAIGN TO BUILD UP CASE OF IRANIAN RESTRAINT IN FACE OF CONTINUED IRAQI PROVOCATION. EDITORIAL COMMENT CONTINUES TO CONTRAST IRAQI BORDER VIOLATIONS WITH THAT COUNTRY'S PARTICIPATION IN BILATERAL TALKS IN ISTANBUL (REFTEL). KAYHAN ADDS FOLLOWING CRYPTIC NOTE: "IRAN COULD EASILY REPLY IN KIND AND MAKE LIFE VERY DIFFICULT FOR BAGHDAD," BUT THEN GOES ON TO SUGGEST CONTINUED NEGOTIATION.
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*** Current Classification *** ~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

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*** Current Classification *** ~~SECRET~~
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

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RELEASE

DOC_NBR= 74TEHRAN07218

FILM= D740236-0795

DATE= 27 AUG 74

TYPE= TE

FROM= TEHRAN

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= STATE
DOD

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= ~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

ORIGPCLASS= n/a

EO= N/A

SUBJECT= IRAN/IRAQ TRADE/ACCUSATIONS ON BORDER BUILD-UP

REFERENCE= TEHRAN 7134

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= PRESS COMMENTS, MOBILIZATION, BORDER INCIDENTS, THREATS

TAGS= PFOR, IR, IZ

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Date: 1/2/97

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PAGE 01 TEHRAN 07218 271225Z

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ACTION NEA-16

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 IO-14 ISO-00 SAM-01 SAJ-01 ACDA-19

CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-11 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04

RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 SS-20 USIA-15 DRC-01 /153 W

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R 271155Z AUG 74

FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7930

USINT BAGHDAD

DIA WASHDC

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

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E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PFOR, IR, IZ

SUBJECT: IRAN/IRAQ TRADE ACCUSATIONS ON BORDER BUILD-UP

REF: TEHRAN 7134

1. FOREIGN LANGUAGE IRANIAN PRESS AUGUST 27 FEATURED REUTERS REPORT FROM BAGHDAD THAT IRAQI GOVERNMENT HAD HANDED DIPLOMATIC NOTES TO ENVOYS THERE ALLEGING AN IRANINA MILITARY BUILD-UP ON BORDER. IRAQIS SAID TO HAVE ACCUSED IRAN OF ATTACKING A POLICE POST AT KHANAQIN, JUST SOUTH OF QASR SHIRIN, AND OF KILLING AN IRAQI SOLDIER IN A BORDER CONFRONTATION OVER WEEKEND. (THIS WAS PRESUMABLY AUGUST 23 EXCHANGE OF FIRE REPORTED REFTEL). ACCORDING TO STORY, OFFICIAL IRAQI POSITION WAS THAT IRAN WAS OBSTRUCTING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION MADE AFTER THE FEB-MARCH CLASHES ASKING BOTH COUNTRIES TO WITHDRAW FORCES FROM BORDER AREA.

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PAGE 02 TEHRAN 07218 271225Z

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2. EDITORIALS BLASTED IRAQ FOR TRYING TO DISCREDIT IRAN WHILE NEGOTIATIONS UNDERWAY. TEHRAN JOURNAL ACCUSED IRAQ OF MASSING TROOPS AND CARRYING OUT AGGRESSIVE ACTS, AND COMMENTED THAT IRAQI PLOY TO GET IRAN TO WEAKEN ITS DEFENSES ALONG BORDER WOULD NOT SUCCEED. KAYHAN TERMED ISTANBUL TALKS A "COVER-UP FOR HOSTILE ACTS."

3. COMMENT: MOST OF RECENT BORDER VIOLATIONS HAVE TAKEN PLACE SOUTH OF QASR SHIRIN AND ARE NOT DIRECTLY RELATED TO IRAQI MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST THE KURDS.
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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

*** Current Classification *** ~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

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*** Current Classification ***
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<*** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ***>>>

DOC_NBR= 74TABRIZ00012

RELEASE

FILM= D740177-0146

DATE= 03 JUL 74

TYPE= TE

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ORIGHAND= n/a

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ORIGCLASS= ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ORIGPCCLASS= n/a

EO= GS

SUBJECT= KURDISH REFUGEES IN IRAN

REFERENCE= TABRIZ 07, TABRIZ 08

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= KURDS, REFUGEES, POLITICAL SITUATION, REFUGEE CAMPS

TAGS= PINS, SREF, IR, IZ

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EO Citations

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9302996 IS/FPC/CDR/DKime Date: 1/2/97

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PAGE 01 TABRIZ 00012 031140Z

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ACTION NEA-16

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 PM-07 NSC-07 SP-03 SS-20 RSC-01

L-03 CIAE-00 DODE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00 PA-04 USIA-15

PRS-01 AID-20 IO-14 ACDA-19 SR-02 ORM-03 DRC-01 /172 W
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R 031120Z JUL 74

FM AMCONSUL TABRIZ

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 85

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMCONSUL ADANA

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

AMCONSUL KHORRAMSHAHR

USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GER

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TABRIZ 0012

BEIRUT PASS BAGHDAD

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PINS, IR, IZ

SUBJ: KURDISH REFUGEES IN IRAN

REF: TABRIZ 07, TABRIZ 08

GOVERNOR GENERAL IRANIAN KURDISTAN AND CHIEF OF SAVAK CONFIRMED JUNE 26 THAT CAMP FOR IRAQI KURDISH CIVILIANS FOR 3,000 PERSONS HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED NEAR MARIVAN. CAMP ENTIRELY USED BY WOMEN, CHILDREN AND OLD MEN BUT NOT MILITARY-AGE MEN (PRESUMABLY BUSY IN IRAQ). IN CONVERSATION IN SANANDAJ BOTH GOVGEN AND SAVAK CHIEF INDICATED CONSIDERABLE CONCERN OVER HOUSING AND FOOD SUPPLY OF REFUGEES ONCE WINTER SNOWS BEGIN IN THREE TO FOUR MONTHS. THEY STATED THEY HAD CONSIDERED MOVING ALL PERSONS TO SANANDAJ BUT ABANDONED IDEA DUE LACK OF HOUSING IN THE CITY. PLANS NOW CALL FOR MAJOR EFFORT CONSTRUCT HOUSES, CLINIC, AND SCHOOL FOR JURDS IN AREA OF PRESENT CAMP. THIS BRINGS NUMBER OF REFUGEES ~~CONFIRMED~~ BY GOI OFFICIALS (REFTELS) TO 25,000 BUT SINCE SOME

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PAGE 02 TABRIZ 00012 031140Z

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INFORMATION ALREADY ~~DECLASSIFIED~~ WOULD GUESS THAT PRESENT TOTAL CLOSER TO 30,000.

CONCERN FOR SUPPLYING WINTER CAMPS APPARENTLY GENERAL SINCE GOVERNOR GENERAL OF KERMANSHAH, IN JUNE 29 TALK WITH AMBASSADOR AND CONSUL, REPORTED SAME WORRIES. HE WAS TO MEET THAT AFTERNOON WITH RED LION AND SUN (IRANIAN RED CROSS) REPRESENTATIVE TO DISCUSS SITUATION.
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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

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AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
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AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
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AMEMBASSY DACCA
AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU
USLO PEKING (POUCH)
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

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SUBJECT: IRAN'S CURRENT FOREIGN RELATIONS - AN ANALYSIS

1. SUMMARY: RECENT MULTIPLICATION OF OIL REVENUES HAS GIVEN IRAN NEW TOOLS TO CARRY OUT ITS LONG-CHERISHED DESIRE TO PLAY MORE INFLUENTIAL ROLE ON WORLD SCENE, PARTICULARLY IN REGIONAL AFFAIRS. SHAH HAS SKILLFULLY USED THIS ECONOMIC LEVERAGE TO ENHANCE IRAN'S POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES, AND COUNTRY IS RIDING WAVE OF CONFIDENCE AND PRIDE IN ITS NEW PROMINENCE AND POWER. IN PAST SIX MONTHS SOME THIRTY COUNTRIES HAVE SENT HIGH-LEVEL DELEGATIONS TO IRAN SEEKING AID AND TRADE AGREEMENTS, AND MANY HAVE OFFERED POLITICAL IOU'S IN EXCHANGE. IN PERSIAN GULF AREA IRAN HAS SOUGHT TO SAFEGUARD ITS OIL LIFELINE BY BUILDING ITS OWN ARMED STRENGTH AND GIVING ECONOMIC (AND IN CASE OF OMAN, MILITARY) AID TO BOLSTER SHEKDOMS AND HELP THEM SURVIVE INSURGENT THREATS. HOSTILITY TOWARDS IRAQ WHICH SHAH VIEWS AS SOVIET STALKING-HORSE AND REGIONAL TROUBLEMAKER WILL CONTINUE FOR TIME BEING. ON SUBCONTINENT, IN ORDER TO FOSTER STABILITY AND BRING ITS OWN RELATIONS INTO BETTER ALIGNMENT WITH POWER REALITIES IRAN HAS DRAWN CLOSER TO INDIA WHILE MAINTAINING GOOD RAPPORT WITH OTHER COUNTRIES. IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS WITH EGYPT AND SYRIA WILL GIVEN IRAN NEW BACKING IN ARAB COUNCILS, WHILE CONOMIC DEALS WITH DOZEN AFRICAN COUNTRIES WILL INCREASE IRAN'S INFLUENCE THERE AND PROVIDE IT WITH MANY NEEDED COMMODITIES. SHAH REMAINS DEEPLY SUSPICIOUS OF SOVIET INTENTIONS AND ACTIONS IN MIDDLE EAST, AND COMMERCIAL AND POLITICAL DISPUTES HAVE COOLED RELATIONS BETWEEN TWO COUNTRIES. WITH CHINA, HOWEVER, RELATIONSHAVE IPROVED CONSIDERABLY BECAUSE OF CONGRUENT INTERESTS. NUMEROUS OECD COUNTRIES RECENTLY HAVE NEGOTIATED ECONOMIC DEALS WITH IRAN WHICH COULD POSSIBLY AMOUNT TO \$18 BILLION OR MORE, AND IRAN IS PURCHASING INCREASING, BUT STILL SMALL, SHARE OF ITS MILITARY HARDWARE FROM EUROPEANS. UNITED STATES REMAINS SINGLE MOST IMPORTANT COUNTRY FOR IRAN. FUNDAMENTALLY OUR INTERESTS ARE SIMILAR AND OUR RELATIONS EXCELLENT, AND WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO PLAY INFLUENTIAL, IF NOT EXCLUSIVE, ROLE IN IRAN'S DEVELOPMENT AS A SUBSTANTIAL POWER. END SUMMARY.

2. SHAH HAS LONG BEEN DETERMINED TO CARVE OUT ROLE IN WORLD AFFAIRS FOR IRAN COMMENSURATE WITH ITS SIZE, WEALTH AND PAST GLORY. THANKS LARGELY TO RECENT MULTIPLICATION OF ITS OIL REVENUES, IRAN NOW ENJOYS GREATER ABILITY TO PROJECT ITS POWER AND INFLUENCE ABROAD THAN IT HAS HAD FOR CENTURIES. IRANIANS ARE RIDING WAVE OF CONFIDENCE AND EBULLIENCE ABOUT THEIR FOREIGN

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RELATIONS AND ARE TAKING ENORMOUS SATISFACTION FROM IMAGE OF BRITISH, ITALIANS, AND OTHERS RUSHING TO IRAN FOR HELP IN SOLVING

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THEIR ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES. STEADY STREAM OF HEADS OF STATE, CABINET MINISTERS AND ECONOMIC DELEGATIONS--OVER THIRTY IN PAST SIX MONTHS--HAS COME TO TEHRAN SEEKING AID OR TRADE. SIMILARLY, IRANIAN OFFICIALS HAVE CARRIED OFFERS OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, JOINT COMMERCIAL AND INVESTMENT VENTURES, AND GUARANTEED OIL SUPPLY TO ALL PARTS OF ASIA, AFRICA AND EUROPE. ON MULTILATERAL SCALE SHAH HAS ALSO SEIZED INITIATIVE BY PROPOSING ESTABLISHMENT OF DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE FUND FOR LDC'S AND PROMISING LARGE LOANS TO IMF AND IBRD TO CUSHION EFFECTS OF HIGHER OIL PRICES ON LDC'S.

3. SHAH HAS USED IRAN'S NEW ECONOMIC LEVERAGE TO ENHANCE HIS LONG-TERM POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES, EXCHANGING ECONOMIC CONCESSIONS, MOST OF WHICH WILL NOT COME DUE FOR MANY YEARS, FOR POLITICAL IOU'S. AMONG THESE OBJECTIVES, DISCUSSED IN MORE DETAIL BELOW, ARE (A) ASSURING DOMINANT POLITICAL AND MILITARY ROLE FOR IRAN IN PERSIAN GULF AND EVENTUALLY EFFECTIVE INFLUENCE IN INDIAN OCEAN AFFAIRS; (B) THWARTING WHAT SHAH SEES AS CONTINUING SOVIET THREAT TO IRAN THROUGH ENCIRCLEMENT AND SUBVERSION OF GULF, INDIAN OCEAN AND SUBCONTINENTAL STATES; (C) ISOLATING IRAQ AND GAINING SETTLEMENT OF CONFLICT WITH THAT COUNTRY ON TERMS ACCEPTABLE TO IRAN; (D) UNDERCUTTING RADICAL ARAB INFLUENCE IN UNDERDEVELOPED WORLD AND INCREASING IRAN'S INFLUENCE WITH LDC'S; AND (E) ASSURING NECESSARY SUPPLIES AND MARKETS FOR FUTURE IRANIAN INDUSTRY AFTER OIL RUNS OUT.

4. CLEARLY IRAN HAS MADE REMARKABLE USE RECENTLY OF ITS ECONOMIC AND DIPLOMATIC ASSETS TO GAIN NEW INFLUENCE AND TO PROJECT AN IMAGE OF STRENGTH AND RESPONSIBILITY ON INTERNATIONAL SCENE. IN ASSESSING THIS PERFORMANCE, HOWEVER, WE MUST NOT LOSE SIGHT OF FACT THAT FOR PRESENT AT LEAST MUCH OF THIS IMAGE IS MORE A STATEMENT OF FUTURE INTENTIONS THAN OF CURRENT REALITY. IN MANY WAYS IRAN IS STILL VERY MUCH AN UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRY ITSELF AND WILL REQUIRE YEARS OF STEADY PROGRESS DOMESTICALLY BEFORE IT CAN MAKE GOOD ON ALL COMMITMENTS AND PROMISES IT IS NOW MAKING. ALTHOUGH THIN LAYER OF TRAINED TECHNOCRATS IS VERY GOOD INDEED, ONLY ABOUT ONE-THIRD OF POPULATION CAN READ AND WRITE, AND COUNTRY IS ALREADY HARD-PRESSED TO FIND PEOPLE WITH MANAGERIAL AND TECHNICAL SKILLS IT REQUIRES. DIPLOMATIC SERVICE WHICH MUST CARRY OUT EXPANDED FROEIGN POLICY IS CRITICALLY SHORT OF COMPETENT MIDDLE AND SENIOR

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LEVEL TALENT. IT WILL BE YEARS BEFORE MILITARY HAS RECEIVED AND ASSIMILATED IMPRESSIVE ARSENAL OF NEW WEAPONS NOW ON ORDER. INDUSTRIAL BASE ON WHICH IRAN PINS ITS HOPES FOR POST-OIL POWER IS STILL IN ENBRYONIC STAGE. AND IRAN IS DESPERATELY DEPENDENT UPON DRIVE, VISION, AND SKILL OF ONE MAN TO CONTINUE IT MOVING RAPIDLY TOWARD THAT WORLD POSITION IT ALREADY CLAIMS FOR ITSELF.

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5. THERE FOLLOWS A REGION BY REGION ANALYSIS OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN IRANIAN FOREIGN POLICY AND AN ASSESSMENT OF WHAT IT ALL MEANS FOR THE UNITED STATES.

6. PERSIAN GULF AND ARABIAN PENINSULA. NOTWITHSTANDING EXPANSION OF DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC INFLUENCE ON SUBCONTINENT AND IN

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AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY KABUL

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

USUN NY 678

USINT BAGHDAD

AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMEMBASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY MUSCAT

AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI

AMEMBASSY MANAMA

AMEMBASSY ODHA

N/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV (POUCH)

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

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EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN AND AFRICA, AREA WHICH REMAINS MOST VITAL TO IRAN IS NEARBY PERSIAN GULF AND ARABIAN PENINSULA. EVER SINCE
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1968 WHEN BRITISH ANNOUNCED PLANS TO WITHDRAW, SHAH HAS SOUGHT TO BECOME DOMINANT POWER IN REGION IN ORDER TO SAFEGUARD OIL LIFELINE UPON WHICH ALL OF IRAN'S PLANS TO BECOME A MAJOR POWER AND TO DEVELOP THE QTE GREAT CIVILIZATION UNQTE DEPEND. SHAH IS DEEPLY CONCERNED WITH POTENTIAL FOR INSTABILITY IN GULF STATES AND WITH SOVIET AND RADICAL ARAB EFFORTS TO EXPLOIT IT. FOR SOME TIME HE HAS SOUGHT IN A VARIETY OF WAYS TO ESTABLISH MUTUAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS WITH OTHER LITTORAL STATES, BUT NONE EXCEPT OMAN HAS RESPONDED POSITIVELY. IRAN IS PROVIDING SUBSTANTIAL MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO HELP OMAN DEFEAT PDRY-BACKED INSURGENTS AND IS GIVING ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE TO A NUMBER OF GULF SHEIKDOMS TO HELP ASSURE THEIR SURVIVAL AND POLITICAL COOPERATION. AMONG REASONS ARABS HAVE BEEN RELUCTANT TO COLLABORATE ON DEFENSE ARRANGEMENTS ARE LINGERING DISTRUST OF IRAN'S SIZE AND STRENGTH, FEAR THAT SUCH A PACT COULD PROVIDE IRAN WITH CARTE BLANCHE TO INTERVENE ON ARAB SIDE OF GULF, AND RELUCTANCE TO TAKE SIDES BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ AGAINST WHOM PACT WOULD CLEARLY BE DIRECTED. IN ANY CASE, IF SHAH PERCEIVED THAT SUBVERSION OR COUPS IN LITTORAL STATES GENUINELY THREATENED FREE PASSAGE THROUGH GULF, HE PROBABLY WOULD TAKE WHATEVER ACTION HE CONSIDERED NECESSARY AND POSSIBLE WHETHER PREVIOUS COLLECTIVE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS EXISTED OR NOT.

7. GEOGRAPHICALLY, SAUDI ARABIA SHOULD BE IRAN'S NATURAL PARTNER IN MAINTAINING SECURITY OF GULF, BUT IRANIAN EFFORTS TO FOSTER GREATER COLLABORATION THUS FAR HAVE NOT SUCCEEDED. IN ADDITION TO REASONS MENTIONED ABOVE, OTHER FACTORS INHIBITING EFFECTIVE COOPERATION HAVE BEEN TRADITIONAL ARAB/IRANIAN HOSTILITY, IRAN'S SEIZURE OF TUNBS AND ABU MUSA, SAUDI REALIZATION THAT UNDER PRESENT CONDITIONS IT WOULD BE JUNIOR PARTNER, IRAN'S RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL, AND, IN RECENT MONTHS, DIFFERENCE OVER OIL PRICE POLICY. NEVERTHELESS, SHAH WANTS A STRONGER SAUDI ARABIA ABLE AND WILLING TO COOPERATE TO ENSURE PEACE AND STABILITY IN GULF, ALTHOUGH HE PROFESSES LITTLE HOPE FOR POSITIVE SAUDI CONTRIBUTION AS LONG AS FAYSAL RULES. SHAH AGREES WITH OUR REASONS FOR RECENT MASSIVE AID AND ARMS OFFER TO SAUDIS AND DOES NOT FEEL THREATENED BY IT,

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PERHAPS BECAUSE HE REALIZES IRAN IS ALREADY SO FAR AHEAD AND INCREASING ITS LEAD.

8. DESPITE REESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH IRAQ, THAT COUNTRY REMAINS FOCUS OF IRAN'S MOST INTENSE HOSTILITY AND SUSPICION, NOT ONLY BECAUSE OF ETHNIC, RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL DIFFERENCES

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AND LONG-STANDING BORDER DISPUTES, BUT ALSO BECAUSE SHAH IS CONVINCED IRAQ HAS BECOME STALKING-HORSE FOR SOVIET PENETRATION OF MIDDLE EAST AND STIRS UP SUBVERSION THROUGHOUT REGION. CONSEQUENTLY, SHAH IS NOT INTERESTED IN PIECE-MEAL IMPROVEMENT IN RELATIONS SUCH AS SETTLEMENT OF LAND FRONTIER DISPUTE WHICH WOULD TAKE PRESSURE OFF IRAQIS BUT NOT SOLVE ESSENTIAL DIFFICULTIES. INSTEAD, HE HAS MADE CLEAR HE WANTS PACKAGE DEAL WHICH WOULD NOT ONLY SETTLE LAND BORDER AND SHATT AL-ARAB DISPUTES, BUT LEAD TO CESSATION OF IRAQI INTERFERENCE IN AFFAIRS OF OTHER STATES AS WELL. FURTHER RECENT AGGRAVANT IN RELATIONS IS HEAVY IRAQI BOMBING OF KURDISH POPULATION WHICH SHAH CONDEMNES AS GENOCIDE AGAINST ETHNIC GROUP RELATED TO IRANIANS. IRAN DOUBTLESS WILL CONTINUE TO GIVE ENOUGH ASSISTANCE TO KURDS TO KEEP THEM FROM BEING DEFEATED BOTH FOR HUMANITARIAN REASONS AND BECAUSE CONFLICT KEEPS IRAQI GOVERNMENT OFF BALANCE. IN LONGER TERM SHAH HOPES TO SEE LESS SOVIET-INFLUENCED AND MORE COOPERATIVE GOVERNMENT REPLACE PRESENT BAATHIST REGIME.

9. SUBCONTINENT. IN EARLY 1974, PAKISTANIS WERE JOLTED WHEN IRAN REACHED NEW COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT WITH INDIA AND SEEMED TO DOWNGRADE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP IT HAD HAD WITH PAKISTAN. AFTER 1971 WAR, NOT WANTING WEAK AND INSTABLE PAKISTAN ON ITS BORDER AND FEARING FURTHER DISMEMBERMENT OF PAKISTAN WHICH MIGHT HAVE ATTRACTED IRANIAN BALUCHIS TO AN AUTONOMOUS BALUCHISTAN, IRAN MADE IT EMPHATICALLY CLEAR THAT IT STOOD BEHIND PAKISTAN AND ISSUED STRONG STATEMENTS OF SUPPORT FOR ITS TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY. FOR ITS PART, INDIA, UNCONVINCED BY IRAN'S ASSURANCES THAT AGREEMENT WITH PAKISTAN WAS PURELY DEFENSIVE (AND WANTING TO ENSURE STEADY SUPPLY OF OIL), ENTERED INTO CLOSER POLITICAL AND MILITARY RELATIONS WITH IRAN'S ENEMY, IRAQ.

10. STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF CLOSE POLITICAL AND MILITARY TIES BETWEEN INDIA, IRAQ, AND SOVIET UNION WORRIED IRAN, ESPECIALLY AFTER AN APPARENTLY LEFTIST COUP IN AFGHANISTAN SEEMED TO ADD ANOTHER LINK IN CHAIN OF HOSTILE ENCIRCLEMENT. RELATIONS BETWEEN IRAN AND INDIA CONTINUED TO DETERIORATE, NOT BECAUSE OF ANY BILATERAL DISPUTE BUT BECAUSE OF MUTUAL SUSPICIONS ABOUT OTHER COUNTRY'S ARMS BUILDUP AND INTENTION TOWARD PAKISTAN.

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1. BY LATE 1973 IRANIAN RELATIONS WITH SUBCONTINENT COUNTRIES
BEGAN TO SHIFT INTO BETTER REFLECTION OF POWER REALITIES THERE.

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ON ONE HAND IRAN'S SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH PAKISTAN
BEGAN TO COOL BECAUSE OF BHUTTO'S CULTIVATION OF ARAB STATES,
PARTICULARLY LIBYA, AND FACT THAT CLOSE SUPPORT OF PAKISTAN
COMPLICATED IRAN'S RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN; THIS COINCIDED
WITH INDIA'S INCREASED WILLINGNESS TO TAKE PRGAMATIC VIEW OF
IRAN'S ROLE IN AREA. NEW ATMOSPHERE OF GOOD WILL GREW AS BOTH
SIDES BEGAN TO REALIZE ADVANTAGES OF CLOSER COLLABORATION. IN
DECEMBER SHAH SINGLED OUT INDIA AS KIND OF COUNTRQ WHERE IRAN
WAS PREPARED TO INVEST SURPLUS CAPITAL, AND MAJOR TRADE AGREEMENT
FOLLOWED IN FEBRUARY 1974 EFFECTIVELY GIVING OIL AT CONCESSIONARY
PRICES AND PROMISINGHEAVY INVESTMENT IN INDUSTRY TO INDIA IN
EXCHANGE FOR COMMODITIES. MRS. GANDHI'S VISIT TO TEHRAN IN LATE
APRIL FURTHER CLEARED AIR POLITICALLY AND LAID GROUNDWORK FOR
STILL CLOSER COOPERATION, PARTICULARLY IN COMMERCIAL FIELD. ONE
AREA OF POTENTIAL CONFLICT IN FUTURE IS INDIAN OCEAN WHERE TWO
COUNTRIES BOTH HAVE AMBITIONS BUT DISAGREE ON ROLE SUPERPOWERS
SHOULD PLAY.

12. RAPPROCHMENT WITH INDIA HAS NOT RESULTED IN IRAN'S ABANDONMENT
OF GOOD RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN BUT HAS ONLY BROUGHT THEM INTO
BETTER BALANCE. DURING BHUTTO'S VISIT IN MARCH, SHAH REASSURED
HIM OF CONTINUING CONCERN FOR PAKISTAN'S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY.
PROMISED TO CONTINUE MODEST PROGRAM OF MILITARY COOPERATION, AND
OFFERED GENEROUS FINANCIAL AID TO MEET BALANCE OF PAYMENTS AND
DEVELOPMENT EEDS.

13. SIMILARLY, IRAN HAS USED ITS NEW WEALTH TO IMPROVE RELATIONS
AND INCREASE INFLUENCE WITH AFGHANISTAN AND, MOST RECENTLY,
BANGLADESH. IRANIANS NOW SEE DAUD AS NON-COMMUNIST WHO IS
PROBABLY BEST LEADER LIKELY TO ARISE AND ARE DOING WHAT THEY CAN
TO BUTTRESS HIM INPOWER, ALTHOUGH THEY HAVE TO PROCEED CAREFULLY
TO AVOID AFGHAN CHARGES OF PATERNALISM. HAVING WAITED TO RECOG-
NIZE BANGLADESH UNTIL AFTER BHUTTO DID SO, IRAN HAS NOW OFFERED
LIMITED ASSISTANCE TO HELP KEEP THAT COUNTRY AFLOAT, THEREBY
ENHANCING SUBCONTINENT'S STABILITY.

14. NEAR-EAST AND AFRICA. IRAN'S RELATIONS WITH EGYPT IN RECENT
MONTHS HAVE TAKEN EVEN MORE DRAMTIC TURN FOR BETTER THAN WITH
INDIA. SHAH, WHO DESPISED AND FEARED NASSERISM, ADMIRES SADAT
AND BEFORE OCTOBER WAR HAD MADE SEVERAL MOVES TO IMPROVE RELATIONS
WITH EGYPT. HE WAS PLEASED WHEN IN EARLY 1974 SADAT ENCOURAGED

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NUMEIRY OF SUDAN AND QABUS OF OMAN TO TURN TO IRAN FOR ASSITANCE. SHORT TIME LATER SHAH SENT MINISTER OF ECONOMY TO CAIRO TO SEE WHETHER OFFER OF IRANIAN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE WOULD HELP HEAL RIFT BETWEEN TWO COUNTRIES. FINDING IT WOULD, HE INVITED EGYPTIAN DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER TO TEHRAN IN MAY WHERE SUBSTANTIAL AID AND DEVELOPMENT PACT AMOUNTING TO NEARLY ONE BILLION DOLLARS WAS SIGNED. UNDOUBTEDLY SHAH HOPES THIS INVESTMENT WILL REINFORCE SPLIT BETWEEN EGYPT ON ONE HAND ANDUSSR AND LIBYA ON OTHER, GAIN

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7067

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AMEMBASSY KABUL

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

USUN NY 679

USINT BAGHDAD

AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMEMBASSY AMMAN

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AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
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AMEMBASSY MANAMA
AMEMBASSY DOHA
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY DACCA
AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU
USLO PEKING
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

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EGYPTIAN ASSISTANCE IN MODERATING IRAQI POLICY, AND LEAD TO
EGYPTIAN SUPPORT FOR IRANIAN VIEWS IN ARAB OIL COUNCILS AND
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INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION.

15. FOR SOMEWHAT SIMILAR REASON, AND AGAIN USING ECONOMIC AID AS MEANS, IRAN HAS DRAWN CLOSER TO SYRIA, ALTHOUGH SHAH STILL HAS DOUBTS ABOUT INTENTIONS AND TRUSTWORTHINESS OF ASSAD. GIVEN PROGRESS IN ACHIEVING MID-EAST PACE SETTLEMENT AND SIMULTANEOUS IMPROVEMENT IN US RELATIONS WITH SYRIA AND EGYPT, IRAN'S NEW RELATIONSHIP WITH THOSE TWO COUNTRIES SHOULD NOT ENDANGER ITS TIES WITH ISRAEL AND MAY EVEN MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO BRING THEM MORE INTO OPEN.

16. IN AFRICA, IRAN HAS RECENTLY OFFERED OR CONCLUDED ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE AGREEMENTS WITH SUDAN, SENEGAL, ZAIRE, MOROCCO, TUNISIA, LESOTHO, KENYA, ETHIOPIA, NIGERIA, IROVY COAST AND SOUTH AFRICA. IN ADDITION TO INCREASING IRAN'S POLITICAL INFLUENCE IN THOSE COUNTRIES, SIMULTANEOUSLY UNDERCUTTING RADICAL ARAB INFLUENCE IN BLACK AFRICA, AND PAVING WAY FOR ARICAN SUPPORT ON INTERNATIONAL ISSUES, THESE DEALS WILL PROVIDE IRAN WITH MANY NEEDED COMODITIES, ACCESS TO MARKETS FOR FUTURE IDUSTRIAL OUTPUT, AND CONSTRUCTIVE USE FOR ITS SURPLUS OIL REVENUES.

17. RELATIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES. DESPITE BETTER RELATIONS WITH SOVIET UNION AND SERIES OF AID, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS SINCE 1962, SHAH REMAINS DEEPLY SUSPICIOUS OF SOVIET INTENTIONS TOWARD IRAN AND MIDDLE EAST. WITH DECLINING SOVIET INFLUENCE IN EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN, HE FEARS USSR WILL NOW TURN WITH INCREASED VIGOR TO EXPANDING ITS INFLUENCE IN GULF THROUGH CLOSER TIES WITH IRAQ AND SUPPORT OF INSURGENT ATTEMPTS TO TOPPLE CONSERVATIVE GOVERNMENTS IN LITTORAL STATES. OPENING OF SUEZ CANAL

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WILL ACILITATE THIS SOVIET EFFORT IN SHAH'S VIEW: FOR THAT REASON HE FAVORS CONTINUING US MILITARY PRESENCE IN INDIAN OEAN AS A BALANCE TO SOVIET, ALTHOUGH IN PURSUIT OF BETTER RELATIONS WITH INDIA AND OTHER LDC'S HE STILL PUBLICLY PROFESSES SUPPORT FOR NUCLEAR-FREE INDIAN OCEAN RESOLUTION. OTHER STRAINS ON RELATIONS BETWEEN TWO COUNTRIES HAVE BEEN QUANTITY OF IRANIAN ARMS PURCHASES, IRAN'S MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO OMAN IN DHOFAR FIGHTING, AND ITS CENTO ROLE AND BILATERAL TIES TO US. OUTSIDE SECURITY FIELD, SHAH IS RESENTFUL OF USSR FOR HIGH PRICE IT CHARGES FOR STEEL MILL EQUIPMENT, LOW PRICE IT PAYS FOR IRANIAN NATURAL GAS, UNWILLINGNESS TO RENEGOTIATE GAS PRICE AS CALLED FOR IN AGREEMENT, AND INCREASINGLY HOSTILE ANTI-IRANIAN PROPAGANDA BROADCASTS FROM

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MOSCOW AND CLIENT STATES. IN SPITE OF THESE STRAINS AND DIVERGENT INTERESTS, HOWEVER, SHAH RECOGNIZES THAT IT IS ESSENTIAL FOR IRAN TO MAINTAIN MINIMALLY GOOD RELATIONS WITH ITS COLOSSUS OF THE NORTH AND THEREFORE TO EXTENT POSSIBLE HE TRIES AVOID PUBLIC CONFRONTATION WITH SOVIETS.

18. SINCE 1971 IRAN HA SOUGHT BETTER RELATIONS WITH CHINA AS LONG-TERM POLITICAL COUNTERWEIGHT TO USSR. IRANIAN AND CHINESE INTERESTS HAVE COINCIDED ON SUCH MATTERS AS SUPPORT OF PAKISTAN AGAINST FURTHER DISMEMBERMENT, OPPOSITION TO STRONGER SOVIET INFLUENCE IN INDIA AND AFGHANISTAN AND, FOR DIFFERING REASONS, OPPOSITION TO SOVIET-SPONSORED ASIAN COLLECTIVE SECURITY SYSTEM. SHAH ESTABLISHED DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH CHINA IN 1971 AND SENT EMPRESS ON GOODWILL VISIT FOLLOWING YEAR. SINCE THEN IRAN'S COMMERCIAL AND ECONOMIC TIES WITH CHINA HAVE EXPANDED SOMEWHAT AND AIR SERVICE BETWEEN CAPITALS WILL BEGIN THIS SUMMER, BUT IT IS STILL IN POLITICAL SPHERE THAT RELATIONS ARE MOST IMPORTANT.

19. IN RECENT MONTHS OECD COUNTRIES ALSO HAVE SCRAMBLED TO GET PART OF IRANIAN ACTION AND TO ENSURE THEIR FUTURE OIL SUPPLY. TRADE, JOINT-VENTURE INVESTMENT, AND TECHNICAL AGREEMENTS WHICH COULD AMOUNT TO \$18 BILLION OR MORE HAVE BEEN NEGOTIATED OR DISCUSSED WITH GERMANY, FRANCE, UK, ITALY, AND CANADA, AMONG OTHERS. IN MILITARY FIELD IRAN HAS DIVERSIFIED ITS SOURCES OF SUPPLY: IT PURCHASES BRITISH TANKS, HOVERCRAFT AND MISSILES, FRENCH PATRO BOATS, RUSSIAN VEHICLES AND ARTILLERY, GERMAN TANK ENGINES AND ISRAELI COMMUNICATIONSEQUIPMENT, ALTHOUGH GREAT BULK OF MILITARY HARDWARE IS STILL BOUGHT FROM US. SHAH'S POLICY IS TO KEEP IMPERIAL AIR FORCE 100 PERCENT AMERICAN EQUIPPED. HIGH- LEVEL VISITS HAVE BEEN EXCHANGED WITH MANY EAST AND WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, AND SHAH AND EMPRESS THEMSELVES ARE IN FRANCE AT THIS MOMENT. UNLIKE CASE OF CHINA, BASIC IMPORTANCE OF IRANIAN LINKS WITH EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND JAPAN IS IN ECONOMIC TERMS, ALTHOUGH

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BY-PRODUCT OF IMPROVED POLITICAL RELATIONS IS IMPORTANT SECONDARY BENEFIT.

20' UNITED STATES AND IRAN. DESPITE EXPANSION OF IRANIAN TIES WITH OTHER AREAS OF WORLD, SINGLE MOST IMPORTANT AND INFLUENTIAL COUNTRY FOR IRAN REMAINS UNITED STATES. THERE ARE NO MAJOR ISSUES BETWEEN US ASIDE FROM DIFFERENCE ON OIL PRICE, AND WE HAVE MANY MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL INTEREST. IRAN LOOKS TO US TO PROVIDE

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(A) STRATEGIC UMBRELLA WHICH ALLOWS IT TO PLAY MAJOR REGIONAL ROLE EVEN WHEN ITS POLICIES CONFLICT WITH THOSE OF USSR; (B) SOPHISTICATED MILITARY HARDWARE AND TRAINING IN ITS OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE; (C) MODERN TECHNOLOGY, PLANTS, EQUIPMENT AND SERVICES; (D) EDUCATION FOR LARGE PORTION OF ITS FUTURE LEADERS; AND (E) POLITICAL SUPPORT. US FOR ITS PART HAS GREAT STAKE IN IRAN'S SURVIVAL AND WELFARE BECAUSE (A) IT HAS ABILITY AND WILLINGNESS TO PLAY RESPONSIBLE ROLE IN REGION; (B) IT HAS HISTORY OF CLOSE AND FRIENDLY TIES WITH US; (C) IT IS RELIABLE AND IMPORTANT SOURCE OF OIL AND OTHER RESOURCES; (D) IT IS GROWING MARKET FOR OUR GOODS AND SERVICES (\$7 BILLION IN US CIVILIAN AND MILITARY CONTRACTS IN PAST TWO YEARS) AND A HOSPITABLE LOCATION FOR US INVESTMENT; (E) IT PROVIDES ESSENTIAL AIR CORRIDOR BETWEEN EUROPE AND ORIENT; AND (F) IT ALLOWS US TO USE ITS TERRITORY FOR SPECIAL COMMUNICATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE FACILITIES.

21. IN GENERAL, US AND IRANIAN FOREIGN POLICY INTERESTS HAVE COINCIDED IN RECENT YEARS AND AS OUR AID AND TUTELAGE PHASED OUT A CLOSE RELATIONSHIP AS EQUAL PARTNERS HAS EVOLVED. WE HAVE ENCOURAGED SHAH TO PLAY CONSTRUCTIVE LEADERSHIP ROLE IN REGIONAL AFFAIRS AND IN GULF IRANIAN ACTIONS SEEM ALMOST CLASSIC CASE OF NIXON DOCTRINE IN ACTION. HOWEVER, WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO SEEK WAYS TO ENCOURAGE SAUDI ARABIA TO PLAY MORE ACTIVE REGIONAL ROLE SO IRAN'S INCREASING PREDOMINANCE DOES NOT OVERWHELM AND FRIGHTEN OTHER LITTORAL STATES. IRAN'S EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN A BALANCE IN ITS RELATIONS WITH EAST AND WEST, ARABS AND ISRAEL, INDIA AND PAKISTAN, DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING, PARALLELS OUR OWN AND SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED. WE MUST RECOGNIZE, HOWEVER, THAT THESE DIVERSIFIED TIES, COMBINED WITH IRANIAN PRIDE, NATIONALISM AND SELF-ASSERTIVENESS, MAY SOMETIMES LEAD TO DIFFERENCES IN OUR VIEW OF BILATERAL OR INTERNATIONAL ISSUES. ONE SUCH DIFFERENCE ON HORIZON MAY BE IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC FIELD WHERE IRAN IS ESPOUSING VIEWS WHICH WOULD REQUIRE FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES IN MONETARY, TRADE AND ECONOMIC STRUCTURE BUILT UP OVER PAST THIRTY YEARS. ANOTHER AREA OF POSSIBLE CONCERN IN FUTURE IS WHETHER IRANIAN MILITARY POWER BECOMES SO DISPROPORTIONATE TO THAT OF ITS NEIGHBORS THAT IT CEASES TO BE STABILIZING FACTOR AND BECOMES DISRUPTIVE.

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2. BUT GIVEN FUNDAMENTALLY EXCELLENT RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES AND ASSETS WE CAN BRING TO BEAR, THERE IS VERY REASON TO BELIEVE WE WILL WIN OUR SHARE OF THESE DISAGREEMENTS AS WE DO
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PAGE 05 TEHRAN 05268 03 OF 03 261546Z

WIT OTHE COUNTRIES AND WILL CONTINUE TO PLAY AN IMPORTANT AND INFLUENTIAL, IF NOT EXCLUSIVE, ROLE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF IRAN AS A SUBSTANTIAL POWER.
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<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 74BAGHDA00397

RELEASE

FILM= D740170-0754

DATE= 25 JUN 74

TYPE= TE

FROM= BAGHDAD

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION SS

TO= STATE

CHANNEL= n/a

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ORIGPHAND= n/a

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EO= X1

SUBJECT= US-IRAQI RELATIONS

REFERENCE= BAGHDAD 938, STATE 121823

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= KURDS, DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS ESTABLISHMENT, DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS,
FOREIGN POLICY POSITION

TAGS= PFOR, IZ, US

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ACTION SS-30.

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E.O. 11652: ~~XGDS-1~~

TAGS: PFOR, IZ

SUBJECT: US-IRAQI RELATIONS

REF: BAGHDAD 338, STATE 121823

1. SUMMARY: FOREIGN OFFICE DISCUSSIONS INDICATE IRAQ CONTINUES BE INTERESTED IN NORMALIZATION RELATIONS WITH U.S. BUT AT GRADUAL PACE. ARAB-ISRAEL PROBLEM AND U.S. "ACQUIESCENCE" TO IRANIAN SUPPORT FOR KURDS REMAIN CHIEF OBSTACLES TO RESUMPTION OF RELATIONS. RESUMPTION OF US-ALGERIAN RELATIONS WILL HAVE FAVORABLE EFFECT ON U.S.-IRAQI RELATIONS. APPOINTMENT OF DR. TAQA AS NEW FOREIGN MINISTER MAY ALSO BE A PLUS.

2. I HAVE HAD TWO CONVERSATIONS WITH MISS BAQR REGARDING U.S.-IRAQI RELATIONS SINCE RECEIPT STATE REFTEL. ON JUNE 22 I CONVEYED SUBSTANCE PARA 3 STATE REFTEL AND MISS BAQR TOOK CAREFUL NOTES, SAYING THAT SHE WOULD PASS ON U.S. POSITION TO DR. TAQA WHO WAS THEN UNDERSECRETARY IN FOREIGN MINISTRY. IN SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION ABOUT ARAB-ISRAEL PROBLEM DURING FIRST MEETING WITH MISS BAQR, I REMARKED THAT WHATEVER IRAQ THOUGHT ABOUT SYRIAN-ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT, THERE HAD BEEN A DIVIDENT FOR IRAQ -I.E. THE RELEASE AND SAFE RETURN TO IRAQ OF TEN IRAQI POWS HELD BY ISRAEL (THESE MEN HAVE BEEN GIVEN RED CARPET TREETMENT INCLUDING BEING RECEIVED BY PRESIDENT BAQR WITH ATTENDANT EXTENSIVE PUBLICITY).

3. MISS BAQR ASKED IF U.S.-ALGERIAN RELATIONS HAD BEEN

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RESTORED. I SAID I HAD NO OFFICIAL CONFIRMATION BUT HAD SEEN PRESS STATEMENTS TO THAT EFFECT. MISS BAQR SAID IRAQI LEADERSHIP HAD GREAT RESPECT FOR AND CONFIDENCE IN JUDGMENT OF BOUMEDIEN. ALGERIAN ACTION WOULD TEND TO INFLUENCE IRAQIS IN DIRECTION OF RESUMING RELATIONS.

4. MISS BAQR THEN REVERTED TO KURDISH ISSUE SAYING IRAQ STILL BELIEVES U.S. COULD PREVENT IRAN FROM AIDING KURDISH REBELS IF IT WISHED. I OBSERVED THAT U.S. ABILITY TO INFLUENCE THE SHAH WAS LIMITED TO SAY THE LEAST. WHEN SHE EXPRESSED POLITE DISBELIEF, I SAID SHAH ACTED INDEPENDENTLY IN HIS OWN PERCEIVED INTERESTS, CITING IRANIAN SEIZURE TUNBS AND ABU MUSA IN FACE OF U.S. ADVICE TO CONTRARY. MISS BAQR SAID THAT U.S. NONETHELESS WAS "ACQUIESCING" IN IRANIAN SUPPORT FOR THE KURDS. SHE ADDED HOWEVER THAT GOI STILL GRATIFIED AT USG REFUSAL TO DEAL WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF KURDISH REBELS IN U.S.

5. MISS BAQR THEN INFORMED ME SHE IS SHORTLY LEAVING FOR ASSIGNMENT TO IRAQI EMBASSY IN ROME.

6. ON JUNE 23 DR. TAQA'S APPOINTMENT AS FOREIGN MINISTER WAS ANNOUNCED. I CALLED ON MISS BAQR ON JUNE 24. SHE REPORTED THAT TAQA HAD APPRECIATED RECEIVING CLEAR STATEMENT U.S. POSITION, BUT HAD INDICATED THAT PATIENCE WOULD BE REQUIRED. BEFORE OBSTACLES COULD BE OVERCOME. MISS BAQR SAID TAQA WANTED U.S. TO KNOW THAT IRAQIS HAVE FAITH IN SINCERITY AND GOOD WILL OF PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY KISSINGER. MISS BAQR MADE PERSONAL OBSERVATION THAT TAQA'S APPOINTMENT WAS GOOD OMEN FOR FUTURE U.S.-IRAQI RELATIONS.

7. SHE THEN SAID TAQA WANTED TO ESTABLISH NEW CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATION FOR ME AND ARTHUR LOWRIE ON MATTERS OF SUBSTANCE. WE ARE INSTRUCTED TO DEAL WITH MUNIM AL-ZUBAIDI IN FOREIGN MINISTRY. AL-ZUBAIDI WILL BE BRIEFED ON OUTSTANDING ISSUES OR OTHER MATTERS OF INTEREST BETWEEN U.S. AND IRAQ AND WILL BE AUTHORIZED SPEAK ON TAQA'S BEHALF. GATCH

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: June 19, 1974

SUBJECT: The Kurdish Situation

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Chafiq Qazzaz, Head of the Information
Department for the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP)
Mr. Stephen E. Ward, Acting Country Director, NEA/ARN
Mr. Gregory D. Strong, Iraqi Desk Officer

Distribution: NEA USINT Baghdad USUN New York
NEA/ARN AmEmbassy Beirut
NEA/IRN AmEmbassy Tehran
EUR/TUR AmConsul Tabriz
P AmEmbassy Ankara

Summary

Qazzaz, Head of Information for the KDP, called at the Department on June 18 to request U.S. assistance for the Kurds. He said the Kurds have given up hope of negotiating a settlement with the Iraqis, and, consequently, have taken their case to the UN Commission on Human Rights. Qazzaz said the Kurds major objection to the Ba'athi plan for Kurdish autonomy was that it does not include in Kurdistan lands which have traditionally been inhabited by a Kurdish majority. Qazzaz said the Kurdish problem can no longer be regarded as internal since there are about 80,000 Kurdish refugees in Iran. He stated the Kurds could stand up against the Ba'athis indefinitely, adding that no Iraqi government has fought the Kurds and survived. Ward said that it is the policy of the United States not to intervene or interfere in the internal affairs of Iraq; while many individual Americans may sympathize with the situation of the Kurds, we can offer no hope of official U.S. support for their cause in Iraq. End summary.

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NEA/ARN:GDS/Strong:dav
(Drafting Office and Officer)

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Qazzaz (who was recently in Iraqi Kurdistan and plans to return shortly) gave Ward a copy of the statement concerning alleged Iraqi violations of Kurdish rights which KDP representatives had presented to the UN Committee on Human Rights on June 10. Qazzaz said he realized actions at the UN are more often prompted by political than humanitarian motives but the KDP had not given up the hope of finding that "magic country" to present the Kurds' case; he hoped the U.S. would be that country. Qazzaz continued that the Kurds are pressing at the UN because they have given up on the possibility of reaching an accommodation with the Iraqi Government; after the atrocities the Iraqis have committed it would be impossible to resume a meaningful dialogue.

In response to Ward's question concerning the plan for Kurdish autonomy announced by Iraq on March 11, Qazzaz said the Kurds major objection to the plan is that it only gives the Kurds 2/3 of the land to which they are entitled and would not give them control of oil resources in Kurdistan. Qazzaz said it is not only a question of oil but of land and people as well, and the KDP strongly believes the majority of the people in Kirkuk are Kurds. Other problems with the Ba'athi plan for autonomy are that it says nothing about Kurdish participation in the Revolutionary Command Council, the locus of power in Baghdad. Qazzaz said that for the last ten years the Kurds have controlled at least half of the territory they want; in effect the Government is offering them less than they already have.

Responding to a question about the level of fighting, Qazzaz said that until about April 15 the fighting consisted of skirmishes. Since then it has been a vicious and large-scale war. The Kurds have suffered about 1500 civilian casualties. The Iraqis now have seven of their nine divisions poised against the Kurds. Iraqi attacks on civilians have added to the bitterness. Qazzaz asked about the possibility of U.S. support.

Ward said the chances of official U.S. support are not good, and he would be less than honest if he said otherwise. He explained that U.S.-Iraqi relations are such that we cannot intervene effectively on a diplomatic level even if we desired to do so. He explained that although many Americans have a great deal of understanding and sympathy

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for the Kurds' difficult situation, it is our policy not to intervene or interfere in the internal affairs of Iraq or other states. We do not want to undertake actions which could be interpreted as subversive. Mr. Ward concluded that he could not hold out any hope that we will change our position.

Qazzaz said that he could understand to some extent the USG position, but he still hopes that the U.S. will support the Kurds. He asked about our policy vis-a-vis Iraq. He explained that Iraq is isolated diplomatically; it has designs on Kuwait; it is at loggerheads with Iran; the Ba'athi regime is isolated and unpopular both at home and internationally; the Russians maintain a strong hand in Iraq (and, according to Qazzaz, Russian pilots are flying missions over Kurdistan). There is reason to believe the present regime will not last since no Iraqi government has fought the Kurds and survived. Qazzaz expressed his belief that the Iraqis had intended to isolate the Kurdish leadership and not get bogged down in a major campaign, but their plan has not worked. He concluded that Saddam Hussein is becoming very, very nervous.

Ward reiterated that the United States does not want to undertake actions which could be interpreted as subversive; we hope the Iraqis and Kurds will resolve their differences peacefully.

Qazzaz stressed that the Kurdish problem can no longer be regarded as internal. There are presently about 80,000 Kurdish refugees in Iran. Qazzaz said the Kurds control all of the Iraqi-Iranian border except the southern part. The Kurds have good relations with Iran and even Turkey is beginning to come around slowly; the Turks now at least admit there are Kurds in Turkey. He concluded that the Kurds can stand up against the Ba'athis indefinitely.

Responding to a question about what would follow if the present regime fell, Qazzaz admitted that this is a problem. The past had shown that, in Iraq, a change of regime does not always result in a change of policy. However, for the Kurds, no government could be worse than the present regime. Concerning the military balance, Qazzaz said Iran has given

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the Kurds some aid including older anti-aircraft guns. He said the Iraqis have not been able to advance very much or achieve anything beyond control of some of the main roads.

Qazzaz asked if the United States might do something at the UN for the Kurds on a human rights basis. Ward replied it was extremely doubtful that the United States would take the lead in this regard, adding that he was simply not in a position to speculate on what the USG position might be if the matter came to a vote.

Qazzaz asked if we expect U.S.-Iraqi relations to improve. Ward said he did not want to predict, nor did he want to rule out, such a development. He added that there are precedents for dramatic turnabouts in the Middle East, and U.S.-Iraqi commercial relations have improved of late.

Concerning Qazzaz's query about humanitarian aid from international organizations, Ward said these organizations are entities independent from the USG and could be expected to judge the Kurdish case on its merits.

Comment

In parting, Qazzaz said the Kurds had information that Saddam Hussein's brother, an experienced assassin, was in New York. He added the Iraqis have tried to "mess up" Kurdish operations here before.

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*** Current Classification ***
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

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DOC_NBR= 74USUNN02213

FILM= D740161-0157

DATE= 19 JUN 74

TYPE= TE

FROM= USUN NEW YORK

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION IO

TO= STATE

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

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EO= GS

SUBJECT= KURDISH NATIONALISTS SEEK US SUPPORT AT UN

REFERENCE= USUN A-797 (NOTAL)

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= GENOCIDE, MEETING AGENDA, MINORITIES, DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIONS

TAGS= PFOR, IZ, US, UN, KDP

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ACTION IO-14

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 NEA-14 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07

H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01

SP-03 SS-20 USIA-15 SR-02 ORM-03 AID-20 AF-10 ARA-16

EA-11 DRC-01 /191 W

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FM USMISSION USUN NY
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4493
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

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BEIRUT PASS BAGHDAD

E.O. 11652: ~~GDS~~

TAGS: PFOR, UN IZ

SUBJ: KURDISH NATIONALISTS SEEK US SUPPORT AT UN

REF: USUN A-797 (NOTAL)

BEGIN SUMMARY: THREE KURDISH DEMOCRATIC PARTY (KDP) OFFICIALS CALLED AT USUN JUNE 19 TO DESCRIBE THEIR ACTIVITIES AT UN AND SOLICIT US SUPPORT. WE LISTENED SYMPATHETICALLY, BUT EXPLAINED WHY US COULD NOT BECOME INVOLVED IN KURDS' DISPUTE WITH IRAQ. END SUMMARY.

1. KDP OFFICIALS WHO SIGNED LETTERS TO UNSYG FROM "KURDISH DELEGATION ABROAD" (REFAIR) CALLED ON MISSION OFFICER JULY 19, AMBASSADOR SCALI HAVING INDICATED HE WAS OCCUPIED. SPOKESMAN FOR GROUP WAS M.M. ABDUL RAHMAN, MEMBER OF KDP POLITICAL BUREAU, WHO WAS ARTICULATE AND SOFT-SPOKEN. OTHER OFFICIALS WERE M. DIZAYEE, CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBER OF DKP AND CHALAK JEWANROYEE, WHO IS SETTING UP SHOP IN NEW YORK AS "PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE" OF KURDISH DELEGATION ABROAD.

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HEWANROYEE IS IN HIS TWENTIES AND HAS JUST ARRIVED FROM CALIFORNIA; ANY BIO DEPT MAY HAVE WOULD BE APPRECIATED.

2. ABDUL RAHMAN BEGAN BY DESCRIBING PLIGHT OF KURDS IN IRAQ, WHERE A TOTALITARIAN REGIME HAD AS ITS MAIN OBJECTIVE EXTERMINATION OF KURDISH PEOPLE. RAHMAN SAID KDP MIGHT TRY TO HAVE QUESTION OF GENOCIDE OF KURDS PUT ON AGENDA OF 29TH GA. HE REALIZED US WAS NOT A PARTY TO GENOCIDE CONVENTION, BUT HOPED SOME UN MEMBER MIGHT INSCRIBE ITEM. (WE DID NOT HAVE IMPRESSION HE HAD FOUND ANY VOLUNTEERS.)

3. RAHMAN STRONGLY CRITICIZED SOVIET AID TO BAGHDAD IN FIGHT AGAINST KURDS. HE CLAIMED USSR HAD PROVIDED IRAQ WITH POISON GAS, WHICH BAGHDAD WAS "PREPARED TO USE" AT ANY TIME. MOREOVER, ALL IRAQI AIR OPERATIONS AGAINST KURDS WERE BEING SUPERVISED BY SOVIET OFFICER NAMED ALEXANDER VASILEF.

4. FAHMAN SAID MAJOR KURDISH EFFORT IN NEW YORK WOULD BE IN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, AND IT WAS IN THIS FORUM PARTICULARLY THAT HE SOUGHT US HELP. KURDISH COMPLAINT WAS NOW BEFORE HUMAN RIGHTS WORKING COMMITTEE, COMPRISING FRANCE, URUGUAY, PAKISTAN, USSR AND GHANA. IF WORKING COMMITTEE RECOMMENDED FURTHER ACTION, COMPLAINT WOULD GO TO SUBCOMMITTEE ON PREVENTION OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST MINORITIES AND FROM THERE TO COMMISSION. RAHMAN ASKED THAT WE USE OUR INFLUENCE WITH URUGUAY, PAKISTAN AND FRANCE TO SEE THAT KURDISH COMPLAINT WAS NOT BOTTLED UP IN WORKING COMMITTEE.

5. WE REPLIED THAT WHILE AMERICAN HAD MUCH UNDERSTANDING ANY SYMPATHY FOR SITUATION OF KURDS, THERE WAS LITTLE US COULD DO TO HELP. SINCE US DID NOT HAVE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH IRAQ, OUR BILATERAL LEVERAGE WAS MINIMAL. MOREOVER, AT THIS STAGE IN SEARCH FOR PEACE IN MIDDLE EAST, US COULD NOT AFFORD TO PROVOKE CONFRONTATION WITH A GOVERNMENT WHICH HAD THE CAPABILITY OF DISRUPTING THAT PEACE. RAHMAN SAID HE COULD UNDERSTAND THIS POLICY, HOWEVER, HE EARNESTLY HOPED US WOULD DO WHAT IT COULD TO ENSURE KURDISH COMPLAINT GOT HEARING ON ITS MERITS, AND WAS NOT SCUTTLED BY SOVIETS.

6. RAHMAN SAID HE PLANNED TO GO TO WASHINGTON JUNE 20,
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VISIT SOME EUROPEAN COUNTRIES IN JULY, THEN RETURN TO KURDISH-HELD TERRITORY IN IRAQ BY WAY OF IRAN.
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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

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DOC_NBR= 74BAGHDA00348

FILM= n/a

DATE= 10 JUN 74

TYPE= TE

FROM= BAGHDAD

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

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CHANNEL= n/a

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EO= RR

SUBJECT= KURDISH CONFLICT ✓

REFERENCE= 74 BAGHDAD 218 (NOT SENT BONN AND V

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE

ERRORS= N/A

DEPARTMENT OF STATE 9302996

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CONCEPTS= n/a

TAGS= PINT, IZ

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ACTION NEA-16

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 IO-14 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03

INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03

SS-20 USIA-15 ACDA-19 OMB-01 AID-20 SAM-01 SAB-01

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FM USINT BAGHDAD
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INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
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USINT DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY VIENNA

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E.O. 11652: ~~GDS~~

TAGS: PINT, IZ

SUBJECT: KURDISH CONFLICT

REF: BAGHDAD 218 (NOT SENT BONN AND VIENNA)

1. SUMMARY: DESPITE GOVERNMENT PROTESTATIONS TO CONTRARY,
IT APPEARS KURDISH SITUATION MAY BE WORSENING FOR IRAQ. INDICATIONS
INCLUDING CALL-UP OF RESERVE OFFICERS AND GO CONCERN FOR WOUNDED

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MILITARY MEANS CANNOT BE MET.
IDENTIFICATION OF US WITH KURDISH CONFLICT HAS BEEN GREATLY
DOWNPLAYED, BUT IRAQI SUSPICION OF AMERICAN INTENTIONS REMAINS.

3. ON OTHER HAND, PRESS HAS REPORTED THAT RESERVE OFFICER CLASSES GOING BACK AS FAR AS 1949 HAVE BEEN RECALLED TO ACTIVE DUTY, AND MAY OBSERVERS HAVE NOTED INCREASED MILITARY SHIPMENTS BY RAIL PROCEEDING TO THE NORTH. CLANDESTINE KURDKSIH BROADCASTS REPORTING HEAVY FIGHTING ARE HEARD HERE REGULARLY. MOST SIGNIFICANT HAS BEEN GOI REQUEST TO FRENCH AND AUSTRIAN AMBASSADORS AND WEST GERMAN AND BRITISH CHARGES FOR ASSISTANCE IN MEDICAL TREATMENT OF IRAQI OFFICERS AND MEN WOUNDED IN KURDISH FIGHTING. FOREIGN MINISTRY UNDERSECRETARY TAKA MADE THIS REQUEST INDIVIDUALLY LAST WEEK. AUSTRIAN AMBASSADOR NORBERT (PROTECT) INFORMED ME THAT TAKA INDICATED IRAQI HOSPITALS WERE CROWDED WITH WOUNDED MEN. HE ASSURED NORBERT ALL EXPENSES IN CONNECTION WITH TRAVEL AND MEDICAL CARE WOULD BE BORNE BY GOI. BOTH NORBERT AND BRITISH CHARGE TOLD ME THEIR GOVERNMENTS HAD AGREED ASSIST ON HUMANITARIAN GROUNDS AND I ASSUME FRENCH AND WEST GERMANS HAVE RESPONDED SIMILARLY.

CONTINUE BE CHIEF FOREIGN VILLIANS IN IRAQI PRESS. US HAS NOT BEEN DIRECTLY NAMED IN RECENT MONTHS. FOREIGN OFFICE CALLED ME IN TO SAY GOI GRAFTIFIED THAT HIGH-LEVEL DEPARTMENT OFFICERS HAD REFUSED RECEIVED REPRESENTATIVES OF KURDISH REBELS IN WASHINGTON, BUT AT SAME TIME I WAS TOLD GOI BELIEVES US COULD AND SHOULD PREVAIL UPON IRAN TO CEASE ASSISTANCE TO KURDS. THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT KURDISH SITUATIONS RANKS ALMOST EQUALLY WITH ARAB-ISRAEL PROBLEM IN IRAQI EYES AS MAJOR IRRITANT IN US-IRAQI RELATIONS. GATCH

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FILM= D740158-0945

DATE= 18 JUN 74

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REFERENCE= TABRIZ 007

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PAGE 01 TABRIZ 00008 181328Z

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ACTION NEA-16

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 IO-14 ACDA-19 PM-07 NSC-07 SP-03

SS-20 RSC-01 L-03 CIAE-00 DODE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00

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FM AMCONSUL TABRIZ

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 080

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMCONSUL ADANA

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT BY POUCH

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN BY POUCH

AMCONSUL KHORRAMSHAHR BY POUCH

USINT BAGHDAD BY POUCH

USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GERMANY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TABRIZ 008

E.O. 11652: ~~GDS~~

TAGS: PINS IR IZ

SUBJ: IRAN AND THE KURDISH WAR IN IRAQ

REF: TABRIZ 007

VISIT TO CITY OF KERMANSHAH, JUNE 12 TO 14, FURTHER ROUNDS OUT PICTURE OF IRANIAN AID TO KURDS NOTED REFTEL. VEHICLES OF IRAQI ORIGIN SEEN ALL PARTS OF TOWN. GOVERNOR GENERAL (PROTECT) STATED THAT MAIN BORDER CROSSING POINT INTO KERMANSHAHAN PROVINCE IN AREA SHEYKHSALEH. HE SAID CAMP FOR 7000 KURDISH CIVILIANS NOW FUNCTIONING IN PROVINCE. THIS BRINGS MINIMUM CONFIRMED NUMBER OF SUCH REFUGEES IN WESTERN IRAN TO 22,000 BUT FIGURE COULD BE LARGER. GOVERNOR GENERAL STATED THAT HE DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR CAMP ADMINISTRATION AND SUPPLY. HE FELT THINGS NOW RUNNING WELL BUT DOES WORRY WHAT WILL HAPPEN WHEN WINTER SNOWS COME IF ALL THESE PEOPLE STILL LIVING IN TENTS. KURDS HAVE BROUGHT LIVESTOCK WITH THEM AND THIS MAY FURTHER COMPLICATE SITUATIONS. TO DATE, NO TROUBLES OVER GRAZING RIGHTS WITH LOCAL INHABITANTS.

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PAGE 02 TABRIZ 00008 181328Z

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SUBJECT= KURDISH WAR IN IRAQ: IRANIAN INPUTS

REFERENCE= TABRIZ A-10 OF APRIL 27, 1974

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LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

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CONCEPTS= ARMED FORCES, KURDS, PARAMILITARY FORCES, MINORITIES, COMBAT OPERATIONS, POLITICAL SITUATION

TAGS= PINS, MOPS, IR, IZ

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PAGE 01 TABRIZ 00007 090859Z

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INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMCONSUL ADANA

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

AMCONSUL KHORRAMSHAHR

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TAGS: PINS, MOPS, IR, IZ

SUBJ: KURDISH WAR IN IRAQ: IRANIAN INPUTS

REF: TABRIZ A-10 OF APRIL 27, 1974

SUMMARY: IRAQI GOVERNMENT POLICY OF SUBDUING MULLA MUSTAFA BARZANI'S KURDS THROUGH ECONOMIC BLOCKADE AND AIR STRIKES APPEARS TO BE FAILING COMPLETELY, INsofar AS FIRST HAND OBSERVATIONS AND INFORMATION FROM IRANIAN SIDE CAN DETERMINE. KURDISH NON-COMBATANTS ARE MOVING INTO IRAN. IRANIAN SUPPLIES AND SOME WEAPONS ARE MOVING INTO IRAQI KURDISTAN. THESE ARE THE MAIN CONCLUSIONS DRAWN FROM VICE COUNSUL JUNE 4-6 TRIP TO THE IRANO-IRAQI BORDER. END SUMMARY.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS: IRAQ HAS DECLARED AN ECONOMIC BLOCKADE OF KURDISH AREAS. NO ONE SHOULD BE UNDER ILLUSION THAT IRANIAN BORDER IS A SEIVE; IT IS A FAUCET. HOTELS IN REZAIYEH, MAHABAD, AND SARDASHT, ALL IN PROVINCE OF WEST AZERBAIJAN, ARE WELL FILLED WITH BARZANI KURDS. HOTEL KEEPERS, BAZAAR

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MERCHANTS, AND OTHERS UNIFORMLY SAY THAT IRAQI KURDS ARE WELL SUPPLIED WITH MONEY AND ARE SPENDING FREELY. FABULOUS RUMORS ARE SPREAD OF INDIVIDUAL KURDS DROPPING 100,000 OR 150,000 RIALS AT A CRACK. WHILE PROBABLY EXAGGERATED, THIS DOES GIVE FEEL FOR VOLUME OF SPENDING GOING ON IN BORDER AREA. THOSE DOING SPENDING ARE GENERALLY YOUNG MEN, WITHOUT WOMEN, WHO IDENTIFY THEMSELVES FREELY AS IRAQI KURDS BUT WEAR NON-DISTINCTIVE CLOTHING AND TURN UP FOR THREE, FOUR DAYS BEFORE RETURNING TO WAR. THEIR VEHICLES, EITHER WITHOUT LICENSE PLATES OR WITH IRAQI ONES, CAN BE SEEN AS FAR EAST AS REZAIKEH.

EXTENT OF IRANIAN COOPERATION QUITE CLEAR AT SARDASHT. STOCKS IN GAS STATION NOW NUMBER MORE THAN 6,000 55 GALLON DRUMS OF GASOLINE. APPROXIMATELY 50 VEHICLES OF IRAQI ORIGIN WERE SEEN IN TOWN, MOSTLY LANDROVERS BUT WITH SPRINKLING OF RUSSIAN AND AMERICAN JEEPS AND SOME SMALL TRUCKS OF THREE QUARTER TON SIZE. ONE RUMOR, UNSUBSTANTIATED, FROM TRUCK DRIVER WHO REGULARLY DRIVES SHORT STRETCH BETWEEN SARDASHT AND BORDER, HAS IT THAT IRAN HAS RECENTLY GIVEN 25 RUSSIAN JEEPS TO KURDS AND THAT TRUCKS CAPTURED IN IRAQ EXCEED KURDISH NEEDS. SINCE RUMORS ARE FLYING FAST AND THICK THESE DAYS, THIS SHOULD BE ACCEPTED WITH CAUTION.

DETAILS FROM GENERAL OTMISHI: MORE DETAILS ON FIGHTING AND IRANIAN SUPPORT WERE PROVIDED BY GENERAL OTMISHI, GOVERNOR OF SARDASHT (PROTECT; SEE REF AIR FOR BIOGRAPHIC DETAILS ON GENERAL OTMISHI). ACCORDING TO HIM, IRAQI DECISION TO BOMB ALL POSSIBLE TARGETS IN KURDISH AREAS WAS CONSIDERABLE MISTAKE. SCHOOLS, HOSPITALS AND PRIVATE HOMES WERE ALL STRUCK. FIELDS HAVE BEEN HIT WITH NAPALM. MAJORITY OF FAMILIES HAVE LOST RELATIVES OR FRIENDS. THE RESULT HAS BEEN TO DRIVE EDUCATED AND URBAN KURDS INTO UNITY WITH BARZANI, WHOSE PRESTIGE IS NOW ENORMOUS THROUGHOUT KURDISTAN. TO SAFEGUARD FAMILIES, INCREASING NUMBERS OF NON-COMBATANTS ARE MOVING INTO IRAN. SINCE LAST VISIT FROM THIS CONSULATE, JUST OVER MONTH AGO, REFUGEE CAMP OF OVER THOUSAND PERSONS HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED AT SARDASHT. GENERAL OTMISHI STATED THAT TWO LARGER CAMPS, EACH OF 7-8,000 PERSONS HAVE BEEN SET UP NEAR KHANEH AND REZAIYEH. IRANIAN GOVERNMENT IS PROVIDING AMPLE FOOD AND SOME CLOTHING TO THESE PEOPLE. CAMP AT SARDASHT, WHICH REPORTING OFFICER SAW, HAD OVER ONE HUNDRED FAMILY SIZE TENTS, WAS LAID OUT IN NEAT MILITARY

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FASHION, AND APPEARED CLEAN. A RED LION AND SUN (IRANIAN RED CROSS) TENT HAD BEEN SET UP NEXT TO IT TO FUNCTION AS A CLINIC. BAZAAR RUMOR IN SARDASHT PLACED NUMBER OF REFUGEE CIVILIANS

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IN IRAN AT 18,000; CLOSE ENOUGH TO GENERAL OTMISHI'S FIGURES TO ACT AS PARTIAL CONFIRMATION.

AGAIN ACCORDING GENERAL OTMISHI, FIGHTING HAS SLOWED IN RECENT WEEKS. IRAQI GARRISONS HOLD ALL MAJOR TOWNS BUT DO NOT EXTEND OUTSIDE TOWNS. BARZANI FORCES STILL HOLD MOUNTAIN TOPS AND RIDGE LINES WITHIN ONE OR TWO KILOMETERS OF TOWNS SUCH AS SULAIMANIYA. IRAQIS, ACCORDING TO GOVERNOR, DO NO NIGHT PATROLLING OUTSIDE THEIR LINES. THE ROADS ARE OPEN IN TERMS OF LARGE CONVOY MOVEMENT BUT CAN CERTAINLY NOT BE CONSIDERED SAFE.

MOST KURDISH CASUALTIES TO DATE HAVE BEEN FROM AIR STRIKES. GOVERNOR OTMISHI STATED FLATLY THAT KURDS HAVE RECEIVED NEW ANTI-AIRCRAFT WEAPONS WITHIN LAST THREE WEEKS. HE CLAIMED NOT TO KNOW EXACTLY WHAT TYPE OR IN WHAT QUANTITY BUT CLEARLY INDICATED THAT THEY HAD BEEN PROVIDED BY IRANIANS. THIS PARTIALLY SUPPORTED BY REPORT CONSULATE RECEIVED FROM AN AMERICAN PAGE COMPANY EMPLOYEE, WHO SPOKE OF SEEING COLUMN OF TOWED ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS MOVING TOWARD BORDER IN VICINITY KHANEH ABOUT THREE WEEKS AGO. GENERAL OTMISHI CLAIMED NEW ANTI-AIRCRAFT WEAPONS HAD RESULTED IN IRAQIS GOING OVER TO HIGH ALTITUDE BOMBING WITH NATURAL LOSS OF ACCURACY. HE NOTED THAT CASUALTIES IN SARDASHT WERE REDUCED FROM TIME OF LAST CONSULAR VISIT AND THAT HOSPITAL AT SARDASHT WAS NO LONGER FULL. HE DID NOTE THAT SERIOUS WOUNDED ARE EVACUATED BY ROAD TO MEHABAD AND REZIAYEH. NO HELICOPTERS ARE BEING USED FOR THIS PURPOSE. SOME CASES ARE FLOWN FROM REXIAYEH TO TEHRAN. TWO EXCELLENT SOURCES IN TABRIZ HAVE CONFIRMED THAT RED LION AND SUN DOCTORS ARE RECEIVING EXTRA PAY FOR WORKING ONE OR TWO MONTH STINTS AT HOSPITALS ALONG BORDER.

CONTINUING TO TALK ABOUT EQUIPMENT, GENERAL OTMISHI STATED THAT KURDS HAVE SOME HEAVY MORTARS (81 AND 120MM) AND THAT AMMUNITION WAS NOT PROBLEM. IN SEPARATE CONVERSATION WITH A CONSULATE LOCAL, TRUCK DRIVER MENTIONED EARLIER, STATED THAT AMMUNITION IS DRIVEN REGULARLY TO BORDER BY IRANIAN ARMY TRUCKS WITH ARMY DRIVERS OF KURDISH ORIGIN WEARING CIVILIAN CLOTHES. SUCH TRUCKS HAVE BEEN SEEN BY US, ALTHOUGH WE COULD NOT IDENTIFY

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CONTENTS. TRANSPORTATION ACROSS BORDER APPARENTLY ACCOMPLISHED BY KURDS THEMSELVES. SAME DRIVER ALSO CLAIMED THAT 60-65 IRAQI ARMY POW'S ARE BEING HELD JUST ON IRANIAN SIDE OF BORDER NEAR SARDASHT.

GENERAL OTMISHI CONCLUDED THAT BARZANI DETERMINED CONTINUE WAR UNTIL HE RECEIVES AUTONOMY HE HAS DEMANDED AND MEASURE OF

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CONTROL OVER KIRKUK OIL FIELDS. IN OTMISH'S OPINION, BARZANI HAS UNITY, STRENGTH, AND ABILITY TO CONTINUE STRUGGLE FOR LONG TIME. IRAQIS, ON THE OTHER HAND, LACK THIS UNITY OF PURPOSE OR SINGLE LEADER OF BARZANI'S STATURE. IN LONG RUN, THIS COULD BRING ABOUT COLLAPSE OF BAGHDAD GOVERNMENT.

CONCLUSION: JUDGING NOT ONLY BY WHAT WE HAVE BEEN TOLD, BUT BY WHAT WE HAVE SEEN IRANIAN SUPPORT TO THE BARZANI KURDS HAS BEEN INCREASED IN THE LAST MONTH. MORE SUPPLIES ARE IN EVIDENCE AT THE BORDER. MORE IRAQI DURIISH VEHICLES ARE PRESENT TO CARRY THEM TO THE FIGHTING. NEW REFUGEE CAMPS HAVE BEEN SET UP AND APPEAR TO BE FUNCTIONING SMOOTHLY, MORE IRAQI KURDS WITH MORE MONEY TO SPEND ARE CIRCULATING IN IRANIAN TOWNS. IF TRUE, THE DELIVERY OF NEW ANTI-AIRCRAFT WEAPONS MARKS A FURTHER STEP IN INCREASED IRANIAN SUPPLIES. AT THE SAME TIME, THERE DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE THE KIND OF MASSIVE ARMAMENT SUPPLY THAT WOULD REALLY CHANGE THE OLD BALANCE OF FORCES BETWEEN BARZANI AND THE IRAQI ARMY. THUS FAR, OUR OBSERVATIONS LEAD US TO THINK THAT IRAN IS CONTINUING TO GIVE BARZANI ENOUGH TO KEEP HIM FROM LOSING, ECONOMICALLY OR MILITARILY, BUT NOT ENOUGH TO ALLOW HIM TO WIN ON HIS OWN.

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SUBJECT= (1) MADAM SADDAM HUSSEIN VISIT (2) US-IRAQI RELATIONS

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CONCEPTS= MEDICAL CARE, KURDS, DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS ESTABLISHMENT, DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS, VISITS, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION, FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

TAGS= PFOR, OVIP, IZ, US, (HUSSEIN, SADDAM)

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TAGS: PFOR, IZ

SUBJECT: (1) MADAM SADDAM HUSSEIN VISIT (2) US-IRAQI RELATIONS

1. MISS BAKR, WHO IS USINT'S PRINCIPAL CONTACT AT FOREIGN MINISTRY, CALLED ME IN THREE DAYS IN A ROW BEGINNING MAY 26 TO DISCUSS: VISIT OF VICE PRESIDENT AND BA'ATH PARTY CHAIRMAN SADDAM HUSSEIN'S WIFE TO U.S. FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT; AND US-IRAQI RELATIONS WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO KURDISH PROBLEM AND ARAB-ISRAEL PROBLEM.

2. REGARDING MADAM HUSSEIN'S VISIT, MISS BAKR SAID SHE HAS AN APPOINTMENT JUNE 14 WITH DR. FRANK FURSTENBERG AT THE ALLERGY CLINIC OF JOHNS HOPKINS MEDICAL CENTER. MADAM HUSSEIN IS TRAVELLING ON A DIPLOMATIC PASSPORT UNDER NAME SAJIDA KHAIRI. SHE WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY THREE AND POSSIBLY FOUR PEOPLE INCLUDING HER PERSONAL PHYSICIAN. WE HAVE ISSUED B-2 DIPLOMATIC VISAS TO THIS PARTY (SEE BAGHDAD 335). MISS BAKR REQUESTS THIS INFORMATION BE CLOSELY HELD AND PARTICULARLY NOT DISCUSSED AT THIS TIME WITH IRAQI INTERESTS SECTION IN WASHINGTON. I AGREED TO THIS AND ASKED WHETHER WE COULD BE OF ANY ASSISTANCE TO MADAM HUSSEIN. MISS BAKR SAID SHE WILL INFORM ME WHEN PRECISE SCHEDULE FIRM. AT THAT TIME IRAQI INTERESTS SECTION WASHINGTON WILL BE INFORMED, AND GOI WOULD LIKE DEPARTMENT COORDINATE ARRANGEMENTS WITH IRAQI INTERESTS SECTION FOR MEETING MADAM HUSSEIN AND FACILITATING HER MEDICAL TREATMENT. MISS BAKR SAID GOI IS CONCERNED ABOUT MADAM HUSSEIN'S SECURITY. I SAID I FELT SURE U.S. WOULD TAKE APPROPRIATE STEPS TO MAKE MADAM HUSSEIN'S VISIT SUCCESSFUL, AND PROMISED MISS

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BAKR I WOULD INFORM DEPARTMENT IMMEDIATELY WHEN SHE CONFIRMED MADAM HUSSEIN'S PLANS. COMMENT: BELIEVE IT WOULD BE USEFUL MAKE SPECIAL EFFORT TO SEE THAT VISIT GOES SMOOTHLY. GOI REQUESTS SEEM REASONABLE AND I HOPE WE CAN RESPOND.

3. REGARDING U.S.-IRAQ RELATIONS, MISS BAKR'S REMARKS WERE LARGELY READ FROM A PREPARED POSITION PAPER. SHE SAID GOI HAD BEEN VERY PLEASED TO HEAR THAT HIGH-LEVEL DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS HAD REFUSED TO RECEIVE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE KURDISH REBELS. GOI HAD HEARD THAT KURDS HAD THEN GONE TO CONGRESS BUT GOI CONTINUED TO BE REASSURED THAT DEPARTMENT'S HANDLING OF KURDS REFLECTED USG POSITION. MISS BAKR SAID GOI DOUBTS ABOUT U.S. POSITION ON KURDS AND U.S. POSITION ON ARAB-ISRAEL QUESTION HAVE BEEN ONLY OBSTACLES IN IRAQI EYES TO RESUMPTION DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. ON KURDISH PROBLEM, GOI FELT U.S. WAS IN POSITION TO PREVAIL UPON IRAN TO CEASE GIVING AID TO KURDISH REBELS, BUT NONETHELESS, SHE REITERATED, GOI MOST GRATIFIED BY DEPARTMENT'S ACTION. SHE DID NOT MENTION POSSIBLE KURDISH REPRESENTATIONS AT UN. REGARDING ARAB-ISRAEL PROBLEM, SHE SAID IRAQ'S POSITION WELL KNOWN TO U.S. BUT THAT IN DIPLOMACY "ANYTHING IS POSSIBLE"-- CITING RECENT IRAQI RESUMPTION RELATIONS WITH UK AND WEST GERMANY. I ASKED WHETHER SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION US-ENGINEERED AGREEMENT BETWEEN SYRIA AND ISRAEL WOULD CHANGE GOI POSITION, BUT MISS BAKR SAID SHE NOT AUTHORIZED GO BEYOND WHAT SHE HAD SAID AND FURTHERMORE THAT SHE DID NOT WISH SPECULATE PERSONALLY ON WHAT GOI REACTION WILL BE TO SYRIAN-ISRAEL ACCORD.

4. REGARDING KURDISH QUESTION, I REITERATED U.S. POSITION THAT IT WAS AN INTERNAL MATTER AND ONE WHICH WE HOPED IRAQ COULD SOLVE PEACEFULLY. I DID NOT RESPOND TO HER COMMENT ON POSSIBILITY U.S. PERSUADING IRAN TO STOP AID TO KURDS.

5. REGARDING ARAB-ISRAEL QUESTION, I SAID DR. KISSINGER HAD PERFORMED AN EXTRAORDINARY ACT OF DIPLOMACY WHICH SHOULD BE APPLAUDED BY ARABS AS MOST CONSTRUCTIVE DEVELOPMENT IN WHOLE HISTORY OF ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT AND SHOULD FORESHADOW A NEW ERA OF PRODUCTIVE RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE U.S. THROUGHOUT THE ARAB WORLD. AS FOR IRAQ, I SAID OUR POSITION REMAINED THAT WE PREPARED AT ANYTIME DISCUSS RESUMPTION RELATIONS. MISS BAKR AGAIN SAID SHE NOT AUTHORIZED TO COMMENT.

6. COMMENT: MY LOCAL STAFF TELLS ME THERE ARE MANY RUMORS ABOUT

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THAT HIGH LEVEL DIALOGUE BEING CONDUCTED BETWEEN U.S. AND IRAQ OUTSIDE OF IRAQ WILL RESULT IN REOPENING EMBASSY HERE. THESE SEEM THE TYPICAL BAGHDAD RUMORS I REMEMBER FROM MY PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

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BUT MISS BAKR'S APPROACH COULD BE AT LEAST THE BEGINNING OF A
SIGNAL THAT IRAQIS WANT TO RESUME RELATIONS.

7. I WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING INSTRUCTION FOR RESPONDING TO
FUTURE APPROACHES OF THIS NATURE OR TO A CLEAR PROPOSAL THAT
WE RESUME. SPECIFICALLY, I SHOULD HAVE IN HAND U.S. POSITION
ON CONFISCATION EMBASSY PROPERTY AND ANY OTHER SERIOUS OUTSTANDING
ISSUES BETWEEN U.S. AND IRAQ.
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EO= GS

SUBJECT= JOSEPH KRAFT VISIT

REFERENCE= MOSCOW 5842

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ACTION NEA-16

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AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
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AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
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SUBJECT: JOSEPH KRAFT VISIT

REF: MOSCOW 5842

1. COLUMNIST JOSEPH KRAFT HAD BUSY 48 HOUR VISIT TO BAGHDAD APRIL 27-28. HE WAS WELL TAKEN CARE OF BY CHIEF PARTY PROPAGANDIST AND ATH-THAWRA EDITOR-IN-CHIEF TARIQ AZIZ. SHORT STAY APPARENTLY PREVENTED INTERVIEW WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN FOR WHICH TARIQ AZIZ APOLOGETIC. FOLLOWING ARE PEOPLE KRAFT

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PAGE 02 BAGHDA 00279 060931Z

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SAW AND COMMENTS HE MADE TO ME:

2. MINISTER OF PETROLEUM SADOUN HAMMADI - A VERY IMPRESSIVE TECHNOCRAT. HOWEVER, IN REVIEWING MAJOR PLANS AND PROJECTS FOR PETROLEUM SECTOR HAMMADI BECAME QUITE DEFENSIVE, PRESUMABLY BECAUSE PREPONDERANCE OF PROJECTS CLEARLY BEING DONE BY WESTERN FIRMS. HAMMADI CLAIMED TO BE VERY PLEASED WITH RECENTLY COMPLETED CZECH REFINERY IN BASRA. (U.S. OIL MEN HAVE TOLD ME INOC VERY UNHAPPY THAT CZECHS FINISHED REFINERY TWO YEARS BEHIND SCHEDULE AND IT IS 1935 VINTAGE.) ON SERVICE CONTRACTS FOR NEW EXPLORATION AREAS, HAMMADI SAID THERE WOULD BE ABSOLUTELY NO DISCRIMINATION AGAINST AMERICAN OIL COMPANIES, INCLUDING MAJORS. IN ADDITION TO 37 MILLION DOLLAR CONTRACT FOR 8 INCH PRODUCTS PIPELINE FROM BAGHDAD TO BASRA SIGNED MARCH 30, HAMMADI SAID RUSSIANS WILL BUILD MOSUL REFINERY. (THIS APPEARS TO CONTRADICT IN PART INFO CONTAINED REFTTEL.) HAMMADI REFUSED TO ANSWER QUESTIONS WITH SLIGHTEST POLITICAL CONTENT.

3. FIRST SECRETARY OF ICP AZIZ MOHAMMAD - VERY SERIOUS, THOUGHTFUL MAN, MUCH MORE IMPRESSIVE THAN SYRIAN CP LEADER KHALID BAKHDASH. AZIZ IS KURD AND HE MADE NO EFFORT TO DOWNPLAY SERIOUSNESS OF KURDISH PROBLEM. ON CONTRARY, HE ADMITTED THAT MOST KURDS HAD JOINED BARZANI FORCES. HE ALSO DISCUSSED POLICY DIFFERENCE WITH BAATH OVER ME SETTLEMENT.

4. MINISTER OF STATE OBEIDALLAH BARZANI - AN OBVIOUS PUPPET, WHO IS SURROUNDED BY IRAQI SOLDIERS IN VIRTUALLY EMPTY OFFICE. ONLY INTERESTING COMMENTS WERE ON HIS FATHER WHO HE SAID WAS DICTATORIAL TRIBAL LEADER WHOSE ONLY GOAL WAS TO KEEP FIGHTING FOR HIS DREAM OF KURDISH INDEPENDENCE HOWEVER UNREALISTIC AND DESTRUCTIVE IT MAY BE FOR KURDISH PEOPLE.

5. TARIQ AZIZ - VERY IMPRESSIVE, SPEAKS EXCELLENT ENGLISH. HE CLAIMED IRAN AND U.S. ARE AIDING BARZANI. WHEN ASKED FOR EVIDENCE HE SAID KURDS HAVE U.S. ARMS SUCH AS ANTI-AIRCRAFT WEAPONS WHICH CAN ONLY BE OBTAINED WITH USG APPROVAL. FURTHERMORE, USG COULD STOP IRAN FROM ASSISTING KURDS IF IT WISHED TO DO SO. HE ALSO ALLEGED THAT IRAN HAD SHOWN INTEREST IN RAPPROCHEMENT LAST APRIL AND ON FIRST DAY OF

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SECRET MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS IN GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS HAD GONE VERY WELL. THEN JOSEPH SISCO, WHO HAD BEEN IN TEHRAN (FOR COM CONFERENCE) HAD INTERVIEWED AND IRANIAN POSITION

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HAD IMMEDIATELY HARDENED.

6. TARIQ AZIZ AND MEMBER OF NATIONAL BAATH LEADERSHIP ABDUL WAHAB KAYYALI (PALESTINIAN MARRIED TO AN AMERICAN) CLAIMED THAT SYRIA AND USSR WORKING CLOSELY TOGETHER AND HAD ALREADY DECIDED ON DISENGAGEMENT. CURRENT ACTIVITIES OF SECRETARY KISSINGER AND GROMYKO ARE DESIGNED TO SAVE FACE OF USSR AND ASSAD BY MAKING DAMASCUS APPEAR AS CENTER OF WORLD AND SHOW THAT RUSSIANS PLAYING ACTIVE ROLE. WHILE RECOGNIZING THAT DISENGAGEMENT ACCORD MAY BE POSSIBLE, IRAQIS SAW NO POSSIBILITY OF NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT SATISFACTORY TO ARABS. IMPROVEMENT IN IRAQ'S RELATIONS WITH SYRIA IS STILL BEING PURSUED AND HIGH LEVEL PARTY MEETING WAS HELD IN APRIL. PRESIDENT ASAD DID NOT, ACCORDING TO TARIQ AZIZ, STOP IN BAGHDAD ON HIS RETURN FROM MOSCOW.

7. TARIQ AZIZ SAID INCLUSION OF ICP IN NATIONAL FRONT WAS TACTICAL ALLIANCE TO RESOLVE KURDISH PROBLEM SINCE IF ICP NOT WITH BAATH IT WOULD BE WITH KDP AGAINST BAATH. IN DISCUSSING REASONS BEHIND LAST JUNE 30 ABORTIVE COUP TARIQ AZIZ ADMITTED ABUSES OF SECRET POLICE AND CLAIMED THINGS ARE MUCH IMPROVED. HE ADMITTED THAT REGIME HAD NOT ENJOYED POPULAR SUPPORT PRIOR TO 1972 BUT SUCCESSES SINCE THEN SUCH AS OIL NATIONALIZATION AND DISPATCH OF IRAQI TROOPS DURING OCTOBER WAR TO SAVE DAMASCUS (SIC) HAVE GIVEN REGIME POPULAR BACKING IT LACKED.

8. COMMENT: DESPITE FACT KRAFT DID NOT SEE SADDAM HUSSEIN, VISIT IS FURTHER EVIDENCE OF IRAQI DESIRE TO IMPROVE THEIR IMAGE AND CULTIVATE INFLUENTIAL AMERICANS. IN ADDITION, THERE IS REAL VALUE IN EXPOSING ISOLATED IRAQIS TO THINKING OF SUCH AMERICANS. PERHAPS AS RESULT OF KRAFT VISIT AND EARLIER ONE BY ROWLAND EVANS, TARIQ AZIZ EXPRESSED SERIOUS INTEREST IN VISITING U.S. I AM EXPLORING BEST WAY TO ENCOURAGE AND FACILITATE VISIT.
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DOC_NBR= 74BAGHDA00274

FILM= D740105-0365

DATE= 01 MAY 74

TYPE= TE

FROM= BAGHDAD

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= STATE

CHANNEL= n/a

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EO= GS

SUBJECT= KUDRISH CONFLICT

REFERENCE= BAGHDAD 259

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= ARMED FORCES, KURDS, PARAMILITARY FORCES, MINORITIES, SELFGOVERNMENT, PERSONNEL APPOINTMENTS, COMBAT OPERATIONS

TAGS= PINT, IZ

RELEASE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE 9302996

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ACTION NEA-12

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INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

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AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

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E.O. 11652: ~~ODS~~

TAGS: PINT, IZ

SUBJECT: KUDRISH CONFLICT

REF: BAGHDAD 259

1. BAGHDAD PRESS MAY 1 CARRIED SMALL ITEM STATING THAT
DEPUTY GOVERNOR OF DOHUK PROVINCE HAD VISITED ZAKHO
TO MEET WITH CITIZENS AND GET ACQUAINTED WITH THEIR NEEDS.
THIS IS ONLY REFERENCE TO REPORT OF SUCCESSFUL RELIEF ON
APRIL 29 OF 1,000 MAN GARRISON THAT HAS BEEN BESIEGED BY
PESH MARGA SINCE MID-MARCH.

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2. ACCORDING TO TURKISH MILITARY ATTACHE COLONEL ARDOGHAN, IT TOOK IRAQI RELIEF FORCE OF THREE BRIGADES TEN DAYS TO PENETRATE MOUNTAIN PASSES SOUTH OF DOHUK. A/C USED EXTENSIVELY AND ATTACKED KURDS WITH NAPALM. MAIN BORDER CROSSING TO TURKEY NEAR ZAKHO NOW FULLY IN GOI CONTROL ACCORDING TO ARDOGHAN.

3. INDIAN EMBOFF NAIRAM, WHOSE INFO COMES FROM SENIOR INDIAN OFFICER TRAINING IRAQI AF, SAID AF IS ON FULL ALERT AND MIG-21S ARE FLYING FROM TIKRIT ARMED WITH AIR-TO-AIR MISSILES. HE HAD NO INFO ON A/C LOSSES, BUT FRENCH COUNSELLOR TOLD ME AF HAD LOST AT LEAST 2 HELICOPTERS AND 1 SU-7.

4. SEVEN KURDISH STUDENTS ARRESTED APRIL 29 FOR PLACING BOMBS IN ATLAS CINEMA AND AIRPORT REST ROOMS. FIVE SENTENCED TO DEATH AND TWO ACQUITTED. THEIR INDIVIDUAL FILMED CONFESSIONS SHOWN ON BAGHDAD TV APRIL 30. BOMBS WOUNDED SOME PEOPLE BUT WE HAVE HEARD OF NO DEATHS. EVEN BEFORE BOMBING, SECURITY PRECAUTIONS TAKEN IN BAGHDAD CINEMAS; E.G. NO ONE CAN LEAVE UNTIL END OF FILM.

5. COMMENT: DESPITE LARGE SCALE ATTACK TO RELIEVE ZAKHO AND APPARENT INCREASED BOMBING ACTIVITY BY AIR FORCE, GOI APPARENTLY STILL EXERCISING RESTRAINT AND IN NO HURRY TO LAUNCH MAJOR OFFENSIVE. NEXT AREA OF CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE LIKELY TO BE NORTHERN BORDER WITH IRAN. RCC VICE CHAIRMAN SADDAM HUSSEIN ON APRIL 25 CALLED FOR COMPLETE ECONOMIC BOYCOTT OF BARZANI CONTROLLED TERRITORY. ONLY WAY THIS CAN BE ACHIEVED IS BY DISRUPTING FLOW OF SUPPLIES COMING FROM IRAN. SINCE THIS TERRIAN IS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT AND USE OF FROUND TROOPS UNLIKELY, GOI MAY ATTEMPT TO DISRUPT TRAFFIC WITH AIR FORCE IN WHICH CASE IT RISKS IRANIAN REACTION.

6. VOICE OF KURDISTAN ANNOUNCED LAST NIGHT (MAY1) THAT PESH MERGA HAD BLOWN UP SOME OF KIRKUK OIL INSTALLATIONS BECAUSE OF AF BOMBING OF VILLAGES. TOGETHER WITH BOMBINGS IN BAGHDAD EVENING OF APRIL 28, THESE ACTS REPRESENTS ANOTHER STEP IN ESCALATION AND SEEM CERTAIN TO RESULT IN NEW GOVERNMENT REPRISALS.

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HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State

INFO : Tehran, Khomramshahr, Baghdad, Ankara, Damascus
Adana

FROM : Amconsul Tabriz
E.O. 11652: GDS

DATE: April 27, 1974

SUBJECT: Iran and the Barzani Kurds

TAGS : PINR, PINS, MILI, IR

REF : Tabriz A-5 of February 10, 1974

SUMMARY: The Baath-Kurdish conflict in Iraq has intensified considerably during the past two weeks. Reports reaching the outside world have been mostly from Radio Kurdistan and Baath state media. In an attempt to gain a different perspective and to substantiate reports of Iranian assistance to the Iraqi Kurds, the reporting officer spent April 22-25 travelling in Rezaieyeh, Mahabad, and the Kurdish border areas of Piranshahr (Khaneh), Sardasht and Baneh.

Though hard data on Iranian arms and munitions supplies to the Barzani forces were hard to come by, Iranian border officials were relatively open in discussing what they know of the situation in near-by Iraq. The reporting officer witnessed large-scale movements of unmarked Iranian army convoys to border areas and efforts being made by the Red Lion and Sun Society to care for wounded Pesh Merga. On April 24, the Iraqi Air Force bombed

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FORM DS-323

Drafted by: CAMast

CMast

Consent and Classification Approved by: CONSUL:CAMast

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Clearances: DPT, STE, Anderson

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the undefended Iraqi Kurdish town of Qaleh Dizeh and the reporting officer witnessed the arrival of large numbers of refugees and seriously wounded into the Iranian border town of Sardasht. END SUMMARY

General Over-view of Iraqi Kurdish Problem and Iranian Response

The reporting officer received a lengthy briefing by the Governor of Sardasht, General Aziz Otmishi (protect). Otmishi, a 52 year old Sanandaj Kurd is a retired police general with 30 years experience in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan. He fought Barzani and Qazi Mohammad at Mahabad, the Tudehists at Miandoab and Tabriz and was chief of police in Mahabad and Sanandaj during the mid-sixties to early seventies. Otmishi knows Barzani well and there is little question that much of his work at Sardasht over the past 18 months has involved liason with the Pesh Merga. Otmishi is an exceedingly interesting personality; he appears to be a strong Kurdish nationalist and supporter of General Barzani, while serving at the same time as a loyal advocate of GOI policies. So far, the loyalties at least partially overlap. Should Barzani gain full autonomy for the Kurds in Iraq, however, one wonders how the Otmishis in Iran would respond.

Otmishi (whose daughter is American educated and worked for some time in the American Embassy) began with a lengthy overview of the Kurdish problem since the Treaty of Lausanne. He strongly feels that the Kurds in the old Ottoman empire were done out of independence at that time and that the resulting striving for a Kurdish state has led to the present impasse in Iraq. He claims the Pesh Merga will not give in to the Baath and that the civil war will lead to Baath loss of power, Kurdish autonomy under Barzani, or a combination thereof. The civil war is a dangerous tinder-box for Iraq, Syria, Turkey and Iran given the large Kurdish minority within the borders of these countries. When questioned as to the Iranian Kurdish response to the successful attainment of Kurdish autonomy in Iraq, Otmishi initially dodged the question by pointing out how much worse the Kurds were treated in Turkey and how susceptible they would be to Kurdish independence.

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Referring to Iranian Kurdish sentiment Otmishi pointed out that traditional Kurdish dissatisfaction with Iranian rule and/or attraction to Barzani has extended in a semi-circle 150 kilometers wide and 150 kilometers deep from Piranshahr in the north, to Mahabad in the west and Baneh in the south (with an additional flat semi-circle perhaps 25 kilometers deep extending some 150 kilometers further south to Marivan). This area provided the support for Barzani and Qazi Mohammad during 1946 and continues to have conflicting feelings toward Barzani to this day. Otmishi sees the bulk of the Iranian Kurdistan province, Sanandaj and Saqqez, as essentially loyal to Iran and interestingly agreed with Governor-General Alizadeh of Kurdistan (see refair), in commenting that the Sanandaj Kurds, while they might be bandits, were not up to protracted warfare and would never fight for Barzani. The Piranshahr-Mahabad-Baneh Kurds might fight, however, given sufficient provocation or the attraction of Kurdish autonomy in Iraq.

GOI response to Kurdish aspirations since the Mahabad Republic has, according to Otmishi, gone through essentially two stages, (1) pre 1967 and (2) post 1967. Pre 1967 involved relatively close GOI relations with Iraq, harsh repression of Iranian Kurds with autonomy sentiments and little economic development in Kurdish areas of Iran. In 1967, Otmishi claimed, the Iraqi Baathists partially succeeded in infiltrating Kurdish groups in Iran, weaning them from Barzani and toward Iraq. The GOI then increased assistance to Barzani, ruthlessly suppressed Baathist sympathizers among Iranian Kurds and proceeded with rapid development in the Kurdish areas in Iran. (Comment: Development of adequate feeder roads, asphalted highways, dams, farm corporations, modernization of Mahabad, etc. do all date from 1967-68). Otmishi remains a strong supporter of the post 1967 GOI policies which appear to go so well with his political beliefs. He finds it difficult, however, to really face up to the larger question of Iranian Kurdish loyalties vis-a-vis a potentially independent Kurdish state.

Iranian Assistance to the Pesh Merga

It is not yet possible to gain information on arms supplies from the GOI to the Pesh Merga (when the question came up, for example, Otmishi winked conspiratorially and said arms

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and the question of Barzani payment for arms and supplies were not a problem for the Pesh Merga). Other forms of assistance are readily apparent. The Red Lion and Sun Society has dispatched a special team from Tehran under the direction of a Dr. Habibi (protect) to Piranshahr and Sardasht where the flow of Pesh Merga casualties has been highest. The Red Lion and Sun Society has just completed a 50-bed mobile hospital in Piranshahr which the reporting officer visited with Mr. Kamali, the Governor. Other wounded (thus far no civilian casualties) have been treated in temporary quarters in Piranshahr.

Reports have been received of wounded Pesh Merga being treated in the 250 bed Red Lion and Sun Hospital at Rezaiyeh. This was, however, denied by a surgeon there who is an acquaintance of the reporting officer. At Sardasht the 60 bed Red Lion and Sun Hospital was jammed with Kurdish casualties. Otmishi himself had just come from the hospital and was pleading with Tehran for additional mobile hospitals, doctors and medicine. The increased casualties on the morning of April 25 resulted from an Iraqi air raid (four SU-7's using bombs and napalm according to survivors) on Qaleh Dizeh the previous day. Qaleh Dizeh has had its population swollen in recent weeks by Kurdish refugees from Sulaimaniya. Some 70 casualties (primarily women and children) arrived in the early morning and many more were expected. Qaleh Dizeh is some 35 kilometers from the Iranian border (and 50 kilometers from Sardasht). Iraqi-registered Land Rovers were bringing the wounded to Sardasht (reportedly in Piranshahr the Iranian Gandarmerie bring in the wounded from the border). Otmishi said the road from Sardasht to the border and a road of sorts from Qaleh Dizeh to the Iranian border had been built during the past six months.

Iraqi Kurds in small numbers were observed (distinctive Kurdish costumes) in Rezaiyeh, Mahabad, Piranshahr and Sardasht. Iranian officials acknowledge they have come to buy supplies. Some supplies appear to be stockpiled near the border. An NIOC gas-station in Sardasht, for example, had over 3,000 55 gallon drums full of gasoline stored in the courtyard. Observed near Piranshahr was an Iranian military convoy of 15 trucks. Although the trucks were the distinctive olive-green Russian-made Iranian army vehicles, all identifying insignia and license plates had been removed and the trucks

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were being driven by military-looking drivers in civilian clothes.

Morale and Military Situation in Iraqi Kurdistan

Although a steady stream of Pesh Merga wounded must provide the Iranian security organizations with fresh information on military fighting in Iraqi Kurdistan, most officials were either unwilling or unable to comment. Otmishi, however, had personally interviewed several refugees who claimed that the Pesh Merga still held the heights around Mosul, Kirkuk and Sulaimaniya and that the fighting was going well for the Kurds.

Morale, even among the wounded, remains high. The reporting officer was struck by how often Iranian officials, commenting on Pesh Merga successes and morale, compared their lengthy fight for independence to the Viet-Cong and North Vietnamese. The assumption here being of course that Iraqi technological superiority would not necessarily bring victory.

A concluding example witnessed by General Otmishi gives some of the flavor of Kurdish morale. A seriously wounded Kurdish woman survivor from Qaleh Dizeh in the Sardasht hospital was mourning the death of two of her children in the time-honored Middle Eastern way, chanting, rocking on her heels and smiting her breast. A wounded Pesh Merga veteran witnessing her display of grief reprimanded her sternly for her shameful display and said thousands more would die before the Kurds won their independence. The woman stopped her chanting and at least temporarily assumed a quiet, grave demeanor.

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*** Current Classification ***
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

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DOC_NBR= 74BAGHDA00252

FILM= D740100-0790

DATE= 27 APR 74

TYPE= TE

FROM= BAGHDAD

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= STATE

CHANNEL= n/a

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EO= GS

SUBJECT= IRAQ ASKS FOR ARAB SUPPORT AGAINST KURDS

REFERENCE= n/a

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= MINORITIES, FOREIGN ASSISTANCE, POLITICAL SITUATION, MEETINGS

TAGS= PINT, PFOR, IZ, XF, (JAMALI, ABDUL HUSSEIN AL)

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Date. 1/2/97

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DEPT PASS ALL ARAB CAPITALS AND ANKARA, LONDON,
MOSCOW, PARIS, TEHRAN, AND TEL AVIV

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PINT, PFOR, IZ, XF

SUBJECT: IRAQ ASKS FOR ARAB SUPPORT AGAINST KURDS

1. ON APRIL 20 ARAB CHIEFS OF MISSION WERE CALLED IN TO MFA
TO MEET WITH UNDER SECRETARY ABDUL HUSSEIN AL-JAMALI. ACCORDING
TO ACCOUNTS GIVEN ME BY EGYPTIAN CHARGE BARAKA AND FRENCH
COUNSELOR SAILLARD (FROM MAGHREB AMBASSADORS) FOLLOWING EXCHANGE
TOOK PLACE:

2. JAMALI REVIEWED KURDISH PROBLEM STATING THAT IRAQ HAD
TRADITIONALLY CONSIDERED IT AN INTERNAL PROBLEM. (THIS
CONFIRMED BY TURKISH AMBASSADOR CUHRUK WHO TOLD ME RECENTLY
THAT GOI HAD NEVER DISCUSSED KURDISH ISSUE WITH HIM OR TURKISH
GOVERNMENT. ON ONE OCCASION WHEN HE HAD MENTIONED KURDS TO
HIGH IRAQI OFFICIAL SEVERAL MONTHS AGO, IRAQI HAD RESPONDED
THAT IT STRICTLY INTERNAL PROBLEM.) JAMALI HAD GONE ON TO SAY
THAT RECENT KURDISH STATEMENTS CALLING FOR INDEPENDENCE AND FOREIGN
INTERFERENCE HAD INTERNATIONALIZED PROBLEM AND GOI NOW WISHED
TO HAVE SUPPORT OF ARAB STATES IN RESOLVING PROBLEM. VERY
SPIRITED TWO AND ONE HALF HOUR DISCUSSION FOLLOWED.

3. EGYPTIAN CHARGE HAD QUESTIONED JAMALI ON EVIDENCE OF FOREIGN

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SUPPORT FOR KURDS. JAMALI HAD MENTIONED SAUDI MONEY AND IRANIAN AND AMERICAN ARMS, BUT SAID "THEY ARE TOO CLEVER" TO DO SO OPENLY AND HARD EVIDENCE LACKING. SAUDI AMBASSADOR HAD DENIED ACCUSATION, BUT OTHERWISE HAD NOTHING TO SAY. TUNISIAN CHARGE HAD ASKED POINTED QUESTIONS ABOUT HOW IRAQ COULD EXPECT SUPPORT OF ARAB STATES WHEN IT HAD ATTACKED THEM IN PAST AND WHEN IT HAD ADMITTED COMMUNIST PARTY TO NATIONAL FRONT. JAMALI HAD REPLIED THAT ADMISSION OF CPI DIDN'T MEAN ACCEPTANCE OF COMMUNIST IDEAS, BUT WAS TACTICAL NECESSITY.

4. ALGERIAN AMBASSADOR OTHMANE SAADI HAD SAID HE WISHED TO SPEAK AS AN ALGERIAN, A BERBER AND A REVOLUTIONARY. HE SAID ALGERIA COULD NEVER PUBLICLY SUPPORT KURDISH AUTONOMY BECAUSE OF ITS BERBER MINORITY. MAXIMUM HE THOUGHT GOA COULD DO WAS STATEMENT OF SUPPORT FOR IRAQ'S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY. SUDANESE AMB MUSA MUSTAFA HAD REFERRED TO SOUTHERN SUDANESE PROBLEM AND MADE STRONG CASE FOR IMPOSSIBILITY OF RESOLVING KURDISH PROBLEM BY MILITARY MEANS. HE HAD ASKED WHETHER IRAQ TRULY COMMITTED TO PEACEFUL SOLUTION. JAMALI EMPHATICALLY SAID YES. YAR AMB AL-MARWANI THEN SUGGESTED THAT, SINCE MAJOR PROBLEM SEEMED TO BE WITH IRAN, IRAQ MAKE NECESSARY CONCESSIONS TO RESOLVE PROBLEMS WITH IRAN. JAMALI HAD REPLIED THAT IRAQ HAD TRIED, RECENTLY, BUT NEGOTIATIONS HAD HAD NO POSITIVE RESULTS. (POSSIBLE REFERENCE TO UNSYG REP MUNOZ MEDIATION, BAGHDAD 241)

5. ALTHOUGH IT TAKEN FOR GRANTED BY ALL PARTICIPANTS THAT THEY WOULD HAVE TO ASK FOR INSTRUCTIONS FROM THEIR GOVERNMENTS, IDEAS DISCUSSED FOR JOINT ARAB ACTIONS INCLUDED ARAB PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN AGAINST KURDS AND THEIR SUPPORTERS, JOINT DEMARCHE TO TEHRAN, AND MEDIATION BETWEEN KURDS AND GOI AND GOI AND IRAN.

6. COMMENT: GENERAL REACTION TO IRAQI REQUEST FOR ARAB SOLIDARITY ON THIS ISSUE SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN RESTRAINED WHICH IS PROBABLY GOOD REFLECTION OF ARAB GOVERNMENTS' ATTITUDES TOWARD DOING SOMETHING FOR BAGHDAD REGIME. EGYPTIANS MAY ATTEMPT SOME KIND OF EFFORT, HOWEVER, SINCE THEY TAKE BROADER VIEW OF AREA THAN MOST AND RECOGNIZE, JUSTIFIABLY IN MY VIEW, THAT CURRENT IRAQI REGIME IS BEST ONE CAN EXPECT AT THIS TIME AND ANY LIKELY SUCCESSOR WOULD PROBABLY MEAN RETURN TO CHAOS.
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RELEASE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: April 9, 1974

SUBJECT: Request for U. S. Aid to Kurds

PARTICIPANTS: Mohammad Dosky, Representative of Mulla Mustafa Barzani
David A. Korn, Country Director, NEA/ARN
Gregory D. Strong, Iraqi Desk Officer, NEA/ARN

Distribution: NEA USINT Baghdad
NEA/ARN-2 AmEmbassy, Beirut
NEA/IRN AmEmbassy, Tehran

(1)

Mr. Dosky, a Kurd and a former Iraqi diplomat, said he had been sent to the U. S. by Barzani to seek help for the Kurdish cause. He said the Kurds would appreciate assistance from the United States in their fight for autonomy. He understood that the U. S. would not want to become directly involved in the Kurdish struggle, but the Kurds hope we will at least encourage Iran to give enough aid to the Kurds to enable them to survive. Dosky said the Kurds would appreciate any sign of friendship from the United States.

Mr. Korn expressed our hope that there would be a peaceful resolution of the problems between the Iraqis and the Kurds. He explained that although Americans have a great deal of understanding and sympathy for the situation of the Kurds, it is not our policy to intervene or interfere in the internal affairs of Iraq or other states. Moreover, our relations with Iraq are such that we are not in a position to intercede with the Iraqi Government on behalf of the Kurds. Korn stressed that we want to be honest with the Kurds and not hold out any false hopes.

Dosky said he had recently received a letter from a Kurdish friend in London saying that Barzani had tried to prevent fighting. It also told of Iraqi plans to withdraw Iraqi forces from the mountains of Kurdistan, to cut the Kurds off economically, and then to leave the situation that way. Dosky said the Iraqis plan to treat the Kurds as bandits. When Korn asked if there was any hope for a settlement, Dosky replied that his information indicated there was none.

NEA:ARN:GD Strong:jfc
(Drafting Office and Officer)

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Dosky commented he is starting to dislike detente. The Kurds are being denied support by both the East and the West. In concluding Dosky said that since the State Department is not willing to aid the Kurds, he intended to take the Kurdish case to Congress.

Dosky said he has not been in Iraq since April 1972 when he last saw Barzani. He intends to return to Kurdistan via Iran in the second half of April.

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*** Current Classification ***

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 74BAGHDA00221

FILM= D740087-0356

DATE= 11 APR 74

TYPE= TE

FROM= BAGHDAD

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= STATE

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ORIGPCLASS= n/a

EO= GS

SUBJECT= KURDISH AUTONOMY CONFLICT

REFERENCE= BAGHDADD 183

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= MOBILIZATION, ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, MINORITIES, SELFGOVERNMENT,
POLITICAL LEADERS

TAGS= PINT, IZ, (BARZANI)

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PAGE 01 BAGHDA 00221 160901Z

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ACTION NEA-12

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03

INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03

SS-20 USIA-15 OMB-01 SAM-01 SY-04 OPR-02 A-01 PER-05

DRC-01 /127 W

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R 110800Z APR 74
FM USINT BAGHDAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 901
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
USINT DAMASCUS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BAGHDAD 221

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINT, IZ
SUBJECT: KURDISH AUTONOMY CONFLICT

REF: BAGHDADD 183

1. WAR OF NERVES BETWEEN BARZANI AND BAATH REGIME CONTINUES, BUT BOTH SIDES STILL APPEAR RELUCTANT TO CLOSE NEGOTIATING DOOR AND RENEW FIGHTING. ON APRIL 6 MINISTRY OF DEFENSE CALLED UP ALL RESERVES BORN IN 1947 TO ACTIVE DUTY. ON APRIL 7 RCC REPLACED FIVE KURDISH MINISTERS WITH "SAFE" KURDS. IT HAD EARLIER REPLACED GOVERNORS OF KURDISH PROVINCES OF SULIMANYAH, IRBIL AND DOHUK. INCUMBENTS HAD ALREADY DESERTED THEIR POSTS IN MARCH TO JOIN BARZANI. MOBILIZATION AND MOVEMENT OF MORE TROOPS TO NORTH ALSO REPORTEDLY TAKING PLACE. AT SAAME TIME, GOI CONTINUES TO PUBLICIZE WHAT IT HAS DONE FOR KURDISTAN AND ANNOUNCED THAT SUPPLEMENTAL FUNDS OF 100 MILLION DOLLARS ARE DESIGNATED FOR KURDISH AREA

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PAGE 02 BAGHDA 00221 160901Z

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IN FY 75 INVESTMENT BUDGET. PRESS REPORTING ON RETURN OF KURDS TO THEIR JOBS AND HOMES, BUT OTHER INFO SUGGESTS OPPOSITE, FOR EXAMPLE, PAPAL NUNCIO'S ASSISTANT TOLD ME APRIL 9 THAT 700 CHRISTIAN FAMILIES HAD COME TO BAGHDAD LEAVING ALL POSSESSIONS IN DISPUTED AREAS IN NORTH. HE ALSO SAID SOME CHRISTIANS HAD JOINED BARZANI'S FORCES, APPARENTLY AS WAY OF STRIKING AT DICTATORIAL BAAATH REGIME. INDIAN EMBOFF SAID SULAMANIYAH UNIVERSITY DESERTED, WITH KURDS GOING TO NORTH AND ARABS TO BAGHDAD; 22 FOREIGN INSTRUCTORS WERE ALL OF FACULTY THAT REMAINED. HE ALSO SAID PESH MERGA NOW CONTROLLING ROAD BETWEEN SULAMANIYAH AND KIRKUK.

2. COMUNIST DIPLOMATS, WHO HAVE BEEN CONSISTENTLY SUPPORTING GOI POSITION, ARE WARNING OF FULL SCALE FIGHTING IF BARZANI DOES NOT COMPROMISE. HUNGARIAN MILATT MADE POINT OF TELLING ME APRIL 10 THAT TWO MOUNTAIN DIVISIONS AND ONE INF DIV NOW POISED ON EDGE OF KURDISH-CONTROLLED TERRITORY, BACKED UP BY TWO ARMORED BRIGADES AND FOUR SQUADRONS A/C. HE PREDICTED THAT OFFENSIVE WOULD BE LAUNCHED APRIL 26, EXPIRY DATE OF AMNESTY FOR KURDS TO RETURN TO JOBS, IF SETTLEMENT NOT REACHED. HE ALSO SAID 5,000 ARMED KURDS FROM SSSYRIA HAD RECENTLY JOINED BARZANI.

3. KURDISH LEADERSHIP SHOWS NO OUTWARD SIGN OF COMPROMISE. VOICE OF KURDISTAN, WHOSE SIGNAL IS STRONG ON MW IN BAGHDAD, CONTINUES TO BROADCAST EVENING REPORTS OF SKIRMISHES AND CLAIMS OF POPULATION RALLYING TO ITS CAUSE. IT RIDICULES INFLUENCE OF GOI APPOINTED KURDISH MINISTERS AND THEIR PRETENSION IN SAYING KDP IS JOINING NATIONAL FRONT.

4. IN APRIL 8 INTERVIEW RCC VICE CHAIRMAN SADDAM HUSSEIN MADE SEVERAL REFERENCES TO KURDS BEING ARMED WITH AMERICAN ARMS, BUT HIS CLEAREST ACCUSATIONS WERE AGAINST IRAN. HE CLAIMED BARZANI NO LONGER REPRESENTED KURDISH PEOPLE AND THAT MEMBERS OF HIS OWN FAMILY WITH HIM IN NORTH DIFFERED WITH STAND. HE SAID NATIONAL ASSEMBLY WOULD BE CREATED IN NEXT FEW MONTHS IN COOPERATION WITH NEW KURDISH LEADERSHIP.

5. COMMENT: MOST OMINOUS DEVELOPMENT FOR US IS INCREASING

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PAGE 03 BAGHDA 00221 160901Z

NUMBER OF RUMORS ABOUT U.S. SUPPORT FOR KURDS. IF SITUATION DETERIORATES WE CAN EXPECT GOI TO DROP CIRCUMSPECTION OF SADDAM HUSSEIN'S RECENT REMARKS AND ATTACK U.S. DIRECTLY

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AND VIOLENTLY. OFFICIAL DENIAL AS SUGGESTED IN PARA 3
OF BAGHDAD 153 WOULD BE USEFUL. DESPITE MILITARY PREP-
ARATIONS, I CONTINUE TO BELIEVE REGIME WILL LAUNCH FULL
SCALE OFFENSIVE ONLY AS LAST RESORT. WHAT DOES SEEM
LIKELY ARE SOME MILITARY ACTIONS AIMED AT SPECIFIC TARGETS
SUCH AS VOICE OF KURDISTAN TRANSMITTER AND VILLAGES NEAR
BARZANI'S HDQS. LOWRIE

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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a
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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 74BAGHDA00196

FILM= D740071-0621

DATE= 31 MAR 74

TYPE= TE

FROM= BAGHDAD

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= STATE

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ORIGPCLASS= n/a

EO= GS

SUBJECT= SOVIET-IRAQI RELATIONS

REFERENCE= n/a

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= PETROLEUM, SALES, SPHERE OF INFLUENCE, MINORITIES, SELFGOVERNMENT,
MINISTERIAL VISITS

TAGS= PFOR, IZ, UR

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE 9302996

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Date: 1/2/97

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PAGE 01 BAGHDA 00196 011012Z

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ACTION NEA-12

INFO OCT-01 AF-10 EUR-25 ISO-00 NIC-01 ACDA-19 SAB-01

CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-07

PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20 USIA-15 EB-11 IO-14

TRSE-00 MC-02 OMB-01 DRC-01 AID-20 IGA-02 /194 W

036682

R 310901Z MAR 74
FM USINT BAGHDAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 879
INFO USINT ALGIERS
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
USINT DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BAGHDAD 0196

E.O. 11652: GS
TAGS: PFOR, IZ, UR
SUBJECT: SOVIET-IRAQI RELATIONS

1. SERIES OF HIGH LEVEL SOVIET VISITORS LED BY MINDEF
MARSHALL GRECHKO (MARCH 23-26) AND MINISTER OF INTERIOR
SHILIKOV (MARCH 28-APRIL 1) ARE SEEN HERE AS JOINT EFFORT
TO DRAMATIZE USSR'S STRONG POSITION IN IRAQ AND ITS FULL
BACKING FOR REGIME'S KURDISH POLICY AND TO SHOW THAT IRAQ
IS NEITHER ISOLATED NOR BEING LEFT OUT OF SOVIET-ARAB

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PAGE 02 BAGHDA 00196 011012Z

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CONSULTATIONS. EVEN HIGHER LEVEL SOVIET VISITOR FOR SECOND ANNIVERSARY OF APRIL 9TH TREATY SEEMS A POSSIBILITY.

2. MARSHALL GRECHKO'S VISIT APPEARED ON SURFACE TO BE PRIMARILY GOOD WILL MISSION AND RCC VICE CHAIRMAN SADDAM HUSSEIN LEFT FOR INDIA DAY AFTER HIS ARRIVAL. VISIT WAS CUT SHORT BY ONE DAY, PRESUMABLY FOR GRECHKO TO ATTEND POLITBURO MEETING MARCH 27. HE TOOK TRIP OUT OF BAGHDAD BY PLANE ON MARCH 25 BUT DESTINATION WAS NOT REVEALED. HE REPORTEDLY EXCHANGED MESSAGES WITH KURDISH LEADERS, REITERATING STRONG SOVIET BACKING FOR REGIME'S AUTONOMY PLAN. NEW ARMS PURCHASES ALSO DISTINCT POSSIBILITY GIVEN IRAQ'S OIL REVENUES AND NERVOUSNESS OVER IRAN AND KURDS.

3. FOLLOWING RESOLUTION OF CONFLICT OVER PRICE SOVIETS WILL PAY FOR CURRENT OIL PURCHASES (MOSCOW 3467), SOVIET RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAQ APPEARS TO BE IN PERIOD OF CONSOLIDATION AND NO DRAMATIC DEVELOPMENTS ANTICIPATED DESPITE THESE HIGH LEVEL VISITS. LOWRIE

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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

*** Current Classification *** ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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*** Current Classification ***
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<*** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ***>>>

DOC_NBR= 74MOSCOW04549

FILM= D740068-0756

DATE= 28 MAR 74

TYPE= TE

FROM= MOSCOW

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION EUR

TO= STATE

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ORIGPCCLASS= n/a

EO= GS

SUBJECT= GRECHKO VISIT TO IRAQ

REFERENCE= n/a

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

RELEASE

CONCEPTS= GOVERNMENT REFORM, POLICIES, FOREIGN RELATIONS, MINORITIES,
SELFGOVERNMENT, CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, POLITICAL SITUATION, MINISTERIAL VISITS

TAGS= PFOR, UR, IZ, KURDISH DEMOCRATIC PARTY, BAATH PARTY, KDP, (GRECHKO)

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PAGE 01 MOSCOW 04549 281850Z

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ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03

INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03

SS-20 USIA-15 SAJ-01 NIC-01 DRC-01 /113 W

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R 281739Z MAR 74

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7362

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

AMCONSUL LENINGRAD BY POUCH

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BEIRUT PASS BAGHDAD

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, UR, IZ

SUBJ: GRECHKO VISIT TO IRAQ

1. EGYPTIAN EMBOFF TELLS US HE HAS HEARD THAT SOVIET DEFENSE MINISTER GRECHKO'S MAIN ITEM OF BUSINESS IN IRAQ WAS TO TRY TO SELL HARD-LINE KURDS ON AUTONOMY PLAN OFFERED BY IRAQI GOVERNMENT. EGYPTIAN NOTED CONSISTENT SOVIET INTEREST IN STABILIZING IRAQI-KURDISH RELATIONS AND SOVIET SUPPORT FOR IRAQ GOVERNMENT'S PROCLAMATION OF AUTONOMY. HE ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT HE DID NOT THINK KURDISH PROBLEM WAS CAUSE OF GRECHKO'S VISIT, WHICH HAD BEEN EXPECTED FOR SOME TIME.

2. IRANIAN EMBASSY IS APPARENTLY PEDDLING SIMILAR REPORT THAT GRECHKO'S IRAQI SOJOURN IS CONNECTED WITH KURDISH PROBLEM. BRITISH EMBOFF HAS ALSO TOLD US THAT SOVIETS ASSURED TEHRAN THAT GRECHKO VISIT SHOULD GIVE IRAN NO CAUSE FOR CONCERN.

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PAGE 02 MOSCOW 04549 281850Z

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*** Current Classification *** ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 74BAGHDA00183

FILM= D740071-0659

DATE= 30 MAR 74

TYPE= TE

FROM= BAGHDAD

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= STATE

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ORIGPCLASS= n/a

EO= GS

SUBJECT= KURDISH AUTONOMY

REFERENCE= n/a

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= ANTIAMERICAN, PRESS COMMENTS, POLITICAL STABILITY, MINORITIES, SELFGOVERNMENT, POLITICAL LEADERS

TAGS= PINT, IZ, (TAHIR), (AREF, ABDUL RAHMAN), (AL-NAYIF, ABDUL RAZZAK)

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PAGE 01 BAGHDA 00183 011059Z

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ACTION NEA-12

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 IO-14 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03

INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03

SS-20 USIA-15 OMB-01 SAJ-01 NIC-01 SAM-01 SAB-01

DRC-01 /132 W

036968

R 300800Z MAR 74
FM USINT BAGHDAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 867
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BAGHDAD 183

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PINT, IZ

SUBJECT: KURDISH AUTONOMY

1. LOCAL COVERAGE OF KURDISH ISSUE MAINLY LIMITED TO MESSAGES OF SUPPORT AND PRAISE FOR KURDISH AUTONOMY LAW. AAPSO CONFERENCE RESOLUTION ALLEGED "IMPERIALISTS AND ESPECIALLY AMERICANS" TRYING TO OBSTRUCT AUTONOMY "IN ORDER TO TOPPLE PROGRESSIVE REGIME IN IRAQ" BUT PRESS HAS BEEN RESTRAINED ABOUT ACCUSING FOREIGNERS OF SUPPORTING KURDS. BRITISH MILATT TOLD ME GOI MINDEF LIASON OFFICER FOR ATTACHES, CAPTAIN TAHIR, WAS HOWEVER CONVINCED USG AIDING KURDS, ALTHOUGH HE OFFERED NO EVIDENCE. KURDISH RADIO FROM UNKNOWN SOURCE NOW BEING HEARD CLEARLY IN BAGHDAD. KURDISH EMPLOYEES OF USINT SAY BARZANI SPOKE EVENING OF MARCH 29 AND WARNED GOI AGAINST LAUNCHING AN OFFENSIVE.

2. SEVERAL SOURCES SAY THAT SECRET NEGOTIATIONS STILL GOING ON BETWEEN GOI AND KDP AND EGYPTIAN AMBASSADOR
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PAGE 02 BAGHDA 00183 011059Z

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NAGGAR TOLD ME ARMY UNDER INSTRUCTIONS NOT TO TAKE ANY OFFENSIVE ACTION. MOST OMINOUS RUMORS CONCERN PRESENCE OF FORMER IRAQI POLITICAL LEADERS AT BARZANI HDQS INCLUDING FORMER PRESIDENT ABDUL RAHMAN AREF, FORMER PM COLONEL ABDUL RAZZAK AL-NAYIF AND A FORMER GENERAL AR-RAWI. PRESENCE OF SUCH FIGURES WOULD OF COURSE BE SEEN BY BAATH AS PRELUDE TO ATTEMPT TO OVERTHROW REGIME.

3. DESPITE DOONSDAY RUMORS, THERE ARE ALSO SOME HOPEFUL SAIGNS. NEITHER SIDE HAS TAKEN ANY IRREVOCABLE STEP. NEW GOVT INSTALLED EDITOR OF KDP AT-TAAXHI IS NOT YET ATTACKING BARZANI. SOVIETS ARE BELIEVED TO HAVE SENT STRONG MESSAGE TO BARZANI URGING THAT HE ACCEPT AUTONOMY PLAN. FINALLY, EGYPTIAN AMB NAGGAR TOLD ME THAT SECRET IRAQI DEL IS ABOUT TO DEPART FOR TEHRAN TO NEGOTIATE WITH IRAN ON KURDISH CONFLICT AND OTHER MATTERS.

4. COMMENT: IF NO ACCORD REACHED, OUTLOOK STILL IS THAT GOI WILL ATTEMPT TO ISOLATE AND WEAKEN BARZANI THROUGH COMBINATION OF MILITARY, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC MEASURES. FULL SCALE MILITARY OFFENSIVE WOULD BE ADMISSION BY SADDAM HUSSEIN THAT HIS KURDISH POLICY HAD FAILED AND HE UNLIKELY TO DO THAT EXCEPT AS LAST RESORT. IF EGYPTIAN REPORT OF IMMINENT IRAQI-IRANIAN NEGOTIATIONS IS TRUE, THERE MAY BE SOME POSSIBILITY OF TRADE OFF WITH IRAQ CEASING ITS EFFORTS TO STIR UP GULF ARABS AGAINST IRAN IN RETURN FOR IRANIAN POLICY OF HANDS OFF KURDS. LOWRIE

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*** Current Classification *** ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Date. 1/27/97

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PAGE 01 BAGHDA 00155 201419Z

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ACTION NEA-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 IO-14 PM-07 NSC-07 SPC-03 SS-20 RSC-01

SCCT-02 SAM-01 SAB-01 CIAE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00 DRC-01

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R 170800Z MAR 74
FM USINT BAGHDAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 842
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
USMISSION USUN
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
USINT DAMASCUS

~~SECRET~~ BAGHDAD 155

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PIINT, IZ, IR
SUBJECT: EGYPTIAN VIEW OF KURDISH PROBLEM

REF: BAGHDAD 136, 141, 144

1. EGYPTIAN AMBASSADOR ABDEL MONEIM AL-NAGGAR CALLED ON ME AT HIS REQUEST FOR OVER ONE HOUR ON MARCH 16. HE HAD KURDISH PROBLEM VERY MUCH ON HIS MIND.

2. NAGGAR SAID HIS EMBASSY WAS IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH IRAQI KURDISH LEADERSHIP. LEADERS COULD BE ROUGHLY DIVIDED INTO THREE GROUPS: "RIGHTISTS", WHO OPPOSE ACCEPTANCE OF BAATH AUTONOMY LAW AND WISH TO CONTINUE STRUGGLE UNTIL KURDISH STATE ENCOMPASSING KURDS OF IRAN, TURKEY AND SYRIA CAN BE BROUGHT INTO BEING; "MODERATES", WHO MAINLY DETRIBALIZED KURDS BEST REPRESENTED BY KURDISH MINISTERS SERVING IN GOVT AND AT-TAAXHI EDITOR DARA TAWFIQ. THEY ARE REALISTIC KURDISH NATIONALISTS AND FAVOR ACCEPTANCE OF AUTONOMY LAW AND WORKING WITHIN IRAQ TO

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PAGE 02 BAGHDA 00155 201419Z

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IMPROVE ECONOMIC LOT OF KURDS AND PROMOTE CULTURAL AUTONOMY. THEY SAY THAT IF THEY CAN ACHIEVE THESE GOALS IN IRAQ OVER NEXT FIVE YEARS, IRAN AND TURKEY WILL HAVE TO GRANT SOME CONCESSIONS TO THEIR KURDS. THIRD GROUP IS "LEFTISTS" REPRESENTED BY JALAL TALBANI AND AZIZ AQRAWI WHO HAVE AGAIN SPLIT WITH BARZANI, PRESUMABLY HAVING BEEN BOUGHT OFF BY GOI. THEY REPRESENT MAINLY THEMSELVES.

3. NAGGAR SAID THAT "RIGHTISTS" ARE MAINLY PESHMERGA

AND TRIBAL LEADERS AND THEIR INFLUENCE ON BARZANI HAS BEEN PREDOMINANT UNTIL NOW. REASON THAT DARA AT-TAWFIQ AND OTHER KIRDISH LEADERS HAVE LEFT BAGHDAD IS NOT TO ESCAPE BAATH REPRISALS (THEIR FAMILIES ARE STILL HERE) BUT TO ATTEMPT TO PERSUADE BARZANI TO ACCEPT AUTONOMY LAW BY DEADLINE OF MARCH 26. NAGGAR SAID REGIME IS OFFERING SPECIAL PRIVILEGES AND HONORS TO BARZANI AS KURDISH LEADER IF HE ACCEPTS. THESE WOULD, HOWEVER, END WITH BARZANI'S DEATH AND NOT BE INHERITED BY SUCCESSOR.

4. NAGGAR SAID HE CONSIDERS AIMS OF "RIGHTISTS" COMPLETELY UNREALISTIC. HE SAID THEY HAD REQUESTED EGYPTIAN SUPPORT AND HE HAD TOLD THEM THAT EGYPT WOULD NOT GO BEYOND. HUMANITARIAN CONCERN FOR KURDS, SINCE IT WOULD DISRUPT ARAB UNITY AND REGIONAL STABILITY, AND ENCOURAGE OTHER MINORITY MOVEMENTS WITHIN ARAB WORLD. NAGGAR STRONGLY IMPLIED KURDISH "RIGHTISTS" HAD GOTTEN SAME RESPONSE FROM ALL OTHER ARAB AMBASSADORS.

5. NAGGAR BELIEVES IRAN IS ONLY EXTERNAL SOURCE OF ASSISTANCE TO KURDS AND THAT IF IRAN WOULD CLOSE OFF BORDER AS TURKEY HAD DONE, IRAQI KURDISH PROBLEM WOULD BE MANAGEABLE. FURTHERMORE, NAGGAR BELIEVES IRAQ IS SERIOUS ABOUT RAPPROCHEMENT WITH IRAN. HE SAID EGYPT IS ENCOURAGING IRAQ TO ADOPT ARAB POLICY IN GULF RATHER THAN BAATHIST POLICY WHICH BRINGS IT INTO CONFLICT WITH IRAN. NAGGAR IS ENCOURAGED BY RESPONSE AND CITED IRAQI AGREEMENT TO PARTICIPATE IN GULF POLLUTION CONFERENCE WITH IRAN. HE IS ALSO ENCOURAGED BY GENERAL TREND OF EVENTS IN IRAQ, PARTICULARLY REGIME'S CONCENTRATION ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, MAJOR ACCORDS WITH FRANCE AND JAPANN, RESUMPTION

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OF RELATIONS WITH FRG AND EXPECTATION OF EARLY RESUMPTION WITH UK.

6. COMMENT: WHILE NAGGAR DID NOT SAY SO, IT SEEMS

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OBVIOUS THAT HE BELIEVES USG HAS SOME CAPABILITY TO
INFLUENCE IRAQ AND BELIEVES WE SHOULD DO WHAT WE
CAN TO RESOLVE IRAQI KRDISH PROBLEM IN INTEREST OF LONG
RANGE REGIONAL STABILITY AS WELL AS SHORTER TERM EGYPTIAN
AND ARAB
INTERESTS. LOWRIE

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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a
*** Current Classification *** ~~SECRET~~

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*** Current Classification ***

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

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<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 74STATE054466

FILM= D740058-0420

DATE= 19 MAR 74

TYPE= TE

FROM= STATE

DRAFTER= NEA/ARP:GQLUMSDEN, JR:BG

OFFICE= ORIGIN NEA

TO= KUWAIT

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

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ORIGPCLASS= n/a

EO= GS

SUBJECT= PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF IRAN-IRAQ BORDER CLASHES

REFERENCE= THERAN 1786 AND PREVIOUS

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= PROVINCE, ARMED FORCES, BORDER INCIDENTS, BOUNDARY CLAIMS,
MINORITIES, AMBASSADORS, PUBLIC ATTITUDES

TAGS= PINS, IZ, IR

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DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARP:GQLUMSDEN, JR:BG

APPROVED BY: NEA/ARP:FMDICKMAN

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FOLLOWING REPEAT TEHRAN 1995 ACTION SECSTATE INFO BEIRUT
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BEIRUT PASS BAGHDAD

E.O. 11653: GDS

TAGS: PINS, IZ, IR

SUBJ: PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF IRAN-IRAQ BORDER CLASHES

REF: THERAN 1786 AND PREVIOUS

SUMMARY: IRANIAN MILITARY ACTIONS ON IRAQI FRONT HAVE BEEN
DECISIVE AND FIRM, BUT DIPLOMATIC AND MEDIA SUPPORT HAS BEEN
MILD. WHILE IRAN WISHES TO MAINTAIN PRESSURE ON BAGHDAD, IT
DOES NOT SEEM TO WISH TO PROVOKE UNFAVORABLE REACTION FROM
IRANIAN PUBLIC OR OTHER ARABS. WE BELIEVE RESTRAINT WILL
CONTINUE TO BE DOMINANT ALTHOUGH BORDER SKIRMISHES LIKELY TO
CONTINUE. END SUMMARY.

1. ALTHOUGH OUR LACK OF KNOWLEDGE AS TO PRECISELY WHAT HAPPENED
DURING RECENT IRAN-IRAQ BORDER CLASH MAKES IT DIFFICULT TO
ANALYZE WHY IT HAPPENED, WE BELIEVE TENTATIVE JUDGMENTS MAY BE
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USEFUL. IRAN HAS PURSUED A TWO-SIDED POLICY WHICH REFLECTS, WE THINK, CONFLICTING BUT EQUALLY IMPORTANT OBJECTIVES FOR GOI.

2. ACCORDING TO RELIABLE REPORTS, IRAQIS PROBABLY STARTED MAJOR INCIDENTS IN FEBRUARY AND MARCH BY SHOOTING FIRST. HOWEVER, FIGHTING REACHED SERIOUS LEVEL IN LARGE PART BECAUSE IRANIANS PUSHED BACK VERY HARD. ASSERTED CAUSE OF EARLY FEBRUARY INCIDENTS NEAR MEHREN (SW OF KERMANSHAHR) WAS IRANIAN ROAD BUILDING ON IRAQI-CLAIMED TERRITORY. AT THAT TIME, IRANIANS SHOWED NO DISPOSITION TO DISCUSS IRAQI COMPLAINTS. DURING ENSUING BATTLE FEBRUARY 10, IRANIANS ARE SAID TO HAVE CROSSED INTO IRAQ AND REMAINED THERE FOR SOME TIME. SUBSEQUENTLY, BOTH SIDES HAVE MOVED CONSIDERABLE HEAVY EQUIPMENT INTO BORDER AREA.

3. ON THE OTHER HAND, DURING THIS PERIOD OF INTERMITTENT FIGHTING AND TENSION, IRANIANS HAVE SENT THEIR AMBASSADOR TO BAGHDAD AND SHAH RECEIVED IRAQI AMBASSADOR IN AUDIENCE. PRESS AND GOI OFFICIALS HAVE PLAYED FIGHTING IN VERY LOW KEY AND THERE HAS BEEN NO EFFORT TO WHIP UP PUBLIC SENTIMENT ON THIS ISSUE. DESPITE SERIOUS PROVOCATIONS AND LOSSES, IRAN HAS HELD LARGELY TO GENDARMERIE DEFENSE BACKED UP BY ARTILLERY AND HAS NOT FULLY COMMITTED GROUND OR AIR FORCE. (AIRCRAFT WERE USED FOR LIMITED RECONNAISSANCE ONLY.) IRAN READILY AGREED TO AND HAS OBSERVED CEASE FIRE AFTER MOST RECENT FIGHTING.

4. WE SEE FOLLOWING POLITICAL FACTORS AS POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS OF APPARENT INCONSISTENCIES IN GOI TREATMENT OF IRAQ PROBLEM:

A. IRANIANS WISH TO KEEP DESPISED IRAQI REGIME OFF BALANCE TO MAXIMUM EXTENT. BAGHDAD IS SEEN AS IRAN'S PRINCIPAL EXTERNAL THREAT AND CHIEF SUPPORT FOR TERRORISTS AND OTHER INTERNAL DISSIDENTS. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE NO DEFINITE EVIDENCE, IT SEEMS LOGICAL THAT IRANIANS CAN HAVE NO WISH FOR IRAQIS TO PROGRESS TOWARDS SOLUTION TO KURDISH PROBLEM, THEREBY RELEASING ENERGIES THAT COULD BE USED AGAINST IRAN OR IN SUPPORT OF GULF SUBVERSION. IF IRAQI TROOPS WERE DRAWN AWAY TO BORDER DEFENSE, BAGHDAD MIGHT HAVE MORE DIFFICULT TIME IN PUTTING ACROSS ITS KURDISH AUTONOMY PLAN. HOWEVER, AS STATED REFTTEL, WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT IRAN IS MOTIVATED BY FEAR THAT KURDISH AUTONOMY

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WILL PROVE ATTRACTION FOR IRANIAN KURDS.

B. IRANIAN ARMED FORCES HAVE HISTORICALLY BEEN LITTLE DISPOSED

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TO TOLERATE IRAQI BREACHES OF BORDER PEACE. BY MAINTAINING PRESSURE ON IRAQ, IRAN IS LETTING ITS NEIGHBOR KNOW THAT IT WILL HAVE TO SHOW GENEROSITY ON RIVER AND BORDER DEMARCATION DISPUTES IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE NORMAL RELATIONS. WE HAVE IMPRESSION DESIRE FOR RESOLUTION THESE PROBLEMS IS STRONGER AMONG IRAQIS THAN IRANIANS.

C. PARTIALLY EXPLAINING IRANIAN GOVERNMENT'S RESTRAINT, WE BELIEVE, IS NECESSITY TO PAY SOME HEED TO POPULAR SENTIMENT WHICH DOES NOT FULLY SUPPORT PAST HOSTILE POLICY TOWARDS IRAQ. IN FACT, WE UNDERSTAND RESTORATION OF RELATIONS WITH BAGHDAD WAS WIDELY POPULAR MOVE, SEEN AS OPENING WAY TO PILGRIMAGE TO MOST IMPORTANT SHIA SHRINES WHICH ARE IN IRAQ. IF ACCESS TO THESE WERE TO BE BLOCKED AGAIN, IRANIAN GOVERNMENT WOULD NEED CONVINCING CASE WITH ITS PUBLIC.

D. FOR ITS ARAB POLICY ALSO, IRANIAN GOVERNMENT NEEDS TO APPEAR STATESMANLIKE IN ITS HANDLING OF IRAQI PROBLEM. TO PREVENT EROSION OF CAREFULLY NURTURED POLICY OF COOPERATION WITH ARABS WHO ARE ALREADY SUSPICIOUS OF IRANIAN MILITARY BUILDUP, SHAH MUST ESTABLISH HIS FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH IN DEALING WITH IRAQ. WITH DIFFICULT OPEC DECISIONS ON OIL PRICES COMING UP, IRAN DOES NOT WISH UNNECESSARILY TO ALIENATE ORGANIZATION'S ARAB MEMBERSHIP.

5. NEAR-TERM PROSPECT: WITH MELTING OF SNOW, FRONTIER GUARDS ON BOTH SIDES OF THE LINE WILL LEAVE THEIR WINTER QUARTERS AND MOVE TOWARDS THE POORLY-DEMARCATED BORDER. IF THE PAST IS A GUIDE, THEY WILL BRUSH UP AGAINST EACH OTHER AND WE CAN EXPECT THERE WILL BE SKIRMISHES. BUT ON THE IRANIAN SIDE, AT LEAST, THERE WILL BE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL CONSIDERATIONS TO PREVENT ESCALATION. WE BELIEVE RESTRAINING FORCES WILL CONTINUE TO CONTROL AND TO LIMIT CONSEQUENCES OF LOCAL ACTIONS.

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DOC_NBR= 74ANKARA01963

FILM= n/a

DATE= 15 MAR 74

TYPE= TE

FROM= ANKARA

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

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CHANNEL= n/a

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ORIGPCCLASS= n/a

EO= GS

SUBJECT= TURKISH REACTION TO OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES BETWEEN IRAQI GOVERNMENT
AND BARZANI FORCES

REFERENCE= n/a

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= PARAMILITARY FORCES, GROUND COMBAT OPERATIONS, MINORITIES, FOREIGN
POLICY POSITION

TAGS= PINT, MOPS, IZ, TU, (BARZANI) 9302996

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R 151441Z MAR 74
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3218
INFO USINT BAGHDAD
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
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AMCONSUL IZMIR

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EO 11652 GDS

TAGS: PINT, IZ, TU

SUBJECT: TURKISH REACTION TO OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES
BETWEEN IRAQI GOVERNMENT AND BARZANI FORCES

1. DATT HAS RECEIVED INFORMATION FROM TURK MILITARY SOURCES THAT TURKEY HAS SEALED ITS BORDER WITH IRAQ AS A CONSEQUENCE OF OUTBREAK OF FIGHTING BETWEEN IRAQ AND BARZANI-LED KURDISH FORCES. FURTHERMORE, ACCORDING TO THESE SOURCES, GENDARMERIE AND MILITARY UNITS IN THE BORDER AREA ARE ON ALERT TO PREVENT SUPPORT FOR KURDISH FORCES FROM TURKISH SOIL AND TO CONTROL ANY POSSIBLE INFILTRATION OR INFLUX OF KURDISH REFUGEES INTO TURKEY.

2. WHEN ASKED ABOUT EXTENT OF FIGHTING, FONMINISTRY OFFICIAL (SECTION CHIEF ARBAK IN MFA MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA DEPT) ON MARCH 15 DESCRIBED TURK PRESS REPORTS OF RATHER EXTENSIVE
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PAGE 02 ANKARA 01963 150918Z

FIGHTING IN NORTHERN IRAQ AS EXAGGERATED. HE STATED, HOWEVER, THAT ACCORDING TO HIS INFORMATION IRAQI FRONTIER TOWN OF ZAHO -ON THE ONE MAIN ROAD BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES- HAD BEEN CAPTURED BY BARZANI'S FORCES.

3. ARBAK OBSERVED THAT "AT HIS LEVEL" THERE WAS NOT CONCERN AS YET OVER THE SAFETY OF THE ESTIMATED 1.3 MILLION PERSONS OF TURK ORIGIN LIVING IN IRAQ.

4. TURK NEWSPAPERS SPECULATE ON IRANIAN MILITARY AID TO BARZANI, AND IN THIS CONNECTION POINT OUT THAT THE US IS SUPPORTING IRAN, WHILE THE SOVIETS ARE ASSISTING IRAQ. THIS DISPUTE, ACCORDING TO THE PRESS, HAS THE WIDER IMPLICATIONS OF AN IRANIAN-IRAQI CONTEST FOR INFLUENCE IN THE PERSIAN GULF, AND IS OF CONSIDERABLE CONCERN TO TURKEY, WHICH IS AN ALLY OF ONE COUNTRY, AND A FRIEND AND OIL RECIPIENT OF THE OTHER.
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PAGE 01 MOSCOW 03744 161532Z

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ACTION EUR-25

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FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6928
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMCONSUL Leningrad
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

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BEIRUT PASS BAGHDAD AND DAMASCUS

E.O. 11652 GDS

TAGS: PFOR, UR, IZ

SUBJ: SOVIET VIEWS ON KURDISH PROBLEM AND
IRAQI-IRANIAN FRONTIER CLASHES

REF: MOSCOW 3590

1. SUMMARY. DURING TALK ON ME DEVELOPMENTS WITH
EMBOFF MARCH 16 (OTHER TOPICS SEPTTEL) MFA DEPUTY CHIEF
NEAR EAST COUNTRIES DIVISION PYRLIN DISCUSSED THE
KURDISH PROBLEM AND IRAQI-IRANIAN RELATIONS. PYRLIN
INDICATED FULL SUPPORT FOR IRAQI GOVERNMENT'S KURDISH
POLICH AND SAID SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAS URGED IRAQ AND
IRAN TO SETTLE BORDER DISPUTE PEACEFULLY. END SUMMARY.

2. WHEN EMBOFF ASKED ABOUT SOVIET-IRAQI RELATIONS,
PYRLIN DEFLECTED CONVERSATION TO KURDISH PROBLEM.
HE SAID IRAQI GOVERHMENT HAD RESPONDED POSITIVELY TO
KURDISH STRUGGLE FOR AUTONOMY, BUT KURD POGBLEM WAS

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COMPLICATED. IN TERMS SIMILAR TO HIS APPROACH IN DISCUSSING PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS, PYRLIN PAINTED KURDS AS LACKING LEADERSHIP AND UNITY. KURDISH DEMOCRATIC PARTY IS DIVIDED. FACTIONS ALL CLAIM TO SPEAK FOR WHOLE OF PARTY. EACH CLAIMS ALSO TO SPEAK IN NAME OF BARZANI WHOM PYRLIN CHARACTERIZED AS AN "OLD MAN."

3. PYRLIN SAID SITUATION IS FURTHER COMPLICATED BY OUTSIDE FORCES. NOTING TURKEY AND IRAN HAVE LARGE KURDISH MINORITIES, HE SAID TURKISH GOVERNMENT, FOR EXAMPLE, HAD RESPONDED TO IRAQI GOVERNMENT'S PROCLAMATION OF KURDISH AUTONOMY BY STRENGTHENING SECURITY ALONG TURKISH-IRAQI BORDER. IRAQI-IRANIAN BORDER CLASHES ALSO CONNECTED WITH KURDISH PROBLEM.

4. LATTER CLASHES, PYRLIN SAID, WERE PROBLEM FOR SOVIETS. SVIET GOVERNMENT IS TRYING TO MAINTAIN GOOD RELATIONS WITH BOTH IRAQ AND IRAN AND WAS PLEASED WITH APPARENT IMPROVEMENT OF IRAQI-IRANIAN RELATIONS OVER LAST SEVERAL MONTHS (E.G. EXCHANGE OF AMBASSADORS BETWEEN TEHRAN AND BAGHDAD). HOWEVER, RECENT BORDER CLASHES INDICATED THAT IMPROVEMENT WAS NOT DEEP. SOVIETS HAVE URGED BOTH PARTIES TO SETTLE ISSUE PEACEFULLY, BUT THERE HAS BEEN NO REAL PROGRESS AND SOVIETS THUS FIND THEMSELVES IN DIFFICULT POSITION.

5. ON SOVIET-IRAQI RELATIONS, PYRLIN CONFIRMED EARLIER REPORT THAT IRAQI PRICE FOR OIL DELIVERED TO SOVIETS IS "ABOUT 12.00 DOLLARS PER BARREL."

6. COMMENT: PYRLIN'S SUPPORT FOR IRAQI GOVERNMENT ON KURDISH ISSUE IS CONSISTENT WITH LINE IN PRESS COMMENT HERE (REFTEL). HOWEVER, HE APPEARED LESS SANGUINE ABOUT RESOLUTION OF GOI-DURDISH DIFFERENCES THAT DID PRAVDA COMMENTARY WHICH FORECAST ACCORD IN NEXT TWO WEEKS. HIS REMARKS ON IRAQI-IRANIAN RELATIONS SUGGEST THAT, WHILE SOVIETS ARE BACKING BAGHDAD ON INTERNAL HANDLING OF KURDISH AFFAIRS AND ACKNOWLEDGING PROBABILITY OF "OUTSIDE" INTERFERENCE IN THE KURDISH QUESTION,

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PAGE 03 MOSCOW 03744 161532Z

THEY ARE NOT EXTENDING THEIR SUPPORT FOR BAGHDAD TO THE IRANIAN FRONTIER PROBLEM.

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FILM= n/a

DATE= 12 MAR 74

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CHANNEL= n/a

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EO= GS

SUBJECT= PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF IRAN-IRAQ BORDER CLASHES

REFERENCE= THERAN 1786 AND PREVIOUS

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= FOREIGN RELATIONS, BORDER INCIDENTS, BOUNDARY CLAIMS, POLITICAL SITUATION, PUBLIC ATTITUDES

TAGS= PINS, IZ, IR

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5728

INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

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BEIRUT PASS BAGHDAD

E.O. 11653: GDS

TAGS: PINS, IZ, IR

SUBJ: PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF IRAN-IRAQ BORDER CLASHES

REF: THERAN 1786 AND PREVIOUS

SUMMARY: IRANIAN MILITARY ACTIONS ON IRAQI FRONT HAVE BEEN DECISIVE AND FIRM, BUT DIPLOMATIC AND MEDIA SUPPORT HAS BEEN MILD. WHILE IRAN WISHES TO MAINTAIN PRESSURE ON BAGHDAD, IT DOES NOT SEEM TO WISH TO PROVOKE UNFAVORABLE REACTION FROM IRANIAN PUBLIC OR OTHER ARABS. WE BELIEVE RESTRAINT WILL CONTINUE TO BE DOMINANT ALTHOUGH BORDER SKIRMISHES LIKELY TO CONTINUE. END SUMMARY.

1. ALTHOUGH OUR LACK OF KNOWLEDGE AS TO PRECISELY WHAT HAPPENED DURING RECENT IRAN-IRAQ BORDER CLASH MAKES IT DIFFICULT TO ANALYZE WHY IT HAPPENED, WE BELIEVE TENTATIVE JUDGMENTS MAY BE USEFUL. IRAN HAS PURSUED A TWO-SIDED POLICY WHICH REFLECTS, WE

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THINK, CONFLICTING BUT EQUALLY IMPORTANT OBJECTIVES FOR GOI.

2. ACCORDING TO RELIABLE REPORTS, IRAQIS PROBABLY STARTED MAJOR INCIDENTS IN FEBRUARY AND MARCH BY SHOOTING FIRST. HOWEVER, FIGHTING REACHED SERIOUS LEVEL IN LARGE PART BECAUSE IRANIANS PUSHED BACK VERY HARD. ASSERTED CAUSE OF EARLY FEBRUARY INCIDENTS NEAR MEHREN (SW OF KERMANSHAH) WAS IRANIAN ROAD BUILDING ON IRAQI-CLAIMED TERRITORY. AT THAT TIME, IRANIANS SHOWED NO DISPOSITION TO DISCUSS IRAQI COMPLAINTS. DURING ENSUING BATTLE FEBRUARY 10, IRANIANS ARE SAID TO HAVE CROSSED INTO IRAQ AND REMAINED THERE FOR SOME TIME. SUBSEQUENTLY, BOTH SIDES HAVE MOVED CONSIDERABLE HEAVY EQUIPMENT INTO BORDER AREA.

3. ON THE OTHER HAND, DURING THIS PERIOD OF INTERMITTENT FIGHTING AND TENSION, IRANIANS HAVE SENT THEIR AMBASSADOR TO BAGHDAD AND SHAH RECEIVED IRAQI AMBASSADOR IN AUDIENCE. PRESS AND GOI OFFICIALS HAVE PLAYED FIGHTING IN VERY LOW KEY AND THERE HAS BEEN NO EFFORT TO WHIP UP PUBLIC SENTIMENT ON THIS ISSUE. DESPITE SERIOUS PROVOCATIONS AND LOSSES, IRAN HAS HELD LARGELY TO GENDARMERIE DEFENSE BACKED UP BY ARTILLERY AND HAS NOT FULLY COMMITTED GROUND OR AIR FORCE. (AIRCRAFT WERE USED FOR LIMITED RECONNAISSANCE ONLY.) IRAN READILY AGREED TO AND HAS OBSERVED CEASE FIRE AFTER MOST RECENT FIGHTING.

4. WE SEE FOLLOWING POLITICAL FACTORS AS POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS OF APPARENT INCONSISTENCIES IN GOI TREATMENT OF IRAQ PROBLEM:

A. IRANIANS WISH TO KEEP DESPISED IRAQI REGIME OFF BALANCE TO MAXIMUM EXTENT. BAGHDAD IS SEEN AS IRAN'S PRINCIPAL EXTERNAL THREAT AND CHIEF SUPPORT FOR TERRORISTS AND OTHER INTERNAL DISSIDENTS. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE NO DEFINITE EVIDENCE, IT SEEMS LOGICAL THAT IRANIANS CAN HAVE NO WISH FOR IRAQIS TO PROGRESS TOWARDS SOLUTION TO KURDISH PROBLEM, THEREBY RELEASING ENERGIES THAT COULD BE USED AGAINST IRAN OR IN SUPPORT OF GULF SUBVERSION. IF IRAQI TROOPS WERE DRAWN AWAY TO BORDER DEFENSE, BAGHDAD MIGHT HAVE MORE DIFFICULT TIME IN PUTTING ACROSS ITS KURDISH AUTONOMY PLAN. HOWEVER, AS STATED REFTTEL, WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT IRAN IS MOTIVATED BY FEAR THAT KURDISH AUTONOMY WILL PROVE ATTRACTION FOR IRANIAN KURDS.

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B. IRANIAN ARMED FORCES HAVE HISTORICALLY BEEN LITTLE DISPOSED TO TOLERATE IRAQI BREACHES OF BORDER PEACE BY MAINTAINING

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EO= GS

SUBJECT= IRAQ-IRAN BORDER CLASH AND KURDISH PROBLEM

REFERENCE= BAGHDAD 98

CONTROL NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE

RELEASE

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= PROVINCE, BORDER INCIDENTS, BOUNDARY CLAIMS, MINORITIES

TAGS= PFOR, LZ, IR

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PAGE 01 TEHRAN 01786 070927Z

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FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5647
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

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BEIRUT PASS UNINT BAGHDAD

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, IZ, IR

SUBJECT: IRAQ-IRAN BORDER CLASH AND KURDISH PROBLEM

REF: BAGHDAD 98

SUMMARY: WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE TO INDICATE ANY IRANIAN DESIRE TO PREVENT RESOLUTION OF IRAQI KURDISH PROBLEM AS SUGGESTED PARAGRAPH THREE REFTEL. WHILE IT WOULD APPEAR LOGICAL THAT TEHRAN WOULD NOT FAVOR ESTABLISHMENT OF INDEPENDENT OR NEARLY INDEPENDENT ECONOMICALLY VIABLE KURDISTAN IN IRAQI TERRITORY, THIS DOES NOT SEEM TO BE THE SORT OF AUTONOMY THAT BAGHDAD IS OFFERING BARZANI'S KURDS. IN ANY CASE IRANIAN KURDS, DESPITE ETHNIC TIES TO BROTHER KURDS IN IRAQ, UNLIKELY TO BE ATTRACTED TO ANYTHING LESS THAN INDEPENDENT KURDISTAN AS THEIR PRESENT ECONOMIC POSITION AND FUTURE PROSPECTS IN IRAN ARE FAR SUPERIOR TO ANYTHING THEY COULD EXPECT TO FIND IN IRAQI MOUNTAINS.

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PAGE 02 TEHRAN 01786 070927Z

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END SUMMARY.

1. WE HAVE SEEN NOTHING WHICH WOULD SUGGEST IRANIAN INTENTION TO SANDBAG SCHEDULED MARCH 11 RESOLUTION OF IRAQI KURDISH PROBLEM. NO GOI OFFICIALS HAVE SO INDICATED BUT, SOLELY FROM LOGICAL POINT OF VIEW, IT WOULD APPEAR TO MAKE SENSE FOR TEHRAN TO OPPOSE ESTABLISHMENT OF INDEPENDENT OR SEMI-INDEPENDENT KURDISH STATE ON ITS WESTERN FLANK. HOWEVER, IN ORDER TO SURVIVE ECONOMICALLY SUCH A STATE WOULD NEED CONTROL OF A MAJOR ECONOMIC ASSET SUCH AS KIRKUK OIL FIELDS. TO BEST OF OUR KNOWLEDGE BAGHDAD IS NOT OFFERING A DEGREE OF POLITICAL OR ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE SUFFICIENT TO MAKE AUTONOMOUS KURDISTAN ATTRACTIVE TO IRANIAN KURDS, OR EVEN TO IRAQI KURDS.

2. IN CONTRAST TO THEIR IRAQI BRETHREN, IRANIAN KURDS HAVE LIVED AT PEACE WITH THEIR CENTRAL GOVERNMENT FOR 25 YEARS. DURING THIS PERIOD AND ESPECIALLY IN LAST FIVE YEARS TEHRAN HAS MADE SERIOUS EFFORTS TO IMPROVE SOCIO/ECONOMIC CONDITIONS OF ITS KURDS WHILE PROVIDING LIMITED AND POLITICALLY MOTIVATED AID TO STRUGGLING KURDS ON IRAQI SIDE OF BORDER. KURDISH IRNLIANS NOW BENEFIT FROM MODERN ASPHALTED ROAD SYSTEM AND WELL MAINTAINED SECONDARY ROADS THROUGHOUT THEIR REGION AND CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IS SPENDING ENORMOUS SUMS ON DAM CONSTRUCTION AND AGRICULTURAL PROJECTS. CURRENT FIVE YEAR PLAN RATES KURDISH AREA SECOND ONLY TO COSTAL PROVINCE IN TERMS OF PROGRAMMED EXPENDITURES OF DEVELOPMENT FUNDS. PROGRAMS HAVE EVIDENTLY BORNE FRUIT AS PROVINCIAL OFFICIALS VISITED BY TABRIZ CONSULATE OFFICERS SEEMED COMPLETELY UNCONCERNED ABOUT KURDISH LOYALTIES. WHILE IRAN HAS BEEN EXTENDING ITSELF TO ASSURE THEREALITY OF ITS KURDS, RELATIONS BETWEEN BAGHDAD AND BARZANI'S KURDS HAVE BEEN SUCH THAT NIETHER IRANIAN KURDS NOR IRANIAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS EXPECT THAT A PROJECTED MARCH 11 IRAQI-KURDISH AGREEMENT, WHATEVER FORM IT MIGHT TAKE, WOULD BE EITHER SINCERE OF LONGLASTING.

3. IN SHORT, WE DO NOT THINK GOVERNMENT OF IRAN IS SUFFICIENTLY WORRIED BY PROSPECT OF A MARCH 11 AGREEMENT TO TAKE THE KIND OF SPOILING ACTION SUGGESTED BY AMBASSADOR NAGGAR.

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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

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FILM= n/a

DATE= 18 JAN 74

TYPE= TE

FROM= ANKARA

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OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= SECSTATE WASHDC

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ORIGCLASS= ~~SECRET~~

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EO= RR

SUBJECT= n/a

REFERENCE= n/a

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= n/a

TAGS= n/a

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19 REPLACE WITH THE FOLLOWING: QUOTE SYRIA EXTENDED SUPPORT TO THE TURKISH AND IRANIAN TERRORISTS BY PROVIDING AN AREA WHERE SOME PALESTINIAN ORGANIZATIONS COULD TRAIN AND SUPPLY THEM WITH AYMS. HOWEVER, IT HAS BEEN OBSERVED RECENTLY, IN PARTICULAR SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE RECENT ARAB-ISRAELI WAR, THAT THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN FOLLOWING A MORE RESTRAINED COURSE IN THIS RESPECT. UNQUOTE

COMMENT: MFA CLAIMS SYRAINS HAVE NOW BEGUN CURTAILING WHAT PALESTINIANS CAN DO IN TRAINING AND SUPPORTING TURK DISSIDENTS. SINCE THIS SQUARES WITH ONE RECENT US INTELLIGENCE REPORT, PRESUME DEPARTMENT WOULD ACCEPT.

21. REPLACE FIRST SENTENCE WITH FOLLOWING: QUOTE THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT ANTAGONIZED SOME MODERATE ARAB COUNTRIES, INSTIGATED FRONTIER INCIDENTS WITH KUWAIT AND IRAN AND CONDUCTED A PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN AGAINST IRAN. IT ALSO PROVIDED A BASE FOR SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES AGAINST IRAN AND PAKISTAN. UNQUOTE

COMMENT: THIS IS AN IMPROVEMENT AND PRESUME DEPARTMENT WOULD ACCEPT; HOWEVER, IRAN WILL INSIST ON MENTIONING IRAQ'S DISTRIBUTION OF ARMS.

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22. REPLACE PENULTIMATE SENTENCE WITH THE FOLLOWING:
QUOTE THIS SOVIET BUILD-UP OF IRAQI MILITARY STRENGTH WAS
FOLLOWED BY A BORDER INCIDENT BETWEEN IRAQ AND KUWAIT, IN
WHICH IRAQ EXTENDED PRESSURE ON KUWAIT IN ORDER TO GIVE
IRAQ ACCESS TO THE ISLANDS OF BUBIYAN AND WARBAH. UNQUOTE
COMMENT: SEEMS ACCEPTABLE.

24. REPLACE THIRD SENTENCE WITH THE FOLLOWING:
QUOTE THEY ENCOURAGE AND SUPPORT MOVEMENTS LIKE "AZAD
BALUCHISTAN MOVEMENT" AGAINST IRAN AND PAKISTAN. THE
SOVIETS WILL CONTINUE TO SEEK OPPORTUNITIES TO ENCOURAGE
AND SUPPORT FURTHER THE KURDS IN THE AREA AND TRY TO
EXPLOIT ANY DEVELOPMENT SERVING THEIR AIMS. UNQUOTE

COMMENT: WITH SOME LANGUAGE IMPROVEMENTS, THIS
COULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO DEPARTMENT.

40. TURKS WANT TO ADD NEW PARA 41 AFTER PARA 40
ON JORDAN AS FOLLOWS: QUOTE THE PLIGHT OF THE PALESTINIAN
REFUGEES HAS BEEN A CONTINUING CAUSE OF POLITICAL UNREST
AND THIS HAS PROVIDED AN OPPORTUNITY FOR SOVIET AND
CHINESE PENETRATION AND SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES IN THE AREA.
A MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT WHICH TAKES CARE OF THE PALESTINIAN
PROBLEM COULD HELP CURTAIL AN INCREASE OF SOVIET AND
CHINESE INFLUENCE IN THE REGION. INDICATIONS ARE THAT THE
SOVIET UNION WILL TRY TO KEEP THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION
ALIVE IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN, IF NOT STRENGTHEN, ITS POSITION
IN THE AREA. UNQUOTE

COMMENT: THE SUBSTANCE OF THIS NEW
PARA IS A PET THEME OF MFA DIRGEN OF POL AFFAIRS.
WE BELIEVE PAPER EVENTUALLY WILL HAVE TO INCLUDE SOME
REFERENCE TO PALESTINIAN PROBLEM, DESPITE THE DISCOURAGING
ATTITUDE WE AND THE BRITISH PROJECTED TO THE TURKS.
DEPARTMENT'S ADVICE NEEDED.

43. REPLACE WITH THE FOLLOWING: QUOTE CHINA SUPPLIES
ARMS AND AMMUNITION TO THE PALESTINIANS BESIDES PROVIDING
POLITICAL AND MORAL SUPPORT. IT HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED THAT
SOME OF THESE WEAPONS HAD BEEN SMUGGLED INTO TURKEY BY
TURKISH TERRORISTS. (IN FACT, 50 PERCENT OF THE SMUGGLED ARMS

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AND AMMUNITION UNCOVERED IN TURKEY WERE OF CHINESE
MANUFACTURE.) HOWEVER, IN A RECENT STATEMENT THE CHINESE
DEPUTY MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS DENIED THAT CHINA HAD
PROVIDED ARMS AND AMMUNITION TO TURKISH TERRORISTS AND

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CONTENDED THAT SUCH ASSERTIONS WERE PURELY SOVIET FABRICATIONS. UNQUOTE.

COMMENT: THIS IS AN IMPROVEMENT IN ONE SENSE.
RECOMMEND DEPARTMENT ACCEPT.

47. NEW SUB-PARA J) OR K), BEFORE OR AFTER PRESENT
LAST SUB-PARA: QUOTE THE IMPROVEMENT AND PROMOTION OF
BILATERAL RELATIONS OF THE REGIONAL CENTO MEMBERS WITH
THE REGIONAL NON-CENTO COUNTRIES WOULD PREVENT, TO
CERTAIN EXTENT, SOVIET PENETRATION, AND ALSO DISCOURAGE
SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES IN THE AREA. UNQUOTE

COMMENT: WE SUSPECT THAT SUBSTANCE OF THIS POINT
COULD BE HELPFUL, ESPECIALLY WHEN DRAFTING THE POLITICAL
GUIDANCE PAPER. ALTHOUGH IRANIANS AND PAKISTANIS WILL
PROBABLY OBJECT, WE BELIEVE TURKS SHOULD BE SUPPORTED.
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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

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EO= GS

SUBJECT= SUGGESTED REVISIONS TO CENTO SITUATION PAPER

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CONTROL_NBR= n/a

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LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE

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POLICY POSITION

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PAGE 01 STATE 243244

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DRAFTED BY NEA/RA:TGGRANT:AMP
APPROVED BY NEA - RODGER P. DAVIS
NEA/RA:SDSCHIFF
NEA:LBLAINGEN (DRAFT)
EUR/SOV:RMILES (DRAFT)
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DOD/JCS:CALLEN (DRAFT)

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E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: CENTO
SUBJECT: SUGGESTED REVISIONS TO CENTO SITUATION PAPER

REF: ANKARA 9513

SUMMARY: THERE FOLLOW SUGGESTED CHANGES TO LATEST REVISION OF PAPER ON SITUATION IN CENTO AREA. PARAGRAPH NUMBERS AND LETTERS CORRESPOND TO CENTO DOCUMENT CD/73/PWG/DI (REVISION NO. 3). END SUMMARY.

2. DELETE LAST SENTENCE AND INSERT QUOTE DESPITE AN APPARENTLY GENUINE DESIRE BY THE SOVIET UNION FOR DETENTE, SOVIET SUPPORT FOR EGYPT AND SYRIA DURING THE OCTOBER 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE HAS INDICATED THAT THEY INTEND TO UTILIZE EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO ENLARGE THEIR INFLUENCE IN THE REGION EVEN WHEN SUCH ACTIVITY THREATENS DETENTE. NEVERTHELESS, WHILE DETENTE DID NOT DETER SOVIET SUPPORT FOR THE

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PAGE 02 STATE 243244

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ARABS, IT DID MAKE POSSIBLE A MORE RAPID SETTLEMENT. END QUOTE.

7. AS NOW WRITTEN PARA 7 SETS UP A KIND OF STRAW MAN TO BE KNOCKED DOWN BY PARA 46(B). WE WOULD PREFER SEE FLAVOR OF 46(B) INCORPORATED IN PARA 7 I.E., UNLIKELIHOOD OF THIS CONTINGENCY.

11. IN FIRST SENTENCE DELETE ALL AFTER QUOTE ALLIANCE END QUOTE AND ADD AS SECOND SENTENCE QUOTE HOWEVER, AS PART OF THEIR GENERAL MIDDLE EAST POLICY, THE SOVIETS HAVE DEVELOPED POSITIONS OF INFLUENCE ON TURKEY'S SOUTHERN FLANK IN SYRIA AND IRAQ. END QUOTE.

16. ADD FOLLOWING AT END OF LAST SENTENCE IN PARAGRAPH: HOWEVER, SOVIET INFLUENCE MAY UNDERGO EROSION IF THERE IS A MIDDLE EAST PEACE SETTLEMENT.

20. ADD AFTER FIRST SENTENCE: QUOTE HOWEVER, DURING THE OCTOBER 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR, IRAQ SAW IT IN HER INTEREST TO IMPROVE HER RELATIONS WITH IRAN AND TOOK THE INITIATIVE TO REESTABLISH DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. END QUOTE. ADD AS PENULTIMATE SENTENCE: QUOTE HOWEVER, THESE ACTIVITIES MAY SUBSIDE SOMEWHAT WITH THE RESUMPTION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. END QUOTE.

21. WE AGAIN PROPOSE DELETION OF ENTIRE SENTENCE BEGINNING QUOTE THE NUMBER OF AIRFIELDS EXCEEDS END QUOTE UNLESS THOSE FAVORING RETENTION CAN PRESENT SPECIFIC SUPPORTING INFORMATION.

22. ADD AS FINAL SENTENCE: QUOTE HOWEVER, SINCE IRAQ'S NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT WITH THE IPC IN MARCH, 1973, IRAQ HAS ENTERED INTO MAJOR ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS WITH THE WEST IN IMPORTANT OIL, INDUSTRIAL, AND COMMERCIAL PROJECTS. END QUOTE.

23. DELETE PENULTIMATE SENTENCE. IN PRESENT FORM SENTENCE CAN GIVE IMPRESSION SOVIETS ARE SUPPORTING IRAQI KURDS AGAINST IRAQI GOVERNMENT. IF OTHER MEMBERS OF GROUP INSIST
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PAGE 03 STATE 243244

ON SOME REFERENCE TO SOVIET SUPPORT FOR KURDS, WE SUGGEST RETURN TO ORIGINAL LANGUAGE OF PAPER BY ADDING TO THIRD SENTENCE QUOTE AND THE KURDS AGAINST IRAN AND TURKEY. END

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QUOTE.

28. WE HAD BEEN PREPARED TO ACCEPT LANGUAGE PROPOSED IN STATE 181424 S MODIFIED BY THAT IN ANKARA 7679; HOWEVER, NEW LANGUAGE PROPOSED IN THIRD REVISION CONTAINS SO MANY UNACCEPTABLE PASSAGES THAT WE NOW PROPOSE FOLLOWING COMPLETE REDRAFT: QUOTE THE MAIN AIM OF THE SOVIET UNION IN AFGHANISTAN IS TO ENSURE A FRIENDLY STATE AMENABLE TO SOVIET INFLUENCE. POOR RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN OVER THE QUOTE PUSHTUNISTAN END QUOTE ISSUE HAVE DRAWN AFGHANISTAN INTO A CLOSER RELATIONSHIP WITH THE USSR, DESPITE THE TRADITIONAL AFGHAN NONALIGNED POSTURE IN EXTERNAL RELATIONS OVER THE YEARS, SOVIET POLICY HAS BEEN CALCULATED TO BENEFIT FROM PAK-AFGHAN ANTAGONISM. WHEN PAKISTAN JOINED CENTO, THE USSR GAVE GENERAL SUPPORT TO AFGHANISTAN'S PUSHTUNISTAN CLAIM. IN THE MID-1950'S THE SOVIET UNION BEGAN TO PROVIDE LARGE SCALE ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO ITS SOUTHERN NEIGHBOR. ALTHOUGH NO HARD EVIDENCE IS AVAILABLE OF ACTIVE SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN THE COUP D'ETAT OF JULY 17, 1973, BRINGING MOHAMMAD DAOUD TO POWER; THE SOVIETS MAY HAVE HAD PRIOR KNOWLEDGE. IT IS APPARENT THAT DAOUD'S MAJOR EXTERNAL PREOCCUPATION IS THE QUOTE SETTLEMENT END QUOTE OF THE PUSHTUNISTAN ISSUE WITH PAKISTAN. SINCE ASSUMING POWER DAOUD HAS STEPPED UP ANTI-PAKISTAN PROPAGANDA AND HAS GIVEN ENCOURAGEMENT TO TRIBAL OPPONENTS OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IN PAKISTAN'S NORTHWEST FRONTIER PROVINCE. WHILE THE AFGHANS HAVE NOT YET APPEARED TO BE WILLING TO PUSH THE ISSUE TO THE POINT OF DIRECT CONFRONTATION WITH PAKISTAN, THEY CONTINUE TO TALK PUBLICLY ABOUT THE ISSUE IN WAYS THAT ARE VIEWED AS INTERFERENCE IN PAKISTAN'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS. AS AN EXAMPLE, THE AFGHANISTAN REPRESENTATIVE AT THE NONALIGNED CONFERENCE IN ALGIERS IN SEPTEMBER 1973 ALLEGED THAT PAKISTAN HAD REFUSED TO RECOGNIZE THE QUOTE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF SEVEN MILLION PEOPLE SEPARATED BY A COLONIAL POWER FROM THEIR FATHER LAND. END QUOTE. HE CONTINUED BY SAYING THAT AFGHANISTAN QUOTE WOULD SPARE NO EFFORTS TO SEEKING AND REALIZING A SOLUTION OF THIS QUESTION. END QUE

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PAGE 04 STATE 243244

QUOTE. THE SOVIETS RECENTLY HAVE SENT A HIGH-LEVEL MILITARY MISSION TO AFGHANISTAN TO REORGANIZE AND MODERNIZE ITS FORCES. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE AS YET TO SUGGEST THAT THE SOVIETS ARE ENCOURAGING AFGHAN ADVENTURISM ON PUSHTUNISTAN; HOWEVER, THE USSR'S DESIRE FOR EXPANDED INFLUENCE WITH THE DAOUD GOVERNMENT AND ITS WILLINGNESS TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT TO THE AFGHAN MILITARY

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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a
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*** Current Classification *** ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

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DOC_NBR= 73BAGHDA00636

FILM= n/a

DATE= 28 NOV 73

TYPE= TE

FROM= BAGHDAD

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= STATE

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ORIGPCCLASS= n/a

EO= GS

SUBJECT= EGYPTIAN VIEW OF KURDISH PROBLEM

REFERENCE= BAGHDAD 630

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= PARAMILITARY FORCES, MINORITIES, COMMUNISTS, POLITICAL SITUATION

TAGS= PINT, IZ

RELEASE

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PAGE 01 BAGHDA 00636 060257Z

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ACTION NEA-12

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INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03

SS-20 USIA-15 ACDA-19 IO-14 NIC-01 OMB-01 DRC-01 EA-11

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FM USINT BAGHDAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 657
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
USINT CAIRO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BAGHDAD 636

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PINT, IZ

SUBJECT: EGYPTIAN VIEW OF KURDISH PROBLEM

REF: BAGHDAD 630

1. IN COURSE LONG DISCUSSION ON OTHER SUBJECTS NOV 27 EGYPTIAN AMBASSADOR NAJJAR TOLD ME HE BELIEVED SOME KIND OF KURDISH SETTLEMENT BASED ON AUTONOMY WITHIN IRAQI REPUBLIC WAS NOW POSSIBLE BY MARCH 1974. NEITHER SIDE WAS IN MOOD TO RENEW FIGHTING AND THEIR RESPECTIVE POSITIONS ARE NOT AS FAR APART AS PRESENT BARGAINING POSITIONS SUGGEST. VIEW THAT AUTONOMY IS BOTH REALISTIC AND BEST KURDS LIKELY TO OBTAIN IS NOW ACCEPTED AMONG KURDISH ELITE. AMBASSADOR CLAIMS THAT EVEN BARZANI IS READY TO ACCEPT THIS SOLUTION. AMBASSADOR DOES NOT NECESSARILY ENVISAGE SIGNED SETTLEMENT DOCUMENT BY MARCH, BUT DE FACTO SITUATION ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH SIDES.

2. NAJJAR DISCOUNTED IMPORTANCE RECENT CLASHES BETWEEN

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PAGE 02 BAGHDA 00636 060257Z

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COMMUNISTS AND KURDS AND SAID: GOI HAD GIVEN ARMS TO COMMUNISTS KNOWING KURDS WOULD REACT VIOLENTLY, AS THEY DID. REAL GOVERNMENT AIM WAS TO UNDERCUT AND WEAKEN COMMUNISTS. SOVIETS WERE FURIOUS WITH ICP FOR HAVING FALLEN INTO TRAP. HE BELIEVES SOVIETS NOW WISH TO SEE SETTLEMENT AS MEANS OF STABILIZING THEIR POSITION IN IRAQ. SOVIETS HAVE NOT GIVEN UP EXPANSIONIST DESIGNS TOWARD GULF, NOR EXPLOITATION OF MIDDLE EASTERN MINORITIES FOR THEIR OWN PURPOSES, BUT THEIR LARGER OBJECTIVES NOW DICTATE PUTTING SUPPORT FOR KURDS IN REFRIGERATOR. LARGER SOVIET AIMS ARE, IN NAKJAR'S VIEW, BUILDING STRONG, STABLE POSITION THROUGHOUT AREA TO KEEP CHINESE OUT AND DETENTE WITH WEST.

3. AMBASSADOR NAJJAR ALSO BELIEVES IRANIANS ARE NOW PREPARED TO STOP AID FOR KURDS IN EXCHANGE FOR NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS AND END TO IRAQI SUBVERSIVE EFFORTS IN IRAN. SINCE EGYPT PLAYED ROLE IN RE-ESTABLISHMENT IRANIAN-IRAQI DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, NAJJAR PROBABLY KNOWS MORE ABOUT IRAQI-IRANIAN TALKS THAN HE LET ON.

4. NAJJAR SAID EGYPTIAN OBJECTIVE IN IRAQ AND GULF WAS STABILITY IN ORDER TO ENSURE ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF ARAB-ISRAELI SETTLEMENT ACCRUE TO ARAB WORLD. IF ASSESSMENT OF SOVIET OBJECTIVES CORRECT, HE THOUGHT POSSIBILITIES FOR STABILIZING GULF AREA WERE GOOD. LOWRIE

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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

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<<<*** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ***>>>

DOC_NBR= 73TEHRAN08549

FILM= n/a

DATE= 05 DEC 73

TYPE= TE

FROM= TEHRAN

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= STATE

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ORIGPCCLASS= n/a

EO= GS

SUBJECT= ROCKY ROAD FOR IRANIAN-IRAQI RELATIONS

REFERENCE= TEHRAN 7584

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS ESTABLISHMENT, FOREIGN RELATIONS, POLITICAL SITUATION

TAGS= PFOR, IR, IZ

RELEASE

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ACTION NEA-12

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BEIRUT PASS BAGHDAD

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR IR IZ

SUBJ: ROCKY ROAD FOR IRANIAN-IRAQI RELATIONS

REF: TEHRAN 7584

SUMMARY: LATEST DEVELOPMENTS RAISE DOUBTS RE PROSPECTS FOR
IMPROVED RELATIONS BETWEEN TEHRAN AND BAGHDAD. END SUMMARY.

1. MFA UNDERSECRETARY FOR INTERNATIONAL AND ECONOMIC
AFFAIRS JAFAR NADIM TOLD DCM DECEMBER 3 THAT MFA HAD RECEIVED
A NOTE FROM IRAQI EMBASSY IN TEHRAN RAISING MOST SERIOUS
DOUBTS RE IRAQI GOOD FAITH IN SEEKING TO RESTORE DIPLOMATIC
RELATIONS WITH IRAN AND ESTABLISHING RESIDENT AMBASSADORS
IN EACH CAPITAL. NOTE HAD REFERRED TO IRANIAN CITY OF
KHORRAMSHAHR BY ANCIENT ARABIC NAME OF MUHAMMAREH AND
PROTESTED USE OF SHATT-AL-ARAB RIVER BY IRANIAN WARSHIPS.
NADIM SAID IRAN PROPOSED TO DELIVER COPIES OF OFFENDING NOTE
TO ARAB EMBASSIES IN TEHRAN AND RETURN THE NOTE ITSEC
UNANSWERED TO IRAQI EMBASSY. ON DECEMBER 5 WHAT HAD TRANS-
PIRED WAS TO BE FEATURED IN IRANIAN PRESS. A HINT OF THIS
RENEWED STRAIN APPEARED IN DECEMBER 4 PRESS WHICH PROTESTED
RECENT BAGHDAD TELEVISION PROGRAMS ALLEGEDLY CLAIMING

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KHORRAMSHAHR PROPERLY TO BE IRAQI TERRITORY AND DENOUNCING
IRANIAN TAKE-OVER OF GULF ISLANDS.

2. DURING DECEMBER 4 CONVERSATION AT MFA, POLCOUN WAS TOLD
BY DG FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS (ASIA AND AFRICA) SANANDAJI
THAT NOTE HAD BEEN RETURNED UNANSWERED TO IRAQI EMBASSY
AS PLANNED. HOWEVER, IRAQI CHARGE KHALID SAMARRAI HAD
PROTESTED WITH APPARENT SINCERITY THAT HE HAD BEEN UNDER
NO INSTRUCTIONS FROM HIS GOVERNMENT TO SEND THE NOTE AND
THAT HIS TRANSLATOR HAD MISTRANSLATED KHORRAMSHAHR AND HAD
OTHERWISE ACTED WITHOUT AUTHORITY. ALTHOUGH MFA IS OBVIOUSLY
SKEPTICAL ABOUT SAMARRAI'S STORY, PLANS TO PUBLICIZE THE NOTE
IN IRANIAN MEDIA HAVE BEEN SHELVED FOR THE TIME BEING.
SANANDAJI PERSONALLY DOUBTS THAT IRAQ REALLY MEANS TO
EXCHANGE AMBASSADORS WITH IRAN, RELATING THIS
PRIMARILY TO THE BAGHDAD REGIME'S CONTINUING UNSETTLED
PROBLEMS WITH THE KURDS. IN ANY CASE, IRAN WOULD NOT SEND
AN AMBASSADOR TO BAGHDAD UNTIL AN IRAQI AMBASSADOR HAD FIRST
ARRIVED IN TEHRAN.

3. COMMENT: THIS LATEST EPISODE IN THE UNHAPPY
RELATIONS BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ HELPS TO CONFIRM THE
VIEWS OF MANY OBSERVERS HERE THAT IN SPITE OF IRAQ'S
INITIATIVE IN THE BEGINNING OF THE OCTOBER WAR TO
RESTORE RELATIONS WITH IRAN, ANY REAL IMPROVEMENT IN
RELATIONS IS UNLIKELY TO OCCUR. END COMMENT.
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SUBJECT= POST WAR ASSESSMENT OF IRAQ AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

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LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE

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ACTION NEA-12

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INFO AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
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AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PINT, PFOR, IZ, US

SUBJECT: POST WAR ASSESSMENT OF IRAQ AND POLICY
RECOMMENDATIONS

1. SUMMARY: ON EVE OF ARAB-ISRAELI WAR IRAQI REGIME WAS
ESTRANGED FROM MOST ARABS AND IRAN, ENGAGED IN BITTER INTRA-PARTY
STRUGGLE FOR POWER, FACED WITH POSSIBLE NEW WAR AGAINST KURDS, AND
INVOLVED IN MARRIAGE OF CONVENIENCE WITH COMMUNIST PARTY WHICH
COMMUNISTS SKILLFULLY EXPLOITING. ONLY ON ECONOMIC FRONT WERE
THINGS GOING WELL AND REGIME NO DOUBT HOPED PROSPERITY WOULD
RESOLVE PROBLEMS. WAR HAS NOT REMOVED UNDERLYING CAUSES OF
INSTABILITY. AT MOST REGIME HAS GAINED TIME TO DEAL WITH
PROBLEMS. DESPITE ANTI-U.S. STAND, THERE IS STILL HOPE FOR U.S.

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END SUMMARY.

2. WAR WAS GODSEND FOR BAATH REGIME AND IT ACTED SWIFTLY TO EXPLOIT IT. IT CONTRIBUTED TWO DIVISIONS AND FIVE AIR FORCE SQUADRONS BUT KEPT BEST WEAPONS AT HOME. INDIAN MILATT SAYS TWO BRIGADES WHICH SAW ACTION FOUGHT WELL. HE PUTS AIRCRAFT LOSSES AT 32 OUT OF 60, TANK LOSSES AT 120, AND CASULTIES OF TWO BRIGADES AT 50 PERCENT. REGIME'S ABRUPT REJECTION OF CEASE-FIRE AND DECISION TO WITHDRAW TROOPS WERE POPULAR WITH PUBLIC, BUT WAY IT WAS DONE HAS OFFENDED ARMY. ISOLATION AND WITHDRAWAL APPEAR TO HAVE ELIMINATED IRAQ AS IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN SEARCH FOR SETTLEMENT. REGIME BELIEVES U.S. AND U.N. LACK WILL TO BRING ABOUT SETTLEMENT AND HOPES TO BE IN POSITION TO EXPLOIT ANTICIPATED FAILURE.

3. USE OF CRISIS TO ACHIEVE EARLIER OBJECTIVES OF RESUMPTION OF RELATIONS WITH IRAN AND NATIONALIZATION OF LAST U.S. INVESTMENTS WAS SKILLFULLY DONE. LATTER ENHANCED REGIME'S RADICAL REPUTATION, AS DID LATER NATIONALIZATION OF DUTCH PORTION OF SHELL HOLDINGS IN BPC. IRAQ HAS NOT, HOWEVER, PROHIBITED OIL EXPORTS TO U.S. NOR CUT ITS PRODUCTION, PRESUMABLY BECAUSE THIRD OF EXPORTS ALREADY STOPPED BY BANIAS CLOSURE AND BECAUSE IT WAS CONFRONTATION STATE AND NEEDS REVENUE.

4. KURDS - FOR PAST YEAR BAATH LEADERS HAVE RECOGNIZED NECESSITY OF RAPPROCHMENT WITH IRAN AS PREREQUISITE FOR DEALING WITH KURDS AND RESUMPTION OF RELATIONS MAY LEAD TO PROGRESS. FRENCH AMBASSADOR HAS REPORT THAT SHAH IS NOW PREPARED TO COOPERATE BECAUSE OF KURDISH NATIONALIST ACTIVITY IN IRAN. REGIME HAS ALSO USED WAR TO PRESSURE KDP TO ACCEPT BAATH PLAN FOR AUTONOMY. KDP, WHILE PROFESSING SOLIDARITY AGAINST ISRAEL, HAS SHOWN NO INCLINATION TO COMPROMISE AND IS ATTACKING ICP FOR ITS ROLE IN NATIONAL FRONT.

5. ICP ALSO EXPLOITED WAR FOR ITS OWN PURPOSES. IN MIDST OF WAR CENTRAL COMMITTEE ISSUED EMERGENCY CALL FOR MOBILIZATION OF MASSES AND INDIRECTLY CRITICIZED REGIME'S ACTIONS. SINCE CEASE-FIRE ICP HAS BEEN APOLOGIST FOR USSR AND IS IN DIRECT CONFLICT WITH BAATH POSITION THAT CEASE-FIRE IS SELL-OUT OF ARAB MASSES. LABOR UNION ELECTIONS SCHEDULED FOR NOV 3 POSTPONED UNTIL JANUARY SUGGESTING BAATH WANTS MORE TIME TO

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DEAL WITH ICP THREAT.

6. BAATH PARTY ELECTIONS ARE REPORTEDLY COMPLETED AND NEXT STEP

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IS PARTY CONGRESS. WHILE SOME HIGH OFFICIALS APPARENTLY DEFEATED, SIGNIFICANCE OF CHANGES MUST AWAIT CONGRESS. EVEN IF REGIME RESOLVES INTRA-PARTY STRUGGLE AND INCIPIENT THREAT FROM ICP, IT MAY FACE NEW THREAT FROM MILITARY. INDIAN MILATT SURI TOLD ME NOV 3 THAT CRITICISM OF REGIME IN ARMY INCREASINGLY WIDE-SPREAD. BASIS OF IT IS THAT ARMED FORCES THROWN INTO WAR WITHOUT ADEQUATE PREPARATION OR CONSULTATION, THEN WITHDRAWN ABRUPTLY, AGAIN WITHOUT CONSULTATION WITH MILITARY LEADERS. INSULT ADDED TO INJURY WHEN TROOPS NOT GIVEN AMMO UNTIL JUST BEFORE ENTERING SYRIA AND HAVING IT TAKEN AWAY UPON RETURN TO IRAQ.

7. VIEW PUT FORTH BAGHDAD 586 THAT IRAQ NEEDS USSR FOR FORESEEABLE FUTURE DESPITE MAJOR DIFFERENCE OVER WAR AND THAT USSR POISED TO EXPLOIT IRAQI WEAKNESSES SEEMS BORNE OUT BY 150 MILLION RUBLE LONG TERM LOAN AT 2 AND ONE HALF PERCENT SIGNED NOV 3 IN BAGHDAD.

8. DESPITE NATIONALIZATION OF EXXON AND MOBIL AND VIOLENT ANTI-U.S. PROPAGANDA, THERE ARE RECENT INDICATIONS THAT REGIME WISHES TO KEEP LINES TO U.S. OPEN. FOR EXAMPLE, THERE IS APPARENT DESIRE TO GO AHEAD WITH RECENT DEEP SEA TERMINAL CONTRACT, DIRGEN OF IRAQI AIRWAYS IS ABOUT TO ATTEND BOEING CONFERENCE IN MIAMI, AND COLUMNIST ROWLAND EVANS WARMLY RECEIVED LAST WEEK INCLUDING INTERVIEW WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN.

9. IF ABOVE ASSESSMENT CORRECT, IRAQ UNLIKELY TO EXPEND MAJOR RESOURCES TO DISRUPT SETTLEMENT, BUT CONTINUE AID TO PALESTINIANS. IF SETTLEMENT REACHED, REGIME WILL BE PREPARED TO RESUME POLICY OF FREE COMPETITION AND EXPANDED ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH U.S. IT IS STRONGLY RECOMMENDED THEREFORE THAT USG POSITION ON EXXON AND MOBIL NATIONALIZATION NOT PUT INSURMOUNTABLE OBSTACLE IN WAY OF FUTURE RELATIONS. NATIONALIZATION WAS POLITICAL IMPERATIVE FOR THIS REGIME AND PRICE WE PAID FOR SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP TO ISRAEL. LOOKING TO FUTURE, HOWEVER, REMOVAL OF LAST "COLONIALIST-ERA" INVESTMENT MAY ACTUALLY IMPROVE ATTRACTIVENESS OF U.S. FOR IRAQ. LOWRIE

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ORIGPCLASS= n/a

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SUBJECT= KURDISH PROBLEM AND IRAN

REFERENCE= 73 BAGHDAD 363 *m*

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APPROVED BY NEA - MR. SISCO

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TO USINT BAGHDAD

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA

USINT ALGIERS

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY SANAA

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY PARIS

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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PINT, IZ, IR

SUBJECT: KURDISH PROBLEM AND IRAN

REFERENCE: BAGHDAD 363

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1. THERE IS REASON TO BELIEVE AS STATED REFTEL THAT IRAQIS MAY SEE IT IN THEIR INTEREST TO SEEK SOME FORM OF DETENTE WITH IRAN AS A NECESSARY COROLLARY TO ATTEMPTING TO BRING ABOUT A SETTLEMENT WITH THE KURDS AND TO CONCENTRATE SPECIFICALLY ON DEVELOPMENT OF THE PETROLEUM SECTOR AND ECONOMIC/SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN GENERAL.
2. USG WOULD DO NOTHING TO DISCOURAGE SUCH DETENTE AND WOULD NOT RPT NOT INTERVENE IN SUCH REGIONAL ISSUE. ACCORDINGLY, RUMORS MENTIONED IN REFTEL THAT "SHAH FAVORS DETENTE WITH IRAQ BUT WESTERN POWERS HAVE DISSUAD HIM PRESUMABLY TO CONTAIN REVOLUTIONARY VIEWS FROM SPREADING" ARE BASELESS. IN FACT, THERE HAS BEEN NO USG APPROACH TO SHAH ON THIS POINT.
3. WE THINK IT DESIRABLE, THEREFORE, TO MAKE IT CLEAR TO THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT THAT WE REGARD IRAN, AS WE DO IRAQ, AS A SOVEREIGN, INDEPENDENT COUNTRY, FULLY CAPABLE OF MAKING ITS OWN DECISIONS AS TO WHERE ITS BEST INTERESTS LIE AND ACTING ON ITS CONCLUSIONS. AS A MATTER OF GENERAL POLICY WE WELCOME ANY STEP ANYWHERE WHICH REDUCES INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS AND PERMITS GOVERNMENTS TO DEVOTE THEIR FULL ATTENTION TO IMPROVING THE WELFARE AND WELL BEING OF THEIR PEOPLE. WE HAVE NOT, HOWEVER, ANY VESTED INTERESTS IN THE MODE OR DETAIL OF A RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ, A MATTER WHICH WE CONSIDER TO BE STRICTLY BETWEEN THE TWO STATES DIRECTLY CONCERNED. AS OCCASIONS ARISE IN OUR DEALING WITH IRAQI INTERESTS SECTION IN WASHINGTON AND IN USINT BAGHDAD'S CONTACTS WITH IRAQI OFFICIALS, WE SHOULD INFORM IRAQIS OF ABOVE STATED US POSITION. WE WOULD PREFER TO DO THIS DIRECTLY WITH OUR LIMITED IRAQI CONTACTS, RATHER THAN GOING THROUGH INTER-MEDIARIES. HOWEVER, THERE IS NO OBJECTION TO REITERATING OUR POSITION TO FOREIGN DIPLOMATS, SUCH AS TURKS AND ALGERIANS AS MENTIONED IN REFTEL, BUT NOT RPT NOT AS OUR CHOSEN CHANNELS TO IRAQI GOVERNMENT.

4. FOR TEHRAN: AS APPROPRIATE OCCASIONS ARISE, EMBASSY AUTHORIZED TO CONVEY SUBSTANCE OF U.S. POSITION AS OUT-
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SUBJECT= PRESS INTERVIEW WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN

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NEA/P - MR. BRIGGS

NEA/IRN - MR. MICHAUD

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TO USINT BAGHDAD

INFO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

AMEMBASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY PARIS

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E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PINS, IZ

SUBJ: PRESS INTERVIEW WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN

1. SUMMARY. JULY 15 EDITIONS OF NEW YORK TIMES AND WASHINGTON POST REPORTED EXCLUSIVE INTERVIEW WITH IRAQI REVOLUTIONARY COMMAND COUNCIL (RCC) VICE PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN. IN JULY 13 INTERVIEW HUSSEIN INDICATED DESIRE TO

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IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH THE WEST; STRESSED IRAQ'S NEUTRAL AND INDEPENDENT POSITION IN INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES; EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER IRAN'S INTENTIONS IN THE GULF AND IRAN'S ARMS BUILDUP; FORECAST THE CREATION OF A NATIONAL PARLIAMENT AND SWIFTER KURDISH PROGRESS TO AUTONOMY BY NEXT MARCH. END SUMMARY.

2. IN JULY 13 INTERVIEW WITH WESTERN JOURNALISTS IN BAGHDAD RCC VICE PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN AL TAKRITI INDICATED THAT IRAQ DOES NOT WANT ALIGNMENT WITH EAST OR WEST BUT HOPES TO "BE NEUTRAL BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS." ALTHOUGH HUSSEIN VIEWS CURRENT US AND UK POLICY AS HOSTILE, HE SAID "IRAQ WOULD WELCOME MOVES BY THE U.S. AND BRITAIN THAT COULD LEAD TO NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS." HUSSEIN WAS MORE OPTIMISTIC CONCERNING THE POSSIBLE IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS WITH THE UK THAN WITH THE U.S. BECAUSE "BRITAIN'S STANCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST CAN BE FAR LESS RIGID" AND "THE U.S. IS SEEN AS DEEPLY AND UNALTERABLY PRO-ISRAEL" (WASHINGTON POST). THERE WAS NO SUGGESTION DURING THE INTERVIEW THAT IRAQ WANTS TO DEPRIVE THE WEST OF ITS OIL RESOURCES. HUSSEIN TOLD NEWSMEN THAT "IRAQ CANNOT DRINK OIL, AND OUR MARKETS ARE THE WEST AND JAPAN." HUSSEIN PLAYED DOWN THE IMPORTANCE OF IRAQ'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION WHICH THE WASHINGTON-POST STATED IS "ECONOMICALLY PRACTICAL AND POLITICALLY LIMITED."

2. NEW YORK TIMES ARTICLE REPORTS HUSSEIN AS SAYING "THE SECURITY OF AMERICAN OIL SUPPLIES FROM THE MIDDLE EAST WOULD BE BETTER SERVED BY DEVELOPING FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH ARAB PRODUCERS THAN BY ARMING ISRAEL AND IRAN." BOTH THE TIMES AND POST ARTICLES EMPHASIZED HUSSEIN'S CONCERN OVER IRAN'S LARGE PURCHASES OF AMERICAN AND BRITISH MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND OVER IRAN'S SEIZURE OF THREE ISLANDS AT THE MOUTH OF THE GULF (ABU MUSA, GREATER AND LESSER TUNB). HUSSEIN SAID IRAN MUST WITHDRAW FROM THE ISLANDS OR NEGOTIATE A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT WITH THE ARAB EMIRATES ON THE FUTURE OF THE ISLANDS. HE INFORMED NEWSMEN THAT RECENT CONTACTS WITH IRAN HAD PRODUCED "NO POSITIVE RESULTS" AND "THERE IS NO REASON TO BELIEVE IN IRAN'S PEACEFUL INTENTIONS." THE N.Y. TIMES REPORTED HIM AS SAYING, HOWEVER, THAT THERE WERE "STILL MANY

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CHANCES TO ESTABLISH A BENEFICIAL RELATIONSHIP IF IRAN CHANGES HER ATTITUDE."

3. HUSSEIN TALKED OF THE CREATION OF A NATIONAL PARLIA-

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MENT TO ACHIEVE "A HEALTHY CONSENSUS." HE ANNOUNCED A NEW AGREEMENT WITH THE IRAQI COMMUNIST PARTY. THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMAND COUNCIL IS TO REMAIN THE SUPREME AUTHORITY IN IRAQ, AND EXCLUSIVELY BA'ATHIST, BUT IT WILL BE ENLARGED.

4. HUSSEIN ALSO FORECAST KURDISH PROGRESS TO AUTONOMY BY NEXT MARCH. THE WASHINGTON POST REPORTS KURDS BLAMED NAZIM KAZZAR, WHO WAS "WIDELY CONSIDERED TO HAVE BEEN A VIRTUAL PSYCHOPATH," FOR INCIDENTS BETWEEN THE KURDS AND IRAQI SECURITY FORCES. THE POST ARTICLE GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT NOW THAT KAZZAR HAS BEEN ELIMINATED RELATIONS BETWEEN THE KURDS AND THE BA'ATH PARTY MAY IMPROVE. RUSH

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SUBJECT= KURDISH BID FOR USG SUPPORT

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CONCEPTS= n/a

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ACTION NEA-06

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FM USINT BAGHDAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 434
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

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E. O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINT, IZ, US
SUBJECT: KURDISH BID FOR USG SUPPORT

REF: BEIRUT 7351; BAGHDAD 369

1. IF WE ARE INTERESTED IN WORKING TOWARD IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH IRAQ, I BELIEVE TIME HAS COME TO DISASSOCIATE OURSELVES FROM KURDISH REQUESTS FOR U. S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND AVOID RECEIVING KURDISH ENVOYS, EVEN FOR SYMPATHETIC HEARINGS. SUCH A DECISION COULD ALSO CONTRIBUTE TO OUR BROADER INTEREST IN REGIONAL STABILITY. THIS RECOMMENDATION IS BASED ON FOLLOWING CONCLUSIONS:

2. BAATH REGIME, HOWEVER DISTASTEFUL TO US AND MOST IRAQIS, IS ESSENTIALLY A NATIONALIST REGIME, EXCEEDINGLY JEALOUS OF ITS SOVEREIGNTY. IT HAS RECOGNIZED IT CANNOT DEFEAT KURDS MILITARILY AND IN MARCH 1970 ACCEPTED NECESSITY OF GRANTING KURDS CULTURAL AND OTHER RIGHTS. THESE RIGHTS GO WELL BEYOND WHAT KURDS ENJOY

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IN NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES. NEITHER BAAATH REGIME NOR ANY OTHER IRAQI REGIME IS LIKELY TO AGREE TO TYPE OF AUTONOMY THAT BARZANI DEMANDS SINCE TO DO SO WOULD BE TANTAMOUNT TO SURRENDERING SOVEREIGNTY.

3. AS LONG AS BARZANI RECEIVES ASSISTANCE FROM IRAN AND CAN HOPE FOR U. S. ASSISTANCE, HE IS UNLIKELY TO COMPROMISE WITH BAAATH. THUS PROSPECT OF RENEWED FIGHTING AND DIVERSION OF IRAQ FROM ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT REMAINS HIGH. MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST KURDS WOULD ALSO BE LIKELY TO STRENGTHEN RATHER THAN TO WEAKEN SOVIET INFLUENCE. THERE IS ALSO POSSIBILITY THAT KURDISH INSURGENCY WILL SPREAD INTO TURKEY, AND EVENTUALLY TO IRAN. I DO NOT KNOW SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH TURKISH GOVERNMENT VIEWS KURDISH PROBLEM, BUT TURKISH AMBASSADOR CUHRUK IS INTENSELY INTERESTED IN ALL ASPECTS OF SUBJECT AND RECENT 5 DAY VISIT OF TURKISH INTERIOR MINISTER IS BELIEVED TO HAVE BEEN PARTLY MOTIVATED BY CONCERN OVER KURDS.

4. FOR BETTER OR WORSE, IT IS HARD TO ESCAPE CONCLUSION THAT FUTURE OF IRAQI KURDS LIES WITH THEIR INTEGRATION INTO IRAQI STATE, ALBEIT WITH AS MUCH AUTONOMY AS THEY CAN OBTAIN. ONLY IF IRAQI KURDS WERE TO RECEIVE MASSIVE OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE WOULD THEY BE ABLE TO ACHIEVE REAL AUTONOMY. SUCH ASSISTANCE IS UNLIKELY TO BE FORTHCOMING EVEN FROM IRAN. FURTHERMORE, IN TERMS OF REGIONAL STABILITY, IT IS PROBABLY PREFERABLE THAT KURDISH INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT DOES NOT SUCCEED.

5. IRANIAN AND ISRAELI ASSISTANCE TO KURDS HAS SERVED THEIR PURPOSES, BUT THERE IS LITTLE TO SUGGEST IT HAS SERVED INTERESTS OF KURDISH PEOPLE, EXCEPT BY KEEPING ALIVE ILLUSION OF EVENTUAL INDEPENDENCE AND WINNING CONCESSIONS FROM BAAATH REGIME. SINCE CESSATION OF FIGHTING IN MARCH 1970, HOWEVER, KURDISTAN HAS, ACCORDING TO SCANTY INFO AVAILABLE HERE, REMAINED A DEPRESSED AREA. IT HAS NOT SHARED IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND REMAINS SOMETHING LIKE A STATE UNDER SIEGE. A RECENT SURVEY BY ENGLISH ILO EXPERT, INDICATES THAT INCOME OF KURDISH ARTISANS MAY BE AS MUCH AS 40 PERCENT BELOW ARTISANS IN REST OF COUNTRY.

6. KURDISH PROBLEM IS OF COURSE INEXTRICABLY LINKED WITH IRAN'S POLICY TOWARD IRAQ. THERE CAN BE NO RESOLUTION OF PROBLEM IN IRAQ OR LASTING DETENTE BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN WITHOUT CESSATION OF

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IRANIAN ASSISTANCE TO KURDS. WHILE RECOGNIZING OVERWHELMING IMPORTANCE OF IRANIAN POLICY, I RECOMMEND THAT WE MAKE CLEAR TO ALL CONCERNED PARTIES WHAT U. S. POLICY IS. I BELIEVE U. S. POSITION SHOULD BE THAT IRAQI-KURDISH CONFLICT IS STRICTLY IRAQI

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INTERNAL MATTER IN WHICH USG HAS NO INTENTION OF BECOMING INVOLVED. THIS POSITION SHOULD BE CONVEYED TO BARZANI'S ENVOYS WHENEVER THEY ATTEMPT TO ELICIT U. S. ASSISTANCE AND ALSO TO IRAQI GOVERNMENT, PREFERABLY THROUGH OFFICIAL NOTE.
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EO= RR

SUBJECT= KURDISH PROBLEM AND IRAN

REFERENCE= 73 BAGHDAD 329

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

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ACTION NEA-12

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AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
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AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS

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TAGS: PINT IZ IR

SUBJ: KURDISH PROBLEM AND IRAN

REF: BAGHDAD 329

1. COMMUNIST WEEKLY AL- FIKR AL- JADID AND KDP AL TAAXHI PUBLISHED IDENTICAL ARTICLE JUN 23 STATING THAT ICP DELEGATION HEADED BY FIRST SEC OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE AZIZ MOHAMMAD HAD MET WITH MUSTAFA BARZANI AT HIS HDQS ON JUN 19. STATEMENT SAID TWO PARTIES HAD CONCLUDED THAT IRAQ FACING GREAT DANGER FROM IMPERIALISTS AND THAT TO MEET IT REQUIRED (A) NATIONAL UNITY THROUGH IMPLEMENTATION OF MAR 1970 MANIFESTO AND SAFEGUARDING RIGHTS OF MINORITIES; AND (B) CREATION OF NATIONAL FRONT AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. AL- FIKR AL- JADID COMMENTED EDITORIALY BY PRAISING MEETING AS NEW STEP TOWARD ACCELERATING

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ESTABLISHMENT OF NATIONAL FRONT AND DEFEATING EFFORTS OF
REACTIONARY ELEMENTS TRYING TO EXPLOIT DIFFERENCES AND SOWING
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HATRED AND DOUBTS AMONG NATIONAL FORCES. IT CALLED ON MASSES
TO HELP BRING PEACE BETWEEN BAATH AND KDP.

2. COMMENT: THIS MEETING ALMOST CERTAINLY HAD APPROVAL OF
BAATH, WHO ARE PRESUMABLY ATTEMPTING TO USE COMMUNIST
INFLUENCE WITHIN KDP - AND THEIR STRONG INTEREST INFORMATION
OF NATIONAL FRONT - TO PRESSURE BARZANI TO COMPROMISE ON
DEMANDS FOR AUTONOMY. THERE IS, HOWEVER, INCREASING EVIDENCE
OF DIVERGENCE BETWEEN ICP AND BAATH OVER KURDISH ISSUE.
BAATHIST LEADERS ARE BELIEVED TO VIEW KURDISH PROBLEM AS
REGIME'S MAJOR REMAINING WEAK SPOT AND TO BE DETERMINED TO
RESOLVE IT. LONDON OBSERVER CORRESPONDENT GAVIN YOUNG, WHO RECENTLY
SPENT SEVERAL WEEKS HERE AT INVITATION OF GOI, SAID MINISTERS ALL
STRESSED THEIR DETERMINATION TO RESOLVE ISSUE AND HAD INDICATED
WILLINGNESS TO REACH DETENTE WITH IRAN AS NECESSARY TO KURDISH
SETTLEMENT. COMMUNIST LEADERS, ON OTHER HAND, HAD APPEARED
MORE RELAXED ABOUT KURDS AND THREAT FROM IRAN. THEY
CITED LONG IRANIAN BORDER WITH USSR WHICH MEANT USSR COULD
PRESSURE IRAN WHENEVER REQUIRED TO PROTECT IRAQ.

3. ALTHOUGH MANY PIECES OF PUZZLE OBVIOUSLY MISSING, IT APPEARS
THAT COMMUNISTS DO NOT WANT TO SEE BAATH RESOLVE KURDISH ISSUE
AND ACHIEVE DETENTE WITH IRAN ON THEIR OWN, SINCE THIS WOULD
FURTHER STRENGTHEN BAAATHIST POWER MONOPOLY. IF, HOWEVER,
COMMUNISTS CAN BRING ABOUT KURDISH SETTLEMENT, THEIR PRICE
WILL BE GREATER ROLE IN NATIONAL FRONT.

4. FRENCH AMB CERLES HAS REPORT, IN ADDITION TO THAT
CONTAINED IN REFTTEL, THAT BAATHISTS ARE BEING TOLD BY SOURCES
UNKNOWN THAT SHAH FAVORS DETENTE WITH IRAQ BUT WESTERN POWERS
HAVE DISSUADED HIM, PRESUMABLY TO CONTAIN "REVOLUTIONARY" VIEWS
FROM SPREADING. THIS RUMOR WAS GIVEN CREDIBILITY BY HEAVY
COVERAGE OF CENTO MEETING AND EMPHASIS ON COMBATTING
"SUBVERSION".

5. CONSENSUS OF DIPLOMATS HERE IS THAT BAATH REGIME IS SERIOUS
IN SEEKING DETENTE WITH IRAQ IN ORDER TO RESOLVE KURDISH
PROBLEM AND CONCENTRATE ON RAPID DEVELOPMENT OF PETROLEUM SECTOR
AFTER 10 YEARS OF NEAR STAGNATION. I REALIZE DEPT AND
EMBASSY TEHRAN MAY HAVE INFO WHICH CONTRADICTS SOME OF ABOVE.
IF NOT, HOWEVER, I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IN
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PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES IF U. S. COULD LET GOI KNOW, PERHAPS
THROUGH THIRD PARTY SUCH AS ALGERIAN OR TURKISH AMB,
THAT USG WOULD LIKE TO SEE RAPPROACHMENT BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ.
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	INR-01	IO-19	JUSE-00	LAB-04	L-03	ADS-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	PA-01	PM-01	PRS-01	P-02
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FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8405
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INFO USIA WASHDC PRIORITY 3119
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USMISSION GENEVA
ISLAMIC CONFERENCE COLLECTIVE
AMCONSUL ADANA
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PROVIDE COMFORT FOR POLAD - MAKOVSKY
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LONDON FOR NJOHNSON
CENTCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12356: ~~DECL. OADR~~
TAGS: PROP, PHUM, PINR, PTER, ETTC, UNSC, IZ
SUBJECT: (LOLL) 1988 AUDIOTAPES OF SENIOR IRAQI
OFFICIAL ORDERING OPPRESSION IN THE NORTH

1. (S) SUMMARY: THIS IS A SUMMARY REPORT OF THREE AUDIO CASSETTE RECORDINGS DATED 1988.

THE TAPES PROVIDE DIRECT EVIDENCE OF THE IRAQI REGIME'S PUNISHMENT OF ITS OWN FORCES RELUCTANT TO FIGHT THE "SABOTEURS;" WITHHOLDING OF ESSENTIAL COMMODITIES FROM RURAL POPULATIONS TO FORCE MIGRATION TO THE CITIES; FORCING OF MASSIVE

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ETHNIC POPULATION SHIFTS TO IMPOSE INTERNAL SECURITY; AND OF ITS ORDERS TO "PUT THE KURDS IN CORNERS AND GAS THEM FOR 15 DAYS," IN RESPONSE TO KURDISH DEMANDS FOR A TRUCE AND NEGOTIATIONS. THE RECORDINGS POWERFULLY DOCUMENT THE ABUSES IN WHICH THE SAME IRAQI REGIME PRINCIPAL, THE CURRENT MINISTER OF DEFENSE, PERSISTS TO THE PRESENT, AND MAY BE OF VALUE IN OUR DIPLOMATIC AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS EFFORTS. END SUMMARY.

(U) ACTION REQUESTS:

2. (U) FOR DEPARTMENT: PLEASE ADVISE HOW POST SHOULD DISPOSE OF AUDIO CASSETTE TAPES DESCRIBED BELOW. WE

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RECOMMEND FULL TRANSCRIPTION AND TRANSLATION BUT LACK RESOURCES TO PROVIDE THESE. POST HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECONTROL OF ACTUAL RECORDINGS OR OF SUMMARY TRANSLATIONS BELOW.

3. (S)

(U) ACQUISITION AND DESCRIPTION:

4. (S)

PROVIDED OFFICER OF THIS POST THREE 60-MINUTE AUDIO CASSETTE TAPES (NOT FULLY RECORDED) DURING VISIT TO NORTHERN IRAQ WITH PROVIDE COMFORT POLAD 16-18 MARCH.

5. (LSU) THE TAPES ARE LABELLED (IN ARABIC HANDWRITING): "ALI HASSAN AL-MAJID SPEAKS WITH PARTY MEMBERS - 1988". (FORMERLY INTERIOR MINISTER, ALI HASSAN AL-MAJID IS NOW SADDAM'S MINISTER OF DEFENSE AND A MEMBER OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMAND COUNCIL. IN 1988 HE WAS THE REGIME OFFICIAL CHARGED WITH THE FORCED RELOCATION AND REPRESSION OF THE KURDS.) WE HAVE NO EXTENSIVE CURRENT VOICE RECORDING OF THIS FIGURE TO COMPARE TO THE VOICE OF THE PRINCIPAL SPEAKER ON THE TAPES. HE IS NOT NAMED IN THE

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RECORDINGS BUT ONCE IS ADDRESSED AS "ABU HASSAN."

6. (LOU) AUDIO CONTENT INDICATES THE RECORDINGS DATE TO AROUND THE END OF THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR. WE DO NOT KNOW WHETHER THE TAPES ARE ORIGINALS OR COPIES. WE ARE UNAWARE OF PREVIOUS BROADCAST OF THESE RECORDINGS. (PREVIOUSLY BROADCAST CLIP OF AL-MAJID'S INFAMOUS "I WILL BURY THEM WITH BULLDOZERS" IS NOT INCLUDED.) AUDIO SIGNAL IS CLEAR, BROADCAST QUALITY ON TWO TAPES. THE THIRD CASSETTE IS UNDECIPHERABLE AT THIS POST, BUT A TECHNICALLY ENHANCED COPY MADE HERE IS READABLE. POST WILL RETAIN TAPES PENDING DEPARTMENT INSTRUCTIONS. WE HAVE ARBITRARILY DESIGNATED THE CASSETTES AS FIRST/SECOND/THIRD.

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	INR-01	IO-19	JUSE-00	LAB-04	L-03	ADS-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	PA-01	PM-01	PRS-01	P-02
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8406
CTF PROVIDE COMFORT INCIRLIK TU PRIORITY
INFO USIA WASHDC PRIORITY 3120
SECDEF WASHDC
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CIA WASHDC
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USMISSION GENEVA
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PROVIDE COMFORT FOR POLAD - MAKOVSKY
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USIA FOR NEA - AMB. RUGH

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LONDON FOR NJOHNSON
CENTCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PROP, PHUM, PINR, PTER, ETC, UNSC, IZ
SUBJECT: (LOU) 1988 AUDIOTAPES OF SENIOR IRAQI

(U) SUMMARY CONTENT DESCRIPTION:

7. (LOU) FIRST CASSETTE: SIDE A: 32 MINUTES; SIDE
B: 18 MINUTES. MAIN TOPICS: PUNISHING "SABOTEURS"
AND FAILED NATIONAL DEFENSE REGIMENTS; FORCING URBAN
MIGRATION BY DEPRIVING RURAL AREAS OF ESSENTIAL

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COMMODITIES:

-- PARTICIPANTS APPEAR TO BE ALI HASSAN AL-MAJID, GOVERNORS OF IRBIL AND DAHUK, AND OTHER OFFICIALS OF IRAQ'S NORTHERN PROVINCES. DISCUSSION COVERS THE FIRING OF LOCAL OFFICIALS; OBJECTION TO PRIVATIZING GASOLINE STATIONS "UNTIL THE EMERGENCY IN THE NORTH COMES TO AN END;" AND ORDERS TO PUNISH SIX "NATIONAL DEFENSE REGIMENTS" FOR THEIR "PSYCHOLOGICAL COLLAPSE" WHEN CONFRONTED BY THE "RUMORS OF SABOTEURS".

-- PUNISHMENT IS DEPRIVATION OF TWENTY FIVE PERCENT OF THEIR SALARIES (OR CADRES -- "MILAK"), AND IMMEDIATE IMPRISONMENT OF ANY COMMANDERS WHO DO NOT COMPLY WITH ORDERS TO RESIST THE "SABOTEURS." CRITICIZES

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"ADVISORS" TO THE DEFENSE REGIMENTS WHO ARE "COWARDS" AND ACTING OUT OF SELF INTEREST. "PUNISHMENT AT THE PRESENT STAGE IS REQUIRED; UNFAIR PUNISHMENT IS REQUIRED; UNCONSCIOUS (POSSIBLY, "UNCONSCIONABLE" -- "CHAIR AL-WA'ITYAH") PUNISHMENT IS SOMETIMES, AND NOT ALWAYS, REQUIRED. WE HAVE NOT BEEN APPLYING ANY OF THESE."

-- RECALLING A PREVIOUS STATEMENT TO AN OIL COMMITTEE, AL-MAJID SAYS "EXODUS FROM RURAL TO URBAN AREAS IN THE NORTHERN REGION SHOULD BE USEFUL. I SHOULD NOT GIVE PEOPLE IN THE RURAL AREAS ANYTHING, SO THAT THEY WILL BE COMPELLED TO MIGRATE TO THE CITY... WHY SHOULD I GIVE HIM FOUR BOTTLES OF PETROLEUM EVERY WEEK? I'LL GIVE HIM ONE BOTTLE... I WILL NOT GIVE HIM FLOUR, SUGAR, PETROLEUM, ELECTRICITY, OR WATER. LET HIM COME CLOSE TO ME IN ORDER TO HEAR MY VOICE SO THAT I CAN IMPLANT IN HIS MIND WHAT I WANT IN TERMS OF IDEOLOGY, CULTURE, AND AWARENESS."

8. (LOW) SECOND CASSETTE: CHANGE OF COMMAND SPEECH:
SIDE A: 30 MINUTES:

-- ALI HASSAN AL-MAJID APPEARS TO BE TURNING OVER RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE BAATH PARTY'S "NORTHERN ORGANIZATION BUREAU" TO ONE "ABU ALI", ONCE CITED AS "COMRADE HASSAN, ONE OF THE OLD COMRADE MEMBERS OF THE LEADERSHIP AND OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMAND COUNCIL." ABU ALI IS THE "BEST QUALIFIED TO TACKLE THE SITUATION IN THE NORTH AFTER STABILITY HAS BEEN RESTORED." HE EXHORTS THOSE ASSEMBLED TO SUPPORT ABU ALI, NOTING

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THERE STILL MAY BE "NEED FOR THE SWORD." ALI HASSAN
AL-MAJID EXPLAINS HE WILL STAY ON IN AN HONORARY AND
ADVISORY CAPACITY.

-- AL-MAJID REFERS TO INSTRUCTIONS HE HAS GIVEN TO
CORPS COMMANDERS REGARDING TRACKING AND PUNISHING
"SABOTEURS", NOTING THAT SOME CORPS COMMANDERS FELT
THEY COULD NOT CARRY OUT THESE INSTRUCTIONS AND
"EXCUSED THEMSELVES." HE NOTES HE SIGNED AN ORDER TO
EXECUTE 35 PERSONS, EVIDENTLY ISLAMIC MOVEMENT
MEMBERS. THANKS TO HIS INSTRUCTIONS, "THE SABOTAGE
WAS ENDED FOREVER ON 4 SEPTEMBER." HOWEVER, "OTHER
SABOTAGE, THAT OF HOSTILE POLITICAL IDEAS, HAS NOT
ENDED." NOW THE PARTY'S TASK IS TO END "INTELLECTUAL
SABOTAGE" BY TACKLING UNEMPLOYMENT AND THE "POLITICAL

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	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	PA-01	PM-01	PRS-01	P-02
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SUBJECT: (LOU) 1988 AUDIOTAPES OF SENIOR IRAQI

VACUUM." (UNCLEAR PASSAGE: APPEARS TO CRITICIZE
PREVIOUS LAWS FOR KURDISH AUTONOMY BECAUSE THEY "GAVE
THE KURDS TOO MUCH.") HE WAS "VERY MUCH AMAZED AND
ASTONISHED AT THE AMNESTY GRANTED SABOTEURS," AND
"HAS NO CONFIDENCE IN ANY KURD IN THE IRAQI
GOVERNMENT" EXCEPT THE GOVERNORS OF ERBIL AND
SULEIMANIYEH.

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9. ~~(LOU)~~ SECOND CASSETTE, SIDE B (27 MINUTES):
FORCED POPULATION SHIFTS TO COMBAT SECTARIANISM:

ALI HASSAN SAYS HE IS NOT "HARSH" OR "A CRIMINAL." HE CLAIMS ARABS AND YEZIDIS ARE 51 PER CENT OF THE POPULATION OF KIRKUK. HE HAS BANNED KURDS NOT LIVING IN KIRKUK FROM WORKING THERE --- "I IMPRISONED SOME OF THEM." THE TURCOMANS ARE LOYAL TO TURKEY, RATHER THAN TO IRAQ, HE SAYS, AND "TAKE EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO SHOW THIS... THOSE WHO EXPLOIT TRIBALISM OR SECTARIANISM ARE DANGEROUS... WE SHOULD NOT POLITICIZE THE SUNNI SECT AGAINST THE SHIITE ... WE WOULD BE FRAGMENTING OURSELVES... WE WILL BE THE LOSERS... WE DECIDED THAT IN THIS AREA" (MANDALI, KHANAQIN -- TOWNS BETWEEN DISTINCT KURDISH AND ARAB-INHABITED ZONES), "ARABS

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SHOULD NOT BE LESS THAN 40 PERCENT... WE SHOULD ENCIRCLE POPULATION CENTERS WITH A SECURITY BELT... THOSE WHO COME HERE FROM OUTSIDE WILL GET PRIVILEGES... IF I SUPPLY THEM WITH ALL THE REQUISITES OF DECENT LIVELIHOOD AND THEY DEVIATE, THEN WE CAN PUNISH THEM, BUT AS RELIGION DICTATES -- WE CAN NOT MUTILATE BODIES."

10. ~~(LOU)~~ THIRD CASSETTE: POLITICAL EXPLOITATION OF RELIGION; CHEMICALS AGAINST KURDS; JAMMING (SIDE A - 32 MINUTES; SIDE B - 32 MINUTES):

-- UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER TELLS "COMRADE" ABU HASSAN (APPARENTLY AL-MAJID) "SOME SEEK TO EXPLOIT RELIGION FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES ... AGAINST THE PARTY... THE BRANCH COMMAND SHOULD FORMULATE A PLAN... STUDIES HAVE SHOWN RELIGIOUS FANATICISM WITHIN THE PARTY, WHICH SHOULD BE REMEDIED... WE MUST MAKE THE (FANATICS) LOSE THEIR POPULAR SUPPORT (BUT) IF WE MOVE AGAINST THEM NOW, PART OF THE PEOPLE WILL SUPPORT THEM AND WE WILL LOSE." ABU HASSAN AND FIRST SPEAKER DISCUSS THOSE REGISTERED AS ARABS IN 1977 WHO NOW WANT TO BE IDENTIFIED AS KURDS: "THE YAZIDIS AND CHRISTIANS ARE ARABS. WE HAVE LAWS. A PERSON MIGHT SAY I AM A KURD, NOT AN ARAB. WE WILL TELL HIM: 'NO, YOU ARE A DESERTER.'"

-- "ABU HASSAN" REFERS TO A DEMAND FROM PUK LEADER TALABANI THAT THE "WE (PUK) HOLD THE (BAATHI) AUTHORITIES RESPONSIBLE FOR OUR COORDINATION WITH IRAN... IF THERE IS NO TRUCE OR NEGOTIATIONS, WE

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WILL CONTINUE OUR COORDINATION WITH IRAN." ABU HASSAN
ADVISES "I TOLD HIM (TALABANI OR A MESSENGER FOR
TALABANI) 'YOU KNOW THE ANSWER: NO NEGOTIATIONS, NO
TRUCE, AND NO STOPPAGE OF THE EVACUATION" (OF THE
KURDS FROM THEIR VILLAGES)... I TOLD THE
COMMANDERS OF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE REGIMENTS OF THE
CONTACTS WITH TALABANI: 'I WILL STRIKE WITH
CHEMICALS. YOU SHOULD EVACUATE. EVEN IF THE WAR
STOPS AND IRAN WITHDRAWS FROM OCCUPIED TERRITORY,
EVACUATION WILL NOT STOP. WE WILL FIRST END THE
EVACUATION, CARRY OUT MILITARY OPERATIONS, AND THEN WE
WILL PUT THEM IN CORNERS. WE WILL ATTACK THEM WITH
CHEMICALS, NOT FOR ONLY ONE OR TWO DAYS, BUT FOR

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UNCLASSIFIEDPAGE 01 AMMAN 04790 04 OF 04 150722Z
ACTION NEA-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-01	AMAD-01	CIP-01	COME-00	CTME-00	C-01
	DOEE-00	DS-00	EB-01	EUR-01	HA-09	H-01	INRE-00
	INR-01	IO-19	JUSE-00	LAB-04	L-03	ADS-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	PA-01	PM-01	PRS-01	P-02
	RP-10	SCT-03	SIL-01	SNP-01	SP-01	SR-01	SS-01
	STR-20	TRSE-00	TST-02	T-01	/093W		

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P 150708Z APR 92
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8408
CTF PROVIDE COMFORT INCIRLIK TU PRIORITY
INFO USIA WASHDC PRIORITY 3122
SECDEF WASHDC
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CIA WASHDC
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AMCONSUL ADANA
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PROVIDE COMFORT FOR POLAD - MAKOVSKY
DEPT FOR NSC - REIDEL
USIA FOR NEA - AMB. RUGH

UNCLASSIFIEDPAGE 02 AMMAN 04790 04 OF 04 150722Z
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PROP, PHUM, PINR, PTER, ETC, UNSC, IZ
SUBJECT: (L6U) 1988 AUDIOTAPES OF SENIOR IRAQI

FIFTEEN DAYS. THEN, I WILL ACCEPT THOSE WHO WILL
SURRENDER WITH THEIR WEAPONS.'"

-- UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER REPORTS SYRIAN AND TURKISH
BROADCASTS ARE HEARD IN THE REGION. ABU HASSAN
ORDERS: "SEND A MESSAGE TO THE INFORMATION MINISTER.
IT SEEMS THERE IS A SPECIAL TRANSMISSION DIRECTED TO
TEL 'AFAR... . YOU CAN JAM ANY BROADCAST... . IT IS
IN THE NATURE OF PEOPLE TO LISTEN TO OTHER COUNTRIES'

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TEXT OF TELEGRAM 92AMMAN 004790

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BROADCASTS."

-- RECORDING ENDS AS CONFEREES DISCUSS METHODS OF
EVACUATION OF THE KURDS.
HARRISON

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O 281138Z JUN 89
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0718
AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMCONSUL ADANA
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS

~~1. CONFIDENTIAL - FOREIGN TEXT~~

3. ON JUNE 28, AMBASSADOR ASKED MFA UNDER SECRETARY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HAMDUN FOR CLARIFICATION, NOTING THAT IT WAS EMPHATICALLY NOT THE EMBASSY'S UNDERSTANDING THAT RELOCATED KURDS HAD BEEN PROVIDED CASH COMPENSATION UP UNTIL NOW. HAMDUN SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS MADE A DECISION AND ISSUED A DIRECTIVE THAT CASH COMPENSATION WILL BE PAID. HAMDUN'S NOTETAKER VOLUNTEERED HER UNDERSTANDING THAT THE DIRECTIVE ALSO INSTRUCTED GOI AUTHORITIES TO PROVIDE A "PIECE OF LAND" TO ALL THOSE RELOCATED. HAMDUN

PAGE NO. 1

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE 9203462

☐ RELEASE
☒ EXCISE
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☐ DELETE Non-Responsive Info
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SAID THAT RELOCATION MAY OCCUR ANYWHERE IN THE GOVERNATE OF THE INHABITANTS' ORIGINAL RESIDENCE; THE CHOICE IS UP TO THE INDIVIDUAL.

4. AMBASSADOR SAID THAT THIS IS GOOD NEWS INDEED. WE HAVE BEEN PAINED BY THE PLIGHT OF THOSE WHO HAVE BEEN FORCIBLY RELOCATED TO THE AREAS NEAR ARBIL AND SULAYMANIYYA, WHERE THEY PLAINLY HAVE NO WORK AND NO LAND.

5. AMBASSADOR ASKED ABOUT THE SOUTHERN BORDER. WE HAVE MADE A LIST OF ARAB SETTLEMENTS WHICH APPEAR TO US TO BE WITHIN 30 KILOMETERS OF THE BORDER. ONLY ONE OF THEM, MANDALI, IS A LARGE TOWN, BUT WE ASSUME THAT MANDALI HAS BEEN EMPTY FOR YEARS GIVEN THE ROUTINE SHELLING IT RECEIVED FROM THE IRANIANS. HAMDUN INDICATED THAT THAT WAS ALSO HIS BELIEF.

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.D. 12356: DECL:OADR

AGS: OVIP (EAGLEBURGER, LAWRENCE S.)

JBJECT: AFTERNOON BRIEF NUMBER 1

. USSR/FRG

3) IN THE FIRST ROUND OF KOHL-GORBACHEV TALKS, KOHL
RIEFED GORBACHEV ON THE RESULTS OF THE NATO SUMMIT.

SD; ACCORDING TO FRG PRESS SPOKESMAN KLEIN, GORBACHEV
AS INTERESTED IN KOHL'S ASSESSMENT OF THE BUSH
MINISTRATION AND HOW PRESIDENT BUSH VIEWS DEVELOPMENTS
THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE. (BONN 18303)

SSR

3) SOVIET PREMIER RYZHKOV FLEW TO UZBEKISTAN TO TRY TO
ALM CONTINUING ETHNIC STRIFE BETWEEN UZBEKS AND

ESKHETIAN TURKS. MORE THAT 11,000 RIOT TROOPS HAVE
EEN FLOWN INTO EASTERN UZBEKISTAN, BUT ORDER HAS NOT
ET BEEN RESTORED. A LOCAL COMMUNIST PARTY OFFICIAL
AID PLANS HAVE BEEN ADOPTED TO EVACUATE 14,500
ESKHETIAN TURKS OUT OF UZBEKISTAN. (UPI, FBIS/MOSCON

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EMBASSY ANKARA REPORTS THAT 3,000 BULGARIAN TURKS
HAVE NOW BEEN EJECTED FROM BULGARIA.

IRAQ

(S) IRAQ CONTINUES CLEARING KURDS FROM ITS PROJECTED
SECURITY BELT ALONG ITS NORTHERN BORDER WITH IRAN.

IRAN

(U) RAFSANJANI WON UNOPPOSED RE-ELECTION AS SPEAKER OF
THE IRANIAN PARLIAMENT. THE ANNUAL VOTE TESTIFIES TO
RAFSANJANI'S CONTINUING POLITICAL STRENGTH, CONFIRMING
THAT HE ENJOYS THE SUPPORT OF MOST PARLIAMENTARY
FACTIONS. (UPI)

SUDAN

(U) THE REBEL SPLA AND THE SUDANESE GOVERNMENT AGREED
TO HOLD A LONG POST-PONED CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION IN
SEPTEMBER, GIVING THEMSELVES THREE MONTHS TO SETTLE
THEIR DIFFERENCES AND REACH A PERMANENT CEASE FIRE.
(UPI)

INDIA

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PAGE 03

STATE 185648

(U) AN EXPLOSION AT A TICKET BOOTH IN NEW DELHI'S TRAIN
STATION KILLED SEVEN AND WOUNDED 50. NO GROUP HAS
CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE BLAST. SECURITY FORCES
HAVE BEEN ON ALERT FOR TERRORIST ATTACKS TO MARK THE
FIFTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE STORMING OF THE SIKH GOLDEN
TEMPLE IN AMRITSAR BY INDIAN TROOPS. (NEW DELHI 13666,
UPI)
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~PAGE 01 BAGHDA 05172 211136Z
ACTION NEA-11INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 EUR-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00 IO-19
NSAE-00 HA-09 PM-10 INRE-00 CA-02 RP-10 SR-06
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-----011222 211304Z /49-40

P 211132Z SEP 88
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8246
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMCONSUL ADANA
DIA WASHDC~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BAGHDAD 05172E.O. 12356: DECL: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, PHUM, IZ, TU
SUBJECT: AMNESTY, BARZANI, U.S. ACTIONS1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ENTIRE TEXT.2. SUMMARY: CONFIRMS THAT 1000
KURDISH REFUGEES WERE SCHEDULED TO COME ACROSS THE
BORDER SEPTEMBER 16. TURKEY MAY HOPE THAT THE ICRC
WILL PLAY A KEY ROLE IN GETTING KURDISH REFUGEES OUT
OF TURKEY BY OBTAINING "GUARANTEES" FROM IRAQ, BUT
THE ARRANGEMENT HAS NOT YET JELLED. BARZANI ASKED
FOR REFUGE IN TURKEY BUT WAS TURNED DOWN. END SUMMARY3. ARE NOT INFORMED OF EVERYTHING
NOR DO THEY TELL
US ALL, BUT WE HAVE PICKED UP SEVERAL PIECES OF
INFORMATION AND ANALYSIS IN RECENT DAYS ON WHICH
EMBASSY ANKARA MAY WISH TO COMMENT.~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 BAGHDA 05172 211136Z

4. THEY CONFIRM THAT 1000 KURDISH REFUGEES WERE
MEANT TO HAVE COME ACROSS THE BORDER (THE MAIN
KHARUP RIVER CROSSING NEAR ZAKHO) ON SEPTEMBER 16.AS
U.S. JOURNALISTS SUBSEQUENTLY TOLD US, THE IRAQIS
SENT A LARGE WESTERN MEDIA CONTINGENT TO ZAKHO
AND EARNED RIDICULE FROM THE INTERNATIONAL PRESS

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WHEN THE REFUGEES DID NOT SHOW UP.

ALSO SAY THAT

THE FOLLOWING DAY SEPTEMBER 17 THAT 1200 REFUGEES WERE TO CROSS THE Khabur, BUT THERE WAS NO SHOW AGAIN.

5.

SURMISE THAT AN ARRANGEMENT IS BEING WORKED OUT BY TURKEY WITH THE ICRC FOR SOME FORM OF "GUARANTEES" FOR THE WELL-BEING OF KURDS THAT RETURN TO IRAQ.

HAD GONE INTO THE MFA THE PREVIOUS DAY TO INQUIRE (WITHOUT USING A LOADED WORD AS "GUARANTEES") WHETHER IRAQ WILL VOUCHSAFE TO THE ICRC A ROLE VIS-A-VIS THE RETURNING KURDISH REFUGEES AND TO ASK WHAT IS TO HAPPEN TO THE REFUGEES (WILL THEY RETURN TO THEIR HOMES, TO NEW SETTLEMENTS, OR TO DETENTION CENTERS; WILL THEY BE REUNITED WITH THEIR FAMILIES, RELATIVES, AND TRIBES?).

ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE APPROACH OF THE END OF THE AMNESTY PERIOD BUT BELIEVE THERE IS TIME ENOUGH "FOR AN ARRANGEMENT TO BE WORKED
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PAGE 03 BAGHDA 05172 211136Z

OUT"--ALTHOUGH THE FAILURE OF REFUGEES TO ARRIVE ON SEPTEMBER 16 OR 17 SUGGESTS TO THEM THAT THE KURDISH REFUGEES ARE NOT YET PLAYING BALL.

(COMMENT: MEANWHILE, OUR OWN ASSESSMENT IS THAT THE IRAQI CLAIM OF NEARLY 40,000 "RETURNING REFUGEES" IS GREATLY INFLATED, AND TO THE EXTENT THAT THERE ARE RETURNEES THEY MUST BE COMING FROM IRAN. THE NUMBERS MAY ALSO LARGELY REFER TO KURDS WITHIN IRAQ WHO HAVE GIVEN THEMSELVES UP.)

6. AFFIRM THAT AS OF THE AMNESTY DATE SEPTEMBER 6 THE TURKISH ARMY SEALED THE BORDER WITH IRAQ, DOING SO EFFECTIVELY FOR THE FIRST TIME EVER. THEY CLAIM THAT, IN ANY CASE, "FEW" KURDS HAVE ATTEMPTED TO CROSS INTO TURKEY SINCE THAT TIME. THEY TAKE CREDIT FOR HAVING "CONVINCED" THE IRAQIS TO ACCEDE TO THE AMNESTY AND TO CEASE OPERATIONS. HOWEVER, AT THE SAME TIME, THEY SAY THAT THERE APPEAR TO BE FEW IF ANY AREAS OF RESISTANCE REMAINING. THEY SAY NONE OF THEIR SOURCES REPORT ANY SIGNIFICANT REMAINING TERRAIN UNDER REBEL CONTROL.

7. ALSO TELL US THAT MAS'UD BARZANI IS IN IRAN AND FROM IRAN PASSED ON A "REQUEST FOR REFUGE"

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IN TURKEY. ACCORDING TO
BARZANI A DEFINITE "NO."

TURKEY GAVE

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DECLASSIFIEDPAGE 01 BAGHDA 02572 01 OF 02 041043Z
ACTION SS-00INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 (AS-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSCE-00 NSAE-00
INRE-00)/000 W

-----050562 051506Z /40 34

P 040859Z JUN 87
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4072
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMCONSUL ADANA
USMISSION GENEVA~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 2572

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: ~~DES~~ OADR
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, IZ, TU
SUBJECT: TURKISH-IRAQI-KURDISH RELATIONS

REFS (A) BAGHDAD 2323 ✓ (B) BAGHDAD 2458 ✓

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.2. SUMMARY: ACCORDING TO IRAQI FORCES
ARE 'DOING BETTER' NOW IN COPING WITH KURDISH ATTACKS IN THE
NORTH THAN THEY HAD BEEN OVER THE PAST TWO MONTHS. THE
DESTRUCTION OF MOUNTAIN VILLAGES CONTINUES, WITH 'VERY MANY'
TURKOMAN AND ASSYRIAN, AS WELL AS KURDISH, VILLAGES AFFECTED.
TALABANI/BARZANI COOPERATION IS GREATER THAN IN THE PAST BUT
HAS NOT EXTENDED TO THE POINT THAT THEIR MEN ACTUALLY FIGHT
TOGETHER.**DECLASSIFIED**

PAGE 02 BAGHDA 02572 01 OF 02 041043Z

TURKISH NEWSPAPERS REPORTS OF TURKISH
INTENT TO OCCUPY THE MOSUL AREA IN THE EVENT OF IRAQI
DEFEAT HAVE BEEN TAKEN SERIOUSLY BY THE IRAQI AUTHORITIES,
CAUSING TIGHTER IRAQI SURVEILLANCE OF TURKOMAN
COMMUNITY. END SUMMARY.3. STAND BY HIS
EARLIER ASSERTION (REF A) THAT 300 NORTHERN VILLAGES
HAVE BEEN FORCIBLY EVACUATED AND DESTROYED IN THE

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NORTH; REPORTS OF MORE VILLAGES BEING AFFECTED ARE FILTERING IN. THE KURDS BEAR THE BRUNT, BUT 'VERY MANY' TURKOMAN AND ASSYRIAN (CHRISTIAN) VILLAGES ARE ALSO BEING LEVELED. THE CAMPAIGN AFFECTS THE ENTIRE NORTH BUT ESPECIALLY THE SENSITIVE KIRKUK AND SULAYMANIYYA AREAS -- KIRKUK BECAUSE IT IS THE OIL CENTER WHICH THE KURDS (AND TURKOMANS) CLAIM AS THEIR OWN AND WHICH THE REGIME IN BAGHDAD JUST AS UNCOMPROMISINGLY INSISTS IS 'ARAB' AND SULAYMANIYYA BECAUSE OF THE PROXIMITY TO THE RECENT KURDISH-IRANIAN OFFENSIVES. ACCORDING TO THE TRANSPORT OF KURDS, TURKOMANS AND ASSYRIANS OUT OF THE NORTH IS TAKING PLACE ON A LARGE SCALE, WITH CAMPS BEING SET UP IN MANY AREAS IN THE SOUTH AND WEST OF IRAQ. VILLAGE FAMILIES ARE INTENTIONALLY BEING SENT IN DIFFERENT DIRECTIONS TO EFFECT A 'TOTAL DISPERSAL'. THE SITUATION IN THE NORTH REMAINS TOO UNSETTLED FOR THE AUTHORITIES TO CONTEMPLATE BEGINNING THE PROCESS OF SENDING ARABS INTO THE NORTH TO RESETTLE THE LEVELED AREAS. SAID, HOWEVER, THAT THE IRAQIS WANT TO COMPLETE THE CAMPAIGN BY SEPTEMBER, IN ORDER TO CHANGE THE ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF THE AREA IN TIME FOR A SCHEDULED CENSUS.

4. THE VILLAGE-DESTRUCTION CAMPAIGN WAS FINALLY

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PAGE 03 BAGHDA 02572 01 OF 02 041043Z

TRIGGERED BY THE KURDISH-IRANIAN ATTACKS BEGINNING IN EARLY APRIL, THE IRAQIS WERE PUSHED BACK NORTH AND EAST OF SULAYMANIYYA IN A MANNER THAT TOOK THEM BY SURPRISE AND SHOCKED AND ANGERED THEM. THE ISSUE OF KIRKUK IS CRITICALLY IMPORTANT BUT WAS NOT THE TRIGGERING FACTOR, THOUGH THE DECISION HAVING BEEN MADE TO TAKE DRASTIC MEASURES, THE IRAQIS ARE MAKING SURE THAT KIRKUK IS PROPERLY TAKEN CARE OF. ADDED THAT THE GRAVITY OF THE SITUATION FOR THE IRAQIS SHOULD NOT BE EXAGGERATED. IN FACT, AFTER INITIAL REVERSES, THE IRAQIS ARE 'DOING BETTER' IN COPING WITH THE KURDS, AS THEY ARE BEGINNING TO RETAKE OLD POSITIONS AND THE NUMBER OF KURDISH ATTACKS HAS FALLEN SHARPLY OVER THE PAST WEEK.

5. SAID THAT JALAL TALABANI (PATRIOTIC UNION OF KURDSTAN CENTERED IN THE SULAYMANIYYA AREA) AND MAS'UD BARZANI (KURDISH DEMOCRATIC PARTY CENTERED IN NORTHERN IRAQI KURDSTAN) CONTINUE TO BE BITTER ENEMIES AND RIVALS AND THEIR FORCES HAVE YET TO BE OBSERVED FIGHTING SIDE BY SIDE. NEVERTHELESS, SINCE LATE 1986 THERE HAS BEEN A MEASURE OF COORDINATION. THE TWO GROUPS ARE IN COMMUNICATION AND THEY ARE PERMITTING EACH OTHER'S FORCES TO PASS THROUGH THEIR OWN TERRITORY, AND BARZANI ATTACKS SOMETIMES TAKE PLACE IN TALABANI TERRITORY AND VICE VERSA.

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-----351463 041347Z /48 40P 040859Z JUN 87
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4073
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMCONSUL ADANA
USMISSION GENEVA~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 BAGHDAD 2572~~EXDIS~~E.O. 12356: ~~DEC) - OADR~~
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, IZ, TU
SUBJECT: TURKISH-IRAQI-KURDISH RELATIONS

6. DESCRIBED THE SITUATION OF THE TURKOMAN'S AS 'VERY DIFFICULT.' TURKS, HE SAID PREFER TO CALL THE TURKOMANS 'TURKS,' AS THEIR DIALECT CAN BE EASILY UNDERSTOOD BY THE TURKS OF TURKEY (UNLIKE THE TURKOMANS OF THE SOVIET UNION); THEY ARE VIEWED BY THE PEOPLE OF TURKEY AS BEING ONE OF HEIR OWN. TURKEY DOES NOT ALLOW THEM TO GO TO TURKEY, HOWEVER, AS IT IS TURKISH POLICY THAT 'OUTSIDE TURKS' REMAIN WHEREVER TURKS HAVE ESTABLISHED THEMSELVES OVER THE MANY CENTURIES. FOR EXAMPLE, 'THE PRIME MINISTER TALKS OF ACCEPTING ALL THE TURKS IN BULGARIA,' HE SAID 'BUT THAT IS JUST PROPAGANDA.

CLAIMED THAT THERE

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PAGE 02 BAGHDA 02572 02 OF 02 041056Z

ARE 500,000 - 8000,000 TURKS (TURKOMANS) IN NORTHERN IRAQ.
(COMMENT: THIS IS A HIGHER FIGURE THAN WE HAVE HEARD FROM ANY NON-TURKISH SOURCE; 250,00 - 350,000 WOULD SEEM MORE PROBABLE.) THE REGION WAS ORIGINALLY PART OF TURKEY AS ENVISIONED IN THE 'NATIONAL' PACT.' HOWEVER, ADDED, THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO VALIDITY TO SPECULATION IN TURKISH NEWSPAPERS OVER THE PAST NINE MONTHS ABOUT A TURKISH 'PLAN' TO RETAKE MOSUL IN THE EVENT OF AN IRAQI COLLAPSE OR IN COORDINATION

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WITH THE IRANIANS. THESE JOURNALISTIC SPECULATIONS HAVE HAD ADVERSE EFFECT ON RELATIONS

THE IRAQIS NONETHELESS HAVE TAKEN THEM SERIOUSLY. SURVEILLANCE AND CONTROL OF THE TURKOMAN COMMUNITY HAS STIFFENED MARKEDLY.

7. SAID THAT

UP UNTIL 1986 THE TURKS HAD BUILT FEW OBSTACLES ALONG THE IRAQI BORDER, IN CONTRAST TO THE SYRIAN BORDER. STATED THAT KURDS LIVED IN SYRIA AND TURKEY, IN ADDITION TO IRAQ AND IRAN, THAT THE BORDERS WERE 'ARTIFICIAL' AND THAT FAMILIES OFTEN EXTENDED ACROSS NATIONAL BORDERS.

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PAGE 03

BAGHDA 02572 02 OF 02 041056Z

8. DISPLAYED ANNOYANCE AT WHAT APPEARS TO BE INCREASING IRANIAN SUPPORT FOR KURDS OPERATING AGAINST TURKEY. LOGIC WOULD DICTATE THAT, WITH ALL ITS ENEMIES, IRAN DOES NOT NEED TO ALIENATE TURKEY. BUT AS RELIGION DRIVES THE IRANIAN REGIME, LOGIC SEEM NOT TO AVAIL. BY THE SAE TOKEN, THE IRANIAN S APPEAR TENTATIVE ABOUT HOW MUCH SUPPORT THEY WILL GIVE IRAQI KURDS. THEY SEEM TO FALL SHORT OF GIVING THE IRAQI KURDS THE FULL SUPPORT THE KURDS NEED AND THE IRANIANS ARE -- HE

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ASSUMES -- IN A POSITION TO PROVIDE.
CONCLUDED THAT THE IRANIANS ARE AFRAID TO PRODUCE A
REALLY STRONG IRAQI KURDISH MOVEMENT THAT WOULD
INEVITABLE TURN AGAINST IRAN.

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ACTION NEA-11

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CIAE-00	DODE-00	H-01	NSCE-00	NSAE-00	HA-09	L-03	
TRSE-00	PH-10	PA-01	OMB-01	INRE-00	ANAE-00	ACDA-12	
USIE-00	SP-02	SNP-01	C-01	PRS-01	DS-01	DSE-00	
SCT-02	P-02	T-01	/070 W				

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P 010690Z JUN 87
 FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4005
 INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA
 AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
 AMEMBASSY AMMAN
 AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
 AMCONSUL ADANA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BAGHDAD 2458

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PGOV, MOPS, IZ, IR
 SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRAQI CITY OF RAWANDUZ STILL UNDER GOVERNMENT CONTROL

REF: BAGHDAD 2323

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY:

WHO VISITED RAWANDUZ MAY 24
 REPORTS THE CITY IS UNDER IRAQI GOVERNMENT, NOT IRANIAN CONTROL.
 DURING HIS FLIGHT TO THE NORTH, HE SAW SEVERAL RAZED KURDISH
 VILLAGES, ONE OF WHICH HAD HAD AN ESTIMATED POPULATION OF
 10,000; HIS KURDISH SOURCES TALK OF MANY MORE VILLAGES HAVING
 BEEN DESTROYED. EARLIER, IRAQI GOVERNMENT TROOPS WERE UNABLE TO
 PROVIDE SAFE PASSAGE TO THE BORDER CITY OF HAWAT NORTH OF
 SULAIANIYA. END SUMMARY.

3.

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PAGE 02 BAGHDA 02458 011004Z

GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED VISIT TO RAWANDUZ IN NORTHEASTERN IRAQ NEAR

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THE IRANIAN BORDER. IRAN HAD PUBLICLY CALIMED (FBIS LD201109) THAT "THE PEOPLE AND COMBATIVE FORCES OF IRAQ" (I.E., PRO-IRANIAN KURDS) HAD TAKEN CONTROL OF THE CITY, AND TO PROVE THE LIE THE IRAQI MILITARY FERRIED A NUMBER OF JOURNALISTS TO RAWANDUZ FOR A FIRST-HAND INSPECTION.

4. RAWANDUZ, REPORTED, WAS CLEARLY UNDER IRAQI GOVERNMENT CONTROL; HEAVILY ARMED IRAQI COMBAT PERSONNEL KEPT IT THAT WAY. DESPITE THE PRESENCE OF THE MILITARY, LIFE IN RAWANDUZ SEEMED TO GO ON AS NORMAL: THE SOUKS WERE OPEN, WITH A WIDER VARIETY OF GOODS THAN SEEN IN BAGHDAD AVAILABLE, AS IS TYPICAL IN KURDISTAN.

NOTED SIGNS THAT SOME SORT OF ARMED ACTIVITY HAD RECENTLY TAKEN PLACE IN THE CITY--MANY CARTRIDGE CASINGS LYING ABOUT, A RECENTLY BURNED AUTOMOBILE ON THE SIDE OF THE STREET--BUT WHEN QUERIED ABOUT THESE A LOCAL OFFICIAL PASSED THEM OFF AS "NOTHING UNUSUAL" FOR RAWANDUZ. LOCAL KURDS, THE OFFICIAL SAID, LIKE TO FIRE THEIR WEAPONS INTO THE AIR BY WAY OF CELEBRATION, AND THE BURNED-OUT AUTO WAS AN OLD TRAFFIC ACCIDENT. THE OFFICIAL WAS NOT AMUSED WHEN [REDACTED] WENT OVER TO SNIFF AT THE VEHICLE AND FOUND IT TO HAVE BEEN VERY RECENTLY DESTROYED.

5. THE MOST INTERESTING PART OF HIS VISIT TO RAWANDUZ OCCURRED ON THE HELICOPTER JOURNEY THERE FROM BAGHDAD. ENROUTE, FLYING AT "150 METERS," [REDACTED] SAW FIVE OR SIX KURDISH VILLAGES DESTROYED IN THE ON-GOING IRAQI GOVERNMENT CAMPAIGN TO, IN [REDACTED] OPINION, CREATE BUFFER ZONES AROUND IMPORTANT CITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ. ONE OF THE VILLAGES HE OVERFLEW HAD ONCE HAD 10,000 INHABITANTS, HE ESTIMATED, AND WAS NOW REDUCED TO RUBBLE.

6. HIS SIGHTING OF THE DESTROYED VILLAGES ONLY CONFIRMED WHAT HE HAD BEEN HEARING FROM KURDISH CONTACTS: THAT THE GOVERNMENT WAS DELIBERATELY DESTROYING THOSE VILLAGES WHICH REFUSE TO SIGN PLEDGES OF LOYALTY TO THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, AND REMOVING THE PEOPLE TO SITES IN THE DESERT NEAR AR-AR AND RUTBA. (DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS TALK ABOUT RESETTLEMENT CLOSER TO BAGHDAD, NEAR RUMADI

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AND HILLA.) [REDACTED] HAS HEARD THAT AT LEAST 56 SUCH VILLAGES HAVE BEEN DESTROYED; AS INDICATED IN REFTEL [REDACTED] SPEAKS OF 300. THE POLICY IS BACK-FIRING AGAINST THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, BELIEVES, FOR THE MEN OF THESE DESTROYED VILLAGES IMMEDIATELY GO OUT AND JOIN THE ANTI-GOVERNMENT KURDS; EVEN SOME PRO-GOVERNMENT "FURSAN" ARE FINDING THEIR HOMES RAZED AND ARE DESERTING TO BAR-ZANI OR TALABANI.

7. [REDACTED] CONTRASTED HIS VISIT TO RAWANDUZ WITH A SIMILAR ESCORTED VISIT IN EARLY MAY TO THE IRAQI CITY OF NAWAT, NORTH OF SULAIMANIYA. ON THAT OCCASION, THE JOURNALISTS WERE HELICOPTERED TO A BASE ON THE

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OUTSKIRTS OF SULAIMENIYA WHERE THEY WERE NOT ALLOWED TO ENTER THE CITY PROPER BY THEIR MILITARY HOSTS. A CONVEY OF SOME EIGHT OR TEN VEHICLES WAS PUT TOGETHER FOR THE 60-KILOMETER JOURNEY TO HAWAT, WHICH PASSED UNEVENTFULLY UNTIL THE CONVOY GOT WITHIN SOME 10 KILOMETERS OF THE CITY. AS THEY NEARED THE MOUNTAIN-TOP HEAD-QUARTERS OF THE IRAQI ARMY'S 39TH DIVISION, IRANIAN ARTILLERY BEGAN SHELLING THE CONVOY, CAUSING ALL CONCERNED TO SCRAMBLE FOR COVER. SHELLS LANDED WITH 25 METERS OF THEIR POSITION AT THE RATE OF TWO PER MINUTE FOR OVER HALF AN HOUR. IN HIS OWN WORDS, WAS TERRIFIED. HE NOTED WHAT HE BELIEVED TO BE IRANIAN KURD FORWARD ARTILLERY OBSERVERS IN THE NEARBY HILLS, WALKIE-TALKIES IN HAND, THOUGH THE IRAQI ESCORT CLAIMED "THOSE ARE OUR KURDS." ONCE THE SHELLING LIFTED, THE JOURNALISTS GAVE UP THEIR ATTEMPT TO REACH HAWAT AND RETURNED TO BAGHDAD.

B. COMMENT: THE EXTENT OF DESTRUCTION OF KURDISH VILLAGES REMAINS UNCLEAR, BUT THE CAMPAIGN APPEARS AT MINIMUM TO BE SERIOUS, BOTH IN EXTENT AND IN ILL WILL GENERATED AMONG THE KURDS. WE MAY BE SEEING A COMBINATION OF TARGETS: DESTRUCTION OF VILLAGES AROUND CITIES (ESPECIALLY THE EVER-SENSITIVE OIL CAPITAL OF KIRKUK), ALONG THE MAJOR HIGHWAYS (CLEARLY APPARENT FROM RECENT TRAVEL BY EMBOFFS ALONG THE MOSUL-ARBIL-KIRKUK-BAGHDAD HIGHWAY), IN BORDER AREAS (BOTH TURKEY AND IRAN), AND WHEREVER REBELS ARE THOUGHT TO HIDE OUT OR PERHAPS EVEN AS ~~THEY~~ ASSERTS, WHERE LOYALTY PLEDGES ARE NOT GIVEN. END COMMENT. NEWTON

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IRAQ: KURDISTAN SPRING CLASHES

1. ~~(S/NF)~~ THREE LIMITED IRANIAN ATTACKS, TYPICAL FOR THE SEASON, HAVE CLAIMED SOME TERRITORY NEAR THE IRAQI BORDER. IRAQ HAS COPEd BY FORCIBLE RELOCATION OF MORE THAN A HUNDRED KURDISH VILLAGES, AN EFFORT THAT MAY SOON END.

LIKELY FUTURE ATTACKS PRESENT NO SERIOUS THREAT. THE FIGHTING IN KURDISTAN, THOUGH DISTURBING TO IRAQ AND TURKEY, HAS LITTLE STRATEGIC MILITARY IMPACT ON THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR.

THREE PROBES . . .

2. ~~(S/NF)~~ MILITARY ACTIVITY HAS PICKED UP IN KURDISTAN,

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AS IS USUAL IN THE SPRING. THE IRANIAN ARMY "KARBALA VII" ATTACK ENDED INCONCLUSIVELY. A REVOLUTIONARY GUARD AND KURDISH RAID TAGGED "FATEH V" SEIZED A FEW UNCONTESTED VILLAGES NORTHEAST OF SULAYMANIYAH, FOLLOWED BY AN ARMY SUPPORTING ATTACK, "KARBALA X," IN THE SAME AREA. THESE OPERATIONS SPARKED SOME IRAQI REINFORCEMENT OF THEIR KURDISTAN GARRISON. DESULTORY FIGHTING NOW APPEARS BOGGED DOWN NORTH OF MAWAT.

. . . AND GUERRILLA RAIDS

3. ~~(S/NF)~~ A FEW THOUSAND IRANIAN-ARMED IRAQI KURDS REGULARLY CONDUCT AMBUSHES AND ATTACKS ON IRAQI OUTPOSTS.

7 DESPITE IRANIAN PRESS CLAIMS, THEIR OPERATIONS HAVE PRESENTED NO DANGER TO IRAQI OIL PRODUCTION OR PIPELINES.

4. ~~(S/NF)~~ THE OPPOSING IRAQI FORCES ARE OFTEN THEMSELVES KURDISH MANNED "NATIONAL DEFENSE BATTALIONS," SUPPLEMENTED BY SPARSE IRAQI REGULAR BATTALIONS WITH

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EXTENSIVE SUPPORT FROM HELICOPTERS, LOW-FLYING PROPELLER AIRCRAFT, AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS FOR THE HILL FIGHTING TYPICAL OF KURDISTAN.

KURDISH RELOCATIONS

5. (S/NE) SINCE ABOUT APRIL 20, IRAQ HAS FORCIBLY RELOCATED KURDISH VILLAGERS AND BULLDOZED THEIR HAMLETS, TO DISCOURAGE SABOTAGE ATTEMPTS AND REIMPOSE CONTROL,

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ESPECIALLY OF ROADS. ABOUT 75 KDP VILLAGES NORTH OF DIHOK AND AT LEAST 44 PUK VILLAGES SOUTHEAST OF KIRKUK WERE REPORTEDLY DESTROYED BY EARLY MAY.

6. (S/NE) THE DEPOPULATION CAMPAIGN, THE MOST EXTENSIVE IN IRAQ'S KURDISH CONFLICT, MAY SOON STOP, SINCE IT DIVERTS MANPOWER FROM THE FRONT. BUT IN THE MEANTIME, THE RELOCATIONS ARE AROUSING KURDISH ANGER AND CAUSING DEFECTIONS TO THE GUERRILLAS, WHO ARE COUNTERATTACKING, ARMING CIVILIANS, AND BURNING DOWN RESETTLEMENT CAMPS.

PUK ACTIVISM, AND A SEPARATIST LINE

7. (S/NE) WITH THE DEATH OF ONE OF THE BARZANI BROTHERS, PUK LEADER JALAL TALABANI IS EMERGING AS THE KEY KURDISH FIGURE.

7 ACCORDING TO A "LE MONDE" REPORT, TALABANI, UNLIKE THE KDP OF MASUD BARZANI, NOW ADVOCATES--PROBABLY IN PART A REACTION TO IRAQI BRUTALITY--AN INDEPENDENT KURDISH STATE RATHER THAN MERE AUTONOMY. SHULTZ

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TAGS: PREL, OPRC, UNSC, IZ, US

SUBJECT: BAGHDAD'S REPRESSION OF ITS CIVILIAN POPULATION

REF: STATE 245481

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1. MAX VAN DER STOEL, THE UN SPECIAL RAPORTEUR OF THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, DELIVERED TO THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL, AUGUST 11, A STRONG CONDEMNATION OF IRAQI GOVERNMENT MISTREATMENT OF ITS CIVILIAN POPULATION. US PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UN AMBASSADOR PERKINS, AS WELL AS REPRESENTATIVES OF FRANCE AND THE UNITED KINGDOM AMONG OTHERS, MADE STATEMENTS. THE WIRELESS FILE WILL CARRY THE FULL TEXT OF VAN DER STOEL AND PERKINS' STATEMENTS.

2. ACTION REQUESTED - AMBASSADORS ARE INSTRUCTED TO DRAW HOST GOVERNMENT ATTENTION TO THE VAN DER STOEL STATEMENT AND AMBASSADOR PERKINS' STATEMENT AND TO SHARE THE TEXT OF THE FOLLOWING FACT SHEET ON BAGHDAD'S REPRESSION OF ITS CIVILIAN POPULATION. PAO'S SHOULD DRAW ATTENTION TO THE

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VAN DER STOEL STATEMENT, PROVIDE COPIES OF THE PERKINS' STATEMENT, AND DRAW ON THE FOLLOWING FACT SHEET TO RESPOND FURTHER INQUIRIES. AMBASSADORS SHOULD URGE GOVERNMENTS TO

MAKE A STRONG STATEMENT ON IRAQ'S VIOLATION OF UNSC RESOLUTION 688, WHICH REQUIRES BAGHDAD TO CEASE REPRESSION OF ALL ITS CITIZENS AND ALLOW ACCESS BY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS.

3. FOR ARAB LEAGUE CAPITALS AND MUSLIM COUNTRIES; STATEMENT BY YOUR HOST GOVERNMENT'S WOULD BE PARTICULARLY HELPFUL IN DEMONSTRATING THAT IRAQI 688 VIOLATIONS ARE NOT SIMPLY AN ISSUE OF CONCERN IN THE WESTERN WORLD. ANYTHING YOU CAN DO TO GENERATE OFFICIAL AND MEDIA APPRECIATION FOR VAN DER STOEL'S EFFORTS AND CONDEMNATION OF BAGHDAD'S REPRESSION OF IRAQI CIVILIANS WOULD BE MOST WELCOME.

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4. BEGIN TEXT:

BAGHDAD'S REPRESSION OF ITS CIVILIAN POPULATION

IRAQ IS IN CLEAR AND DIRECT VIOLATION OF UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 688, WHICH REQUIRES IRAQ TO END REPRESSION OF ITS CITIZENS, ALLOW HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS ACCESS TO ALL OF THOSE IN NEED OF ASSISTANCE, AND MAKE FACILITIES AVAILABLE FOR THIS PURPOSE. FURTHER, IRAQ HAS REFUSED TO IMPLEMENT UNSCRS 706 AND 712 WHICH PROVIDE FOR THE IMPORTATION OF ABOUT 930 MILLION DOLLARS IN HUMANITARIAN GOODS THROUGH LIMITED OIL SALES. REJECTION OF THESE RESOLUTIONS HIGHLIGHTS BAGHDAD'S COMPLETE DISREGARD FOR THE WELFARE OF THE MAJORITY OF ITS CITIZENS. NO ELEMENT OF THE IRAQI POPULATION IS IMMUNE FROM SADDAM HUSSEIN'S RUTHLESS POLICE STATE METHODS. AMONG VICTIMS OF THE RECENT EXECUTIONS OF MERCHANTS WERE SUNNI MUSLIM ARABS WHO HAVE IN THE PAST COOPERATED WITH THE REGIME.

THE NORTH

IRAQI REPRESSION OF THE KURDS FOLLOWING IRAN-IRAQ WAR

SADDAM HUSSEIN'S REGIME HAS LONG HAD A TROUBLED RELATIONSHIP WITH ITS KURDISH POPULATION, STEMMING IN PART

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FROM THE REGIME'S OPPRESSIVE AND BRUTAL TREATMENT OF ITS
POPULATION WHICH HAS REKINDLED KURDISH ASPIRATIONS FOR
GREATER AUTONOMY. SADDAM'S RUTHLESSNESS WAS DEMONSTRATED
WHEN, TOWARD THE END OF THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR IN 1988, IRAQI
MILITARY FORCES EMPLOYED CHEMICAL WEAPONS AGAINST THE IRAN

OCCUPIED KURDISH VILLAGE OF HALABJA, CAUSING MASSIVE
CIVILIAN CASUALTIES.

FOLLOWING THE END OF THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR IN AUGUST 1988
SADDAM BEGAN A SYSTEMATIC CAMPAIGN TO "PACIFY" THE
KURDS. IRAQI CHEMICAL ATTACKS AGAINST ITS KURDISH
CIVILIAN POPULATION RESULTED IN APPROXIMATELY 50,000
KURDISH REFUGEES FLEEING TO TURKEY AT THAT TIME. WITH
NORTHERN IRAQ CLOSED OFF TO VIRTUALLY ALL OUTSIDERS FOR
"SECURITY" REASONS, SADDAM LAUNCHED AN INITIATIVE TO
CREATE A 30 KILOMETER-WIDE "SECURITY ZONE" ALONG HIS
BORDER WITH IRAN. THE CREATION OF THIS ZONE REQUIRED THE
RELOCATION OF APPROXIMATELY FOUR TO FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND
KURDS TO GOVERNMENT "CAMPS" LOCATED PRIMARILY IN NORTHERN
IRAQ, BUT ALSO IN THE SOUTHERN DESERT AREAS.
APPROXIMATELY 1,000 KURDISH VILLAGES WERE COMPLETELY RAZED
BY GOVERNMENT TROOPS. DURING THIS PERIOD, THOUSANDS OF
KURDISH MEN DISAPPEARED AND ARE PRESUMED DEAD.

DURING THE KURDISH UPRISING IN THE SPRING OF 1991, KURDISH
LEADERS UNCOVERED LITERALLY TONS OF IRAQI MILITARY
DOCUMENTS OUTLINING THE REGIME'S ATROCITIES AGAINST THE
KURDS. MUCH OF THIS DOCUMENTATION HAS SINCE BEEN
AIRLIFTED FROM NORTHERN IRAQ AND BROUGHT TO THE UNITED
STATES. FURTHER STUDY OF THESE DOCUMENTS WILL PROVIDE FAR
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GREATER KNOWLEDGE OF IRAQI ACTIONS AND INTENTIONS DURING
THE PERIOD FOLLOWING THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR.

THE NORTHERN UPRISING--SPRING 1991

FOLLOWING IRAQ'S DEFEAT IN THE GULF WAR AND IN THE WAKE OF
THE SHIA UPRISING IN SOUTHERN IRAQ, KURDISH FORCES
LAUNCHED AN OFFENSIVE AGAINST IRAQI GOVERNMENT TROOPS IN
NORTHERN IRAQ IN MARCH 1991 AND MANAGED TO SEIZE CONTROL
OF LARGE PORTIONS OF IRAQI KURDISTAN, INCLUDING THE KEY
CITIES OF KIRKUK, IRBIL, AND SULAYMANIYAH. BY THE END OF
MARCH IRAQI FORCES, HAVING QUELLED THE UPRISING IN
SOUTHERN IRAQ BEGAN TO LAUNCH ATTACKS TO REESTABLISH
CONTROL IN NORTHERN IRAQ. IN REGAINING ITS CONTROL, THE
IRAQI MILITARY ATTACKED AND RAZED A NUMBER OF VILLAGES,
INCLUDING TURKOMAN AND ASSYRIAN AS WELL AS KURDISH
VILLAGES. THE BRUTALITY OF THE IRAQI MILITARY CAMPAIGN,
AND FEAR OF A REPEAT OF IRAQ'S 1988 USE OF CHEMICAL

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WEAPONS, RESULTED IN MORE THAN TWO MILLION KURDS, TURKOMEN, AND ASSYRIANS FLEEING TOWARD THE TURKISH AND IRANIAN BORDERS.

WITH SUCH A FLOOD OF REFUGEES FLEEING INTO TURKEY, IRAN, AND ALONG THE IRAQI SIDE OF BOTH BORDERS, THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL PASSED UNSCR 688 ON APRIL 5, 1991, DEMANDING IRAQ CEASE REPRESSION OF ITS CIVILIAN POPULATION. UNDER OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT, A SECURITY ZONE WAS FORMED ALONG THE IRAQI-TURKISH BORDER TO PREVENT IRAQI TROOPS FROM FURTHER PURSUING THE KURDISH POPULATION AND TO PROVIDE CARE TO THE REFUGEES. RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY THE

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COALITION FORCES ON IRAQ'S ABILITY TO FLY AIRCRAFT ABOVE THE 36TH PARALLEL FURTHER IMPEDED THE IRAQI MILITARY'S ABILITY TO ATTACK ITS NORTHERN POPULATION. ON APRIL 19, THE UN SIGNED A MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING WITH IRAQ, WHICH SET OUT THE ADMINISTRATIVE DETAILS FOR IMPLEMENTING UNSCR 688.

TALKS BETWEEN THE KURDISH LEADERSHIP AND THE BAGHDAD REGIME AIMED AT NORMALIZING THE SITUATION IN KURDISTAN BEGAN LATER IN APRIL 1991 AND AN AGREEMENT LOOKED LIKELY BY THE END OF THE MONTH. DESPITE INITIAL OPTIMISM, HOWEVER, TALKS BETWEEN THE KURDISH LEADERSHIP AND BAGHDAD YIELDED NO SATISFACTORY RESULTS AND AN AGREEMENT WAS NEVER REACHED.

IRAQI VIOLATIONS OF UNSCR 688 IN THE NORTH

THE NO FLY ZONE IN NORTHERN IRAQ AND UNSCR 688 LARGELY CHECKED SADDAM'S ABILITY TO MOVE MILITARILY AGAINST THE POPULATION IN THE NORTH. NEVERTHELESS, THE IRAQI MILITARY HAS CONTINUED TO LAUNCH ARTILLERY ATTACKS AGAINST KURDISH VILLAGES AND SPORADIC CLASHES BETWEEN IRAQI AND KURDISH FORCES ALONG THE IRAQI MILITARY LINE OF CONTROL OCCUR ON A REGULAR BASIS. SINCE NOVEMBER 1991, THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT HAS SOUGHT TO INTIMIDATE ITS NORTHERN POPULATION THROUGH OTHER THAN MILITARY MEANS, INCLUDING AN ECONOMIC EMBARGO, SABOTAGE, TERRORISM, AND HARASSMENT OF RELIEF WORKERS. IN ADDITION, CIVILIAN KURDS, TURKOMEN, AND YAZIDIS, HAVE BEEN EVICTED FROM THEIR VILLAGES. THE FOLLOWING REPRESENTS A CHRONOLOGY OF SOME OF THE MAJOR VIOLATIONS OF UNSCR 688

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AGAINST CIVILIANS IN THE NORTHERN REGION WHICH BAGHDAD HAS COMMITTED OVER THE PAST 9 MONTHS.

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- LATE OCTOBER 1991 -

BAGHDAD BEGINS TO REFUSE TO RENEW VISAS TO UN AND RELIEF PERSONNEL IN AN EFFORT TO REDUCE THE UN PRESENCE IN IRAQ.

- NOVEMBER 4, 1991 -

IRAQI GOVERNMENT BEGINS ECONOMIC EMBARGO OF NORTHERN PROVINCES BY CLOSING THE KEY HIGHWAY CHECKPOINT AT FAYDAH, PREVENTING THE MOVEMENT OF FUEL, FOOD, AND OTHER GOODS TO THE KURDS. THE LACK OF FUEL HAMPERS THE ABILITY OF HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS TO DISTRIBUTE FOOD TO MOUNTAINOUS VILLAGES AS WINTER BEGINS TO SET IN.

- EARLY NOVEMBER 1991 -

BAGHDAD BEGINS TO WITHDRAW GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS FROM NORTHERN IRAQ, CUTTING OFF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES FROM THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT.

- NOVEMBER 13, 1991 -

THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT ISSUES AN EVACUATION ORDER EVICTING KURDS FROM 260 VILLAGES OUTSIDE IRBIL AND 200 VILLAGES BETWEEN KIRKUK AND CHAMCHAMAL. THE ORDER IS ENFORCED BY HELICOPTERS, ARTILLERY, AND SOLDIERS, AND VILLAGERS ARE NOT PERMITTED TO TAKE THEIR POSSESSIONS WITH THEM. APPROXIMATELY 50,000 PEOPLE ARE EFFECTED.

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- JANUARY 11, 1992 -

SEVERE FOOD SHORTAGES CAUSED BY BAGHDAD'S EMBARGO OF NORTHERN IRAQ, A TURKISH TRUCKERS STRIKE, AND HEAVY SNOWS SPARKED DEMONSTRATIONS BY SEVERAL HUNDRED KURDS IN FRONT OF FOOD WAREHOUSES IN NORTHERN IRAQ.

- MARCH 6, 1992 -

CAR BOMB EXPLODES IN SULAYMANIYAH, KILLING 12 AND WOUNDING 15. THE EXPLOSION OCCURS OUTSIDE THE PEACE HOTEL WHICH HOUSES UN STAFF AND AID WORKERS, AND NEAR THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE IRAQI KURDISTAN FRONT.

- APRIL 8, 1992 -

IRAQI MILITARY ELEMENTS FIRE ON AN ICRC VEHICLE TRAVELING NEAR THE KURDISH CITY OF CHAMCHAMAL.

- EARLY MAY 1992 -

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IRAQI FORCES ARE REPORTED TO BE THREATENING SOME KURDS THAT THEIR VILLAGES WILL BE DESTROYED IF THEY VOTE IN UPCOMING KURDISH ELECTIONS. KURDISH FARMERS COMPLAIN THAT IRAQI FORCES ARE PREVENTING THEM FROM PLANTING CROPS.

- MAY 14, 1992 -

CAR BOMB EXPLODES IN FRONT OF A HOTEL IN DOHUK, SLIGHTLY WOUNDING A GREEK JOURNALIST.

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- MAY 17, 1992 -

ON THE EVE OF KURDISH ELECTIONS, KURDISH FORCES DISCOVER THREE BOMBS IN ZAKHO, INCLUDING A CAR BOMB IN FRONT OF A HOTEL HOUSING WESTERN JOURNALISTS AND ELECTION OBSERVERS.

- JUNE 30, 1992 -

MOU ON UN ACTIVITIES IN IRAQ EXPIRES AFTER IRAQ REFUSES TO RENEW IT.

- JUNE 30, 1992 -

THREE ROCKET-PROPELLED GRENADES ARE FIRED AT UN GUARDS IN SULAYMANIYAH.

- EARLY JULY 1992 -

A NUMBER OF GRENADE AND BOMBING ATTACKS AGAINST UN OFFICES IN NORTHERN IRAQ ARE REPORTED, INCLUDING ATTACKS AGAINST UN GUARD HEADQUARTERS IN IRBIL AND SULAYMANIYAH.

- JULY 6, 1992 -

BOMB EXPLODES NEAR DANIELLE MITTERRAND'S MOTORCADE IN NORTHERN IRAQ, KILLING 7 KURDS.

- JULY 12, 1992 - A BOMB WITH A TIMING DEVICE IS DISCOVERED UNDER A CAR BELONGING TO SAVE THE CHILDREN IN NORTHERN IRAQ.

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- EARLY AUGUST 1992 -

THREE KEY CHECKPOINTS INTO KURDISTAN ARE COMPLETELY CLOSED

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OFF TO HUMANITARIAN AID, PETROLEUM PRODUCTS, OR PEOPLE, INCLUDING UN PERSONNEL. IRAQ REFUSES TO SELL FUEL TO HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS, SEVERELY HAMPERING RELIEF OPERATIONS. THE TIGHTENED BLOCKADE IS FURTHER EXACERBATED BY THE REFUSAL OF TURKISH TRUCK DRIVERS TO ENTER IRAQ, DUE IN LARGE PART TO THREATS FROM THE TURKISH KURDISH WORKERS PARTY.

THE SOUTH

THE SOUTHERN UPRISING

FOLLOWING SADDAM'S DEFEAT IN THE GULF WAR, LARGE NUMBERS OF IRAQI MILITARY PERSONNEL AND THE CIVILIAN POPULATION IN SOUTHERN IRAQ ROSE UP AGAINST THE SADDAM HUSSEIN REGIME AND WRESTLED CONTROL OVER A NUMBER OF MAJOR SOUTHERN CITIES, INCLUDING THE HOLY SHIA CITIES OF KARBALA AND NAJAF. IN RESPONDING TO THIS POPULAR UPRISING, IRAQI TROOPS INDISCRIMINATELY FIRED ON CIVILIANS AND HUNG SOME FROM THE BARRELS OF TANKS. IN REGAINING CONTROL OF NAJAF AND KARBALA, GOVERNMENT FORCES SEVERELY DAMAGED SACRED SHIA SHRINES, AND RAZED RESIDENTIAL AREAS AROUND THE HOLY MOSQUES IN BOTH CITIES. THIS BRUTAL SUPPRESSION OF THE UPRISING HAS BEEN FOLLOWED BY CONTINUED ATTACKS AGAINST

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THE CIVILIAN POPULATION AS WELL AS THROUGH HARSH ECONOMIC REPRESSION.

IRAQI VIOLATIONS OF UNSCR 688 IN THE SOUTH

-- IN 1992 BAGHDAD CONTINUES TO MASS FORCES IN THE SOUTH TO CONDUCT MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST SHIA AND OTHER IRAQIS WHO HAVE TAKEN REFUGE IN THE MARSHES. THE REGIME HAS ATTEMPTED TO DRAIN THESE REFUGE AREAS IN ORDER TO FACILITATE THESE OPERATIONS. THIS CAMPAIGN HAS SEEN THOUSANDS OF IRAQI CIVILIANS KILLED AND CAPTURED.

-- BAGHDAD'S VIOLATIONS OF UNSCR 688 IN SOUTHERN IRAQ HAVE BECOME INCREASINGLY BLATANT AND VICIOUS OVER THE LAST SEVERAL WEEKS, THOUGH IRAQ HAS ROUTINELY REPPRESSED ITS SOUTHERN CITIZENRY IN ITS ATTEMPTS TO REGAIN CONTROL IN SOUTHERN IRAQ.

-- IN DIRECT CONTRAVENTION OF UNSCR 688, HUMANITARIAN WORKERS HAVE BEEN DENIED UNRESTRICTED ACCESS IN SOUTHERN IRAQ THOUGH BAGHDAD HAS PAID LIP SERVICE TO UN DEMANDS.

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--- IRAQI OFFICIALS HAVE REFUSED TO GRANT PERMISSION TO UN PERSONNEL WISHING TO TRAVEL TO THE UNHCR OFFICE IN AN NASIRIYAH. THE OFFICE IS ALLOWED TO EXIST, BUT IT REMAINS UNMANNED, AND THEREFORE UNABLE TO MEET ITS RESPONSIBILITY TO MONITOR THE SITUATION IN SOUTHERN IRAQ.

-- WITHOUT PROPER UN MONITORING, IT HAS BEEN IMPOSSIBLE TO ENSURE THAT THE POPULATION OF SOUTHERN IRAQ RECEIVES

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THE HUMANITARIAN AND MEDICAL AID IT NEEDS.

-- RECONSTRUCTION HAS BEEN FAR SLOWER IN THE SOUTH THAN IN BAGHDAD AND CENTRAL IRAQ.

-- THE IRAQI MILITARY HAS USED DRACONIAN MEASURES TO BATTLE SOUTHERN DISSIDENTS WITH NO REGARD FOR PROTECTING ITS CIVILIANS. LAST SPRING SADDAM HUSSEIN'S REGIME ANNOUNCED A POLICY TO RELOCATE THE CIVILIAN POPULATION FROM THE MARSHES.

-- IN AN INTERVIEW WITH REUTERS LAST MAY, THE SPEAKER OF THE IRAQI PARLIAMENT PUBLICLY STATED THAT CIVILIANS WOULD BE GIVEN NO CHOICE IN THE MATTER AND WOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO RETURN TO THEIR HOMES. THE SPEAKER COMPARED THE RELOCATION OF THE MARSH DWELLERS TO THE BRUTAL RESETTLEMENT OF IRAQ'S KURDISH POPULATION DURING THE LATE 1980'S.

-- REPORTS SUGGEST THAT MARSH DWELLERS WHO HAVE RESISTED GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO RESETTLE HAVE BEEN FORCIBLY REMOVED FROM THEIR HOMES AND MOVED TO REMOTE PARTS OF IRAQ.

-- IRAQI COMMANDERS RECENTLY WERE ORDERED TO DESTROY SHIA VILLAGES AND KILL THEIR OCCUPANTS; A VIDEOTAPE NOW IN THE POSSESSION OF THE UN SHOWS IRAQ'S PRIME MINISTER ORDERING GOVERNMENT COMMANDERS TO "WIPE OUT" MARSH ARAB TRIBES.

-- IN MID-JULY, FIXED-WING AIRCRAFT SUPPLEMENTED HELICOPTER GUNSHIPS PROVIDING SUPPORT FOR GROUND OPERATIONS IN DIRECT VIOLATION OF UNSCR 688. THE IRAQI

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AIR FORCE HAS USED MIG-21S, MIG-23S, PC-7S, AND OTHER FIXED-WING COMBAT AIRCRAFT IN AIRSTRIKES AGAINST CIVILIAN TARGETS.

-- THE IRAQI MILITARY ALSO HAS STEPPED UP "SEARCH AND DESTROY" OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN IRAQ, DURING WHICH ENTIRE

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VILLAGES HAVE BEEN RAZED AND CIVILIANS HAVE BEEN MURDERED OR ARRESTED.

-- DURING A RECENT OFFENSIVE, GOVERNMENT FORCES DESTROYED MORE THAN 45 DWELLINGS IN SETTLEMENTS SUCH AS AS SAIQAL AND WADIYAH.

-- GOVERNMENT FORCES HAVE CONDUCTED HOUSE-TO-HOUSE SEARCHES FOR INSURGENTS AND MILITARY DESERTERS AND ARE EXECUTING CIVILIANS ACCUSED OF SUPPORTING THE REBELS.

-- IRAQI MILITARY UNITS HAVE BEGUN TO DRAIN SOME MARSH AREAS IN ORDER TO IMPROVE ACCESS TO THEIR TARGETS. THIS IS AN ALARMING DEVELOPMENT IN LIGHT OF THE DELICATE ECOSYSTEM OF THE MARSHES AND THE UNIQUE WAY OF LIFE OF SOUTHERN IRAQIS.

-- THERE HAVE BEEN REPORTS ON THE USE OF NAPALM BY IRAQI MILITARY TROOPS AND ALLEGATIONS THAT BAGHDAD HAS DELIBERATELY POISONED WATER IN SOME MARSH AREAS.

-- THE CONTINUED LACK OF ACCESS TO SOUTHERN IRAQ HAS PREVENTED HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS FROM INVESTIGATING THESE ALLEGATIONS.

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5. THE STATEMENT BY THE MINISTER OF INFORMATION ON AUGUST 6 CLAIMING TO HAVE UNCOVERED AN "IRANIAN" PLOT TO ATTACK UN AND NGO WORKERS IN SOUTHERN IRAQ RAISES FURTHER CONCERNS OVER THE SAFETY OF THE FEW PERSONNEL WHO DO TRAVEL IN THE SOUTH. BAKER

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UNCLAS BAGHDAD 01493

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, IZ

SUBJECT: SADDAM SAYS KURDS CAN EVENTUALLY RETURN TO
BORDER VILLAGES

REF: BAGHDAD 1492 ✓

AS A FOLLOW-UP TO REFTTEL, SADDAM YESTERDAY COMMENTED DURING HIS CONTINUING TOUR OF KURDISTAN THAT KURDS WHO HAD BEEN EVICTED FROM BORDER VILLAGES--IN THE COURSE OF THE GOI'S CREATION OF A 30-KILOMETER CORDON SANITAIRE ALONG ITS BORDERS WITH TURKEY AND IRAN--WOULD EVENTUALLY BE ALLOWED TO RETURN. HE SAID IRAQ HAD BEEN FORCED BY ITS ENEMIES TO EVACUATE THE BORDER VILLAGES, BUT THAT WHEN STABILITY AND SECURITY RETURNED TO THE AREA PEOPLE WOULD BE FREE TO LIVE ANYWHERE. WILSON

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UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 01726

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, SW, IZ
SUBJECT: SWEDISH DELEGATION STUDIES KURDISH ISSUE IN IRAQ

1. CONSERVATIVE STOCKHOLM DAILY "SVENSKA DAGBLADET"
(SVD) REPORTED MARCH 7 THAT A FIVE-PERSON SWEDISH
PARLIAMENTARY DELEGATION VISITED IRAQ AT THE INVITATION
OF THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT TO STUDY THE SITUATION OF THE
KURDS. MOST OF THE SWEDISH GROUP HAD ALSO VISITED
KURDISH REFUGEE CAMPS IN IRAN AND TURKEY LAST YEAR. AT
THAT TIME, THE SWEDES WERE HIGHLY CRITICAL OF IRAQI
TREATMENT OF THE KURDS AND CONDEMNED THE IRAQI USE OF
POISON GAS AGAINST THE KURDISH VILLAGE OF HALABJA.
REPORTEDLY AS A RESULT OF THIS CRITICISM, THE IRAQI
GOVERNMENT ISSUED THE INVITATION TO THE SWEDES TO STUDY
THE KURDISH SITUATION IN IRAQ FIRSTHAND.

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2. THE FOUR-DAY VISIT, HOWEVER, WAS NOT A PUBLIC
RELATIONS PLUS FOR IRAQ. AT A PRESS CONFERENCE UPON
THEIR RETURN, THE SWEDISH MP'S AND THEIR COUNSEL
COMPLAINED OF NUMEROUS DIFFICULTIES THEY ENCOUNTERED.
THEY WERE NOT ABLE TO VISIT THE PRISONS THEY WANTED NOR
INTERVIEW ANY "POLITICAL PRISONERS". THE IRAQIS REFUSED
TO ANSWER QUESTIONS ABOUT ABUSE OF POLITICAL PRISONERS
IN GENERAL AND PROVIDED FEW OR NO DETAILS ABOUT SPECIFIC

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CASES THE SWEDES RAISED. IN ADDITION TO UNSPECIFIED PROBLEMS WITH THE SECURITY POLICE, AND LOST PASSPORTS AND LUGGAGE, THERE REPORTEDLY WERE EVEN TIMES WHEN THE IRAQI TRANSLATORS FOR THE GROUP INTENTIONALLY MISINTERPRETED DURING CONVERSATIONS THE SWEDES HELD.

3. THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE SWEDISH DELEGATION ARE REPORTED TO COINCIDE CLOSELY WITH THOSE OF AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, I.E.: KURDS ARE MOVED AGAINST THEIR WILL AWAY FROM THE BORDER AREAS; ONLY A FEW THOUSAND OF THE 70-80,000 KURDS WHO FLED TO TURKEY AND IRAN HAVE RETURNED; AND, DESPITE THE BAGHDAD REGIME'S DENIALS, TORTURE AND OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS CONTINUE.
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FROM NEA/NGA

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM
SUBJECT: HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR IRAQ.

1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR IRAQ.

2. BEGIN TEXT:

IRAQ IS IN EFFECT A ONE-PARTY STATE GOVERNED BY THE ARAB BA'ATH SOCIALIST PARTY (ABSP) THROUGH A REVOLUTIONARY COMMAND COUNCIL (RCC) WHICH HAS BOTH EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY UNDER THE PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION OF 1968. SADDAM HUSSEIN HOLDS DECISIVE POWER AS PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC, CHAIRMAN OF THE RCC, AND SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE REGIONAL COMMAND OF THE ABSP. TWO OTHER SMALL PARTIES ARE ESSENTIALLY SUPPORT GROUPS FOR THE GOVERNMENT. IN 1989 THE GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED ITS

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INTENTION TO ADOPT A MULTIPARTY SYSTEM ENSHRINED IN A NEW CONSTITUTION. ELECTIONS FOR THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY--WHICH HAS FEW POWERS--WERE HELD APRIL 1. A DRAFT CONSTITUTION WHICH WOULD REPORTEDLY ALLOW A MULTIPARTY SYSTEM WAS COMPLETED IN 1989 AND IS EXPECTED TO BE PUT TO A REFERENDUM IN EARLY 1990. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN, HOWEVER, WHETHER THIS WILL DILUTE THE MONOPOLY OF POWER HELD BY SADDAM HUSSEIN AND THE ABSP. IRAQ'S POPULATION COMPRISES MANY DISPARATE GROUPS, MOST NOTABLY SHI'A AND SUNNI MUSLIM

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ARABS, KURDS, TURCOMANS, AND VARIOUS CHRISTIAN SECTS, PREDOMINANTLY ASSYRIANS AND CHALDEANS.

IRAQ'S MILITARY IS LARGE AND WELL TRAINED, AND PARTS OF IT, NOTABLY THE FURSAN, OR KURDISH TRIBAL LEVIES, HAVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR SECURITY WITHIN THE KURDISH AUTONOMOUS REGION. THE NATIONAL POLICE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR CIVIL ORDER.

THE GOVERNMENT EXERTS A HIGH DEGREE OF CONTROL OVER THE ECONOMY, DOMINATED BY THE PETROLEUM SECTOR, AND OWNS ALL MAJOR INDUSTRIES. THE GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN CARRYING OUT A PROGRAM OF DIVESTITURE AND PRIVATIZATION IN AGRICULTURE, TOURISM, THE SERVICES INDUSTRY, AND LIGHT INDUSTRY, AND IS TRYING TO ATTRACT INVESTOR CAPITAL AND EXPERTISE IN THE OPERATION OF THE ECONOMY. HOWEVER, CLOSE GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY IS EXPECTED TO CONTINUE.

IRAQ'S HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD REMAINED ABYSMAL IN 1989. EFFECTIVE OPPOSITION TO GOVERNMENT POLICY IS STIFLED; THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES ENGAGE IN EXTENSIVE SURVEILLANCE AND UTILIZE EXTRALEGAL MEANS, INCLUDING TORTURE AND SUMMARY EXECUTION, TO DEAL WITH ANTIREGIME ACTIVITY. THE CIVIL RIGHTS OF IRAQI CITIZENS CONTINUE TO BE SHARPLY LIMITED, ~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~
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AND IRAQIS DO NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO CHANGE THEIR GOVERNMENT. THE FREEDOMS OF SPEECH AND PRESS AND ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION ARE VIRTUALLY NONEXISTENT. OTHER IMPORTANT HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEMS INCLUDE CONTINUING DISAPPEARANCES AND ARBITRARY DETENTIONS, LACK OF FAIR TRIAL, WIDESPREAD INTERFERENCE WITH PRIVACY, EXCESSIVE USE OF FORCE AGAINST KURDISH CIVILIANS, AND ALMOST TOTAL LACK OF WORKERS' RIGHTS. IN ADDITION TO THE REPRESSIVE DOMESTIC CONTROLS THAT PREDATE THE WAR WITH IRAN, TIGHT WARTIME CONTROLS, INCLUDING TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS, REMAIN IN EFFECT DESPITE THE AUGUST 1988 CEASE-FIRE WITH IRAN.

AN ARMED KURDISH INSURGENCY CONTINUED IN 1989, BUT AT A REDUCED LEVEL. ALTHOUGH THERE WERE NO ALLEGATIONS THAT THE GOVERNMENT USED CHEMICAL WEAPONS AGAINST KURDISH CIVILIANS IN 1989, AS IT DID IN 1988, IN ITS EFFORTS TO

CRUSH THE REBELLION. IT CONTINUED TO VIOLATE THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF ELEMENTS OF THE KURDISH POPULATION. THE GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED IN JUNE THAT IN ITS CAMPAIGN TO SUPPRESS THE REBELLION IT HAS PURSUED A PROGRAM SINCE 1987 OF ESTABLISHING A DEPOPULATED SECURITY ZONE ALONG THE FULL LENGTH OF IRAQ'S BORDERS WITH IRAN AND TURKEY. UNDER THIS PROGRAM, THE GOVERNMENT HAS DESTROYED VILLAGES WITHIN A 30-KILOMETER-WIDE ZONE AND RELOCATED APPROXIMATELY 500,000 KURDISH AND ASSYRIAN INHABITANTS INTO MORE EASILY

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CONTROLLED AND PROTECTED TOWNS, CITIES, AND NEWLY
CONSTRUCTED SETTLEMENTS IN TRADITIONAL KURDISH AREAS.

RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

SECTION 1 RESPECT FOR THE INTEGRITY OF THE PERSON,
INCLUDING

FREEDOM FROM:

A. POLITICAL AND OTHER EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLING

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FOR YEARS EXECUTION HAS BEEN AN ESTABLISHED IRAQI METHOD
FOR DEALING WITH PERCEIVED POLITICAL AND MILITARY
OPPONENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO
MEMBERS OF THE OUTLAWED DA'WA ORGANIZATION (AN
IRAN-SUPPORTED FUNDAMENTALIST SHI'A MUSLIM GROUP THAT HAS
ENGAGED IN ACTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM). IN SOME
CASES, A FAMILY ONLY LEARNS THAT ONE OF ITS MEMBERS HAS
BEEN EXECUTED WHEN THE SECURITY SERVICES RETURN THE BODY
AND REQUIRE THE FAMILY TO PAY A FINE.

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL (AI). IN ITS PRESENTATION BEFORE THE
U.N. SUBCOMMISSION ON THE PREVENTION OF DISCRIMINATION AND
PROTECTION OF MINORITIES IN AUGUST, STATED THAT IT HAD
RECEIVED ALLEGATIONS THAT SOME 80 ARMY DESERTERS WERE
EXECUTED IN DECEMBER 1988 AND CHARGED THAT THE GOVERNMENT
EXECUTED 11 OF ITS KURDISH OPPONENTS IN MARCH AND APRIL
1989.

IN ITS FEBRUARY REPORT, "IRAQ: CHILDREN: INNOCENT VICTIMS
OF POLITICAL REPRESSION." AI STATED THAT IT RECEIVES
ALLEGATIONS OF HUNDREDS OF EXECUTIONS IN IRAQ EACH YEAR.
AI CITED THE CASE OF 29 KURDISH CHILDREN AND YOUTHS
ALLEGEDLY EXECUTED IN JANUARY 1987. IN ADDITION, AI, IN
ITS 1989 REPORT COVERING 1988, CITED ALLEGATIONS THAT
HUNDREDS OF CIVILIANS, INCLUDING WOMEN AND CHILDREN, WERE
EXECUTED AT TANJARO MILITARY GARRISON, SULAIMANIYA
PROVINCE. INDEPENDENT INFORMATION TO CONFIRM THE
ALLEGATIONS CITED IN AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORTS IS NOT
AVAILABLE.

B. DISAPPEARANCE

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IN THE FEBRUARY REPORT, AI ASSERTED THAT THOUSANDS OF
PEOPLE ARRESTED BY IRAQI SECURITY OR INTELLIGENCE FORCES

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REPORTEDLY HAVE "DISAPPEARED" WHILE IN DETENTION, WITH MANY FEARED EXECUTED. IN ITS AUGUST PRESENTATION TO THE U.N. SUBCOMMISSION, AI REPORTED THE DISAPPEARANCE IN MID-APRIL OF MULLA MUHAMMAD DALGAYI, DESCRIBED AS THE IMAM OF QAL'AT DIZA, WHO WAS AMONG DELEGATES FROM KURDISTAN WHO REPORTEDLY MET WITH GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS TO APPEAL AGAINST FORCED SETTLEMENT OF THE KURDS AT QAL'AT DIZA. HE WAS REPORTEDLY ARRESTED IN BAGHDAD AND HAS SINCE DISAPPEARED. AN ASSYRIAN ORGANIZATION BASED IN THE UNITED STATES CHARGED IN MARCH THAT THE WHEREABOUTS OF 33 ASSYRIANS, WHO TOOK ADVANTAGE OF THE AMNESTY ISSUED BY THE GOVERNMENT AND RETURNED TO IRAQ FROM IRAN AND TURKEY, WERE UNKNOWN.

C. TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN, OR DEGRADING
TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT

THE CONSTITUTION PROHIBITS TORTURE AND PRESCRIBES STIFF PUNISHMENT FOR IT, BUT IT IS CLEAR THAT BOTH PHYSICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TORTURE ARE USED BY THE AUTHORITIES, ESPECIALLY THE SECURITY POLICE. GIVEN THE RIGID CHAIN OF COMMAND WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT AND SECURITY SERVICES, TORTURE COULD NOT BE PRACTICED WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OR AUTHORIZATION OF SENIOR OFFICIALS.

EMIGRE GROUPS AND FORMER PRISONERS ASSERT THAT PERSONS DETAINED BY THE SECURITY POLICE FOR POLITICAL OR SECURITY-RELATED MATTERS ARE FREQUENTLY TORTURED AND MISTREATED. TREATMENT IS REPORTED TO BE WORST IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING ARREST AND DURING THE PERIOD OF INTERROGATION AND INVESTIGATION, WHICH CAN LAST FOR MONTHS. TORTURE AND BRUTAL TREATMENT ARE NOT LIMITED TO POLITICAL CASES.

SECURITY-RELATED OFFENSES ARE BROADLY DEFINED AND INCLUDE SUCH ROUTINE CRIMINAL MATTERS AS CURRENCY VIOLATIONS.

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IN ITS 1989 REPORT COVERING 1988, AI STATED THAT THE ROUTINE TORTURE AND ILL-TREATMENT OF PRISONERS CONTINUED TO BE WIDELY REPORTED. IT SAID THE VICTIMS INCLUDED DETAINEES BELOW THE AGE OF 18 WHO WERE REPORTEDLY BEATEN, WHIPPED, GIVEN ELECTRIC SHOCKS, AND DEPRIVED OF FOOD. THE GOVERNMENT CATEGORICALLY DENIED ANY USE OF TORTURE AGAINST CHILDREN AS AN OFFICIAL POLICY OR AS A PRACTICE, AND STATED ITS READINESS TO CONSIDER FULLY ANY INDIVIDUAL

ALLEGATION WITH A VIEW TO BRINGING PERPETRATORS TO JUSTICE. IMPARTIAL OBSERVERS HAVE SO FAR BEEN UNABLE TO LOOK INTO THESE ALLEGATIONS.

D. ARBITRARY ARREST, DETENTION, OR EXILE

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WHILE THE CONSTITUTION AND LEGAL CODE PROVIDE FOR THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS AND PLACE CHECKS ON POLICE POWERS IN SUCH AREAS AS ARREST, DETENTION, IMPRISONMENT. AND SEARCH, THESE PROVISIONS HAVE VIRTUALLY NO WEIGHT IN POLITICAL OR NATIONAL SECURITY CASES, ALTHOUGH THEY ARE GENERALLY RESPECTED IN ORDINARY CRIMINAL CASES. SECURITY POLICE NOT ONLY MAKE ARBITRARY ARRESTS BUT ALSO SECRETLY DETAIN SUSPECTS, WHOSE FATE SOMETIMES BECOMES KNOWN ONLY AFTER THEY HAVE BEEN EXECUTED. SECURITY CHARGES HAVE INCLUDED ESPIONAGE, TREASON, AND CONSPIRACY AGAINST IRAQ, OFTEN IN COLLABORATION WITH UNNAMED FOREIGN ENEMIES.

THE RELOCATION OF 500,000 KURDISH VILLAGERS TO OTHER AREAS OF KURDISTAN SINCE 1987 MAY BE CONSIDERED A FORM OF INTERNAL EXILE. THE GOVERNMENT DECLARED IN JUNE 1989 THAT IT WAS CREATING AN UNINHABITED SECURITY ZONE TO ENSURE THE SAFETY AND SECURITY OF CITIZENS IN THE BORDER REGIONS (WHO
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WERE SUBJECTED TO SHELLING AND MILITARY OPERATIONS DURING THE WAR WITH IRAN) AND TO PROVIDE BETTER SERVICES TO THE VILLAGERS.

ALTHOUGH THE GOVERNMENT HAS CEASED EXPELLING IRAQIS OF SUPPOSED IRANIAN DESCENT, MOST OF THE FEW REMAINING IRANIANS HAVE BEEN IMPRISONED OR LIVE UNDER THE FEAR OF DEPORTATION OR INCARCERATION. SPOUSES OF IRAQIS OF IRANIAN ORIGIN ARE REQUIRED TO OBTAIN A DIVORCE OR SUFFER THE SAME CONSEQUENCES. MOREOVER, OTHER IRAQIS, WHOSE GRANDPARENTS ARE SHOWN NOT TO BE OF IRAQI ORIGIN, ARE SUBJECT TO ARBITRARY DETENTION AND DEPORTATION.

WITH REGARD TO FORCED OR COMPULSORY LABOR, SEE SECTION 6.
C.

E. DENIAL OF FAIR PUBLIC TRIAL

IRAQ'S LEGAL SYSTEM PROVIDES FOR INVESTIGATION BY POLICE AND THEN BY AN INQUIRY JUDGE WHO MAY REFER A CASE TO THE COURTS OR DISMISS IT. JUDGES TRY CRIMINAL CASES; THERE ARE NO JURIES. CONVICTIONS MAY BE APPEALED TO THE COURT OF APPEAL AND THEN TO THE COURT OF CASSATION, THE SUPREME COURT. THERE ARE NO SHARI'A COURTS PER SE IN IRAQ; HOWEVER, FAMILY COURTS ADMINISTER SHARI'A LAW MODIFIED BY IRAQI CUSTOM.

TRIALS OF ORDINARY CASES ARE HELD IN CIVIL, CRIMINAL. AND RELIGIOUS COURTS AND ARE OPEN. DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO COUNSEL--AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE, IF THE DEFENDANT IS INDIGENT. CHARGES AND EVIDENCE ARE AVAILABLE FOR REVIEW BY THE LAWYER. APPELLATE COURTS HEAR CASES NOT UNDER THE JURISDICTION OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COURTS.

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IN CONTRAST TO ORDINARY CASES, SECURITY CASES ARE HANDLED BY THE REVOLUTIONARY COURTS, WHICH USUALLY HOLD CLOSED

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TRIALS. SECURITY CASES INCLUDE ESPIONAGE, TREASON, SMUGGLING, CURRENCY EXCHANGE VIOLATIONS AND DRUG TRAFFICKING. THE RIGHT OF DEFENSE IN SUCH COURTS IS SAID TO BE SEVERELY RESTRICTED. THE "SPECIAL COURTS" CONSTITUTED BY THE RCC FOR SPECIFIC INCIDENTS, SUCH AS THE REPORTED CONSPIRACY AGAINST THE REGIME IN 1979, ARE ALSO CLOSED. THESE SPECIAL TRIBUNALS ARE APPARENTLY EXEMPT FROM CONSTITUTIONAL SAFEGUARDS OF DEFENDANTS. RIGHTS; DEFENDANTS ARE HELD INCOMMUNICADO, AND CONFESSIONS EXTRACTED BY TORTURE ARE ADMISSIBLE. APPEALS CAN BE TAKEN ONLY TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE RCC. HOWEVER, THE UTILITY OF THIS APPEAL IS QUESTIONABLE, SINCE THERE ARE REPORTS THAT EXECUTIONS TAKE PLACE SHORTLY AFTER TRIAL.

POLITICAL DISSENT IN IRAQ IS TAKEN BY THE AUTHORITIES TO ENCOMPASS A WIDE RANGE OF ACTIVITIES AND, IN AN ENVIRONMENT WHERE PUBLIC ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF ARREST OR IMPRISONMENT IS RARE, IT IS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO ESTIMATE THE NUMBER OF POLITICAL PRISONERS. IN ITS 1989 REPORT, AI STATED THAT "THOUSANDS" OF POLITICAL PRISONERS CONTINUED TO BE ARBITRARILY ARRESTED AND DETAINED, ESPECIALLY MEMBERS OF PROHIBITED POLITICAL PARTIES, ARMY DESERTERS, AND DRAFT RESISTERS. RELATIVES, INCLUDING CHILDREN OF SUSPECTS, ARE SAID TO BE HELD AS HOSTAGES TO COMPEL CONFESSIONS.

F. ARBITRARY INTERFERENCE WITH PRIVACY, FAMILY, HOME, OR
CORRESPONDENCE

THE CONSTITUTION PROVIDES PROTECTIONS FOR THE INVIOABILITY OF THE HOME, AND STRONG CULTURAL VALUES REINFORCE THESE PROTECTIONS. POLICE MUST OBTAIN A SEARCH

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WARRANT BEFORE ENTERING THE HOME OF A CRIMINAL SUSPECT. HOWEVER, WARRANTS ARE NOT REQUIRED FOR THE ARREST OF SECURITY SUSPECTS. ALTHOUGH MOST ARRESTS OCCUR OUTSIDE THE HOME, THERE HAVE BEEN REPORTS OF FORCED ENTRY AND ARREST BY THE SECURITY POLICE, PARTICULARLY OF SUSPECTED MEMBERS OF THE OUTLAWED DA'WA ORGANIZATION.

ALTHOUGH THE CONSTITUTION PROVIDES FOR SECRECY OF MAIL AND TELEGRAPHIC AND TELEPHONE CORRESPONDENCE, MANY IRAQIS

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BELIEVE THAT THE MONITORING OF TELEPHONES IS A COMMON PRACTICE AND THAT ALL MAIL IS SUBJECT TO REVIEW BY CENSORS. THE SECURITY SERVICES AND BA'ATH PARTY MAINTAIN PERVASIVE NETWORKS OF INFORMERS. THE GOVERNMENT MAINTAINS A CLOSE WATCH AGAINST IRANIAN ATTEMPTS TO EXPLOIT DISSATISFACTION AMONG IRAQI SHI'A, WHO ADHERE TO THE BRANCH OF ISLAM PREVALENT IN IRAN.

G. USE OF EXCESSIVE FORCE AND VIOLATIONS OF HUMANITARIAN

LAW IN INTERNAL CONFLICTS

ELEMENTS OF IRAQ'S KURDISH POPULATION HAVE ENGAGED IN ARMED STRUGGLE WITH ALL GOVERNMENTS OF IRAQ PERIODICALLY SINCE THE 1920.S. THE OUTBREAK OF THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR IN 1980 SPARKED A NEW ANTIGOVERNMENT INSURGENCY BY KURDISH ELEMENTS, MANY OF WHOM FOUGHT WITH OR AIDED IRAN DURING THE WAR. FROM 1981 TO 1989, THE GOVERNMENT'S EFFORTS TO CRUSH THE REBELLION MILITARILY RESULTED IN APPROXIMATELY 8,000 DEATHS, MANY OF THEM CIVILIANS KILLED INDISCRIMINATELY BY CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN 1988.

ALTHOUGH THE FIGHTING WAS AT A REDUCED LEVEL IN 1989, KURDISH MILITARY OPERATIONS CONTINUED, AS DID GOVERNMENT MEASURES TO CONTAIN THEM. KURDISH REBELS CONTINUED TO ANNOUNCE THEIR HOSTILITY TOWARDS THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT. ON AUGUST 29, 1989, THE LEADER OF ONE GROUP OF INSURGENTS

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STATED TO THE PRESS IN GENEVA THAT HIS GROUP WOULD TARGET FOREIGN INTERESTS IN IRAQ SUPPORTING THE IRAQI REGIME. AS OF THE END OF 1989, THE CYCLE OF KURDISH REBELLION AND GOVERNMENT REPRESSION REMAINED UNRESOLVED.

SECTION 2 RESPECT FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES, INCLUDING:

A. FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS

THE FREEDOMS OF SPEECH AND PRESS ARE NOT RESPECTED. THE CONSTITUTION PROHIBITS "ANY ACT AIMED AT UNDERMINING THE NATIONAL UNITY OF THE PEOPLE, PROVOKING RACIAL, SECTARIAN, AND REGIONAL BIGOTRY, OR VIOLATING GAINS AND ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE COUNTRY." THE GOVERNMENT VIEWS POLITICAL DISSENT AS A THREAT TO ITS SECURITY AND STRICTLY CONTROLS SPEECH AND ALL INFORMATION MEDIA. ALL PUBLICATIONS ARE SUBJECT TO CENSORSHIP. THE GOVERNMENT AND THE BA'ATH PARTY OWN AND OPERATE THE PRESS, RADIO, AND TELEVISION. THE MEDIA DO NOT

CRITICIZE THE GOVERNMENT, AND NEWS REPORTING IS STRONGLY BIASED. THERE IS NO PRESENTATION OF OPPOSITION VIEWPOINTS.

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FEW FOREIGN PERIODICALS REACH IRAQ AND THOSE THAT DO MAY BE CENSORED. WESTERN NEWSPAPERS ARE NOT SOLD. FOREIGN VISITORS' MAGAZINES, NEWSPAPERS, CASSETTES, CAMERAS, AND VIDEO CASSETTES MAY BE CONFISCATED AT THE AIRPORT. TO CONTROL THE DISSEMINATION OF POLITICAL LEAFLETS, WORD PROCESSORS AND COMPUTERS MUST BE REGISTERED. FAILURE TO REGISTER IS A CRIMINAL OFFENSE. IRAQIS NO LONGER NEED TO REGISTER THEIR TYPEWRITERS OR PHOTOCOPIERS, BUT FOREIGNERS IN IRAQ MUST DO SO. TAKING PHOTOGRAPHS OF MILITARY INSTALLATIONS, GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS, OR AREAS NEAR

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SENSITIVE LOCATIONS IS FORBIDDEN AND PUNISHABLE BY IMPRISONMENT. JOURNALISTS AND PHOTOGRAPHERS VISITING IRAQ AT THE INVITATION OF THE GOVERNMENT ARE REQUIRED TO PRESENT FILM TAKEN IN IRAQ FOR INSPECTION BY THE AUTHORITIES.

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

THESE FREEDOMS ARE SEVERELY LIMITED. PUBLIC MEETINGS MAY ONLY BE ORGANIZED UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE GOVERNMENT OR THE BA'ATH PARTY. ASSOCIATION FOR NONRELIGIOUS PURPOSES AND DEMONSTRATIONS WITHOUT GOVERNMENT APPROVAL HAVE MET WITH SEVERE REPRESSION. PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS ARE SUBJECT TO CONTROL BY THE BA'ATH PARTY CENTRAL VOCATIONAL BUREAU.

FOR A DISCUSSION OF FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AS IT APPLIES TO LABOR UNIONS, SEE SECTION 6.A.

C. FREEDOM OF RELIGION

IRAQ IS AN ETHNICALLY AND RELIGIOUSLY DIVERSE SOCIETY. SINCE ITS RISE TO POWER IN 1968, THE BA'ATH GOVERNMENT, WHILE CAREFULLY CONTROLLING RELIGIOUS GROUPS, HAS ENFORCED TOLERANCE OF RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY, SEEKING TO SUBMERGE RELIGIOUS DIFFERENCES IN THE PROMOTION OF SECULAR NATIONALISM. A 1981 LAW GAVE THE MINISTRY OF ENDOWMENTS AND RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS THE AUTHORITY TO PROMULGATE LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING PLACES OF WORSHIP, APPOINTMENT OF CLERGY, PUBLICATION OF RELIGIOUS LITERATURE, AND PARTICIPATION IN RELIGIOUS COUNCILS AND MEETINGS. MUSLIM RELIGIOUS LEADERS OPERATE UNDER CLOSE GOVERNMENT SUPERVISION, ARE CONSIDERED GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, AND RECEIVE THEIR SALARIES THROUGH THE GOVERNMENT. THE GOVERNMENT ADMINISTERS THE PRINCIPAL MUSLIM SHRINES AND MOSQUES AND HAS PROVIDED ALLOTMENTS TO THEM AND TO

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CHURCHES FOR MAINTENANCE AND REFURBISHING. THERE ARE NO PENALTIES UNDER IRAQI LAW FOR CHANGING ONE'S RELIGION, ALTHOUGH THERE IS A SOCIAL STIGMA FOR MUSLIMS WHO CONVERT TO ANOTHER FAITH.

WHILE THE GOVERNMENT HAS ASSUMED MUCH GREATER AUTHORITY IN ISLAMIC RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS SINCE 1981, IT HAS BEEN LESS INTRUSIVE INTO THE RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS OF IRAQ'S CHRISTIANS, WHO NUMBER MORE THAN 500,000 AND CONSTITUTE NEARLY 4 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION. THEIR FREEDOM OF WORSHIP IN CHURCHES OF ESTABLISHED DENOMINATIONS IS LEGALLY PROTECTED, BUT THEY ARE NOT PERMITTED TO PROSELYTIZE OR TO HOLD MEETINGS OUTSIDE CHURCH PREMISES. CONVENTS AND MONASTERIES EXIST, AND SOME NEW CHURCHES HAVE BEEN CONSTRUCTED, IN SOME CASES WITH GOVERNMENT FINANCIAL SUPPORT. THE JEWISH COMMUNITY HAS DECREASED FROM 150,000 FOLLOWING WORLD WAR II TO UNDER 400. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF RECENT PERSECUTION. ONE SYNAGOGUE IN BAGHDAD STILL FUNCTIONS.

D. FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT WITHIN THE COUNTRY, FOREIGN TRAVEL, EMIGRATION AND REPATRIATION

IRAQIS ARE GENERALLY FREE TO TRAVEL WITHIN THE COUNTRY AND TO CHANGE THEIR RESIDENCES OR WORKPLACES. HOWEVER, THEY ARE LIKELY TO BE CONSTRAINED BY SOCIAL, CULTURAL, AND RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS WHICH DEFINE THE AREAS OCCUPIED BY THE VARIOUS ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS GROUPS. SENSITIVE BORDER AND OTHER SECURITY AREAS ARE OFF LIMITS. THERE ARE POLICE CHECKPOINTS ON HIGHWAYS AND OUTSIDE MAJOR TOWNS, BUT IRAQIS AND NONDIPLOMATIC FOREIGNERS TRAVEL FREELY IN NONRESTRICTED AREAS.

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THE GOVERNMENT'S HARSH CAMPAIGN TO SUPPRESS KURDISH REBELS, INVOLVING MASS RELOCATIONS OF KURDISH VILLAGERS, HAS NULLIFIED THE RIGHT OF HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF KURDS TO CHOOSE THEIR PLACE OF RESIDENCE. SINCE THE GOVERNMENT BEGAN ITS PROGRAM OF FORCED RELOCATION IN 1987, AN ESTIMATED 500,000 PEOPLE HAVE BEEN UPROOTED. SINCE TRADITIONAL KURDISH CULTURE HAS BEEN DEEPLY EMBEDDED IN THE RURAL VILLAGE, THE FORCED REMOVALS AND RAZING OF VILLAGES HAS HAD A DESTRUCTIVE IMPACT ON THE LIVES OF SOME HALF A MILLION KURDS.

MOST FOREIGNERS WHO REMAIN IN THE COUNTRY FOR MORE THAN 30 DAYS AND ALL IRAQIS MUST OBTAIN EXIT PERMISSION. TRAVEL HAS BEEN SEVERELY LIMITED SINCE SEPTEMBER 1986, WHEN THE GOVERNMENT IMPOSED TIGHT RESTRICTIONS ON CURRENCY EXCHANGE. THESE RESTRICTIONS WERE EASED SOMEWHAT IN 1989.

BUT THE MOST AN IRAQI MAY EXCHANGE IS 1,000 DINARS (DOLS

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3,220). BECAUSE OF THE DRAIN ON THE ECONOMY CAUSED BY THE WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION, PERMISSION TO TRAVEL ABROAD IS RESTRICTED TO A FEW CATEGORIES OF IRAQIS, INCLUDING OFFICIALS, BUSINESSMEN, GOVERNMENT-APPROVED STUDENTS, AND PERSONS NEEDING MEDICAL TREATMENT. IN 1989 THE GOVERNMENT EASED RESTRICTIONS TO PERMIT ONE PARENT TO VISIT HIS OR HER OFFSPRING WHO IS STUDYING OR WORKING ABROAD.

WHILE PERMISSION FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT ABROAD MAY BE GRANTED, PERMISSION TO TRANSFER HARD CURRENCY ABROAD TO PAY FOR IT MAY NOT BE. IN CASES OF THOSE DESIRING MEDICAL TREATMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, THE GOVERNMENT NOW REQUIRES A BOND TO BE POSTED BY AN AMERICAN FRIEND OR RELATIVE WITH THE IRAQI EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON BEFORE EXIT PERMISSION IS GRANTED. THE MINIMUM AMOUNT OF THIS BOND IS DOLS 10,000. THE GOVERNMENT SOMETIMES LIMITS THE COUNTRIES AN IRAQI TRAVELER MAY VISIT AND, SHOULD THE

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TRAVELER VISIT A NONAUTHORIZED COUNTRY, A SMALL FINE MAY BE LEVIED UPON HIS RETURN. IRAQIS WHO HAVE RESIDENCES ABROAD MAY DEPART THE COUNTRY, PROVIDED THEY ORIGINALLY LEFT BEFORE THE WAR BEGAN. A MARRIED WOMAN MUST HAVE THE PERMISSION OF HER HUSBAND TO TRAVEL ABROAD.

THE GOVERNMENT CAN REQUIRE A PROSPECTIVE TRAVELER TO POST A SUBSTANTIAL BOND TO ASSURE HIS RETURN. THE RCC DECREED IN 1987 THAT IRAQI STUDENTS ABROAD WHO REFUSE TO RETURN TO IRAQ MUST REIMBURSE THE GOVERNMENT FOR ALL EDUCATION RECEIVED IN IRAQ OR ABROAD AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE. THE DECREE IS APPLICABLE RETROACTIVELY TO STUDENTS WHO HAVE REFUSED TO RETURN SINCE MAY 16, 1983, THE DATE THE GOVERNMENT BEGAN REQUIRING EMPLOYEES LEAVING GOVERNMENT JOBS BEFORE 20 YEARS OF SERVICE TO REIMBURSE THE STATE FOR THE COST OF THEIR EDUCATION. AMOUNTS DUE CAN BE RECOVERED BY CONFISCATION; NONPAYMENT MAY RESULT IN IMPRISONMENT. EACH STUDENT MUST PROVIDE A GUARANTOR BEFORE TRAVELING ABROAD. THIS GUARANTOR AND THE STUDENT'S PARENTS MAY BE HELD LIABLE IF THE STUDENT FAILS TO RETURN.

THERE IS NO SPECIFIC BAN ON EMIGRATION OR SPECIAL RESTRICTIONS FOR MEMBERS OF MINORITY GROUPS; HOWEVER, EMIGRATION IS DISCOURAGED. FOR THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS ALMOST ALL OF THOSE GIVEN PERMISSION TO EMIGRATE HAVE BEEN CHRISTIAN IRAQI WIVES OF FORMER IRAQI CITIZENS NOW LIVING ABROAD AS CITIZENS OF ANOTHER COUNTRY. PROSPECTIVE EMIGRANTS HAVE HAD TRAVEL PERMISSION DELAYED AND HAVE BEEN HARASSED. MANY EMIGRANTS LEAVE BEHIND SUBSTANTIAL PROPERTY BECAUSE OF THE DIFFICULTY OF EXPORTING ASSETS.

CURRENCY EXCHANGE VIOLATIONS ARE CONSIDERED NATIONAL

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SECURITY OFFENSES, AND PENALTIES CAN BE SEVERE.

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NON-IRAQI SPOUSES OF IRAQI CITIZENS WHO HAVE RESIDED IN IRAQ FOR 5 YEARS ARE REQUIRED TO TAKE IRAQI NATIONALITY OR LEAVE IRAQ. MANY PEOPLE, INCLUDING SEVERAL AMERICANS, HAVE THUS BEEN OBLIGED TO ACCEPT IRAQI CITIZENSHIP AND ARE THEREFORE SUBJECT TO THE PRESENT TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS. IN MARCH 1984, AN ORDER BY THE RCC REDUCED THE RESIDENCY PERIOD BEFORE NATURALIZATION TO 1 YEAR FOR THE SPOUSES OF IRAQI CITIZENS EMPLOYED IN GOVERNMENT OFFICES. THE IRAQI SPOUSE FACES PENALTIES FOR NONCOMPLIANCE, INCLUDING LOSS OF JOB, A FINE OF APPROXIMATELY DOLS 10,000, AND REPAYMENT OF THE COSTS OF EDUCATION. IRAQ DOES NOT RECOGNIZE THE CONCEPT OF DUAL NATIONALITY, AND MANY IRAQI "DUAL NATIONALS," ESPECIALLY THE CHILDREN OF AN IRAQI FATHER AND A MOTHER OF NON-IRAQI BIRTH, HAVE BEEN DENIED PERMISSION TO LEAVE IRAQ TO VISIT THE COUNTRY OF THEIR OTHER NATIONALITY.

IN RECENT YEARS, THE GOVERNMENT HAS INSTITUTED SPECIAL PROGRAMS TO ENCOURAGE REPATRIATION OF QUALIFIED PROFESSIONALS. ALIENS OF IRAQI ORIGIN CAN APPLY FOR A DOCUMENT PERMITTING THEM TO ENTER AND EXIT FROM IRAQ WITHOUT A VISA.

OTHER PERSONS OF IRAQI ORIGIN ARE PERMITTED TO RETURN, INCLUDING MANY PERSONS WHO WERE ADMITTED TO OTHER COUNTRIES AS REFUGEES. A NUMBER OF SUCH PEOPLE, ESPECIALLY ASSYRIAN CHRISTIANS, HAVE RETURNED ON TEMPORARY VISITS. THEY ARE FREE TO COME AND GO, WITHIN THE LIMITS OF THE PRESENT TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS, SINCE THEY ARE NOT CONSIDERED TO HAVE VIOLATED IRAQI LAWS. HOWEVER, THOSE WHO EMIGRATED ONLY AFTER THE BEGINNING OF THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR, INCLUDING SEVERAL U.S. PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIENS, HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO DEPART IRAQ AFTER RETURNING. IN SEPTEMBER AND NOVEMBER 1988 AND IN FEBRUARY AND MARCH 1989, THE GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED AMNESTIES

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FOR KURDS WHO FLED THE COUNTRY FOR ANY REASON. APPROXIMATELY 2,000 HAVE VOLUNTARILY RETURNED FROM REFUGEE CAMPS IN TURKEY.

SECTION 3 RESPECT FOR POLITICAL RIGHTS: THE RIGHT OF CITIZEE
TO CHANGE THEIR GOVERNMENT

IRAQI CITIZENS DO NOT HAVE THE ABILITY PEACEFULLY TO CHANGE THEIR GOVERNMENT. PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN AND THE RCC RULE

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IRAQ THROUGH THE BA'ATH PARTY. IT REPORTEDLY HAS SOME 1.5 MILLION ADHERENTS, REPRESENTING ABOUT 9 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION.

THERE ARE TWO OTHER SMALL LEGAL POLITICAL PARTIES, BOTH KURDISH. THEY AND THE BA'ATH PARTY CONSTITUTE THE PATRIOTIC AND PROGRESSIVE NATIONAL FRONT, ESSENTIALLY A VEHICLE OF SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT. MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY OR SECURITY SERVICES MAY ENGAGE IN POLITICAL ACTIVITIES ONLY WITHIN THE BA'ATH PARTY. ASSOCIATION WITH THE PARTY IS NOT REQUIRED FOR APPOINTMENT TO SENIOR GOVERNMENT POSITIONS OR MILITARY RANKS OR ELECTION TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, BUT IS NORMALLY NECESSARY TO ATTAIN POLITICAL INFLUENCE. OPPOSITION GROUPS, INCLUDING VARIOUS KURDISH GROUPS AND SPLINTER PARTIES ARE SEVERELY REPPRESSED. THE COMMUNIST PARTY WAS REMOVED FROM THE NATIONAL FRONT AND DECLARED ILLEGAL IN 1979. THE DA'WA ORGANIZATION, A VIOLENT SHI'ITE GROUP, IS STILL PROSCRIBED, AND ITS MEMBERS ARE SUBJECT TO INCARCERATION AND EXECUTION, A ARE MEMBERS OF OTHER PARTIES BELIEVED TO BE COOPERATING WITH IRAN. PLANS THE GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED IN 1988 TO PERMIT LEGAL FORMATION OF OPPOSITION PARTIES WERE NOT IMPLEMENTED IN 1989.

GENERAL ELECTIONS WERE HELD FOR THE 250-SEAT NATIONAL ASSEMBLE IN APRIL. THOUGH IN THEORY POSSESSING A WIDE RANGE OF OFFICIAL DUTIES, THE ASSEMBLY EXERCISES LITTLE REAL

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AUTHORITY. THE MAJORITY OF THE MORE THAN 900 CANDIDATES WERE INDEPENDENTS, ALTHOUGH ALL SUPPORTED CURRENT GOVERNMENT POLICIES. THE ELECTIONS BY SECRET BALLOT WERE MORE OPEN THAN IN THE PAST, AND SOME HIGH-RANKING BAATH PARTY OFFICIALS WERE DEFEATED.

THE BIENNIAL ELECTIONS FOR THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY OF THE KURDISH AUTONOMOUS REGION WERE HELD IN SEPTEMBER 1989. ALL 174 CANDIDATES, FROM THE THREE LEGAL PARTIES AND INDEPENDENTS HAD TO SATISFY THE SAME REQUIREMENTS AS NATIONAL ASSEMBLY CANDIDATES. THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY DOES NOT EXERCISE MEANINGFUL AUTHORITY.

IN OCTOBER 1989, AN EXPERTS COMMISSION FINISHED DRAFTING A NE CONSTITUTION TO REPLACE THE PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION OF 1970. IRAQI OFFICIALS ASSERT THAT THE NEW CONSTITUTION WILL PROVIDE MORE GUARANTEES OF HUMAN RIGHTS. HOWEVER, THE NEW CONSTITUTION HAS NOT YET BEEN MADE PUBLIC PENDING APPROVAL BY PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN AND THE RCC.

WOMEN HAVE BEGUN TO INCREASE THEIR ROLE IN THE BA'ATH PARTY AND CIVIL SERVICE, BUT REMAIN GREATLY UNDERREPRESENTED. THERE ARE NO WOMEN IN THE RCC, REGIONAL COMMAND, OR CABINET; THERE ARE 27 AMONG THE 250 MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND 2 IN THE 50-MEMBER LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY OF THE KURDISH AUTONOMOUS

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REGION.

SECTION 4 GOVERNMENTAL ATTITUDE REGARDING INTERNATIONAL AND
NONGOVERNMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGED VIOLATION
OF HUMAN RIGHTS

THE GOVERNMENT ALLOWS ONE HUMAN RIGHTS GROUP TO OPERATE INSIDE
IRAQ, BUT THIS IS LARGELY UNDER GOVERNMENT CONTROL. THE
GOVERNMENT HAS RARELY COOPERATED WITH PRIVATE FOREIGN GROUPS
OR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN INVESTIGATING EVENTS OR
PRACTICES IN IRAQ.

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THE GOVERNMENT DENIES CHARGES THAT IT VIOLATES HUMAN RIGHTS
AND CLAIMS THAT THE INFORMATION ON WHICH AI AND OTHER HUMAN
RIGHTS GROUPS BASE THEIR CHARGES COMES FROM PRO-IRANIAN AND
KURDISH IRAQI EXILE GROUPS IN LONDON AND PARIS. IN ITS 1989
REPORT ON CHILDREN IN IRAQ, AI CITED SEVERAL INSTANCES IN
WHICH IRAQI AUTHORITIES HAD COMMENTED ON AI REPORTS OR
RESPONDED TO AI INQUIRIES, BUT IN EACH CASE THESE AUTHORITIES
HAD DEFENDED THE GOVERNMENT'S ACTIONS AS JUSTIFIABLE OR DENIES
THE ACCURACY OF AI'S INFORMATION. A RESOLUTION BEFORE THE
U.N. SUBCOMMISSION ON THE PREVENTION OF DISCRIMINATION AND
PROTECTION OF MINORITIES IN AUGUST 1989, RECOMMENDING THAT THE
U.N. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS STUDY THE HUMAN RIGHTS
SITUATION IN IRAQ, WAS NARROWLY DEFEATED.

IRAQ DOES COOPERATE WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE
RED CROSS IN EFFORTS TO RESETTLE IRANIAN CIVILIAN REFUGEES IN
THIRD COUNTRIES, AND THE U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES
HAS HAD A PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE IN IRAQ SINCE APRIL 1988
WHO REGISTERS IRANIAN REFUGEES AND WORKS FOR THEIR
RESETTLEMENT.

SECTION 5. DISCRIMINATION BASED ON RACE, SEX, RELIGION,
LANGUAGE, OR SOCIAL STATUS

THE BA'ATH PARTY IS COMMITTED TO THE EQUALITY OF THE SEXES,
AND A SERIES OF LAWS SINCE IT CAME TO POWER IN 1968 HAS
STEADILY IMPROVED THE STATUS OF WOMEN. THERE HAVE BEEN LAWS
TO PROTECT WOMEN FROM EXPLOITATION IN THE WORKPLACE; GRANT
SUBSIDIZED MATERNITY LEAVE; PERMIT WOMEN TO JOIN THE REGULAR
ARMY, POPULAR ARMY, AND POLICE FORCES; AND EQUALIZE WOMEN'S
RIGHTS ON DIVORCE, LAND OWNERSHIP, TAXATION, SUFFRAGE, AND
ELECTION TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. IN THE 1970'S, THE

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GOVERNMENT IMPOSED LEGAL PENALTIES ON FAMILIES THAT OPPOSED

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SENDING THEIR WOMEN TO LITERACY SCHOOLS, AND ON MEN WHO WERE SEEN HARASSING WOMEN. WHILE THE APPLICATION OF THESE LAWS HAVE RESULTED IN SIGNIFICANT TANGIBLE IMPROVEMENTS FOR WOMEN, A NUMBER OF PROBLEMS REMAIN. MARRIED WOMEN MAY STILL TRAVEL ABROAD ONLY WITH THE PERMISSION OF THEIR HUSBANDS. SCHOOL ENROLLMENT OF FEMALES HAS BEEN INCREASING IN RECENT YEARS,

REACHING 45 PERCENT IN ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS AND 36 PERCENT IN SECONDARY SCHOOLS IN 1985-86.

WOMEN REPRESENT ABOUT 47 PERCENT OF AGRICULTURAL WORKERS AND ABOUT 25 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL WORK FORCE. THE WAR ACCELERATE THE GOVERNMENT'S DRIVE TO ELEVATE THE STATUS OF WOMEN, AND IT APPEARS TO HAVE SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED, IF NOT REMOVED, BARRIERS TO THE ACCEPTANCE OF WOMEN IN TRADITIONAL MALE ROLES. WOMEN ARE INCREASINGLY EMPLOYED AS ARCHITECTS, CONSTRUCTION ENGINEERS, OIL ENGINEERS, AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS, AND FACTORY AND FARM MANAGERS. THEIR ROLE IN THE ARMED FORCES IS LIMITED TO THE MEDICAL FIELD.

VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, SUCH AS WIFE-BEATING AND RAPE, IS KNOWN TO OCCUR BUT LITTLE IS KNOWN ABOUT ITS EXTENT. SUCH ABUSE IS CUSTOMARILY DEALT WITH WITHIN THE TIGHTLY KNIT IRAQI FAMILY STRUCTURE BECAUSE OF THE VALUE ATTACHED TO PERSONAL PRIVACY IN THIS CONSERVATIVE SOCIETY. CONSEQUENTLY, THERE IS NO PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF THE SUBJECT. THERE ARE NO OFFICIAL STATISTICS ON THE SUBJECT. EXCESSIVE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN WOULD BE GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE AND CRIMINAL CHARGES, BUT SUITS BROUGHT ON THESE CHARGES IN IRAQ ARE BELIEVED TO BE RARE.

THE USE OF MINORITY LANGUAGES IS UNRESTRICTED. KURDISH IS AN OFFICIAL LANGUAGE USED IN SCHOOLS AND MEDIA IN KURDISH AREAS. TURCOMANS PUBLISH IN THEIR DIALECT OF TURKISH, AND CHRISTIANS OFTEN USE ARAMAIC AS WELL AS ARABIC.

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THE SHI'A, WHO MAKE UP ROUGHLY 55 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION, HAVE HISTORICALLY BEEN ECONOMICALLY, POLITICALLY, AND SOCIALLY DISADVANTAGED THROUGHOUT MUCH OF THE MIDDLE EAST. THE GOVERNMENT HAS A DECLARED POLICY TO RAISE THEIR LIVING STANDARDS AND EQUALIZE OPPORTUNITIES FOR THEIR ECONOMIC AND PROFESSIONAL ADVANCEMENT. FOR FOUR CENTURIES, POLITICAL POWER IN IRAQ HAS BEEN CONCENTRATED IN THE HANDS OF THE SUNNI MINORITY. SUNNI ARABS, WHO COMPRISE 20 TO 25 PERCENT OF IRAQ'S POPULATION, DOMINATE THE RCC, THE REGIONAL COMMAND OF THE BA'ATH PARTY, AND THE CABINET. HOWEVER, INCREASING NUMBERS OF SHI'AS HOLD PROMINENT POSITIONS, AND THE ECONOMIC STATUS OF THE SHI'A HAS IMPROVED THROUGH INTENSIVE GOVERNMENT INVESTMENT IN THE ECONOMIC AND EDUCATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE OF SOUTHERN IRAQ.

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ALTHOUGH CHRISTIANS SOMETIMES ALLEGE DISCRIMINATION IN EDUCATION AND JOBS, ADHERENCE TO THEIR RELIGION HAS NOT PREVENTED MANY FROM OBTAINING WEALTH AND PROFESSIONAL ADVANCEMENT. THE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER, A CHALDEAN CHRISTIAN, HAS REPRESENTED IRAQ AT MEETINGS OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ISLAMIC

CONFERENCE. OTHER CHRISTIANS HOLD IMPORTANT OFFICIAL AND PRIVATE POSITIONS.

CITIZENS CONSIDERED TO BE OF IRANIAN ORIGIN CARRY SPECIAL IDENTIFICATION. THEY ARE OFTEN PRECLUDED FROM DESIRABLE EMPLOYMENT AND THEIR ADVANCEMENT MAY BE IMPEDED. MANY "IRANIAN" FAMILIES HAVE BEEN IN IRAQ FOR GENERATIONS. THE TWO HOLIEST SHRINES OF SHI'A ISLAM, THE PREVALENT SECT IN IRAN, ARE LOCATED IN IRAQ. FOR GENERATIONS IRANIANS HAVE COME TO NAJAF AND KARBALA ON PILGRIMAGE OR TO STUDY IN THE SEMINARIES AND MANY SETTLED THERE. SOME "IRANIANS" SAY THEIR FOREBEARS
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WERE NOT FROM IRAN BUT CLAIMED IRANIAN NATIONALITY TO EVADE OTTOMAN MILITARY CONSCRIPTION.

SECTION 6 WORKER RIGHTS

A. THE RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION

TRADE UNIONS INDEPENDENT OF GOVERNMENT CONTROL DO NOT EXIST IN IRAQ. UNDER THE TRADE UNION ORGANIZATION LAW OF JUNE 2, 1987 A NEW SINGLE TRADE UNION STRUCTURE WAS PRESCRIBED FOR ORGANIZED LABOR. WORKERS IN PRIVATE AND MIXED ENTERPRISES AND IN COOPERATIVES--BUT NOT PUBLIC EMPLOYEES OR WORKERS IN STATE ENTERPRISES--HAVE THE RIGHT TO JOIN A LOCAL UNION COMMITTEE. THE COMMITTEES FORM TRADE UNIONS WHICH IN TURN ARE PART OF PROVINCIAL TRADE UNION FEDERATIONS. AT THE TOP IS AN UMBRELLA ORGANIZATION, THE IRAQI GENERAL FEDERATION OF TRADE UNIONS. WHICH IS ORGANICALLY LINKED TO THE BA'ATH PARTY AND REQUIRED TO PROMOTE PARTY PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES AMONG UNION MEMBERS. THE GENERAL FEDERATION IS AFFILIATED WITH THE INTERNATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF ARAB TRADE UNIONS AND THE SOVIET-CONTROLLED WORLD FEDERATION OF TRADE UNIONS. IT IS ALSO ACTIVE IN THE TRIPARTITE ARAB LABOR ORGANIZATION, HEADQUARTERED IN BAGHDAD.

ALTHOUGH WORKERS LEGALLY HAVE THE RIGHT TO STRIKE, AFTER PROVIDING NOTICE TO THE LABOR MINISTRY, NO SUCH STRIKES WERE REPORTED IN 1989. THERE WAS A ONE-DAY WILDCAT WALKOUT BY EGYPTIAN WORKERS PROTESTING EXCESSIVE WORK HOURS.

B. THE RIGHT TO ORGANIZE AND BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY

THE RIGHT TO BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY IS NOT RECOGNIZED. SALARIES FOR PUBLIC SECTOR WORKERS (I.E. THE BULK OF THE EMPLOYED) ARE

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SET BY THE GOVERNMENT. WAGES IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR ARE SET BY THE EMPLOYERS OR NEGOTIATED INDIVIDUALLY WITH WORKERS.

IRAQ, WHICH HAS RATIFIED ILO CONVENTION 98 ON THE RIGHT TO
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ORGANIZE AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, WAS CRITICIZED BY THE ILO'S COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS (COE) IN 1989 FOR THE FACT THAT ITS

NEW LABOR CODE OF 1987 FAILS TO PROVIDE WORKERS WITH PROTECTION AGAINST ANTI-UNION DISCRIMINATION. THE COE ALSO REGRETTED THAT THE 1987 ACT ON TRADE UNION ORGANIZATIONS DID NOT PROVIDE FOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING.

THERE ARE NO EXPORT PROCESSING ZONES IN IRAQ.

C. PROHIBITION OF FORCED OR COMPULSORY LABOR

ALTHOUGH COMPULSORY LABOR IS PROHIBITED BY LAW, DURING AND SHORTLY AFTER THE WAR WITH IRAN THE POPULAR ARMY, THE MILITIA OF THE BA'ATH PARTY, EMPLOYED PRESS-GANG METHODS TO DRAFT RECRUITS. HOWEVER, THESE ACTIVITIES CEASED IN NOVEMBER 1988, AND THE POPULAR ARMY WAS FOR THE MOST PART DEMOBILIZED IN 1988. ILO SUPERVISORY BODIES AGAIN IN 1989 EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT THE PENAL CODE PERMITS THE PUNISHMENT OF CIVIL SERVANTS WITH IMPRISONMENT, INCLUDING COMPULSORY PRISON LABOR, FOR BREACHES OF LABOR DISCIPLINE WHICH INCLUDE RESIGNING FROM ONE'S JOB. NOVEMBER CABINET MEETING REPORTED IN THE GOVERNMENT-DIRECTED PRESS QUOTED THE REMARK OF A MINISTER THAT RESIGNATION FROM GOVERNMENT JOBS SHOULD BE FREE, CONFIRMING THAT HERETOFORE CIVIL SERVANTS HAVE HAD TO BUY THEIR WAY OUT OF GOVERNMENT SERVICE.

D. MINIMUM AGE FOR EMPLOYMENT OF CHILDREN

CHILDREN ARE FREQUENTLY ENCOURAGED TO WORK AS NECESSARY TO SUPPORT THE FAMILY, BUT THE EMPLOYMENT OF CHILDREN UNDER AGE 14 IS FORBIDDEN IN ALL ENTERPRISES OTHER THAN SMALL-SCALE FAMILY ENTERPRISES. CHILDREN BETWEEN THE AGES OF 14 AND 18

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WHO ARE EMPLOYED ARE PROTECTED BY LAW: THEY WORK FEWER HOURS AND HAVE MORE PRIVILEGES THAN ADULT WORKERS.

E. ACCEPTABLE CONDITIONS OF WORK

THE WORKWEEK IN URBAN AREAS IS 6 DAYS, 7 TO 8 HOURS A DAY, FOR WORKERS IN THE PRIVATE AND MIXED SECTORS. THESE PROVISIONS DID NOT APPLY TO AGRICULTURAL WORKERS WHOSE WORKWEEK AND HOURS OF

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WORK PER DAY CAN VARY ACCORDING TO INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE AGREEMENTS. HOURS FOR GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES ARE SET BY THE HEAD OF THE MINISTRY FOR WHICH THE EMPLOYEE WORKS. MANY GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES ROUTINELY WORK LONGER THAN HOURS A DAY, SOME OF THEM AS MUCH AS 12 HOURS PER DAY.

OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY PROGRAMS ARE IN EFFECT IN STATE-RUN ENTERPRISES, AND INSPECTORS MAKE IRREGULAR VISITS TO PRIVATE ESTABLISHMENTS. ENFORCEMENT VARIES WIDELY. A GOVERNMENT DECREE TO EXTEND OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH PROTECTION WAS ISSUED AND SUBSEQUENTLY WITHDRAWN IN DECEMBER 1988, REPORTEDLY THE CAUSE OF THE DISMISSAL OF THE LABOR MINISTER.

A SPECIAL PROBLEM AROSE AFTER THE GOVERNMENT DECIDED IN JUNE TO REDUCE DRASTICALLY THE AMOUNT OF HARD CURRENCY FOREIGN WORKERS COULD REMIT. IT IS WIDELY BELIEVED THAT THE GOVERNMENT TOOK THIS MEASURE TO "ENCOURAGE" FOREIGN WORKERS TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY, THUS FREEING JOBS FOR DEMOBILIZED IRAQI SOLDIERS. WORKERS NOT ON CONTRACT WERE PARTICULARLY HARD HIT. MOST OF THE OVER TWO MILLION EGYPTIAN WORKERS IN IRAQ WERE MANUAL LABORERS. WHEN THEY LEARNED THEY WOULD BE ABLE TO TRANSFER ONLY U.S. DOLS 32 PER MONTH, THEY BEGAN TO LEAVE IRAQ IN DROVES, AN ESTIMATED 2,000 PER DAY BY AIR ALONE. EGYPTIAN AND OTHER FOREIGN WORKERS IN IRAQ HAVE CLAIMED THAT SOME IRAQ EMPLOYERS FORCED THEM TO WORK 12-15 HOURS A DAY FOR EIGHT HOURS PAY OR REFUSED TO PAY WAGES. THE GOVERNMENT HAS ADMITTED THAT IRAQI BANKS HAVE BEEN SLOW TO PAY REMITTANCES. EGYPTIAN WORKERS ARE IN FACT RECEIVING THEIR SAVINGS A YEAR

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AFTER LEAVING IRAQ. BAKER

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FROM NEA/NGA

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM
SUBJECT: HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR IRAQ.

1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR IRAQ. PLEASE DO NOT RELEASE ANY PART UNTIL YOU RECEIVE THE CABLE ANNOUNCING THE REPORT'S PUBLIC RELEASE, AROUND 2/21.

2. BEGIN TEXT:

IRAQ IS IN EFFECT A ONE-PARTY STATE GOVERNED BY THE ARAB
BA'ATH SOCIALIST PARTY (ABSP) THROUGH A REVOLUTIONARY
COMMAND COUNCIL (RCC) WHICH HAS BOTH EXECUTIVE AND
LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY UNDER THE PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION
OF 1968. SADDAM HUSSEIN HOLDS DECISIVE POWER AS PRESIDENT
OF THE REPUBLIC, CHAIRMAN OF THE RCC, AND
SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE REGIONAL COMMAND OF THE ABSP.
TWO OTHER SMALL PARTIES ARE ESSENTIALLY SUPPORT GROUPS FOR

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THE GOVERNMENT. IN 1989 THE GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED ITS

INTENTION TO ADOPT A MULTIPARTY SYSTEM ENSHRINED IN A NEW CONSTITUTION. ELECTIONS FOR THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY--WHICH HAS FEW POWERS--WERE HELD APRIL 1. A DRAFT CONSTITUTION WHICH WOULD REPORTEDLY ALLOW A MULTIPARTY SYSTEM WAS COMPLETED IN 1989 AND IS EXPECTED TO BE PUT TO A REFERENDUM IN EARLY 1990. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN HOWEVER, WHETHER THIS WILL DILUTE THE MONOPOLY OF POWER HELD BY

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SADDAM HUSSEIN AND THE ABSP. IRAQ'S POPULATION COMPRISES MANY DISPARATE GROUPS, MOST NOTABLY SHI'A AND SUNNI MUSLIM ARABS KURDS, TURCOMANS, AND VARIOUS CHRISTIAN SECTS, PREDOMINANTLY ASSYRIANS AND CHALDEANS.

IRAQ'S MILITARY IS LARGE AND WELL TRAINED, AND PARTS OF IT NOTABLY THE FURSAN, OR KURDISH TRIBAL LEVIES, HAVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR SECURITY WITHIN THE KURDISH AUTONOMOUS REGION. THE NATIONAL POLICE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR CIVIL ORDER.

THE GOVERNMENT EXERTS A HIGH DEGREE OF CONTROL OVER THE ECONOMY DOMINATED BY THE PETROLEUM SECTOR, AND OWNS ALL MAJOR INDUSTRIES. THE GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN CARRYING OUT A PROGRAM OF DIVESTITURE AND PRIVATIZATION IN AGRICULTURE, TOURISM, THE SERVICES INDUSTRY, AND LIGHT INDUSTRY, AND IS TRYING TO ATTRACT INVESTOR CAPITAL AND EXPERTISE IN THE OPERATION OF THE ECONOMY. HOWEVER, CLOSE GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY WILL BE MAINTAINED.

IRAQ'S HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD REMAINED ABYSMAL IN 1989. EFFECTIVE OPPOSITION TO GOVERNMENT POLICY IS STIFLED; THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES ENGAGE IN EXTENSIVE SURVEILLANCE AND UTILIZE EXTRALEGAL MEANS, INCLUDING TORTURE AND SUMMARY
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EXECUTION. TO DEAL WITH ANTIREGIME ACTIVITY. THE CIVIL RIGHTS OF IRAQI CITIZENS CONTINUE TO BE SHARPLY LIMITED, AND IRAQIS DO NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO CHANGE THEIR GOVERNMENT. THE FREEDOMS OF SPEECH AND PRESS AND ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION ARE VIRTUALLY NONEXISTENT. OTHER IMPORTANT HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEMS INCLUDE CONTINUING DISAPPEARANCES AND ARBITRARY DETENTIONS, LACK OF FAIR TRIAL, WIDESPREAD INTERFERENCE WITH PRIVACY, EXCESSIVE USE OF FORCE AGAINST KURDISH CIVILIANS, AND ALMOST TOTAL LACK OF WORKERS' RIGHTS. IN ADDITION TO THE REPRESSIVE DOMESTIC CONTROLS THAT PREDATE THE WAR WITH IRAN, TIGHT WARTIME CONTROLS, INCLUDING TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS, REMAIN IN EFFECT DESPITE THE AUGUST 1988 CEASE-FIRE WITH IRAN.

AN ARMED KURDISH INSURGENCY CONTINUED IN 1989, BUT AT A REDUCED LEVEL. ALTHOUGH THERE WERE NO ALLEGATIONS THAT THE GOVERNMENT USED CHEMICAL WEAPONS AGAINST KURDISH CIVILIANS IN 1989 AS IT DID IN 1988, IN ITS EFFORTS TO

CRUSH THE REBELLION, IT CONTINUED TO VIOLATE THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF ELEMENTS OF THE KURDISH POPULATION. THE GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED IN JUNE THAT IN ITS CAMPAIGN TO SUPPRESS THE REBELLION IT HAS PURSUED A PROGRAM SINCE 1987 OF ESTABLISHING A DEPOPULATED SECURITY ZONE ALONG THE FULL LENGTH OF IRAQ'S BORDERS WITH IRAN AND TURKEY. DURING THIS PROGRAM, THE GOVERNMENT HAS DESTROYED VILLAGES WITHIN

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A 30-KILOMETER-WIDE ZONE AND RELOCATED APPROXIMATELY 500.000 KURDISH AND ASSYRIAN INHABITANTS INTO MORE EASILY CONTROLLED AND PROTECTED TOWNS, CITIES, AND NEWLY CONSTRUCTED SETTLEMENTS IN TRADITIONAL KURDISH AREAS.

RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

SECTION 1 RESPECT FOR THE INTEGRITY OF THE PERSON,
INCLUDING

FREEDOM FROM:

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A. POLITICAL AND OTHER EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLING

FOR YEARS EXECUTION HAS BEEN AN ESTABLISHED IRAQI METHOD FOR DEALING WITH PERCEIVED POLITICAL AND MILITARY OPPONENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO MEMBERS OF THE OUTLAWED DA'WA ORGANIZATION (AN IRAN-SUPPORTED FUNDAMENTALIST SHI'A MUSLIM GROUP THAT HAS ENGAGED IN ACTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM). IN SOME CASES, A FAMILY ONLY LEARNS THAT ONE OF ITS MEMBERS HAS BEEN EXECUTED WHEN THE SECURITY SERVICES RETURN THE BODY AND REQUIRE THE FAMILY TO PAY A FINE.

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL (AI), IN ITS PRESENTATION BEFORE THE U.N. SUBCOMMISSION ON THE PREVENTION OF DISCRIMINATION AND PROTECTION OF MINORITIES IN AUGUST, STATED THAT IT HAD RECEIVED ALLEGATIONS THAT SOME 80 ARMY DESERTERS WERE EXECUTED IN DECEMBER 1988 AND CHARGED THAT THE GOVERNMENT EXECUTED 11 OF ITS KURDISH OPPONENTS IN MARCH AND APRIL 1989.

IN ITS FEBRUARY REPORT "IRAQ: CHILDREN: INNOCENT VICTIMS OF POLITICAL REPRESSION," AI STATED THAT IT RECEIVES ALLEGATIONS OF HUNDREDS OF EXECUTIONS IN IRAQ EACH YEAR. AI CITED THE CASE OF 29 KURDISH CHILDREN AND YOUTHS ALLEGEDLY EXECUTED IN JANUARY 1987. IN ADDITION, AI, IN ITS 1989 REPORT COVERING 1988, CITED ALLEGATIONS THAT HUNDREDS OF CIVILIANS INCLUDING WOMEN AND CHILDREN, WERE EXECUTED AT TANJARO MILITARY GARRISON, SULAIMANIYA PROVINCE. INDEPENDENT INFORMATION TO CONFIRM THE ALLEGATIONS CITED IN AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORTS IS NOT AVAILABLE.

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B. DISAPPEARANCE

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IN THE FEBRUARY REPORT, AI ASSERTED THAT THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE ARRESTED BY IRAQI SECURITY OR INTELLIGENCE FORCES HAVE OVER THE YEARS REPORTEDLY "DISAPPEARED" WHILE IN DETENTION, WITH MANY FEARED EXECUTED. IN ITS AUGUST PRESENTATION TO THE U.N. SUBCOMMISSION, AI REPORTED THE DISAPPEARANCE IN MID-APRIL OF MULLA MUHAMMAD DALGAYI, DESCRIBED AS THE IMAM OF QAL'AT DIZA, WHO WAS AMONG DELEGATES FROM KURDISTAN WHO REPORTEDLY MET WITH GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS TO APPEAL AGAINST FORCED SETTLEMENT OF THE KURDS AT QAL'AT DIZA. HE WAS REPORTEDLY ARRESTED IN BAGHDAD AND HAS SINCE DISAPPEARED. AN ASSYRIAN ORGANIZATION BASED IN THE UNITED STATES CHARGED IN MARCH THAT THE WHEREABOUTS OF 33 ASSYRIANS WHO TOOK ADVANTAGE OF THE AMNESTY ISSUED BY THE GOVERNMENT AND RETURNED TO IRAQ FROM IRAN AND TURKEY, WERE UNKNOWN.

C. TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN, OR DEGRADING
TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT

THE CONSTITUTION PROHIBITS TORTURE AND PRESCRIBES STIFF PUNISHMENT FOR IT, BUT IT IS CLEAR THAT BOTH PHYSICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TORTURE ARE USED BY THE AUTHORITIES, ESPECIALLY THE SECURITY POLICE. GIVEN THE RIGID CHAIN OF COMMAND WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT AND SECURITY SERVICES, TORTURE COULD NOT BE PRACTICED WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OR AUTHORIZATION OF SENIOR OFFICIALS.

EMIGRE GROUPS AND FORMER PRISONERS ASSERT THAT PERSONS DETAINED BY THE SECURITY POLICE FOR POLITICAL OR SECURITY-RELATED MATTERS ARE FREQUENTLY TORTURED AND MISTREATED. TREATMENT IS REPORTED TO BE WORST IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING ARREST AND DURING THE PERIOD OF INTERROGATION AND INVESTIGATION, WHICH CAN LAST FOR MONTHS. TORTURE AND BRUTAL TREATMENT ARE NOT LIMITED TO POLITICAL CASES.

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SECURITY-RELATED OFFENSES ARE BROADLY DEFINED AND INCLUDE SUCH ROUTINE CRIMINAL MATTERS AS CURRENCY VIOLATIONS.

IN ITS 1989 REPORT COVERING 1988 AI STATED THAT THE ROUTINE TORTURE AND ILL-TREATMENT OF PRISONERS CONTINUED TO BE WIDELY REPORTED. IT SAID THE VICTIMS INCLUDED DETAINEES BELOW THE AGE OF 18 WHO WERE REPORTEDLY BEATEN, WHIPPED GIVEN ELECTRIC SHOCKS, AND DEPRIVED OF FOOD. THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ CATEGORICALLY DENIED ANY USE OF TORTURE AGAINST CHILDREN AS AN OFFICIAL POLICY OR AS A PRACTICE, AND STATED ITS READINESS TO CONSIDER FULLY ANY INDIVIDUAL

ALLEGATION WITH A VIEW TO BRINGING PERPETRATORS TO JUSTICE. IMPARTIAL OBSERVERS HAVE SO FAR BEEN UNABLE TO LOOK INTO THESE ALLEGATIONS.

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D. ARBITRARY ARREST, DETENTION, OR EXILE

WHILE THE CONSTITUTION AND LEGAL CODE PROVIDE FOR THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS AND PLACE CHECKS ON POLICE POWERS IN SUCH AREAS AS ARREST, DETENTION IMPRISONMENT AND SEARCH THESE PROVISIONS HAVE VIRTUALLY NO WEIGHT IN POLITICAL OR NATIONAL SECURITY CASES ALTHOUGH THEY ARE GENERALLY RESPECTED IN ORDINARY CRIMINAL CASES. SECURITY POLICE NOT ONLY MAKE ARBITRARY ARRESTS BUT ALSO SECRETLY DETAIN SUSPECTS, WHOSE FATE SOMETIMES BECOMES KNOWN ONLY AFTER THEY HAVE BEEN EXECUTED. SECURITY CHARGES HAVE INCLUDED ESPIONAGE TREASON, AND CONSPIRACY AGAINST IRAQ, OFTEN IN COLLABORATION WITH UNNAMED FOREIGN ENEMIES.

THE RELOCATION OF 500,000 KURDISH VILLAGERS TO OTHER AREAS OF KURDISTAN SINCE 1987 MAY BE CONSIDERED A FORM OF

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INTERNAL EXILE. THE GOVERNMENT DECLARED IN JUNE 1989 THAT IT WAS CREATING AN UNINHABITED SECURITY ZONE TO ENSURE THE SAFETY AND SECURITY OF CITIZENS IN THE BORDER REGIONS (WHO WERE SUBJECTED TO SHELLING AND MILITARY OPERATIONS DURING THE WAR WITH IRAN) AND TO PROVIDE BETTER SERVICES TO THE VILLAGERS.

ALTHOUGH THE GOVERNMENT HAS CEASED EXPELLING IRAQIS OF SUPPOSED IRANIAN DESCENT, MOST OF THE FEW REMAINING IRANIANS HAVE BEEN IMPRISONED OR LIVE UNDER THE FEAR OF DEPORTATION OR INCARCERATION. SPOUSES OF IRAQIS OF IRANIAN ORIGIN ARE REQUIRED TO OBTAIN A DIVORCE OR SUFFER THE SAME CONSEQUENCES. MOREOVER, OTHER IRAQIS, WHOSE GRANDPARENTS ARE SHOWN NOT TO BE OF IRAQI ORIGIN ARE SUBJECT TO ARBITRARY DETENTION AND DEPORTATION.

WITH REGARD TO FORCED OR COMPULSORY LABOR, SEE SECTION 6.
C.

E. DENIAL OF FAIR PUBLIC TRIAL

IRAQ'S LEGAL SYSTEM PROVIDES FOR INVESTIGATION BY POLICE AND THEN BY AN INQUIRY JUDGE WHO MAY REFER A CASE TO THE COURTS OR DISMISS IT. JUDGES TRY CRIMINAL CASES; THERE ARE NO JURIES. CONVICTIONS MAY BE APPEALED TO THE COURT OF APPEAL AND THEN TO THE COURT OF CASSATION, THE SUPREME COURT. THERE ARE NO SHARI'A COURTS PER SE IN IRAQ; HOWEVER, FAMILY COURTS ADMINISTER SHARI'A LAW MODIFIED BY IRAQI CUSTOM.

TRIALS OF ORDINARY CASES ARE HELD IN CIVIL, CRIMINAL AND RELIGIOUS COURTS AND ARE OPEN. DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO COUNSEL--AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE, IF THE DEFENDANT IS

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INDIGENT. CHARGES AND EVIDENCE ARE AVAILABLE FOR REVIEW BY THE LAWYER. APPELLATE COURTS HEAR CASES NOT UNDER THE JURISDICTION OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COURTS.

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IN CONTRAST TO ORDINARY CASES SECURITY CASES ARE HANDLED BY THE REVOLUTIONARY COURTS, WHICH USUALLY HOLD CLOSED TRIALS. SECURITY CASES INCLUDE ESPIONAGE, TREASON, SMUGGLING, CURRENCY EXCHANGE VIOLATIONS AND DRUG TRAFFICKING. THE RIGHT OF DEFENSE IN SUCH COURTS IS SAID TO BE SEVERELY RESTRICTED. THE "SPECIAL COURTS" CONSTITUTED BY THE RCC FOR SPECIFIC INCIDENTS, SUCH AS THE REPORTED CONSPIRACY AGAINST THE REGIME IN 1979, ARE ALSO CLOSED. THESE SPECIAL TRIBUNALS ARE APPARENTLY EXEMPT FROM CONSTITUTIONAL SAFEGUARDS OF DEFENDANTS' RIGHTS; DEFENDANTS ARE HELD INCOMMUNICADO, AND CONFESSIONS EXTRACTED BY TORTURE ARE ADMISSIBLE. APPEALS CAN BE TAKEN ONLY TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE RCC. HOWEVER, THE UTILITY OF THIS APPEAL IS QUESTIONABLE, SINCE THERE ARE REPORTS THAT EXECUTIONS TAKE PLACE SHORTLY AFTER TRIAL.

POLITICAL DISSENT IN IRAQ IS TAKEN BY THE AUTHORITIES TO ENCOMPASS A WIDE RANGE OF ACTIVITIES AND, IN AN ENVIRONMENT WHERE PUBLIC ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF ARREST OR IMPRISONMENT IS RARE, IT IS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO ESTIMATE THE NUMBER OF POLITICAL PRISONERS. IN ITS 1989 REPORT AI STATED THAT "THOUSANDS" OF POLITICAL PRISONERS CONTINUED TO BE ARBITRARILY ARRESTED AND DETAINED, ESPECIALLY MEMBERS OF PROHIBITED POLITICAL PARTIES, ARMY DESERTERS AND DRAFT RESISTERS. RELATIVES, INCLUDING CHILDREN OF SUSPECTS, ARE SAID TO BE HELD AS HOSTAGES TO COMPEL CONFESSIONS.

F. ARBITRARY INTERFERENCE WITH PRIVACY, FAMILY,
HOME, OR
CORRESPONDENCE

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THE CONSTITUTION PROVIDES PROTECTIONS FOR THE INVIOABILITY OF THE HOME, AND STRONG CULTURAL VALUES REINFORCE THESE PROTECTIONS. POLICE MUST OBTAIN A SEARCH WARRANT BEFORE ENTERING THE HOME OF A CRIMINAL SUSPECT. HOWEVER, WARRANTS ARE NOT REQUIRED FOR THE ARREST OF SECURITY SUSPECTS. ALTHOUGH MOST ARRESTS OCCUR OUTSIDE THE HOME, THERE HAVE BEEN REPORTS OF FORCED ENTRY AND ARREST BY THE SECURITY POLICE, PARTICULARLY OF SUSPECTED MEMBERS OF THE OUTLAWED DA'WA ORGANIZATION.

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ALTHOUGH THE CONSTITUTION PROVIDES FOR SECRECY OF MAIL AND TELEGRAPHIC AND TELEPHONE CORRESPONDENCE, MANY IRAQIS BELIEVE THAT THE MONITORING OF TELEPHONES IS A COMMON PRACTICE AND THAT ALL MAIL IS SUBJECT TO REVIEW BY CENSORS. THE SECURITY SERVICES AND BA'ATH PARTY MAINTAIN PERVASIVE NETWORKS OF INFORMERS. THE GOVERNMENT MAINTAINS A CLOSE WATCH AGAINST IRANIAN ATTEMPTS TO EXPLOIT DISSATISFACTION AMONG IRAQI SHI'A, WHO ADHERE TO THE BRANCH OF ISLAM PREVALENT IN IRAN.

G. USE OF EXCESSIVE FORCE AND VIOLATIONS OF
HUMANITARIAN
LAW IN INTERNAL CONFLICTS

ELEMENTS OF IRAQ'S KURDISH POPULATION HAVE ENGAGED IN ARMED STRUGGLE WITH ALL GOVERNMENTS OF IRAQ PERIODICALLY SINCE THE 1920'S. THE OUTBREAK OF THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR IN 1980 SPARKED A NEW ANTIGOVERNMENT INSURGENCY BY KURDISH ELEMENTS MANY OF WHOM FOUGHT WITH OR AIDED IRAN DURING THE WAR. FROM 1981 TO 1989, THE GOVERNMENT'S EFFORTS TO CRUSH THE REBELLION MILITARILY RESULTED IN APPROXIMATELY 8,000 DEATHS. MANY OF THEM CIVILIANS KILLED INDISCRIMINATELY BY CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN 1988.

ALTHOUGH THE FIGHTING WAS AT A REDUCED LEVEL IN 1989, KURDISH MILITARY OPERATIONS CONTINUED, AS DID GOVERNMENT

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MEASURES TO CONTAIN THEM. KURDISH REBELS CONTINUED TO ANNOUNCE THEIR HOSTILITY TOWARDS THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT. ON AUGUST 29, 1989, THE LEADER OF ONE GROUP OF INSURGENTS STATED TO THE PRESS IN GENEVA THAT HIS GROUP WOULD TARGET FOREIGN INTERESTS IN IRAQ SUPPORTING THE IRAQI REGIME. AS OF THE END OF 1989, THE CYCLE OF KURDISH REBELLION AND GOVERNMENT REPRESSION REMAINED UNRESOLVED.

SECTION 2 RESPECT FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES INCLUDING:

A. FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS

THE FREEDOMS OF SPEECH AND PRESS ARE NOT RESPECTED. THE CONSTITUTION PROHIBITS "ANY ACT AIMED AT UNDERMINING THE NATIONAL UNITY OF THE PEOPLE, PROVOKING RACIAL, SECTARIAN AND REGIONAL BIGOTRY, OR VIOLATING GAINS AND ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE COUNTRY." THE GOVERNMENT VIEWS POLITICAL DISSENT AS A THREAT TO ITS SECURITY AND STRICTLY CONTROLS SPEECH AND ALL INFORMATION MEDIA. ALL PUBLICATIONS ARE SUBJECT TO CENSORSHIP. THE GOVERNMENT AND THE BA'ATH PARTY OWN AND OPERATE THE PRESS, RADIO AND TELEVISION. THE MEDIA DO NOT

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CRITICIZE THE GOVERNMENT, AND NEWS REPORTING IS STRONGLY BIASED. THERE IS NO PRESENTATION OF OPPOSITION VIEWPOINTS.

FEW FOREIGN PERIODICALS REACH IRAQ AND THOSE THAT DO MAY BE CENSORED. WESTERN NEWSPAPERS ARE NOT SOLD. FOREIGN VISITORS' MAGAZINES, NEWSPAPERS, CASSETTES CAMERAS, AND VIDEO CASSETTES MAY BE CONFISCATED AT THE AIRPORT. TO CONTROL THE DISSEMINATION OF POLITICAL LEAFLETS, WORD PROCESSORS AND COMPUTERS MUST BE REGISTERED. FAILURE TO REGISTER IS A CRIMINAL OFFENSE. IRAQIS NO LONGER NEED TO

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REGISTER THEIR TYPEWRITERS OR PHOTOCOPIERS, BUT FOREIGNERS IN IRAQ MUST DO SO. TAKING PHOTOGRAPHS OF MILITARY INSTALLATIONS, GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS OR AREAS NEAR SENSITIVE LOCATIONS IS FORBIDDEN AND PUNISHABLE BY IMPRISONMENT. JOURNALISTS AND PHOTOGRAPHERS VISITING IRAQ AT THE INVITATION OF THE GOVERNMENT ARE REQUIRED TO PRESENT FILM TAKEN IN IRAQ FOR INSPECTION BY THE AUTHORITIES.

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

THESE FREEDOMS ARE SEVERELY LIMITED. PUBLIC MEETINGS MAY ONLY BE ORGANIZED UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE GOVERNMENT OR THE BAAATH PARTY. ASSOCIATION FOR NONRELIGIOUS PURPOSES AND DEMONSTRATIONS WITHOUT GOVERNMENT APPROVAL HAVE MET WITH SEVERE REPRESSION. PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS ARE SUBJECT TO CONTROL BY THE BA'ATH PARTY CENTRAL VOCATIONAL BUREAU.

FOR A DISCUSSION OF FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AS IT APPLIES TO LABOR UNIONS, SEE SECTION 6.A.

C. FREEDOM OF RELIGION

IRAQ IS AN ETHNICALLY AND RELIGIOUSLY DIVERSE SOCIETY. SINCE ITS RISE TO POWER IN 1968, THE BA'ATH GOVERNMENT, WHILE CAREFULLY CONTROLLING RELIGIOUS GROUPS, HAS ENFORCED TOLERANCE OF RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY, SEEKING TO SUBMERGE RELIGIOUS DIFFERENCES IN THE PROMOTION OF SECULAR NATIONALISM. A 1981 LAW GAVE THE MINISTRY OF ENDOWMENTS AND RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS THE AUTHORITY TO PROMULGATE LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING PLACES OF WORSHIP, APPOINTMENT OF CLERGY, PUBLICATION OF RELIGIOUS LITERATURE, AND PARTICIPATION IN RELIGIOUS COUNCILS AND MEETINGS. MUSLIM RELIGIOUS LEADERS OPERATE UNDER CLOSE GOVERNMENT SUPERVISION ARE CONSIDERED GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, AND

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RECEIVE THEIR SALARIES THROUGH THE GOVERNMENT. THE GOVERNMENT ADMINISTERS THE PRINCIPAL MUSLIM SHRINES AND MOSQUES AND HAS PROVIDED ALLOTMENTS TO THEM AND TO

CHURCHES FOR MAINTENANCE AND REFURBISHING. THERE ARE NO PENALTIES UNDER IRAQI LAW FOR CHANGING ONE'S RELIGION, ALTHOUGH THERE IS A SOCIAL STIGMA FOR MUSLIMS WHO CONVERT TO ANOTHER FAITH.

WHILE THE GOVERNMENT HAS ASSUMED MUCH GREATER AUTHORITY IN ISLAMIC RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS SINCE 1981, IT HAS BEEN LESS INTRUSIVE INTO THE RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS OF IRAQ'S CHRISTIANS, WHO NUMBER MORE THAN 500,000 AND CONSTITUTE NEARLY 4 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION. THEIR FREEDOM OF WORSHIP IN CHURCHES OF ESTABLISHED DENOMINATIONS IS LEGALLY PROTECTED BUT THEY ARE NOT PERMITTED TO PROSELYTIZE OR TO HOLD MEETINGS OUTSIDE CHURCH PREMISES. CONVENTS AND MONASTERIES EXIST, AND SOME NEW CHURCHES HAVE BEEN CONSTRUCTED, IN SOME CASES WITH GOVERNMENT FINANCIAL SUPPORT. THE JEWISH COMMUNITY HAS DECREASED FROM 150,000 FOLLOWING WORLD WAR II TO UNDER 400. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF RECENT PERSECUTION. ONE SYNAGOGUE IN BAGHDAD STILL FUNCTIONS.

D. FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT WITHIN THE COUNTRY, FOREIGN TRAVEL, EMIGRATION AND REPATRIATION

IRAQIS ARE GENERALLY FREE TO TRAVEL WITHIN THE COUNTRY AND TO CHANGE THEIR RESIDENCES OR WORKPLACES. HOWEVER THEY ARE LIKELY TO BE CONSTRAINED BY SOCIAL, CULTURAL. AND RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS WHICH DEFINE THE AREAS OCCUPIED BY THE VARIOUS ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS GROUPS. SENSITIVE BORDER AND OTHER SECURITY AREAS ARE OFF LIMITS. THERE ARE POLICE

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CHECKPOINTS ON HIGHWAYS AND OUTSIDE MAJOR TOWNS, BUT IRAQIS AND NONDIPLOMATIC FOREIGNERS TRAVEL FREELY IN NONRESTRICTED AREAS.

THE GOVERNMENT'S HARSH CAMPAIGN TO SUPPRESS KURDISH REBELS, INVOLVING MASS RELOCATIONS OF KURDISH VILLAGERS, HAS NULLIFIED THE RIGHT OF HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF KURDS TO CHOOSE THEIR PLACE OF RESIDENCE. SINCE THE GOVERNMENT BEGAN ITS PROGRAM OF FORCED RELOCATION IN 1987, AN ESTIMATED 500,000 PEOPLE HAVE BEEN UPROOTED. SINCE TRADITIONAL KURDISH CULTURE HAS BEEN DEEPLY EMBEDDED IN THE RURAL VILLAGE, THE FORCED REMOVALS AND RAZING OF VILLAGES HAS HAD A DESTRUCTIVE IMPACT ON THE LIVES OF SOME HALF A MILLION KURDS.

MOST FOREIGNERS WHO REMAIN IN THE COUNTRY FOR MORE THAN 30 DAYS AND ALL IRAQIS MUST OBTAIN EXIT PERMISSION. TRAVEL HAS BEEN SEVERELY LIMITED SINCE SEPTEMBER 1986, WHEN THE

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GOVERNMENT IMPOSED TIGHT RESTRICTIONS ON CURRENCY EXCHANGE. THESE RESTRICTIONS WERE EASED SOMEWHAT IN 1989

BUT THE MOST AN IRAQI MAY EXCHANGE IS 1,000 DINARS (DOLS 3,220). BECAUSE OF THE DRAIN ON THE ECONOMY CAUSED BY THE WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION, PERMISSION TO TRAVEL ABROAD IS RESTRICTED TO A FEW CATEGORIES OF IRAQIS INCLUDING OFFICIALS' BUSINESSMEN, GOVERNMENT-APPROVED STUDENTS, AND PERSONS NEEDING MEDICAL TREATMENT. IN 1989 THE GOVERNMENT EASED RESTRICTIONS TO PERMIT ONE PARENT TO VISIT HIS OR HER OFFSPRING WHO IS STUDYING OR WORKING ABROAD.

WHILE PERMISSION FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT ABROAD MAY BE GRANTED PERMISSION TO TRANSFER HARD CURRENCY ABROAD TO PAY FOR IT MAY NOT BE. IN CASES OF THOSE DESIRING MEDICAL TREATMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, THE GOVERNMENT NOW REQUIRES A BOND TO BE POSTED BY AN AMERICAN FRIEND OR

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RELATIVE WITH THE IRAQI EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON BEFORE EXIT PERMISSION IS GRANTED. THE MINIMUM AMOUNT OF THIS BOND IS DOLS 10,000. THE GOVERNMENT SOMETIMES LIMITS THE COUNTRIES AN IRAQI TRAVELER MAY VISIT AND SHOULD THE TRAVELER VISIT A NONAUTHORIZED COUNTRY, A SMALL FINE MAY BE LEVIED UPON HIS RETURN. IRAQIS WHO HAVE RESIDENCES ABROAD MAY DEPART THE COUNTRY, PROVIDED THEY ORIGINALLY LEFT BEFORE THE WAR BEGAN. A MARRIED WOMAN MUST HAVE THE PERMISSION OF HER HUSBAND TO TRAVEL ABROAD.

THE GOVERNMENT CAN REQUIRE A PROSPECTIVE TRAVELER TO POST A SUBSTANTIAL BOND TO ASSURE HIS RETURN. THE RCC DECREED IN 1987 THAT IRAQI STUDENTS ABROAD WHO REFUSE TO RETURN TO IRAQ MUST REIMBURSE THE GOVERNMENT FOR ALL EDUCATION RECEIVED IN IRAQ OR ABROAD AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE. THE DECREE IS APPLICABLE RETROACTIVELY TO STUDENTS WHO HAVE REFUSED TO RETURN SINCE MAY 16, 1983, THE DATE THE GOVERNMENT BEGAN REQUIRING EMPLOYEES LEAVING GOVERNMENT JOBS BEFORE 20 YEARS OF SERVICE TO REIMBURSE THE STATE FOR THE COST OF THEIR EDUCATION. AMOUNTS DUE CAN BE RECOVERED BY CONFISCATION; NONPAYMENT MAY RESULT IN IMPRISONMENT. EACH STUDENT MUST PROVIDE A GUARANTOR BEFORE TRAVELING ABROAD. THIS GUARANTOR AND THE STUDENT'S PARENTS MAY BE HELD LIABLE IF THE STUDENT FAILS TO RETURN.

THERE IS NO SPECIFIC BAN ON EMIGRATION OR SPECIAL RESTRICTIONS FOR MEMBERS OF MINORITY GROUPS; HOWEVER, EMIGRATION IS DISCOURAGED. FOR THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS ALMOST ALL OF THOSE GIVEN PERMISSION TO EMIGRATE HAVE BEEN CHRISTIAN IRAQI WIVES OF FORMER IRAQI CITIZENS NOW LIVING AEROD AS CITIZENS OF ANOTHER COUNTRY. PROSPECTIVE EMIGRANTS HAVE HAD TRAVEL PERMISSION DELAYED AND HAVE BEEN

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HARASSED. MANY EMIGRANTS LEAVE BEHIND SUBSTANTIAL

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PROPERTY BECAUSE OF THE DIFFICULTY OF EXPORTING ASSETS.

CURRENCY EXCHANGE VIOLATIONS ARE CONSIDERED NATIONAL
SECURITY OFFENSES, AND PENALTIES CAN BE SEVERE.

NON-IRAQI SPOUSES OF IRAQI CITIZENS WHO HAVE RESIDED IN
IRAQ FOR 5 YEARS ARE REQUIRED TO TAKE IRAQI NATIONALITY OR
LEAVE IRAQ. MANY PEOPLE, INCLUDING SEVERAL AMERICANS,
HAVE THUS BEEN OBLIGED TO ACCEPT IRAQI CITIZENSHIP AND ARE
THEREFORE SUBJECT TO THE PRESENT TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS. IN
MARCH 1984 AN ORDER BY THE RCC REDUCED THE RESIDENCY
PERIOD BEFORE NATURALIZATION TO 1 YEAR FOR THE SPOUSES OF
IRAQI CITIZENS EMPLOYED IN GOVERNMENT OFFICES. THE IRAQI
SPOUSE FACES PENALTIES FOR NONCOMPLIANCE, INCLUDING LOSS
OF JOB, A FINE OF APPROXIMATELY DOLS 10,000, AND REPAYMENT
OF THE COSTS OF EDUCATION. IRAQ DOES NOT RECOGNIZE THE
CONCEPT OF DUAL NATIONALITY, AND MANY IRAQI "DUAL
NATIONALS," ESPECIALLY THE CHILDREN OF AN IRAQI FATHER AND
A MOTHER OF NON-IRAQI BIRTH, HAVE BEEN DENIED PERMISSION
TO LEAVE IRAQ TO VISIT THE COUNTRY OF THEIR OTHER
NATIONALITY.

IN RECENT YEARS, THE GOVERNMENT HAS INSTITUTED SPECIAL
PROGRAMS TO ENCOURAGE REPATRIATION OF QUALIFIED
PROFESSIONALS. ALIENS OF IRAQI ORIGIN CAN APPLY FOR A
DOCUMENT PERMITTING THEM TO ENTER AND EXIT FROM IRAQ
WITHOUT A VISA.

OTHER PERSONS OF IRAQI ORIGIN ARE PERMITTED TO RETURN,
INCLUDING MANY PERSONS WHO WERE ADMITTED TO OTHER
COUNTRIES AS REFUGEES. A NUMBER OF SUCH PEOPLE,
ESPECIALLY ASSYRIAN
CHRISTIANS, HAVE RETURNED ON TEMPORARY VISITS. THEY ARE FR
TO COME AND GO WITHIN THE LIMITS OF THE PRESENT TRAVEL
RESTRICTIONS, SINCE THEY ARE NOT CONSIDERED TO HAVE VIOLATE
IRAQI LAWS. HOWEVER, THOSE WHO EMIGRATED ONLY AFTER THE

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BEGINNING OF THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR, INCLUDING SEVERAL U.S.
PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIENS, HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO DEPART IRAQ
AFTER RETURNING. IN SEPTEMBER AND NOVEMBER 1988 AND IN
FEBRUARY AND MARCH 1989, THE GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED AMNESTIES
FOR KURDS WHO FLED THE COUNTRY FOR ANY REASON. APPROXIMATE.
2,000 HAVE VOLUNTARILY RETURNED FROM REFUGEE CAMPS IN TURKEY

SECTION 3 RESPECT FOR POLITICAL RIGHTS: THE RIGHT OF CITI

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TO CHANGE THEIR GOVERNMENT

IRAQI CITIZENS DO NOT HAVE THE ABILITY PEACEFULLY TO CHANGE THEIR GOVERNMENT. PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN AND THE RCC RUL IRAQ THROUGH THE BA'ATH PARTY. IT REPORTEDLY HAS SOME 1.5 MILLION ADHERENTS, REPRESENTING ABOUT 9 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION.

THERE ARE TWO OTHER SMALL LEGAL POLITICAL PARTIES, BOTH KURDISH. THEY AND THE BA'ATH PARTY CONSTITUTE THE PATRIOTI AND PROGRESSIVE NATIONAL FRONT, ESSENTIALLY A VEHICLE OF SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT. MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY OR SECURITY SERVICES MAY ENGAGE IN POLITICAL ACTIVITIES ONLY WITHIN THE BA'ATH PARTY. ASSOCIATION WITH THE PARTY IS NOT REQUIRED FOR APPOINTMENT TO SENIOR GOVERNMENT POSITIONS OR MILITARY RANKS OR ELECTION TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, BUT IS NORMALLY NECESSARY TO ATTAIN POLITICAL INFLUENCE. OPPOSITI GROUPS INCLUDING VARIOUS KURDISH GROUPS AND SPLINTER PARTII ARE SEVERELY REPRESSED. THE COMMUNIST PARTY WAS REMOVED FF THE NATIONAL FRONT AND DECLARED ILLEGAL IN 1979. THE DA'WA ORGANIZATION, A VIOLENT SHI'ITE GROUP, IS STILL PROSCRIBED AND ITS MEMBERS ARE SUBJECT TO INCARCERATION AND EXECUTION, ARE MEMBERS OF OTHER PARTIES BELIEVED TO BE COOPERATING WIT IRAN. PLANS THE GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED IN 1988 TO PERMIT LEG FORMATION OF OPPOSITION PARTIES WERE NOT IMPLEMENTED IN 198

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GENERAL ELECTIONS WERE HELD FOR THE 250-SEAT NATIONAL ASSEMM IN APRIL. THOUGH IN THEORY POSSESSING A WIDE RANGE OF OFFICIAL DUTIES, THE ASSEMBLY EXERCISES LITTLE REAL AUTHORITY. THE MAJORITY OF THE MORE THAN 900 CANDIDATES WE INDEPENDENTS, ALTHOUGH ALL SUPPORTED CURRENT GOVERNMENT POLICIES. THE ELECTIONS BY SECRET BALLOT WERE MORE OPEN TH IN THE PAST, AND SOME HIGH-RANKING BAATH PARTY OFFICIALS WE DEFEATED.

THE BIENNIAL ELECTIONS FOR THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY OF THE KURDISH AUTONOMOUS REGION WERE HELD IN SEPTEMBER 1989. ALL 174 CANDIDATES, FROM THE THREE LEGAL PARTIES AND INDEPENDEN HAD TO SATISFY THE SAME REQUIREMENTS AS NATIONAL ASSEMBLY CANDIDATES. THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY DOES NOT EXERCISE MEANINGFUL AUTHORITY.

IN OCTOBER 1989, AN EXPERTS COMMISSION FINISHED DRAFTING A CONSTITUTION TO REPLACE THE PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION OF 1977 IRAQI OFFICIALS ASSERT THAT THE NEW CONSTITUTION WILL PROVII MORE GUARANTEES OF HUMAN RIGHTS. HOWEVER, THE NEW CONSTITUTION HAS NOT YET BEEN MADE PUBLIC PENDING APPROVAL PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN AND THE RCC.

WOMEN HAVE BEGUN TO INCREASE THEIR ROLE IN THE BA'ATH PARTY

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AND CIVIL SERVICE, BUT REMAIN GREATLY UNDERREPRESENTED. THERE ARE NO WOMEN IN THE RCC, REGIONAL COMMAND, OR CABINET; THERE ARE 27 AMONG THE 250 MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND 2 THE 50-MEMBER LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY OF THE KURDISH AUTONOMOUS REGION.

SECTION 4 GOVERNMENTAL ATTITUDE REGARDING INTERNATIONAL AND
NONGOVERNMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGED VIOLATIONS
OF HUMAN RIGHTS

THE GOVERNMENT ALLOWS ONE HUMAN RIGHTS GROUP TO OPERATE IN
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IRAQ BUT THIS IS LARGELY UNDER GOVERNMENT CONTROL. THE GOVERNMENT HAS RARELY COOPERATED WITH PRIVATE FOREIGN GROUPS OR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN INVESTIGATING EVENTS OR PRACTICES IN IRAQ.

THE GOVERNMENT DENIES CHARGES THAT IT VIOLATES HUMAN RIGHTS AND CLAIMS THAT THE INFORMATION ON WHICH AI AND OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS BASE THEIR CHARGES COMES FROM PRO-IRANIAN AND KURDISH IRAQI EXILE GROUPS IN LONDON AND PARIS. IN ITS 198 REPORT ON CHILDREN IN IRAQ, AI CITED SEVERAL INSTANCES IN WHICH IRAQI AUTHORITIES HAD COMMENTED ON AI REPORTS OR RESPONDED TO AI INQUIRIES, BUT IN EACH CASE THESE AUTHORITIES HAD DEFENDED THE GOVERNMENT'S ACTIONS AS JUSTIFIABLE OR DENIED THE ACCURACY OF AI'S INFORMATION. A RESOLUTION BEFORE THE U.N. SUBCOMMISSION ON THE PREVENTION OF DISCRIMINATION AND PROTECTION OF MINORITIES IN AUGUST 1989, RECOMMENDING THAT THE U.N. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS STUDY THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN IRAQ, WAS NARROWLY DEFEATED.

IRAQ DOES COOPERATE WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS IN EFFORTS TO RESETTLE IRANIAN CIVILIAN REFUGEES IN THIRD COUNTRIES, AND THE U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES HAS HAD A PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE IN IRAQ SINCE APRIL 1988 WHO REGISTERS IRANIAN REFUGEES AND WORKS FOR THEIR RESETTLEMENT.

SECTION 5 DISCRIMINATION BASED ON RACE, SEX, RELIGION,
LANGUAGE, OR SOCIAL STATUS

THE BA'ATH PARTY IS COMMITTED TO THE EQUALITY OF THE SEXES AND A SERIES OF LAWS SINCE IT CAME TO POWER IN 1968 HAS STEADILY IMPROVED THE STATUS OF WOMEN. THERE HAVE BEEN LAWS TO PROTECT WOMEN FROM EXPLOITATION IN THE WORKPLACE; GRANT
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SUBSIDIZED MATERNITY LEAVE; PERMIT WOMEN TO JOIN THE REGULAR

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ARMY, POPULAR ARMY, AND POLICE FORCES; AND EQUALIZE WOMEN'S RIGHTS ON DIVORCE, LAND OWNERSHIP, TAXATION SUFFRAGE, AND ELECTION TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. IN THE 1970'S, THE GOVERNMENT IMPOSED LEGAL PENALTIES ON FAMILIES THAT OPPOSED SENDING THEIR WOMEN TO LITERACY SCHOOLS. AND ON MEN WHO WERE SEEN HARASSING WOMEN. WHILE THE APPLICATION OF THESE LAWS RESULTED IN SIGNIFICANT TANGIBLE IMPROVEMENTS FOR WOMEN, A NUMBER OF PROBLEMS REMAIN. MARRIED WOMEN MAY STILL TRAVEL ABROAD ONLY WITH THE PERMISSION OF THEIR HUSBANDS. SCHOOL ENROLLMENT OF FEMALES HAS BEEN INCREASING IN RECENT YEARS,

REACHING 45 PERCENT IN ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS AND 36 PERCENT IN SECONDARY SCHOOLS IN 1985-86.

WOMEN REPRESENT ABOUT 47 PERCENT OF AGRICULTURAL WORKERS AND ABOUT 25 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL WORK FORCE. THE WAR ACCELERATED THE GOVERNMENT'S DRIVE TO ELEVATE THE STATUS OF WOMEN, AND APPEARS TO HAVE SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED, IF NOT REMOVED, BARRIERS TO THE ACCEPTANCE OF WOMEN IN TRADITIONAL MALE ROLES. WOMEN ARE INCREASINGLY EMPLOYED AS ARCHITECTS, CONSTRUCTION ENGINEERS, OIL ENGINEERS, AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS AND FACTORY AND FARM MANAGERS. THEIR ROLE IN ARMED FORCES IS LIMITED TO THE MEDICAL FIELD.

VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, SUCH AS WIFE-BEATING AND RAPE, IS KNOWN TO OCCUR BUT LITTLE IS KNOWN ABOUT ITS EXTENT. SUCH ABUSE IS CUSTOMARILY DEALT WITH WITHIN THE TIGHTLY KNIT IRAQI FAMILY STRUCTURE BECAUSE OF THE VALUE ATTACHED TO PERSONAL PRIVACY IN THIS CONSERVATIVE SOCIETY. CONSEQUENTLY, THERE IS NO PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF THE SUBJECT. THERE ARE NO OFFICIAL STATISTICS ON THE SUBJECT. EXCESSIVE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN WOULD BE GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE AND CRIMINAL CHARGES, BUT SUITS BROUGHT ON THESE CHARGES IN IRAQ ARE BELIEVED TO BE RARE.

THE USE OF MINORITY LANGUAGES IS UNRESTRICTED. KURDISH IS
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OFFICIAL LANGUAGE USED IN SCHOOLS AND MEDIA IN KURDISH AREA TURKOMANS PUBLISH IN THEIR DIALECT OF TURKISH, AND CHRISTIANS OFTEN USE ARAMAIC AS WELL AS ARABIC.

THE SHI'AS, WHO MAKE UP ROUGHLY 55 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION HAVE HISTORICALLY BEEN ECONOMICALLY, POLITICALLY AND SOCIALLY DISADVANTAGED THROUGHOUT MUCH OF THE MIDDLE EAST. THE GOVERNMENT HAS A DECLARED POLICY TO RAISE THEIR LIVING STANDARDS AND EQUALIZE OPPORTUNITIES FOR THEIR ECONOMIC AND PROFESSIONAL ADVANCEMENT. FOR FOUR CENTURIES, POLITICAL POWER IN IRAQ HAS BEEN CONCENTRATED IN THE HANDS OF THE SUNNI MINORITY. SUNNI ARABS, WHO COMPRISE 20 TO 25 PERCENT OF IRAQ'S POPULATION, DOMINATE THE RCC, THE REGIONAL COMMAND OF THE BA'ATH PARTY AND THE CABINET. HOWEVER, INCREASING NUMBERS OF SHI'AS HOLD PROMINENT POSITIONS, AND THE ECONOMIC

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STATUS OF THE SHI'A HAS IMPROVED THROUGH INTENSIVE GOVERNMENT INVESTMENT IN THE ECONOMIC AND EDUCATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE SOUTHERN IRAQ.

ALTHOUGH CHRISTIANS SOMETIMES ALLEGE DISCRIMINATION IN EDUCATION AND JOBS, ADHERENCE TO THEIR RELIGION HAS NOT PREVENTED MANY FROM OBTAINING WEALTH AND PROFESSIONAL ADVANCEMENT. THE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER A CHALDEAN CHRISTIAN, HAS REPRESENTED IRAQ AT MEETINGS OF T FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ISLAMIC

CONFERENCE. OTHER CHRISTIANS HOLD IMPORTANT OFFICIAL AND PRIVATE POSITIONS.

CITIZENS CONSIDERED TO BE OF IRANIAN ORIGIN CARRY SPECIAL IDENTIFICATION. THEY ARE OFTEN PRECLUDED FROM DESIRABLE EMPLOYMENT AND THEIR ADVANCEMENT MAY BE IMPEDED. MANY "IRANIAN" FAMILIES HAVE BEEN IN IRAQ FOR GENERATIONS. THE

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HOLIEST SHRINES OF SHI'A ISLAM, THE PREVALENT SECT IN IRAN, ARE LOCATED IN IRAQ. FOR GENERATIONS IRANIANS HAVE COME TO NAJAF AND KARBALA ON PILGRIMAGE OR TO STUDY IN THE SEMINARII AND MANY SETTLED THERE. SOME "IRANIANS" SAY THEIR FOREBEAR WERE NOT FROM IRAN BUT CLAIMED IRANIAN NATIONALITY TO EVADE OTTOMAN MILITARY CONSCRIPTION.

SECTION 6 WORKER RIGHTS

A. THE RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION

TRADE UNIONS INDEPENDENT OF GOVERNMENT CONTROL DO NOT EXIST IRAQ. UNDER THE TRADE UNION ORGANIZATION LAW OF JUNE 2, 19 A NEW SINGLE TRADE UNION STRUCTURE WAS PRESCRIBED FOR ORGANIZED LABOR. WORKERS IN PRIVATE AND MIXED ENTERPRISES IN COOPERATIVES--BUT NOT PUBLIC EMPLOYEES OR WORKERS IN STATE ENTERPRISES--HAVE THE RIGHT TO JOIN A LOCAL UNION COMMITTEE. THE COMMITTEES FORM TRADE UNIONS WHICH IN TURN ARE PART OF PROVINCIAL TRADE UNION FEDERATIONS. AT THE TOP IS AN UMBRELLA ORGANIZATION, THE IRAQI GENERAL FEDERATION OF TRADE UNIONS WHICH IS ORGANICALLY LINKED TO THE BA'ATH PARTY AND REQUIRE. TO PROMOTE PARTY PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES AMONG UNION MEMBER. THE GENERAL FEDERATION IS AFFILIATED WITH THE INTERNATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF ARAB TRADE UNIONS AND THE SOVIET-CONTROLLED WORLD FEDERATION OF TRADE UNIONS. IT IS ALSO ACTIVE IN THE TRIPARTITE ARAB LABOR ORGANIZATION, HEADQUARTERED IN BAGHDAD.

ALTHOUGH WORKERS LEGALLY HAVE THE RIGHT TO STRIKE, AFTER PROVIDING NOTICE TO THE LABOR MINISTRY, NO SUCH STRIKES WERE REPORTED IN 1989. THERE WAS A ONE-DAY WILDCAT WALKOUT BY EGYPTIAN WORKERS PROTESTING EXCESSIVE WORK HOURS.

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THE RIGHT TO BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY IS NOT RECOGNIZED. * SALAR
FOR PUBLIC SECTOR WORKERS (I.E. THE BULK OF THE EMPLOYED) AA

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SET BY THE GOVERNMENT. WAGES IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR ARE SET
THE EMPLOYERS OR NEGOTIATED INDIVIDUALLY WITH WORKERS.

IRAQ, WHICH HAS RATIFIED ILO CONVENTION 98 ON THE RIGHT TO
ORGANIZE AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING. WAS CRITICIZED BY THE
ILO'S COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS (COE) IN 1989 FOR THE FACT THAT

NEW LABOR CODE OF 1987 FAILS TO PROVIDE WORKERS WITH
PROTECTION AGAINST ANTI-UNION DISCRIMINATION. THE COE ALSO
REGRETTED THAT THE 1987 ACT ON TRADE UNION ORGANIZATIONS DI
NOT PROVIDE FOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING.

THERE ARE NO EXPORT PROCESSING ZONES IN IRAQ.

C. PROHIBITION OF FORCED OR COMPULSORY LABOR

ALTHOUGH COMPULSORY LABOR IS PROHIBITED BY LAW, DURING AND
SHORTLY AFTER THE WAR WITH IRAN THE POPULAR ARMY THE MILIT
OF THE BA'ATH PARTY, EMPLOYED PRESS-GANG METHODS TO DRAFT
RECRUITS. HOWEVER, THESE ACTIVITIES CEASED IN NOVEMBER 198
AND THE POPULAR ARMY WAS FOR THE MOST PART DEMOBILIZED IN 1

ILO SUPERVISORY BODIES AGAIN IN 1989 EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT
THE PENAL CODE PERMITS THE PUNISHMENT OF CIVIL SERVANTS WITH
IMPRISONMENT INCLUDING COMPULSORY PRISON LABOR, FOR BREACH
OF LABOR DISCIPLINE WHICH INCLUDE RESIGNING FROM ONE'S JOB.
NOVEMBER CABINET MEETING REPORTED IN THE GOVERNMENT-DIRECTT
PRESS QUOTED THE REMARK OF A MINISTER THAT RESIGNATION FROM
GOVERNMENT JOBS SHOULD BE FREE, CONFIRMING THAT HERETOFORE
CIVIL SERVANTS HAVE HAD TO BUY THEIR WAY OUT OF GOVERNMENT
SERVICE.

D. MINIMUM AGE FOR EMPLOYMENT OF CHILDREN~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

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CHILDREN ARE FREQUENTLY ENCOURAGED TO WORK AS NECESSARY TO
SUPPORT THE FAMILY, BUT THE EMPLOYMENT OF CHILDREN UNDER AG
14 IS FORBIDDEN IN ALL ENTERPRISES OTHER THAN SMALL-SCALE
FAMILY ENTERPRISES. CHILDREN BETWEEN THE AGES OF 14 AND 1
WHO ARE EMPLOYED ARE PROTECTED BY LAW: THEY WORK FEWER HOU
AND HAVE MORE PRIVILEGES THAN ADULT WORKERS.

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E. ACCEPTABLE CONDITIONS OF WORK

THE WORKWEEK IN URBAN AREAS IS 6 DAYS, 7 TO 8 HOURS A DAY, WORKERS IN THE PRIVATE AND MIXED SECTORS. THESE PROVISIONS NOT APPLY TO AGRICULTURAL WORKERS WHOSE WORKWEEK AND HOURS WORK PER DAY CAN VARY ACCORDING TO INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE AGREEMENTS. HOURS FOR GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE ARE SET BY THE HEAD OF THE MINISTRY FOR WHICH THE EMPLOYEE WORKS. MANY GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES ROUTINELY WORK LONGER THAN HOURS A DAY SOME OF THEM AS MUCH AS 12 HOURS PER DAY.

OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY PROGRAMS ARE IN EFFECT IN STATE-RUN ENTERPRISES AND INSPECTORS MAKE IRREGULAR VISITS TO PRIVATE ESTABLISHMENTS. ENFORCEMENT VARIES WIDELY. A GOVERNMENT DECREE TO EXTEND OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH PROTECTION

ISSUED AND SUBSEQUENTLY WITHDRAWN IN DECEMBER 1988, REPORTED THE CAUSE OF THE DISMISSAL OF THE LABOR MINISTER.

A SPECIAL PROBLEM AROSE AFTER THE GOVERNMENT DECIDED IN JUNE TO REDUCE DRASTICALLY THE AMOUNT OF HARD CURRENCY FOREIGN WORKERS COULD REMIT. IT IS WIDELY BELIEVED THAT THE GOVERNMENT TOOK THIS MEASURE TO "ENCOURAGE" FOREIGN WORKERS LEAVE THE COUNTRY, THUS FREEING JOBS FOR DEMOBILIZED IRAQI SOLDIERS. WORKERS NOT ON CONTRACT WERE PARTICULARLY HARD HIT. MOST OF THE OVER TWO MILLION EGYPTIAN WORKERS IN IRAQ WERE MANUAL LABORERS. WHEN THEY LEARNED THEY WOULD BE ABLE TRANSFER ONLY U.S. DOLS 32 PER MONTH, THEY BEGAN TO LEAVE II

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IN DROVES, AN ESTIMATED 2,000 PER DAY BY AIR ALONE. EGYPTIANS AND OTHER FOREIGN WORKERS IN IRAQ HAVE CLAIMED THAT SOME IR EMPLOYERS FORCED THEM TO WORK 12-15 HOURS A DAY FOR EIGHT HOURS PAY OR REFUSED TO PAY WAGES. THE GOVERNMENT HAS ADMITTED THAT IRAQI BANKS HAVE BEEN SLOW TO PAY REMITTANCES. EGYPTIAN WORKERS ARE IN FACT RECEIVING THEIR SAVINGS A YEAR AFTER LEAVING IRAQ. EAGLEBURGER

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ACTION NEA-11

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	INR-07	SS-00	CIAE-00	DODE-00	H-01
	NSCE-00	NSAE-00	HA-09	L-03	TRSE-00	PM-10	PA-01
	OMB-01	INRE-00	ACDA-12	USIE-00	SP-02	SNP-01	PRS-01
	DS-01	P-02	T-01	/063 W			

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INFO ARABLEAGUE COLLECTIVE

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E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, IZ
SUBJECT: TARIQ AZIZ'S INTERVIEW TO KULL AL-ARAB
- MAGAZINE

REF: (A) FBIS JN0907134889
- (B) FBIS JN0907135789

1. (U) SUMMARY: IN AN INTERVIEW WITH "KULL AL-ARAB" MAGAZINE, FOREIGN MINISTER TARIQ AZIZ REITERATED THE STANDARD GOI LINE ON REGIONAL AND DOMESTIC ISSUES. ON LEBANON, HE SAID IT IS "NOT POSSIBLE" TO SEND IRAQI TROOPS AND AFFIRMED THE MILITARY SITUATION ON THE IRAQI-SYRIAN BORDER IS "NORMAL".

2. (U) WHILE FBIS HAS PROVIDED EXCELLENT COVERAGE OF FONMIN AZIZ' FEATURE INTERVIEW IN THE JULY 10 KULL AL-ARAB MAGAZINE (REFS), THIS TELEGRAM CONTAINS ADDITIONAL POINTS AND DETAILS.

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3. (U) AZIZ CHARACTERIZED THE SITUATION IN TEHRAN AFTER THE DEATH OF KHOMEINI AS AMBIGUOUS. RAFSANJANI HAS NOT CONSOLIDATED HIS POWER AND WHY WAS HE RECEIVED IN THE SOVIET UNION AS A HEAD OF STATE? AZIZ DOES NOT EXPECT ANY PROGRESS IN THE PEACE PROCESS UNTIL IRANIAN LEADERS EMERGE AND PROVE THEIR LEADERSHIP. ON THE SOVIET DECISION TO SELL ARMS TO IRAN, AZIZ SAID THAT BECAUSE IRAN IS NOT THREATENED BY ANYONE, THERE IS NO REASON FOR THE

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IRANIANS TO NEED ARMS. IRAQ HAS NO EXPLANATION FOR THE SOVIETS' DECISION. IF THE SOVIETS WANT TO BE HELPFUL TO THE IRANIANS, THEY SHOULD PROVIDE POSITIVE, DEVELOPMENTAL AID INSTEAD OF WEAPONRY.

4. ~~(S)~~ COMMENT: AZIZ'S CALL FOR AN EXPLANATION OF THE SOVIET DECISION WAS MADE BEFORE DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER BESSMERTNYKH'S VISIT TO BAGHDAD ON JULY 1, BUT THE GOI IS STILL DISSATISFIED. AZIZ' WILLINGNESS TO BLESS SOVIET DEVELOPMENTAL AID TO IRAN IS THE FIRST STATEMENT WE HAVE SEEN THAT SUGGESTS ANY ECONOMIC CONTACT WITH IRAN IS ACCEPTABLE TO THE IRAQIS IN THE NO-WAR/NO-PEACE STALEMATE. END COMMENT.

LEBANON

5. (U) AZIZ REAFFIRMED IRAQ'S FULL SUPPORT OF THE WORK OF THE ARAB TRIPARTITE COMMITTEE, BUT SYRIAN SABOTAGE AND OPPOSITION HAVE STYMIED THE COMMITTEE. THE SYRIAN REGIME WANTS THE STATUS QUO TO CONTINUE IN LEBANON BECAUSE IT BENEFITS FROM THE SITUATION POLITICALLY AND MATERIALLY. WHEN ASKED ABOUT SENDING
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IRAQI TROOPS TO LEBANON, AZIZ SAID THAT THIS WAS NOT POSSIBLE (ARABIC: GHAYR WAARID).

KURDS

6. (U) AZIZ NOTED THAT THERE HAD BEEN A LOT OF TALK IN THE WEST ABOUT THE KURDS AND EVACUATION AS A RESULT OF A "CAMPAIGN OF LIES AND RUMORS" SPREAD BY THE WESTERN MEDIA TO CREATE TURMOIL AND UNREST IN THE REGION. THE SECURITY ZONE WAS BEING CREATED TO PROTECT IRAQI CITIZENS LIVING ALONG THE DANGEROUS BORDER AND TO HELP THE GOVERNMENT PROVIDE BETTER SERVICES FOR THEM.

7. ~~(S)~~ COMMENT: AZIZ'S STATEMENTS ON THE KURDS ARE A CONTINUATION OF RECENT GOI EFFORTS TO EXPRESS THE SINCERITY OF ITS CONCERN FOR THE WELFARE OF ITS KURDISH CITIZENS. END COMMENT.

THE ACC

8. (U) AZIZ STATED THAT THE ACC IS IN NO WAY AN AXIS AGAINST THE ARAB LEAGUE.

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NUCLEAR REACTOR RECONSTRUCTION

9. (U) AZIZ ASSERTED THAT AS A SIGNATOR TO THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY THAT IRAQ HAS THE RIGHT TO HAVE A NUCLEAR REACTOR FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES. AZIZ CONFIRMED THAT FRANCE HAS NOT YET

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PAGE 01 BAGHDA 03829 02 OF 03 181157Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	INR-07	SS-00	CIAE-00	DODE-00	H-01
	NSCE-00	NSAE-00	HA-09	L-03	TRSE-00	PM-10	PA-01
	OMB-01	INRE-00	ACDA-12	USIE-00	SP-02	SNP-01	PRS-01
	DS-01	P-02	T-01	/063 W			

-----273156 181258Z /48

R 181147Z JUL 89
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0880
INFO ARABLEAGUE COLLECTIVE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 BAGHDAD 03829

E.O. 12356: ~~DECL:OADR~~
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, IZ
SUBJECT: TARIQ AZIZ'S INTERVIEW TO KULL AL-ARAB

AGREED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE RECONSTRUCTION OF
THE REACTOR DESTROYED BY THE ISRAELIS IN 1981.

REDUCTIONS IN THE IRAQI MILITARY

10. (U) THE INTERVIEWER CITED PRESS STORIES IN WHICH IT WAS REPORTED THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD ASKED IRAQ TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF IRAQI TROOPS AFTER A CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT WAS CONCLUDED AND ASKED AZIZ WHETHER OR NOT THE AMERICAN REQUEST WAS THE REASON BEHIND THE DEACTIVATION OF THE FIRST SPECIAL ARMY CORPS. AZIZ RESPONDED, "MY GOD, THIS IS A JOKE I HAVE NOT HEARD BEFORE." HE EXPLAINED THAT THE DEACTIVATION IS PART OF AN IRAQI EFFORT TO INCREASE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE IRAQI ARMED FORCES WHILE REDUCING THEIR NUMBER.

11. (S) COMMENT: THIS IS THE LATEST IN A SERIES

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PAGE 02 BAGHDA 03829 02 OF 03 181157Z

OF PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY IRAQI OFFICIALS WHICH SELF-CONSCIOUSLY INSIST THAT, FOR IRAQ, THE WAR IS IN THE PAST; THE ERA OF DEVELOPMENT HAS BEGUN.
END COMMENT.&

IRAQI-SYRIAN BORDER

12. (U) ASKED ABOUT THE SITUATION ON THE SYRIAN

PAGE NO. 4

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BORDER AND WHETHER OR NOT ANY IRAQI TROOPS WERE STATIONED THERE, AZIZ SAID THAT IRAQ MOVES ITS TROOPS INSIDE IRAQ AS IT PLEASES BUT STRESSED THAT THE SITUATION ALONG THE BORDER IS NORMAL.

LIBERALIZATION

13. (U) AZIZ "HOPED" THAT THE NEW CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW PARTY AND PRESS LAWS WILL BE READY SOON.

14. (S) COMMENT: GOI OFFICIALS LOSE NO OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE NEW CONSTITUTION AND OTHER "LIBERALIZATION" MEASURES. WHILE NO FIRM DATE HAS BEEN ANNOUNCED FOR WHEN THESE MEASURES WILL BE ISSUED, THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY WHICH IS CHARGED WITH DRAFTING THESE MEASURES RECONVENES IN SEPTEMBER. END COMMENT.

U.S.-IRAQI RELATIONS

15. (U) ASKED IF IRAQ'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 03 BAGHDA 03829 02 OF 03 181157Z

UNITED STATES HAD CHANGED OR DEVELOPED SINCE THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION HAD TAKEN OFFICE, AZIZ STATED THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO CHANGE IN THE RELATIONSHIP OR HIGH-LEVEL CONTACTS MADE WITH THE NEW ADMINISTRATION. WHEN ASKED IF HE WOULD WELCOME SUCH HIGH-LEVEL CONTACTS, AZIZ STATED THAT THE NEW ADMINISTRATION WAS A CONTINUATION OF THE PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATION WITH NOTHING NEW IN IT.

16. (C) COMMENT: THESE STATEMENTS DIRECTLY CONTRADICT WHAT AZIZ AND OTHER MFA OFFICIALS HAVE TOLD US IN PRIVATE. THE MFA IS LOBBYING US HARD FOR AN OPPORTUNITY FOR AZIZ TO MEET WITH SECRETARY BAKER AT THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY MEETING IN SEPTEMBER. END COMMENT.

IRAQI-KUWAITI BORDER

17. (U) WHEN ASKED WHY NO FORMAL BORDER AGREEMENT HAD YET BEEN ESTABLISHED WITH KUWAIT, AZIZ REPLIED THAT NEGOTIATIONS WERE UNDERWAY WITH THE KUWAITIS AND HE EXPECTED POSITIVE RESULTS SOON. WHEN PRESSED FOR A REASON IT IS TAKING SO LONG TO FORMALIZE THE BORDER WITH KUWAIT, AZIZ LAMELY RESPONDED "TOPOGRAPHY."

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SHATT AL-ARAB DIVERSION PLANS

18. (U) AZIZ ASSERTED THAT THE GOI DOES HAVE A
CONTINGENCY PLAN TO DIVERT THE SHATT AL-ARAB.
HOWEVER, HE STRESSED THAT THIS PLAN WOULD ONLY BE

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PAGE 01 BAGHDA 03829 03 OF 03 181157Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	INR-07	SS-00	CIAE-00	DODE-00	H-01
	NSCE-00	NSAE-00	HA-09	L-03	TRSE-00	PM-10	PA-01
	OMB-01	INRE-00	ACDA-12	USIE-00	SP-02	SNP-01	PRS-01
	DS-01	P-02	T-01	/063 W			

-----273160 181258Z /48

R 181147Z JUL 89
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0881
INFO ARABLEAGUE COLLECTIVE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 BAGHDAD 03829

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, IZ

SUBJECT: TARIQ AZIZ'S INTERVIEW TO KULL AL-ARAB

ENACTED IN AN EMERGENCY SITUATION. WHEN ASKED
ABOUT THE LEGALITY OF DIVERTING THE SHATT, AZIZ
SAID THAT IF THE SHATT STARTED IN IRAQ, IT CAN
FINISH IN IRAQ.

THE ECONOMY

19. (U) AZIZ BLAMED THE COST OF THE WAR AND THE
IMPACT OF WORLD INFLATION AS CAUSES OF INFLATION
IN IRAQ. HE NOTED THE RECENT SALARY INCREASE
GIVEN TO GOI EMPLOYEES AND PROFESSED OPTIMISM FOR
IRAQ'S ECONOMIC FUTURE. GLASPIE

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PAGE 01 LONDON 13706 01 OF 02 051645Z
ACTION NEA-04

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-07 EUR-00 SS-00 CIAE-00
EB-00 DODE-00 H-01 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09
L-03 TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-02 OMB-01 INRE-00 RP-10
USIE-00 SP-02 SR-06 SNP-01 PRS-01 P-02 T-01
/060 W

-----205657 051659Z /47

O 051629Z JUL 89
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0306
INFO AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMCONSUL ADANA
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY PARIS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 13706

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PINS, PHUM, UK, IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQ'S RESETTLEMENT SCHEME

REF: BAGHDAD 3480

1. EMBASSY LONDON RECEIVED A PAMPHLET JULY 5 FROM THE
EMBASSY OF IRAQ DATED JUNE 26 AND ENTITLED "FACTS ABOUT
IRAQ'S RESETTLEMENT SCHEME." THE FULL TEXT OF THE
PAMPHLET FOLLOWS IN PARA. 2 BELOW. CONTRARY TO REFTTEL
REPORT OF THE IRAQI PRESS RELEASE, KURDISH FAMILIES
RELOCATED FROM RURAL AREAS WOULD RECEIVE CASH
COMPENSATION OF ID 1500 (VICE 15,000). THE HIGHEST
LEVELS OF COMPENSATION CITED IN THE PAMPHLET WOULD GO TO
FAMILIES FROM QAL'AT DIZA WHO WOULD RECEIVE ID 10,000
"IN APPRECIATION OF THE PARTICULARLY GREAT SACRIFICES
THEY HAD SUFFERED IN LIFE AND PROPERTY AS A RESULT OF
IRAN'S CONSTANT BOMBARDMENT" OF THEIR AREA.

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2. BEGIN TEXT:

FOLLOWING THE BITTER EXPERIENCE SUFFERED BY OUR TOWNS
AND VILLAGES ALONG THE BORDER WITH IRAN THROUGHOUT THE
EIGHT YEARS OF THE IRANIAN AGGRESSION, AND IN VIEW OF
THE BARBARIC BOMBARDMENT AND DESTRUCTION TO WHICH THE
POPULATION OF THESE AREAS WERE SUBJECTED AND OF THE ACTS
OF TERROR AND BLACKMAIL PERPETRATED AGAINST THEM BY THE

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TREASONOUS GROUPS OF MERCENARY BANDITS WHO HAVE SOLD THEMSELVES TO THE ENEMY, THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT DECIDED TO CREATE A DEPOPULATED STRIP OF LAND, NO MORE THAN 30 KILOMETERS WIDE INSIDE OUR TERRITORY AND ALL ALONG THE 1200 KM BOUNDARY LINES WITH BOTH IRAN AND TURKEY. THIS MEASURE IS NOT LIMITED TO THE AUTONOMOUS REGION OF KURDISTAN IN THE NORTH, BUT IS EXTENDED TO THE PROVINCES OF THE MIDLANDS AND THE SOUTH. THE PROVINCES OF BASRAH, MISAN, WASIT, DYALA, SULAIMANIYAH, ARBIL AND DHAWK HAVE ALL BENEFITED FROM THIS PROTECTIVE MEASURE. THE ONLY TWO TOWNSHIPS WHICH HAD TO BE LEFT OUT WERE THE ENTRY-GATES OF KHANAQEEH AND ZAKHO, THE FIRST BEING ON THE IRAQ-IRAN BORDER AND THE SECOND ON THE IRAQ-TURKEY BORDER.

TO FACILITATE THE TRANSFER OF PEOPLE FROM THE AREAS IN WHICH THEY USED TO LIVE IN CONSTANT FEAR AND DANGER TO OTHER MORE SECURE AREAS WHERE THEY COULD RESTORE THEIR NORMAL LIFE, THE GOVERNMENT GRANTED EACH AND EVERY FAMILY THE FOLLOWING BENEFITS:

--A FREE GRANT OF ID 3000 (OVER U.S. DOLS. 9000) TO URBAN FAMILIES AND ID 1500 (OVER U.S. DOLS. 4500) TO RURAL FAMILIES.

--FAMILIES DESERVING OF A GREATER COMPENSATION MAY
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WELL BE GRANTED A LARGER AMOUNT AT THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE SPECIAL COMPENSATION COMMITTEES SET UP TO SUPERVISE THE OPERATION.

--IN ADDITION TO THIS, EACH AND EVERY FAMILY HAS BEEN ALLOCATED A PIECE OF LAND WHICH THEY COULD LIVE ON AND CULTIVATE IN PEACE AND SAFETY.

AS REGARDS THE TOWN OF QAL'AT DIZA AND THE BASIN SURROUNDING IT, THE FAMILIES THERE RECEIVED A MUCH GREATER COMPENSATION (MORE THAN THREE TIMES THE COMPENSATION GIVEN TO THE FAMILIES OF OTHER PROVINCES IN THE SOUTH, THE MIDLANDS AND THE NORTHERN AUTONOMOUS REGION.)

SUCH ESPECIALLY HIGH COMPENSATION WAS GIVEN BY THE GOVERNMENT TO THE FAMILIES OF QAL'AT DIZA AND THE VILLAGES BELONGING TO IT IN APPRECIATION OF THE PARTICULARLY GREAT SACRIFICES THEY HAD SUFFERED IN LIFE AND PROPERTY AS A RESULT OF IRAN'S CONSTANT BOMBARDMENT OF THEIR PARTS THROUGHOUT THE EIGHT YEARS OF THE WAR, AND OF THE COURAGE AND DETERMINATION WITH WHICH THEY FACED THE ACTS OF AGGRESSION PERPETRATED BY THE IRANIANS AND THE TRAITORS COLLABORATING WITH THEM. THE COMPENSATION GRANT RECEIVED BY THE THIRTEEN THOUSAND AND FIVE HUNDRED URBAN QAL'AT DIZA FAMILIES AMOUNTED TO ID 10,000 (OVER U.S. DOLS. 30,000); WHILE THE ONE THOUSAND

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SEVEN HUNDRED AND EIGHTY FAMILIES OF THE RURAL PARTS
RECEIVED EACH A GRANT OF ID 5,000 (OVER U.S. DOLS.
10,000). THE COMPENSATION COMMITTEES MAY AGAIN DECIDE
THAT A GREATER COMPENSATION BE GRANTED TO DESERVING
FAMILIES.

THE PEOPLE OF QAL'AT DIZA AND ITS VILLAGES WERE
GRANTED THE RIGHT TO CHOOSE FOR THEMSELVES THE PLACE IN

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ACTION NEA-04

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-00	INR-07	EUR-00	SS-00	CIAE-00
	EB-00	DODE-00	H-01	NSCE-00	NSAE-00	SSO-00	HA-09
	L-03	TRSE-00	PM-10	PA-02	OMB-01	INRE-00	RP-10
	USIE-00	SP-02	SR-06	SNP-01	PRS-01	P-02	T-01
	/060 W						

-----205654 051658Z /46

O 051629Z JUL 89
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0307
INFO AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMCONSUL ADANA
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY PARIS

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 LONDON 13706

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PINS, PHUM, UK, IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQ'S RESETTLEMENT SCHEME

WHICH THEY WANTED TO LIVE ANYWHERE IN THE AUTONOMOUS PROVINCES OF ARBIL AND SULAIMANIYAH. EACH FAMILY RECEIVED A SPECIAL FORM IN WHICH IT WAS ASKED TO INDICATE ITS PREFERENCE; AND THE RESULT WAS THAT 48 PERCENT OF THE FAMILIES CHOSE TO LIVE IN THE PROVINCE OF ARBIL WHILE 52 PERCENT PREFERRED SULAIMANIYAH. ALL NEW RESIDENTIAL AREAS FOR THESE FAMILIES HAVE NOW BEEN PREPARED IN THE TWO PROVINCES OF ARBIL AND SULAIMANIYAH.

THE RESETTLEMENT OPERATION FOR THESE TOWNS AND VILLAGES HAS BEEN DELAYED UNTIL AFTER THE STUDENTS THERE HAVE COMPLETED THEIR EXAMS IN MID-JUNE. END TEXT.
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PAGE 01 BAGHDA 03574 01 OF 02 031145Z
ACTION NEA-04

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	INR-07	EUR-00	SS-00	CIAE-00	DODE-00
	H-01	IO-19	NSCE-00	NSAE-00	HA-09	L-03	TRSE-00
	PM-10	PA-02	OMB-01	INRE-00	ACDA-12	USIE-00	SP-02
	SNP-01	PRS-01	DS-01	P-02	T-01	/076 W	

-----073016 031344Z /49-44

R 031142Z JUL 89
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0760
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 03574

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PINS, IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQI DIP NOTE ON BORDER SECURITY ZONE

1. EMBASSY RECEIVED JULY 2 A DIPLOMATIC NOTE FROM THE IRAQI MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS CONFIRMING IRAQ'S POLICY OF CREATION OF A SECURITY ZONE ALONG THE IRAQI BORDER WITH TURKEY AND IRAN WHICH WAS FIRST ANNOUNCED BY THE IRAQI AMBASSADOR TO THE UK ON JUNE 26. TEXT OF DIP NOTE FOLLOWS IN PARA 2. A JULY 1 COMMENTARY WHICH APPEARED IN THE ARABIC LANGUAGE PRESS REVEALING DETAILS OF THE PLAN WAS THE FIRST PUBLIC ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE PLAN IN BAGHDAD.

2. MFA TRANSLATION OF THE TEXT OF THE DIP NOTE:

QUOTE

1. FOLLOWING THE BITTER EXPERIENCE SUFFERED BY OUR TOWNS AND VILLAGES ALONG THE BORDER WITH IRAN THROUGHOUT THE EIGHT YEARS OF THE IRANIAN
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AGGRESSION, AND IN VIEW OF THE BARBARIC BOMBARDMENT AND DESTRUCTION TO WHICH THE POPULATION OF THESE AREAS WERE SUBJECTED AND OF THE ACTS OF TERROR AND BLACKMAIL PERPETRATED AGAINST THEM BY THE TREASONOUS GROUPS OF MERCENARY BANDITS WHO SOLD THEMSELVES TO THE ENEMY, THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT DECIDED TO CREATE A DEPOPULATED STRIP OF LAND, NO MORE THAN 30 KILOMETERS WIDE INSIDE OUR TERRITORY AND ALL ALONG THE 1200 KM BOUNDARY LINES WITH BOTH

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IRAN AND TURKEY. THIS MEASURE IS NOT LIMITED TO THE AUTONOMOUS REGION OF KURDISTAN IN THE NORTH, BUT IS EXTENDED TO THE PROVINCES OF THE MIDLANDS AND THE SOUTH. THE PROVINCES OF BASRAH, MISAN, WASIT, DYALA, SULAIMANIYAH, ARBIL AND DHAWK HAVE ALL BENEFITED FROM THIS PROTECTIVE MEASURE. THE ONLY TWO TOWNSHIPS WHICH HAD TO BE LEFT OUT WERE THE ENTRY-GATES OF KHANAQEEH AND ZAKHO, THE FIRST BEING ON THE IRAQ-IRAN BORDER AND THE SECOND ON THE IRAQ-TURKEY BORDER.

TO FACILITATE THE TRANSFER OF PEOPLE FROM THE AREAS IN WHICH THEY USED TO LIVE IN CONSTANT FEAR AND DANGER TO OTHER MORE SECURE AREAS WHERE THEY COULD RESTORE THEIR NORMAL LIFE, THE GOVERNMENT GRANTED EACH AND EVERY FAMILY THE FOLLOWING BENEFITS:

--A FREE GRANT OF ID 3000 (OVER U.S.\$9,000)
TO URBAN FAMILIES AND ID 1500 (OVER U.S.\$4,500)
TO RURAL FAMILIES.

--FAMILIES DESERVING OF A GREATER COMPENSATION MAY
WELL BE GRANTED A LARGER AMOUNT AT THE
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RECOMMENDATION OF THE SPECIAL COMPENSATION
COMMITTEES SET UP TO SUPERVISE THE OPERATION.

--IN ADDITION TO THIS, EACH AND EVERY FAMILY
HAS BEEN ALLOCATED A PIECE OF LAND WHICH THEY
COULD LIVE ON AND CULTIVATE IN PEACE AND
SAFETY.

2. AS REGARDS THE TOWN OF QAL'AT DIZA AND
THE BASIN SURROUNDING IT, THE FAMILIES THERE
RECEIVED A MUCH GREATER COMPENSATION (MORE
THAN THREE TIMES THE COMPENSATION GIVEN TO THE
FAMILIES OF OTHER PROVINCES IN THE SOUTH, THE
MIDLANDS AND THE NORTHERN AUTONOMOUS REGION).

SUCH ESPECIALLY HIGH COMPENSATION WAS GIVEN BY
THE GOVERNMENT TO THE FAMILIES OF QAL'AT DIZA
AND THE VILLAGES BELONGING TO IT IN APPRECIATION
OF THE PARTICULARLY GREAT SACRIFICES THEY HAD
SUFFERED IN LIFE AND PROPERTY AS A RESULT OF
IRAN'S CONSTANT BOMBARDMENT OF THEIR PARTS
THROUGHOUT THE EIGHT YEARS OF THE WAR, AND OF
THE COURAGE AND DETERMINATION WITH WHICH THEY HAD
FACED THE ACTS OF AGGRESSION PERPETRATED BY THE
IRANIANS AND THE TRAITORS COLLABORATING WITH
THEM. THE COMPENSATION GRANT RECEIVED BY THE

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THIRTEEN THOUSAND AND FIVE HUNDRED URBAN
QAL'AT DIZA FAMILIES AMOUNTED TO ID 10,000
(OVER U.S.\$30,000); WHILE THE ONE THOUSAND
SEVEN HUNDRED AND EIGHTY FAMILIES OF THE RURAL
PARTS RECEIVED EACH A GRANT OF ID 5,000 (OVER
U.S.\$15,000). THE COMPENSATION COMMITTEES

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ACTION NEA-04

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	INR-07	EUR-00	SS-00	CIAE-00	DODE-00
	H-01	IO-19	NSCE-00	NSAE-00	HA-09	L-03	TRSE-00
	PM-10	PA-02	OMB-01	INRE-00	ACDA-12	USIE-00	SP-02
	SNP-01	PRS-01	DS-01	P-02	T-01	/076 W	

-----073015 031344Z /49-44

R 031142Z JUL 89
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0761
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 BAGHDAD 03574

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PINS, IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQI DIP NOTE ON BORDER SECURITY ZONEMAY AGAIN DECIDE THAT A GREATER COMPENSATION
BE GRANTED TO DESERVING FAMILIES.

3. THE PEOPLE OF QAL'AT DIZA AND ITS VILLAGES
WERE GRANTED THE RIGHT TO CHOOSE FOR THEMSELVES
THE PLACE IN WHICH THEY WANTED TO LIVE ANYWHERE
IN THE AUTONOMOUS PROVINCES OF ARBIL AND
SULAIMANIYAH. EACH FAMILY RECEIVED A SPECIAL FORM
IN WHICH IT WAS ASKED TO INDICATE ITS PREFERENCE;
AND THE RESULT WAS THAT 48 PERCENT OF THE
FAMILIES CHOSE TO LIVE IN THE PROVINCE OF ARBIL
WHILE 52 PERCENT PREFERRED SULAIMANIYAH. ALL NEW
RESIDENTIAL AREAS FOR THESE FAMILIES HAVE NOW
BEEN PREPARED IN THE PROVINCES OF ARBIL AND
SULAIMANIYAH.

THE RESETTLEMENT OPERATION FOR THESE TOWNS AND
VILLAGES HAS BEEN DELAYED UNTIL AFTER THE
STUDENTS THERE HAVE COMPLETED THEIR EXAMS IN
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MID-JUNE.

END QUOTE.

3. A COPY OF THE DIP NOTE IS BEING POUCHED TO
NEA/NGA. GLASP&E

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ACTION EUR-00

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-00	INR-07	SS-00	OIC-02	CIAE-00
	EB-00	DODE-00	H-01	IO-19	NEA-06	NSCE-00	NSAE-00
	HA-09	L-03	LAB-04	TRSE-00	PA-01	STR-18	SIL-01
	INRE-00	RP-10	USIE-00	SP-02	SR-06	PRS-01	P-02

/092 W

-----076065 152330Z /63

R 141808Z JUN 89
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9567
INFO AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 12357

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, PREL, IZ, UK
SUBJECT: IRAQI KURDS IN THE UK PRESS, JUNE 14.

1. THE LONDON "TIMES" AND THE "INDEPENDENT" JUNE 14 BOTH REPORTED THAT THE IRAQI ARMY MOVED INTO QALA DIZA MONDAY, JUNE 12 AND BEGAN THE FORCIBLE REMOVAL OF THE INHABITANTS IN MILITARY TRUCKS. BASED ON A MESSAGE ALLEGEDLY RECEIVED FROM KURDISH LEADER JALAL TALABANI, THE DEADLINE FOR THE TOWN TO BE EMPTIED IS SUNDAY, JUNE 18. TALABANI SAID HE DID NOT KNOW IF THERE HAD BEEN BLOODSHED, BUT THE INHABITANTS HAD BARRICADED THEMSELVES IN THEIR HOMES IN PEACEFUL RESISTANCE. THE ARMY HAS ALLEGEDLY RESPONDED BY SENDING IN MORE TROOPS.

2. TALABANI APPEALED TO THE BIG POWERS AND THE UNITED NATIONS TO EXERT PRESSURE ON BAGHDAD TO HALT THE OPERATION. THE PRESS SPECULATED THAT DISCLOSURE OF

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IRAQ'S INTENTIONS IN APRIL TO RELOCATE THE ESTIMATED 100,000 INHABITANTS OF QALA DIZA HAD GIVEN THE TOWN A TEMPORARY REPRIEVE. HARVEY MORRIS OF "THE INDEPENDENT" SAID THE DELAY MIGHT EQUALLY HAVE BEEN THE RESULT OF IRAQI CONCERN ABOUT THE CONTINUED LOYALTY OF THE WELL-ARMED, PRO-GOVERNMENT KURDISH MILITIA, THE JASH, WHICH OPPOSED THE DEPORTATIONS. MORRIS CLAIMED THE GOVERNMENT HAD BEGUN TRANSFERRING THE JASH TO OTHER AREAS OF KURDISTAN BEFORE IMPLEMENTING THE RELOCATION

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3. IN THE JUNE 14 EDITION OF THE "GUARDIAN," NAIEL A.J. HASSAN, THE PRESS COUNSELOR AT THE IRAQI EMBASSY IN LONDON, WHILE ATTEMPTING TO REBUT A JUNE 9 ARTICLE BY HELGA GRAHAM ON THE KURDS' FIGHT FOR AUTONOMY, ADMITTED TO THE RELOCATION OF KURDS, WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS NECESSARY NOT ONLY FROM A SECURITY STANDPOINT, BUT ALSO "AS A MEANS OF PROVIDING A BETTER LIFE FOR IRAQI CITIZENS THROUGH THE PROVISION OF ELECTRICITY, WATER, AND OTHER ESSENTIAL FACILITIES WHICH CONTRIBUTE TOWARDS MODERN LIVING." FULL TEXT IN PARA. 4 BELOW.

4. BEGIN TEXT OF "GUARDIAN" LETTER FROM NAIAL HASSAN.

AUTONOMY AND THE IRAQI KURDS

THE CLAIM BY HELGA GRAHAM (GUARDIAN, JUNE 9) THAT THE IRAQI KURDS WERE FIGHTING FOR AUTONOMY REFLECTS THE GENERAL INACCURACY OF HER ARTICLE.

OUR LAW OF AUTONOMY FOR THE KURDISH REGION OF IRAQ WAS IN FACT PROMULGATED ON MARCH 11, 1974, AND IT CONTAINS SUBSTANTIAL PROVISION FOR KURDISH PARTICIPATION IN THE

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DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES TAKING PLACE IN THE KURDISH AUTONOMOUS REGION AND AT NATIONAL LEVEL.

THE AUTONOMOUS REGION HAS AN ELECTED LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, WITH A KURDISH PUBLISHING HOUSE ENCOURAGING THE PRODUCTION OF BOOKS AND NEWSPAPER IN THE KURDISH LANGUAGE, WHICH IS ALSO A LANGUAGE OF EDUCATION.

THE RESULT HAS BEEN A FLOWERING OF KURDISH CULTURE WHICH MAKES NONSENSE OF UNINFORMED OR MALICIOUS CLAIMS THAT IRAQ IS ATTEMPTING TO SUPPRESS THE KURDISH IDENTITY.

IT IS INTERESTING TO NOTE THAT THE MINORITY OF KURDS UNSUCCESSFULLY TRYING TO REPEAT THE 1974 REVOLT RELY QUITE HEAVILY ON IRAN AND ISRAEL FOR SUPPORT, AND THE IRANIAN KURDS AND PALESTINIANS CAN TESTIFY TO WHAT EXTENT IRAN AND ISRAEL ARE COMMITTED TO JUSTICE.

THE RELOCATION OF SOME OF IRAQI'S KURDS IN THE MOUNTAINOUS REGION BORDERING IRAN IS AN ESSENTIAL SECURITY MEASURE FORCED UPON IRAQ BY THE CONTINUING INSTABILITY IN THE REGION. BUT THIS NEED IS ONLY PART OF THE REASON FOR THE RELOCATION OF PEOPLE AND THE BUILDING OF NEW TOWNS THROUGHOUT IRAQ AS WELL AS IRAQI KURDESTAN. IT IS ALSO A MEANS OF PROVIDING A BETTER LIFE FOR IRAQI CITIZENS THROUGH THE PROVISION OF

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ELECTRICITY, WATER AND OTHER ESSENTIAL FACILITIES WHICH
CONTRIBUTE TOWARDS MODERN LIVING.

THE LAW OF AUTONOMY ENSURES THAT THE AUTONOMOUS REGION
REMAINS THE HOMELAND OF THE IRAQI KURDS AND MANY NEW
TOWNS ARE BEING BUILT THERE.

IT IS A PITY THAT YOUR ARTICLE HAS ATTEMPTED TO REVIVE
THE MYTH OF IRAQ'S USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AGAINST THE
KURDS BECAUSE THE UN'S REJECTION OF THIS CHARGE SUGGESTS

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THAT IT SHOULD BE DROPPED. THE MYTH OF AN IRAQI

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INFO AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD

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E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, PREL, IZ, UK
SUBJECT: IRAQI KURDS IN THE UK PRESS, JUNE 14.

SUPPRESSION IS REBUTTED BY THE EXISTENCE OF THE KURDISH
AUTONOMOUS REGION, THE KURDISH VICE-PRESIDENT OF IRAQ
AND SEVERAL KURDISH MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL CABINET.

IRAQI'S KURDS WILL CONTINUE TO PARTICIPATE IN AND
BENEFIT FROM, ALONG WITH ALL IRAQIS, THE DEVELOPMENTS
NOW TAKING PLACE IN IRAQ. END TEXT.

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P 121604Z JUN 89
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9448
INFO AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY
AMCONSUL ADANA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

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SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 12134

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, PREL, IZ, UK
SUBJECT: MORE ON IRAQI KURDS

REF: BAGHDAD 3146

1. THE BRITISH PRESS CONTINUES TO ALLEGE FORCED RELOCATION OF KURDS, THIS TIME OF 17,000 INHABITANTS FROM THE TOWNS OF SENGESER AND DEGALA. IN A JUNE 12 ARTICLE IN THE LONDON "TIMES" (FULL TEXT PARA. 3 BELOW), HAZHIR TEIMOURIAN -- CITING THE PATRIOTIC UNION OF KURDISTAN AND AN UNNAMED IRAQI VISITOR TO LONDON AS HIS SOURCES -- ALLEGED THAT ALL 2,400 HOUSES IN SENGESER WERE RAZED FOLLOWING THE FORCED DEPORTATIONS. HE REPORTED THAT RELOCATION OF THE 100,000 INHABITANTS OF QALA DIZA WAS EXPECTED TO BE COMPLETED BY JUNE 18 AND THAT A PROGRAM OF ARAB "COLONIZATION" -- WHEREBY ONLY ARABS COULD BUY OR BUILD HOUSES -- WAS UNDERWAY IN THE TOWN OF KOI SANJAQ.

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2. IN A SEPARATE REPORT APPEARING IN THE LONDON "OBSERVER" JUNE 11, HELGA GRAHAM ALLEGED THAT 3,000 KURDISH REFUGEES BECAME GRAVELY ILL OVER THE WEEKEND AFTER EATING POISONED BREAD IN THE TURKISH CAMP OF MARDIN. CITING UNNAMED KURDISH SPOKESMEN IN THE CAMP, THE OBSERVER SAID IT IS BELIEVED THE IRAQI INTELLIGENCE IS TO BLAME AND NOTED THAT "THE USE OF POISON AGAINST POLITICAL OPPONENTS IS A FAMILIAR TACTIC OF PRESIDENT

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SADDAM HUSSEIN'S REGIME." THE REPORT ALLEGED THAT IRAQ'S DEPUTY INTERIOR MINISTER AND THE IRAQI AMBASSADOR TO ANKARA VISITED THE CAMP THREE WEEKS AGO TO PERSUADE THE KURDS TO RETURN. THE KURDS SAY THE POISONING MAY BE THE REGIME'S REVENGE FOR THE REFUGEES REFUSAL TO RETURN.

3. BEGIN TEXT:

PLIGHT OF THE KURDS --
MORE TOWNS ARE EMPTIED BY IRAQ

BY HAZHIR TEIMOURIAN

IRAQ, LAST WEEK, DEPORTED THE KURDISH INHABITANTS OF TWO MORE SMALL TOWNS IN THE NORTH OF THE COUNTRY AND BEGAN A PROGRAM FOR COLONIZING ANOTHER WITH ARABS.

THE NEXT STEP BY IRAQ, WHICH HAS BEEN ACCUSED OF TRYING TO DESTROY THE KURDISH MINORITY OF FOUR MILLION PEOPLE AS A SEPARATE ENTITY, IS EXPECTED TO BE THE DEPORTATION OF THE TOWN OF QALA DIZA, WITH AN ESTIMATED POPULATION OF 100,000, TO BE COMPLETED BY JUNE 18.

THE PATRIOTIC UNION OF KURDISTAN, ONE OF THE TWO MAIN POLITICAL PARTIES OF THE KURDS AND A RELIABLE SOURCE OF

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PAGE 03 LONDON 12134 01 OF 02 121607Z

INFORMATION IN THE PAST, AND ALSO AN IRAQI VISITOR TO LONDON, ALLEGED THAT SOME 17,000 INHABITANTS OF THE TOWNS OF SENGESER AND DEGALA WERE TRUCKED TO CAMPS NEAR THE KURDISH CITY OF ARBIL.

ALL THE 2,400 HOUSES IN SENGESER WERE REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN RAZED IMMEDIATELY AFTERWARDS AND THE TOWN'S ORCHARDS BURNT.

REPORTS FROM QALA DIZA SAID THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAD TOLD THE INHABITANTS THAT BEFORE THE DEADLINE OF JUNE 18 THEY COULD MIGRATE TO ANY DESTINATION INSIDE IRAQ THEY CHOSE. MORE THAN 1,000 WELL-TO-DO FAMILIES HAD ALREADY DONE SO, BUT THE BULK OF THE POPULATION, ESTIMATED AT 20,000 FAMILIES, HAD DECIDED THAT IT DID NOT HAVE THE MEANS TO GO ELSEWHERE.

THE TOWN'S PRAYER LEADER, IMAN MUHAMMAD DELGAIL, WHO WENT TO BAGHDAD IN APRIL TO PLEAD FOR A CHANGE OF HEART BY PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN, REMAINS IN DETENTION WITH HIS FAMILY UNABLE TO CONTACT HIM.

THE PATRIOTIC UNION ALSO CLAIMED THAT THE GOVERNOR AND THE MILITARY COMMANDER OF THE TOWN OF KOI SANJAQ HAD BEEN ORDERED TO FORBID THE SALE OF HOUSES BY KURDS THERE TO ONE ANOTHER. FROM NOW ON, ONLY ARABS COULD BUY

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HOUSES OR BUILD NEW ONES IN THE TOWN. IF TRUE, THE POLICY WOULD APPEAR TO BE SIMILAR TO THE ONE ADOPTED IN THE FORMER KURDISH CITY OF KIRKUK IN THE 1970'S.

A LARGE ARAB COLONY, IT IS SAID, WOULD SOON BE ESTABLISHED IN THE TOWN, WHOSE HOUSES HAVE BEEN BOUGHT FROM KURDS AT PRICES SUBSIDIZED BY THE GOVERNMENT.

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E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PHUM, PREL, IZ, UK

SUBJECT: MORE ON IRAQI KURDS

KOI SANJAG IS SOME 45 MILES FROM THE IRANIAN BORDER AND
FELL NEITHER TO THE KURDS NOR THE IRANIANS IN THE GULF
WAR. IT IS NOT PART OF THE SECURITY BELT ALONG THE
BORDER WITH IRAN WHICH HAS BEEN DEPOPULATED, ALLEGEDLY
TO SAVE ITS INHABITANTS FROM IRANIAN ARTILLERY.

THE KURDS FEAR THAT THE CAMPS INSIDE IRAQI KURDISTAN, TO
WHICH THE DEPORTEES ARE TAKEN, ARE ONLY TRANSIT CAMPS
AND THAT THE DEPORTEES WILL END UP IN THE SOUTHERN
DESERT BORDERING KUWAIT AND SAUDI ARABIA IN WHICH THEY
COULD NOT SURVIVE.

'IN THE SO-CALLED CLUSTER VILLAGES THAT THE GOVERNMENT
HAS BUILT FOR THE DEPORTEES INSIDE KURDISTAN,' SAID A
MAN FROM QALA DIZA IN LONDON YESTERDAY, 'THE DEPORTEES

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HAVE NO EMPLOYMENT AND NO FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT. THE
GOVERNMENT CAN DO TO THEM WHATEVER THEY LIKE.'

SOME 10,000 KURDISH CIVILIANS DIED IN IRAQ LAST YEAR AS
A RESULT OF POISON GAS ATTACKS BY THE GOVERNMENT ARMY,
AND AN ESTIMATED 3,000 VILLAGES HAVE BEEN RAZED IN THE
PAST DECADE.

ARBIL: A SENIOR IRAQI OFFICIAL HAS DENIED CLAIMS BY

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KURDISH OPPOSITION GROUPS THAT THE GOVERNMENT IS
FORCIBLY RESETTLING KURDS OUTSIDE THEIR TRADITIONAL
MOUNTAIN HOMELAND IN AN EFFORT TO CRUSH THEIR SEPARATIST
MOVEMENT (AP REPORTS).

HE SAID KURDISH VILLAGERS WERE BEING RELOCATED AS PART
OF A GOVERNMENT PROJECT TO DEVELOP THE AREA AFTER 'LONG
YEARS OF BACKWARDNESS.' END TEXT.

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APPROVED BY: IO:PEASTMAN

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TAGS: UNHRC-1, PREL, IZ

SUBJ: 45TH UN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION: CONFIDENTIAL

COMMUNICATIONS UNDER ECOSOC RESOLUTION 1503

REF: GENEVA 13224 (NOTAL)

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THIS IS AN ACTION MESSAGE - SEE PARAGRAPH 5.

3. AT ITS FEBRUARY-MARCH 1989 SESSION, THE UN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (UNHRC) WILL CONSIDER THE REPORT OF THE
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SUBCOMMISSION ON SITUATIONS WHICH "APPEAR TO REVEAL A CONSISTENT PATTERN OF GROSS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS, AS PROVIDED IN COMMISSION RESOLUTION 8 (XXIII) AND ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 1235 (XLII) AND 1503 (XLVIII)" PER REFTEL.

4. ALONG WITH SEVERAL OTHERS, YOUR HOST GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN INFORMED BY THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS CENTER THAT THESE ALLEGATIONS WILL BE CONSIDERED BY THE UNHRC AND HAS BEEN

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ASKED TO RESPOND IN ADVANCE OF THE SESSION. THE

COMMISSION WILL DETERMINE WHETHER, ON THE BASIS OF THESE COMPLAINTS FROM NGO'S AND INDIVIDUALS, THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN YOUR HOST COUNTRY REQUIRES SOME FORM OF CONTINUED ACTION ON ITS PART. THE DEPARTMENT IS IN THE PROCESS OF DEVELOPING VOTING INSTRUCTIONS FOR USDEL ON WHETHER OR NOT THESE ALLEGATIONS WARRANT CONTINUED OVERSIGHT BY THE COMMISSION. WE DO NOT YET KNOW THE PRECISE TEXT OF THE COMMISSION'S RESOLUTIONS WHICH WILL BE BASED ON ITS CONSIDERATION OF THE VARIOUS ALLEGATIONS. THE COMMISSION WILL ACT IN CLOSED SESSION DURING ITS FEBRUARY-MARCH MEETING.

5. THE UNHRC WILL CONSIDER TWO COMMUNICATIONS (NOS. 88/5/2,286 AND 88/5/2,311) CONCERNING ALLEGED HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN IRAQ. THE SUBSTANCE OF THESE COMPLAINTS IS QUOTED BELOW FROM UN SUMMARIES. DEPARTMENT REQUESTS ANY BACKGROUND POST HAS ON THE ALLEGATIONS WHICH WOULD ALLOW US TO EVALUATE THEIR VALIDITY. (IF EMBASSY REPORTS HAVE ALREADY COVERED THESE ISSUES, PLEASE CITE REFERENCE NUMBERS.) DEPARTMENT ALSO REQUESTS POST TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ PLANS TO RESPOND TO THE ALLEGATIONS AND IF SO, IN WHAT MANNER. RESPONSES

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SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED AS PART OF THE ONGOING HUMAN RIGHTS DIALOGUE.

BEGIN QUOTE FROM UN CONFIDENTIAL SUMMARY (PARAGRAPHS ADDED): 88/5/2,286. COMMUNICATION DATED 29 MARCH 1988 FROM THE KURDISH COMMUNITY IN THE NETHERLANDS, ALLEGING MASS KILLINGS WITH CHEMICAL WEAPONS, THE USE OF TORTURE AND FORCED RELOCATION OF MEMBERS OF THE KURDISH ETHNIC COMMUNITY BY THE AUTHORITIES IN IRAQ AND SEEKING UNITED NATIONS INTERCESSION IN THIS CONNECTION.

IT IS ALLEGED THAT SINCE APRIL 1987 THE IRAQI ARMED FORCES HAVE CARRIED OUT ATTACKS USING CHEMICAL WEAPONS AGAINST 28 KURDISH VILLAGES AND SETTLEMENTS IN THE PROVINCES OF ERBIL, SULAYMANIA AND DAHOK WHICH ARE SAID TO HAVE RESULTED IN THE DEATHS OF OVER 130 CIVILIANS AND THE WOUNDING OF MORE THAN 350, MOSTLY WOMEN AND CHILDREN. THE MOST RECENT ATTACK IN 1988 ON THE TOWN OF HALABJA HAS REPORTEDLY CAUSED THE DEATH OF BETWEEN 5,000 AND 7,000 PERSONS.

IT IS FURTHER ALLEGED THAT SINCE 1970 THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ HAS CARRIED OUT A POLICY OF FORCED RELOCATION OF THE KURDISH POPULATION AND THE DESTRUCTION OF KURDISH VILLAGES. BETWEEN 1975 AND 1979 OVER 2,000 VILLAGES ARE SAID TO HAVE BEEN DESTROYED ALONG THE NORTHERN AND

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EASTERN BORDERS WITH TURKEY AND IRAN AND APPROXIMATELY

300,000 PERSONS DISPLACED INTO REFUGEE CAMPS IN SOUTHWESTERN IRAQ. SINCE APRIL 1987 OVER 700 KURDISH VILLAGES HAVE REPORTEDLY BEEN DESTROYED, DISPLACING OVER 140,000 KURDS. DURING THEIR EXPULSION, THESE PERSONS ARE SAID TO HAVE BEEN SUBJECTED TO TORTURE AND OTHER FORMS OF ILL TREATMENT.

88/5/2,311. COMMUNICATION DATED 6 MAY 1988 FROM AMNESTY

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INTERNATIONAL ALLEGING THE GROSS AND FLAGRANT VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN IRAQ, MENTIONING IN PARTICULAR SUMMARY EXECUTIONS, DISAPPEARANCES, TORTURE, ARBITRARY ARRESTS AND UNFAIR TRIALS AND REQUESTING THE UNITED NATIONS TO TAKE ALL STEPS WHICH IT DEEMS APPROPRIATE TO REDRESS THESE VIOLATIONS. IN SUBSTANTIATION OF ITS ALLEGATIONS THE ORGANIZATION SUBMITS A 13-PAGE REPORT WITH THREE APPENDICES TOTTALLING 53 PAGES.

IT IS REPORTED THAT HUNDREDS OF PERSONS HAVE BEEN DETAINED IN IRAQ BECAUSE THEIR POLITICAL OPINIONS WITHOUT BEING INFORMED OF THE REASON FOR THEIR ARREST AND WITH NO LEGAL BASIS FOR THEIR DETENTION. SUCH PERSONS ARE SAID TO HAVE OFTEN BEEN HELD INCOMMUNICADO FOR PROLONGED PERIODS WITHOUT ACCESS TO A LAWYER, RELATIVES OR A DOCTOR AND MANY HAVE ALLEGEDLY BEEN SENTENCED TO SEVERE TERMS OF IMPRISONMENT, INCLUDING THE DEATH PENALTY, FOLLOWING SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS. IT IS DURING THE PROLONGED PERIOD OF INCOMMUNICADO DETENTION THAT DETAINEES, INCLUDING CHILDREN HAVE REPORTEDLY DISAPPEARED.

IN LATE 1985, 300 KURDISH CHILDREN AND YOUTHS FROM THE PROVINCE OF SULAIMANIYA WERE REPORTEDLY ARRESTED AS HOSTAGES IN RETALIATION FOR THE POLITICAL ACTIVITIES OF MEMBERS OF THEIR FAMILIES. AT LEAST 29 OF THEM ARE SAID TO HAVE BEEN SUMMARILY EXECUTED WITHOUT TRIAL IN EARLY JANUARY 1987 AND THE FATE OF OVER 250 OTHERS WHO DISAPPEARED IS SAID TO REMAIN UNKNOWN, AS DOES THE FATE OF 8,000 MEMBERS OF THE BARZANI TRIBE ARRESTED IN AUGUST 1983 BY IRAQI SECURITY FORCES, REPORTEDLY ON SUSPICION OF HAVING POLITICAL LINKS WITH THE KURDISTAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY. CONCERN IS EXPRESSED THAT MANY OF THESE PERSONS HAVE BEEN EXECUTED.

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TORTURE AND ILL-TREATMENT OF DETAINEES IN THE CUSTODY OF

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THE SECURITY FORCES IS SAID TO BE SYSTEMATIC. VICTIMS REPORTEDLY INCLUDE POLITICAL PRISONERS, WHO ARE SAID TO BE SUBJECTED TO TORTURE IN ORDER TO FORCE THEM TO SIGN CONFESSIONS OR TO RENOUNCE THEIR POLITICAL AFFILIATION, AS WELL AS RELATIVES, INCLUDING CHILDREN, OF SUSPECTED GOVERNMENT OPPONENTS BEING SOUGHT BY THE AUTHORITIES.

THE METHODS OF TORTURE ARE SAID TO BE PARTICULARLY BRUTAL AND SOME DETAINEES HAVE REPORTEDLY DIED IN DETENTION AS A RESULT OF SUCH TORTURE OR HAVE BEEN LEFT PHYSICALLY OR MENTALLY MARKED FOR LIFE. IN SUBSTANTIATION OF THE ALLEGATIONS OF TORTURE, APPENDIX III CONTAINS A DESCRIPTION OF DIFFERENT METHODS USED AS WELL AS INDIVIDUAL TESTIMONIES.

IT IS FURTHER ALLEGED THAT HUNDREDS OF SUMMARY EXECUTIONS TAKE PLACE IN IRAQ EACH YEAR, WITH MANY OF THE VICTIMS SAID TO BE EXECUTED WITHOUT TRIAL OR AFTER SUMMARY TRIALS BY REVOLUTIONARY COURTS WITH PROCEDURES WHICH REPORTEDLY HAVE NOT MET INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS. MOST TRIALS HAVE ALLEGEDLY BEEN HELD IN CAMERA AND ACCESS TO A LAWYER, OFTEN SAID TO BE APPOINTED BY THE GOVERNMENT, IS SAID TO CONTINUE TO BE SEVERELY RESTRICTED AND IN SOME INSTANCES TO HAVE BEEN CONFINED TO THE DAY OF THE TRIAL ONLY. CONFESSIONS EXTRACTED UNDER TORTURE HAVE REPORTEDLY BEEN FREQUENTLY USED AS A BASIS FOR CONVICTIONS. SENTENCES PASSED BY A REVOLUTIONARY COURT, INCLUDING DEATH SENTENCES ARE SAID TO BE FINAL AND CANNOT BE APPEALED AGAINST TO A HIGHER JUDICIAL BODY.

IT IS STATED THAT A NUMBER OF LAWS AND RESOLUTIONS (APPENDIX I ENUMERATES THEM IN DETAIL) ADOPTED IN THE PAST FEW YEARS IN IRAQ, HAVE INTRODUCED THE DEATH PENALTY FOR CERTAIN NON-VIOLENT POLITICAL OFFENCES AND AS A

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RESULT THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF THOUGHT, THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF OPINION AND THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION HAVE BEEN SEVERELY RESTRICTED. THESE OFFENCES INCLUDE IN PARTICULAR POLITICAL ACTIVITIES IN THE ARMED FORCES DEEMED TO BE DETRIMENTAL TO THE RULING PARTY, THE BAATH PARTY. AT LEAST ONE OF THESE RESOLUTIONS, WHICH REPORTEDLY INTRODUCED THE DEATH PENALTY FOR MEMBERSHIP OF, OR AFFILIATION TO, AL-DAWAAL-ISLAMIYYA (AN OPPOSITION POLITICAL PARTY) IS SAID TO HAVE RETROACTIVE APPLICATION (RESOLUTION NO. 461 OF 31 MARCH 1980).

VICTIMS OF ARBITRARY EXECUTIONS HAVE REPORTEDLY INCLUDED MEMBERS OF BANNED POLITICAL PARTIES, SUSPECTED OPPONENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT, STUDENTS, ARMY DESERTERS AND CIVILIANS ARRESTED AS HOSTAGES, INCLUDING RELATIVES AND CHILDREN OF

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SUSPECTED GOVERNMENT OPPONENTS. IT IS FURTHER REPORTED THAT PRISONERS HAVE ALSO BEEN THE VICTIMS OF DELIBERATE KILLINGS CARRIED OUT BY THE AUTHORITIES.

FOR EXAMPLE, BETWEEN AUGUST AND NOVEMBER 1985 LARGE NUMBERS OF POLITICAL PRISONERS AND ARMY DESERTERS WERE

REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN EXECUTED IN ABU GHRAIB AND MOSUL PRISONERS, INCLUDING 60 PRISONERS REPORTEDLY EXECUTED ON ABU GHRAIB PRISON IN BAGDAD IN THE FIRST WEEK OF NOVEMBER 1985 ALONE. ON 30 AND 31 DECEMBER 1987 MORE THAN 150 PRISONERS, INCLUDING MINORS AGED BETWEEN 14 AND 17 YEAR OLD, WERE REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN EXECUTED BY FIRING SQUAD IN ABU GHRAIB PRISON, INCLUDING SOME OF WHOM HAD BEEN SENTENCED TO TERMS OF IMPRISONMENT. APPENDIX II CONTAINS THE NAMES AND DETAILS OF THESE VICTIMS. MEMBERS OF THE KURDISH OPPOSITION GROUPS AND THEIR RELATIVES HAVE

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REPORTEDLY ALSO BEEN SUMMARILY EXECUTED.

FOR EXAMPLE, IT IS REPORTED THAT AS MANY AS 360 PEOPLE WERE SUMMARILY EXECUTED IN SEPARATE INCIDENTS IN NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER 1987; THE MAJORITY OF THE KNOWN VICTIMS ARE SAID TO HAVE BEEN KURDISH POLITICAL PRISONERS AND TO HAVE INCLUDED 17 CHILDREN BETWEEN 14 AND 17 YEARS OLD. IN ONE INCIDENT ON 11 NOVEMBER 1987 BETWEEN 100 AND 150 KURDS WERE REPORTEDLY SUMMARILY EXECUTED BY THE ARMED FORCES FOLLOWING HOUSE-TO-HOUSE SEARCHES AND AT LEAST 40 KURDISH OPPONENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT WERE REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN PRISONED IN SEPARATE INCIDENTS BY THE SECURITY FORCES IN LATE 1987 WITH THALLIUM, SAID TO BE COMMONLY USED AS A RAT POISON. END QUOTE. SHULTZ

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, UNSC, IR, IZ

SUBJECT: ASSISTANT SECRETARY MURPHY'S 9/12 MEETING WITH
IRAQI AMBASSADOR

1. CONFIDENTIAL ENTIRE TEXT.

2. IRAQI AMBASSADOR AL-ANBARI CALLED ON ASSISTANT
SECRETARY MURPHY AT ANBARI'S URGENT REQUEST 9/12. POPE,
NEA/NGA, SAT IN.3. IN RESPONSE TO MURPHY'S QUESTION, ANBARI SAID HE
THOUGHT IRAQ WOULD AGREE TO THE COMPROMISE PROPOSAL ON
VENUE FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH IRAN UNDER U.N. AUSPICES
INVOLVING A MEETING IN NEW YORK FOLLOWED BY A RETURN TO
GENEVA. MURPHY WELCOMED THIS. SUBSEQUENTLY, POPE
REITERATED TO ANBARI THAT WE HOPED IRAQ WOULD ACCEPT THE
COMPROMISE, FOLLOWING OUR COMMITMENT TO THE SYG THAT WE
WOULD WEIGH IN. THE REMAINDER OF THE MEETING FOCUSSED ON
IRAQI CHEMICAL WEAPONS USE.

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4. ANBARI SAID HE WAS VERY WORRIED ABOUT THE COURSE OF
U.S.-IRAQI RELATIONS, AND HAD INSTRUCTIONS TO CONVEY A
QUESTION TO MURPHY FROM FOREIGN MINISTER TAPIC AZIZ: DID
WE WANT TO DESTROY THE U.S.-IRAQI RELATIONSHIP? THIS WAS
THE ONLY LOGICAL EXPLANATION IRAQ COULD FIND FOR THE U.S.
CONDEMNATION OF IRAQ FOR CW USE, FOLLOWED BY THE ADOPTION
OF THE PELL BILL IN THE SENATE, AND OUR EFFORTS IN THE
SECURITY COUNCIL TO CONDEMN IRAQ. WHAT WAS THE TRUTH?

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IRAQ NEEDED TO KNOW. WE WOULD FIND THAT IRAQ WAS NOT ISOLATED IN THE ARAB WORLD LIKE LIBYA OR SYRIA.

4. IN RESPONSE MURPHY SAID THAT AS THE SECRETARY HAD TOLD MINISTER OF STATE HAMMADI WE WANTED TO CONTINUE TO DEVELOP OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS. THERE WAS NO ORCHESTRATED CAMPAIGN. OUR ACTIONS AND THOSE OF THE CONGRESS NEEDED TO BE SEEN AS EXPRESSIONS OF OUR TRADITIONAL CONCERN AS A NATION OVER CW USE DATING BACK TO THE ADOPTION OF THE GENEVA PROTOCOL OF 1925 AND THE HORROR OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR. THAT WAS THE SOLE EXPLANATION FOR THE TENSION WHICH HAD ARISEN IN OUR RELATIONSHIP. CW USE EVOKED A PARTICULAR REVULSION FOR US. IF WE DID NOT HAVE PROOF IRAQ HAD USED IT AGAINST THE KURDS WE WOULD NOT HAVE SPOKEN AS WE DID. WE DO NOT MAKE SUCH STATEMENTS LIGHTLY. WE WERE VERY CONCERNED ABOUT PROLIFERATION AS A RESULT OF THE WAR AND THE FACT THAT OTHER NATIONS WERE DEVELOPING A CHEMICAL CAPABILITY. WE HAD DISCUSSED THE ISSUE REPEATEDLY WITH IRAQ, AND WE HAD SPOKEN OUT PUBLICLY, BUT USE OF CW HAD NOT STOPPED. NOW THE ISSUE HAD BECOME A MAJOR IMPEDIMENT TO OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS. IT WAS AS SIMPLE AS THAT.

5. WITH REGARD TO THE PELL BILL, MURPHY SAID, WE
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BELIEVED IT WAS INACCURATE IN ITS USE OF THE TERM GENOCIDE AND STATEMENT OF THE FACTS. WE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THE SWEEPING SANCTIONS PROPOSED WERE THE WAY TO ACHIEVE THE OBJECTIVE, AND WERE MAKING THIS CLEAR ON THE HOUSE SIDE. BUT MURPHY SAID IRAQ SHOULD BE REALISTIC. THERE WOULD BE SOME CONGRESSIONAL ACTION.

6. MURPHY SAID THAT IRAQ SHOULD NOT IMAGINE THAT THIS WAS PART OF A PLAN TO CUT IRAQ DOWN TO SIZE. WE HAD A STRONG SELF-INTEREST IN GOOD RELATIONS WITH IRAQ, AND IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF OUR ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP. MORE NORMAL RELATIONS WITH IRAN, IF THEY CAME, WOULD NOT BE AT THE EXPENSE OF IRAQ. WE WANTED BETTER RELATIONS WITH IRAQ, WHICH WAS A MAJOR REGIONAL POWER. THERE WAS NO PLOT. OUR ACTIONS SHOULD BE SEEN AS PART OF OUR GLOBAL AND OVERRIDING CONCERN OVER CHEMICAL WEAPONS.

7. ANBARI ASKED ABOUT THE SECURITY COUNCIL, INDICATING THAT IRAQ HAD HEARD FROM THE SOVIETS THAT THE U.S. WAS TAKING THE LEAD TO SEEK SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION AGAINST IRAQ. POPE SAID THAT THIS WAS A MISREPRESENTATION.

HAVING NOTED IRAQ'S STATED WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT INDEPENDENT OBSERVERS, WE WERE CONSULTING WITH OTHERS AND THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO URGE THAT THE UN CONSIDER ASKING IF IRAQ WOULD AGREE TO THE VISIT OF A UN TEAM. ANBARI

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SAID HE WAS PLEASED TO HEAR THIS. ANBARI MAINTAINED THAT IN RECENT DAYS SOME 12,000 KURDS HAD TAKEN ADVANTAGE OF THE AMNESTY OFFER AND HAD RETURNED TO IRAQ FROM TURKEY. HE DENIED THAT IRAQ HAD A PLAN TO DEPOPULATE KURDISTAN OR TO RESETTLE MASS NUMBERS OF KURDS. ANBARI WONDERED ALOUD IF IT WOULD HELP IF IRAQ INVITED OFFICERS FROM EMBASSY BAGHDAD TO VISIT KURDISTAN AND SEE FOR THEMSELVES. MURPHY SAID THAT HE DID NOT THINK WE WOULD TURN DOWN SUCH AN OFFER, BUT WONDERED WHETHER IRAQ MIGHT NOT BE WELL ADVISED TO INVITE OTHER EMBASSIES TO SEND REPRESENTATIVES

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O 141418Z SEP 88
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8198
INFO GULFWAR COLLECTIVE
DIA WASHDC

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, PHUM, IZ, TU
SUBJECT: JOURNALIST TRAVELS TO TURKISH AND
IRAQI KURDISTAN

2. SUMMARY: JOURNALIST WHO HAS MADE UNIQUE TRIP IN BOTH TURKISH AND IRAQI KURDISTAN IS "PERSONALLY CONVINCED" OF IRAQI USE OF LETHAL CHEMICAL WARFARE BUT DOUBTS THAT IT WAS EXTENSIVELY USED AND IS PERPLEXED THAT TURKISH DOCTORS UNIFORMLY HAVE DENIED SEEING EVIDENCE OF ITS USE. ACCORDING TO THIS JOURNALIST, THE IRAQI CAMPAIGN AGAINST BARZANI SEEMS TO HAVE BEGUN IN EARLY AUGUST WITH AN AIR ATTACK ON BARZANI HEADQUARTERS, BUT THE MAIN PART OF OPERATION WAS IN AUGUST 23-25 TIMEFRAME, WHEN THE BULK OF REFUGEES MOVED. VILLAGES ARE BEING DESTROYED JUST EAST OF AMADIYYA; THEREFORE, THE EXTENT OF IRAQI CONTROL OF NORTHERN KURDISTAN BEFORE THE RECENT CAMPAIGN WAS MUCH LESS THAN WE HAD PREVIOUSLY THOUGHT. WHAT IS OCCURRING IS NOT GENOCIDE; IT

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IS RATHER THE LATEST PHASE OF A PROCESS OF MASSIVE
FORCIBLE RELOCATION THAT BEGAN IN APRIL 1987.
END SUMMARY.

3. A WESTERN JOURNALIST FROM A MAJOR NEWSPAPER WHO HAS A CONSIDERABLE DEPTH OF EXPERIENCE IN THE REGION HAS PROVIDED US WITH AN ACCOUNT OF A UNIQUE AND EXTRAORDINARY JOURNEY THAT TOOK HER NOT ONLY THROUGH

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TURKISH KURDISTAN BUT ALSO ON A ONE-DAY TRIP--NOT APPROVED BY THE IRAQI AUTHORITIES--ON SEPTEMBER 13 TWENTY MILES EAST OF AMADIYYA. (AMADIYYA LIES ACROSS TWO EAST/WEST MAJOR MOUNTAIN CHAINS FIFTEEN MILES SOUTHWEST OF CUKURCA, THE TURKISH BORDER TOWN WHERE THE GREATER ZAB FLOWS INTO IRAQ AND WHICH HAS BEEN A MAJOR ENTRY POINT FOR REFUGEES.) WHILE WE CANNOT VOUCH FOR THE JOURNALIST'S ACCOUNT, WE HAVE NO REASON TO DOUBT HER VERACITY, BASED ON PREVIOUS CONVERSATIONS WITH HER.

4. JOURNALIST WENT BY HIRED CAR TO CUKURCA AND THENCE TWENTY MILES EAST ALONG THE IRAQI BORDER TO UZUNDERE, IN TURKEY, ANOTHER MAJOR ENTRY POINT FOR REFUGEES. AT UZUNDERE SHE ASKED TO SEE VICTIMS OF CHEMICAL WARFARE AMONG THE TEN THOUSAND REFUGEES; TWENTY WERE BROUGHT BEFORE HER. ALL DISPLAYED BLISTERING BUT THE ONLY VERY SERIOUS CASE WAS A MAN WITH "SERIOUS BURNS AND BLISTERS" OVER ALL THE EXPOSED PARTS OF HIS BODY (BUT NOT ON CLOTHED PARTS OF THE BODY). HE SAID HE WAS A GUERRILLA WHO HAD COME TO UZUNDERE FROM "LAKH 1" JUST ACROSS THE BORDER FROM UZUNDERE IN IRAQ (AND WHERE WE UNDER-
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STAND THAT BARZANI HAD HAD HIS HEADQUARTERS). HE SAID THAT THE IRAQI OPERATION HAD BEGUN THERE WITH AN AIR BLITZ IN EARLY AUGUST, WHICH HAD INVOLVED DROPPING "CHEMICAL BOMBS THAT KILLED MANY PEOPLE." THE OTHER VICTIMS THAT THIS JOURNALIST SAW IN UZUNDERE, ALL WITH RELATIVELY MINOR BURNS/BLISTERS, SAID THAT THEY CAME FROM THE "AMADIYYA AREA" (I.E., MUCH FURTHER WEST THAN LAKH 1) AND THAT THEY HAD BEEN ATTACKED BY "HELICOPTERS USING SPRAY" IN THE AUGUST 23-25 TIMEFRAME.

5. THE JOURNALIST SAW REFUGEES AT YUKSEKOVA WHO HAD BEEN MOVED FROM THE BORDER AREA; THEY SPOKE OF "CHEMICAL ATTACKS" IN THE AUGUST 23-25 TIMEFRAME BUT NO VICTIMS WERE PRESENTED TO HER. SHE ALSO TRAVELED TO SEMDINLI AND ALAN JUST AT THE IRAN-IRAQ-TURKEY TRIPOINT BUT THIS FAR-EASTERN ZONE DID NOT APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN THE LOCUS OF ANY SIGNIFICANT MOVEMENT OF REFUGEES. THE TURKS AT ALAN, HOWEVER, CLAIMED THAT "GAS" HAD COME OVER THE BORDER AND KILLED BEES.

6. THE JOURNALIST TALKED TO A NUMBER OF TURKISH DOCTORS AND MEDICAL OFFICIALS. IN EVERY CASE THEY

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INSISTED THAT NEITHER THEY NOR ANY MEDICAL AUTHORITIES WITH WHOM THEY HAD BEEN IN TOUCH HAD FOUND EVIDENCE THAT WOULD INDICATE THAT REFUGEES HAD BEEN EXPOSED TO CHEMICAL WARFARE. (UNFORTUNATELY, THE JOURNALIST DID NOT BRING THE DOCTOR AT UZUNDERE TO THE ONE BADLY-BURNED CASE SHE SAW TO INQUIRE

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ACTION NEA-11

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	INR-10	EUR-00	SS-00	CIAE-00	H-01
	IO-19	NSCE-00	NSAE-00	SSO-00	HA-09	L-03	TRSE-00
	PM-10	PA-01	OMB-01	INRE-00	ACDA-12	USIE-00	SP-02
	SNP-01	C-01	PRS-01	DS-01	P-02	T-01	/086 W

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INFO GULFWAR COLLECTIVE
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~~C O N F I D E N T I A~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 BAGHDAD 05049

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, PHUM, IZ, TU
SUBJECT: JOURNALIST TRAVELS TO TURKISH AND

WHAT HE MIGHT HAVE SUFFERED FROM, IF NOT CHEMICAL EXPOSURE.) THE JOURNALIST ADMITTED THAT THIS UNIFORMITY OF OPINION AMONG THE TURKISH DOCTORS WAS THE SINGLE FACTOR THAT MOST TROUBLED HER IN HER "PERSONAL CONVICTION" THAT THE IRAQIS HAD USED CHEMICAL WARFARE, ESPECIALLY AT LAKH 1. SHE HAD CONCLUDED THAT, IN ANY CASE, THE IRAQIS HAD "NOT EXTENSIVELY USED" CHEMICAL WARFARE.

7. BY CHANCE THE JOURNALIST HAD A VALID IRAQI VISA AND SHE HAD BEEN TOLD THAT THE IRAQIS PLANNED TO TAKE ASSEMBLED JOURNALISTS TO THE NORTH THIS WEEK. SO SHE TOOK A CHANCE ON DRIVING ACROSS THE BORDER AT ZAKHO, WHERE SHE LIED ABOUT HER REASONS FOR ENTERING THE COUNTRY, AND THENCE INSTEAD OF HEADING DIRECTLY FOR BAGHDAD, SHE WENT TO DOHUK, AMADIYYA, AND ULTIMATELY TWENTY MILES BEYOND AMADIYYA TO
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SURIYYA ON THE GREATER ZAB. (HOW SHE GOT THROUGH ALL THE CHECKPOINTS WILL REMAIN A MYSTERY TO ALL OF US.)

8. AT THE PROVINCIAL CAPITAL (AND ALMOST COMPLETELY KURDISH CITY) OF DOHUK, THE JOURNALIST WANDERED THROUGH THE SOUK AND CONVERSED WITH KURDS. ONE KURD TOLD HER HE WAS A GUERRILLA WHO HAD JUST FLED WITH

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HIS FAMILY OF NINE CHILDREN FROM THE AREA EAST OF AMADIYYA TO DOHUK. MANY RELATIVES HAD FLED TO TURKEY: THE GENERAL FEELING HAD BEEN THAT "KURDISTAN IS FINISHED, EITHER FLEE TO TURKEY OR TO THE KURDISH CITIES OF IRAQ." HE CLAIMED THAT MANY OTHERS HAD FLED TO DOHUK, BOTH IN THE PRESENT CAMPAIGN AND IN EARLIER CAMPAIGNS (I.E., 1987 AS WELL AS 1988). HE SAID THAT HIS VILLAGE HAD BEEN ATTACKED BY "CHEMICAL WEAPONS" (UNSPECIFIED) ON AUGUST 30.

9. FROM DOHUK TO AMADIYYA, THE JOURNALIST CONFIRMED THE SCENE WAS VERY MUCH AS OBSERVED BY AMBASSADOR NEWTON AND POLCHIEF IN OCTOBER 1987: HEAVY PRESENCE OF MILITARY (APPROXIMATELY ONE THIRD OF WHOM IN KURDISH ATTIRE) AND ALMOST NO REMAINING VILLAGES. JUST BEFORE AMADIYYA SHE WITNESSED SEVERAL CANNONS FIRING ACROSS THE WIDE VALLEY TO THE SLOPES OF THE GREAT RIDGE SOUTH OF AMADIYYA AND CAUSING MAJOR FIRES.

10. TAKING UP WHERE AMBASSADOR NEWTON AND POLCHIEF HAD NOT TRAVELED, THE JOURNALIST CONTINUED EAST FROM
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AMADIYYA, DESCENDING TEN MILES TO THE POINT WHERE THE GREATER ZAB MAKES A NINETY-DEGREE TURN EAST AND THENCE FOLLOWED THE RIVER ALONG A DIRT ROAD EAST ANOTHER TEN MILES TO THE TOWN OF SURIYA. IN THIS ZONE EAST OF AMADIYYA SHESAW 35 TANKS DRIVING ALONG THE ROAD AND FIVE "VERY RECENTLY DESTROYED" VILLAGES. JUST NORTH OF THE NINETY-DEGREE TURN OF THE GREATER ZAB SHE OBSERVED A SUBSTANTIAL TOWN THAT WAS ALSO IN THE PROCESS OF BEING DESTROYED, AND ALONG THE ROAD ALL ISOLATED BUILDINGS AND DWELLINGS WERE DESTROYED. BUILDINGS APPEARED GENERALLY TO HAVE BEEN INDIVIDUALLY BLOWN UP (AS WE HAVE OBSERVED THE PATTERN TO BE THROUGHOUT KURDISTAN). THE JOURNALIST SAID THAT THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE BURNING OF TREES AND ORCHARDS. SHE OBSERVED NUMEROUS "CRATERS" IN THE HILLSIDES RINGED WITH A WHITE SUBSTANCE AND SCORCHED EARTH. THE CROSSING AT THE GREATER ZAB WAS OVER A NEW BRIDGE, NEXT TO A DESTROYED BRIDGE.

11. THE JOURNALIST SAID THAT SHE HAD SPOKEN LAST WEEK WITH "BARZANI'S PEOPLE IN BERLIN," WHO SAID THAT HE HAD MOVED OPERATIONS TO SIDEKA, IN THE FAR NORTHEASTERN CORNER OF IRAQI KURDISTAN, FIFTEEN MILES NORTHEAST OF ROWANDUZ. THEY CLAIMED TO BE

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IN CONSTANT TELEPHONIC CONTACT WITH MAS'UD BARZANI
AT SIDEKA, AND HE HAD TOLD THEM THAT "FORTY THOUSAND
OF HIS PEOPLE WERE NOW UNABLE TO GET OUT."

(COMMENT: THE IMPLICATION IS THAT THE IRAQIS
HAVE SOMEHOW BOTTLED BARZANI UP AT SIDEKA BY
CONTROLLING THE VERY HIGH, DIFFICULT MOUNTAIN

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PM-10	PA-01	OMB-01	INRE-00	ACDA-12	USIE-00	SP-02
SNP-01	C-01	PRS-01	DS-01	P-02	T-01	/086 W

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O 141418Z SEP 88
 FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8200
 INFO GULFWAR COLLECTIVE
 DIA WASHDC

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 BAGHDAD 05049

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PREL, MOPS, PHUM, IZ, TU
 SUBJECT: JOURNALIST TRAVELS TO TURKISH AND

BORDER WITH IRAN AND THAT EITHER THE IRAQIS OR
 THE TURKS HAVE BLOCKED THE BORDER WITH TURKEY.)

12. THE JOURNALIST REPEATEDLY CAME BACK TO THE
 THEME THAT SHE WAS CONVINCED OF USE OF CHEMICAL
 WARFARE BUT NOT AT ALL SURE HOW WIDELY IT HAD BEEN
 USED. SHE SAID SHE WAS CONVINCED PARTY ON THE
 BASIS OF THE BURN CASES SHE OBSERVED--THOUGH SHE
 ADMITTED SHE WAS NO EXPERT AND THEY "COULD CONCEIV-
 ABLY HAVE BEEN CAUSED BY 'NONLETHAL' SUBSTANCES"--
 BUT MAINLY ON THE BASIS OF HUNDREDS OF CLAIMS MADE
 BY KURDS. SHE ENCOUNTERED MANY KURDS WHO ADMITTED,
 AS WELL, THAT THEY HAD NOT SEEN OR BEEN EXPOSED TO
 CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND THAT THEY HAD FLED BECAUSE OF
 THE REPORTS OF THEIR USE. (ONE TRIBAL CHIEF RE-
 PORTEDLY SAID THAT HE HAD ORDERED HIS ENTIRE TRIBE
 TO MOVE, THOUGH NO ONE IN THE TRIBE HAD BEEN

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ATTACKED BY CHEMICAL WEAPONS.) THE JOURNALIST
 REPEATED THAT ALL THE TURKISH DOCTORS WHOM SHE MET
 MAINTAINED THAT THEY HAD NO EVIDENCE OF USE OF
 CHEMICAL WEAPONS; SHE FOUND IT DIFFICULT TO BELIEVE
 THAT THEY WOULD ALL SUBMIT TO AN OFFICIAL COVERUP
 OR THAT THE TURKISH OPPOSITION PRESS WOULD NOT
 SOMEHOW BRING A COVERUP TO LIGHT.

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13. COMMENT: IF CORRECT, THIS JOURNALIST'S ACCOUNT CONFIRMS THAT AS OF SEPTEMBER 13 THE IRAQIS CONTINUED TO BE VERY ACTIVELY DESTROYING VILLAGES. MASSIVE RELOCATION OF THE KURDISH POPULATION TO OTHER, MORE EASILY CONTROLLED CENTERS, MUST ALSO BE OCCURRING, AS HAS BEEN THE CASE SINCE APRIL 1987. UP TILL NOW WE HAD THOUGHT THAT THE IRAQIS HAD BEEN ABLE TO PROCEED WITH VILLAGE DESTRUCTION EAST OF AMADIYYA, BUT IT APPEARS NOW THAT UNTIL THE AUGUST CAMPAIGN THE IRAQIS DID NOT EXERCISE CONTROL BEYOND THE TOWN. THE COROLLARY IS THAT THE IRAQIS ALMOST CERTAINLY COULD NOT HAVE CONTROLLED THE MAJOR EAST-WEST VALLEY NORTH OF AMADIYYA. THE PICTURE THAT EMERGES IS THAT BARZANI PROBABLY HAD RELATIVE FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AS WELL AS SCORES OF VILLAGES FOR SANCTUARY, IN A SWATHE OF TERRITORY RUNNING FROM PERHAPS THE OUTSKIRTS OF ZAKHO ALL THE WAY TO IRAN, A DISTANCE OF 120 MILES (AND 10 TO 50 MILES DEEP). THAT ERA IS OVER.

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THE PRESSURES ON TURKEY, OUR NATO ALLY, WHICH COULD CONTAIN THE SEEDS OF FUTURE REGIONAL INSTABILITY.

4. AMBASSADOR STRESSED THAT THE ISSUE IS NOT ONE OF THE USG GRATUITOUSLY LECTURING IRAQ ON ITS DOMESTIC POLICY. WE ARE WELL AWARE THAT AN ARMED REBELLION IS IN PROGRESS, ASSISTED BY IRAN WHICH IS STILL AT WAR WITH IRAQ. WHAT IS OUR BUSINESS, AND IS THE BUSINESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, IS IRAQ'S CONDUCT OF THE KURDISH CAMPAIGN. EARLIER IN THE WEEK PRESIDENT HUSSEIN HAD SPOKEN TO THE AMBASSADORS OF THE FIVE AS REPRESENTING "FRIENDLY GOVERNMENTS." FRIENDS OWE EACH OTHER CLARITY AND FRANKNESS. WE THEREFORE ASK THAT WHEN PRESIDENT HUSSEIN MAKES FURTHER DECISIONS ABOUT HIS TACTICS IN THE KURDISH CAMPAIGN, HE FACTOR IN OUR DEEP CONCERNS ABOUT THE FUTURE OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP.

5. FINALLY, THE AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT THE INTERNATIONAL OUTCRY IS CONSIDERABLE AND IS A REFLECTION OF GENUINE INTERNATIONAL CONCERN. THE DIFFICULTIES OF THE KURDS IS THE LEAD STORY

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IN THE BBC WORLD SERVICE. FOR OUR PART, WE HAVE SOUGHT TO RESERVE PUBLIC COMMENT UNTIL WE COULD DISCUSS OUR CONCERNS DIRECTLY WITH HAMDUN AND WE WOULD TAKE FULL ACCOUNT OF THE IRAQI RESPONSE AS WE DEVELOP OUR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ON THIS IMPORTANT ISSUE.

6. HAMDUN THEN SPOKE AT LENGTH ABOUT THE HISTORY OF KURDISH INSURGENCY. HE SAID IRAQ FOR HISTORIC REASONS UNDERSTANDS THE BRITISH CONCERNS. THE WORLD DOES NOT FULLY APPRECIATE, HOWEVER, THAT EVEN PRIOR TO THE CURRENT CAMPAIGN, THERE WERE AREAS OF KURDISTAN WHERE THE GOI HAD NOT EXTENDED ITS SOVEREIGNTY, AREAS WHERE NO ONE COULD TRAVEL SAFELY. IRAN'S ROLE SHOULD BE WELL-KNOWN AND NOW ONE KURDISH LEADER - TALABANI - HAS GONE SO FAR AS TO SPEAK PUBLICLY OF DISASSOCIATING THE KURDS FROM THE IRAQI STATE.

7. AS FOR TURKEY, HAMDUN CONTINUED, THE TURKS TOO HAVE SUFFERED FROM KURDISH INTRANSIGENCY. IT WILL BE A BOON ON BOTH SIDES OF THE BORDER TO BE SURE THAT THE BORDER IS CLEAR OF INDIVIDUALS WHO MAY WISH TO CAUSE TROUBLE. HAMDUN SAID HE HAD BEEN PRESENT DURING THE AUGUST 30 MEETING IN BAGHDAD AT WHICH TURKISH MFA U/S NUZHET KANDEMIR,

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ACCOMPANIED BY TURKISH MILITARY ADVISERS, HAD
SPOKEN AT LENGTH AND IN DETAIL TO IRAQI MILITARY

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FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO SECSTATE WADDC IMMEDIATE 8086
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL ADANA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY RIYADH
USMISSION GENEVA

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 BAGHDAD 04833

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL PHUM MOPS, IZ
SUBJ: IRAQI ATTACKS ON KURDS

OFFICERS. THERE HAD BEEN A FULL AND FRANK EXCHANGE
AND HAMDUN BELIEVED THE FIGHTING WOULD BE OVER
"IN A FEW DAYS."

8. AMBASSADOR REITERATED OUR CONCERNS WITH AN
EMPHASIS ON CHEMICAL WARFARE. SHE TOLD HAMDUN
THAT IRAQ HAS, AT A MINIMUM, A MAJOR PUBLIC
RELATIONS PROBLEM. IF CHEMICAL WARFARE IS NOT
BEING USED AND IF KURDS ARE NOT HERDED INTO WWII
CONCENTRATION CAMPS, THEN IRAQ SHOULD FACILITATE
THE TRAVEL INTO NEW TOWNS AND INTO THE KURDISH
HINTERLAND, OF RESPONSIBLE THIRD COUNTRY
INDIVIDUALS, WHETHER FROM INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS, OR THE MEDIA. HAMDUN SAID THAT
WOULD BE "IMPOSSIBLE" JUST NOW, BUT THE GOI IS
ALREADY CONSIDERING SUCH A STEP. HE REPEATED HIS

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BELIEF THAT THE FIGHTING WOULD BE OVER "IN A
FEW DAYS."

9. COMMENT: HAMDUN CAREFULLY AVOIDED ANY COMMENT
OR ADMISSION ON THE CHEMICAL WARFARE QUESTION. IN
REVEALING THAT THE FIGHTING SHOULD BE OVER VERY SOON,
HE CAUTIONED HIS NOTETAKER THAT THE INFORMATION IS
EXTREMELY SENSITIVE. WHILE WE FEEL CONFIDENT THAT
DIPLOMATS LIKE HAMDUN ARE FULLY AWARE THAT IRAQ

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MAY DO ITSELF IRREPARABLE INTERNATIONAL DAMAGE BY ITS BRUTAL TACTICS AGAINST THE KURDS, IT HAS BEEN CLEAR FOR MANY DAYS THAT SADDAM HAS TAKEN THE DECISION TO DO WHATEVER THE ARMY BELIEVES NECESSARY TO FULLY PACIFY THE NORTH. THE MOST HAMDUN CAN THEREFORE UNDERTAKE IN RESPONSE TO OUR DEMARCHE IS REPORT IT TO SADDAM -- WHICH HE WILL CERTAINLY DO IMMEDIATELY -- AND TO EXCEED HIS BRIEF BY LETTING US KNOW CONFIDENTIALLY THAT THE FIGHTING WILL SOON BE OVER.

10. IRAQI AMBASSADOR TO THE U.S. AL-ANBARI IS IN BAGHDAD, PLANNING TO TRAVEL WITH MINSTATE HAMMADI TO MEET THE SECRETARY ON SEPTEMBER 8. WE WILL ENDEAVOR TO REPEAT THIS DEMARCHE TO ANBARI BEFORE HE LEAVES AND WE RECOMMEND IN SEPTTEL THAT THE SECRETARY RAISE THE CHEMICAL WARFARE ISSUE WITH HAMMADI DIRECTLY.

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PAGE 01 STATE 289518
ORIGIN SS-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 SSO-00 /000 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA/NGA:PNREMLER

APPROVED BY: NEA:RWMURPHY

NEA/NGA:LEPOPE

P:AEASTHAM

EUR/SE:JCLUNAN

S/S: JELAKE

HA:RWFARRAND

PM/ISP:TOTIS

S/S-O:DTROTTER

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TO AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD IMMEDIATE
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AMEMBASSY RIYADH IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL ADANA IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ STATE 289518

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, MOPS, IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQI ATTACKS ON KURDS

REF: A) STATE 277112 ✓ B) BAGHDAD 4763 ✓ (NOTAL)

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. IRAQ'S RUTHLESS CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE KURDISH INSURGENCY IS LIKELY TO HAVE A SERIOUS IMPACT ON OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS, GIVEN THE HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES AND USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS NOW COMING TO LIGHT. THE FLOW OF REFUGEES INTO TURKEY ALSO PRESENTS IMPLICATIONS FOR

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REGIONAL STABILITY. IRAQ SHOWS NO SIGN OF WILLINGNESS TO TAKE INTERNATIONAL OPINION INTO ACCOUNT IN ITS DETERMINATION TO RESOLVE THE KURDISH PROBLEM ONCE AND FOR ALL.

3. WE RECOGNIZE THAT THE SITUATION IS COMPLEX, WITH DEEP HISTORICAL ROOTS, AND THAT IT INVOLVES AN ARMED REBELLION IN WHICH KURDS ALLIED THEMSELVES WITH IRAN AGAINST THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT. WE ALSO RECOGNIZE IRAQ'S SENSITIVITY

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TO OUR INVOLVEMENT, GIVEN THE RECORD OF THE 70'S. WE SEE LITTLE TO BE GAINED FROM LECTURING THE IRAQIS -- BUT WE DO WANT TO MAKE CLEAR TO THEM THAT WE WILL NOT BE SILENT

IN THE FACE OF SUCH HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES, AND THAT THIS WILL INEVITABLY HAVE AN ADVERSE IMPACT ON OUR ABILITY TO PROMOTE A CLOSER BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. WE WANT TO BE SURE THE IRAQIS, AND SADDAM PERSONALLY, TAKE THIS FACTOR FULLY INTO ACCOUNT.

4. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, THE AMBASSADOR SHOULD CONSIDER HOW BEST TO BRING HOME OUR CONCERNS TO THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT AT A SENIOR LEVEL. WE SUGGEST AN INFORMAL DISCUSSION WITH NIZAR HAMDOON AS A STARTING POINT USING THE FOLLOWING POINTS, BUT LEAVE TACTICS TO THE AMBASSADOR'S DISCRETION:

5. BEGIN TALKING POINTS:

-- THE CAMPAIGN THE IRAQI ARMY IS CONDUCTING AGAINST THE KURDISH INSURGENCY, INCLUDING THE REPORTED USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS, IS OF DEEP CONCERN TO US.

-- WE RECOGNIZE THAT THE PROBLEM IS A HISTORICAL ONE.

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PAGE 03 STATE 289518

WE ALSO RECOGNIZE THAT KURDISH INSURGENTS SOUGHT SUPPORT FROM IRAN DURING THE WAR.

-- BUT THE CONDUCT OF THE CAMPAIGN, INCLUDING THE FORCED RELOCATION OF TENS OF THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE AND REPORTED USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS, IS CAUSING AN INTERNATIONAL OUTCRY. IT APPEARS TO INVOLVE SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS, AND IS PUTTING OUR NATO ALLY TURKEY IN A DIFFICULT POSITION.

-- WE ATTACH GREAT VALUE TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS. THIS HAS BEEN REITERATED BY THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY, AND WE MEAN IT. WE BELIEVE IRAQ ALSO ATTACHES IMPORTANCE TO OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP.

-- HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST KURDISH GROUPS, PARTICULARLY CONTINUED USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS, WILL MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR BOTH OF US TO PROMOTE DEVELOPMENT OF OUR RELATIONS.

-- WE ASK IRAQ TO WEIGH THIS FACTOR CAREFULLY IN MAKING DECISIONS ON THE CONDUCT OF ITS MILITARY CAMPAIGN IN KURDISTAN.

-- IN PUBLIC STATEMENTS, WE HAVE TRIED TO RESERVE

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COMMENT ON THE SITUATION UNTIL WE WERE ABLE TO DISCUSS
THE SITUATION DIRECTLY WITH YOU. WE WILL TAKE YOUR VIEWS
FULLY INTO ACCOUNT IN FURTHER PUBLIC COMMENT. WHITEHEAD

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ACTION NEA-11

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	INR-10	EUR-00	SS-00	OIC-02	CIAE-00
	DODE-00	H-01	MSC-01	IO-19	NSCE-00	NSAE-00	HA-09
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	ACDA-12	USIE-00	SP-02	SNP-01	C-01	PRS-01	DS-01
	SCT-02	P-02	T-01	/101 W			

-----150245 041307Z /41

P 041259Z SEP 88
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8083
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY
AMCONSUL ADANA PRIORITY
USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY

C.O.N.F.I.D.E.N.T.I.A.L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 04832

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PREF, UNHCR, IZ, TU
SUBJECT: DETENTION CAMPS FOR KURDISH POPULATION

REF: STATE 289901

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. WHEN IT FIRST BECAME APPARENT THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN HAD DETERMINED ON THE KURDISH VILLAGE DESTRUCTION CAMPAIGN, IN THE SPRING OF 1987, WE BEGAN RECEIVING REPORTS THAT SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS OF KURDS WERE BEING TRANSPORTED FROM THE MOUNTAINS EITHER INTO THE DESERT AROUND THE JORDAN BORDER STATION OF RUTBA, TO CAMPS NEAR FALLUJA AND RAMADI, OR TO THE SOUTH (UNSPECIFIED). THESE REPORTS FIT WITH THE PATTERN ESTABLISHED IN EARLIER ANTI-KURDISH CAMPAIGNS IN THE 1960'S AND 1970'S. WE HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO OBTAIN FIRST-HAND CONFIRMATION ABOUT NUMBERS INVOLVED OR

CONFIDENTIAL
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LOCALITIES. OUR IMPRESSION IS THAT LARGE NUMBERS ARE NOT INVOLVED IN THESE LENGTHY TRANSFERS AND THEY PROBABLY INVOLVE IMMEDIATE FAMILIES OF MEN KNOWN TO SERVE AS PFSPMERGAS.

3. OUR OWN TRAVEL IN KURDISTAN HAS CONFIRMED THE MASSIVE DESTRUCTION OF VILLAGES AND EVEN SEVERAL SIZEABLE TOWNS ALONG ALL THE MAIN HIGHWAYS OF THE

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PROVINCES OF SULAYMANIYYA, ARBIL, AND DOHUK. MOSUL PROVINCE BY COMPARISON HAS BEEN SPARED, BUT ITS OUTLYING VILLAGES ARE PRINCIPALLY CHRISTIAN, SUNNI-ARAB, TURKOMEN, AND YAZIDI; AND THE KURDISH PRESENCE WEST OF MOSUL WAS LARGELY EXPELLED IN THE 1970'S (PERHAPS BECAUSE OF PROXIMITY TO SYRIA).

4. WE HAVE OBSERVED THREE LARGE AREAS OF CONSTRUCTION IN SULAYMANIYYA PROVINCE WHERE NEW TOWNS ARE BEING CONSTRUCTED TO HOUSE KURDS BEING REMOVED FROM ADJACENT AREAS: 1. BAVIAN VALLEY BETWEEN THE TWO MOUNTAIN RIDGES WHICH LIE BETWEEN KIRKUK AND SULAYMANIYYA. 2. THE PLAIN SOUTHEAST OF ARBAT, SOUTH OF SULAYMANIYYA. 3. THE HILLS EAST OF KILAR IN THE DIYALA VALLEY, SOUTHERNMOST IRAQI KURDISTAN. THESE NEW TOWNS DO NOT APPEAR TO BE FENCED OR GUARDED IN THE STYLE OF DETENTION CAMPS BUT RATHER SEEM SIMPLY TO BE NEW TOWNS. THE TRADITIONAL AGRARIAN LIVELIHOOD OF THE KURDS IN THESE NEW TOWNS IS OF COURSE NOT PROVIDED FOR.

5. OUR AUSTRALIAN COLLEAGUES OBSERVED IN JUNE THREE POSSIBLY NEW VILLAGES LAID OUT IN GRID
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PATTERN IN WESTERN DOHUK PROVINCE BETWEEN THE TIGRIS AND THE WESTERNMOST RIDGELINE POINTING TOWARD THE SYRIAN BORDER AT FAYSHKABUR. THESE VILLAGES ARE SURROUNDED BY A FENCE AND GUARD TOWERS AND HAVE THE APPEARANCE OF DETENTION CENTERS, BUT WITHIN WHICH KURDISH FAMILY LIFE--WOMEN IN COLORFUL DRESS, MEN IN BAGGY PANTS, GEESE STRUTTING, CHILDREN PLAYING IN THE MUCK--GOES ON.

6. NO WESTERN OBSERVERS THAT WE KNOW OF HAVE TRAVELED IN RECENT YEARS NORTH OF ARBIL OR EAST OF AMADIYYA, I.E., INTO THE KDP/BARZANI HEARTLAND THAT LIES ALONG THE MOUNTAINOUS BORDER WITH TURKEY EAST TO IRAN. IT HAS BEEN OUR UNCONFIRMED IMPRESSION THAT THE TRADITIONALLY PRO-REGIME TRIBES OF THE SURCHI AND HERKI JUST TO THE NORTH OF ARBIL--THE TRIBES THAT ALSO HAVE BEEN INSTRUMENTAL IN PROTECTING WORKERS BUILDING THE BEKHME DAM WHERE THE GREATER ZAB BREAKS OUT OF THE MAIN RIDGELINES--HAVE NOT BEEN SUBJECTED TO MASSIVE VILLAGE DESTRUCTION. WE HAVE TAKEN IT AS GIVEN THAT THE REGIME WOULD ERADICATE BARZANI'S PLACES OF REFUGE AT ANY OPPORTUNITY. WE HAVE NO INFORMATION ABOUT THE EXTENT TO WHICH DESTRUCTION IN BARZANI TERRAIN TOOK PLACE BEFORE THE LATEST PERIOD, BUT IT IS CLEAR, ON THE BASIS OF PUBLIC STATEMENTS FROM THE

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KURDS AND REPORTS FROM TURKEY THAT WHAT PREVIOUS-
LY OCCURRED IN SOUTHERN AND NORTHWESTERN KURDISTAN
IS NOW TAKING PLACE COMPREHENSIVELY IN NORTHEAST-
ERN KURDISTAN. WE HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO OBSERVE
THE CONSTRUCTION OF NEW TOWNS OR DETENTION CAMPS
IN THE NORTHEASTERN ZONE, SINCE TRAVEL EVEN FROM
ARBIL TO SHAQLAWA AND ROWANDUZ HAS BEEN IMPOSSIBLE

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ACTION NEA-11

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	INR-10	EUR-00	SS-00	OIC-02	CIAE-00
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P 041259Z SEP 88
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8084
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY
AMCONSUL ADANA PRIORITY
USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY
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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 BAGHDAD 04832

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PREF, UNHCR, IZ, TU
SUBJECT: DETENTION CAMPS FOR KURDISH POPULATION

UP TO THE PRESENT.

7. THE NORTHERN CITIES OF MOSUL, DOHUK, ARBIL, AND SULAYMANIYYA ARE ALL TEEMING WITH POPULATION AND EXPANDING VERY RAPIDLY INTO THEIR HINTERLANDS. MOSUL WHICH WAS NEVER PREVIOUSLY A CITY WITH A LARGE KURDISH POPULATION IS NOW FULL OF KURDS IN ADDITION TO ITS TRADITIONAL SUNNI-ARAB AND CHRISTIAN POPULATIONS. WE SURMISE THAT MANY KURDS DISPLACED FROM VILLAGES HAVE MOVED TO THESE CITIES.

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ACTION RP-10

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-00	INR-10	EUR-00	SS-00	CIAE-00
	DODE-00	H-01	NEA-06	NSCE-00	NSAE-00	HA-09	PA-01
	INRE-00	USIE-00	SP-02	SR-06	PRS-01	/046 W	
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R 191252Z JUN 88
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7437
INFO AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY ATHENS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 03374

ROME AND ATHENS. FOR INS OIC

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREF, PHUM, IZ, IR
SUBJECT: VISIT TO IRANIAN REFUGEE CAMP

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: ON JUNE 5, 1988, POLOFF/CONOFF ACCOMPANIED TWO ICRC OFFICIALS ON A VISIT TO AL-TASH REFUGEE CAMP WHERE 25,000 IRANIAN KURDS HAVE BEEN INTERNED SINCE 1982. THE CAMP RESEMBLES A HUGE COLLECTION OF MUD BRICK VILLAGES WITH OPEN SEWERS AND OUTHOUSES IN THE STREETS. A HOSPITAL AND SCHOOL PROVIDE BASIC MEDICAL AND EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES. THERE IS LITTLE WORK TO OCCUPY THE INMATES, ONLY 450 OF WHOM HAVE BEEN APPROVED FOR RESETTLEMENT. END SUMMARY.

3. APPROXIMATELY 25,000 IRANIAN KURDS ARE INTERNED AT AL-TASH REFUGEE CAMP. MOST OF THE CAMP'S INMATES LEFT IRAN BEFORE THE OUTBREAK OF THE IRAQ-IRAN WAR, IN 1979, DURING A PERIOD OF UNREST RESULTING FROM

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THE COLLISION OF KURDISH AUTONOMOUS ASPIRATIONS WITH THE NASCENT ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN. FEARING ARMED ATTACKS BY THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT AGAINST KURDISH SETTLEMENTS AND POSSIBLE IMPRISONMENT BECAUSE OF THEIR POLITICAL STAND THEY CROSSED THE FRONTIER INTO IRAQI KURDISTAN. INITIALLY INTERNED IN CAMPS NEAR THE INTERNATIONAL BORDER IN NORTHEASTERN IRAQ THEY WERE REMOVED TO AL-TASH IN 1982. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (ICRC) HAS VISITED AL-

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TASH REGULARLY SINCE JULY 1983. A TRICKLE OF REFUGEES HAS CONTINUED TO FLOW INTO AL-TASH OVER THE YEARS, SOME OF THE ORIGINAL INMATES HAVE DIED, AND MANY BABIES HAVE BEEN BORN IN THE CAMP. AN ICRC OFFICIAL ESTIMATED THAT THE POPULATION OF THE CAMP HAD GROWN FROM ABOUT 20,000 IN JULY 1983 TO OVER 25,000 IN JUNE 1988.

-
THE CAMP

4. AL-TASH CAMP IS LOCATED ON THE EDGE OF THE DESERT NEAR RAMADI, 150 KILOMETERS WEST OF BAGHDAD. A HUGE MUD BRICK VILLAGE BUILT BY THE INMATES, AL-TASH IS HOT AND DUSTY IN THE SUMMER AND A SEA OF MUD IN WINTER. THE IRAQI AUTHORITIES WHO RUN THE CAMP ASSIGNED A SEPARATE AREA OF THE CAMP TO EACH OF THE THIRTY-TWO KURDISH TRIBES REPRESENTED AMONG THE INMATES. EACH TRIBE HAS A DESIGNATED CHIEF BUT THERE IS NO OTHER INTERNAL ORGAN OF GOVERNMENT. THE TRIBAL AREAS (OR SUB-VILLAGES) ARE BUILT AROUND A FAIRLY LARGE SUQ WHICH FORMS THE MAIN STREET OF THE CAMP. AN OPEN "PARADE GROUND" SEPARATES THE TRIBAL VILLAGES FROM THE

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IRAQI COMMAND POST. A CHAIN-LINK FENCE TOPPED WITH BARBED WIRE SURROUNDS THE CAMP AND THE SINGLE GATE IS GUARDED BY UNIFORMED ARMED IRAQIS. TWO INMATE CEMETERIES LIE OUTSIDE THE FENCE.

5. THE STREETS OF THE CAMP ARE NARROW ALLEYWAYS WHICH WIND AMONG THE MUD BRICK HOUSES. SMALL OPEN DITCHES FILLED WITH WATER AND FILTH SERVE AS THE CAMP'S ONLY SEWERAGE. MUD outhouses, OPEN TO THE SKY, DOT THE STREETS. WHEN ONE IS FULL, THE HOLE IS COVERED OVER, A NEW HOLE IS DUG NEAR-BY, AND THE MUD FRAME IS MOVED THE FEW FEET NECESSARY TO COVER THE NEW HOLE. GOATS, CHICKENS, AND CHILDREN ROAM AMONG PILES OF GARBAGE. NO DOGS OR CATS ARE TO BE SEEN IN AL-TASH. THE ONLY VEHICLES ARE BICYCLES AND DONKEY CARTS. THE SUQ IS LINED ON EITHER SIDE WITH SMALL MUD BRICK SHOPS. THERE ARE BARBER SHOPS, CLOTHING AND FABRIC ESTABLISHMENTS, A BLACKSMITH, SEVERAL SHOPS SELLING LIVE CHICKENS, VZGETABZ SOFT/QAFD A XUMBER OF SHOPS SELLING VARIOUS ODDS AND ENDS. A BUTCHER SHOP, DISPLAYING LARGE CHUNKS OF MEAT ON HOOKS, HAD A LIVE BLACK AND WHITE GOAT TETHERED AT THE ENTRANCE, AS EITHER AN ADVERTISEMENT OR TOMORROW'S MENU. THE SUQ WAS FILLED WITH MEN AT 11 A.M., BUT, ODDLY, NO WOMEN WERE

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PRESENT, EITHER IN THE SUQ OR IN THE STREETS.
ASIDE FROM THE FEW WOMEN BEING INTERVIEWED BY
RED CROSS OFFICIALS, THE ONLY WOMEN SEEN IN THE
CAMP WERE GLIMPSED THROUGH OPEN DOORWAYS OF
HOUSES OR YARDS. THE MEN WERE GENERALLY DRESSED

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ACTION RP-10

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-00	INR-10	EUR-00	SS-00	CIAE-00
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	INRE-00	USIE-00	SP-02	SR-06	FAIM-01	PRS-01	/047 W

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R 191252Z JUN 88
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7438
INFO AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY ATHENS

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ROME AND ATHENS FOR INS OIC

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREF, PHUM, IZ, IR
SUBJECT: VISIT TO IRANIAN REFUGEE CAMP

IN TRADITIONAL KURDISH BAGGY TROUSERS AND SHIRTS.
MOST APPEARED TO BE UNDER FORTY YEARS OF AGE.

CAMP FACILITIES

6. A HOSPITAL WITH THREE IRAQI DOCTORS (ONE MAN AND TWO WOMEN) IS LOCATED INSIDE THE CAMP. CASES TOO SERIOUS TO BE TREATED THERE ARE SENT TO THE HOSPITAL IN RAMADI. THE MEDICAL AILMENTS MOST PREVALENT IN THE CAMP ARE DIARRHEA, FEVERS, SKIN AILMENTS, AND HEADACHES, THE SORT OF THINGS ONE WOULD EXPECT IN CROWDED, UNSANITARY CONDITIONS. AN IRAQI GOVERNMENT SCHOOL SET UP IN SIX TENTS IN THE CAMP PROVIDES RUDIMENTARY EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES TO ABOUT 600

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STUDENTS. THE SCHOOL'S IRAQI TEACHERS COMMUTE TO WORK FROM RAMADI. THE REMAINDER OF THE CAMP'S ESTIMATED 3,000 SCHOOL-AGE CHILDREN ARE TAUGHT IN MAKE-SHIFT KURDISH SCHOOLS BY INMATE TEACHERS WHO CHARGE 1.8 TO 2 IRAQI DINARS PER PUPIL. EACH TRIBE HAS AT LEAST ONE KURDISH SCHOOL. STUDENTS ATTEND SCHOOL TO THE AGE OF 12 OR 13. THE VARIOUS TRIBES OPERATE MAKE-SHIFT MOSQUES TO PROVIDE FOR THE SPIRITUAL NEEDS OF THEIR PEOPLE.

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CAMP CONDITIONS

7. THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT DISTRIBUTES STAPLES (RICE, SUGAR, COOKING OIL, AND SOUP POWDER) TO THE TRIBAL CHIEFS WHO IN TURN DISTRIBUTE THEM TO THEIR PEOPLE. THE GOVERNMENT GIVES EACH FAMILY FROM 40 ID (FOR A SINGLE PERSON) TO 120 ID (FOR A FAMILY OF SIX OR MORE MEMBERS) PER MONTH. THIS MONEY IS SUPPOSED TO BE PAID BIMONTHLY BUT IS SOMETIMES UP TO A MONTH LATE. INMATES MUST BUY ANYTHING THEY NEED FROM THE MERCHANTS IN THE SUQ. THE MERCHANTS ARE ALSO CAMP INMATES WHO OPENED BUSINESSES WITH MONEY THEY MANAGED TO BRING WITH THEM FROM IRAN. THE MERCHANTS PURCHASE SUPPLIES IN RAMADI AND HAVE IT DELIVERED TO THE CAMP BY TRUCK. INMATES COMPLAINED THAT THEY PAID THE SUQ MERCHANTS TWO OR THREE TIMES THE PRICE CHARGED FOR PRODUCE IN RAMADI (FOR EXAMPLE, 500 FILS FOR A KILOGRAM OF TOMATOES THAT WOULD COST 200 FILS IN RAMADI). A FEW INMATES WORK IN RAMADI, COMMUTING BETWEEN THE CAMP AND THEIR JOBS, BUT MOST OF THE CAMP'S RESIDENTS ARE IDLE, WITHOUT WORK OR ANYTHING ELSE TO OCCUPY THEM. DUE TO THE INADEQUACY OF THE CAMP'S WATER SUPPLY DURING THE LONG, HOT, DRY,

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DUSTY SUMMER, CAMP AUTHORITIES LIMIT EACH TRIBE'S ACCESS TO WATER TO TWO HOURS EACH DAY. SOME TRIBES MUST ARISE IN THE MIDDLE OF THE NIGHT TO FILL EVERY AVAILABLE CONTAINER WITH WATER.

8. OF THE 25,000 OR SO INMATES OF AL-TASH, ONLY ABOUT 450 HAVE BEEN APPROVED FOR RESETTLEMENT BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS. THESE FORTUNATE FEW ARE WAITING FOR A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT TO ACCEPT THEM AS REFUGEES. A THREE-MAN INMATE COMMITTEE REPRESENTS THEM IN DEALINGS WITH THE ICRC. CURRENTLY ABOUT TWENTY ARE EXPECTING TO BE INTERVIEWED BY A CANADIAN IMMIGRATION OFFICIAL WHO IS TO ARRIVE IN IRAQ FROM CAIRO IN A COUPLE OF WEEKS.

SOLDIERS' STORIES

9. POLOFF/CONOFF VISITED AL-TASH IN THE COMPANY OF TWO ICRC OFFICIALS WHO INTERVIEWED SEVERAL OF THE INMATES SELECTED TO SEE THE CANADIAN OFFICIAL AS WELL AS SEVERAL WHO HAD NOT BEEN. TWO OF THOSE INTERVIEWED HAD SEEN MILITARY SERVICE IN IRAN. A LAD OF ABOUT FOURTEEN HAD BEEN TAKEN AS A BASIJ ("VOLUNTEER") WITHOUT HIS MOTHER'S PERMISSION AND AGAINST HIS WILL. AFTER SEVERAL MONTHS OF SERVICE HE DESERTED ONE NIGHT WHILE ON GUARD DUTY. HE AND THREE OTHERS ATTEMPTED TO MAKE THEIR WAY TO THE IRAQI LINES. THE OTHER THREE WERE KILLED IN A MINE FIELD. HE FINALLY WAS PICKED UP

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BY AN IRAQI PATROL, KEPT UNDER GUARD BEHIND THE
LINES FOR A FEW DAYS, AND THEN SENT TO A PRISON IN
BAGHDAD. AFTER A COUPLE OF WEEKS HE WAS TRANSFERRED
TO AL-TASH WHERE HE WAS TAKEN UNDER THE WING OF ONE
OF THE COMMITTEE MEMBERS. HE LEFT A WIDOWED MOTHER
AND SEVERAL YOUNGER SIBLINGS IN IRAN.

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ACTION RP-10

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 EUR-00 SS-00 CIAE-00
DODE-00 H-01 NEA-06 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09
PA-01 INRE-00 USIE-00 SP-02 SR-06 PRS-01 /046 W
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R 191252Z JUN 88
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7439
INFO AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY ATHENS

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ROME AND ATHENS FOR INS OIC

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREF, PHUM, IZ, IR
SUBJECT: VISIT TO IRANIAN REFUGEE CAMP

10. THE OTHER MILITARY VETERAN ATTENDED THE NATIONAL MILITARY ACADEMY IN TEHRAN FOR THREE YEARS. COMMISSIONED A SECOND LIEUTENANT, HE WAS ASSIGNED TO THE INFANTRY TRAINING CENTER IN SHIRAZ FOR AN ADDITIONAL YEAR OF SCHOOLING BEFORE BEING ORDERED TO DUTY WITH THE 55TH AIRBORNE BRIGADE AT SHIRAZ. HIS PAY AS A SECOND LIEUTENANT WAS 7,000 TOUMANS. AFTER FIVE MONTHS HE DESERTED AND EVENTUALLY MADE HIS WAY TO IRAQ WHERE HE WAS INTERNED IN AL-TASH.

11. WHEN ASKED WHETHER THE IRAQI AUTHORITIES KNEW THESE TWO INMATES HAD SERVED IN THE IRANIAN MILITARY, AN ICRC OFFICIAL REPLIED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE. ASKED WHY THEY WERE NOT PLACED IN A PRISONER-OF-WAR CAMP HE SAID THAT HE WAS NOT SURE BUT THAT HE THOUGHT THE FOURTEEN-YEAR OLD MAY HAVE BEEN SENT TO AL-TASH BECAUSE OF HIS AGE WHILE THE FORMER LIEUTENANT HAD

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DESERTED SOMETIME BEFORE MAKING HIS WAY TO IRAQ AND THUS WAS NOT CAPTURED WHILE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATING IN THE WAR.

12. ALTHOUGH THE INMATES DISPLAY THE QUIESCENCE OF THOSE WHO HAVE LOST HOPE AND APPARENTLY GIVE THE IRAQI AUTHORITIES LITTLE TROUBLE, THERE IS OCCASIONAL VIOLENCE AT AL-TASH. SEVERAL MONTHS AGO AN INMATE WHOM CANADA HAD ACCEPTED FOR SETTLEMENT AS A REFUGEE

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WAS FATALLY INJURED BY A THROWN ROCK AS HE ATTEMPTED TO INTERVENE IN AN ALTERCATION BETWEEN TWO OTHER INMATES. HIS DEATH ENDED THE OPPORTUNITY FOR HIS WIFE AND CHILDREN TO IMMIGRATE TO CANADA.

13. THE REFUGEES REPRESENT AN ETHNIC, RELIGIOUS, AND POLITICAL MINORITY WHICH FLED TO IRAQ DURING WARTIME. EVEN AFTER THE END OF THE IRAQ-IRAN WAR IT IS DOUBTFUL WHETHER THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT WOULD ALLOW THEM TO RETURN TO IRAN. FURTHERMORE, THE FACT THAT MOST OF THE REFUGEES HAVE ALREADY LIVED IN IRAQ FOR NINE YEARS WOULD BE REASON ENOUGH FOR THE IRANIAN AUTHORITIES TO VIEW THEM WITH SUSPICION. BECAUSE OF PROBLEMS WITH ITS OWN KURDISH MINORITY, THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT IS UNLIKELY TO ACCEPT PERMANENT RESETTLEMENT OF THE REFUGEES IN IRAQ. THAT THE REFUGEES ARE STILL INTERNED NINE YEARS AFTER MOST OF THEM ARRIVED IN IRAQ IS EVIDENCE THAT THE IRAQIS VIEW THEIR PRESENCE AS TEMPORARY AND DO NOT CONTEMPLATE RESETTLEMENT IN IRAQ. FOLLOWING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN IN 1979, IRAQ FORCED THOUSANDS OF ETHNIC PERSIANS, MANY OF THEM BORN IN IRAQ, INTO IRAN. FOR THE AL-TASH INMATES THE ALTERNATIVES SEEM TO BE EITHER RESETTLEMENT IN

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COUNTRIES OTHER THAN IRAQ AND IRAN OR A MORE OR LESS PERMANENT EXISTENCE IN AL-TASH OR A SIMILAR REFUGEE CAMP.

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ACTION NEA-11

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CONFIDENTIAL A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 01513

DEPT FOR NEA/NGA, NEA/EX, DS/OPS/NEA, CA/OCS/EMR

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, ASEC, IZ

SUBJECT: IRAQI LOSSES IN KURDISTAN WHILE THE WAR OF
THE CITIES SIMMERS

REF: BAGHDAD 1498

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: THE IRAQIS HAVE ADMITTED THE FALL OF THE
KURDISH BORDER TOWN OF HALABCHA (HALABJA), THE SHELLING
OF WHICH ON MARCH 13 WAS GIVEN AS THE REASON FOR THE
RESUMED MISSILE CAMPAIGN. AN EXPECTED COUNTERATTACK
WILL PROBABLY NECESSITATE THE DRAWDOWN OF FORCES FROM
OTHER SECTORS. THE MISSILE CAMPAIGN HAS BEEN QUIET
OVER THE PAST TWENTY-FOUR HOURS, WITH ONLY ONE IRAQI
MISSILE FIRED AGAINST TEHRAN AND NO IRANIAN MISSILES

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AGAINST BAGHDAD. SADDAM HUSSEIN CONVENED THE PARTY
LEADERSHIP MARCH 16, FOLLOWING WHICH A STATEMENT WAS
ISSUED BETRAYING KEEN IRAQI ANNOYANCE AT LACK OF
PROGRESS IN THE UNSC AND TOO-GREAT INTERNATIONAL FOCUS
ON IRAQI MISSILE ATTACKS. END SUMMARY.

3. AT 1100 LOCAL MARCH 17 CHIEF OF MILITARY GUIDANCE
ABD AL-JABBAR MUHSIN BROADCAST THE ADMISSION--ALBEIT
IN EXTREMELY ROUNDABOUT LANGUAGE--THAT IRANIAN ARMED

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FORCES HAVE OCCUPIED THE KURDISH BORDER TOWNS OF HALABCHA AND KHURMAL. CLAIMING THAT THE IRAQI ARMY IS STILL "IN FULL CONTROL OF ALL OPERATIONAL SECTORS," MUHSIN CLAIMED THAT THERE HAS NOT BEEN ANY FIGHTING IN HALABCHA AND KHURMAL--AS CLAIMED BY IRAN--BECAUSE IRAQI FORCES "HAVE BEEN EVACUATED FROM THESE AREAS." HE FOCUSED ON IRAN'S "DESTRUCTION OF THE TOWN AND VILLAGES OF HALABCHA WHICH WERE OCCUPIED."

4. EVIDENTLY SENSING THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE PROBLEM, SADDAM HIMSELF VISITED THE AREA MARCH 13, AND MINDEF KHAYRALLAH WAS AT THE SCENE MARCH 16. AS THE ONLY ROAD ACCESS TO THE AREA, WHICH IS BOUNDED ON THE EAST AND SOUTH BY MOUNTAINS AND THE WEST BY THE DARBANDIKHAN RESERVOIR, IS FROM THE ROAD TO SULAYMANIYYA TO THE NORTH. THE LOSS OF HALABCHA AND KHURMAL EFFECTIVELY TURNS OVER TO THE IRANIANS A NEW PIECE OF BORDER TERRITORY COMPARABLE TO THE FAO SALIENT OR THE PANJWIN "PARROT'S BEAK"

LOST IN OTHER CAMPAIGNS. THE BRAZILIAN COMPANY GEOTECNICA HAS EVACUATED ITS CAMP IN THE AREA OF DARBANDIKHAN DAM (WHERE THE BRAZILIANS HAVE BEEN WORKING TO SHORE UP CRUMBLING ROCK NEAR THE 30-YEAR-OLD DAM). UNDERSECRETARY HAMDOON HAD ALREADY LEARNED

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OF THE FALL OF KHURMAL AND FEARED THE LOSS OF HALABCHA ON THE EVENING OF MARCH 16 AND EXPRESSED TO THE AMBASSADOR CONCERN ABOUT THE IRANIAN THREAT TO THE RESERVOIR. (BAGHDAD IS ALREADY WORRIED ABOUT HIGH WATER ON THE TIGRIS AND A THREAT ON THE DIYALA RIVER, WHICH ADJOINS THE TIGRIS JUST BELOW BAGHDAD, IS THUS ALL THE MORE

UNWELCOME.)

5. THESE SETBACKS IN KURDISTAN HAVE COINCIDED WITH A ONE-DAY COOLING OFF IN THE MISSILE CAMPAIGN. THE EVENING OF MARCH 16/17 PASSED WITHOUT MISSILES IN EITHER DIRECTION, AND THE IRAQIS HAVE SENT ONLY ONE AGAINST TEHRAN SO FAR TODAY MARCH 17 (AT 0930 LOCAL). NEVERTHELESS, THE IRAQI AIR ATTACKS AGAINST IRANIAN CITIES CONTINUE AT A TORRID PACE, AND TOTAL REPORTED AIRPLANE AND HELICOPTER ATTACKS AGAINST IRAN HAVE TOPPED 400 FOR TWO DAYS IN A ROW (A MUCH HIGHER RATE THAN WE HAVE OBSERVED IN A YEAR--PRESUMABLY MUCH OF IT DIRECTED IN THE HALABCHA AREA).

6. SADDAM CONVENED THE COMBINED RCC-RC MARCH 16, FOR THE SECOND TIME IN LESS THAN A WEEK. FOLLOWING THE MEETING AN OFFICIAL STATEMENT WAS ISSUED "REGRETTING FALSE INTENTIONS IN THE UNITED NATIONS" WHICH ARE BEHIND MOVES TO STEM THE WAR OF THE CITIES. THE STATE-

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MENT RECALLED THAT IRAQ HAD NOTIFIED THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF IRAN'S SHELLING OF HALABCHA "BACKED BY IRANIAN GROUND FORCES," BUT "SOME PARTIES ARE OVERLOOKING THESE FACTS," FOCUSING INSTEAD ON IRAQI MISSILE ATTACKS ON TEHRAN. THE IRAQIS INSIST THAT IRAQ'S MISSILE STRIKES WERE LAUNCHED IN "SELF-DEFENSE" FOLLOWING THE ATTACK

ON HALABCHA.

7. COMMENT: IT APPEARS THAT IRAQ'S USE OF MUSCLE

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AGAINST IRAN IN THE FORM OF ITS NEWLY-ACQUIRED LONG-RANGE MISSILE CAPABILITY HAS NOT ONLY GREATLY COMPLICATED THE DIPLOMATIC FRONT BUT LANDED IT WITH A BATTLEFIELD REVERSE. THE IRAQIS MAY TYPICALLY HAVE TRIED TO HANDLE THE ATTACK ONLY WITH LOCAL AND FIRST CORPS RESERVES IN ORDER NOT TO DRAW DOWN OTHER SECTORS, BUT THEY WILL NOW PROBABLY HAVE TO BRING IN OTHER FORCES IN THE EXPECTED COUNTER-ATTACK, WHICH MAY PROVE DIFFICULT AND COSTLY IN LIGHT OF GEOGRAPHY WHICH IS UNFAVORABLE TO IRAQ. SENIOR IRAQI OFFICERS WERE SAYING ALMOST A YEAR AGO THAT IF THE REGIME DID NOT PACIFY KURDS ENRAGED BY THE RAZING OF THEIR VILLAGES BY THE FALL, IRAQ COULD LOSE SOME PIECES OF KURDISH TERRITORY DURING THE WINTER. THEIR PREDICTION HAS

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INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	INR-10	SS-00	CIAE-00	H-01	MSC-01
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DEPT FOR NEA/NGA, NEA/EX, DS/OPS/NEA, CA/OCS/EMR

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, ASEC, IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQI LOSSES IN KURDISTAN WHILE THE WAR OF

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ACTION NEA-11

INFO	LOG-00	COPY-01	ADS-00	INR-10	EUR-00	SS-00	OIC-02
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AMCONSUL ADANA
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USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL 0072

C ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 00292

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PINS, MOPS, IZ
SUBJECT: TRIP TO ARBIL, KURDISTAN: APPARENT CALM

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: IN SHARP CONTRAST TO IRANIAN CLAIMS OF "VICTORIES" INCLUDING RECENT ALLEGED SEIZURE OF A VILLAGE SEVEN KILOMETERS FROM KIRKUK, ARBIL, SEAT OF THE KURDISH AUTONOMOUS REGION, WAS CALM AND SECURITY LIGHT ON DAY TRIP BY HELICOPTER JANUARY 14. OFFICIALS OF THE IRAQI-CONTROLLED KURDISH AUTONOMOUS ASSEMBLY AND EXECUTIVE COUNCIL EMPHASIZED TO STAFFDEL AND DCM THAT IRAQ GIVES KURDS MORE RECOGNITION AND FREE-

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DOM THAN DO ANY OF ITS NEIGHBORS AND THAT THE FOUR-FOLD INCREASE OF ARBIL CITY POPULATION TO 375,000 IN PAST 15 YEARS IS EVIDENCE OF "SUCCESS" OF THE GOVERNMENT'S POLITICAL/DEVELOPMENT POLICIES. KURDS ARE NEVER GOING TO BE HAPPY WITH IRAQI ARAB CONTROL, BUT THE ECONOMIC/POLITICAL/SECURITY SITUATION IN ARBIL MAY BE MORE VIABLE THAN THE CLAIMS OF TEHRAN RADIO WOULD MAKE ONE BELIEVE. END SUMMARY.

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3. ON JANUARY 14 DCM AND POLOFF ACCOMPANIED VISITING 15-MEMBER CONGRESSIONAL STAFFDEL ON TRIP ORGANIZED BY THE IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTRY TO ARBIL, CENTRAL GOVERNMENT DESIGNATED "CAPITAL" OF IRAQ'S KURDISH AUTONOMOUS REGION (A CLAIM DISPUTED BY SULAYMANIYYA). ARBIL IS FOUR HOURS BY ROAD AND ONE AND A HALF BY HELICOPTER NORTHEAST OF BAGHDAD. THE GROUP WENT IN TWO BELL VIP HELICOPTERS, WHICH FOR THE MOST PART FOLLOWED THE MAIN HIGHWAY TO THE OIL PRODUCING CENTER OF KIRKUK AND THEN DUE NORTH TO ARBIL. THEY WERE RARELY MORE THAN 700 FEET OFF THE GROUND. WHILE IRANIANS HAVE RECENTLY CLAIMED SUCCESS IN "MAJOR OPERATIONS" JUST OUTSIDE OF KIRKUK, ALLEGEDLY INCLUDING CAPTURING A TOWN ONLY SEVEN KILOMETERS FROM KIRKUK, WE FLEW TO THE EAST OF KIRKUK ON THE WAY UP AND TO THE WEST ON THE WAY BACK, AND AT NEITHER TIME NOTICED ANY EVIDENCE OF MILITARY ACTIVITY. IF THE IRANIANS WERE THAT CLOSE, WE WOULD NOT HAVE FLOWN WHERE WE DID. MOREOVER, ON THE WHOLE TRIP WE SAW NO EVIDENCE OF MILITARY ACTIVITY OF ANY KIND, IN SHARP CONTRAST TO SOUTH OF BAGHDAD, WHERE MILITARY EMPLACEMENTS AND TRAFFIC ARE ALMOST ALWAYS VISIBLE. THE COUNTRYSIDE, PARTICULARLY FROM KIRKUK TO ARBIL, IS AN UNDULATING PLAIN OF MUD DURING THIS RAINY SEASON, INTERSPERSED BY LARGE CANALS AND THE TRACKS OF TRACTOR-PLANTED ROWS OF WHEAT.

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4. ARBIL.

LOCATED ON A AIDE PLAIN BORDERED ON THE NORTH AND EAST BY MOUNTAINS, THE CITY HAS A QAL'A, OR ANCIENT CITADEL, RISING UP AS ITS CENTER. AT THE MILITARY AIRPORT WE WERE MET BY THE GOVERNOR, IBRAHIM ZANGANA, A TALL, ENGAGING KURD WHOSE GREYING HAIR DID NOTHING TO SOFTEN A FIERCE DEMEANOR, AND THE PROVINCIAL PARTY SECRETARY, SUBNI ALI KHALIF.

5. MEETINGS.

ACCOMPANIED BY ONLY ONE POLICE CAR AND NO SIGN OF EXTRA SECURITY, THE GROUP WAS WHISKED TO THE KURDISH AUTONOMOUS GOVERNMENT COMPLEX, COMPOSED OF MARBLE-FACED BUILDINGS ON THE CITY'S OUTSKIRTS. IN SUCCESSION THE GROUP MET WITH THE GOVERNOR AND PARTY CHIEF, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE KURDISH EXECUTIVE COUNCIL, SIRWAN AL-JAF, AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE KURDISH AUTONOMOUS LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL. AHMAD NAKISHIBANDI. AFTER TEA AND GIFTS OF LOCALLY WOVEN SMALL CARPETS, THE OFFICIALS ALL REPEATED THE SAME LINE: OF THE FOUR COUNTRIES IN THE REGION WITH KURDISH POPULATIONS, ONLY IRAQ RECOGNIZES THE KURDS AND HAS PROVIDED THEM WITH AUTONOMY. THE KURDS ARE ALLOWED TO SPEAK THEIR OWN LANGUAGE, KURDISH CUL-

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TURAL ACTIVITIES AND PUBLICATIONS ARE SUPPORTED BY THE

GOVERNMENT, AND FREE EDUCATION IS PROVIDED IN ARABIC AND KURDISH UP TO THE UNIVERSITY LEVEL. KURDS ARE IRAQIS JUST AS OTHER MINORITIES ARE IRAQIS. SO LONG AS KURDS ACCEPT THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE IRAQI STATE, THEIR CULTURAL AND SOCIAL ACTIVITIES ARE ALLOWED TO FLOURISH. THOSE WHO OPPOSE THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE IRAQI STATE ARE DEALT WITH FIRMLY, BUT THEY ARE A SMALL NUMBER, INCITED BY OUTSIDE AGITATORS, PRIMARILY FROM IRAN. THE GOVERNOR

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DECLARED IN HIS OPENING REMARKS THAT "THE KURDS ARE ALL ARMED" AND THAT "ALL THE MEN ARE BEHIND PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN IN OPPOSING THE ENEMY." THOSE KURDS OPPOSED TO THE GOVERNMENT ARE "OUTLAWS," SAID THE GOVERNOR, AND "CAN BE COUNTED ON THE FINGERS OF A HAND." THE ARAB BA'TH SOCIALIST PARTY (ABSP) CHIEF WENT TO GREAT LENGTHS TO EXPLAIN THAT KURDS NOW HAVE FULL FREEDOM TO ENJOY ALL THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS TO WHICH THEY ASPIRED IN THE PAST. KURDS, HE CLAIMED, ARE LINKED TO THE ARABS AND "CANNOT LIVE FAR FROM THEIR ARAB BROTHERS." HE CLAIMED THAT KURDS LIVING IN OTHER COUNTRIES ASPIRE TO THE SAME RIGHTS ENJOYED BY IRAQI KURDS IN THE KURDISH AUTONOMOUS REGION (KAR). THOSE FEW KURDS OPPOSED TO THE PRESENT ARRANGEMENTS ARE "BRIGANDS" WHO HAVE BEEN PREVENTED FROM EXPLOITING THE PEOPLE AS THEY DID IN THE PAST. THEY HAVE PLACED THEMSELVES OUTSIDE THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE KURDISH PEOPLE.

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ACTION NEA-11

INFO	LOG-00	COPY-01	ADS-00	INR-10	EUR-00	SS-00	OIC-02
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	L-03	TRSE-00	PM-10	PA-01	OMB-01	INRE-00	ACDA-12
	USIE-00	SP-02	SNP-01	C-01	PRS-01	P-02	T-01

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USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL 0073

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 BAGHDAD 00292

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SUBJECT: TRIP TO ARBIL, KURDISTAN: APPARENT CALM

6. LEVELING OF KURDISH VILLAGES.

QUERIED ABOUT THIS SUBJECT DIRECTLY AND INDIRECTLY BY STAFFERS, ALL OFFICIALS DENIED IT HAD TAKEN PLACE. SIRWAN AL-JAF, CHAIRMAN OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL, CLAIMED THAT THE ONLY RELOCATION CARRIED OUT WAS OF SMALL VILLAGES OF FOUR TO SIX HOUSES. THESE VILLAGES WERE RELOCATED FOR THE INHABITANTS' BENEFIT SINCE THE GOVERNMENT COULD NOT PROVIDE ELECTRICITY AND OTHER SERVICES TO SUCH SMALL SETTLEMENTS. AL-JAF SAID SUCH RELOCATION OF HAMLETS WAS ALSO BEING CARRIED OUT IN

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OTHER PARTS OF IRAQ AND WAS NOT SOLELY A PHENOMENON OF KURDISTAN. GOVERNOR ZANGANA ARGUED FORCEFULLY THAT THE LARGE INFLUX OF KURDISH POPULATION INTO ARBIL --A FOUR-FOLD INCREASE. TO 375,000, IN THE PAST 15 YEARS-- WAS A NATURAL PHENOMENON OF RURAL TO URBAN MIGRATION, CAUSED BY THE ECONOMIC ATTRACTION OF THIS KURDISH CAPITAL, WHICH INCLUDES TEXTILE AND OTHER FACTORIES EMPLOYING OVER 3,000. IN A LATER PRIVATE CONVERSATION WITH DCM, COUNCIL PRESIDENT .NAKISHIBANDI ADMITTED THAT THERE HAD

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BEEN A LARGE INFLUX OF KURDS FROM THE MOUNTAINS TO THE CITY AND ALONG MAJOR HIGHWAYS IN RECENT YEARS. THE GOVERNMENT WAS PROVIDING LAND AND OTHER FACILITIES, INCLUDING HOUSING (WITH HEAVILY SUBSIDIZED MORTGAGES) TO THESE RECENT ARRIVALS, AND THE RICHNESS OF THE LAND MADE IT POSSIBLE FOR THEM TO MAKE A LIVING ON THE PLAINS, NAKIHI BANDI: CLAIMED. THE ARBIL PROVINCE'S TOTAL POPULATION (FROM OCTOBER 1987 CENSUS) IS 750,000, OF WHICH 99 PER CENT ARE KURDS, THE GOVERNOR SAID.

7. SECURITY.

THE AUTONOMOUS KURDISH GOVERNMENTAL COMPLEX BUILDINGS, WITH THEIR SHINING MARBLE, DID NOT HAVE THE LOOK OF BEING PUT TO MUCH USE. A POTESKIN VILLAGE CAME MORE TO MIND. OUR TRAVELS AROUND THE CITY TO THE OLD CITADEL (WHERE SEVERAL LARGE HOUSES ARE BEING RESTORED AND MANY MORE ARE FALLING TO RUIN OR ARE BEING DESTROYED IN A PROGRAM TO DEPOPULATE THE CITADEL), AND THE CENTRAL MARKET AREA REVEALED A LACK OF SECURITY PRESENCE. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF FOUR RED-BERETED SPECIAL FORCES, NO MILITARY WERE IN SIGHT AND LIFE IN THE TOWN SEEMED

NORMAL. ON ONE OF THE RIDES THE POLICE CHIEF DROVE

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THE DCM, ON ANOTHER THE PARTY CHIEF DID THE SAME. WERE SECURITY BAD, THEY WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DRIVING THEMSELVES.

8. KURDISH AUTONOMOUS REGION:

THE KURDISH OFFICIALS SAID THE LEGAL BASIS OF THE KAR IS THE LOCAL AUTONOMY LAW ENACTED BY THE REVOLUTION COMMAND COUNCIL (RCC) IN 1974. THE KAR INCLUDES THE GOVERNORATES OF ARBIL, SULAYMANIYAH, AND DOHUK. THE KAR GOVERNMENT HAS NO AUTHORITY OVER DEFENSE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AND FINANCE. IT HAS NO TAXING AUTHORITY AND NO INDEPENDENT SOURCE OF INCOME. THE KAR GOVERNMENT SUBMITS AN ANNUAL BUDGET REQUEST TO THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IN BAGHDAD AND IS TOTALLY DEPENDENT ON FINANCING FROM THE IRAQI NATIONAL TREASURY. THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL CONSISTS OF 80 MEMBERS ELECTED FOR 3-YEAR TERMS. BY LAW THE NUMBER OF CANDIDATES MUST BE AT LEAST TWICE THE NUMBER OF POSITIONS TO BE FILLED. CANDIDATES MUST BE 25 YEARS OF AGE, HAVE NO CRIMINAL RECORD, BE ABLE TO READ AND WRITE, BE FROM THE KAR, AND MUST BE LOYAL TO IRAQ AND BELIEVERS IN THE PRINCIPLES OF THE 1968 REVOLUTION. MEMBERS OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL ARE PAID 250 IRAQI DINARS PER MONTH. THE COUNCIL HOLDS TWO SESSIONS ANNUALLY, THE FIRST IN APRIL-MAY AND THE SECOND IN OCTOBER-DECEMBER. THE CHAIRMAN CAN CALL

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SPECIAL SESSIONS. THE OFFICIAL DUTIES OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL ARE TO ISSUE LEGISLATIVE DECISIONS, TO DEVELOP AND MODERNIZE THE REGION, AND TO PRESERVE AND PROTECT THE CULTURE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE KURDISH PEOPLE. THE COUNCIL DISBURSES THREE SEPARATE BUDGETS (ORDINARY, MUNICIPAL, AND DEVELOPMENT) FROM FUNDS ALLOCATED BY THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT. THE COUNCIL ELECTS A SPEAKER (CHAIRMAN), DEPUTY SPEAKER, AND SECRETARY. THERE ARE SIX DEPUTY STANDING COMMITTEES: LEGAL AFFAIRS, COMPLAINTS AND SUGGESTIONS, PUBLIC SERVICES,

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AGRICULTURE AND COOPERATIVES, FINANCIAL, AND EDUCATION, CULTURE AND RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS.

9. AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL, THE KAR IS REPRESENTED BY 31 MEMBERS IN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, 7 CABINET MEMBERS (INCLUDING THE CHAIRMAN OF THE KURDISH EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE COUNCILS), AND THE VICE PRESIDENT OF IRAQ. KURDS SERVE IN ALL GOVERNMENT OFFICES.

10. KURDISH EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM.

THE CHAIRMAN OF THE KAR EXECUTIVE COUNCIL SIRWAN AL-JAF SAID THAT BEFORE 1968 (WHEN THE BATHIS TOOK POWER IN IRAQ), THERE WERE IN KURDISTAN SIX KINDERGARDENS WITH 5,223 PUPILS AND 388 TEACHERS. THE CHAIRMAN COMPARED EDUCATION STATISTICS FOR 1974 (WHEN THE AUTONOMY LAW WAS ENACTED) WITH THESE FOR 1986:

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ACTION NEA-11

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CIAE-00 H-01 MSC-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 HA-09
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FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
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AMEMBASSY RIYADH
AMCONSUL ADANA
DIA WASHDC 0013
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL 0074

CONFIDENTIAL A-L SECTION 03 OF 03 BAGHDAD 00292

SUBJECT: TRIP TO ARBIL, KURDISTAN: APPARENT CALM

- INSTITUTION-	1974	1986
PRIMARY SCHOOLS	533	955
" STUDENTS	87,000	300,000
" TEACHERS	5,500	14,300
SECONDARY SCHOOLS	118	274

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VOCATIONAL SCHOOLS:

" AGRICULTURAL	3	4
" INDUSTRIAL	3	19
" TRADE/COMMERCE	1	7

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TEACHERS COLLEGES

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THERE ARE ALSO TWO JUNIOR TEACHERS' COLLEGES AND ONE FINE ARTS INSTITUTE IN SULAYMANIYYA. IN 1987 SEVENTY NEW PRIMARY SCHOOLS, TWENTY NEW SECONDARY SCHOOLS, AND FOUR NEW VOCATIONAL SCHOOLS WERE OPENED IN KURDISTAN.

11. AT THE COLLEGE LEVEL, THERE IS A UNIVERSITY IN ARBIL WITH AN ENGINEERING COLLEGE AND SCHOOLS OF LAW, SCIENCE, THE ARTS, ETC. FOUR NEW UNIVERSITIES ARE PLANNED FOR THE KAR. A COMMITTEE HEADED BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL GRANTS PAID STUDY LEAVE TO EMPLOYEES FOR THEM TO PURSUE ADVANCED DEGREES. IN A SINGLE YEAR 210 SUCH STUDY LEAVES WERE APPROVED.

12. BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION.

NAKSHIBANDI IS SHORT, WITH THICK GLASSES, AND LOOKS TO BE IN HIS LATE 50'S. HE SPEAKS LITTLE ENGLISH AND COMES FROM A FAMILY WHICH HAS BEEN THE "GOVERNMENT KURDS" FOR GENERATIONS. GOVERNOR IBRAHIM ZANGANA TOLD DCM HE HAD SPENT NEARLY TWENTY YEARS AS A LAWYER FOR THE MIN-

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ISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND THEN TEN IN THE KURDISH AUTONOMOUS GOVERNMENT BEFORE BEING NAMED GOVERNOR A YEAR AGO. PARTY CHIEF KHALAF IS AN ARAB WHO BEFORE BEING NAMED TO HIS PRESENT POST LAST YEAR WORKED IN PARTY HEAD-QUARTERS IN BAGHDAD AND BEFORE THAT SPENT FOUR YEARS AS GOVERNOR OF MOSUL AND THREE AS GOVERNOR OF NASIRIYYA. THE GOVERNOR SPEAKS FAIR ENGLISH AND SPENT FOUR WEEKS IN THE U.S. LAST NOVEMBER/DECEMBER GETTING MEDICAL TREATMENT FOR WOUNDS RESULTING FROM A BOTCHED ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT EARLIER IN THE YEAR. AS A SPEAKER HE TENDED TO STICK RIGIDLY TO THE PARTY LINE IN PUBLIC AND WAS NOT AS EFFECTIVE WITH THE STAFFERS AS THE PARTY CHIEF, WHO FREQUENTLY TOOK OVER IN THE QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSIONS.

13. COMMENT: A SIX-HOUR VISIT UNDER HEAVILY CONTROLLED CIRCUMSTANCES PRODUCES A DISTORTED VIEW OF ARBIL, BUT WE WERE SURPRISED BY ITS SEEMING CALM. IN PRIVATE, ANY KURDISH INTERLOCUTOR WILL NOT ONLY ADMIT THE MASSIVE DESTRUCTION OF VILLAGES BUT PAINFULLY REGRET IT AS AN OVERREACTION BY THE GOVERNMENT: BUT IN PUBLIC, THERE IS NO CHOICE BUT TO GIVE THE PARTY LINE. THE CAMPAIGN HAS BEEN EFFECTIVE AT LEAST IN THE SENSE THAT THE KURDS DO NOT HAVE VILLAGES TO GO BACK TO AND MUST THEREFORE SETTLE IN THE GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED CITIES AND "NEW TOWNS."

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TEXT OF TELEGRAM 88BAGHDA000292

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ACTION H-03

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FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PINS, OREP, IZ
SUBJECT: GALBRAITH TRIP TO IRAQ: BASRA AND KURDISTAN

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: DURING SEPTEMBER 3 VISIT, BASRA CENTRAL CITY APPEARED TO BE ALMOST ENTIRELY EVACUATED. INTENSE IRANIAN SHELLING THAT BEGAN SEPTEMBER 1 REACHED CITY'S NORTHWESTERN SUBURBS, WHERE IT HAD NOT BEEN PREVIOUSLY CONCENTRATED, CAUSING MANY CIVILIAN CASUALTIES. DESTRUCTION OF KURDISH VILLAGES BY THE IRAQI AUTHORITIES APPEARS DESIGNED TO FORCE KURDS INTO LARGE, MORE EASILY CONTROLLED SETTLEMENTS AND TO CLEAR MUCH OF THE COUNTRYSIDE. SECURITY IN IRAQI KURDISTAN HAS DETERIORATED MARKEDLY IN COMPARISON TO 1984. END SUMMARY.

3. SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE STAFF MEMBER

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PAGE 02 BAGHDA 04595 171114Z

PETER GALBRAITH VISITED BASRA SEPTEMBER 3 AND SOUTH-EASTERN IRAQI KURDISTAN (DARBANDIKHAN AND SULAYMANIYYA) SEPTEMBER 6-7. HE PREVIOUSLY VISITED IRAQ IN 1984, WHEN HE TRAVELED TO CENTRAL IRAQI KURDISTAN (ARBIL AND SHAQLAWA).

4. BASRA WAS UNDER HEAVY IRANIAN SHELLING WHICH BEGAN SEPTEMBER 1 AND CONTINUED UNTIL THE VISIT OF PEREZ DE CUELLAR TO THE REGION. (IRAQIS CLAIM, BUT IRANIANS DENY,

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THAT IRANIAN SHELLING OF BASRA CONTINUED EVEN DURING PEREZ VISIT.) GALBRAITH VISITED HOSPITAL WHERE SCORES OF CIVILIANS HAD BEEN WOUNDED IN PREVIOUS DAYS' SHELLING; HE ALSO OBSERVED SEVERAL DEAD. AUTHORITIES EXPLAINED THAT SHELLING WAS HITTING NORTHWESTERN SUBURBS WHICH HAD PREVIOUSLY LARGELY BEEN SPARED. THE CENTRAL CITY ITSELF APPEARED TO BE ALMOST COMPLETELY DEVOID OF ITS INHABITANTS.

5. GALBRAITH'S TRIP TO KURDISTAN CONTRASTED WITH HIS PREVIOUS TRIP IN JULY 1984, WHEN HE WAS ABLE TO GET DEEP INTO THE MOUNTAINS AT SHAQLAWA AND WHEN MOST CHECKPOINTS AND FORTIFICATIONS WERE UNMANNED. THIS TIME, THE JOURNEY INTO THE MOUNTAINS (TO SULAYMANIYYA) WAS PUNCTUATED BY LONG WAITS AS MILITARY ESCORTS (HELMETED SOLDIERS, ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS AND RPGS) FORMED UP. AUTHORITIES WERE EXTREMELY NERVOUS ABOUT A VISIT EVEN TO SULAYMANIYYA ITSELF, WHICH WAS REPEATEDLY DESCRIBED AS VERY DANGEROUS.

6. ALONG THE HIGHWAY FROM JALAWLA TO SULAYMANIYYA TO KIRKUK, 23 KURDISH TOWNS AND VILLAGES WERE OBSERVED DESTROYED, FALLING INTO THREE ZONES: BETWEEN JALAWLA AND KILAR; 10 MILES SOUTH AND 20 MILES NORTH OF THE

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PAGE 03

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DARBANDIKHAN RESERVOIR; AND 10 MILES SOUTH AND WEST OF SULAYMANIYYA. LARGE NEW SETTLEMENT AREAS WERE OBSERVED UNDER CONSTRUCTION FIFTEEN MILES SOUTH AND FIFTEEN MILES WEST OF SULAYMANIYYA.

7. COMMENT: IRANIAN SHELLING OF BASRA APPEARS TO BE AT LEAST AS INTENSE AS IN THE JANUARY/FEBRUARY PERIOD. GIVEN THE OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO THE IRANIANS FOR RESPONDING TO IRAQI RECOMMENCEMENT OF INLAND AIR ATTACKS AUGUST 10 AND GULF AIR ATTACKS AUGUST 29 -- INCLUDING FOR EXAMPLE MISSILE ATTACKS ON BAGHDAD, AN ATTACK ON A U.S. SHIP, AND MISSILE OR OTHER ATTACKS ON KUWAIT/SAUDI ARABIA -- THIS FEROCIOUS ATTACK ON BASRA, PLUS SOME "WARNING SHOTS" AT KUWAIT, MUST HAVE APPEARED THE LEAST COSTLY ALTERNATIVE FOR IRAN.

8. GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED AREAS OF KURDISTAN ARE BEING REVOLUTIONIZED DEMOGRAPHICALLY AS A RESULT OF VILLAGE DESTRUCTION. THE KURDS' AGRARIAN WAY OF LIFE HAS BEEN W03\$ -2-6, AS MOST KURDS HAVE BEEN FORCED OUT OF ISOLATED HAMLETS -- WHICH WERE IDEAL SANCTUARY FOR THE GUERRILLAS -- INTO TOWNS (SOME BEING BUILT NEW) AND

CITIES.

9. ABOVE SUMMARY OF LONGER TRIP REPORT DRAFTED AFTER GALBRAITH'S DEPARTURE WHICH WILL BE POUCHED TO DEPT

TEXT OF TELEGRAM 87BAGHDA004595

(NEA/NGA) WITH REQUEST THAT COPY BE FORWARDED TO
GALBRAITH.

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R 091320Z MAY 90
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Date: 9/30/96

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SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 06367

E.O. 12356: DECLASSIFY
TAGS: TU, PGOV, PTER
SUBJECT: CONVERSATIONS AND OBSERVATIONS DURING RECENT
- TRIP TO EASTERN TURKEY

1. ENTIRE TEXT

2. SUMMARY: DURING ANKARA POLOFF'S RECENT PRIVATE VISIT
TO THE SOUTHEAST, LOCAL CONTACTS COMPLAINED ABOUT POOR
ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND, AS KURDS, BEING TREATED AS
"SECOND CLASS CITIZENS." INFORMANTS CLAIMED THE PKK
WOULD NEVER KILL A TOURIST OR FOREIGNER. DESPITE
NUMEROUS JANDARMA CONTROLS IN HAKKARI, LOCAL OFFICIALS
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CLAIMED ALL PARTS OF THE PROVINCE ARE ACCESSIBLE. END

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SUMMARY.

3. ANKARA POLOFF TOOK A PERSONAL TRIP TO SOUTHEASTERN TURKEY APRIL 30-MAY 6, SPEAKING TO A NUMBER OF PEOPLE IN BINGOL, MUS, VAN, HAKKARI, MARDIN, AND DIYARBAKIR. MOST INTERLOCUTORS WERE TOWNSPEOPLE OR FARMERS HITCHHIKING BETWEEN TOWNS. ALL WERE KURDISH EXCEPT FOR JANDARMA AND POLICE OFFICIALS.

ECONOMICS

4. PEOPLE IN ALL LOCALITIES, BUT ESPECIALLY IN BITLIS AND BINGOL (WHICH LOOK PARTICULARLY DEPRESSED), COMPLAINED OF THE LACK OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY AND OF THE FAILURE OF GOVERNMENT ACTION TO REMEDY THE SITUATION. TOURISM HELPS, THEY SAID, BUT REALLY ONLY BENEFITS THOSE WORKING IN HOTELS OR RUG AND SOUVENIR SHOPS. (THE BENEFITS OF THE HIGHLY-ACCLAIMED GAP PROJECT WILL BE LARGELY LIMITED TO PEOPLE IN THE URFA AREA.)

ATTITUDES TOWARD PKK

5. ATTITUDES TOWARD THE PKK ARE AMBIVALENT. VIOLENCE, ESPECIALLY TOWARD ONE'S OWN PEOPLE IS DEPLORED, BUT THE PERCEPTION THAT ARMED KURDS MAKE MORE OF A SPLASH THAN THEIR ELECTED DEPUTIES (WHOM THEY CONSIDER AS EITHER BOUGHT OFF OR EMASCULATED BY THE SYSTEM) EVOKES SOME
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ADMIRATION. ALL INFORMANTS EMPHATICALLY CLAIMED FOREIGNERS AND TOURISTS ARE IN NO DANGER FROM THE PKK, AS THOUGH THIS WERE ANNOUNCED PKK POLICY. A NUMBER OF INFORMANTS CLAIMED THAT MANY INCIDENTS BLAMED BY THE GOT ON THE PKK ARE INSTIGATED BY GOVERNMENT SECURITY FORCES.

ATTITUDES TOWARD TURKEY

6. ATTITUDES TOWARD TURKEY ARE ALSO AMBIVALENT. WHEN

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[REDACTED] **ED**
PRESSED, INFORMANTS SAID THEY ARE BETTER OFF AS KURDS IN TURKEY THAN IRAN OR IRAQ, DESPITE LOCAL ECONOMIC CONDITIONS. THEY ADDED THAT AN INDEPENDENT KURDISTAN IS NOT A VIABLE OPTION. INFORMANTS SHOWED NO RELUCTANCE TO DESCRIBE THEMSELVES AS TURKISH CITIZENS, BUT CALLED FOR MORE OPEN CULTURAL EXPRESSIONS, SUCH AS THE RIGHT TO SING KURDISH SONGS IN PUBLIC AND TO HAVE TELEVISION AND RADIO BROADCASTS IN KURDISH. SOME CALLED FOR SCHOOLING IN KURDISH. "WE ARE LOSING OUR TRADITIONS" IS A COMMON LAMENT.

7. INFORMANTS CLAIM THEY ARE UNIFORMLY TREATED WITH SUSPICION AND AS "SECOND-CLASS CITIZENS" BY THE SECURITY FORCE ELEMENTS (TURKISH NATIONAL POLICE (TNP) AND JANDARMA), WHO ARE ALMOST ALWAYS TURKS FROM WESTERN TURKEY. ONE INFORMANT DEFINED TURKEY'S ALLEGED "LACK OF DEMOCRACY" AS BEING ROUTINELY BEATEN DURING POLICE INTERROGATIONS SIMPLY BECAUSE ONE IS A KURD. ANOTHER CLAIMED POLICE SURVEILLED DIPLOMATS AND FOREIGNERS TRAVELLING IN THE AREA FOR FEAR THEY WOULD WRITE "THE TRUTH." POLOFF OBSERVED PREEMPTORY BEHAVIOR NOT DESIGNED TO WIN LOCAL HEARTS AND MINDS ON THE PART OF A "BLUE BERET" (SPECIAL COMMANDOS TEMPORARILY ATTACHED TO

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FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3546
INFO AMCONSUL ADANA
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SECDEF WASHDC
JCS WASHDC
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USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//POLAD//
USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES IT//INTAFF
USNMR SHAPE BE//INTAFF//
CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE//POLAD//

SECTION 02 OF 02 ANKARA 06367

E.O. 12356: DECL: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
TAGS: TU, PGOV, PTER
SUBJECT: CONVERSATIONS AND OBSERVATIONS DURING RECENT
- TRIP TO EASTERN TURKEY

JANDARMA UNITS) IN A HAKKARI CAFE.

REFUGEES

8. WHEN POLOFF NOTED PRESENCE OF UNIFORMED PESHMERGES IN
DIYARBAKIR, INTERLOCUTOR COMMENTED THEY WERE GIVEN THE
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RUN OF THE CITY TO IMPRESS VISITING EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENTARY DELEGATIONS. "BUT YOU SHOULD SEE

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[REDACTED]
KIZILTEPE (NEAR MARDIN) WHERE REFUGEE CAMP WHERE
CONDITIONS ARE BAD, AND WHERE THEY'RE NOT ALLOWED OUT,"
HE ADDED.

SECURITY

9. POLOFF ENCOUNTERED A NUMBER OF JANDARMA CHECKPOINTS
ON THE VAN-HAKKARI ROAD BEYOND THE GUNZELDERE PASS.
CHECKPOINTS OCCASIONALLY RECORDED LICENSE NUMBER AND
TIME OF PASSAGE. JANDARMA OFFICIALS AND LOCALS WERE
INVARIABLY COURTEOUS AND CLAIMED THERE WERE NO
TERRORISTS IN THE AREA. POLOFF DID NOT ATTEMPT TO GO TO
YUKSEKOVA, BUT NOTICED MOTOR TRAFFIC TOWARD IRAN
PROCEEDING NORMALLY.

10. POLICE AT HAKKARI CLAIMED THE ROAD FROM HAKKARI TO
MARDIN WAS OPEN AND SAFE. LOCALS CLAIMED IT WAS SAFE,
BUT BLOCKED BY A RECENT SNOWFALL ON THE 2,470 METER
SUVARIALIL PASS. POLOFF EVENTUALLY REACHED MARDIN VIA
VAN AND BITLIS.

11. COMMENT: POLOFF WAS SURPRISED TO FIND THE ROAD TO
MARDIN OPEN, SINCE IT PASSES THROUGH SUCH HOTSPOTS AS
ULUDERE, SIRNAK, AND CIZRE. APART FROM PASTORALISM AND
VILLAGE GUARDS, HAKKARI'S MAJOR ECONOMIC ACTIVITY IS
TOURISM, WHICH CONSISTS OF A FEW THOUSAND SUMMER HIKERS
AND MOUNTAINEERS, MOSTLY GERMAN AND FRENCH. POLOFF LEFT
HAKKARI WITH IMPRESSION THAT LOCAL AUTHORITIES AND LOCAL
PEOPLE WELCOMED ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF TOURISM, AND WOULD

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PAGE 03

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TRY TO KEEP THE PROVINCE ACCESSIBLE TO TOURISTS AS MUCH
AS POSSIBLE. END COMMENT.

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24 June 1991

Press Release

The First Inspection of Iraqi Chemical Weapons Capabilities
pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 687 (1991)

The United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) carried out an initial exploratory inspection of the Muthanna State Establishment - also known as the State Enterprise for Pesticide Production - in Iraq over the period 9-14 June 1991.

The Muthanna State Establishment is a major chemical weapon production facility whose existence and location were declared by the Iraqi authorities to the Secretary General on 18 April, as required under UN Security Council Resolution 687 of 3 April. It is located in central Iraq, about 80 km north west of Baghdad and 50 km south west of Samarra, and is the facility which has often been referred to in Western media reports in recent years as the Camarra facility.

The Iraqi declaration of 18 April also confirmed the presence at the site of a number of R&D, production, munitions manufacturing, filling and storage facilities, as well as the presence on the site of substantial quantities of bulk chemical warfare agents, chemical weapons precursor chemicals and chemical munitions of various types.

The purpose of the initial exploratory inspection was to obtain a detailed description of the site, including the nature and condition of the facilities, chemical warfare agents, chemical munitions and precursor chemicals on the site and an indication of the hazards present so as to enable a full inspection of the

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IS/FPC/CDR

Date: 4/16/92

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Muthanna State Establishment, to be carried out at a later stage. The team was also instructed to make an initial assessment of the suitability of the site for the destruction of Iraq's chemical weapons capabilities, and to report any indication of undeclared activity related to nuclear, chemical, biological or missile capability.

The inspection was carried out by a team of 20 experts from eight different countries and the World Health Organisation selected by the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM, Ambassador Rolf Ekeus, for that purpose. The specialist skills in the team included explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), structural engineering, chemical agent detection, decontamination, chemical monitoring, biochemistry, and microbiology. Support personnel - two interpreters, a photographer, a recorder, a communicator and two administrative officers - were supplied by the United Nations. Dr Peter Dunn of Australia was appointed Chief Inspector and Lt Col Jim Knapp of Canada his deputy.

The Muthanna State Establishment is a large complex some 170 sq km in area. The major facilities on the site, however, are concentrated in an area of approximately 25 sq km and this area was the focus of the inspection team's activities.

In carrying out the inspection the safety of the inspection personnel was a prime consideration. Conditions in many areas of the site are hazardous in the extreme. Most major structures on the site have either been totally destroyed or severely damaged as a result of the bombing during the hostilities: few buildings have escaped unscathed. While much unexploded ordnance has been removed, some still remains on the site. The site also contains leaking chemical munitions and the presence of chemical agent was detected in some areas and structures. There is a clear need to clean up the site and to commence the destruction process as quickly as possible, bearing in mind the requirement for public safety and the safety of the personnel involved.

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The team verified the presence on the site of mustard gas and organophosphorus nerve agents, both as bulk agent and in the form of munitions. It was informed by the Iraqi authorities that the nerve agents were of the types GB and GF. The team also clarified with the Iraqi authorities their understanding of the term "binary sarin" as used in their declaration to the Secretary General. In Iraqi terminology, the term sarin covers all G-type nerve agents based on esters, both single and mixed, and in this context "binary sarin" is therefore a chemical munition containing both GB and GF.

The team found evidence for the presence on the site of impure tabun (agent GA), whose use in the Iran-Iraq war had been verified by the United Nations investigations of 1984, 1986 and 1987. It was informed that production of GA at the site had ceased in 1986.

The team was informed that the site had been used for the production of herbicides known as Propanil and Dalapon.

The team was also informed that research had been carried out at the Muthanna State Establishment on the nerve agents soman (agent GD) and VX, but that no large-scale production of these agents had been undertaken. It saw nothing on this occasion which was inconsistent with that statement, but concluded that two undamaged and sophisticated pilot plants found on the site would require further investigation.

The team also verified the presence on site of a number of precursor chemicals, mainly acquired from abroad. Some of these were present in large quantities. It also found that the site contained equipment obtained from a variety of sources.

During the inspection, the Iraqi authorities sought permission to remove certain items of equipment from the site for use in a water purification plant at Fallujah and for the formulation of

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insecticides. This request was granted by the Executive Chairman, subject to certain strict control arrangements being observed by the Iraqi authorities.

The team found no evidence at the site of any undeclared activity related to biological, nuclear or missile capability.

As this was only an initial exploratory inspection, it has not been possible for UNSCOM to come to any conclusion as to the veracity of the overall Iraqi declaration concerning the Muthanna State Establishment. The inspection team found no indication that Iraq was deliberately trying to mislead the Commission: indeed the attitude of the Iraqi authorities throughout was cooperative.

The team also held initial informal discussions with the Iraqi authorities on the Iraqi offer of 9 June (S/22682) to carry out the process of destruction. The team found that the site would be suitable for the destruction of Iraq's chemical weapons capabilities.

The next steps will be a full inspection of the site and further discussions with the Iraqi authorities on the destruction process. Evaluation of the information collected during the initial exploratory inspection has commenced and detailed planning for the full inspection will commence in the very near future. Because of the size of the site and the extent of the facilities as well as the hazards involved, the full inspection could well be a lengthy process.

Ambassador Ekeus said he wished to place on record his appreciation of the dedication, enthusiasm and superb professionalism with which all members of the inspection team went about their tasks and which were, he said, fully in accord with the highest traditions of the United Nations.

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TELEGRAM

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PARM, PREL, US, IZ
SUBJECT: US CHEMICAL SHIPMENT TO IRAQ: MEETING WITH SAHHAF
MARCH 5

REF: STATE 64124

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. MARCH 5 I CALLED ON UNDERSECRETARY SAHHAF AT THE FOREIGN
MINISTRY TO MAKE THE DEMARCHE (REFTEL) ON IRAQI USE OF CHEMICAL
WEAPONS AND THE ATTEMPTED SHIPMENT OF US CHEMICALS TO IRAQ FOR
"INSECTICIDES." I REVIEWED OUR PREVIOUS EXCHANGES ON THE SUBJECT
INCLUDING DAS PLACKE'S FEB 22 MEETING WITH IRAQINT CHIEF
HAMDOUN.

3. SAHHAF TOOK EXTENSIVE NOTES AS I READ PARTS OF THE INSTRUCTIONS
VERBATIM. HIS POSITION REMAINS THAT IRAQ IS NOT USING
CHEMICAL WEAPONS, BUT IRAN, IN THE FACE OF HEAVY CASUALTIES,
IS TRYING TO DIVERT ATTENTION BY LEVYING ACCUSATIONS AGAINST
IRAQ. I TOLD SAHHAF I DID NOT WISH TO DEBATE THE QUESTION WITH
HCH BUT WE WOULD NOT SPEAK OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS IF WE DID NOT
HAVE GOOD REASON TO DO SO. HE COULD ASSUME WE KNEW WHAT WE
WERE TALKING ABOUT. I NOTED THAT WE HAD NOT GONE OUT OF OUR
WAY TO BRING THIS ISSUE TO THE ATTENTION OF THE MEDIA.

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4. SAHHAF SAID HE HOPED OUR STATEMENTS WOULD NOT SUPPORT

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE 9/03/05 IS/FPC/CDR Date: 9/18/96

MR Cases Only:	EO Citations	TS authority to:
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IRANIAN PROPAGANDA TACTICS. I REPLIED THAT THIS WOULD NOT BE OUR INTENTION BUT IRAQ HAD GIVEN THE IRANIANS AN ISSUE. INFORMATION WAS NOW SURFACING IN IRAN AND EUROPE WHICH MADE IRAQI DENIALS LESS PLAUSIBLE THAN THEY HAD BEEN. THE OFFICIAL IRAQI REFERENCE TO AN "INSECTICIDE FOR EVERY INSECT" HAD BEEN WIDELY INTERPRETED AS REFERRING TO AN INTENTION TO EMPLOY CHEMICAL WEAPONS.

5. COMMENT: WHILE THERE IS NO REASON TO COVER UP IRAQI USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS OUR CONDEMNATION WILL BE MORE PALTABLE HERE IF IT IS ACCOMPANIED BY AN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT THAT IRAQ IS UNDER ATTACK BY A REGIME WHICH HAS REPUSED ALL EFFORTS TO FIND A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT AND IS FACING AN OFFENSIVE BY A MASSIVE BUILDUP OF IRANIAN FORCES. AS FAR AS IRAQI PUBLIC OPINION IS CONCERNED, THE MAJORITY WOULD PROBABLY CONSIDER USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS JUSTIFIED AS A MEANS OF PRESERVING IRAQ'S INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY. SOME HOWEVER ARE PROBABLY UNEASY, AND THERE ARE THOSE WHO CONSIDER USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS UNHUMANLY AND SOMEHOW CONTRARY TO MUSLIM TRADITIONS.

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
United States Department of State

Washington, D. C. 20520

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March 9, 1992
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INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

S/S



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DECL: OADR

TO: T - Ambassador Reginald Bartholomew

FROM: PM - Richard A. Clarke
AF - Herman J. Cohen
L - Edwin D. Williamson

SUBJECT: Recent Chemical Weapons (CW) Use Allegations - Africa

SUMMARY

During the past several weeks, the Department has been informed of CW use allegations in southern Mozambique and Sudan. Details remain sketchy in both regions and appear to be insufficient to trigger the requirement for a Presidential determination and report to Congress regarding chemical or biological weapons (CBW) use under the recently enacted CBW sanctions legislation. The Department continues to monitor both situations.

DISCUSSION

Allegations of chemical weapons (CW) use have been made in Mozambique and intelligence sources have reported possible preparations for and past use of CW in Sudan.

Mozambique:

The allegations in southern Mozambique center on an incident near the South African border in which a Mozambique Army battalion was reportedly hit by a CW agent delivered either by air or artillery. Upon request by the UK ambassador to Mozambique, a UK chemical specialist was dispatched to investigate the incident. The resulting UK report -- provided to the U.S., South Africa, and Mozambique -- stopped short of a definite conclusion that CW had been used, but stated that such use was "certainly a possibility". It is even less clear what organization was behind the incident. The guerrilla group Renamo is suspected, although it is unlikely that it has the capability to produce CW itself. We did not send a U.S. expert and have no first hand, independent information.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE 9302568 IS/FPC/CDR Date: 4/2/96

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Sudan:

Intelligence and Embassy reports from Sudan have discussed local allegations of the use of "gas" bombs by the Sudanese Air Force. Eye injuries and burns have been reported, with the latter more indicative of napalm or fuel air explosives than CW. However, Sudan's relations with CW possessors Libya, Iraq and Iran make it distinctly possible that Sudan may possess CW. The allegations of CW use remain unsubstantiated, although the Embassy continues to monitor the situation.

Action Taken:

We have discussed the incident in Mozambique with the Deputy Director General of the South African DFA and the South African Ambassador in Washington. Parallel demarches by the US and UK ambassadors were conducted in Pretoria, urging the SAG to conduct its own investigation and warning it that US sanctions legislation requires sanctions as a consequence of CW or BW use. Embassy Khartoum has been briefed on the sanctions legislation and made aware of the high priority that CBW use issues command. We will be instructing Embassy Khartoum to tell the Sudanese government that we have heard reports of potential CW use and to warn the GOS against any such action. Both embassies will be provided with a guide to investigation and reporting of CBW incidents and the collection of samples.

With respect to the CBW sanctions legislation, we have concluded for the moment that the evidence in neither case is so persuasive that the requirement for a Presidential determination and report to Congress regarding CBW use has been triggered. However, we will continue to evaluate in this regard any new information we receive. (See attached paper drafted by L which summarizes the circumstances under which such a determination and report must be made.)

Stay on top of it

Attachment: CBW Use Determination and Reporting Requirements

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Prepared by: LTC S. Waugh// PM/PRO // SEPROC BW 441

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E.O. 12065: ~~RDS-4~~ 12/9/90 (EAGLETON, WM. L.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, IZ
SUBJ: TARIQ AZIZ INTERVIEW WITH AMERICAN JOURNALIST

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. EVENING DECEMBER 7 AMERICAN SYNDICATED COLUMNIST (WASHINGTON
STAR) GEORGIE ANNE GEYER HAD A THREE-HOUR PRIVATE INTERVIEW

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WITH DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND MEMBER OF THE RCC TARIQ AZIZ.
THIS IS THE FIRST SUCH HIGH LEVEL INTERVIEW IN BAGHDAD BY
AN AMERICAN JOURNALIST SINCE THE WAR. THE ONLY OTHER ONE
WE KNOW OF WAS PAUL BALTA OF LA MONDE WITH TAHA YASIN RAMADAN
AFTER HE WAS UNABLE TO SEE TARIQ AZIZ. BEFORE LEAVING
FOR AMMAN EVENING DECEMBER 8 GEYER BRIEFED ME. SHE
WILL COVER THE INTERVIEW IN SEVERAL CURRENT COLUMNS
PROBABLY OUT OF AMMAN.

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3. MAJOR PORTION OF INTERVIEW WAS DEVOTED TO TARIQ AZIZ'S DETAILED EXPLANATION OF THE IRANIAN PROVOCATIONS WHICH LED INEXORABLY TO FULL SCALE HOSTILITIES. HE DESCRIBED IRAQ'S LIMITED MILITARY OBJECTIVES AS HAVING BEEN MET AND INDICATED THAT THE FRONT WOULD BE HELD ESSENTIALLY WHERE IT IS NOW UNTIL IRAN RECOGNIZES "IRAQ'S RIGHTS" -- SOVEREIGNTY ON THE SHATT AL-ARAB.

4. RE THE SOVIET UNION, TARIQ AZIZ SAID HIS NOVEMBER 11 TRIP TO MOSCOW WAS A FAILURE. THE SOVIETS, HE SAID, ARE SENDING ABSOLUTELY NO MILITARY SUPPLIES TO IRAQ.

5. DURING THE INTERVIEW TARIQ AZIZ MADE NO CRITICISM OF THE U.S. RE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS HE SAID IRAQ DID NOT EXPECT THE NEW ADMINISTRATION TO WITHDRAW ITS SUPPORT OF ISRAEL. HOWEVER THE U.S. HAD IMPOSED A PARTIAL SETTLEMENT (CDA) ON THE ARABS WHICH HAD BEEN DEEPLY RESENTED. NOW ALL THAT IRAQ ASKED WAS THAT THE U.S. SHOULD ADOPT A POSITION NEARER TO THAT OF WESTERN EUROPE.

6. COMMENT: WITH IRAQ'S ALIGNMENTS CHANGING IN THE ARAB WORLD AND CURRENT DIFFICULTIES WITH THE SOVIET UNION, THE IRAQI LEADERSHIP WOULD PROBABLY LIKE TO
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RENEW DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. HOWEVER THEY DO NOT FEEL UNDER ANY PRESSURE TO DO SO AND WILL THEREFORE WAIT UNTIL THERE IS SOME CHANGE OR APPARENT CHANGE IN THE U.S. POSITION ON THE MIDDLE EAST THAT THEY CAN POINT TO AS JUSTIFICATION. OFFICIAL U.S. CONTACT WITH THE PLO, OR SUPPORT OF A PEACE PROCESS INVOLVING JORDAN ARE THE KIND OF DEVELOPMENTS THAT COULD LEAD TO RENEWAL OF RELATIONS WITH IRAQ.
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E.O. 12065: GDS 11/20/86 (EAGLETON, WM. L.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, IZ, IR
SUBJ: THE IRAQ-IRAN WAR AFTER TWO MONTHS

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

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2. SUMMARY: AFTER TWO MONTHS OF WAR CIVILIAN LIFE IN
IRAQIS INCREASINGLY NORMAL. OBSERVERS DISAGREE RE IRAQI PUBLIC
OPINION BUT EXTERNAL SIGNS POINT TO A SUCCESSFUL EFFORT BY THE

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LEADERSHIP TO OBTAIN POPULAR SUPPORT FOR THE WAR EFFORT. ALTHOUGH IRAQI EXPECTATIONS HAVE BEEN REDUCED, SADDAM HUSSAIN CAN FACE THE PROSPECT OF A LONG WAR OF ATTRITION WITH CONSIDERABLE CONFIDENCE. END SUMMARY.

3. NOVEMBER 22 MARKS THE BEGINNING OF THE THIRD MONTH OF THE IRAQ-IRAN WAR, THOUGH IRAQI DOCTRINE HAS IT THAT SEPTEMBER 22 WAS ONLY AN INTENSIFICATION OF A CONFLICT WHICH IRAN STARTED ON SEPTEMBER 4. EARLY PREDICTIONS (BY OTHERS, NOT USINT) THAT THE WAR WOULD EITHER BE VERY SHORT OR, IF PROLONGED, SADDAM HUSSAIN'S GRIP ON THE COUNTRY WOULD BE WEAKENED, HAVE PROVEN FALSE. THE TRUE NATURE OF IRAQI PUBLIC OPINION AND THE DEGREE OF SUPPORT FOR SADDAM HUSSAIN ARE RECURRENT THEMES FOR DEBATE BY LOCAL DIPLOMATS, JOURNALISTS AND OBSERVERS. VIEWS ARE NOTABLY VARIED EVEN AMONG THOSE WHO HAVE FAIRLY WIDE CONTACTS AMONG LOCAL IRAQIS.

4. ON THE ONE HAND ARE THOSE WHO SAY THE MASSES HAVE RALLIED TO SADDAM AND FULLY SUPPORT THE WAR WHATEVER THE SACRIFICES. OTHER APPARENTLY EQUALLY COMPETENT OBSERVERS CLAIM THERE IS WIDESPREAD INDIFFERENCE TOWARD THE WAR OR OUTRIGHT HOSTILITY, PARTICULARLY BECAUSE OF HIGH LOSSES IN MEN AND MATERIEL, ON THE FIGHTING FRONT

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WESTERN NEWSMEN REPORT HIGH MORALE AND EAGERNESS TO TAKE THE OFFENSIVE. AT THE SAME TIME FROM OTHER SOURCES THERE ARE REPORTS OF UNITS WHICH HAVE NOT EXCELLED IN BRAVERY AND OF COMMANDERS WHO HAVE BEEN RELIEVED OR EXECUTED. EVEN SADDAM HUSSAIN HAS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT A FEW HAVE NOT BEEN HEROES.

5. WITH MOST OF OUR SOUNDINGS SECOND HAND WE ARE INCLINED TO BELIEVE THAT BOTH ANALYSES ARE CORRECT WITHIN THEIR OWN CONTEXTS. THIS SIMPLY MEANS THAT THERE IS THE USUAL WIDE DIVERSITY OF VIEWS ON MAJOR ISSUES AMONG A MIXED POPULATION OF SUNNI AND SHIA ARABS, SUNNI KURDS, TURKOMEN AND CHRISTIANS. EXCEPT FOR THE KURDS WHO ARE DEFINITELY ON THE SIDELINES IN THE NORTH, THE REST OF THE POPULATION HAS A REMARKABLE APPEARANCE OF UNITS IN SUPPORT OF THE WAR EFFORT. THIS GIVES SADDAM HUSSAIN AND THE LEADERSHIP WIDE LATITUDE TO END THE CONFLICT QUICKLY OR CARRY ON A LONG WAR OF ATTRITION. WHILE READY FOR THE FORMER IT IS CLEARLY THE LATTER THAT IS EXPECTED AND BEING PREPARED FOR.

6. EFFORTS TO PROMOTE NORMALIZATION OF CIVILIAN LIFE ARE APPARENT EVERYWHERE. AIR RAIDS ON MAJOR POPULATION CENTERS HAVE VIRTUALLY CEASED. SOME FOREIGN WORKERS ARE RETURNING AND THE PROJECTS RESUMING WORK. MEANWHILE NEW CONTRACTS ARE BEING SIGNED IN A SPIRIT OF BUSINESS AS USUAL. THE BAGHDAD TRADE FAIR IS OPEN TO SELECT BUYERS FOR TWO WEEKS TO PERMIT EXHIBITORS TO SEAL THEIR WARES. BAGHDAD UNIVERSITY IS SCHEDULED TO OPEN NOVEMBER

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22 AND THE UPPER GRADES OF HIGH SCHOOL DECEMBER 7.
OIL MAY SOON BE TRANSITTING TURKEY TO THE MEDITERRANEAN.
EVENING BLACKOUTS IN BAGHDAD CONTINUE (PROBABLY BECAUSE
OF FUEL SHORTAGE RATHER THAN SECURITY CONCERNS) BUT
TRAFFIC HAS INCREASED AND SOME RESTAURANTS ARE OPENING
FOR DINNER. MOST DIPLOMATIC DEPENDENTS HAVE RETURNED.

7. AS THE HOME FRONT RETURNS TO NORMAL THE BATTLE IN
THE SOUTH HAS INCREASED IN INTENSITY WITH HEAVIER
CASUALTIES THAN BEFORE. IT IS THUS BECOMING LESS AND

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LESS REALISTIC TO THINK IN TERMS OF EITHER SIDE "WINNING"
THE WAR. EVEN IF IRAQ WERE ABLE TO END THE WAR ON ITS
BASIC TERMS (SOVEREIGNTY ON THE SHATT AL-ARAB), IT WOULD
NOT BE EASY TO PORTRAY IT AS A GREAT SUCCESS FOR THE
IRAQI PEOPLE OR LEADERSHIP. A FORTUITOUS DEVELOPMENT
REMOVING KHOMEINI AND THE CLERICAL REGIME IN TEHRAN
WOULD REPRESENT A VICTORY FOR SADDAM, BUT EVEN THEN IT
WOULD NOT GUARANTEE HIM THE PREEMINENT POSITION IN
THE REGION THAT MANY HAD EARLIER PREDICTED WOULD RESULT
FROM AN IRAQI "VICTORY". ONE OF HIS PROBLEMS IS THAT,
NOTWITHSTANDING HIS WARNINGS ABOUT MILITARY VICTORY
PRODUCING ADDITIONAL RIGHTS, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT
MORE CAN BE GAINED FOR IRAQ IN A LONG WAR THAN IN A
SHORT WAR, UNLESS AN UNEXPECTED CHANGE OCCURS IN IRAN.
HENCE THE IRAQI LEADERSHIP IS ENTERING ITS THIRD
MONTH OF WAR WITH REDUCED EXPECTATIONS BUT FULL
DETERMINATION TO SEE THE CONFLICT THROUGH TO A SATISFACTORY
CONCLUSION. IT IS OUR JUDGMENT THAT THE IRAQI PEOPLE
AS A WHOLE WILL CONTINUE FOR SOME TIME TO SUPPORT THE
WAR EFFORT, WILLINGLY AND WITH RELATIVELY HIGH MORALE,
PROVIDED IRAQ SUFFERS NO MAJOR MILITARY REVERSES ON
THE BATTLEFIELD.
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E.O. 12065: RDS-1 12/9/2000 (BRUNER, WHITLEY) OR-P
TAGS: PEPR, IZ, UR, FR
SUBJ: SOVIET VIEWS ON IRAQ-IRAN DEVELOPMENTS

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: ACCORDING TO [REDACTED]
DURING A LONG DISCUSSION WITH SOVIET DCM THE LATTER
EXPRESSED HIS BELIEF THAT THE MILITARY BALANCE WAS GRADUALLY

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SHIFTING IN FAVOR OF IRAN. HE REITERATED SOVIET NEUTRALITY
AND DESIRE TO END THE WAR, THE BEST PROSPECT BEING THE CUBAN/
NAM PROPOSALS APPARENTLY INVOLVING STAGED IRAQI WITH-
DRAWALS. THE SOVIET SHIFTED FROM AN EARLIER POSITION
WHICH PREDICTED THAT SADDAM HUSSAIN WOULD SOON BE OVER-
THROWN BY BAATH PARTY MEMBERS TO A LONGER TERM PREDICTION
THAT THE IRAQI MILITARY WOULD EVENTUALLY REPLACE SADDAM.
COMMENT: SURPRISING SOVIET VIEW FROM BAGHDAD THAT THE
MILITARY BALANCE IS SHIFTING AGAINST IRAQ MAY HAVE

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BEEN A WARNING [REDACTED] NOT TO OVERDO THEIR MILITARY SUPPLIES TO IRAQ AT A TIME WHEN THE SOVIET UNION IS HOLDING BACK. END SUMMARY.

3. [REDACTED] HAS PROVIDED US WITH AN INFORMAL SUMMARY OF COMMENTS MADE BY SOVIET DCM TCHERNYCHEV [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE MOST STARTLING COMMENT MADE BY TCHERNYCHEV, WHICH HE STRESSED SEVERAL TIMES, WAS THAT THE SOVIETS NOW PERCEIVE THAT THE MILITARY BALANCE HAS SHIFTED (OR AT LEAST IS SHIFTING) IN FAVOR OF IRAN. THE SOVIETS HAVE RECEIVED REPORTS FROM THE FRONT IN KHUZESTAN THAT IRAQI UNITS ARE NOW DIGGING IN AND ASSUMING DEFENSIVE POSITIONS, WHILE IRANIAN UNITS ARE BEGINNING TO PROBE CAUTIOUSLY AT THE STATIC IRAQIS. TCHERNYCHEV STATED THAT IRAN HAS MANAGED TO TIE DOWN THE IRAQIS WITHOUT EVEN COMMITTING THE MAIN BULK OF THE IRANIAN REGULAR FORCES, RELYING INSTEAD ON REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS. MOSCOW IS AWARE THAT THE IRANIAN REGULAR ARMY HAS NOT BEEN COMMITTED THUS FAR BECAUSE OF THE DETERMINATION BY HARD-LINE CLERICS NOT TO RELY ON THE MILITARY. TCHERNYCHEV PREDICTED THAT THIS TREND WOULD GRADUALLY BE REVERSED. IN THE SOVIET VIEW, IRANIAN MILITARY INVENTORIES ARE QUITE

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SUFFICIENT AT PRESENT, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF HIGHLY SOPHISTICATED ITEMS SUCH AS COMBAT AIRCRAFT AND TANKS. IRAN'S PRIMARY PROBLEM IS TRAINED MANPOWER AND THE WINTER STALEMATE WILL ALLOW THE IRANIANS TO UNDERTAKE EXTENSIVE MILITARY TRAINING PROGRAMS. THIS WILL ALLOW THEM TO PUT MANY MORE MEN INTO THE FIELD FOR A SPRING OFFENSIVE.

4. TCHERNYCHEV NOTED THAT THE SOVIETS HAD REVISED EARLIER ESTIMATES CONCERNING SADDAM HUSSAIN'S VULNERABILITY TO POPULAR DISCONTENT OVER THE WAR. IN OCTOBER, MOSCOW CONSIDERED THAT SADDAM MIGHT WELL BE TOPPLED BY PUBLIC (AND MOST IMPORTANT) BAAATH PARTY DISILLUSION OVER IRAQ'S INABILITY TO WIN A SWIFT VICTORY. TCHERNYCHEV ADMITTED THAT THIS EARLIER VIEW OF SADDAM'S VULNERABILITY WAS EXAGGERATED AND HE AGREED WITH HIS [REDACTED] INTERLOCUTOR THAT THE IRAQI REGIME APPEARED RELATIVELY STABLE AT PRESENT. TCHERNYCHEV STRESSED, HOWEVER, THAT THE SOVIETS DO CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT SADDAM WILL RUN INTO TROUBLE EVENTUALLY, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT THE MILITARY BALANCE IS NOW SHIFTING TOWARDS IRAN. PUBLIC DISILLUSION ALONE WILL NOT, THE SOVIETS AGREE, TOPPLE SADDAM, BUT SERIOUS MILITARY REVERSES IN THE SPRING COULD MORE EASILY BRING ABOUT HIS OUSTER. THE SOVIETS MAY HAVE BEEN PRECIPITOUS IN PREDICTING SADDAM'S DEMISE EARLIER, BUT THE OVERALL PROGNOSIS REMAINS THE

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SAME. THE SOVIETS HAVE DETECTED INCREASED ACTIVITY AMONG MILITARY OFFICERS LOYAL TO EX-PRESIDENT AHMAD HASSAN BAKR AND THEY CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT BAKR WOULD PROBABLY RETURN AS A FIGURE-HEAD PRESIDENT SHOULD SADDAM GO. THE SOVIETS HAVE ALSO RECONSIDERED THEIR EARLIER PREDICTIONS THAT ANY MOVE TO REPLACE SADDAM WOULD BE PRIMARILY THE WORK OF BAAATH PARTY APPARATCHIKS ANXIOUS TO PROTECT THE PARTY'S POSITION. IN TCHERNYCHEV'S OPINION, THE LONGER THE WAR GOES ON THE GREATER THE LIKELIHOOD OF A STRICTLY MILITARY COUP TAKING PLACE.

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5. TCHERNYCHEV CLAIMED THAT THE SOVIETS WERE STILL ANXIOUS FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT, BECAUSE IT APPEARS MORE AND MORE LIKELY THAT A U.S.-IRAN RAPPROCHEMENT WILL TAKE PLACE IF THE FIGHTING BECOMES MUCH MORE PROTRACTED. THE SOVIETS ARE CURRENTLY DISCUSSING WITH THE CUBANS THE CONCEPT OF STAGED IRAQI WITHDRAWALS, NOT UNLIKE SOME OF THE

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EARLIER PROPOSALS FOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWALS IN SINAI.
TCHERNYCHEV SUGGESTED THAT IRAQ COULD OPEN THE PROCESS
BY AGREEING TO A MINOR PULLBACK AND REAFFIRMING THAT,
IF IRAQ'S CONCERNS ABOUT IRAQI SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE
SHATT AL-ARAB MWERE MET, THE GOI WOULD BE PREPARED IN
PRINCIPLE TO WITHDRAW TOTALLY. TCHERNYCHEV ADMITTED
THAT THE MODALITIES OF SUCH A PHASED PULLBACK HAVE
YET TO BE WORKED OUT, BUT MOSCOW VIEWED SUCH A DRAWN-
OUT PROCESS AS ONE OF THE FEW WAYS OUT OF THE IMPASSE.

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(COMMENT: CUBAN FOREIGN MINISTER MALMIERCA RETURNED
TO BAGHDAD YET AGAIN DECEMBER 5-6.)

6. TCHERNYCHEV WAS VERY EMPHATIC THAT THE SOVIETS ARE
NOT PROVIDING ARMS, SPARE PARTS OR MUNITIONS TO IRAQ
AT PRESENT. THIS WAS OUT OF A DESIRE TO SEE THE FIGHTING
END AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. HE SOVIETS HAD EXPLAINED THEIR
POSITION "MANY TIMES" TO THE IRAQIS, WHO APPARENTLY REMAIN
LESS THAN CONVINCED. IN VIEW OF THE PERCEIVED SHIFT IN

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MILITARY BALANCE, HOWEVER, TCHERNYCHEV PREDICTED THAT "THE IRAQIS WILL SEE THE WISDOM OF OUR POSITION IN THE NEAR FUTURE". TCHERNYCHEV ALSO CONCEDED THAT THERE HAD BEEN CONSIDERABLE CRITICISM OF THE SOVIET WEAPONS IN THE IRAQI ARSENAL. HE CONTRASTED IRAQI EXPRESSION OF APPRECIATION FOR SOVIET WEAPONRY AT THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR TO INCREASING NITPICKING DURING NOVEMBER. IN SEPTEMBER, TCHERNYCHEV WAS SOVIET CHARGE AND SAW SADDAM "MANY TIMES" DURING THE EARLY DAYS OF THE WAR. SADDAM WAS ALMOST EUPHORIC DURING THAT STAGE, LAVISHING PRAISE UPON SOVIET MIG 21S "AND EVEN THE MIG 17". THE SOVIETS ARE BECOMING CONVINCED THAT THE IRAQIS ARE LOOKING FOR A SCRAPEGOAT FOR THEIR LESS-THAN-SUCCESSFUL MILITARY CAMPAIGN AND SOVIET WEAPONS ARE A SUITABLE TARGET. THE SOVIETS, HOWEVER, ARE APPALLED BY THE INABILITY OF THE IRAQIS TO USE THE SOPHISTICATED SOVIET EQUIPMENT WHICH HAS MOST RECENTLY BEEN ADDED TO IRAQ'S ARSENAL: MIG 23S, T-72S, AIR DEFENSE RADAR, ETC. [REDACTED] ASKED WHAT MADE THE IRAQIS LESS SKILLFUL WITH ADVANCED SOVIET WEAPONRY THAN OTHER THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES. TCHERNYCHEV RESPONDED THAT NOTHING MADE THEM LESS SKILLFUL: THEY MERELY INSISTED ON TAKING THIS SOPHISTICATED EQUIPMENT INTO COMBAT VIRTUALLY UNTRAINED.

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7. COMMENT [REDACTED]

WAS NOT CERTAIN WHY TCHERNYCHEV CHOSE TO EXPOUND AT SUCH LENGTH ON THE SHIFTING MILITARY BALANCE. HE REFRAINED IN GENERAL FROM PROVIDING SOME OF TCHERNYCHEV'S MORE PROPAGANDISTIC ANTI-USG COMMENTS, BUT NOTED THAT "IT WAS NOTHING NEW". IT WOULD APPEAR THAT, POSSIBLY, THE SOVIETS WERE TRYING TO DAMPEN [REDACTED] ENTHUSIASM FOR RUSHING IN, IN CONCERT WITH THEIR WESTERN EUROPEAN FRIENDS, TO FILL THE MILITARY SUPPLY VOID LEFT BY THE SOVIETS, SHOULD MOSCOW CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN ITS VIRTUAL EMBARGO ON ARMS SHIPMENTS TO IRAQ. TCHERNYCHEV'S GLOOMY OUTLOOK FOR IRAQ MAY BE AN ATTEMPT TO PERSUADE [REDACTED] SHOULD NOT PUT ALL ITS EGGS IN SADDAM'S BASKET. WE HAVE HEARD (FOR INSTANCE BAGHDAD 2897) SOVIET PREDICTIONS ABOUT SADDAM'S EVENTUAL DEMISE. THIS IS THE FIRST INSTANCE WE ARE AWARE OF, HOWEVER, WHEN THE SOVIETS HAVE FLATLY MAINTAINED THAT THE BALANCE HAS SHIFTED IN FAVOR OF IRAN. SUCH SOVIET COMMENTS, IF THEY COME TO THE ATTENTION OF THE IRAQIS (AND THEY UNDOUBTEDLY WILL) ARE UNLIKELY TO DO MUCH FOR ALREADY STRAINED RELATIONS AFTER THE NOVEMBER 11 TARIQ AZIZ TRIP TO MOSCOW.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BAGHDAD 3242E.O. 12065: ~~SDS~~ 11/16/86 (EAGLETON, WM. L.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, PGOV, IZ, US
SUBJ: IRAQI PRESS TREATMENT OF THE U.S. AND REAGAN

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. COMMENT IN IRAQI MEDIA ON THE U.S. AND PRESIDENT-ELECT
REAGAN HAS BEEN NOTABLE IN RECENT DAYS FOR ITS SCARCITY AND~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 BAGHDA 03242 161311Z

LOW KEY. THE IMPRESSION HERE IS THAT THE IRAQIS, AFTER
INITIALLY EXAGGERATING THE IMMINENCE AND IMPORTANCE OF A
HOSTAGES/ARMS DEAL, ARE NOW PAUSING TO SEE WHAT WILL FINALLY
HAPPEN. THEIR AWARENESS THAT A DEAL HAS NOT ALREADY
BEEN ARRANGED AND THAT THERE ARE LEGAL PROBLEMS
INVOLVED IN MEETING IRANIAN DEMANDS SEEMS TO HAVE RAISED
THEIR HOPE THAT THE U.S. WILL REMAIN NEUTRAL RATHER THAN
TILT TOWARD IRAN AS THEY HAD EXPECTED. MEANWHILE THEY
SEE NO REASON TO ATTACK THE PRESIDENT-ELECT PRIOR TO

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HIS ESTABLISHING OFFICIAL POSITIONS ON ISSUES IMPORTANT
TO IRAQ, PARTICULARLY THE IRAQ-IRAN CONFLICT.
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BAGHDAD 3243

E.O. 12065: ~~CDR~~ 11/16/90 (EAGLETON, WM. L.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, IZ, IR
SUBJ: UPDATING IRAQ'S WAR AIMS

1. (2 - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. BECAUSE OF CONTINUED PRESS SPECULATION, REINFORCED BY
EXCERPTS FROM SADDAM HUSSAIN'S RECENT STATEMENTS, TO THE
EFFECT THAT IRAQ MIGHT ENLARGE ITS TERRITORIAL CLAIMS AGAINST
IRAN, IT IS PERHAPS TIME TO REAFFIRM OUR BELIEF THAT THE IRAQI

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PAGE 02 BAGHDA 03243 161315Z

REQUIREMENT FOR ENDING THE WAR REMAINS LIMITED ESSENTIALLY
TO GAINING SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE SHATT AL-ARAB WATERWAY.

3. SADDAM HUSSAIN HAS HINTED THAT HE IS UNDER PRESSURE
FROM HIS MILITARY COMMANDERS TO REMAIN IN SOME TERRITORIES
PAID FOR WITH IRAQI BLOOD. WE SUSPECT THAT THIS NOTION
ORIGINATED WITH SADDAM RATHER THAN HIS COMMANDERS AND
IS PART OF HIS ATTEMPT TO BRING THE IRANIANS TO THE
NEGOTIATING TABLE SOONER RATHER THAN LATER. ALTHOUGH

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IRAQ WOULD PROBABLY WITHDRAW QUICKLY IF ITS CONTROL OF
THE SHATT WERE CREDIBLY ENSURED, A LONG IRAQI OCCUPATION
OF PARTS OF KHUZESTAN WILL INCREASINGLY COMPLICATE AND
LENGTHEN THE TIME REQUIRED FOR AN IRAQI WITHDRAWAL.
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BAGHDAD 3209E.O. 12065: GDS 11/11/86 (EAGLETON, WM. L.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, IZ, IR, US
SUBJ: SADDAM HUSSAIN'S NOVEMBER 10 PRESS CONFERENCE

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

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PAGE 02 BAGHDA 03209 111443Z

2. SADDAM HUSSAIN'S TWICE-DELAYED PRESS CONFERENCE, FOR WHICH
MANY JOURNALISTS WERE BROUGHT TO BAGHDAD FROM OUTSIDE IRAQ,
FINALLY TOOK PLACE EVENING NOVEMBER 10. MIDWAY THROUGH, A RARE
NIGHT AIR RAID ALERT (NO PLANES) CAUSED THE MAIN POWER SWITCHES
IN BAGHDAD TO BE PULLED. SADDAM ANNOUNCED THAT HE
WOULD PHONE THE POWER COMPANY AND HAVE THE LIGHTS PUT
BACK ON BUT THIS DID NOT OCCUR UNTIL THE ALL CLEAR 15
MINUTES LATER.

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3. IF THERE WAS ANY SURPRISE IN THE CONFERENCE IT WAS THE LACK OF NEW MATERIAL, IT HAVING BEEN ASSUMED THAT ALL THE BUILD-UP AND CORRALING OF MEDIA REPS MEANT SADDAM HAD SOMETHING DRAMATIC TO SAY. INSTEAD HE COVERED FAMILIAR THEMES INCLUDING IRAQ'S WILLINGNESS TO WITHDRAW FROM IRAN AS SOON AS LEGITIMATE RIGHTS WERE RECOGNIZED, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME BEING BETTER PREPARED THAN IRAN FOR A LONG WAY. HE ALSO REPEATED THE THREAT TO TAKE MORE TERRITORY IN KHUZESTAN IF IRAN DID NOT AGREE TO A CEASE-FIRE ON IRAQI TERMS.

4. THE CONFERENCE WAS NOT CARRIED LIVE ON IRAQI MEDIA AND WE DO NOT YET HAVE THE COMPLETE TRANSCRIPT WHICH WILL PROBABLY BE CARRIED LATER BY FBIS. JOURNALISTS WHO WERE THERE HOWEVER TELL US THAT IN SPITE OF MANY APPROPRIATE OPENINGS FOR COMMENTS CRITICAL OF THE U.S., SADDAM HUSSAIN WAS CAUTIOUS. HE OBSERVED THAT IRAQIS "DID NOT EXPECT THE U.S. TO BE OUR FRIEND IN THIS WAR". RE THE POSSIBILITY OF U.S. SUPPLYING ARMS TO IRAN, HE SAID THIS WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON THE OUTCOME.

5. SADDAM WAS EQUALLY CAUTIOUS IN HIS TREATMENT OF THE SOVIET UNION WHICH HE LABELED ALONG WITH FRANCE, A

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PAGE 03 BAGHDA 03209 111443Z

"FRIEND OF IRAQ". HE NOTED THAT THE SOVIET-IRAQ FRIENDSHIP TREATY DID NOT REQUIRE EITHER SIDE TO DEFEND THE OTHER. THESE COMMENTS WERE IN LINE WITH THE STANDARD IRAQI POSITION THAT IRAQ DOES NOT NEED, AND HAS NOT ASKED FOR, ADDITIONAL MILITARY EQUIPMENT FROM THE USSR.

6. AT ONE POINT SADDAM REPORTEDLY SAID HE WAS NOT IN FAVOR OF THE DISMEMBERMENT OF IRAN. OUR JOURNALIST CONTACTS BELIEVE THE AP REP GOT THIS WRONG AND REPORTED OTHERWISE.

7. WE DO NOT KNOW WHETHER AT THE TIME THE PRESS CONFERENCE WAS SCHEDULED ABOUT A WEEK AGO IT WAS EXPECTED THAT SADDAM HUSSAIN WOULD HAVE SOMETHING IMPORTANT TO ANNOUNCE OR WHETHER A CONTACT BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRESS WAS SIMPLY CONSIDERED OVERDUE AND FINALLY TOOK PLACE. THE JOURNALISTS WHO WERE BROUGHT IN FOR THE EVENT AND SOME OTHERS WHO HAVE REMAINED FROM BEFORE ARE NOW HOPING TO BE TAKEN TO THE ABADAN FRONT.

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E.O. 12065: RDS-4 11/9/90 (EAGLETON, WM. L.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, IZ, IR, US
SUBJ: CONVERSATION WITH UNDERSECRETARY SUMARA'I AT THE
FOREIGN MINISTRY

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: I MET UNDERSECRETARY SAMURA'I IN THE CONTEXT OF OUR DESIRE TO RAISE THE LEVEL OF CONTACT WITH IRAQI OFFICIALS. WE REVIEWED THE IRAQI POSITION ON RELATIONS (DEPENDS ON THE NEW ADMINISTRATION'S MIDDLE EAST POLICY). MOST OF THE CONVERSATION WAS DEVOTED TO OUR EFFORT TO CONVINCE SAMURA'I THAT OUR INTENTION TO RELEASE FROZEN ITEMS IN CONNECTION WITH GREEKING THE U.S. HOSTAGES DID NOT PUT US ON THE SIDE OF IRAN. SAMURA'I EXPRESSED IRAQI CONCERN OVER A HOSTAGES/SPARE PARTS DEAL, BUT HE SEEMED TO RECOGNIZE THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CLEARING THE PIPELINE AND PROVIDING NEW ARMS. HE ALSO REFLECTED IRAQI FRUSTRATION IN TRYING TO FIND SOMEONE IN TEHRAN WITH WHOM TO NEGOTIATE WHILE KHOMEINI SEES THE CONFLICT AS A HOLY WAR AGAINST INFIDELS. END SUMMARY.

3. PHONE CALL FROM FOREIGN MINISTRY AFTERNOON NOVEMBER 8

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ASKED ME TO COME TO MINISTRY AT 6:30 PM TO SEE UNDERSECRETARY AHMAD HUSSAIN SAMURA'I. MEETING WAS NOT THE JOINT BRIEFING I HAD EXPECTED BUT A PRIVATE SESSION ACCOMPANIED BY SOUNDLESS TV (CARTOONS) WHICH IS THE WAR TIME FORM FOR THE OFFICES OF SENIOR OFFICIALS. SAMURA'I IS MY HIGHEST LEVEL CONTACT IN THE MINISTRY (EXCEPT FOR A JOINT BRIEFING BY THE FOREIGN MINISTER).

4. SAMURA'I OPENED BY REFERRING TO MY MEETING OCTOBER 25

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WITH CHIEF OF THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT, MUHAMMAD SA'ID SAHHAF. SAMURA'I NOTED AT THAT MEETING I HAD SUGGESTED RAISING THE LEVEL OF U.S.-IRAQI DIALOGUE. HE SAID THE MINISTRY WOULD LIKE A CLARIFICATION OF WHAT PRECISELY WE HAD IN MIND. IN REPLY, I REFERRED TO SECRETARY MUSKIE'S COMMENTS ON THE SUBJECT IN HIS MEETING WITH DR. HAMMADI IN NEW YORK SEPTEMBER 30 AND OBSERVED THAT THIS MEETING WITH HIM WAS THE KIND OF THING WE HAD IN MIND.

5. THIS BEING MY FIRST MEETING WITH SAMURA'I OTHER THAN SOCIALLY AND FINDING THAT HE HAD NOTHING SPECIFIC TO RAISE, I BEGAN BY REVIEWING THE STATUS OF U.S.-IRAQI RELATIONS NOTING THAT WE WERE NOT NOW PRESSING FOR A RESUMPTION OF DIPLOMATIC TIES THOUGH THE ABSENCE OF SUCH TIES WAS AN ANOMALY PARTICULARLY SINCE SOME OF OUR BEST FRIENDS IN THE AREA ALSO HAD CLOSE TIES WITH IRAQ. I REFERRED TO OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN WAITING UNTIL AFTER OUR PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS TO DETERMINE WHETHER THERE WAS ANYTHING NEW IN OUR POLICY, PARTICULARLY REGARDING THE PALESTINIANS, THAT WOULD JUSTIFY ESTABLISHING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE US.

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6. SAMURA'I REPLIED THAT IN THIS REGARD THERE WAS NOTHING NEW. PERHAPS WISHING TO IMPLY THAT I HAD OVERSTRESSED THE PALESTINIAN ASPECT, HE ADDED THAT IT WAS UP TO THE US. ALL IRAQ ASKED WAS THAT THE U.S. SHOULD BE "NEUTRAL" ON THE ARAB-ISRAELI ISSUE. THIS LED TO A DISCUSSION OF THE MIDDLE EAST IN FAMILIAR TERMS WITH SAMURA'I ARGUING THAT THE U.S. SHOULD DEVELOP GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE ARABS SINCE ISRAEL CANNOT IN THE LONG RUN PROTECT U.S. INTERESTS. IN REPLY I REVIEWED THE U.S. POSITION SUPPORTING ISRAEL'S SECURITY AND INTEGRITY COMBINED WITH EFFORTS TO HELP ESTABLISH PEACE, WITH FULL AWARENESS OF THE NEED TO ADDRESS THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE.

7. SAMURA'I ASKED "ON A PERSONAL BASIS" WHAT WAS THE POSITION OF PRESIDENT-ELECT REAGAN ON THE MIDDLE EAST. I EXPLAINED THAT AS GOVERNOR, REAGAN DID NOT DEAL WITH

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 2 OF 2. BAGHDAD 3186

~~EXDTS~~

THIS ISSUE. HE WAS ORGANIZING HIS FOREIGN POLICY TEAM AND WOULD NO DOUBT BE ADDRESSING THE SUBJECT IN COMING MONTHS. ON THE IRAQ-IRAN WAR MY IMPRESSION WAS THAT REAGAN WAS, LIKE THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION, STRICTLY NEUTRAL.

8. THIS GAVE ME AN OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW OUR STATEMENTS ON U.S. NEUTRALITY AND TO ADDRESS SOME OF THE MISGIVINGS AND MISCONCEPTIONS THAT HAVE CAUSED THE IRAQI LEADERSHIP TO CONCLUDE THAT THE U.S. IS SIDING WITH IRAN. I EMPHASIZED THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PROVIDING SPARE PARTS AND MATERIEL THAT WE HAD ALWAYS SAID WOULD BE RELEASED IF THE HOSTAGES WERE FREED AND LEGITIMATE IRAQI CONCERN THAT WE MIGHT ENTER INTO A NEW MILITARY SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAN WHILE HOSTILITIES WERE STILL IN PROGRESS. THE LATTER, I ARGUED, WAS A VERY UNLIKELY PROSPECT.

9. SAMURA'I REPLIED THAT IRAQ WAS NOT AGAINST OUR EFFORTS TO FREE THE HOSTAGES WHOSE SEIZURE THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT HAD CONDEMNED FROM THE OUTSET. THIS SHOULD NOT HOWEVER BE AT THE EXPENSE OF IRAQ. THE PROVISION OF SPARE PARTS WOULD HAVE BEEN NORMAL DURING PEACE TIME. PRESIDENT

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SADDAM HUSSAIN HAD DECLARED IN HIS RECENT SPEECH IRAQ'S READINESS TO WITHDRAW IMMEDIATELY WHEN IRAN RECOGNIZED IRAQI RIGHTS. ISRAEL, HE SAID, DID NOT MAKE SUCH A DECLARATION IN 1967 AND AFTERWARD. ANY SPARE PARTS OR MATERIEL GOING TO IRAN NOW, HE ARGUED, WOULD ONLY PROLONG THE WAR.

10. I REPLIED THAT WE COULD NOT PROLONG THE ORDEAL OF THE HOSTAGES SIMPLY BECAUSE IRAQ WAS AT WAR WITH IRAN.

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IT COULD BE ARGUED THAT CHANGING OUR POSITION ON RELEASING THE PIPELINE WOULD BE ABANDONING NEUTRALITY IN FAVOR OF IRAQ. IN ANY CASE WE DOUBTED THAT THE MATERIEL INVOLVED WOULD HAVE AN APPRECIABLE EFFECT ON THE MILITARY BALANCE. THE IMPORTANT THING FROM IRAQ'S POINT OF VIEW WAS TO GET ACCURATE FACTS AND NOT JUMP TO CONCLUSION RE U.S. INTENTIONS. I UNDERTOOK TO KEEP THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT INFORMED OF DEVELOPMENTS.

11. SAMURA'I REPLIED THAT THE BIG QUESTION WAS WITH WHOM TO NEGOTIATE IN TEHRAN. KHOMEINI HAD SAID THE CONFLICT WAS NOT ABOUT FRONTIERS OR WATER RIGHTS, BUT A STRUGGLE BETWEEN BELIEVERS AND INFIDELS. ON THAT BASIS THE IRANIANS SAW NO PLACE FOR MEDIATION. ANY SUPPORT FOR IRAN WOULD ONLY MAKE THEM MORE ARROGANT. I REPLIED THAT IF THE PARTIES WERE UNABLE TO SETTLE THEIR CONFLICT, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WOULD AT SOME POINT HAVE TO COME UP WITH SUGGESTIONS, THE BASIC ELEMENTS OF WHICH WE HAD PRESENTED IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. (WE HAD NOT YET RECEIVED STATE 298134 ON OUR LATEST UNSC POSITION.)

12. IN DISCUSSING THE DIFFICULTY OF DEALING WITH IRANIAN AUTHORITIES SAMURA'I SAID THE CAPTURED IRANIAN
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OIL MINISTER TOLD THE IRAQI HE HAD NOT BEEN AWARE IRAQI FORCES WERE IN THE ABADAN AREA. HE DID NOT EVEN KNOW THE IRAQI ARMY HAD CAPTURED QASR-E-SHIRIN IN THE NORTHERN SECTOR EARLY IN THE WAR.

13. THE CONVERSATION ENDED WITH AGREEMENT THAT I WOULD KEEP ZUHAIR IBRAHIM AND MUHAMMAD SA'ID SAHHAF INFORMED OF U.S. POSITIONS AND WOULD ASK TO SEE SAMURA'I IF WE HAD ANYTHING TO DISCUSS AT A HIGHER LEVEL.
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1096 DEPARTMENT OF STATE 9204489

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INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

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E.O. 12065: GDS 11/10/86 (EAGLETON, WM. L.) OR-M

TAGS: PORG, UNSC, IR, IZ

SUBJ: U.S. POSITION ON IRAN-IRAQ CONFLICT IN UNSC

REF: STATE 298134⁽ⁿ⁾

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. GIVEN THE RULUCTANCE OF OUR FRIENDS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE ON SUBSTANTIVE RESOLUTIONS, WE AGREE A U.S. EFFORT IN THIS REGARD IS JUSTIFIED AND TIMELY. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES WE ASSUME THE DRAFT TRANSMITTED IN REFTTEL WILL CARRY AN AMERICAN LABEL AND BE DESCRIBED AS AN AMERICAN PLAN. WE ARE THEREFORE SENSITIVE AS TO HOW IT WILL PLAY IN BAGHDAD WHERE THERE IS GENUINE CONCERN THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS DECIDED, FOR IMMEDIATE AND LONG-TERM STRATEGIC REASONS, TO SUPPORT IRAN IN THE CONFLICT AND PREVENT IRAQ FROM ACHIEVING ITS BASIC OBJECTIVES (SOVEREIGNTY IN THE SHATT AL-ARAB AND REMOVAL OF THE REVOLUTIONARY ISLAMIC THREAT TO IRAQ'S INTERNAL

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SECURITY.)

3. A QUICK READING OF THE ILLUSTRATIVE DRAFT WILL PROBABLY LEAD THE IRAQIS IMMEDIATELY TO CONCLUDE THAT THE UNITED STATES IS SEEKING A CEASE-FIRE ESSENTIALLY ON IRANIAN TERMS. WE WOULD LIKE TO BE IN A POSITION

TO DISCUSS THE RESOLUTION AND OUR OVERALLY EFFORTS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL WITH OFFICIALS HERE. IN THESE

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DISCUSSIONS WE WOULD HOPE TO BE ABLE TO CONVINCE THEM THAT THE UNITED STATES REMAINS NEUTRAL AND IS SEEKING A PRACTICAL AND JUST MEANS OF ENDING THE CONFLICT.

4. THE ESSENCE OF THE PROBLEM IS HOW WE ENVISAGE A WITHDRAWAL PROCESS WHICH IS TO COMMENCE IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE CEASE-FIRE. DO WE EXPECT THE IRANIAN CEASE-FIRE LINE TO REMAIN IN PLACE SO AS TO CREATE A SEPARATION OF FORCES? IF THIS IS THE PLAN WOULD IT NOT BE NECESSARY TO HAVE PEACE-KEEPING FORCES RATHER THAN, OR IN ADDITION TO, UN OBSERVERS IN THE DEMILITARIZED AREA? TO WHERE WOULD WE EXPECT THE IRAQIS TO WITHDRAW? PRESUMABLY THE SEPTEMBER 22 LINE? WHAT WOULD BE THE REGIME ON THE SHATT AL-ARAB DURING THE PERHAPS LENGTHY PERIOD OF NEGOTIATIONS? THE IRAQI SIDE WOULD POSE SUCH QUESTIONS AND PROBABLY SOME OTHERS, AND THEIR VIEW OF OUR NEUTRALITY WOULD BE BASED ON OUR ANSWERS.

5. WE REALIZE THAT DETAILED U.S. POSITIONS ON MANY OF THESE QUESTIONS HAVE NOT YET BEEN ESTABLISHED AND THAT THIS DRAFT RESOLUTION IS A MEANS OF STIMULATING DISCUSSION AMONG SC MEMBERS ON THESE ISSUES AND OBTAINING THEIR VIEWS. NEVERTHELESS IT IS IMPORTANT FOR US HERE IN

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BAGHDAD TO HAVE AS MUCH INFORMATION AS IS AVAILABLE ON HOW WE BELIEVE THE WITHDRAWAL PROCESS MIGHT EFFECTIVELY AND FAIRLY BE IMPLEMENTED. THERE ARE SOME PRECEDENTS LOOKING BACK TO TIMES WHEN ISRAELI TROOPS WERE FIGHTING WITHIN ARAB TERRITORIES WHICH THE IRAQIS AND OTHERS WILL PROBABLY BE STUDYING. WE DO NOT NEED ALWAYS TO AVOID OFFENDING IRAQ, BUT WE WOULD LIKE TO BE IN A POSITION TO HEAD OFF MISUNDERSTANDINGS AND AVOID GIVING THE IMPRESSION WE ARE TAKING A MORE HOSTILE POSITION THAN IS IN FACT THE CASE. PLEASE KEEP US AS FULLY INFORMED AS POSSIBLE.

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PA Exemptions		<input type="checkbox"/> DOWNGRADE TS to <input type="checkbox"/> S or <input type="checkbox"/> C	

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~ BAGHDAD 3163E.O. 12065: ~~SES~~ 11/6/86 (EAGLETON, WM. L.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, PGOV, US, IZ
SUBJ: IRAQI PRESS REPORTS IRANIAN OIL MINISTER WOUNDED

REF: BAGHDAD 3123 ✓

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

PAGE 02 BAGHDA 03163 061622Z

NOVEMBER 6 ATH-THAWRA, IN AN ARTICLE DESIGNED TO DEAL WITH
CRITICISM OF THE WAY IRAQ SEIZED AND IS HOLDING IRAN'S
PETROLEUM MINISTER, MOHAMMAD JAVAD TONDGUYAN, REPORTED THAT
THE MINISTER WAS CAPTURED DURING A BATTLE, RATHER THAN
KIDNAPPED AS THE IRANIANS CLAIM. FURTHERMORE IT IS
SAID THAT HE WAS FOUND TO BE BLEEDING TO DEATH AND WAS
TAKEN TO BAGHDAD FOR URGENT MEDICAL TREATMENT. THE
ARTICLE GOES ON TO SAY THAT THE EFFORT TO SAVE HIS LIFE
IS CONTINUING "IN SPTE OF COMPLICATIONS". NO MENTION**DECLASSIFIED**

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TEXT OF TELEGRAM 80BAGHDA003163

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IS MADE OF OTHER MEMBERS OF THE MINISTER'S PARTY.
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~PAGE 01 BAGHDA 03149 051405Z
ACTION NEA-11INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 IO-14 ADS-00 SSN-02 AID-07 CIAE-00
DODE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00 ICAE-00 INRE-00
EB-08 DOE-17 ACDA-12 HA-06 PM-07 H-01 INR-10
L-03 PA-01 SP-02 SS-15 /129 W

-----053107 051415Z /40

O 051120Z NOV 80
FM USINT BAGHDAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1076
INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY DOHA
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MANAMA
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

DEPARTMENT OF STATE 9204489 IS/FPC/CDR <i>11/26</i> Date: <i>9/25/86</i>	
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BAGHDAD 3149E.O. 12065: ~~SBS~~ 11/5/90 (EAGLETON, WM. L.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, IZ, IR
SUBJ: SADDAM HUSSAIN'S NOVEMBER 4 SPEECH1. ~~(C)~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)2. PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSAIN'S NOVEMBER 4 SPEECH TO THE
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY (FULLY CARRIED IN FBIS) FEATURED HIS
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
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PAGE 02 BAGHDA 03149 051405Z

REITERATION OF IRAQI WAR AIMS ALONG WITH WARNING THAT IRAQ'S
DEMANDS MIGHT ESCALATE IF THE WAR CONTINUES. HE MADE NO
MENTION OF THE UNITED STATES, WHICH SEEMS TO SIGNAL A CAUTIOUS
PUBLIC TREATMENT OF MEDIA REPORTS THAT HAVE CAUSED
MANY IRAQIS TO BELIEVE THE U.S. IS SIDING WITH IRAN IN
THE WAR.3. THE TONE OF SADDAM'S SPEECH WAS TOUGH, BOTH TO
INSPIRE THE IRAQI PUBLIC AND NOT TO GIVE IRAN THE IMPRESSION**DECLASSIFIED**

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HE WAS SPEAKING FROM WEAKNESS. AT THE SAME TIME HE EMPHASIZED THAT IRAQI WAR AIMS WERE LIMITED TO SECURING IRAQI RIGHTS. THIS IS A CODE PHRASE FOR RECOVERY OF FULL SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE SHATT AL-ARAB AND 400 SQUARE KM. OF FRONTIER TERRAIN THAT HAD BEEN ENCROACHED ON BY IRAN OVER THE YEARS. WHAT IT GETS DOWN TO IS THAT IF IRAN RECOGNIZES IRAQ'S SOVEREIGNTY ON THE SHATT AL-ARAB IRAQ WILL WITHDRAW ITS FORCES FROM IRANIAN TERRITORY. TO PUT ADDITIONAL PRESSURE ON IRAN TO ACCEPT SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT SADDAM HAS THREATENED THAT A CONTINUED WAR COULD LEAD TO LARGER IRAQI CLAIMS. WE SUSPECT THIS IS LARGELY BLUFF, SINCE FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE THE IRAQI LEADERSHIP WOULD BE HAPPY TO BRING THE WAR TO AN END ON ITS MINIMUM TERMS.

4. SINCE IRAN SHOWS NO SIGN OF ACCEPTING THE IRAQI PROPOSITION, MUCH OF THE SPEECH WAS DEVOTED TO PREPARING PUBLIC OPINION FOR A LONG WAR. THIS INVOLVES PLACING FULL BLAME ON IRAN FOR THE INITIATION OF HOSTILITIES AND THE FAILURE TO BRING THEM TO A HALT. SADDAM'S INSISTENCE THAT A TRUE MOSLEM COULD NOT OPPOSE ARAB RIGHTS ("THE KORAN IS ARAB, AND PROPHET MOHAMMAD WAS ARAB AND THE LANGUAGE OF PARADISE IS ARABIC") IS ONCE AGAIN AN ATTEMPT TO PLACE THE STRUGGLE IN AN ARAB/PERSIAN

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PAGE 03 BAGHDA 03149 051405Z

CONTEXT WHICH WILL RANGE THE SHIA ARABS OF IRAQ ON HIS SIDE AGAINST THE ATTRACTIONS OF KHOMEINI'S ISLAMIC REVOLUTION.

5. AS FAR AS WE CAN JUDGE THE IRAQI PUBLIC, THOUGH HAVING NO REAL CHOICE IN THE MATTER, FOR THE MOST PART FOLLOWS THE PRESIDENT'S REASONING THAT IF THE STUBBORN AND FANATIC PERSIANS REFUSE TO MAKE PEACE THERE IS NO CHOICE BUT TO CONTINUE THE WAR UNTIL "IRAQI RIGHTS" ARE RECOGNIZED.
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PAGE 01 BAGHDA 03123 031359Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 IO-14 PM-07 SP-02 SS-15 H-01
CIAE-00 DODE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00 PA-01 DOE-17
DOEE-00 EB-08 OES-09 NSCE-00 SSO-00 ICAE-00
INRE-00 /096 W

-----036279 031405Z /47

O 031132Z NOV 80
FM USINT BAGHDAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1055
INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY DOHA
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY RABAT
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
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PA Exemptions	EO Citations
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BAGHDAD 3123

E.O. 12065: ~~EDS~~ 11/3/86 (EAGLETON, WM. L.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, MOPS, PGOV, IZ, IR
SUBJ: VISIT OF IRANIAN OIL MINISTER TO BAGHDAD
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 BAGHDA 03123 031359Z

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. OTHER THAN A BRIEF COMMUNIQUE, THE ONLY PRESS COMMENT SO FAR ON THE CAPTURE OF IRANIAN OIL MINISTER, MUHAMMAD JAWAD BADIR TENDKUYAN, AND PARTY NEAR ABADAN WAS AN ITEM IN DAILY ATH-THAWRA ENTITLED "IRAN WITHOUT OIL . . . AND WITHOUT AN OIL MINISTER". THIS BIT OF FRONT PAGE HUMOR INCLUDED QUESTION WHETHER THE "MULLAS OF QOM AND TEHRAN WILL TRY

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THEIR LUCK BY GETTING CLOSE TO THE FRONT LINES". WE UNDERSTAND LOCAL JOKE IS THAT BRINGING IRAN'S OIL MINISTER TO BAGHDAD WAS TO ENSURE THAT IRAN WOULD BE REPRESENTED AT THE OPEC SUMMIT.

3. THIS WAR-TIME HUMOR FOLLOWS CLOSELY A TV CLIP THAT HAS HAD BOTH IRAQIS AND FOREIGNERS LAUGHING LAST TWO DAYS. IT SHOWS THE AYATOLLAH KHALKHALI TRYING TO ADDRESS THE IRANIAN MAJLIS WHILE RAFSAIYANI ABOVE HIM RINGS THE BELL IN UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPT TO BRING THE ASSEMBLY TO ORDER. TWICE DURING KHALKHALI'S ADDRESS HE POUNDS THE TABLE AND HIS WHITE TURBAN FLIES INTO THE AIR TO BE RETRIEVED BY AN AIDE AND RETURNED TO HIM. HE IS FINALLY LED, OR ALMOST PULLED, OFF THE PODIUM BY A BLACK-BEARDED TURBANED GENTLEMAN. THIS UNSEEMLY DISPLAY CONTRASTS WITH THE DECORUM WHICH PREVAILS IN THE IRAQI ASSEMBLY NOW MEETING FOR ITS SECOND SESSION.

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PAGE 01 BAGHDA 03124 031438Z
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 SSO-00 /031 W

-----036599 031441Z /44

O R 031232Z NOV 80

FM USINT BAGHDAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1056

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

~~SECRET~~ BAGHDAD 3124~~EXDIS~~

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E.O. 12065: RDS-173-11/3/2000 (EAGLETON, WM. L.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, MILI, UK, US, IR, IZ
SUBJECT: BRITISH AMBASSADOR ON HIS CREDENTIALS CONVERSATION
WITH SADDAM HUSSAIN

REF: AMMAN 7117(n)

1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT).

2. DURING CONVERSATION WITH NEW BRITISH AMBASSADOR EGERTON
NOVEMBER 3 HE REVIEWED SOME OF THE SUBJECTS RAISED BY SADDAM
HUSSAIN, WHO DID MOST OF THE TALKING, DURING PRESENTATION
OF CREDENTIALS OCTOBER 30. EGERTON SAID SADDAM'S STRONGEST
STATEMENTS WERE RELATED TO HIS UNHAPPINESS WITH BRITISH
PRESS COVERAGE OF THE WAR. SADDAM WENT SO FAR AS TO SUGGEST
BRITISH GOVERNMENT SHOULD TAKE STEPS TO IMPROVE THE COVERAGE,
WHICH BROUGHT THE EXPECTED REPLY FROM THE AMBASSADOR.

3. IN ANSWER TO MY QUESTION, AMBASSADOR EGERTON SAID SADDAM
MADE NO REFERENCE TO THE UNITED STATES. WHEN I ASKED WHAT
SADDAM HAD SAID ABOUT IRAQI PEACE TERMS OR WITHDRAWAL,
AMBASSADOR REPLIED ONLY THAT HE HAD TAKEN STANDARD IRAQI
POSITION THAT THERE COULD BE NO WITHDRAWAL UNTIL IRAN

~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 BAGHDA 03124 031438Z

RECOGNIZED IRAQ'S RIGHTS. SADDAM ALSO FOLLOWED STANDARD
LINE THAT IRAQ COVETED NO IRANIAN TERRITORY. HE
EMPHASIZED THAT IF WAR CONTINUED HE WOULD BE UNDER
INCREASED PRESSURE TO HANG ON TO IRANIAN TERRITORY.
THIS SEEMED TO CONVEY MESSAGE THAT IT WOULD BE WELL
TO HAVE A CEASE-FIRE NOW WHILE IRAQI CLAIMS ARE MINIMAL.
EGERTON'S IMPRESSION WAS THAT SADDAM WOULD LIKE TO HAVE
SOMEONE OUTSIDE STEP IN TO BRING ABOUT A CEASE-FIRE, ON
IRAQI TERMS.

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4. COMMENT:

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PAGE 01 BAGHDA 03125 050629Z
ACTION NEA-11INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 IO-14 ACDA-12 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07
H-01 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 SP-02
SS-15 ICA-11 EUR-12 /105 W

-----050628 050710Z /22

P 031239Z NOV 80
FM USINT BAGHDAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1058~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BAGHDAD 3125E.O. 12065: ~~SDS~~ 11/3/86 (JONES, A. ELIZABETH) ~~OR P~~
TAGS: PINR, PGOV, IZ
SUBJ: NATIONAL ASSEMBLY RECONVENES

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1. (U) AS PROVIDED FOR IN ITS PRECEPTS, THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY CONVENED FOR ITS FALL SESSION ON NOVEMBER 1 (THE FIRST SATURDAY IN NOVEMBER). THE SESSION WAS TAKEN UP WITH A LONG EXPLICATION BY FOREIGN MINISTER HAMMADI ON THE WAR, IN WHICH HE NOTED THAT IRAQ WAS ON THE BRINK OF ENDING AN EPISODE IN IRANIAN-ARAB RELATIONS TYPIFIED BY IRANIAN EXPANSION AND DOMINATION AND ARAB SELF-DEFENSE. HE PRAISED THE NEUTRAL STAND TAKEN BY THE SOVIET UNION, THE US AND OTHERS, BUT EMPHASIZED THAT U.S. NEUTRALITY WOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED "AUTHENTIC" IF THE U.S. SENDS MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO IRAN "UNDER WHATEVER COVER." HAMMADI DETAILED THE REMAINDER OF IRAQ'S POSITION ON THE SHATT, THE THREE ISLANDS AND IRAQI TERRITORY IN FAMILIAR TERMS.

2. ~~(LNU)~~ BAGHDAD'S SHIA-DOMINATED THAWRA TOWNSHIP HELD ELECTIONS OCTOBER 31 TO REPLACE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY MEMBER JASSIM KADHUM WHO DIED SHORTLY AFTER HIS ELECTION. THE WINNER WAS MINISTER OF STATE HASHIM HASSAN AQRAWI, A KURD WHO RAN FOR ELECTION IN ANOTHER OF BAGHDAD'S DISTRICTS ON JUNE 20 AND LOST. HE COMPETED THIS TIME WITH ONLY ONE OTHER CANDIDATE.

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PAGE 02 BAGHDA 03125 050629Z

3. (G) COMMENT: DESPITE THE CONTINUATION OF HOSTILITIES, THE IRAQIS ARE DETERMINED TO RETURN TO BUSINESS AS USUAL AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE. THE OPENING SESSION WAS STRUCTURED, AS MIGHT HAVE BEEN EXPECTED UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, WITH A BRIEFING BY THE FOREIGN MINISTER ON THE ON-GOING CRISIS. WE UNDERSTAND THE ASSEMBLY WILL NOW GET DOWN TO THE BUSINESS OF FINALYZING ITS BY-LAWS AND WORKING ON PENDING ITEMS SUCH AS ITS BUDGET. AFTER

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THE BEATING THE U.S. HAS RECEIVED IN THE MEDIA LATELY
OVER THE SPARE PARTS TO IRAN QUESTION, WE FIND IT OF
SOME INTEREST THAT HAMMADI WILL STILL ACKNOWLEDGE AND
ACCEPT IN A PUBLIC FORUM US, PROFESSION OF NEUTRALITY.
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PAGE 01 BAGHDA 03025 271105Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 IO-14 ADS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00
NSAE-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00 ICAE-00 INRE-00 PM-07 H-01
INR-10 L-03 PA-01 SP-02 SS-15 SPRS-02 ACDA-12
EB-08 OMB-01 TRSE-00 DOE-17 DOEE-00 /117 W
-----111746 271109Z /15

O 270827Z OCT 80
FM USINT BAGHDAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 998
INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY DOHA
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MANAMA
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PA Exemption			

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BAGHDAD 3025

E.O. 12065: ~~RDS-1~~ 10/27/86 (JONES, A. ELIZABETH) OR-P
TAGS: PINT, IZ
SUBJ: BAGHDAD SCHOOLS REOPEN AND BUTAGAZ IS AGAIN FOR SALE

1. ~~(C - ENTIRE TEXT)~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 BAGHDA 03025 271105Z

2. BAGHDAD SCHOOLS OPENED OCTOBER 27, AFTER HAVING BEEN
INFORMALLY CLOSED SINCE THE FIRST FEW DAYS OF THE WAR.
KINDERGARTEN, PRIMARY AND JUNIOR HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS WERE
NOTIFIED BY WORD OF MOUTH RATHER THAN BY PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT
THAT SCHOOLS WOULD BE BACK IN SESSION. HIGH SCHOOLS
AND UNIVERSITIES HAVE NOT YET REOPENED, PRIMARILY
BECAUSE MOST STUDENTS ARE IN OR BEING TRAINED FOR THE
POPULAR ARMY, CIVIL DEFENSE OR IN THE REGULAR MILITARY. IT WOULD

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BE CONSIDERED UNFAIR TO OPEN THESE SCHOOLS AND HAVE SO MANY STUDENTS MISS SO MANY CLASSES. EARLY MORNING OBSERVATIONS BY USINT OFFICERS CONFIRMS THE REAPPEARANCE OF STUDENTS IN SCHOOL UNIFORMS ON THE STREETS OF BAGHDAD, ALTHOUGH NOT YET IN THE SAME NUMBERS AS IN PRE-WAR DAYS. THE RECENT SCARCITY OF AIR ATTACKS ON BAGHDAD IS BEING CITED AS LEADING TO THE DECISION TO REOPEN THE SCHOOLS.

3. THE BUTAGAZ (COOKING GAS) SITUATION ALSO SEEMS TO BE EASING. THE CENTRAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM IS NOW FILLING OFFICIAL REQUESTS FROM INSTITUTIONS (INCLUDING EMBASSIES) FOR SMALL AMOUNTS OF BUTAGAZ BOTTLES, AND NEIGHBORHOOD DISTRIBUTORS HAVE BEEN AUTHORIZED DURING THE PAST WEEK TO DISTRIBUTE ONE FULL BUTAGAZ BOTTLE PER HOUSE FOR THE TIME BEING. USINT ITSELF STILL HAS AN AMPLE SUPPLY, HAVING BOUGHT A LARGE QUANTITY AS SOON AS THE WAR STARTED AND BEFORE THE SHORTAGE OCCURRED.

4. COMMENT: THESE MEASURES APPEAR DESIGNED TO RETURN BAGHDADIS TO AS NORMAL A LIFE AS POSSIBLE DESPITE THE CONTINUATION OF THE WAR. THEY ARE INDEED WELCOMED, BUT WE UNDERSTAND THAT THERE IS GROWING APPREHENSION AMONG THOUGHTFUL BAGHDADIS OVER THE EFFECT THE

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PAGE 03 BAGHDA 03025 271105Z

HOSTAGE RELEASE AND THE PRESUMED AUTOMATIC RESUPPLY OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO IRAN WILL HAVE ON A WAR THAT MANY BELIEVE HAS ALREADY GONE ON TOO LONG.
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PAGE 01 BAGHDA 03097 011507Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 IO-14 ADS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00
NSAE-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00 ICAE-00 INRE-00 PM-07 H-01
INR-10 L-03 PA-01 SP-02 SS-15 ACDA-12 EB-08
DOE-17 DOEE-00 HA-06 SSN-02 /122 W
-----021198 011514Z /40

O 011155Z NOV 80

FM USINT BAGHDAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1045

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY ALGIERS

AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

AMEMBASSY TUNIS

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BAGHDAD 3097E.O. 12065: ~~RRS-1~~ 11/1/90 (EAGLETON, WM. L.) OR-M

TAGS: PEPR, UNSC, IZ, IR

SUBJ: DISCUSSION AT FOREIGN MINISTRY RE IRAQ-IRAN PEACE EFFORTS

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. DURING A CONVERSATION NOVEMBER 1 WITH CHIEF OF THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT, MUHAMMAD SA'ID SAHHAF, I ASKED WHETHER HIS GOVERNMENT HAD ANY VIEWS TO SHARE REGARDING THE NAM, ISLAMIC, AND UNSC EFFORTS TO FIND A WAY TO END THE IRAQ-IRAN WAR. SAHHAF REPLIED THAT HE HAD NO PARTICULAR COMMENT EXCEPT THAT IRAQ WAS COOPERATING WITH THESE INITIATIVES. THE NON-ALIGNED REPRESENTATIVES WERE EXPECTED TO VISIT BAGHDAD AND TEHRAN SOON. HE INDICATED THAT ALGERIA COULD NOT BE ACCEPTED AS A MEMBER OF THE GROUP, NOT BECAUSE OF AN ANTI-ALGERIAN BIAS BUT BECAUSE OF THE PRINCIPLE THAT NO ARAB STATE SHOULD BE INVOLVED IN MEDIATING BETWEEN AN ARAB AND NON-ARAB STATE.

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PAGE 02 BAGHDA 03097 011507Z

3. RE UN SECURITY COUNCIL DELIBERATIONS AND POSSIBLE RESOLUTIONS, SAHHAF REPLIED THAT IRAQ HAD MADE ITS POSITION CLEAR, PARTICULARLY IN FOREIGN MINISTER HAMMADI'S LETTERS TO THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL. THE PROBLEM WAS THAT THE IRANIAN SIDE HAD NOT MADE ITS POSITION CLEAR OR PRODUCED ANY USEFUL SUGGESTIONS. IRAQ DID NOT SEEK ANY IRANIAN TERRITORY AND WOULD BE PREPARED TO WITHDRAW ONCE RIGHTS WERE RECOGNIZED.

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"TO WITHDRAW NOW WOULD NOT BE PRACTICAL". HE HAD SEEN
REPORTS THAT A NEW RESOLUTION MIGHT GIVE SECRETARY
GENERAL WALDHEIM A MANDATE TO WORK ON THE PROBLEM BUT
DID NOT HAVE AN OFFICIAL IRAQI POSITION ON THIS
POSSIBILITY.
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PAGE 01

BAGHDA 03016

PA 01 OF 02

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ACTION NEA-11

INFO OCT-01 IO-14 ADS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSAE-00
 NSCE-00 SSO-00 ICAE-00 INRE-00 ACDA-12 PM-07 H-01
 INR-10 L-03 PA-01 SP-02 SS-15 SPRS-02 /079 W
 -----110936 270840Z /15

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FM USINT BAGHDAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 990

INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 BAGHDAD 3016E.O. 12065: ~~DS~~-10/26/86 (EAGLETON, WM. L.) OR-M

TAGS: UNSC, US, IZ, IR

SUBJ: TEXT OF FOREIGN MINISTER HAMMADI'S OCTOBER 25 LETTER TO
 SECRETARY MUSKIE

REF: BAGHDAD 3015

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. BELOW IS THE TEXT OF THE ENGLISH TRANSLATION PROVIDED BY
 THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OF IRAQ OF A LETTER FROM FOREIGN MINISTER
 SA'ADUN HAMMADI TO SECRETARY MUSKIE DATED 25 OCTOBER 1980.

BEGIN QUOTE:

HIS EXCELLENCY
 EDMUND MUSKIE
 SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

EXCELLENCY,

ON THE OCCASION OF THE PRESENT DISCUSSION IN THE
 SECURITY COUNCIL AND, AFTER THE COUNCIL HAS HAD THE
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PAGE 02

BAGHDA 03016 01 OF 02 270836Z

OPPORTUNITY TO HEAR THE VIEWS OF IRAQ AND IRAN, ON THE SUBJECT
 UNDER DISCUSSION, I SHOULD LIKE TO RECALL ONCE AGAIN THAT
 IRAQ DOES NOT HAVE ANY TERRITORIAL AMBITIONS IN IRAN AND TO
 REAFFIRM THAT WE DO NOT DESIRE ANYTHING BUT THE
 RESTORATION OF OUR SOVEREIGNTY AND RIGHTS WITH
 EFFECTIVE GUARANTEES.

WE WISH TO RECALL THAT IRAN IN REALITY STARTED
 THE HOSTILITIES. IRAN COMMITTED AGGRESSION WHEN IT

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BORDERING THE ARABIAN GULF HAS BASED IT CONDUCT ON
AN EXPANSIONIST POLICY, AND WE HAVE, IN ADDITION TO
THE ACTUAL PRACTICES, DOCUMENTS WHICH PROVE THIS FACT.

IRANIAN OFFICIALS HAVE MADE STATEMENTS OF CLEARLY
EXPANSIONIST NATURE.

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PAGE 01 BAGHDA 03016 02 OF 02 261656Z POSS DUPE
ACTION NEA-11

INFO OCT-01 IO-14 ADS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSAE-00
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THEY HAVE ACTED IN A SIMILAR MANNER AT THE EXPENSE OF THE ARAB STATES NEIGHBORING IRAN OR SITUATED NEAR IT. IT IS, THEREFORE, NECESSARY TO GUARANTEE THE SOVEREIGNTY AND FULL RIGHTS OF IRAQ AND THE OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES. WHEN REFERENCE IS MADE TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE IRAQI FORCES, WE SHALL ASK AT ONCE: BUT TO WHAT BORDERS, AND ACCORDING TO WHICH BORDER AGREEMENT, SHALL SUCH A WITHDRAWAL TAKE PLACE? HOW AND WHO WOULD GUARANTEE THAT IRAN, AFTER OUR WITHDRAWAL, WILL NOT THREATEN OUR CITIES AND NATIONAL SECURITY? WHAT GUARANTEE IS THERE THAT IRAN WILL NOT REFUSE AGAIN, AS IT DID IN THE PAST, TO RECOGNIZE OUR SOVEREIGN RIGHTS OVER OUR TERRITORIES AND WATERS? WHO WILL GUARANTEE THAT IRAN WILL NOT AGAIN WAGE WAR ON US AND THE WHOLE PROBLEM WILL START ALL OVER AGAIN? THE LANDS REACHED SO FAR BY IRAQI FORCES ARE THE NECESSARY POSITIONS FOR DEFENSE UNTIL IRAN RECOGNIZES OUR RIGHTS AND GUARANTEES ARE REACHED FOR THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A FINAL AND PERMANENT SOLUTION TO THE DISPUTE.

ON THE BASIS OF MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS AND TOPOGRAPHY THERE MAY BE BETTER POSITIONS FORWARD FOR DEFENSIVE PURPOSES BUT THERE ARE NONE BACKWARD. CONSEQUENTLY, NO PARTIAL OR TOTAL WITHDRAWAL SHOULD BE PRACTICALLY CONTEMPLATED UNLESS IT IS SUPPORTED BY

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THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE FOLLOWING:

X 1. THE RECOGNITION BY IRAN OF OUR SOVEREIGNTY AND RIGHTS WHICH ARE IN HARMONY WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CUSTOM, AND ITS REAFFIRMATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF THE INADMISSIBILITY OF HER ACQUISITION BY FORCE OF IRAQI TERRITORIES AND THOSE OF THE NEIGHBORING ARAB STATES IN THE ARAB GULF, AND THAT THIS SHOULD BE IN WORD AND DEED.

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2. THE WITHDRAWAL SHOULD BE GUARANTEED BY PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WOULD MAKE A SURPRISE IRANIAN MILITARY AGGRESSION AGAINST IRAQ MATERIALLY IMPOSSIBLE. IN FURTHER CLARIFICATION, WE WISH TO POINT OUT THAT THERE IS NO LONGER ANY BORDER AGREEMENT WHICH DELIMITS THE FRONTIERS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE PROTOCOL FOR THE DELIMITATION OF THE TURCO-PERSIAN FRONTIERS SIGNED IN 1913, THE VIEWS OF IRAQ AND IRAN REGARDING THAT PROTOCOL NOT WITHSTANDING.

CONSEQUENTLY, AND ON THE BASIS OF ALL THESE CONSIDERATIONS AND FACTS, AND FROM A POSITION OF RESPONSIBILITY AND IN ORDER TO REAFFIRM THE PRINCIPLES OF RIGHT AND JUSTICE, WE BELIEVE THAT THE ONLY POSSIBLE, LOGICAL AND PRACTICAL RESOLUTION IN THE PRESENT SITUATION WHICH WOULD NOT UNDERMINE THE INTERESTS OF EITHER PARTY IS ONE WHICH INCLUDES A CEASE-FIRE AND IMMEDIATE NGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THEM UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS WITH THE GOAL OF ACHIEVING A FINAL SOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT, BY DEMARCATING THE FRONTIERS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES IN A FINAL MANNER, AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF BOTH PARTIES FROM THE TERRITORIES AND WATERS WHICH DO NOT FALL WITHIN THEIR TERRITORIAL BOUNDARIES ACCORDING TO THE
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FRONTIERS LINE.

ACCEPT, EXCELLENCY, THE ASSURANCES OF MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION.

DR. SADOUN HAMMADI,
MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE
REPUBLIC OF IRAQ.

END QUOTE.
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PAGE 01 BAGHDA 03017 261658Z
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 SSO-00 /031 W

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INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

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E.O. 12065: RDS-1 & 2, 10/26/2000 (EAGLETON, 2M. L) OR-M

TAGS: PEPR, US, JO, IZ, IR, IS

SUBJ: (S) EMBASSY TEL AVIV'S COMMENTS ON THE IRAQ-IRAN WAR

REF: TEL AVIV 10535

1. (~~S~~-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. WILL LEAVE IT TO EMBASSIES CAIRO, AMMAN AND DAMASCUS TO
DEAL WITH EMBASSY TEL AVIV'S SUGGESTION THAT ISRAEL WAS
ATTACKED BY ITS ARAB NEIGHBORS IN 1967. WE DO NOTE HOWEVER,

ANOTHER ELEMENT OF PARALLELISM IN THE FACT THAT ISRAEL'S
PRE-EMPTIVE ATTACK ON EGYPT IN 1967, WHICH BROUGHT IN JORDAN AN
SYRIA AND MANY OF US THINK WAS JUSTIFIED, WAS CAUSED BY
NASSER'S CLOSURE OF THE AQABA WATERWAY WHILE IN 1980 IRAN'S
MOVES TO CLOSE THE SHATT AL-ARAB (AFTER IRAQ HAD CLAIMED FULL
SOVEREIGNTY) WAS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF IRAQ'S
SEPT 22 ATTACK.

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PAGE 02 BAGHDA 03017 261658Z

3. ON ANOTHER POINT, WE ARE NOT CERTAIN FROM READING
PARA 2 REFTTEL THAT EMBASSY TEL AVIV, IN REFERRING TO
"CONQUERED IRANIAN TERRITORY, HAS AN ACCURATE VERSION
OF IRAQ'S TERRITORIAL CLAIMS. IT IS NOT OUR PURPOSE
TO TRY TO DEFEND THE WAY IRAQ DEALT WITH ITS TERRITORIAL
DISPUTE, THROUGH WE CAN IMAGINE SOME OF THE FRUSTRATIONS
IT ENCOUNTERED IN TRYING TO COMMUNICATE RATIONALLY WITH
ITS NEIGHBORS IN TEHRAN. HOWEVER, WE NOTE THAT THE

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ONLY TERRITORY CLAIMED BY IRAQ IS WHAT WAS OCCUPIED BEFORE THE SEPTEMBER 22 WAR BEGAN. IT COMPRISED ABOUT 400 SQUARE KILOMETERS IN THREE SECTORS OF THE FRONTIER WHICH HAD BEEN ENCROACHED UPON BY IRAN OVER A NUMBER OF YEARS. THESE TERRITORIES APPEAR ON THE IRAQI SIDE OF THE FRONTIER ON ALL INTERNATIONAL MAPS WE HAVE SEEN, AND WE BELIEVE THE IRAQIS ARE CORRECT IN SAYING THAT THE 1975 AGREEMENT PROVIDED FOR IRANIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM THEY SHOULD PROBABLY NOT BE REGARDED AS "CONQUERED IRANIAN TERRITORY".

4. THE MORE IMPORTANT IRAQI CLAIM IS FOR FULL SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE SHATT AL-ARAB WATERWAY. FIRST THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THEN IRAQ EXERCISED SUCH SOVEREIGNTY EXCEPT FOR THE PERIOD AFTER THE 1975 AGREEMENT WHEN IRAQ DIVIDED THE SHATT WITH IRAN IN EXCHANGE FOR IRANIAN WITHDRAWAL OF SUPPORT FOR THE KURDISH REBELLION. WHETHER OR NOT THE 1975 AGREEMENT ON THE SHATT WAS STILL VALID R IN SEPTEMBER 1980 IS ONE OF THE ISSUES OF CONTENTION IN THE IRAQ-IRAN DISPUTE.

5. CONTRARY TO THE STATEMENT IN PARA 2 REFTTEL, THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT HAS, AT THE UN AND IN STATEMENTS TO US IN BAGHDAD, ACCEPTED THE "PRINCIPLE OF WITHDRAWAL"

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FROM OCCUPIED TERRITORIES , I.E. , TERRITORIES OCCUPIED AFTER SEPTEMBER 22. WE AGREE WITH PARA 3 REFTTEL THAT THE U.S. POSITIONS IN 1967 AND THUS FAR IN 1980 HAVE BEEN CONSISTENT.
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ACTION SS-30

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AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE

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E.O. 12065: RDS-1 10/25/92 (EAGLETON, WM. L) OR-M

TAGS: PORG, UNSC, IZ, IR

SUBJ: ~~(e)~~ DISCUSSION OF SECURITY COUNCIL DEVELOPMENTS WITH FOREIGN
MINISTRY OFFICIAL

REF: A) USUN 4433; B) STATE 271895; C) STATE 284491

1. ~~(e)~~ ENTIRE TEXT)2. AT MY REQUEST ON OCTOBER 25 I CALLED ON CHIEF OF THE FIRST
INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT AT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY, MUHAMMAD SA'ID SAHH
AF,WHO WAS ACCOMPANIED BY AMERICAN DESK OFFICER, ZUHAIR
IBRAHIM. LIKE THE LAST TIME, APPOINTMENT CAME ONE HOUR AFTER
OUR REQUEST. I BEGAN BY REFERRING TO VOA, BBC, FOREIGN AND IRAQI
PRESS COVERAGE OF AMBASSADOR MCHENRY'S OCTOBER 23 SECURITY
COUNCIL STATEMENT WHICH ALMOST UNIVERSALLY GAVE THE IMPRESSION
THAT THE STATEMENT WAS PRO-IRAN AND ANTI-IRAQ. SAHHAF SAID HE
HAD SEEN A COPY OF THE STATEMENT WHICH WE HAD PROVIDED ZUHAIR
IBRAHIM YESTERDAY, OCTOBER 24. I TOLD HIM THE DEPT~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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HAD SENT US COMMENTS ON THE STATEMENT WHICH I HAD BEEN
ASKED TO CONVEY TO THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT. THESE SHOULD
MAKE IT CLEAR THAT U.S. POSITION REMAINS BALANCED AND
IMPARTIAL.3. I READ TALKING POINTS FROM PARA 3 STATE 284491
VERBATIM. SAHHAF TOOK NOTES AND ASKED FOR CLARIFICATIONS
ON SEVERAL POINTS. HIS FIRST CONCERN WAS WITH CONTINUED
U.S. REFERENCES TO "DISMEMBERMENT OF IRAN" EVEN THOUGH

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IRAQ HAD CONSISTENTLY MADE IT CLEAR THAT IT HAD NO CLAIM ON IRANIAN TERRITORY. I NOTED THAT AMBASSADOR MCHENRY HAD ACKNOWLEDGED THIS POINT AND EMPHASIZED THAT OUR POSITION IN THIS REGARD WAS A HISTORICAL ONE WHICH RECOGNIZED THE FACT THAT IRAN WAS MADE UP OF A NUMBER OF NATIONALITIES AND THAT THE USSR HAD AT ONE TIME OCCUPIED A NORTHERN SECTION OF THE COUNTRY. THE CONTINUATION OF THE IRAQ/IRAN WAR OBVIOUSLY INCREASED THE DANGER OF A BREAKUP OF IRAN. SAHHAF SEEMED SATISFIED WITH THIS EXPLANATION.

4. IN THE FINAL TALKING POINT WHERE WE LISTED THE THREE KEY PRINCIPLES BEGINNING WITH "NON ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY BY FORCE" SAHHAF SAID WITH A SMILE, "WHAT ABOUT ISRAEL?" I REPLIED THAT I HAD BEEN EXPECTING HIS COMMENT AND WENT ON TO THE NEXT POINT, NOT WISHING TO GET INTO THE INTERESTING PARALLEL BETWEEN IRAQI AND ISRAELI POSITIONS ON WITHDRAWAL.

5. HAVING PUT AWAY MY NOTES I TOLD SAHHAF I WOULD LIKE TO FILL HIM IN ON THE WAY WE WERE APPROACHING THE DIFFICULT QUESTION OF HOW TO BRING ABOUT A CEASE-FIRE AND NEGOTIATED SETELEMANT. THE IRANIAN POSITION HAD BEEN THAT THEY WOULD NOT TALK UNTIL ALL IRAQI TROOPS

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HAD WITHDRAWN. WE HAD NOT ENDORSED THIS POSITION BUT BELIEVED THAT IF IRAN WAS TO BE BROUGHT TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE THERE MUST BE SOME ELEMENT OF WITHDRAWAL ON THE IRAQI SIDE. THERE WERE PRECEDENTS FOR VARIOUS TYPES OF WITHDRAWAL AND SEPARATION OF FORCES. A NUMBER OF DELEGATIONS AT THE UN WERE EXPLORING POSSIBILITIES ALONG THESE LINES. WE DID NOT HAVE A SPECIFIC PLAN OR RECOMMENDATION BUT BELIEVED BOTH IRAQ AND IRAN SHOULD BE FLEXIBLE TO BRIDGE THE GAP BETWEEN TOTAL WITHDRAWAL AND NO WITHDRAWAL.

6. SAHHAF SAID IRAQ SOUGHT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE END OF THE WAR. THEY HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH OTHER DELEGATIONS AT THE UN AND WERE AWARE OF WHAT WAS BEING DISCUSSED. HE ASKED WHETHER WE HAD ANYTHING TO INDICATE THAT THE IRANIAN SIDE WAS APPROACHING THE PROBLEM WITH MORE REALISM THAN PREVIOUSLY. I REPLIED THAT IN THE PAST SEVERAL DAYS WE HAD SOME INDICATION IN NEWYORK THAT THE IRANIAN DELEGATION WAS SPEAKING WITH MORE REALISM AND FLEXIBILITY THAN BEFORE. SAHHAF SAID THEY HAD HEARD THE SAME THING BUT HAD CONCLUDED THAT, UNLESS THERE WAS EVIDENCE TO THE CONTRARY, WHAT WAS BEING SAID BY THE IRANIAN DELEGATION DID NOT REPRESENT AN OFFICIAL IRANIAN POSITION. I REPLIED THAT I DID NOT KNOW WHO IT REPRESENTED BUT ANY INDICATION OF IRANIAN FLEXIBILITY WAS WORTH EXPLORING. SAHHAF AGREED BUT ADDED THAT HE WAS SKEPTICAL.

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7. SAHHAF SAID THERE WAS ONLY ONE ISSUE ON WHICH IRAQ HAD NO FLEXIBILITY. THIS WAS SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE SHATT AL-ARAB. I TOLD HIM WE HAD CONSISTENTLY REPORTED THIS TO WASHINGTON. WE HAD NOT TAKEN A POSITION ON THIS ISSUE. HOWEVER SINCE IRAQ HAS A STRONG HISTORIC CLAIM AS WELL AS A LEGAL CASE, IT SHOULD BE ABLE TO APPROACH NEGOTIATIONS WITH SOME FLEXIBILITY REGARDING MODALITIES OF ARRANGING A CEASE-FIRE AND NEGOTIATIONS.

8. SAHHAF EXPRESSED HIS APPRECIATION FOR OUR CLARIFICATION

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OF THE U.S. POSITION AND SAID HE WOULD REPORT OUR CONVERSATION IN FULL TO FOREIGN MINISTER HAMMADI WHO HAS RETURNED TO BAGHDAD.
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AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY DOHA
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MANAMA
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY RABAT
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY TUNIS

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TAGS: PORC, PEPR, UNSC, IZ, IR, US
SUBJ: FOREIGN MINISTER HAMMADI ADDRESSES MESSAGE TO
MEMBERS OF SECURITY COUNCIL

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

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2. WHEN CALLED TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY EVENING OCTOBER 25
I FOUND MYSELF FOR THE FIRST TIME WITH A GROUP OF CHIEFS OF
MISSION (REPRESENTING MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL) WHO
HAD BEEN CONVOKED BY FOREIGN MINISTER SA'ADUN HAMMADI. THIS
INCLUSION OF AN AMERICAN REPRESENTATIVE SEEMS TO FOLLOW FROM
THE SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH HAMMADI IN NEW YORK LAST
MONTH.

3. AS AMBASSADORS TOOK NOTES, HAMMADI MADE A STATEMENT

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REVIEWING IRAQ'S WELL-KNOWN POSITIONS ON THE ORIGIN AND AIMS OF THE CONFLICT WITH IRAN. HAVING BEEN IN NEW YORK, THIS WAS HAMMADI'S FIRST MEETING WITH AMBASSADORS IN BAGHDAD SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR. OTHERWISE HIS REPETITION OF THE IRAQI CASE WOULD HARDLY HAVE BEEN JUSTIFIED. AT THE END OF THE MEETING LETTERS TO EACH OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERS WERE DISTRIBUTED AND DR. HAMMADI ASKED THAT HIS PERSONAL BEST WISHES BE CONVEYED WITH THEM.

4. THE MOST NOTABLE FEATURE OF HAMMADI'S PRESENTATION AND HIS LETTER TO THE SECRETARY WAS THE RECENT IRAQI INSISTENCE THAT THE ORIGINAL AGGRESSION WAS INITIATED BY IRAN, BEGINNING WITH ARTILLERY ATTACKS ON SEPTEMBER 4. THE IRAQI PRESENTATION IS DEFENSIVE AND WAS WE BELIEVE STIMULATED BY REFERENCES BY PRESIDENT CARTER TO IRAQI "AGGRESSION". THE ONLY MENTION OF THE U.S. IN THE PRESENTATION (THE FBIS VERSION IS ACCURATE) WAS HAMMADI'S STATEMENT THAT U.S. OFFICIALS HAD MADE CLEAR HINTS ABOUT IRAQI WITHDRAWAL. THE STATEMENT AND THE LETTER REITERATED IRAQ'S POSITION THAT IT HAS NO CLAIMS ON IRANIAN TERRITORY. AT THE SAME TIME IRAQ'S CLAIM TO SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE SHATT AL-ARAB WAS EMPHASIZED.

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5. ALTHOUGH IRAQ IS TAKING THE POSITION THAT "TALK ABOUT WITHDRAWAL IS UNREALISTIC" NOW, HAMMADI'S STATEMENT AND LETTER WENT ON TO LIST CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE POSSIBLE WHICH INCLUDED IRANIAN RECOGNITION OF IRAQI SOVEREIGNTY AND RIGHTS, ETC., AND THAT WITHDRAWAL SHOULD BE "GUARANTEED BY PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS WHICH MAKE A SURPRISE IRANIAN MILITARY AGGRESSION AGAINST IRAQ MATERIALLY IMPOSSIBLE." OUR CONCLUSION IS THAT THE IRAQI POSITION ON WITHDRAWAL IS OPEN TO DISCUSSION AND PERHAPS SOME MODIFICATION, PROVIDED IRAQI SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE SHATT IS NOT JEOPARDIZED.
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INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE

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FOIA Exemptions

PA Exemptions

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E.O. 12065: RDS-1 10/21/2000 (EAGLETON, WM. L.) OR-M

TAGS: PEPR, UK, IR, IZ

SUBJ: (S) BRITISH EMBASSY CONCERN RE HOSTAGES/ARMS DEAL

1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. DURING RECENT DAYS, BRITISH AMABASSADOR-DESIGNATE EGERTON HAS ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS TOLD ME OF HIS CONCERN RE THE POSSIBLE REPERCUSSIONS ON UK/IRAQI RELATIONS AND STATUS OF HIS EMBASSY SHOULD A SUDDEN DEAL ON THE RELEASE OF AMERICAN HOSTAGES BRING A LIFTING OF THE BRITISH EMBARGO ON SHIPMENTS TO IRAN. ON OCTOBER 19 THE BRITISH CHARGE WAS CALLED TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY BY CHIEF OF FIRST INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT, SAHHAF. (THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR, ALONG WITH AMBASSADORS OF CANADA, AUSTRIA AND AFGHAN-ISTAN, WERE SUPPOSED TO PRESENT THEIR CREDENTIALS TO SADDAM HUSSAIN OCTOBER 18 BUT THE CEREMONY WAS POSTPONED AT THE LAST MINUTE.) BRITISH CHARGE WAS GIVEN FULL TREATMENT ON IRAQI CONCERN OVER A REPORT RELAYED (APPARENTLY INACCURATELY) BY THEIR EMBASSY IN LONDON ABOUT THE FOREIGN OFFICE PRESS SPOKESMANS REPLY TO A QUESTION ON HOSTAGES/ARMS DEAL.

3. THE QUESTIONS WAS RELATED TO A REPORT THAT SECRETARY MUSKIE HAD SPOKEN OF "AUTOMATIC" RESUMPTION OF SHIPMENTS TO IRAN

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FOLLOWING A RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES. WHEN THE BRITISH SPOKESMAN WAS ASKED WHETHER THIS APPLIED TO BRITISH SHIPMENTS HE REPLIED THAT THEY WOULD BE CONSIDERED CASE BY CASE ON THE BASIS OF MERIT. THAT THE IRAQIS GOT IT WRONG, HOWEVER, AND THOUGHT IT WOULD BE AUTOMATIC. HENCE THEIR DEMARCHE TO THE BRITISH EMBASSY HERE.

4. IF THE BRITISH ARE SEEN TO BE FOLLOWING OUR LEAD IN A MILITARY SUPPLY/HOSTAGE DEAL THEY STAND TO LOOSE MORE IN IRAQ THAN WE

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WOULD. THERE IS ALREADY THE PRECEDENCE OF DIPLOMATIC BREAKS WITH SYRIA, LIBYA AND NORTH KOREA. BREAKING WITH THE UK WOULD BE ANOTHER MATTER AND MIGHT BE REJECTED BY THE IRAQIS AS COUNTERPRODUCTIVE, BUT THEY WOULD BE TEMPTED TO DO SOMETHING TO ILLUSTRATE THEIR UNHAPPINESS. WHILE THE SAME APPLIES TO THE U.S. WE HAVE LESS OF A COMMERCIAL AND DIPLOMATIC PRESENCE TO BE AFFECTED. IN BOTH CASES IRAQI PERCEPTIONS OF WHAT WE ARE DOING AND ITS IMPACT ON IRAN'S ARMED STRENGTH WILL HAVE AS MUCH OR MORE EFFECT ON IRAQI REACTIONS AS WHAT IS IN FACT HAPPENING RE U.S. /UK SUPPLIES FOR IRAN.

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PAGE 01 BAGHDA 02949 181847Z
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INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DMASCUS
AMEMBASSY DOHA
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BAGHDAD 2949

E.O. 12065: ~~ADS-1~~ 10/18/90 (HOMAN, TH. A) OR-O
TAGS: PINT, PINS, IZ, IR, MOPS
SUBJ: MILITARY OBSERVATIONS, BAGHDAD-BASRA TRIP (OCTOBER 15-17)

1. (~~C~~-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: DURING TRIP BY USINT OFFICERS FROM BAGHDAD TO
BASRA AND RETURN (OCTOBER 15-17), CONSIDERABLE MILITARY
ACTIVITY WAS NOTED ONLY IN AREA JUST NORTH OF AMARA. ALTHOUGH

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SOLDIERS WERE SEEN IN TWOS AND THREES ALL ALONG ROUTE AND IN
LARGE NUMBERS AT INFREQUENT CHECK POINTS, ONLY LARGE MASSING
WAS IN AND AROUND AMARA WHERE TANKS AND ARTILLERY WERE PRESENT
IN LARGE NUMBERS. AIR ALERTS WERE ENCOUNTERED DAILY, ALTHOUGH
ONLY ACTUAL STRIKE WITNESSED WAS ON OIL STORAGE FACILITY NEAR
BASRA OCTOBER 16. MIGS WERE SEEN CLIMBING INTO SKY HEADED EAST
FROM POINTS SOUTH OF KUT. JOURNALIST WHO VISITED KARUN RIVER
REPORTED ENTRENCHED IRAQI POSITIONS, SOMMTHLY OPERATING PONTOON
BRIDGE AND RELAXED TROOPS. A RETIRED BRITISH GENERAL LEARNED

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THAT OFFICERS IN THE FIELD HAD LITTLE UNDERSTANDING OF OVERALL WAR STRATEGY AND INSTEAD WERE FORCED TO RELY ON AD HOC ORDERS. END SUMMARY.

2. DURING DRIVE FROM BAGHDAD TO BASRA ON ROUTE THROUGH KUT AND NASRIYYA, SURPRISINGLY LITTLE MILITARY ACTIVITY WAS IN EVIDENCE. SECURITY ALONG ROAD WAS VERY LIGHT AND USINT OFFICERS WERE NEVER ASKED FOR MFA TRAVEL PERMIT, UNUSUAL EVEN IN NORMAL TIMES. ALTHOUGH TROOPS WERE EVIDENT IN ALL CITIES AND VILLAGES, THERE WERE NO TANKS OR HEAVY ARTILLERY VISIBLE FROM THE MAIN ROAD. OFFICERS ENCOUNTERED NO HEAVY MILITARY EQUIPMENT BEING MOVED AND SAW ONLY EMPTY TANK TRANSPORTS. AS OFFICERS ENTERED BASRA, AIR ALERT WAS IN PROGRESS BUT NO SHOOTING OR ATTACK TOOK PLACE. LIGHTS WERE OFF DURING PERIOD OF ALERT BUT WERE TURNED ON AGAIN IMMEDIATELY AFTER ALL CLEAR WAS SOUNDED. ACCORDING TO JOURNALISTS REPORTING FROM BASRA, THIS IS ROUTINE. NIGHT LIGHTING IS AT ABOUT ONE-THIRD OF NORMAL INTENSITY WITH ALL MAJOR ACCESS ROADS ADEQUATELY LIGHTED. CIVILIAN TRAFFIC IS LIGHT BUT STEADY THROUGH THE LATE EVENING HOURS.

3. THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF DISSIDENCE FROM ANY QUARTER IN THE CITY OF BASRA. THE MILITARY IS EVERYWHERE, CARRYING SHOULDER WEAPONS. USINT OFFICERS SAW NO MOUNTED GUNS OR HEAVY ARTILLERY WITHIN THE CITY LIMITS, ALTHOUGH IT IS POSSIBLE AND EVEN

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LIKELY THAT SUCH WEAPONRY IS OUT OF VIEW IN MILITARY ENCAMPMENTS.

4. THE SHATT AL-ARAB IS CROWDED WITH FOREIGN MERCHANT SHIPS. SIZE RANGES FROM GULF DHOWS APPROXIMATELY FIFTY METERS IN LENGTH TO FREIGHTERS AND OILERS OF SUBSTANTIAL SIZE. THERE ARE PERHAPS FIFTY VESSELS (INCLUDING DHOWS) ALONG MAJOR PART OF CITY ITSELF. JOURNALISTS REPORT PERHAPS ANOTHER FIFTY FURTHER SOUTH. MOST APPEAR TO BE LIGHTLY MANNED. MANY SAILORS ARE SAID TO HAVE BEEN EVACUATED OVERLAND.

5. DURING RETURN TRIP VIA AMARA AND MUCH CLOSER TO IRAQ-IRAN BORDER, AMOUNT OF MILITARY ACTIVITY WAS CONSIDERABLY HIGHER, ESPECIALLY IN AREA JUST NORTH OF AMARA ITSELF. THERE OFFICERS SAW LARGE NUMBER OF TANKS, APC'S, TANK TRANSPORT TRUCKS, PROVISION TRUCKS AND GUN EMPLACEMENTS. IRAQI ARMY APPEARED WELL ENTRENCHED ALONG APPROXIMATELY THREE KILOMETER STRIP BEGINNING JUST NORTH OF AMARA. TANKS IN THAT AREA MAY HAVE NUMBERED WELL OVER ONE HUNDRED WITH A GREAT VARIETY OF ANCILLARY EQUIPMENT. THIS APPEARS TO BE MAJOR BIVOUAC AREA WITH SOLDIERS EVERYWHERE. ALL VEHICLES WERE CHECKED AS THEY ENTER THE CITY FROM THE SOUTH. AIR ALERT WAS IN PROGRESS AS USINT OFFICERS ENTERED CITY BUT NO ATTACK WAS WITNESSED. ARTILLERY FIRE COULD BE HEARD IN THE DISTANCE ALONG ROAD IN THE AMARA AREA. NONE WAS HEARD ELSEWHERE ALONG ROUTE. MOVEMENT OF TANKS ALONG ROUTE WAS LIGHT; OFFICERS ENCOUNTERED ONLY SIX TANK TRANSPORTS

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ON RETURN TRIP, ALL SOUTH OF AMARA. THIS CONCENTRATION APPEARS TO SUPPORT SPECULATION THAT IRAQIS MAY BE PREPARING TO LAUNCH MAJOR ATTACK ON DEZFUL.

6. AP CORRESPONDENT WHO VISITED KARUN RIVER ON OCTOBER 16 REPORTED SMOOTHLY OPERATING IRAQI MILITARY EFFORT. HE SAID PONTOON BRIDGE IS PUT INTO PLACE WHENEVER NEEDED (IS IS RIGGED FOR EASY DISASSEMBLY WITH SMALL OUTBOARD MOTORS ON KEY SECTIONS) TO MOVE TANKS TO THE EAST SIDE. HE SAW TWELVE TANKS MOVE ACROSS THE BRIDGE DURING THREE-HOUR PERIOD OF HIS VISIT. HE SAID TROOPS WERE RELAXED ENOUGH

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TO BE SWIMMING IN THE WATER NEAR THE BRIDGE AND THAT FIELD COMMANDERS REFLECTED CONFIDENCE THAT ABADAN WOULD BE TAKEN WITH A MINIMUM OF IRAQI CASUALTIES. HE SAID TROOP MORALE APPEARED HIGH WITH GOOD SUPPLY LINES AND A STEADY PACE OF ADVANCEMENT. HE BELIEVES IRAQIS WERE IN FULL CONTROL OF BOTH BANKS OF RIVER ONE AND HALF KILOMETERS OUTSIDE THE CITY AT THE TIME OF HIS VISIT. THERE WAS LITTLE INCOMING IRANIAN ARTILLERY FIRE DURING HIS VISIT THOUGH THERE WERE SPORADIC BURSTS OF FIRING. THE TROOPS DID NOT APPEAR TO BE CONCERNED ABOUT THE INTERMITTENT SHELLING, APPARENTLY BECAUSE TARGETING HAD BEEN INACCURATE .

7. AS AN INTERESTING INFORMAL OBSERVATION, A RETIRED GENERAL NOW WORKING AS A MILITARY CORRESPONDENT FOR THE LONDON TIMES, HAD A LONG CHAT WITH THE GENERAL COMMANDING THE OPERATIONS AT THE KARUN RIVER. HE SAID THAT THE GENERAL CONFIDED, AFTER SOME CAMARADERIE HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED, THAT FIELD OFFICERS HAD NO PERCEPTION OF ANY OVERALL STRATEGY ON THE PART OF IRAQ. INSTRUCTIONS WERE BEING ISSUED ON AN AD HOC BASIS AND SOLDIERS IN THE FIELD COULD ONLY GUESS AS TO THE WAR STRATEGY. THE RETIRED BRITISH GENERAL WAS IMPRESSED BY THE BRIDGING OPERATION.
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ACTION NEA-11

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PM-07 H-01 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 PA-01 SP-02 SS-15
NSCE-00 SSO-00 ICAE-00 INRE-00 ACDA-12 OMB-01
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 955
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AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
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AMEMBASSY DOHA
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
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E.O. 12065: GDS 10/20/86 (EAGLETON, WM. L.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, IZ
SUBJ: FIRST DAY OF ID IN BAGHDAD

1. (P - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: THREE ALARMS AND ONE (POSSIBLY TWO) AIR RAIDS
OCTOBER 19 REMINDED BAGHDADIS THAT THE WAR WOULD NOT RESPECT
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THEIR ID HOLIDAY. IN ANY CASE MOST OF THEM SEEMED READY TO IGNORE
THE ID THIS YEAR, WHICH WAS GOOD NEWS FOR THE SHEEP. PRESIDENT
SADDAM HUSSEIN MADE AN EXTENDED TOUR DURING THE DAY MEETING
IN STREETS AND HOMES WITH FAMILIES OF OFFICERS AND NCO'S.
BY THE END OF THE DAY HE LOOKED TIRED WHEN HE READ HIS ID ADDRESS,
FREQUENTLY STUMBLING OVER WORDS. HIS MAIN THEME WAS THAT IN A
WAR FORCED ON IRAQ BY AN IRAN MORE STRATEGICALLY SECURE AND
BETTER EQUIPPED WITH U.S. ARMS, THE HEROIC IRAQIS WERE DOING
VERY WELL.

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E.O. 12065: RDS-10/18/90 (HOMAN, THOMAS A) OR-O
TAGS: PINT, PINS, MOPS, IZ, IR
SUBJ: USINT OFFICERS' VISIT TO BASRA (OCT 15-17)

1. ~~ENTIRE~~ TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: DURING VISIT TO BASRA OCTOBER 15-17, USINT
OFFICERS HAD OPPORTUNITY TO TOUR LUMMUS-THYSSEN COMPOUND WHERE
THREE AMERICANS WERE KILLED ON SECOND DAY OF IRAQ-IRAN HOSTIL-
ITIES. OFFICERS ALSO TOURED CITY EXTENSIVELY, NOTING VIRTUALLY
NO PHYSICAL DAMAGE. IRANIAN AIR STRIKES APPEAR TO BE CONCENTRATED

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ON OIL INSTALLATIONS. CITY IS GENERALLY RELAXED WITH PARTIAL
BLACKOUT AT NIGHT. LIGHTS ARE OFF COMPLETELY ONLY DURING AIR ALERTS.
AMERICAN NEWSMEN BASED IN BASRA ARE FRUSTRATED BY LACK OF ACCESS.
THOSE REPORTERS WHO HAVE ACHIEVED TRIPS TO KARUN RIVER REPORT
STEADY IRAQI ADVANCE WITH MINIMUM IRAQI CASUALTIES. ON RETURN
TRIP OFFICERS NOTED LARGE-SCALE MILITARY ENTRENCHMENT ONLY
IN AMARA AREA. SEE SEPTELS FOR DETAILS ON MILITARY AND CONSULAR
ASPECTS OF TRIP END SUMMARY.

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3. DURING OVRRLAND TRIP FROM BAGHDAD TO BASRA ON OCTOBER 15, USINT OFFICERS VISITED KUT, ASRIYYA AND SMALLER VILLAGES ALONG ROUTE. THERE IS LITTLE EVIDENCE OF WAR DAMAGE: ONLY INDICATION THAT CONFLICT IS IN PROGRESS IS LARGE NUMBER OF SOLDIERS EVIDENT EVERYWHERE. SURPRISINGLY, NO MOVEMENT OF HEAVY MILITARY EQUIPMENT WERE SEEN ALONG THIS ROUTE.

4. IN BASRA ITSELF, LARGE NUMBERS OF IRAQI ARMY TROOPS PATROL EVERY SECTION OF CITY. AT NIGHT THERE IS SOME STREET LIGHTING AMOUNTING TO PERHAPS ONE-THIRD OF NORMAL. JOURNALISTS TEMPORARILY BASED THERE IN HAMDAN HOTEL HAVE NOTED NOTHING IN THE WAY OF CIVIL DISTURBANCES OR SHI'ITE UNREST. SOUQS ARE OPEN NORMALLY, MOST RESTAURANTS CONTINUE TO OPERATE EVEN AT NIGHT AND NO SHORTAGES OF CONSUMER GOODS ARE EVIDENT. WITH THE COMING OF THE FALL GARDENING SEASON, VEGETABLE STALLS ARE FULL OF FRESH PRODUCE AND RESTAURANTS SERVE NORMAL MENU FARE. THERE WERE THREE AIR ALERTS DURING PERIOD OF VISIT, BUT ONLY SUCESSFUL STRIKE CAME ON MORNING OF OCTOBER 16 WHEN OIL STORAGE DEPOT WAS HIT ON EDGE OF BASRA, PRESUMABLY BY IRANIAN PHANTOM. IN SHORT, LIFE GOES ON ALMOST NORMALLY. SOLDIERS TOP CARS (INCLUDING USG OFFICAL VEHICLE) FOR SPOT CHECKING, BUT THIS EFFORT IS NOT INTENSIVVE THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF ANTI-REGIME SENTIMENT, NOR HAD JOURNALISTS PICKED UP ANY RUMORS ON THIS SUBJECT ALL POLITICAL SLOGANS WERE SUPPORTIVE OF SADDAM AND STRESSED SOLIDARITY THEME.

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4. AMERICAN AND OTHER JOURNALISTS COMPLAINED BITTERLY ABOUT BEING "SPOONFED". THE GOI HAS RESTRICTED THEIR MOVEMENT BY WARNING TAXICAB DRIVERS TO CLEAR ALL DESTINATIONS OF FOREIGNERS WITH MINISTRY OF INFORMATION OR SECURITY OFFICIALS BEFOFE TAKING THEM ANYWHERE OFF THE MAIN ROUTES. THIS EFFECTIVELY ELIMINATES FREEDOM OF TRAVEL SINCE PERMISSION TO VISIT BATTLE ZONES IS NEVER GIVEN. NEVERTHELESS, OCCASIONALLY JOURNALISTS ARE TAKEN TO THE FRONT BY MINISTRY OF DEFENSE OFFICERS. FOR EXAMPLE, AN AP CORRESPONDENT MANAGED TO ARRANGE A TRIP TO THE KARUN RIVER ON OCTOBER 16. HE WAS IMPRESSED BY IRAQI BRIDGING OPERATION AND NOTED THAT IRAQIS WERE CASUAL ENOUGH TO BE "SWIMMING AROUND IN THE RIVER.

5. DURING VISIT TO LUMMUS-THYSSSEN PETRO-CHEMICAL COMPLEX ON OCTOBER 16, OFFICERS WERE GIVEN TOUR OF AREAS DESTROYED IN SEPTEMBER 23 IRANIAN AIR ATTACK IN WHICH THREE AMERICANS WERE KILLED. CAMP IS CURRENTLY UNDERGOING REPAIR. INDUSTRIAL FACILITY IS INTACT. ONLY DAMAGE WAS TO LIVING QUARTERS AND WORKSHOP.

6. ON RETURN TRIP BY ALTERNATE ROAD THROUGH AMARA (WHICH IS MUCH CLOSER TO IRANIAN BORDER), OFFICERS NOTED LITTLE ACTUAL DESTRUCTION BUT MUCH HEAVIER CONCENTRATIONS OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT. THIS WAS ESPECIALLY TRUE AT AMARA WHERE TROOPS WERE WELL ENTRENCHED WITH LARGE NUMBERS OF TANKS, APC'S AND TRANSPORT VEHICLES. ONLY AIR ACTIVITY ACTUALLY OBSERVED WAS ON OCTOBER 17 WHEN THREE

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GROUPS OF MIGS (TOTAL NINE PLANES) WERE SEEN SHORTLY AFTER
TAKE-OFF FROM NEAR KUT HEADING EAST.
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E.O. 12065: GDS 10/18/86 (EAGLETN, WM L)OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, MOPS, IZ, IR, US
SUBJ: MEETING WITH ZUHAIR IBRAHIM AT FOREIGN MINISTRY

REF: A) STATE 277583; B) USUN 4377

1. (X-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. OCTOBER 18 I CALLED ON OFFICIAL RESPONSIBLE FOR US AFFAIRS AT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY, ZUHAIR IBRAHIM. I GAVE HIM A COPY OF SECRETARY MUSKIE'S ID GREETINGS TO FOREIGN MINISTER HAMMADI. IN REPLY TO MY QUESTION HE SAID HE THOUGHT THERE WOULD BE LITTLE OBSERVANCE OF THE ID IN IRAQ THIS YEAR.

3. I THEN GAVE IBRAHIM A COPY OF AMBASSADOR MCHENRY'S STATEMENT AT THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL OCTOBER 17 EMPHASIZING THAT THE US GOVERNMENT WISHED IRAQ'S OFFICIALS TO BE FULLY INFORMED REGARDING THIS AND OTHER STATEMENTS.

4. CONVERSATION THEN TURNED TO OUR CONTINUING EFFORT TO HELP THE IRAQIS SORT OUT OFFICIAL US STATEMENTS FROM THE MANY RUMORS, INCLUDING THE ONE ON AN ARMS FOR HOSTAGES DEAL. I REAFFIRMED OUR REFUSAL TO TAKE SIDES ON THE ORIGINS OF THE CONFLICT AND GAVE IBRAHIM A COPY OF THE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN'S REFERENCE TO THIS

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ON OCTOBER 16.

5. IBRAHIM OBSERVED THAT EUROPEAN MEDIA SEEMED TO PORTRAY IRANIAN PRIME MINISTER RAJAI'S VISIT TO NEW YORK AS BEING PRIMARILY TO OBTAIN U.S. ARMS. HE AGREED THAT RAJAI HAD NOT DONE VERY WELL IN THIS REGARD SO FAR. I REVIEWED WITH HIM OUR LONG-STANDING POSITION ON LIFTING THE EMBARGO ON IRAN AFTER THE RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES AND GAVE HIM THE PRESS SPOKESMANS CLARIFICATIONS PROVIDED BY STATE 277583. HE SEEMED SATISFIED, BUT WE KNOW THE

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IRAQIS WILL REMAIN NERVOUS ON THIS SUBJECT.

6. IBRAHIM SAID HIS MINISTRY HAD SEEN AN ARTICLE IN A FRENCH NEWSPAPER WHICH REFERRED TO A COMMENT BY SECRETARY MUSKIE ON OCTOBER 2, IN REPLY TO AN ALLEGATION THAT THE U.. WAS TILTING TOWARD IRAQ, IN WHICH THE SECRETARY SAID THERE WAS PROBABLY MORE EVIDENCE IN THE OTHER DIRECTION. IBRAHIM ASKED WHETHER WE HAD THE ORIGINAL STATEMENT. I REPLIED THAT THE IRAQIS WERE OVER-REACTING TO STATEMENTS BY AMERICAN OFFICIALS WHICH WERE PARTICULARLY PLENTIFUL DURING THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN. SOME OF THESE WERE ATTEMPTS TO PRESERVE OUR BALANCE BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN, BUT THEY PERHAPS LOOKED TO ONE OR THE OTHER SIDE AS A TILT. I ADVISED THAT THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT STOP ANALYZING EACH REMARK AND INSTEAD JUDGE OUR POLICY BY THE OFFICIAL STATEMENTS THAT HAVE BEEN ISSUED WHICH HAVE CONSISTENTLY REITERATED OUR NEUTRALITY AND IMPARTIALITY. IBRAHIM AGREED THAT IRAQ HAD BEEN OVER-REACTING. WHEN HE APOLOGIZED FOR BOTHERING US SO OFTEN REGARDING U.S. STATEMENTS, I SAID THE U.S.GOVERNMENT WELCOMED THESE OPPORTUNITIES TO KEEP EACH OTHER FULLY INFORMED REGARDING OUR CONCERNS AND POSITIONS.

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E.O. 12065: RDS4-10/17/2000 (EAGLETON, WM. L) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, IZ, IR
SUBJ: IRAQI CONCERN RE U.S. POSITION ON IRAQ-IRAN WAR

1. ~~(S)~~-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. AT NOON TODAY OCTOBER 17 THE OFFICIAL RESPONSIBLE FOR U.S. AFFAIRS AT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY, ZUHAIR IBRAHIM, PHONED ME TO SAY THAT HEAD OF THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT, SAHHAF, HAD ASKED HIM TO TRY TO GET A TEXT OF PRESIDENT CARTER'S SPEECH OF OCTOBER 16 WHICH HAD REFERRED TO THE IRAQ/IRAN WAR. I FOUND COVERAGE OF THE WINDSORLOCK, CONNECTICUT SPEECH IN THE WIRELESS FILE AND TOLD HIM THAT HIS COPY (WHICH WE SEND TO THE MINISTRY DAILY) SHOULD BE WITH HIM SHORTLY.

3. THE WIRELESS FILE QUOTES PRESIDENT CARTER AS HAVING REFERRED TO IRAQ AS THE AGRESSOR "FOR THE SECOND CONSECUTIVE DAY." WE CAN ANTICIPATE THAT THESE STATEMENTS WILL AROUSE CONSIDERABLE CONCERN AND SOME ANGER IN THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT AND WITH THE PUBLIC. THE IRAQIS FEEL VERY SELF RIGHTEOUS ABOUT THEIR IRANIAN CAMPAIGN WHICH THEY BELIEVE WAS FORCED UPON THEM BY IRANIAN PROVOCATIONS AGAINST AND WITHIN IRAQ. OUR PREVIOUS POSITION OF STRICT NEUTRALITY AND REFUSAL TO PLACE THE BLAME ON EITHER PARTY ENHANCED OUR POSITION HERE AND OUR ABILITY TO DISCUSS THE SUBJECT

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WITH IRAQI OFFICIALS.

4. I WOULD APPRECIATE HAVING ON AN URGENT BASIS ANY OFFICIAL CLARIFICATION THAT MIGHT REITERATE OUR NEUTRALITY AND PLACE US IN THE POSITION OF WITHHOLDING JUDGEMENT ON THE MERITS OF THE CONFLICTING CLAIMS OF THE PARTIES. WE HOPE THE DEPARTMENT'S PRESS SPOKESMAN OCT 17 WILL BE ABLE TO SAY SOMETHING USEFUL IN THIS REGARD. I HAVE AN APPOINTMENT WITH ZUHAIR IBRAHIM AT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY AT 10 AM OCT 18 TO DELIVER SECRETARY MUSKIE'S

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ID GREETING TO IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER HAMMADI. IT IS LIKELY THAT STATEMENTS BY AMERICAN OFFICIALS AND PERSISTENT RUMORS (FED BY THE VOA) THAT AN ARMS/HOSTAGES DEAL IS IMMINENT WILL BE SUBJECTS OF LIVELY DISCUSSIONS AT THAT MEETING.
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AMEMBASSY ANKARA
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AMEMBASSY CAIRO 3403
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY DOHA
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MANAMA
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
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AMEMBASSY SANA
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E.O. 12065: ~~RDS-4 10/11/90~~ (EAGLETON, 2.. L) OR-M

TAGS: PEPR, MOPS, PINT, IZ, IR

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PAGE 02 BAGHDA 02860 111351Z

SUBJ: DEVELOPMETS IN IRAQI KURDISTAN

1. (Z-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. ON OCTOBER 10 A MEMBER OF THE FAMILY OF ONE OF OUR LOCAL
EMPLOYEES CAME BY ROAD FROM HIS HOME NEAR ROWANDUZ IN IRAQI KURDISTAN
TO BAGHDAD. HE REPORTS THAT DURING THE PAST WEEK AN IRANIAN AIR
ATTACK ON THE MILITARY CAMP NEAR ROWANDUZ CAUSED ABOUT 100
DEATHS INCLUDING AT LEAST ONE DOCTOR IN THE MILITARY HOSPITAL THAT

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WAS HIT. IRANIAN PLANES HAVE ALSO ATTACKED HAJUMRAN AT THE FRONTIER AND RAYAT VILLAGE AND MILITARY CAMP ABOUT 20 KILOMETERS THIS SIDE OF THE FRONTIER.

3. MEANWHILE PESHMERGA REBEL FORCES LOYAL TO THE SONS OF MULLA MUSTAFA BARZANI (WHO OPERATE OUT OF IRAN) HAVE TAKEN ADVANTAGE OF THE ABSENCE OF IRAQI AIR COVER TO ATTACK ARMY LOOK-OUT POSTS AND STRONG POINTS IN THE BARZANI TRIBAL AREA NORTHWEST OF ROWANDUZ. A NUMBER OF POSTS HAVE BEEN CAPTURED AND PERSONNEL HAVE REPORTEDLY BEEN KILLED. TO COUNTER THIS ACTIVITY THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT HAS SENT PRO-GOVERNMENT KURDISH "JASH" FORCES UP THE MAIN ARBIL/HAJUMRAN ROAD TO HELP ARMY UNITS DEAL WITH THE INSURGENTS. ISOLATED CLASHES HAVE OCCURRED BETWEEN THE JASH AND PESHMERGA. (THIS IS THE KIND OF FIGHTING THE KURDS MOST ENJOY.)

4. ALL THESE DEVELOPMENTS ARE THE TRADITIONAL MOVES THAT SIGNAL THE BEGINNING OF A KURDISH REVOLT. HOWEVER, IT IS TOO EARLY TO CONCLUDE THAT A LARGE SCALE KURDISH MOVEMENT IS NOW UNDER WAY IN THE NORTH. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT KURDISH FORCES NOW IN THE FIELD ARE LARGE ENOUGH TO THREATEN MAJOR TOWNS AND MILITARY GARRISONS. MANY OF THEIR POTENTIAL FIGHTING MEN ARE INTERRED IN CAMPS IN THE ARBIL PLAIN. KURDISH PESHMERGA NOW IN THE BARZAN REGION ARE PROBABLY STRONG ENOUGH TO HARASS TRAVEL ON THE MAIN ROAD TO HAJUMRAN, AND IF ANY SIGNIFICANT FIGHTING OCCURS THIS IS A
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PAGE 03 BAGHDA 02860 111351Z

LIKELY PLACE FOR IT. THE IRAQIS WILL WISH TO KEEP THE ROAD OPEN SINCE IT IS THEIR SUPPLY ROUTE TO KURDISH FORCES ON THE IRANIAN SIDE NEAR MAHBAD WHO ARE COOPERATING WITH IRAQ.

5. THE KURDISH TRAVELER ALSO REPORTED AN AIR STRIKE WHICH HIT A KURDISH REFUGEE CAMP ON THE ROAD INTO ARBIL AND SOME DAMAGE IN ARBIL TOWN. HE REFERRED TO THE KIRKUK OIL FIELD AS "ALL BLACK" PROBABLY MEANING THAT OIL FIRES WERE BURNING AS HE PASSED THE REGION KIRKUK TOWN AND OIL INSTALLATIONS HAVE BEEN REPEATEDLY STRUCK DURING THE PAST TWO WEEKS.

6. A NUMBER OF IRAQI COMMUNIQUE HAVE MENTIONED IRANIAN AIR ACTIVITY IN THE KURDISH REGION THESE RAIDS SEEM TO BE EVEN MORE EXTENSIVE THAN THE COMMUNIQUE SUGGEST, PERHAPS BECAUSE SOME OF THE TARGETS ARE SO INSIGNIFICANT THEY ARE NOT REPORTED. WE DO NOT KNOW TO WHAT EXTENT SUCH ATTACKS MIGHT BE COORDINATED WITH KURDISH GROUND ACTION.
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INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BAGHDAD 2865

E.O. 12065: ~~RDS-1~~ 10/11/90 (EAGLETON, WM. L.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, IZ, IR, US
SUBJ: IRAQI DEMARCHE RE POSSIBLE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION

1. ~~(C)~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. AFTERNOON OCTOBER 11 I WAS CALLED TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY TO MEET WITH THE HEAD OF THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT (WITH WHOM I HAVE BEEN TRYING TO GET AN WPOINTMENT FOR THE PAST TWO MONTHS) MUHAMMAD SA'ID AL-SAHHAF. IN A FRIENDLY AND BUSINESS-LIKE WAY, SAHHAF MADE HIS PRESENTATION TO THE EFFECT THAT IRAQ AGREED ON SEPTEMBER 28 TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION CALLING FOR A CEASE-FIRE AND NEGOTIATION. IRAQ HAS HEARD THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL MIGHT BE MEETING WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS AND THAT SOME PARTIES ARE THINKING OF PRESENTING A NEW TEXT WHICH WOULD INCLUDE A PARAGRAPH CALLING FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF IRAQI FORCES FROM IRAN.

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PAGE 02 BAGHDA 02865 111808Z

3. SAHHAF SAID THAT, IN PRINCIPLE, IRAQ IS NOT AGAINST WITHDRAWAL SINCE IT HAS NO CLAIM ON IRANIAN TERRITORY. HOWEVER, WITHDRAWAL AT THE PRESENT TIME IS NOT PRACTICAL. WHY? BECAUSE OF THE PROBLEM OF WHERE TO WITHDRAW TO. THE IRANIANS HAVE NOT MADE CLEAR THEIR POSITION ON THE BORDER. IF IRAQ WITHDRAWS TO WHAT IT CONSIDERS TO BE THE BORDER, THE IRANIANS MAY CLAIM IRAQ IS STILL ON IRANIAN TERRITORY.

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4. SAHHAF SAID IRAQ BELIEVES IT WOULD BE BETTER FOR ANY NEW RESOLUTION TO CALL FOR A CEASE-FIRE AND NEGOTIATIONS. FURTHERMORE, THE RESOLUTION SHOULD STATE THAT THE SECURITY AND FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN THE GULF AND STRAITS OF HORMUZ IS GUARANTEED FOR ALL PARTIES, INCLUDING, OF COURSE, IRAQ AND IRAN. IRAQ, HE SAID, HAS DECLARED ITS READINESS TO NEGOTIATE ALL ISSUES DIRECTLY WITH IRAN OR INDIRECTLY THROUGH THIRD PARTIES OR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS.

5. SAHHAF ASKED THAT I CONVEY THIS POSITION TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. I SAID I WOULD AND ADDED THAT THE U.S. HAD SUPPORTED A CEASE-FIRE WITHOUT PRE-CONDITIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS AND WOULD CONTINUE TO SUPPORT EFFORTS TO BRING THE CONFLICT TO AN EARLY END.

6. NOTE: THIS IS THE FIRST TIME IN TWO YEARS THAT USINT HAS BEEN INCLUDED IN A DEMARCH OF THIS KIND, WHICH WE BELIEVE WAS ALSO MADE TO OTHER SECURITY COUNCIL REPS HERE.
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AMEMBASSY ALGIERS

AMEMBASSY BEIJING

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

AMEMBASSY DOHA

AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MANILA

AMEMBASSY MADRID

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY MUSCAT

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

AMEMBASSY PARIS

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E.O. 12065: RDS-1 10/7/90 (EAGLETON, WM. L.) OR-M

TAGS: PEPR, MARR, IZ, IR

SUBJ: IRAQI ENVOYS TO EUROPE, AFRICA AND ASIA

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

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2. DIPLOMATIC COLLEAGUES IN BAGHDAD TELL US THAT SOME OF THEM HAVE BEEN INFORMED BY THE FOREIGN MINISTRY THAT SPECIAL IRAQI ENVOYS WILL BE DISPATCHED TO WESTERN EUROPE, AFRICA, AND ASIA TO PRESENT THE IRAQI CASE IN ITS DISPUTE WITH IRAN. IT IS BELIEVED THAT THEY WILL ASK COUNTRIES VISITED TO USE THEIR INFLUENCE IN TEHRAN TO URGE THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT TO ACCEPT THE UN RESOLUTION CALLING FOR A CEASE-FIRE AND NEGOTIATIONS. THE ENVOYS WILL ALSO, WHERE NECESSARY, MAKE REPRESENTATIONS AGAINST ANY SUPPLY OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT OR SPARE PARTS TO IRAN.

3. THIS LATTER SUBJECT IS AN EXTREMELY SENSITIVE ONE FOR THE IRAQIS AT PRESENT. THEY HAVE ALREADY MADE REPRESENTATIONS TO A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES, INCLUDING THE BRITISH, ASKING FOR ASSURANCES THAT RUMORS OF MILITARY SUPPLIES FOR IRAN ARE FALSE. THE IMPLICATION IS THAT ANYONE SUPPORTING IRAN WOULD PAY DEARLY IN TERMS OF BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH IRAQ.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BAGHDAD 2850

E.O. 12065: ~~REF-1 10/10/90~~ (JONES, A. ELIZABETH) OR-P
TAGS: PEPR, PINT, MOPS, IZ, IR
SUBJ: IRAQ-IRAN WAR, OCTOBER 10

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2. ALTHOUGH THE ASSUMPTION CONTINUES THAT IRANIAN AIR FORCE WILL AT SOME POINT RETALIATE ON BAGHDAD FOR ITS HEAVY AIR ATTACKS AGAINST TEHRAN EARLIER THIS WEEK, IT HAS BEEN NEARLY ONE WEEK SINCE THE LAST AIR RAID ON BAGHDAD. SINCE THE DAWN ATTACK ON OCTOBER 4, THERE HAVE BEEN ONLY SEVEN AIR RAID WARNINGS IN BAGHDAD (TWO SO FAR TODAY) AND NO RAIDS; IRANIAN RAIDS DURING THE PAST WEEK HAVE BEEN CONCENTRATED ON NORTHERN TARGETS.

3. JOURNALISTS WHO RETURNED LATE OCTOBER 8 AND 9 FROM BASRA REPORT SEEING ON BOTH DAYS MASSIVE AMOUNTS OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT MOVING SOUTH TOWARDS BASRA. THEY ALSO REPORT HAVING SEEN HEAVY CONCENTRATION OF MATERIEL, INCLUDING BRIDGING EQUIPMENT, IN THE BASRA AND KHORRAMSHAHR AREAS. THEY REPORT FURTHER THAT CITY OF BASRA HAS BEEN FREE OF AIR RAIDS FOR SEVERAL DAYS AND, IN CONTRAST TO BAGHDAD, IS NO LONGER FOLLOWING EVENING BLACKOUT PROCEDURES. JOURNALISTS WHO HAVE SPENT CONSIDERABLE TIME IN BASRA REPORT HAVING SEEN NO PHANTOMS AT ALL DURING THE PAST WEEK IN CONTRAST TO CONSIDERABLE IRANIAN AIR ACTIVITY OVER THE CITY IN THE PREVIOUS TWO WEEKS. JOURNALISTS CONTINUE TO REPORT LITTLE ACTION ON THE FRONT WITHIN KHORRAMSHAHR CITY.

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4. THE GOI CONTINUES TO IGNORE THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS IN TERMS OF PROVIDING BRIEFINGS ON PROGRESS OF THE WAR OR REPRESENTATIONS ON IRAQ'S DIPLOMATIC POSITION. MEANWHILE, IRAQI EMISSARIES HAVE FANNED OUT ACROSS EUROPE, ASIA, AFRICA AND THE ARAB WORLD STARTING OCTOBER 8, BUT OUR COLLEAGUES COMPLAIN THAT THE IRAQIS HAVE NOT YET PROVIDED ARRIVAL SCHEDULES OF THESE EMISSARIES IN THE VARIOUS CAPITALS. CUBAN FOREIGN MINISTER MALMIERCA ARRIVED IN BAGHDAD OCTOBER 9 ON HIS SECOND VISIT TO IRAQ SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR. NO DETAILS ARE AVAILABLE ON THE PURPOSE OF MALMIERCA'S VISITS, BUT IT IS ASSUMED FROM HIS INTERVENING TRIP TO TEHRAN THAT, AS LEADER OF THE NON-ALIGNED, THE CUBANS MAY BE ANSIXIOUS TO FIND A WAY TO END THE FIGHTING BETWEEN TWO OF ITS PROMINENT MEMBERS.

5. COMMENT: THE IRAQIS ARE OBVIOUSLY PREPARING FOR A MAJOR PUSH ALONG THE SHATT, ALTHOUGH THEY SEEM TO BE TAKING THEIR TIME ABOUT LAUNCHING IT. MOST OBSERVERS ARE UNWILLING TO DRAW FIRM CONCLUSIONS FROM THE ABATEMENT OF IRANIAN AIR ACTIVITY OVER BAGHDAD AND THE SOUTH, OTHER THAN TO NOTE THAT THE IRANIANS APPEAR TO BE HOLDING BACK IN ORDER TO CONSERVE FUEL AND PLANES. TIME STILL SEEMS TO BE ON THE SIDE OF IRAQ FROM THE MILITARY PERSPECTIVE, ALTHOUGH A LONG WAR MAY HAVE SOME DELETERIOUS EFFECT ON THE POPULARITY OF THE REGIME.

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ACTION NEA-11

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INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY

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PAGE 02 BAGHDA 02795 061529Z

E.O. 12065: RDS-1-10/6/90 (EAGLETON, WM. L.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, MOPS, PINT, PINS, IZ, IR
SUBJ: IRAQ-IRAN WAR: PHASE II BEGINS

1. (2 - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. IRAQ'S UNILATERAL CEASE-FIRE OCTOBER 5 ALONG WITH KING
HUSSEIN'S VISIT TO BAGHDAD (SEPTTEL) PROVIDED THE

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POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CONDITIONS FOR NEW IRAQI EFFORTS IN THE FIELD. FOUR SEPARATE AIR RAID ALARMS IN BAGHDAD DID NOT PRODUCE ANY VISIBLE IRANIAN AIRCRAFT, BUT THERE WERE SUFFICIENT IRANIAN VIOLATIONS OF THE CEASE-FIRE ELSEWHERE, INCLUDING ATTACKS ON OTHER IRAQI TOWNS, TO JUSTIFY IRAQ'S OBVIOUSLY PRE-PLANNED RAIDS ON TEHRAN, KERMANSHAH AND TABRIZ. MEANWHILE A REVOLUTIONARY COMMAND COUNCIL STATEMENT COMPLAINED THAT IRAN HAD NOT RECIPROCATED IRAQ'S GOOD INTENTIONS. IT ENDED WITH A CALL TO BATTLE, "NO MATTER HOW LONG OR WHAT SACRIFICES IT TAKES". IRAQI FORCES, IT SAID, "WILL CONTINUE THEIR VICTORIOUS MARCH."

3. WHAT THE IRAQIS ARE PREPARED TO DO MILITARILY REMAINS TO BE SEEN. THEY WILL PROBABLY COMMIT ADDITIONAL FORCES TO THE FIGHTING, PARTICULARLY IN KHUZESTAN, AND TRY TO REACH TERRAIN THAT PROVIDES GOOD DEFENSIVE POSITIONS. THEY MAY ALSO FOLLOW UP THEIR OCTOBER 5 RAIDS WITH MORE STRIKES AT IRANIAN AIR BASES AND INDUSTRIAL --PARTICULARLY REFINING -- TARGETS. MUCH WILL DEPEND ON THEIR LOSSES IN THIS TYPE OF OPERATION ABOUT WHICH WE HAVE LITTLE RELIABLE INFORMATION. IT IS NOT LIKELY THAT PEACE EFFORTS WILL ATTRACT EITHER OF THE COMBATANTS UNTIL THE MILITARY RESULTS OF PHASE II HAVE BEEN REGISTERED.

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FM USINT BAGHDAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 857
INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
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E.O. 12065: RDS 1-10-77/88 (EAGLETON, WM. L) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, MOPS, PINS, PINT, IZ, IR
SUBJ: IRAQ-IRAN AIR WAR

1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. OBSEVERS IN BAGHDAD, INCLUDING PRESS REPS WHO ARE OTEN UNDER
EMPLOYED, SPEND MUCH TIME TRYING TO ANALYZE THE STATUS AND PROBABLE
OUTCOME OF THE AIR COMBAT BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN. THIS INTEREST

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IS MORE THAN ACADEMIC SINCE THE ABILITY OF IRAN TO CONTINUE ATTACKS ON IRAQI CITIES DETERMINES SUCH THINGS AS THE DAILY SCHEDULE OF PERSONS WORKING IN BAGHDAD AND MOVING ABOUT THE COUNTRY, AND THE DATE AT WHICH IT MAY BE SAFE FOR FOREIGN TECHNICIANS AND THEIR FAMILIES TO RETURN.

3. SOME OBSERVERS ARE LOOKING FOR A PATTERN THAT WOULD INDICATE A LESSENING CAPABILITY OF IRANIAN FORCES, OR THE USE OF IRAQI AIR POWER IN A WAY TO SUGGEST THAT THE IRAQIS HAVE CONCLUDED THAT THE TIDE IS TURNING IN THEIR FAVOR. THROUGH THERE IS MUCH SPECULATION THE SHORTAGE OF HARD FACTS REGARDING LOSSES ON BOTH SIDES PREVENTS EASY CONCLUSIONS. FOR EXAMPLE, BAGHDADIS ARE PUZZLED BY THE FAILURE (AS OF 1200 OCTOBER 7), OF THE IRANIAN TO RETALIATE FOR IRAQI RAIDS ON TEHRAN THE PAST TWO DAYS, OCTOBER 5 AND 6. IN FACT, OCTOBER 6 WAS THE FIRST DAY SINCE THE WAR BEGAN IN WHICH THERE WERE NEITHER AIR RAIDS OR ALARMS IN BAGHDAD.

4. MEANWHILE, COMMUNIQUE FROM BAGHDAD AND TEHRAN, WHICH ARE AT LEAST CONSISTENT RE THE LOCATIONS OF RAIDS, INDICATE THAT THE IRANIAN AIR FORCE IS STILL OPERATING AGAINST MILITARY AND INDUSTRIAL TARGETS THROUGHOUT IRAQ, THOUGH ON A LIMITED SCALE. DURING THE PAST WEEK THERE HAVE BEEN SEVERAL REFERENCES IN IRAQI COMMUNIQUE TO IRANIAN ATTACKS ON INSTALLATIONS IN KURDISTAN, INCLUDING INDUSTRIAL TARGETS AT DOKAN AND DEBENDIKHAN. SOME OF THESE ATTACKS

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SEEM TO BE DIRECTED AT MILITARY CAMPS AND COULD BE IN COORDINATION WITH MOVES BY KURDISH REBELS ON THE GROUND. DOKAN AND DEBENDIKHAN, HOWEVER, ARE THE TWO HIGH DAMS COMPLETED IN THE 1950S AND EARLY '60S WHICH, BY STORING WATER OF THE LESSER ZAB AND DIYALA RIVERS, PROVIDE HYDROELECTRIC POWER AND FLOOD CONTROL FOR THE TIGRIS RIVER WHICH PASSES THROUGH BAGHDAD AND MANY OTHER IRAQI TOWNS. IF THE IRANIAN BREACHED ONE OF THESE DAMS, THE DAMAGE DOWNSTREAM WOULD OF COURSE DEPEND ON THE SIZE OF THE SPILL. A MAXIMUM BREACH, WHICH SEEMS UNLIKELY, WOULD DO CONSIDERABLE DAMAGE AS THE WATER RUSHED DOWN THE GORGES. WE DOUBT HOWEVER THAT DURING THE CURRENT DRY SEASON THE VOLUME OF WATER IN THE TIGRIS ITSELF WOULD THREATEN BAGHDAD AND OTHER CITIES DOWNSTREAM (WE WOULD APPRECIATE THE DEPARTMENT'S VIEW ON THIS IF IT IS AT VARIANCE WITH OURS)

5. AS FOR IRAQI AIR ACTION AGAINST IRAN, THE IRANIAN REJECTION OF THE CEASE-FIRE AND CONTINUED ATTACKS ON IRAQI TARGETS WHICH HIT CIVILIANS HAVE JUSTIFIED IRAQI ATTACKS ON INSTALLATIONS IN IRANIAN CITIES INCLUDING TEHRAN. MANY BAGHDADIS, WHO ARE ANNOYED BY THE OCCASIONAL IRANIAN RAIDS AND NUMEROUS ALERTS, WOULD CONSIDER RETALIATION OVERDUE. IT IS ALSO POSSIBLE THAT THE IRAQI AUTHORITIES BELIEVE THAT BY NOW THE IRANIAN AIR FORCE IS SUFFICIENTLY DEPLETED TO PERMIT THE EXPOSURE OF AN INCREASING NUMBER OF IRAQI AIRCRAFT OVER IRANIAN TARGETS.

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INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI

AMEMBASSY ALGIERS

AMEMBASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 2222

AMEMBASSY DOHA

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MUSCAT

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY MADRID

AMEMBASSY RABAT

AMEMBASSY ROME

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE 9204489 15/FPC/CDR 11/86 Date 9/25/86

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E.O. 12065: RDS-1-10/5/00 (EAGLETON, WM. L.) OR-M

TAGS: PEPR, PINT, PINS, MOPS, IZ, IR

SUBJ: THE WAR FROM BAGHDAD

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SADDAM'S QADISIYAH (7TH CENTURY ARAB VICTORY OVER PERSIANS),
 AS THE LOCAL MEDIA CALL THE IRAQ-IRAN CONFLICT, WILL

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COMPLETE ITS SECOND WEEK TOMORROW, OCTOBER 6. IRAQ'S UNILATERAL CEASE-FIRE BEGAN AT DAWN TODAY WITH AN AIR RAID ALERT HERE BUT NO VISIBLE AIRCRAFT. BEFORE NOON BAGHDAD HAD ITS SECOND ALERT FOR THE DAY, STILL NO AIRCRAFT. AS FIGHTING IN THE SOUTH DRAGS ON INDECISIVELY, CLAIMS OF VICTORIES ON BOTH SIDES HAVE LESS AND LESS TO DO WITH REALITY. A NOTICE HAS FINALLY APPEARED AT BAGHDAD UNIVERSITY ADVISING STUDENTS THAT IT IS CLOSED INDEFINITELY. GRADE AND HIGH SCHOOLS ALSO SUSPENDED CLASSES OCTOBER 4, AS IT BECOMES APPARENT THAT IRAQ IS SETTLING IN FOR A LONG WAR.

3. DIPLOMATIC OBSERVERS ARE ALRSUGGESTING THAT SADDAM HUSSAIN'S FAILURE TO ACHIEVE EARLY VICTORY IS UNDERMINING HIS REGIME. WE BELIEVE THIS LINE OF SPECULATION IS PREMATURE, THOUGH EARLY ENTHUSIASM FOR THE WAR IS OBVIOUSLY WANING. WE ALSO HAVE REPORTS THAT BATTLE FRONT CASUALTIES ARE COMPELLING MANY FAMILIES TO ATTEND FUNERALS. THESE, ALONG WITH AIR RAIDS AND WARNINGS, REMIND THE AVERAGE CITIZEN THAT SADDAM'S QADISIYAH IS NOT BEING WAGED WITHOUT COST. NEVERTHELESS, AS FAR AS WE CAN JUDGE, MORALE BOTH ON THE FIGHTING FRONTS AND IN THE CITIES REMAINS HIGH. WE HAVE NOT HEARD OF ANY SERIOUS QUESTIONING OF THE LEADERSHIP'S DECISION

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TO STRIKE THE IRANIAN MENACE WHEN IT DID.

4. IRAQI PROPAGANDA HAS TRIED TO PORTRAY IRANIAN AIR RAIDS AS NOTHING BUT A NUISANCE. IT IS TRUE THAT DAMAGE THUS FAR HAS NOT AFFECTED IRAQ'S ABILITY TO FIGHT THE WAR. HOWEVER, THE AIR RAIDS ARE LARGELY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DEPARTURE OF FOREIGN TECHNICIANS. THEY HAVE ALSO AT LEAST TEMPORARILY CUT OFF IRAQ'S OIL EXPORTS AND CLOSED MOST OF IRAQ'S REFINING CAPACITY. DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS ARE BEING DELAYED, BUT THIS IS OF LITTLE IMPORTANCE TO A COUNTRY WITH IRAQ'S WEALTH.

5. ON THE BATTLE FRONT THE IRAQIS CLAIM THEY HAVE ACHIEVED THEIR OBJECTIVES AND ARE NOW DIGGING IN. THIS IS NOT THE CASE SINCE PRESENT LINES DO NOT EVEN PREVENT IRAQI TERRITORY SOUTH OF BASRA FROM COMING UNDER IRANIAN ARTILLERY FIRE. A DEFENSIBLE LINE WOULD INVOLVE TAKING HIGH POINTS ALONG THE FRONTIER AND KEY PASSES CONTROLLING ACCESS INTO KHUZESTAN. FEW OF THESE HAVE BEEN SECURED SO FAR.

6. THUS THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT IS PUTTING UP A BOLD FRONT AND PREPARING FOR A WAR OF ATTRITION. THEY CALCULATE THAT THEIR OWN MILITARY AND CIVIL SUPPLIES ARE MORE THAN ADEQUATE, WHILE THOSE OF IRAN WILL SOON BE EXHAUSTED. THEY HAVE DECLARED UNILATERAL VICTORIES AND A UNILATERAL

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CEASE-FIRE. THEY GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT EVERYTHING
IER CONTROL AND PROCEEDING ACCORDING TO PLAN.
WHAT THEY LACK IS A PLAN TOBRING THE WAR TO AN EARLY
CONCLUSION.

7. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
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PAGE 01 BAGHDA 02784 060826Z
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E.O. 12065: ~~EDS-10/5/86~~ (JONES, A. ELIZABETH) OR-P
TAGS: PEPR, PINT, MOPS, SOPN, IZ, IR, US
SUBJ: IRAQ QUESTIONS U.S. NEUTRALITY1. *sc* - ENTIRE TEXT)2. THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT IS NOW PUBLICLY QUESTIONING U.S.
NEUTRALITY IN THE IRAQ-IRAN WAR AND IS SUGGESTING U.S.

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COMPLICITY WITH ISRAEL AND OTHERS (PRESUMABLY SYRIA AND LIBYA) IN TILTING TOWARDS IRAN. EDITORIALS OCTOBER 4 AND 5 ASSERT THAT TIMING OF DEP. SEC. CHRISTOPHER'S STATEMENT OPPOSING THE "PARTITION OF IRAN" IS INDICATIVE OF LACK OF U.S. COMMITMENT TONEUTRALITY. EDITORIALS ALSO QUOTE KUWAITI PRESS REPORTS THAT MILITARY SOURCES IN WASHINGTON SAYING THAT "THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION LOOKS FAVORABLY ON THE QUESTION OF SUPPLYING IRAN WITH ARMS, SPARE PARTS AND TECHNICIANS".

3. THESE THEMES WERE PICKED UP BY DEFENSE MINISTER 'ADNAN KHAYRALLAH IN HIS OCTOBER 4 PRESS BRIEFING. HE DIRECTLY ED THE U.S. OF SUPPLYING SPARE PARTS TO IRAN, BUT DID NOT TRY TO IMPLICATE THE U.S. IN CLAIMING THAT ISRAEL HAD BOMBED THEIR NUCLEAR FACILITY AND THAT SYRIA AND LIBYAN SOLDIERS HAD BEEN CAPTURED AT THE FRONT. KHAYRALLAH'S ASSERTIONS AND THESE RECENT EDITORIALS ARE IN FACT CONTRADICTED BY FOREIGN MINISTER HAMMADI'S STATEMENT AT UNGA THAT THE GOI HAS NO EVIDENCE OF U.S. RESUPPLY OF SPARE PARTS TO IRAN.

4. COMMENT: THE IRAQIS HAVE MADE EARLIER STATEMENTS CLAIMING THAT IRAN WAS RECEIVING SPARE PARTS FOR ITS U.S. EQUIPMENT FROM THIRD PARTIES, BUT HAS NOT PREVIOUSLY

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DIRECTLY ACCUSED THE U.S. OF BAD FAITH IN ITS PROFESSION OF NEUTRALITY. IRAQ'S LEADERSHIP OBVIOUSLY PAYS CLOSE ATTENTION TO USG STATEMENTS ON THE WAR, AND PARTICULARLY AS THE WAR DRAGS ON, WILL BE VERY SENSITIVE TO EVERY HINT, RUMOR OR FABRICATED PRESS STORY THAT SPARE PARTS ARE REACHING IRAN. AT THE SAME TIME IT IS DIFFICULT TO SAY WHETHER RECENT PRESS PLAY AND KHAYRALLAH'S STATEMENT REPRESENT A ONE-TIME LASHING OUT AT THE U.S., OR WHETHER THE GOI IS GEARING UP A CAMPAIGN TO LINK THE U.S. WITH IRAN.

5. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
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INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

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E.O. 12065: GDS-10/3/86 (EAGLETON, WM. L) OR-M

TAGS: PBOR, PEPR, IZ, IR

SUBJ: IRAN-IRAQ CONFLICT: IMPLICATIONS FOR CAMP DAVID

REF: A) BANN 18970: B) AMMAN 6354

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1. (2-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. WE DO NOT HAVE BONNS REFTEL WHICH STIMULATED AMMAN'S REPLY BUT CAN NEVERTHELESS VOLUNTEER A FEW PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS ON HOW IRAQ'S EXPERIENCE THUS FAR MIGHT AFFECT LATER MIDDLE EAST PEACE INITIATIVES. ON THE NEGATIVE SIDE HAS BEEN THE IRAQI THEMEPARTICULARLY IN THE FIRST DAYS OF THE WAR, THAT THE ROAD TO ARABISTAN LEADS TO THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE. THIS WAS LARGELY PROPAGANDISTIC, DESIGNED TO COUNTER CHARGES THAT IRAQ'S ADVENTURE IN IRAN WAS HARMING THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE. NEVERTHELESS, IF IRAQ HAD FOUND THE IRANIANS A MILITARY PUSHOVER IT WOULD HAVE REINFORCED THE ARGUMENT THAT A COALITION OF ARAB COUNTRIES

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CAN DEFEAT ISRAEL AND OBTAIN MAXIMUM ARAB AND PALESTINIAN OBJECTIVES. THE COURSE OF THE WAR THUS FAR HAS NOT, HOWEVER, LED TO ANY SUCH CONCLUSION, AND WE ARE HEARING LESS FROM THE IRAQI MEDIA ABOUT THE ROAD TO PALESTINE.

3. WE BELIEVE THAT ON BALANCE THE WAR HAS PROVIDED A USEFUL SOBERING EXPERIENCE FOR THE IRAQI LEADERSHIP. THE VULNERABILITY OF THEIR INDUSTRIAL BAE AND NUCLEAR FACILITIES HAS BEEN DEMONSTRATED, AS HAS THE DIFFICULTY OF ACHIEVING AIR SUPERIORITY

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EVEN AGAINST AN IRANIAN AIR FORCE THAT IS SHORT OF SPARE PARTS AND TECHNICAL SERVICES. ALTHOUGH WE DO NOT YET KNOW HOW THE CONFLICT WIL DEVELOP, IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT EVEN IF THE IRAQIS ARE ABLE TO IMPOSE THEIR BASIC CONDITIONS ON IRAN THEY WILL HAVE THEIR HANDS FULL ON THE EASTERN FRONT FOR ANUMBER OF YEARS. IN THIS CASE, THEIR STUBBORN BUT FAIRLY PRAGMATIC LEADERSHIP SHOULD BE MORE INCLINED THAN IN THE PAST TO JOIN A RESPECTABLE (NOT CAMP DAVID BUT PERHAPS SOMETHING FLOWING FROM IT) ARAB CONCENSUS ON A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT.

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PAGE 01 BAGHDA 02779 070605Z
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E.O. 12065: GDS 10/5/86 (HOMAN, THOMAS A.) OR-O
TAGS: MOPS, PEPR, IR, IZ, UR
SUBJ: IRAQI MINDEF GIVES PRESS CONFERENCE - OCTOBER 4

1. (✓ - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: DURING PRESS CONFERENCE OCTOBER 4 MINISTER OF

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DEFENSE WAS DESCRIBED BY ONE AMERICAN JOURNALIST AS "SLIGHTLY DEFENSIVE AND SOMEWHAT TOUCHY" IN ADDRESSING ISSUES INVOLVED WITH THE COURSE OF THE WAR, AND IN PARTICULAR AS TO WHETHER IRAQ WAS "BOGGED DOWN". MINISTER REVIEWED CURRENT STATUS ALONG THE BORDER AND RESPONDED TO QUESTIONS CONCERNING SUPPLIES AND POSSIBLE ISRAELI INVOLVEMENT IN THE ATTACK ON THE IRAQI NUCLEAR FACILITY. HE EMPHASIZED THAT THE MILITARY HAD MET THE "POLITICAL OBJECTIVES SET BY THE LEADERSHIP" AND THAT IRAQ WAS THOROUGHLY PREPARED TO SUSTAIN ARMED CONFLICT AS LONG AS NECESSARY. JOURNALISTS REPORT FIRST EVIDENCE THAT REGULAR IRANIAN ARMY - AS OPPOSED TO REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS - IS NOW ENGAGED IN KHORRAMSHAHR FIGHTING. END SUMMARY.

3. THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE MET OCTOBER 4 WITH APPROXIMATELY 200 FOREIGN JOURNALISTS INCLUDING REPRESENTATIVES OF MAJOR AMERICAN NEWS MEDIA. HE OUTLINED FOR THEM THE IRAQI MILITARY AIMS AND OBJECTIVES IN THE WAR, ESSENTIALLY AS STATED EARLIER IN IRAQI MILITARY COMMUNIQUE. HE STOPPED SHORT OF INSISTING AS IN PREVIOUS BRIEFINGS, THAT THE IRAQI ARMY WAS IN CONTROL OF SEVERAL IRANIAN BORDER CITIES. INSTEAD HE SAID THAT THE ARMY WAS "IN THE AREA OF AHWAZ", "HAD APRESENCE IN KHORRAMSHAHR" AND WAS "AT DEZFUL AND AT AHWAZ". THIS CONTRASTS WITH EARLIER MORE OPTIMISTIC

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IRAQI ASSESSEMNTS OF IT S ACHIEVEMENTS IN FIGHTING ALONG THE BORDER.

4. RESPONDING TO A QUESTION, THE MINISTER INSISTED THAT IRAQ HAD CLEAR EVIDENCE THAT ISRAELIS HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN THE SEPT. 30 AIR STRIKE ON THE IRAQI NUCLEAR FACILITY. HE SAID THAT ISRAELI FIGHTERS HAD "MADE USE OF THE BATTLE SITUATION TO HIT THE REACTOR", AND THAT "PROOF" WOULD BE PROVIDED AT A LATER DATE. HE ALSO SAID, IN ADDRESSING THE ISSUE OF ALLEGED FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT, THAT SYRIAN AND LIBYAN PRISONERS HAD BEEN TAKEN ALONG WITH IRANIANS AT THE FRONT ON OCTOBER 4. THIS WAS OFFERED AS PROOF OF EARLIER ALLEGATIONS BY THE IRAQIS THAT THOSE TWO COUNTRIES WERE OPERATING IN COLLUSION WITH IRAN. HE FLATLY DENIED WALL STREET JOURNAL REPORT THAT IRAQI PLANES WERE PREPOSITIONED IN SEVERAL ARAB COUNTRIES TO ATTACK IRAN. HE MAINTAINED THE PLANES WERE CIVILIAN AND BEING SAFE HAVENED OUTSIDE IRAQ.

5. CONCERNING THE QUESTION OF SPARE PARTS FOR IRAN, THE MINISTER ALLUDED TO A "U.S. FOREIGN MINISTRY BRIEFING" AS INDICATIVE OF U.S. READINESS TO SUPPLY SPARE PARTS IN EXCHANGE FOR MOVEMENT ON THE HOSTAGE QUESTION. (COMMENT: THIS REFERENCE IS APPARENTLY TO DEPTY. SECY. CHRISTOPHER'S REMARKS SEPT. 28 THAT NORMAL COMMERCIAL RELATIONSHIPS WITH IRAN COULD BE DISCUSSED IN THE

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CONTEXT OF NORMALIZATION AFTER MOVEMENT ON THE HOSTAGE ISSUE BUT THAT NO SUCH DISCUSSIONS ARE CURRENTLY UNDER WAY. END COMMENT.)

6. THE MINISTER APPEARED PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE TO NEWSPAPER REPORTS IMPLYING THAT IRAQ'S ARMED FORCES HAD BOGGED DOWN AFTER EARLIER LIGHTNING STRIKES AGAINST THE IRANIANS. HE REITERATED SEVERAL TIMES THROUGHOUT THE CONFERENCE THAT THE OBJECTIVES OF THE WAR HAD BEEN DEFINED BY THE "POLITICAL LEADERSHIP" AND THAT THE IRAQI

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ARMED FORCES WERE OPERATING SUCCESSFULLY WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THOSE "POLITICAL OBJECTIVES". HE ALSO SAID THAT IRAQ'S UNILATERAL CEASE-FIRE PROVIDED TANGIBLE EVIDENCE TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND TO THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE THAT IRAQ SOUGHT A PEACEFUL END TO THE CONFLICT.

7. ON THE QUESTION OF SUPPLIES, THE MINISTER SAID THAT IRAQ HAD PREPARED ITSELF FOR THE POSSIBILITY OF A LONG CONFLICT AND CONSUMER GOODS AND MILITARY SUPPLIES ALONG WITH FUEL WERE AVAILABLE IN SUFFICIENT QUANTITIES. HE SPECULATED THAT IRAN WAS IN A DISADVANTAGEOUS POSITION RELATIVE TO SUPPLIES AND SAID THAT "THEY WILL SOON BE RUNNING SHORT OF BREAD".

8. IN AN UNRELATED REPORT FROM AN AMERICAN CORRESPONDENT, A LARGE NUMBER OF TANKS, BOTH IRANIAN AND IRAQI, WERE SEEN GROUPED NEAR KHORRAMSHAHR. NYT CORRESPONDENT REPORTED "BEING PINNED DOWN FOR A TIME BY FIVE IRANIAN TANKS OCT. 4." THIS IS THE FIRST SOLID EVIDENCE THAT THE REGULAR IRANIAN ARMY IS NOW INVOLVED IN THE KHORRAMSHAHR FIGHTING. JOURNALISTS TELL US THAT ONLY REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS WERE HANDLING KHORRAMSHAHR'S DEFENSE UNTIL NOW.

9. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
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INFO AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

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TAGS: ELAB, ENRG, EWWT, IZ, CZ

SUBJ: CZECH EXPATRIATES IN IRAQ

1. CZECH COMMERCIAL COUNSELLOR HAS TOLD US THAT EVACUATION IS UNDERWAY OF DEPENDENTS AND NON-ESSENTIAL PERSONNEL AND TECHNICIANS AND CONSULTANTS ON SHORT TERM CONTRACTS WERE NOT BEING REPLACED. SO FAR 200 HAD RETURNED OUT OF A TOTAL POPULATION OF AROUND 1200. EMBASSY DEPENDENTS HAD BEEN SENT HOME ON A VOLUNTARY BASIS. THE MAIN CONTINGENT OF BIPP WHO ARE BUILDING THE NEW REFINERY AT BEJI REMAIN ON THE JOB. APPREHENSION ABOUT THEIR SAFETY IS RUNNING HIGH BOTH ON THE PROJECT AND IN THE EMBASSY SINCE IRAN HAS SHOWN IT WOULD NOT HESITATE TO HIT PROJECTS EVEN THOSE NOT YET ABLE TO CONTRIBUTE TO IRAQ'S WAR POTENTIAL.

2. THE COMMERCIAL COUNSELLOR HAD NO FIRST HAND INFORMATION ON DAMAGE TO THE MAIN BASRAH REFINERY BECAUSE CZECH TECHNICIANS

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THERE HAD BEEN REPLACED BY IRAQIS. HE SAID THAT TWO PEOPLE WHO HAD RECENTLY COME FROM THE PORT OF FAO REPORTED THAT ARTILLERY BOMBARDMENT HAD CAUSED EXTENSIVE DAMAGE THERE.

3. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

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E.O. 12065: GDS 9/30/86 (JONES, A. ELIZABETH) OR-P
TAGS: PEPR, PINS, CASC, MOPS, IZ, IR
SUBJ: IRAQ-IRAN WAR: ONE WEEK LATER

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

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PAGE 02 BAGHDA 02710 301846Z

2. A WEEK AGO TODAY BAGHDAD EXPERIENCED ITS FIRST AIR RAIDS OF THE WAR. WE HAVE JUST HAD (1300 SEPT 30) THE FIRST AIR RAID OVER BAGHDAD SINCE 1300 LOCAL SEPT. 27, AND THERE HAS BEEN CONSIDERABLE SPECULATION OVER WHY IRAN MAY HAVE DECIDED TO REDUCE ITS AIR ATTACKS (SEPTTEL).

3. ANOTHER MATTER OF GREAT INTEREST IN BAGHDAD IS THE FOOD AND FUEL SUPPLY SITUATION. THERE IS NO

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DOUBT THAT BAGHDADIS ARE HOARDING CONSUMABLES, BUT SO FAR THERE IS UNANIMOUS AGREEMENT THERE IS MORE AVAILABLE IN THE LOCAL MARKETS THAN UNDER NORMAL CIRCUMSTANCES, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF FLOUR AND FRESH MEAT. LOCAL BUTCHERS ORDINARILY RECEIVE 500 HEAD OF LAMB PER DAY, AND ARE NOW RECEIVING ONLY ONE-QUARTER OF THAT AMOUNT. BUTCHERS HAVE ALSO RECEIVED GOVERNMENT CIRCULARS REQUESTING THEM TO MAINTAIN PRE-WAR PRICES AND ADMONISHING THEM AGAINST PROFITEERING. IT IS ASSUMED HERE THAT THE GOI, AS PART OF ITS PREPARATIONS FOR WAR, PURPOSELY STOCKED UP ON EXTRA FOOD, KNOWING THAT THE HOARDING INSTINCT IN A WAR SITUATION IS STRONG. WE UNDERSTAND THERE ARE SOME SUPPLIES STILL COMING IN OVERLAND BY TRUCK FROM KUWAIT, AMMAN AND POSSIBLY DAMASCUS, BUT IT IS NOT KNOWN HOW MANY OF THE TRUCKS ARE CARRYING CIVILIAN FOOD SUPPLIES. WE DO EXPECT THERE TO BE A SUGAR SHORTAGE EVENTUALLY, SINCE THE SUGAR REFINERY AT MAYSAN IS REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN HEAVILY DAMAGED.

4. FUEL SHORTAGES ARE NOT YET IN EVIDENCE, BUT ARE EXPECTED. ALL GASOLINE SOLD HERE IS REFINED LOCALLY AND CURRENT ESTIMATES OF IRAQ'S REFINING CAPABILITY PUT IT AT 20-30 PERCENT OF PRE-WAR CAPACITY. IRAQ HAS SO LITTLE STORAGE CAPACITY FOR REFINED FUELS THAT PRODUCTION

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APPROXIMATELY EQUALS CONSUMPTION DURING PEACE TIME.
(SEE BAGHDAD 2671) (USINT HAS ALREADY LAID IN AN EXTRA SUPPLY OF GASOLINE, DIESEL FUEL AND COOKING FUEL.)

5. FOREIGN WORKERS IN IRAQ CONTINUE TO LEAVE IN LARGE GROUPS. THE LATEST DEPARTURES APPARENTLY INCLUDE THOSE WHO ARE TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE SEPT. 28 ORDER THAT PERMITS ALL FOREIGNERS TO LEAVE WITHOUT AN EXIT VISA. THE MAJORITY OF WESTERN AND JAPANESE TECHNICIANS HAVE ALREADY LEFT IRAQ, AND THE POLES, YUGOSLAVS AND RUMANIANS ARE LEAVING SEPT. 29 AND 30. THE CZECHS HAVE PULLED ALL THEIR PEOPLE IN TO BAGHDAD FROM SITES THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. WE HAVE NO WORD YET ON POSSIBLE SOVIET DEPARTURES. OTHER GROUPS SUCH AS MALAYSIAN HOTEL STAFFS AND FILIPINO NURSES ARE ALSO PREPARING TO LEAVE SOON.

6. COMMERCIAL TRANSPORTATION FROM BAGHDAD HAS, AS MIGHT BE EXPECTED, SKYROCKETED IN COST. A SEAT ON A LOCAL BUS GOING TO AMMAN OR DAMASCUS, WHICH COST ID8 THE FIRST DAY OF THE WAR, NOW COSTS ID50. A FIVE-SEATER TAXI IS ID300 (ABOUT \$1,000) AND THE PRICE GOES UP DAILY. AIR FRANCE AND SWISS AIR ARE BOTH OPERATING BUSES TO AMMAN FOR PASSENGERS HOLDING ONWARD TICKETS ON THOSE AIRLINES. THE FEW REMAINING PRIVATE AMERICANS WHO STILL WISH TO LEAVE ARE FINDING PLACES IN PRIVATE COMPANY BUSES OR ARE SHARING TAXIS.

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TEXT OF TELEGRAM 80BAGHDA002710

7. A WARTIME ORDER PROHIBITS THE ISSUANCE OF EXIT VISAS TO IRAQI CITIZENS UNLESS THEY ARE TRAVELING FOR MEDICAL REASONS, ARE GOVERNMENT-APPROVED STUDENTS OR ARE ON A GOVERNMENT MISSION. APPARENTLY THOSE WHO ALREADY HOLD EXIT VISAS WILL NOT BE STOPPED AT THE BORDER.

8. SCHOOLS ARE SLOWLY REOPENING. AN FSN WHO WAS IN TOUCH WITH RELATIVES IN BASRA SEPT. 29, REPORTS THAT
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PAGE 04 BAGHDA 02710 301846Z

TEACHERS WERE CALLED TO RETURN TO THEIR SCHOOLS THE NEXT DAY, BUT CHILDREN HAVE NOT YET RETURNED. SCHOOLS IN BAGHDAD REOPENED SEPT. 29, BUT STUDENTS WERE KEPT FOR ONLY TWO HOURS. AUTHORITIES APPARENTLY PLAN TO KEEP SCHOOLS AND UNIVERSITIES OPEN ON A REDUCED SCHEDULE FOR THE TIME BEING; NEW TIMETABLES ARE TO BE ISSUED TODAY (SEPT. 30).

9. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
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PAGE 01 BAGHDA 02697 291732Z
ACTION NEA-11

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AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
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AMEMBASSY MANAMA
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AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BAGHDAD 2697

E.O. 12065: GDS 8/29/86 (JONES, A. ELIZABETH) OR-P
TAGS: PEPR, PINE, PINR, MOPS, IZ, IR
SUBJ: (C) COMMENTS ON AIR FORCE ASPECTS OF IRAQ-IRAN
WAR - SEPT. 29

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. [REDACTED]

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PAGE 02 BAGHDA 02697 291732Z

[REDACTED] -- (STRICTLY PROTECT) MADE THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS TO
US SEPT. 29 ON CAPABILITIES OF IRAQI AIR FORCE. HE BELIEVES
THAT THE IRAQI COMMAND IS DISAPPOINTED IN THEIR AIR FORCE
AND AIR DEFENSE PERFORMANCE SO FAR. WITH THE SEPT. 22 JACDS
ON THE TEN IRANIAN AIR BASES, THE GOI HAD HOPED TO SO
DISABLE THE IRANIAN AIR FORCE, THAT IRAQI COULD WALK
INTO THE CITIES ALONG THE SHATT WITH IMPUNITY. THAT
THE SEPT. 22 RAIDS WERE AN ABYSMAL FAILURE IS OBVIOUS
FROM THE IRANIAN ABILITY TO STRIKE REPEATEDLY AT IRAQI

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MILITARY AND OIL INSTALLATIONS. HE BELIEVES THIS MIS-CALCULATION WILL COST CHIEF OF STAFF SHANSHAL HIS JOB.

3. [REDACTED] MUCH TO HIS SURPRISE, WAS SUMMONED SEPT. 28 TO AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS TO DISCUSS FUTURE [REDACTED] TRAINING PROGRAMS FOR IRAQI AIR FORCE. HE WAS EVEN MORE SURPRISED TO DISCOVER THAT AIR FORCE COMMAND HEADQUARTERS ARE STILL FUNCTIONING IN THE DOWNTOWN BAGHDAD HEADQUARTERS OFFICE, RATHER THAN IN A BUNKERED COMMAND POST, AS MIGHT BE EXPECTED DURING WAR TIME. HE SAID HE FOUND THE ATMOSPHERE THERE UP-BEATNAND MATTER OF FACT.

4. FROM WHAT HE HAS BEEN ABLE TO OBSERVE, [REDACTED] IS FAIRLY CEGTAIN THAT IRAQ IS NOT USING THE MUTHANNA AIR FIELD (OLD BAGHDAD), BAGHDAD INT'L AIRPORT OR RASHID MILITARY AIR FIELD FOR ONGOING AIR OPERATIONS. HE BELIEVES THAT HABBANIYAH AIR BASE IS IRAQ'S CENTRAL BASE OF AIR OPDRATIONS. HE ALSO HAS WHAT HE CONSIDERS RELIABLE INFORMATION FROM KIRKUK, THAT THE KIRKUK AIR BASE IS NOT BEING USED EITHER. HE BELIEVES OHAT NONE OF THE THREE BAGHDAD AIRPORTS HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY DAMAGED, JND ASSUMES THT THEY ARE NOT BEING USED, PRIMARILY TO AVOID ATTACKS IN DENSE CIVILIAN AREAS. (COMMENT: IF THIS IS TRUE, THE STRATEGY IS

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NOT WORKING WELL. BOTH MUTHANNA AND RASHID AIR FIELDS APPARENTLY CAME UNDER ATTACK AS RECENTLY AS SEPT. 27. END COMMENT.)

5. [REDACTED] HAS BEEN TOLD BY [REDACTED] TECHNICIAN WORKING UNTILL RECENTLY IN KIRKUK THAT HE SAW AN F-14 OVERHEAD DURING FIRST PART OF THE WAR. TECHNICIAN IS A FORMER AIR FORCE PILOT, AND [REDACTED] IS CONVINCED FROM HIS DESCRIPTION OF THE PLANE THAT HE DID INDEED SEE AN F-14.

6. [REDACTED] PROFESSES TO BE SOMEWHAT PUZZLED BY IRANIAN AIR TACTICS. THEIR PHANTOMS REGULARLY COME IN OVER BAGHDAD AT AN ALTITUDE OF ONLY 30 TO 40 METERS, TOO LOW TO RELEASE A CONVENTIONAL BOMB. THIS IS NORMALLY CONSIDERED TOO LOW ALSO FOR USE OF AIR TO SURFACE ROCKETS, BUT THIS APPEARS TO BE WHAT IRANIANS ARE INDEED USING. HE BELIEVES THIS EXPLAINS LOW LEVEL DAMAGE TO AIR FIELDS IN BAGHDAD AREAS. HE SPECULATES THAT IRANIANS MAY BE DROPPING DELAYED-FUSE BOMBS, SOME OF WHICH (SUCH AS THOSE THAT DROPPED ON THE FAIR GROUNDS) HAVE BEE DUDS. HE COMMENTED FURTHER THAT IRAQIS ARE RELEAFING FEWER SAMS THAN HE WOULD HAVE EXPECTED IN PROTECTING THE CITY, BUT ADMITTED THAT IRANIAN LOW SLYING TACTICS SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCE EFFECTIVENESS OF SAMS. IN COMMENTING ON HIGH NUMBER OF AIR RAID ALERTS IN BAGHDAD SEPT. 26 WITHOUT

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IRANIAN ATTACKS, HE AGREED THAT SIRENS ARE BEING
ACTIVATED BEFORE OR AS SOON AS AIRCRAFT CROSS THE
BORDER WHETHER OR NOT THEY APPEAR TO BE COMING TOWARD
BAGHDAD. HE COULD NOT SAY WHETHER THIS WAS A RESULT
OF INCREASED GOI RADAR EFFECTIVENESS OR BECAUSE
IRANIAN AIRCRAFT ARE NOW BEING EMPLOYED DEFENSIVELY.

7. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
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PAGE 01 BAGHDA 02686 291526Z
ACTION SS-30

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E.O. 12065: GDS 9/29/86 (EAGLETON, WM. L.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, PINS, MOPS, IZ, IR
SUBJ: IRAQI OBJECTIVES IN KHUZESTAN

REF: BAGHDAD 2672 ✓

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PAGE 02 BAGHDA 02686 291526Z

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. THE VOICE OF AMERICA THIS MORNING--INCORRECTLY WE BELIEVE--REPORTED THAT DEPUTY SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER IN HIS SUNDAY ISSUES AND ANSWERS TV APPEARANCE "WARNED IRAQ AGAINST DISMEMBERMENT OF IRAN." WHATEVER THE ACCURACY OF THE VOA COVERAGE WE OBVIOUSLY HAVE A LONG-TERM INTEREST IN KEEPING AN EYE ON IRAQ'S AMBITIONS IN KHUZESTAN.

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IRAQ, ON BEHALF OF "THE ARAB NATION", HAS BEEN A DEFENDER OF THE RIGHTS OF THE ARAB POPULATION THERE, AND AS THEIR TROOPS PUSH DEEPER INTO THE AREA THEY WILL LINK UP WITH POLITICALLY-MOTIVATED ARABS WHO WILL BE SEEKING AS MUCH AUTONOMY AS THEY CAN GET. IRAQ CAN BE EXPECTED TO SUPPORT THIS EFFORT.

3. WE DO NOT BELIEVE IRAQ WISHES TO ANNEX KHUZESTAN AND BRING IT JURIDICALLY WITHIN IRAQ'S OWN FRONTIERS. THE MAIN REASON IS THAT KHUZESTAN'S ARABS ARE SHIA MOSLEMS. THE SUNNI DOMINATED BAGHDAD GOVERNMENT HAS NO DESIRE TO INCREASE THE SHIA PROPORTION (NOW ABOUT 60 PERCENT) OF IRAQ'S POPULATION. FURTHERMORE, IRAQ WOULD KNOW THAT A MAJOR REDRAWING OF THE MAP WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

4. IRAQ COULD PERHAPS MAKE AN HISTORIC CLAIM TO SOME TERRITORIES IN THE IMMEDIATE REGION OF KHORRAMSHAHR (MUHAMMARAH) BUT SHE HAS NOT DONE SO YET. NOR DO WE DETECT ANY ANNEXATIONIST SENTIMENT ON THE PART OF THE IRAQI PEOPLE, THOUGH OF COURSE THIS COULD BE DRUMMED UP BY THE GOVERNMENT IF NECESSARY.

5. FOR THE TIME BEING WE ARE INCLINED TO TAKE SADDAM
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PAGE 03 BAGHDA 02686 291526Z

HUSSAIN AT HIS WORD WHEN HE SAYS IRAQ DOES NOT WANT IRANIAN TERRITORY. RECENT IRAQI STATEMENTS BASE IRAQ'S CLAIMS ON THE 1913-1914 FRONTIER, WHICH IS APPROXIMATELY THE PRESENT LINE INCLUDING IRAQI SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE SHATT. OF COURSE IF THE WAR IS PROLONGED OR A CEASE-FIRE ESTABLISHED WHILE IRAQI TROOPS REMAIN INSIDE IRAN, IRAQ'S DIRECT CONTROL OF KHUZESTAN COULD CONTINUE FOR A LONG TIME.

6. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
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PAGE 01 BAGHDA 02696 291656Z
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FM USINT BAGHDAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 781
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
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AMEMBASSY PARIS

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~~SECRET~~ BAGHDAD 2696E.O. 12065: ~~RDS-4 8/29/88~~ (JONES, A. ELIZABETH) OR-P
TAGS: PEPR, MOPS, IZ, IR, XF
SUBJ: (S) ARAB DIPLOMAT COMMENTS ON IRAQI CONTACTS WITHIN
ARAB GROUP

1. (S) - ENTIRE TEXT)
2. [REDACTED] IN DISCUSSION SEPT. 29
ON IRAQI PRE-WAR CONTACTS WITH GULF STATES ON POSSIBLE WAR
WITH IRAN, SAID HE COULD BE SURE OF ONLY ONE SUCH CONVERSATION.
HE SAID THAT DURING THE SEPT. 15-16 VISIT TO BAGHDAD OF AMIR
OF RAS AL-KHAYMAH, THE AMIR SPECIFICALLY REQUESTED THAT THE

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PAGE 02 BAGHDA 02696 291656Z

GOI NOT ATTEMPT TO REGAIN THE THREE GULF ISLANDS USING
MILITARY FORCE. HE REPORTEDLY SAID THAT THE UAE WOULD NOT
BE ABLE TO ASSIST IRAQ IN THIS ENDEAVOR MILITARILY,
AND FURTHERMORE DID NOT WISH TO BECOME INVOLVED ITSELF
IN HOSTILITIES WITH IRAN. THE AMIR REPORTEDLY SAID HE
HAD NO OBJECTION TO IRAQ'S INCLUDING THE RETURN OF THE
ISLANDS TO ARAB SOVEREIGNTY AS A POLITICAL OBJECTIVE
OF A FUTURE IRAQ-IRAN CONFLICT. [REDACTED] SAID HE WAS
CONVINCED THT THERE HAD BEEN PRE-WAR CONSULTATIONS

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WITH OTHER GULF STATES, BUT SAID HE HAD NO SPECIFIC CONFIRMATION.

3. COMMENTING ON LIBYA'S CURRENT RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAQ, [REDACTED] SAID THAT PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSAIN WAS "VERY UPSET" WITH COL. QADHAFI. HE SAID QADHAFI HAD SENT TWO MESSAGES TO SADDAM IN THE EARLY DAYS OF THE WAR, ONE SUGGESTING A MEETING OF ISLAMIC FOREIGN MINISTERS TO DISCUSS RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT, AND THE SECOND EXHORTING IRAN AND IRAQ TO STOP FIGHTING, QUOTING FROM A KORANIC VERSE TO THE EFFECT THAT BOTH THE AGGRESSOR AND THE VICTIM IN ANY CONFLICT WERE DOOMED TO REST IN HELL. NEITHER MESSAGE WAS WELL RECEIVED FOR OBVIOUS REASONS. [REDACTED] COMMENTED FURTHER THAT THE GOI WAS NO DOUBT ALREADY PREDISPOSED AGAINST LIBYA BECAUSE OF ITS ANNOUNCED UNION WITH SYRIA AND SYRIA'S SUPPORT FOR IRAN. [REDACTED] BELIEVES THAT SADDAM'S REFERENCE IN HIS SEPT. 28 SPEECH TO THOSE ARAB NATIONS WHO HAVE "ADOPTED DISGRACEFUL STANDS" REFERS TO LIBYA AND SYRIA.

4. COMMENTING FURTHER ON IRAQ'S CURRENT RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER ARABS, [REDACTED] SAID THAT CONSENSUS IS THAT PLO CHAIRMAN ARAFAT IS BECOMING A LAUGHINGSTOCK.

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PAGE 03 BAGHDA 02696 291656Z

FOREIGN MINISTER HAMMADI, IN HIS SEPT. 27 PRESS CONFERENCE MADE CONDESCENDING REMARK ON ARAFAT'S MEDIATION EFFORTS ("ARAFAT MEANS WELL") BUT BOTH HE, AND LATER SADDAM, STATED SPECIFICALLY THAT ARAB MEDIATION IS INAPPROPRIATE SINCE ARABS ARE OBLIGED TO SUPPORT FELLOW ARAB AGAINST THE OUTSIDER PERSIANS.

5. COMMENT: WHILE WE CANNOT CORROBORATE INFORMATION IN PARAS 2 AND 3, [REDACTED] HAS PROVEN TO BE A GENERALLY RELIABLE SOURCE. HE IS WELL RESPECTED BY AND HAS GOOD CONTACTS IN THE ARAB DIPLOMATIC COMMUNITY IN BAGHDAD.

6. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
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INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
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AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BAGHDAD 2672

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E.O. 12065: GDS 9/28/86 (EAGLETON, WM. L.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, PINS, MOPS, IZ, IR
SUBJ: IRAQI OBJECTIVES, SEPT. 28 UPDATE

REF: BAGHDAD 2649

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PAGE 02 BAGHDA 02672 281544Z

1. (Q - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE PAST FEW DAYS HAVE REINFORCED
OUR BELIEF THAT IRAQ WILL FIND IT DIFFICULT TO BRING
THE WAR, WITH ITS LIMITED OBJECTIVES, TO A RAPID
CONCLUSION. IT IS ALREADY BECOMING APPARENT, IN SPITE
OF DELAYING TACTICS AT THE UN, THAT IRAQ WANTS THE WAR
TO END QUICKLY -- OF COURSE ON ITS OWN TERMS. IRAN

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HAS NO OBLIGATION TO FOLLOW THE IRAQI SCENARIO.

3. AS IRAQI TROOPS ADVANCE INTO KHUZESTAN, A CALL HAS GONE OUT IN THE NAME OF THE CHIEFS OF THE ARAB TRIBES OF THE REGION. THIS IS A STEP IN THE DIRECTION OF SETTING UP SOME KIND OF AUTONOMOUS RULE THERE.

4. THE IRAQIS HAVE OBVIOUSLY BEEN SURPRISED BY IRAN'S ABILITY TO KEEP ITS AIR FORCE FLYING AND HITTING STRATEGIC TARGETS IN IRAQ. SINCE SEPT. 27 A CHANGE IN IRANIAN TACTICS OVER BAGHDAD APPEARS TO HAVE CONFUSED THE IRAQIS (SEPTTEL). LATEST IRANIAN RAIDS ON BAGHDAD DO NOT SEEM TO HAVE DONE MUCH DAMAGE BUT THEY HAVE CAUSED INCONVENIENCE.

5. ALTHOUGH THE IRAQIS PRESUMABLY HAVE A PLAN TO DEAL WITH A "LONG WAR", THERE IS NO SIGN YET OF RATIONING OR OTHER MEASURES TO INDICATE IT IS BEING IMPLEMENTED. IF THE WAR DRAGS ON, WITH IRAN REFUSING TO DISCUSS BAGHDAD'S DEMANDS, THE IRAQIS WILL BE INCREASINGLY TEMPTED TO AIM FOR A CHANGE OF REGIME IN TEHRAN.

6. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
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ACTION SS-30

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AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
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AMEMBASSY LONDON
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E.O. 12065: GDS 9/26/86 (EAGLETON, WM. L.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, PINS, MOPS, IZ, IR
SUBJ: IRAQI OBJECTIVES, SEPT. 26~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
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REF: BAGHDAD 2626 ✓

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. IRAQ'S MILITARY AND POLITICAL MOVES DURING THE
PAST TWO DAYS (SINCE REFTTEL) HAVE BEEN PRUDENT.
IRAQ'S CONDITIONS HAVE BEEN MADE PUBLIC AND CORRESPOND
TO MINIMAL OBJECTIVES. THESE INCLUDE ALL DISPUTED

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FRONTIER TERRITORY (324 SQUARE KILOMETERS), SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE SHATT AL-ARAB, NO IRANIAN INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL ARAB AFFAIRS, AND ARAB RECOVER OF THE THREE GULF ISLANDS.

3. IRAQ HAS MOVED CAUTIOUSLY ON THE FIGHTING FRONTS, THE MAJOR EFFORT BEING TO SECURE THE EAST BANK OF THE SHATT AL-ARAB INCLUDING KHORRAMSHAHR AND ABADAN. AIR ATTACKS HAVE BEEN WIDE RANGING BUT THUS FAR CONFINED TO LEGITIMATE MILITARY AND STRATEGIC TARGETS. WHERE CIVILIANS HAVE BEEN KILLED IT APPEARS TO BE BECAUSE OF PILOT ERROR OR THEIR PRESENCE AT OR NEAR THESE TARGETS. NEITHER SIDE HAS THE CAPABILITY OF CONDUCTING STRATEGIC ATTACKS ON A SCALE TO DEMORALIZE CIVILIAN POPULATIONS. THE ULTIMATE IN SYMBOLIC ESCALATION WOULD BE RECIPROCAL ATTACKS ON TIKRIT AND QUM.

4. IRAQ'S FAILURE TO PRESS MORE RAPIDLY ON ALL FRONTS CAN PERHAPS BE EXPLAINED BY ONE OR MORE OF THE FOLLOWING: A) A DESIRE TO AVOID EXCESSIVE IRAQI CASUALTIES, B) AN IMPLICIT OR EXPLICIT UNDERSTANDING THAT SOVIET SUPPLIES COULD BE JEOPARDIZED BY A DEEP THRUST INTO IRAN, C) A DESIRE TO AVOID ANTAGONIZING AND COMPLETELY DESTROYING THE IRANIAN ARMY WHICH MIGHT BE NEEDED TO

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PAGE 03 BAGHDA 02649 270416Z

INSTALL A POST-KHOMEINI REGIME AMENABLE TO IRAQ. THIS LATTER POSSIBILITY MUST ALWAYS BE IN THE MINDS OF IRAQ'S LEADERS WHO WILL NOT FEEL SECURE UNTIL THE DANGER FROM THE REVOLUTIONARY SHIA REGIME IS REMOVED. WE SUSPECT HOWEVER THAT THEY LACK A SERIOUS PLAN FOR A SUITABLE ALTERNATIVE AND ARE CONCERNED THAT ANARCHY COULD LEAD TO A LEFTIST-TUDEH TAKEOVER AND THE ADVANCE OF SOVIET INFLUENCE TO IRAQ'S FRONTIER.

5. ALTHOUGH IRAQ'S CLAIMS HAVE NOW BEEN DEFINED, IRAN IS NOT YET OBLIGED TO GIVE IN. IRAQI DEFENSE MINISTER KHAYRALLAH HAS SAID THE PURPOSE OF IRAQ'S ACTION IS TO "HOLD IRAN BY THE NECK" UNTIL IT RECOGNIZES IRAQI RIGHTS. WHAT HAPPENS IF IRAN REFUSES TO DO SO AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IS NOT ABLE TO ESTABLISH A CEASE-FIRE? IRAQ MAY THEN FEEL OBLIGED TO SEIZE ADDITIONAL STRATEGIC AREAS. KHUZESTAN (ARABISTAN) WOULD BE A TEMPTING PLACE TO BEGIN, AND ONCE THEIRS IT WOULD BE HARD TO RELINQUISH WITHOUT SETTING UP LOCAL ARAB RULE. IT IS HARD TO CARRY SPECULATION BEYOND THIS POINT WITHOUT ENVISAGING A CHANGE OF REGIME IN IRAN.

6. IN OTHER WORDS IRAQ IS FOLLOWING A LOGICAL COURSE DESIGNED TO ACHIEVE LIMITED OBJECTIVES WHICH HAVE SOME LEGAL BASIS. THE PROBLEM IS THAT IF IRAN REFUSES TO SUBMIT TO IRAQ'S MINIMAL DEMANDS THE SCENARIO

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LEADS INTO UNCHARTED AREAS. IT MAY BE MORE DIFFICULT TO
END THIS WAR THAN IRAQ CALCULATED.
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SP-02 PM-07 INRE-00 CIAE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00 ICAE-00
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PAGE 02 BAGHDA 02658 271229Z

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BAGHDAD 2658E.O. 12065: ~~GDS 9/27/89~~ (JINES, A. ELIZABETH) OR-P
TAGS: PEPR, PINS, MOPS, CASC, IZ, IR
SUBJ: IRAQ-IRAN CONFLICT, SEPT. 271. ~~(S)~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. AMERICAN JOURNALIST IN BAGHDAD HAS RECEIVED PHONE CALL

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FROM LONDON TIMES CORRESPONDENT FISK WHO TRAVELED SEPT. 26 FROM KUWAIT TO BASRA WITH ELEVEN OTHER JOURNALISTS. THE GROUP WAS TAKEN DURING THE THE MORNING TO A VILLAGE SOUTH OF BASRA ACROSS FROM ABADAN. FISK REPORTED THAT ABADAN REFINERIES ARE BURNING APPARENTLY OUT OF CONTROL AND DESCRIBED IT AS THE MOST INCREDIBLE SIGHT HE HAD EVER SEEN. THE IRAQI VILLAGE RECEIVED A HEAVY MORTAR BARRAGE, AND AS THE JOURNALISTS WERE LEAVING TO RETURN TO BASRA, THE ROAD IN FRONT OF THEM WAS STRAFFED BY A PHANTOM.

3. A LARGE GROUP OF FOREIGN JOURNALISTS WERE TAKEN SEPT. 26 TO BASRA, AND WE NOW HAVE CONFIRMATION THAT THEY ARRIVED THERE LATE THE SAME EVENING AFTER FILMING 75 IRANIAN PRISONERS OF WAR AND A JUST-DOWNED BURNING PHANTOM ON ROUTE. WE HOPE TO BE IN TOUCH WITH THEM EITHER DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY FOR FURTHER REPORTING ON THE SITUATION.

4. FISK REPORTS THAT THREE OIL STORAGE TANKS IN BASRA ARE BURNING AND THAT SMOKE WAS COMING FROM AN UNIDENTIFIED INDUSTRIAL INSTALLATION WHICH HE ASSUMED TO BE THE PETROCHEMICAL PLANT. HE REPORTS SIGHTING NO GUNBOATS IN THE SHATT AL-ARAB AND HAS INDICATIONS THAT THE IRANIANS ARE IN CONTROL OF THE MOUTH OF THE SHATT. HE COULD PROVIDE
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NO FURTHER DETAILS ON THIS POINT.

5. WIFE OF USINT FSN WAS ABLE TO TRAVEL FROM KUWAIT TO BAGHDAD THROUGH BASRA ON SEPT. 25-26, AND REPORTED CONSIDERABLE HEAVY SMOKE IN BASRA. SHE WAS ABLE TO FIND NO CEMMERICAL TRANSPORTATION FROM BASRA TO BAGHDAD BUT WAS ABLE TO WANGLE A RIDE ON A MILITARY BUS TRANSPORTING MILITARY CORPSES BACK TO KERBALA, NAJAF AND THAWRA TOWNSHIP IN BAGHDAD.

6. WE HAVE SECOND-HAND REPORTS FROM TWO BRITISH WORKERS WHO ARRIVED MORNING OF SEPT. 27 FROM KIRKUK. THEY REPORTTAHT IN THREE SEPARATE AIR RAIDS ON KIRKUK ON SEPT. 26, THE FOLLOWING INSTALLATIONS WERE SEVERELY DAMAGED AND NO LONGER OPERATIVE: RADIO TOWER, MICRO-WAVE TOWER, AND BOTH OIL REFINERIES. ONE OF THE TWO MAIN HOTELS AND 40-50 HOUSES WERE FLATTENED. THE TWO BRITISH WORKERS BELIEVE THEY WERE THE LAST FOREIGNERS TO LEAVE KIRKUK.

7. WE HAVE ALSO RECEIVED REPORTS THAT THE ARMY HAS CLOSED THE ROAD FROM NASIRIYAH TO MOSUL IN THE NORTH AND FROM KUT TO AMARA. THE ARMY HAS REPORTEDLY TAKEN OVER GASOLINE STATIONS IN KUT.

8. BAGHDAD EXPERIENCED ITS FIRST PRE-DAWN AIR RAID

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AT 0345 SEPT. 27. FOR THE FIRST TIME ALSO, ANTI AIRCRAFT FIRE WAS HEARD APPROXIMATELY 30 SECONDS BEFORE THE AIR RAID SIREN WENT OFF. IN PREVIOUS RAIDS THE SIRENS HAVE SOUNDED AT LEAST 10 OR 15 MINUTES BEFORE ANY FIRING OR BOMBING HAS BEEN HEARD. THE ATTACK WAS OVER THE RASHID MILITARY CAMP AND/OR THE DORA REFINERY, BOTH IN SOUTHEAST BAGHDAD. WE SIGHT NO VISIBLE DAMAGE, AND THE DORA REFINERY HAS SMOKE COMING OUT OF ITS SMOKE STACKS, AS THOUGH IT MAY STILL BE OPERATING. THERE ARE UNCONFIRMED RUMORS AMONG THE

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DIPLOMATIC COMMUNITY THAT REFINERIES ALL OVER IRAQ HAVE BEEN SHUT DOWN TO MAKE THEM LESS VULNERABLE TO AIR RAID ATTACK, AND THAT OIL STORAGE TANKS IN THE BAGHDAD AREA HAVE BEEN EMPTIED IN ORDER TO PREVENT LARGE FIRES SHOULD ANY OF THEM BE HIT. IT IS ASSUMED THAT THE OIL HAS BEEN DISTRIBUTED IN TANKERS THROUGHOUT IRAQ. WE TREAT THESE RUMORS WITH RESERVE.

9. HAVING CHECKED WITH A NUMBER OF EMBASSIES, SOME OF WHOM HAVE EYEWITNESS REPORTS, IT APPEARS THAT THE MOST SERIOUS DAMAGE, ASIDE FROM THE BASRA AREA, HAS OCCURRED IN KIRKUK. THERE ARE DIFFERING OPINIONS AS TO WHETHER THE REPORTED SUSPENSION OF OIL EXPORTS THROUGH THE PIPELINE FROM KIRKUK IS THE RESULT OF A PRECAUTIONARY DECISION BY THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT OR MADE NECESSARY BY DAMAGE TO INSTALLATIONS FROM IRANIAN AIR ATTACKS. WHILE DAMAGE TO INSTALLATIONS FROM IRANIAN OIL INSTALLATIONS DURING THE PAST SEVERAL DAYS HAS BEEN EXTENSIVE, IT SHOULD NOT BE EXAGGERATED. FOR EXAMPLE, WE UNDERSTAND THAT ONLY THREE OR FOUR OUT OF MORE THAN 20 OIL STORAGE TANKS IN THE BASRA REGION ARE ON FIRE. THE DORA REFINERY ACROSS THE TIGRIS FROM USINT APPEARS TO BE FUNCTIONING ALTHOUGH THE SINGLE FLARE HAS BEEN EXTINGUISHED. ACCORDING TO ONE SOURCE THE GASES USUALLY FLARED ARE BEING VENTED INTO THE ATMOSPHERE ALONG WITH COMPRESSED AIR. FILLING STATIONS ARE DISTRIBUTING GASOLINE NORMALLY IN THE BAGHDAD AREA BUT WE CANNOT SPEAK FOR OTHER PARTS OF IRAQ.

10. WE ARE TOLD BY AN AMERICAN BUSINESSMAN WHO CLAIMS TO HAVE CONTINUED ACCESS TO BAGHDAD INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT THAT THE AIRPORT IS COMPLETELY OPERATIONAL AND IS BEING USED EXCLUSIVELY BY THE MILITARY. HE

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DOES NOT KNOW WHETHER THE VARIOUS FOREIGN VIPS WHO HAVE BEEN TRAVELING TO BAGHDAD OVER THE PAST THREE DAYS ARE

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ARRIVING AT BAGHDAD AIRPORT.

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11. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
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PAGE 01 BAGHDA 02610 231449Z
ACTION NEA-11

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CA-01 OPR-02 SY-05 SYE-00 OC-06 CCO-00 DCT-02
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BAGHDAD 2610

E.O. 12065: ~~88-9/23/86~~ (JONES, A. ELIZABETH) OR-P
TAGS: PEPR, PINS, MOPS, IZ, IR
SUBJ: IRAQ-IRAN CONFLICT, SEPT. 23

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REF: BAGHDAD 2599 (NOTAL)

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. FOLLOWING SEPT. 22 IRAQI ANNOUNCEMENT THAT IT WOULD
MAKE DETERRENT STRIKES AGAINST IRAN AND SUBSEQUENT
ANNOUNCEMENT THAT TEN IRANIAN AIR BASES HAD BEEN BOMBED
BY IRAQI AIR FORCE, SEPT. 23 DAWNED IN BAGHDAD, BASRA,
MOSUL AND NASRIYAH WITH IRANIAN AIR RAIDS. IRAQ

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CLAIMED IN A COMMUNIQUE ISSUED AT 1000 LOCAL THAT SIX OF ITS AIR BASES HAD BEEN HIT WITH MINIMAL DAMAGE, AND CLAIMED THAT 20 CIVILIANS WERE KILLED IN ATTACKS ON THE FOUR CITIES. IRAQ ALSO CLAIMS TO HAVE DOWNED 20 IRANIAN AIRCRAFT WITH THE LOSS OF ONE IRAQI AIRCRAFT. FROM NOISES HEARD BY USINT STAFF, IT APPEARS THAT IRANIAN AIRCRAFT DROPPED SEVERAL BOMBS IN BAGHDAD AREA; UNCONFIRMED RUMORS ARE THAT RASHID MILITARY BASE AND BAGHDAD'S MILITARY AND OR CIVILIAN AIRPORT WERE HIT. WE KNOW OF ONE ROCKET ATTACK NEAR ARMY CANAL IN EAST BAGHDAD THAT RESULTED IN LEVELING OF FIVE HOUSES AND SEVERAL DEATHS. AIR RAID SIGNALS SOUNDED TWO MORE TIMES DURING MID MORNING, BUT ONLY SHORT BURSTS OF ANTI AIRCRAFT FIRE WERE HEARD.

3. PETROCHEMICAL PLANT SOUTHWESTSGF BASRA WHERE SOME 600 FOREIGN NATIONALS WORK SUFFERED DIRECT HITS DURING EARLY MORNING AIR RAID. WEH HAVE CONFIRMED REPORTS THAT TWO BRITISH CITIZENS WERE KILLED; OTHER FOREIGNERS MAY ALSO HAVE BEEN KILLED OR INJURED THERE. ALL AMCITS AND OTHER FOREIGNERS ARE ATTEMPTING TO EVACUATE TO KUWAIT TODAY. WE KNOW OF TWO FOREIGN NATIONALS WHO WERE ABLE TO DRIVE FROM BASRAH TO BAGHDAD DURING MIDDAY WITHOUT INCIDENT.

4. USINT HAS BEEN IN REGULAR CONTACT WITH FOREIGN MISSIONS

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IN BAGHDAD REGARDING PLANS FOR POSSIBLE EVACUATION OF FOREIGN NATIONALS LIVING IN BAGHDAD AND OTHER NORTHERN AREAS. GOI REQUIREMENT THAT NON DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL HOLD EXIT VISAS IS A COMPLICATION IN FORMULATING PLANS FOR THEIR DEPARTURE. SINCE BAGHDAD INT'L AIRPORT HAS BEEN CLOSED SINCE AFTERNOON OF SEPT. 22, ANY DEPARTURES FROM BAGHDAD WOULD BE OVERLAND TO JORDAN. NO FOREIGN NATIONALS WILL DEPART UNTIL GOI GIVES ASSURANCES THAT THEIR TRAVEL TO JORDAN WILL BE FACILITATED.

5. GOI ANNOUNCED NATIONWIDE SEMI-BLACKOUT PROCEDURES BEGINNING EVENING OF SEPT. 22.

6. DURING SIXTH AIR ALERT OF THE DAY USINT OBSERVERS SAW A DIRECT HIT OVER BAGHDAD AT 1630 LOCAL. OTHER AIRCRAFT ACTIVITY IN AREA BUT NO OTHER HITS OBSERVED.
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PAGE 01 BAGHDA 02626 241530Z
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ACDA-12 TRSE-00 AID-07 SSN-02 DCT-02 SY-05 SYE-00
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E.O. 12065: GDS-9/24/85 (EAGLETON, WM. L) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, PINS, MOPS, IZ, IR

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SUBJ: IRAQI OBJECTIVES

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. DURING THE FIRST DAY OF OPEN WARFARE WITH IRAN, IRAQI FORCES SEEM TO HAVE ACHIEVED THEIR INITIAL OBJECTIVES AND TAKEN A HEAVY TOLL OF IRANIAN AIRCRAFT. WE DO NOT BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT THE SITUATION IS YET RIPE FOR A CEASE-FIRE SINCE IRAQ WILL, AS A MINIMUM, FIRST WISH TO EXTEND ITS

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CONTROL OVER THE FULL LENGTH OF THE EAST BANK OF THE SHATT AL-ARAB. WHEN THAT HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED THE IRAQIS WILL WANT TO ASSESS THEIR MILITARY SITUATION AND DECIDE WHETHER TO GO FURTHER GAINS OR COOPERATE WITH A MEDIATION OR CEASEFIRE.

3. ADDITIONAL IRAQI OBJECTIVES COULD INCLUDE

A) SEIZURE OF KHUZESTAN PROVINCE WITH ITS LARGE ARAB POPULATION AND ITS DETACHMENT FROM TEHRAN'S AUTHORITY, B) THE RETURN OF THE ISLANDS OF ABU MUSA AND THE TWO TUNBS TO ARAB SOVEREIGNTY, C) WITH ANY DISINTERGRATION OF IRANIAN FORCES, THE SEIZURE OF IRANIAN URBAN CENTERS SUCH AS KERMANSHAH AS WELL AS MILITARY BASES SUCH AS DEZFUL.

4. THE ULTIMATE IRAQI OBJECTIVE IS TO REMOVE THE THREAT TO THE BAAATH REGIME POSED BY THE MILITANT IRANIAN SHIA LEADERSHIP UNDER KHOMEINI. IRAQ WOULD NOT, HOWEVER, WELCOME AN IRANIAN GOVERNMENT CONTROLLED BY THE PRO-SOVIET TUDEH. THIS MIGHT TEMPER IRAQI ENTHUSIASM FOR A BREAKDOWN OF AUTHORITY IN TEHRAN.

5. WE DO NOT KNOW HOW FAR THE IRAQIS WILL DECIDE TO GO TOWARD ACHIEVING THEIR ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE. MUCH WILL DEPEND ON THE MILITARY BALANCE AS EACH SIDE EXPENDS MATERIEL WHICH CANNOT BE READILY REPLACED. (WE ASSUME THE SOVIETS WOULD NOT AIRLIFT IMPORTANT EQUIPMENT TO IRAQ WHILE IRAQI FORCES ARE ATTACKING DEEP INTO IRAN.)

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AS ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER, OR BOTH, SEES SUPPLIES DWINDLING, IT SHOULD INCREASINGLY FIND MEDIATION AND CEASE-FIRE ATTRACTIVE.

6. AS LONG AS THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY PROVIDES AMPLE OPPORTUNITY FOR MEDIATION AND SUFFICIENT PRESSURES FOR A CEASE FIRE THE IRAQIS WILL BE ABLE TO STOP THEIR SIDE OF THE FIGHTING WHEN IT APPEARS TO BE IN THEIR INTEREST. AS IRAQI MATERIEL IS EXPENDED, SOVIET INFLUENCE WHICH SEEMS TO BE IN THE DIRECTION OF ACCOMMODATION, SHOULD INCREASE. FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF BAGHDAD THE U.S. POLICY OF STRICT NEUTRALITY, WITH DISCREET EFFORTS TO PROMOTE AN EARLY SETTLEMENT, SEEMS THE BEST AVAILABLE FOR NOW.

7. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED FOR KUWAIT.
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AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY

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AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY

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E.O. 12065: RDS-1 9/22/90 (EAGLETON, WM.L) OR-M

TAGS: PRPR, PINS, MOPS, IZ, IR

SUBJ: NEXT STEPS IN THE IRAQ-IRAN CONFRONTATION

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1. (X-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. IRAQ HAS NOW MOVED UP ITS MAJOR FORCES TO POSITIONS FACING THE IRANIAN FRONTIER AND MILITARY ACTION IS GRADUALLY ESCALATING, PARTICULARLY IN THE SHATT AL-ARAB REGION WHERE BOTH SIDES HAVE LARGE POPULATION CENTERS. IT IS EASY TO FORESEE SCENARIOS INVOLVING FURTHER ESCALATION AND NOT EASY TO SEE HOW THE FIGHTING CAN BE STOPPED.

3. A PERSISTENT THEME SHARED BY BOTH WESTERN AND EAST BLOCK DIPLOMATS HERE IS THAT THE U.S. AND THE WEST MIGHT SOMEHOW

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PAGE 02 BAGHDA 02600 221912Z

BENEFIT FROM THE IRAQ-IRAN CONFRONTATION WHICH COULD FORCE THE IRANIAN PEOPLE TO RALLY AROUND BANI SADR AND THE ARMY AS A COUNTERWEIGHT TO THE INEFFECTIVE RELIGIOUS LEADERS. IT WOULD ALSO FORCE IRAN TO TURN TO THE U.S. AND THE WEST FOR ARMS SUPPLIES. WE HAVE MADE A POINT OF NOT AGREEING WITH THIS ASSESSMENT, THOUGH IT HAS SOME MERIT.

ONE THING IS CERTAIN: THE IRAQI REGIME CANNOT GIVE UP ITS CLAIM
FULL SOVEREIGNTY TO THE SHATT AL-ARAB AND SURVIVE. ASSUMING

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THAT IRAN CANNOT DEFEAT IRAQ MILITARILY, IT WOULD SEEM THAT A FUTURE SETTLEMENT MUST INCLUDE IRAQI SOVEREIGNTY OF THE SHATT (AS PRIOR TO 1975).

5. IT IS HARD TO IMAGINE THAT IRAN WOULD AGREE TO RELINQUISH SOVEREIGNTY EXCEPT UNDER DURESS. THE IRAQIS ARE PERHAPS CALCULATING THAT THEY CAN PLACE IRAN IN THE SAME POSITION OF WEAKNESS IRAQ HELD IN 1975 WHEN THEY AGREED TO DIVIDE THE SHATT WITH IRAN. TO ACCOMPLISH THIS NOW, HOWEVER, IRAQ WILL HAVE TO DO MORE THAN EXTEND ITS AUTHORITY INTO IRANIAN KURDISTAN (AS THE IRANIANS DID WITH IRAQ IN 1975). TO GET A DEAL WITH IRAN THAT WOULD ENSURE IRAQI HOLD ON THE SHATT, IRAQ'S LEADERSHIP MIGHT FIND IT NECESSARY TO SEIZE A SIGNIFICANT CHUNK OF IRANIAN TERRITORY AFTER WHICH A CEASE-FIRE MIGHT BE ARRANGED AND AGREEMENT MADE TO EXCHANGE THE TERRITORY FOR RECOGNITION OF IRAQ'S POSITION ON THE SHATT. THE ABOVE, OF COURSE, IS ONLY ONE POSSIBLE SCENARIO. IT, LIKE OTHERS, INVOLVES FURTHER ESCALATION IN THE FIGHTING.

6. IT WOULD PERHAPS BE WISE FOR THE IRANIANS TO CUT THEIR LOSSES, REVERT TO THE 1975 REGIME IN THE SHATT AND WAIT FOR A MORE FAVORABLE OCCASION TO REASSERT THEIR POSITION LATER ON. IT IS HARD TO IMAGINE, HOWEVER, THAT THE UNCOMPROMISING IRANIAN LEADERSHIP COULD ACCEPT SUCH A COURSE OF ACTION.

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PAGE 03 BAGHDA 02600 221912Z

7. OUR HANDS-OFF POLICY IS THE ONLY ONE THAT MAKES ANY SENSE AT PRESENT, ALTHOUGH WE MIGHT HAVE AN INDIRECT ROLE TO PLAY AS MEDIATION EFFORTS GET UNDERWAY. FOR THE SOVIETS THE CHOICES MUST BE MUCH MORE DIFFICULT. IT IS ALWAYS POSSIBLE THAT THEY COULD EXPLOIT AREA VIOLENCE TO FURTHER THEIR CAUSE, BUT IT IS MORE LIKELY THAT THEIR ACTIONS WILL PLEASE NEITHER IRAQ NOR IRAN. THEY SHOULD THEREFORE BE PREPARED TO USE THEIR INFLUENCE TO BRING THE CONFLICT TO AN EARLY CONCLUSION. THEIR INFLUENCE IN IRAQ IS LIMITED AT PRESENT BUT WOULD PROBABLY INCREASE IF THE CONFLICT IS PROLONGED AND IRAQ REQUIRES SPARE PARTS AND AMMUNITION.

8. THE ABOVE WAS DRAFTED BEFORE TODAY'S ANNOUNCEMENT THAT IRAQ WAS STRIKING BASES IN IRAN. IT LOOKS AS IF THEY ARE FOLLOWING THE SUGGESTED SCENARIO AND WILL SOON BE SEIZING IRANIAN TERRITORY.
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PAGE 01 BAGHDA 02595 221614Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO OCT-01 AF-10 EUR-12 EA-10 IO-14 ADS-00 SY-05
SYE-00 SSN-02 PM-07 SP-02 SS-15 H-01 CIAE-00
INR-10 NSAE-00 EB-08 DOE-17 DOEE-00 PA-01 DODE-00
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O R 221100Z SEP 80
FM USINT BAGHDAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 716
INFO COMIDEASTFOR
AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY DOHA
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MANAMA
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY RABAT
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BAGHDAD 2595

E.O. 12065: ~~GDS 9/22/86~~ (JONES A. ELIZABETH) OR-P
TAGS: PRPR, ASEC, MOPS, IZ, IR
SUBJ: IRAQ-IRAN CONFRONTATION, SEPT 22

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PAGE 02 BAGHDA 02595 221614Z

REF: BAGHDAD 2577 AND PREVIOUS (NOTAL)

1. (~~Q~~-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. IRAQ'S MILITARY BULLETINS (AVAILABLE IN FBIS) ANNOUNCE
THE DOWNING OF ONE PHANTOM IN MAYSAN AND DESTRUCTION OF TEN
IRANIAN GUNBOATS IN THE SHATT AL-ARAB. TWO NAVAL ENGAGEMENTS
REPORTEDLY ENSUED AS A BRITISH AND KUWAITI VESSEL, ATTEMPTING

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TO ENTER BASRA, WERE INTERCEPTED BY IRANIAN GUNBOATS. BOTH VESSELS REPORTEDLY PROCEEDED INTO BASRA PORT. WE CONTINUE TO RECEIVE REGULAR REPORTS OF SIGHTINGS OF MILITARY MOVEMENTS TOWARD BORDER AREAS. OIL WELLS NEAR THE BORDER IN THE MAJNOUN FIELDS (NORTH OF BASRA) ARE BEING PLUGGED SINCE IT IS CONSIDERED TOO RISKY TO WORK THERE. A DUTCH RIG TECHNICIAN WHO RETURNED FROM BASRA ON SEPT. 20 WAS TOLD BY AN IRAQI FROM A TOWN SOUTH OF BASRA THAT "HUNDREDS" OF PEOPLE WERE KILLED THERE BY SHELLING. AS MIGHT BE EXPECTED, TECHNICIAN REPORTS HEAVY MILITARY PRESENCE THROUGHOUT THE BASRA AND AMARA AREA. AMERICAN TECHNICIANS LIVING NEAR BASRA HAVE UP-TO-DATE STAND-BY EVACUATION PLANS TO KUWAIT AND ALL HOLD CURRENT KUWAITI VISAS.

3. SEPT. 22 LOCAL PRESS REPORTS THAT RCC VICE CHAIRMAN TARIQ AZIZ HAS ARRIVED IN MOSCOW, ON A PREVIOUSLY UNANNOUNCED VISIT. LOCAL SPECULATION IS THAT MOSCOW IS DRAGGING ITS FEET IN COMPLYING WITH IRAQI REQUESTS FOR POLITICAL SUPPORT AND POSSIBLY ALSO FOR RESUPPLY OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT, AS MOSCOW TRIES TO SORT OUT WHERE ITS INTERESTS LIE IN THE IRAQ-IRAN DISPUTE. IRAQIS ARE NO DOUBT VERY UNHAPPY OVER SOVIET HESITATION, AND TARIQ AZIZ HAS PRESUMABLY GONE TO MOSCOW TO MAKE FORCEFUL PRESENTATION OF IRAQI CASE.

4. LOCAL PRESS ALSO REPORTS TODAY THAT PLO CHAIRMAN YASSER ARAFAT HAS SENT A LETTER TO PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSAIN, RECEIVED YESTERDAY

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PAGE 03 BAGHDA 02595 221614Z

BY FOREIGN MINISTER HAMMADI. EARLIER REPORTS THAT PLO WAS ATTEMPTING TO MEDIATE THE DISPUTE BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN THROUGH HANI AL-HASAN (SEE FBIS JN 201653) HAVE REPORTEDLY ANGERED THE IRAQIS CONSIDERABLY, PARTICULARLY SINCE THERE IS NO ROOM FOR MEDIATION BY ANYONE JUST AS THE GOI IS STEPPING UP ITS WAR EFFORT. THIS LETTER FROM ARAFAT MAY BE AN ATTEMPT TO CLEAR UP THE "MISUNDERSTANDING".

5. CBS BEIRUT CORRESPONDENT, IN IRAQ TO COVER SEPT. 19 ELECTIONS TO AUTONOMOUS AREA (KURDISH) LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, WAS TOLD BY MININFO TODAY THAT GOI HAS DECIDED TO GRANT VISAS TO ABOUT ONE HUNDRED FOREIGN JOURNALISTS TO COVER WAR STORY. JOURNALISTS WILL ARRIVE TODAY AND TOMORROW AND ARE BEING PROMISED A TRIP TO THE BORDER ON WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 24. CBS HOPES TO GET FOOTAGE OF TROOP MOVEMENTS OUTSIDE BAGHDAD TODAY TO GET IN AHEAD OF ITS COMPETITORS. EAGLETON

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PAGE 01 BAGHDA 02599 221823Z
ACTION NEA-11

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SP-02 SS-15 NSCE-00 SSO-00 ICAB-00 INRE-00 ACDA-12
ANAE-00 /109 W

-----116045 221827Z /44

O 221330Z SEP 80

FM USINT BAGHDAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 719

FBIS AMMAN NIACT IMMEDIATE

INFO COMIDEASTFOR IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY ALGIERS IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY DOHA

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY MANAMA

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BAGHDAD 2599

E.O. 12065: GDS 9/22/86 (JONES, A.ELIZABETH) OR-P

TAGS: PEPR, PINS, MOPS, IZ, IR

SUBJ: IRAQ ANNOUNCES INTENTION TO MAKE PREEMPTIVE STRIKES AGAINST

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PAGE 02 BAGHDA 02599 221823Z

IRAN

1. (LOU) IN STATEMENT ISSUED AT NOON GMT SEPT. 22 SADDAM HUSSAIN,
AS CHAIRMAN OF THE RCC ANNOUNCED THAT RCC HAS INSTRUCTED IRAQI
MILITARY TO MAKE LIGHTENING STRIKES AGAINST ANY IRANIAN MILITARY
TARGETS AS NECESSARY TO PROTECT IRAQI MILITARY AND NAVAL INSTALLATIONS

STATEMENT CONTINUES THAT IRAN FOR THE PAST TWO DAYS HAS ATTEMPTED
TO HINDER NAVIGATION IN THE SHATT AL-ARAB AND AT ITS ENTRANCE,

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IT HAS MOBILIZED ITS ARMED FORCES AND IT HAS CLOSED ITS AIR SPACE. IRAQ CONSIDERS THESE ACTION TO BE TANTAMOUNT TO A DECLARATION OF WAR. WHEN IRAN RECOGNIZES IRAQI SOVEREIGNTY OVER IRAQ'S "TERRITORY AND RIVER", IRAQ WILL WITHDRAW FROM ANY TERRITORY TAKEN AS A RESULT OF THIS INSTRUCTION. IRAQ DOES NOT INTEND TO ATTACK CIVILIAN TARGETS IN IRAN BUT WILL DO SO IF ANY CIVILIAN TARGETS ARE HIT BY IRAN IN IRAQ.

2. (C) COMMENT: THIS ANNOUNCEMENT STOPS SHORT OF AN IRAQI DECLARATION OF WAR BUT DOES STATE IRAQ'S INTENTION TO ENGAGE IN PREEMPTIVE STRIKES AGAINST ANY IRANIAN MILITARY TARGETS THAT ARE DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN LAUNCHING ATTACKS AGAINST IRAQ. ANNOUNCEMENT ALSO CLEARLY STATES IRAQ'S INTENTION TO RETAIN THE SHATT AL-ARAB AND ALL TERRITORY TAKEN OVER THE LAST TEN DAYS. IN PERIOD IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING ANNOUNCEMENT, ACTIVITIES IN BAGHDAD APPEAR NORMAL: SHOPS ARE OPEN AND TRAFFIC IS FLOWING AS USUAL.

3. FOR FBIS AMMAN: WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING TEXT OF RCC STATEMENT BY NIACT IMMEDIATE.

4. (U) FIRST MILITARY COMMUNIQUE SINCE RCC STATEMENT HAS JUST BEEN ISSUED (1345 GMT) ANNOUNCING THAT AT 0900 GMT TODAY (SEPT 22) IRAQ BOMBED AIR BASES AT FOLLOWING LOCATIONS IN IRAN:

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PAGE 03 . BAGHDA 02599 221823Z

MEHRABAD (TEHRAN) SHIRAZ, BUSHEHR, DEZFUL, CHAROKI (HAMADAN) KHATORI (ISJAHAN), TABRIZ, UMIID (AGHAJARI) KERMANS SHAH, AND AHWAZ. DEZFUL MILITARY HQS WAS REPORTEDLY HIT BY SURFACE TO SURFACE ROCKETS.
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PAGE 01 BAGHDA 02585 220926Z
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E.O. 12065: GDS 9/22/86 (EAGLETON, WM. L.) OR-M

TAGS: AINF, PGOV, LY

SUBJ: MEETING WITH JUSTICE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS IN PARIS

REF: BAGHDAD 2444^N

1. IN VIEW OF DETERIORATING SITUATION ON IRAQ-IRAN BORDER
I DO NOT BELIEVE IT WOULD BE WISE FOR ME TO PLAN TO GO TO PARIS
SEPT. 28. WILL HOLD RESERVATIONS A DAY OR TWO IN CASE
THERE IS A DEVELOPMENT, SUCH AS CEASE-FIRE OR MEDIATION, THAT
WOULD PERMIT ABSENCE FROM POST.

2. WOULD APPRECIATE DEPT'S CONCURRENCE IN ABOVE.
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PAGE 01 BAGHDA 02586 220944Z
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O 220823Z SEP 80 ZFF4

FM USINT BAGHDAD

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E.O. 12065: N/A

TAGS: SOPN, MOPS, PEPR, IZ, IR

SUBJ: REMARKS BY SECRETARY BROWN ON IRAQ-IRAN SITUATION

VOA NEWS CARRIED EXERPTS FROM SECRETARY BROWN'S REMARKS
ON CBS "FACE THE NATION" ON SEPT. 21 REGARDING FIGHTING
BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN. VOA REPORT WAS AIRED AT 0400 GMT ON
SEPTEMBER 22. MFA HAS ASKED FOR THE TEXT OF SECRETARY
BROWN'S REMARKS ON AN URGENT BASIS. PLEASE PROVIDE
BY NIACT IMMEDIATE.
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PAGE 01 BAGHDA 02594 221452Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ADS-00 IO-14 CIAE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00
INRE-00 SS-15 SSO-00 SP-02 NSCE-00 PM-07 DODE-00
PA-01 /073 W

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O R 221030Z SEP 80

FM USINT BAGHDAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 714

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

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E.O. 12065: RDS -1 9/22/90 (EAGLETON WM. L.) OR-M

TAGS: PEPR, PINS, MOPS, IZ, IR

SUBJ: IRAQ-IRAN: MEETING AT FOREIGN MINISTRY

1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. REQUEST THIS MORNING FOR APPOINTMENT WITH FOREIGN MINISTRY'S NORTH AMERICAN DESK OFFICER, ZUHAIR IBRAHIM, BROUGHT UNUSUALLY RAPID APPOINTMENT AT 11 AM. PURPOSE OF MEETING WAS TO CHECK ON MINISTRY'S PREPARATIONS FOR IRAQI DESK OFFICER WIZNITZER'S VISIT LATER THIS WEEK AND ALSO TO MAKE CERTAIN THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT UNDERSTOOD U.S. POSITION ON THE IRAQ-IRAN CONFRONTATION.

3. ZUHAIR IBRAHIM SAID THAT HIS FAILURE TO ACCEPT INVITATION FOR A WORKING LUNCH SEPT 27 WAS NOT BECAUSE OF POLITICAL INHI-

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PAGE 02 BAGHDA 02594 221452Z

BITIONS BUT BECAUSE ALL MINISTRY OFFICIALS ARE ON PERMANENT DUTY AT THE MINISTRY BUILDING AND NOT PERMITTED TO LEAVE EXCEPT FOR EMERGENCIES. HE THOUGHT WIZNITZER' PLANNED TRIP TO NORTHERN IRAQ WOULD PROBABLY BE APPROVED BUT THE TWO-DAY TRIP TO BASRA MIGHT HAVE TO BE CURTAILED IN VIEW OF FIGHTING IN THE AREA.

4. RE IRAQ IRAN CONFRONTATION, I NOTED THAT USINT HAD NOT BEEN INVITED TO THE MINISTRY'S BRIEFINGS THOUGH WE HAD BEEN ABLE TO KEEP INFORMED THROUGH DIPLOMATIC COLLEAGUES. I SUGGESTED THAT

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IF THE MINISTRY WISHED US TO HAVE TIMELY AND ACCURATE VERSIONS OF THEIR POSITIONS THEY SHOULD INCLUDE US IN BRIEFINGS. ZUHAIR IBRAHIM REPLIED THAT FAILURE OF LEGAL DEPARTMENT TO INVITE US WAS PROBABLY AN OVERSIGHT. WE WOULD BE GETTING A COPY OF THE OFFICIAL NOTE RE NAVIGATION ON THE SHATT AL-ARAB.

5. IBRAHIM ASKED FOR TEXT OF SECRETARY BROWN'S STATEMENT ON "FACE THE NATION" SEPT. 21. I TOLD HIM WE HAD REQUESTED TEXT AND WOULD GIVE HIM A COPY, NOTING THAT STATEMENT (WHICH HE HEARD ON VOICE OF AMERICA) HAD APPARENTLY BEEN IN REPLY TO A QUESTION RATHER THAN VOLUNTEERED.

6. I NOTED THAT BOTH IRANIAN AND IRAQI MEDIA HAD MADE RIDICULOUS STATEMENTS ABOUT U.S. BACKING OF ONE OR THE OTHER PARTYS, ADDING THAT WE DO NOT TAKE THESE PROPAGANDA EXCHANGES SERIOUSLY AND ASSUMED THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT DID NOT EITHER. IBRAHIM SMILED AND NODDED. I EMPHASIZED THAT THE OFFICIAL U.S. POSITION OF NON INVOLVEMENT IN THE DISPUTE WAS CLEARLY SET FORTH BY THE DEPT'S SPOKESMAN SEPT. 18, A COPY OF WHICH I HANDED HIM. I ADDED THAT IN SPITE OF SOME LOCAL SPECULATION THAT THE U.S. MIGHT BENEFIT FROM THE CONFLICT, THIS WAS NOT OUR ASSESSMENT. WE COULD NOT ACCEPT THAT INCREASED VIOLENCE AND INSTABILITY IN THE REGION WOULD HELP THE PARTIES INVOLVED OR ANYONE ELSE.

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BAGHDA 02594 221452Z

7. ZUHAIR IBRAHIM SAID THE IRAQI POSITION HAD BEEN VERY CLEARLY ENUNCIATED BY PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSAIN IN HIS SPEECH ABROGATING THE 1975 AGREEMENT. THE IRAQI LEADERSHIP WAS WORKING FROM A SOUND LEGAL POSITION, KNEW WHAT IT WAS DOING, AND WAS PREPARED TO DEAL WITH ANY COUNTER MOVE BY IRAN. THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT, HE ADDED, DID NOT SEEM TO KNOW WHAT IT WAS DOING.

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PAGE 01 BAGHDA 02559 191244Z
ACTION NEA-11

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DODE-00 PM-07 H-01 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 PA-01
SP-02 SS-15 NSCE-00 SSO-00 ICAC-00 INRE-00 ACDA-12
TRSE-00 /094 W

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FM USINT BAGHDAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 703
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY DOHA
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY MANAMA
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
AMEMBASSY PARIS
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BAGHDAD 2559

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 9/19/10 (EAGLETON, WM. L.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, IZ, IR
SUBJ: BRITISH VIEWS ON THE IRAQ-IRAN BORDER CONFLICT

REF: LONDON 19994

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PAGE 02 BAGHDA 02559 191244Z

1. ~~RE~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. WE FIND PATRICK SEALE'S COMMENTS ON IRAQ-IRAN DEVELOPMENT
INTERESTING AND HOPE EMBASSY LOND WILL KEEP IN TOUCH
WITH HIM AND OTHERS WHO CAN PROVIDE INSIGHT ON DEVELOPMENTS
WHICH ARE NOT EASY TO MONITOR FROM BAGHDAD BECAUSE OF
LACK OF ACCESS BY FOREIGN COMMUNITY TO REAL CENTERS OF
IRAQI AUTHORITY. SEALE IS PROBABLY CORRECT IN EMPHASIZING
SADDAM HUSSAIN'S DESIRE TO ENHANCE HIS IMAGE IN THE

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ARAB WORLD. THERE SEEMS TO BE SOMETHING MORE THAN THAT INVOLVED HOWEVER, INCLUDING DEEPLY FELT HISTORICAL ANIMOSITY TOWARD THE PERSIANS.

3. AS SEALE NOTED, IRAQ'S INTERNAL SHIA PROBLEM SHOULD NOT BE OVERLOOKED. IT IS A SUBJECT THAT IS NOT DISCUSSED OPENLY IN BAGHDAD. OUR ASSESSMENT REMAINS THAT MANY IRAQI SHIA (ALMOST 60 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION) ARE UNENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT THEIR BAATHI RULERS WHO ARE LARGELY SUNNI. HOWEVER, MOST OF THEM ARE PROBABLY NOT IMPRESSED BY KHOMEINI AND WHAT HIS REVOLUTION HAS DONE FOR IRAN. HENCE MANY OF THEM WOULD BE AMBIVALENT REGARDING THE CURRENT CONFRONTATION. THOSE IN THE ARMY HOWEVER ARE PROBABLY CARRIED ALONG BY THE CURRENT ENTHUSIASM FOR THE BATTLE OF ARABS AGAINST PERSIANS.
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PAGE 01 BAGHDA 02566 201402Z
ACTION NEA-11

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INR-10 L-03 PA-01 SP-02 SS-15 SSN-02 SSM-03 SY-05
SYE-00 SMS-01 DCT-02 /090 W

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FM USINT BAGHDAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 705
INFO COMIDEASTFOR PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DOHA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MANAMA PRIORITY
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E.O. 12065: GDS 9/20/86 (EAGLETON, WM. L.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, ASEC, MOPS, IZ, IR
SUBJ: IRAQ-IRAN CONFRONTATION, SEPT. 20

REF: BAGHDAD 2557 AND PREVIOUS

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PAGE 02 BAGHDA 02566 201402Z

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. LIFE IN BAGHDAD CONTINUES NORMAL WITH IRAQI MEDIA STILL REPORTING POSITIVE REACTION TO PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSAIN'S SPEECH ABROGATING THE 1975 IRAQ-IRAN AGREEMENT. REPORTS OF CONTINUED BORDER CLASHES UP AND DOWN THE FRONTIER INDICATE THAT INDIVIDUAL ENGAGEMENTS ARE SMALL SCALE BUT WHEN ADDED TOGETHER CONSTITUTE EXTENSIVE MILITARY ACTIVITY.

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3. IRAQI PRESS AND TV HAVE FEATURED THE FIRST PASSAGE OF A SHIP, JAPANESE, UP THE SHATT AL-ARAB WITH AN IRAQI PILOT AND IRAQI FLAG. OUR UNDERSTANDING IS THAT SINCE 1975 MANY SHIPS HAVE FLOWN BOTH FLAGS. REPORT THAT THE JAPANESE SHIP REFUSED INSTRUCTIONS FROM AN IRANIAN PATROL BOAT TO HOIST THE IRANIAN FLAG SUGGESTS THAT FOR THE TIME BEING THE IRAQIS HAVE THE UPPER HAND AT THE MOUTH OF THE WATERWAY. HOWEVER NO REAL SHOWDOWN HAS YET OCCURRED SINCE NO SHIP DESTINED FOR THE IRANIAN PORTS OF ABADAN OR KHORRAMSHAHR HAS TRIED TO ENTER THE SHATT SINCE IRAQI ABROGATION OF THE AGREEMENT.

4. WE STILL DO NOT SEE ANY INDICATION OF A PRE-PLANNED IRAQI INTENTION TO CARRY ITS BORDER WAR AGAINST IRAN BEYOND THE RECOVERY OF WHAT IRAQ CONSIDERS TO BE ITS LEGITIMATE TERRITORY AND RIGHTS. THESE INCLUDE THE POCKETS AND BORDER POSTS ALONG THE FRONTIER ALREADY TAKEN AS WELL AS SOVEREIGNTY ON THE SHATT AL-ARAB WATERWAY, BUT IT DOES NOT INCLUDE KHUZISTAN WITH ITS LARGE ARAB-SPEAKING POPULATION.

5. WE BELIEVE A SERIOUS ESCALATION COULD OCCUR IF IRAN WERE TO GIVE IRAQ A PRETEXT FOR STRIKING MORE

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PAGE 03 BAGHDA 02566 201402Z

DEEPLY INTO HER TERRITORY. THIS COULD HAPPEN IF THE IRANIANS HIT AT IRAQI SUPPLY DEPOTS OR INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES OR TRY TO TAKE AND HOLD ANY SIGNIFICANT PIECE OF IRAQI TERRITORY (IN RETALIATION FOR IRAQI SEIZURE OF BORDER POSTS). IRAQ MIGHT ALSO BE TEMPTED TO ESCALATE IF THERE WERE A BREAKDOWN OF IRANIAN AUTHORITY IN THE KHUZISTAN AREA AND A CALL FOR IRAQI SUPPORT BY THE ARAB POPULATION. THIS IS NOT NOW A LIKELY PROSPECT.

6. WHILE WE DO NOT SEE IT AS IRAQ'S INTENTION, OR IN ITS INTEREST, TO ENGAGE IN A FULL SCALE WAR WITH IRAN, NEITHER DO WE SEE ANY EASY WAY OUT OF THE CURRENT CRISIS UNLESS IRAN IS PREPARED TO ACQUIESCE IN IRAQ'S SEIZURE OF BORDER POCKETS AND POSTS (WHICH IS POSSIBLE), AND IN IRAQ'S EXERCISE OF FULL SOVEREIGNTY ON THE SHATT AL-ARAB (WHICH SEEMS LESS LIKELY). THE IRAQI LEADERSHIP PROBABLY CALCULATES THAT THE PRESENT LEVEL OF FIGHTING IS IN IRAQ'S INTEREST AS IT IS DEPLETING IRANIAN MATERIEL WHICH WILL BE HARD TO REPLACE, AND UNDERMINING KHOMEINI'S REGIME. THIS IS THE PRIMARY IRAQI OBJECTIVE.

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PAGE 01 BAGHDA 02577 211709Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO OCT-01 AF-10 EUR-12 ADS-00 IO-14 EA-10 CIAE-00
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O 211110Z SEP 80
FM USINT BAGHDAD
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INFO COMIDEASTFOR
AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE 9204489

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BAGHDAD 2577

E.O. 12065: ~~GDS 9/21/86~~ (JONES, A. ELIZABETH) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, ASEC, MOPS, IZ, IR
SUBJ: IRAQ-IRAN CONFRONTATION, SEPT.. 21

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PAGE 02 BAGHDA 02577 211709Z

REF: BAGHDAD 2566 AND PREVIOUS (NOTAL)

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: DIPLOMATS WERE CONVENED BY MFA TO RECEIVE LIST OF REGULATIONS THAT GOI CONSIDERS NOW APPLICABLE TO FOREIGN NAVIGATION IN THE SHATT AL-ARAB. LIST IS ESSENTIALLY THE SAME AS THAT GIVEN PREVIOUSLY IN LOCAL MEDIA, WITH

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ADDITIONAL NOTE THAT IRAQ IS PREPARED TO BACK UP THESE NEW RULES WITH MILITARY FORCE IF NECESSARY. MFA OFFICIAL DESCRIBED CLOSURE OF PART OF IRANIAN AIR SPACE AS STEP TOWARDS WAR; ANOTHER OFFICIAL COMMENTED PRIVATELY THAT IRAQ WOULD RETALIATE IN KIND SHOULD IRANIAN SHELLS HIT ANY MORE "STRATEGIC ECONOMIC INSTALLATIONS". WESTERN OBSERVERS HAVE SIGHTED ADDITIONAL TROOP MOVEMENTS. END SUMMARY.

3. HEADS OF DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS (NOT USINT) WERE SUMMONED TO MFA ON SEPT. 21 TO RECEIVE A DEMARCH FROM MINISTRY'S LEGAL AFFAIRS DIRECTOR AL-QAYSI. AL-QAYSI REFERRED TO THE SEPT. 17 ABROGATION OF THE IRAQ-IRAN TREATY AND REITERATED THAT THE SHATT AL-ARAB IS NOW CONSIDERED A "NATIONAL RIVER" SUBJECT TO ALL LAWS AND REGULATIONS OF IRAQ. HE LISTED SPECIFIC RULES WHICH NOW OBTAIN FOR ALL INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING IN THE SHATT:

- ALL FOREIGN VESSELS MUST ADHERE TO THE RULES AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING NAVIGATION IN TZ SHATT ISSUED BY THE STATE ORGANIZATION OF IRAQI PORTS
- ALL FOREIGN VESSELS MUST HOIST THE IRAQI FLAG REGARDLESS OF PORT OF ORIGIN OR DESTINATION
- ALL FOREIGN VESSELS MUST PAY APPLICABLE DUES AND CHARGES FOR NAVIGATION TO THE STATE ORGANIZATION OF

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IRAQI PORTS

- ALL FOREIGN VESSELS ARE OBLIGED TO USE IRAQI PILOTS AND TO ADHERE STRICTLY TO THEIR ORDERS WHILE PROCEEDING UP THE SHATT

4. AL-QAYSI NOTED THAT THESE RULES ARE THE SAME AS THOSE IN FORCE PRIOR TO THE MARCH 6, 1975 CONCLUSION OF THE SHATT AL-ARAB AGREEMENT. HE SAID THE GOI WILL TAKE ALL MEASURES NECESSARY TO ENFORCE THESE RULES AND WILL TOLERATE NO VIOLATION OF THE "TERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY OF THE SHATT". HE ADDED THAT THE GOI IS PREPARED TO USE MILITARY FORCE IF NECESSARY TO ENFORCE THESE RULES. HE REQUESTED THAT THIS INFORMATION BE TRANSMITTED ON AN URGENT BASIS TO ALL GOVERNMENTS; A WRITTEN NOTE SUMMARIZING THESE RULES IS TO BE SENT TO ALL MISSION.

5. AL-QAYSI ADDED THAT IRAQ'S LATEST INFORMATION ON THE SITUATION IS THAT IRAN "TODAY" CLOSED THE MAJOR PART OF ITS AIR SPACE TO AERIAL NAVIGATION. HE SAID HIS GOVERNMENT READS THIS AS A STEP TAKEN BY IRAN TOWARDS THE WAGING OF WAR. (COMMENT: MFA HAD ORIGINALLY ATTEMPTED TO CONVENE HEADS OF MISSIONS AT 10 PM ON THE 20TH. WHEN IT WAS UNABLE TO REACH LARGE GROUPS OF DIPLOMATS, IT SCHEDULED MEETING INSTEAD FOR NEXT MORNING. IT IS THEREFORE POSSIBLE THAT AL-QAYSI WAS READING FROM NOTES PREPARED FOR SEPT. 20 MEETING;

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CLOSING OF AIR SPACE "TODAY" MAY HAVE REFERRED TO AN ACTION TAKEN ON SEPT. 20. END COMMENT)

6. AS MEETING IN MFA WAS BREAKING UP, ZUHAIR IBRAHIM OF FIRST INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT MENTIONED TO AUSTRALIAN CHARGE THAT "SITES OF STRATEGIC ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE" HAD BEEN HIT BY IRANIAN ARTILLERY. HE SAID THAT IF FURTHER SUCH INCIDENTS OCCURRED IRAQ WAS PREPARED TO RETALIATE AGAINST SIMILAR IRANIAN INSTALLATIONS. (COMMENT: WE HAD HEARD SEPARATELY THAT ON SEPT.

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8 AN OIL REFINERY NEAR BASRA HAD BEEN DAMAGED, PRESUMABLY BY SHELLING. END COMMENT)

7. WE ARE RECEIVING ADDITIONAL REPORTS OF RECENT TROOP MOVEMENTS. BETWEEN MIDNIGHT AND 2 AM ON SEPT. 21 A MAJOR THOROUGHFARE IN MASBAH SECTION OF BAGHDAD WAS CLOSED WHILE A MILITARY TROOP CONVOY PASSED. WE ASSUME THEY WERE PROCEEDING FROM RASHID MILITARY CAMP NOT FAR FROM THE MASBAH AREA. A WESTERN TECHNICIAN TRAVELING IN THE NORTH ON SEPT. 14 COUNTED A BATTALION OF INFANTRY WITH THE USUAL SUPPORT ELEMENTS ON THE MOVE FROM NORTHERN AREAS TO THE SOUTH THROUGH ARBIL. IN ADDITION HE SAW APPROXIMATELY 800 SOFT SKIN VEHICLES, 50 PERSONNEL CARRIERS, ABOUT 100 105-MILLIMETER HOWITZERS, SOME MOBILE ANTI-AIRCRAFT EQUIPMENT AND WHAT APPEARED TO BE OLD COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT. THE CONVOY WAS TRAVELING WITH NO FUEL SUPPLY (IT WAS STOPPING AT LOCAL GAS STATIONS TO REFUEL); TECHNICIAN COMMENTED THAT CONVOY DID NOT MAINTAIN USUAL CONVOY DISCIPLINE ON THE ROAD. TECHNICIAN ALSO NOTICED NEW ANTI-AIRCRAFT INSTALLATIONS IN ARBIL AREA.

8. COMMENT: TONE OF MFA BRIEFING WAS APPARENTLY VERY SOMBER, AND THOSE PRESENT GAINED THE CLEAR IMPRESSION THAT IRAQ IS PREPARING FOR INCREASED WARFARE WITH IRAN. LOCAL PRESS SEPT. 21 CARRIES MINIMAL REPORTAGE OF SOME "GUNBOAT" ACTIVITY IN THE SHATT. JAPANESE DCM WITH WHOM WE SPOKE TODAY COULD ADD NO DETAILS OF THE ENTRANCE OF THE JAPANESE SHIP INTO BASRA ON SEPT. 20, AND TO THE BEST OF OUR KNOWLEDGE NO OTHER COMMERCIAL SHIPPING HAS ATTEMPTED TO COME UP THE SHATT. HE TELLS US THAT 50-60 PERCENT OF FOREIGN SHIPPING COMING INTO BASRA IS JAPANESE.

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PAGE 01 BAGHDA 02557 191157Z
ACTION NEA-11

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 701
INFO COMIDEASTFOR PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BAGHDAD 2557

E.O. 12065: GDS 9/19/86 (EAGLETON, WM. L.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, ASEC, MOPS, IZ, IR
SUBJ: IRAQ-IRAN DEVELOPMENTS

REF: BAGHDAD 2554 AND PREVIOUS

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1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. THERE IS NOTHING VISIBLE IN BAGHDAD TO SUGGEST IRAQ IS
ON THE VERGE OF WAR, BUT OBSERVERS HERE ARE WAITING WITH
KEEN INTEREST AND SOME APPREHENSION WHAT WILL HAPPEN ON
THE SHATT AL-ARAB NOW THAT IRAQ HAS SAID IT WILL
REQUIRE SHIPS ON THE WATERWAY TO FLY THE IRAQI FLAG
AND TAKE ON IRAQI PILOTS.

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3. MEANWHILE LOCAL MEDIA REPORT MASSIVE IRAQI AND OTHER ARAB COUNTRY SUPPORT FOR SADDAM HUSSAIN'S SPEECH ANNOUNCING ABROGATION OF THE 1975 AGREEMENT WITH IRAN. PAGES OF PHOTOS, INTERVIEWS AND COMMENTARIES COVER, WITH LITTLE PRECISION, THE VICTORIES OF THE BRAVE IRAQI FIGHTING FORCES. STREAMS OF IRAQIS ARE SAID TO BE CONVERGING ON THE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE ASKING TO JOIN THE BATTLE. OUR IMPRESSION IS THAT MORALE IN THE IRAQI ARMY AND PUBLIC IS RELATIVELY HIGH AND WOULD SUPPORT A MILITARY ESCALATION, AT LEAST AS LONG AS IT APPEARED TO BRING MORE IRAQI "VICTORIES".

4. EVENING SEPT. 18 FRENCH AMBASSADOR TOLD ME HIS PRIVATE SESSION WITH SADDAM HUSSAIN SEPT. 17 WAS TO RECEIVE AN ORAL BRIEFING ON ABROGATION OF THE 1975 AGREEMENT AND NOTHING MORE. DIPLOMATIC OBSERVERS ARE PUZZLED BY FACT THAT PDRK CHIEF OF MISSION, AS WELL AS THOSE OF CHINA, AND YUGOSLAVIA WERE BRIEFED INDIVIDUALLY BY HAMMADI SEPT. 17. THE SOVIET CHARGE WAS NOT CALLED IN UNTIL THE FOLLOWING DAY AND WAS REPORTEDLY HANDED A NOTE ON "IRAQI-IRANIAN RELATIONS AND IRAQ'S DECISION TO ABROGATE THE ALGIERS AGREEMENT". SPECULATION IS THAT SOVIET-IRAQI TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP MIGHT HAVE REQUIRED A FORMAL NOTIFICATION.

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5. ALTHOUGH IRAQI COMMUNIQUE MENTION FIGHTING AND ENEMY LOSSES AT MANY PLACES ALONG BORDER IT IS HARD TO JUDGE FROM HERE THE REAL MAGNITUDE OF THE CONFLICT. FRENCH MILITARY ATTACHE, WITHOUT GIVING HIS SOURCE, CLAIMED THAT NINE IRAQI MIGS HAD BEEN LOST. HE THOUGHT THE IRAQIS WERE SURPRISED BY THE EXTENT OF IRANIAN ARMED RESISTANCE. MOST REPORTS HOWEVER SEEM TO INDICATE THAT THE IRAQIS MET LITTLE RESISTANCE IN THEIR INITIAL "LIBERATION" OF TERRITORY. FRENCH MILITARY ATTACHE OBSERVED THAT THE IRAQIS HAVE EXCELLENT EQUIPMENT THAT WOULD PERMIT THEM TO BUILD PONTOON BRIDGE TO THE IRANIAN SIDE OF SHATT AL-ARAB. HOWEVER, BECAUSE OF EXTENSIVE MARSHES AND CANALS THE AREA IS NOT AN IDEAL ONE FOR LARGE SCALE MILITARY MOVEMENTS.

6. ON SEPT. 18 WE CONTACTED AMERICANS WORKING WITH LUMMUS COMPANY SOUTHWEST OF BASRA. THEY REPORTED EVERYTHING NORMAL AT THEIR PETROCHEMICAL PROJECT.
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O 191020Z SEP 80

FM USINT BAGHDAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 702

INFO COMIDEASTFOR

AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI

AMEMBASSY ALGIERS

AMEMBASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

AMEMBASSY DOHA

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MANAMA

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY RABAT

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

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E.O. 12065: GDS 9/19/86 (EAGLETON, WM. L.) OR-M

TAGS: PEPR, IZ, IR

SUBJ: IRAQIS CLAIM KHOMEINI IS LOOKING TO U.S. FOR SUPPORT

1. (X - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. IRAQI PRESS AND TV REPORT A BRIEF STORY OUT OF TEHRAN

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THAT FORMER PRIME MINISTER BARZERGAN "REVEALED THAT KHOMEINI REQUESTED HIM TO PREPARE IRANIAN PUBLIC OPINION BEFORE RESUMPTION OF RELATIONS WITH AMERICA AND CONTACT FOR PROVISION OF ARMS AND SPARE PARTS". BARZERGAN WAS REPORTED TO HAVE SAID "KHOMEINI WAS AND STILL IS READY TO ESTABLISH RELATIONS WITH THE USA". BARZERGAN WAS REPORTEDLY SPEAKING IN THE PARLIAMENT AND ADDED THAT KHOMEINI TOLD HIM IRAN IS NOW IN URGENT NEED OF U.S. AID. BARZERGAN SAID KHOMEINI MADE THIS STATEMENT

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IN FRONT OF THE DEFENSE MINISTER AND A NUMBER OF
OTHER IRANIAN OFFICIALS.

3. NOT HAVING SEEN THIS STORY ELSEWHERE, WE REPORT
IT AS OF POSSIBLE INTEREST IF ANY PART OF IT IS ACCURATE.
IT IS ALSO AN EXAMPLE OF IRAQ'S EFFORT TO ASSOCIATE THE
U.S. WITH KHOMEINI AND TO COUNTER IRANIAN CHARGES THAT
IRAQ IS FIGHTING IRAN ON BEHALF OF THE UNITED STATES.
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PAGE 01 BAGHDA 02536 180542Z
ACTION NEA-11

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CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00 ICAE-00
INRE-00 PM-07 H-01 INR-10 L-03 PA-01 SP-02 SS-15
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FM USINT BAGHDAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 691
INFO COMIDEASTFOR PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIRITY
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E.O. 12065: ~~GDS 9/17/86~~ (EAGLETON, WM. L.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, ASEC, MOPS, IZ, IR
SUBJ: IRAQ REPUDIATES 1975 AGREEMENT WITH IRAN

REF: BAGHDAD 2531 ✓

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1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. ALL CHIEFS OF MISSION, EXCEPT INTERESTS SECTIONS, WERE CALLED TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY AFTERNOON SEPT. 17 FOR A BRIEFING BY FOREIGN MINISTER HAMMADI WHO ANNOUNCED THAT IRAQ WAS REPUDIATING THE 1975 TREATY WHICH HAD SETTLED TERRITORIAL AND OTHER DIFFERENCES WITH IRAN. HAMMADI'S ARGUMENT WAS THAT IRAN HAD NOT LIVED UP TO ITS ENGAGEMENTS

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UNDER THE TREATY. FOR ONE THING IRAN HAD NOT EVACUATED THE TWO FRONTIER AREAS WHICH IRAQ HAD FINALLY FOUGHT TO RECOVER LAST WEEK. FORTHERMORE IRAN HAD RESUMED SUPPORT OF SOME IRAQI KURDISH GROUPS. IN 1975 THE SHAH HAD CEASED SUCH SUPPORT AND MULLA MUSTAFA BARZANI HAD FINALLY TAKEN REFUGE IN THE U.S. WHERE HE HAD DIED. "THE SPIRIT OF BARZANI LIVES ON IN THE NORTH", SAID HAMMADI, AND IRAN IS INTERFERING IN IRAQ'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS.

3. HAMMADI SAID IRAQ WOULD HENCEFORTH REVERT TO THE SITUATION AND PRACTICES THAT EXISTED BEFORE 1975 AS FAR AS THE SHATT AL-ARAB WAS CONCERNED. HE DID NOT ELABORATE. BRITISH CHARGE D'AFFAIRES DICKSON, WHO SHARED THE ABOVE WITH US, HAS NO MORE PRECISE INFORMATION THAN WE DO REGARDING THE MARITIME REGIME IN THE SHATT AL-ARAB PRIOR TO THE 1975 AGREEMENT, SINCE BOTH EMBASSIES HAVE DESTROYED OR RETIRED MOST OF THEIR CLASSIFIED FILES. THE IRAQI REPUDIATION OF THE AGREEMENT HOWEVER COULD, IF FULL SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE WATERWAY IS EXERCISED IN A WAY UNACCEPTABLE TO IRAN, BRING ABOUT CLOSURE OF THE IRANIAN PORTS OF ABADAN AND KHORRAMSHAHR. THIS MIGHT NOT BE THE IMMEDIATE IRAQI INTENTION, AND WE RECALL THAT IRANIAN SHIPPING WAS NOT USUALLY INTERFERED WITH PRIOR TO 1975. SUGGEST THAT THE DEPT. WITH ITS BETTER FILES AND MEMORY

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PUT TOGETHER SOME INFORMATION ON THE SHATT WHICH MIGHT HELP US FORESEE POSSIBLE FUTURE MOVES BY IRAQ AND IRAN IN THIS AREA.

4. WE STILL BELIEVE IRAQ IS VULNERABLE IN THE BASRA AREA AND THE GULF. WERE IRAQ TO INTERFERE WITH IRANIAN SHIPPING IN THE SHATT, IRAN COULD PRESUMABLY CLOSE OFF THE WHOLE GULF TO IRAQI SHIPPING AT HORMUZ. SIMILAR POSSIBILITIES FOR RETALIATION EXIST FROM BASRA TOWN ALONG THE SHATT TO THE GULF WHERE IRAN IONTROLS THE EAST BANK.

5. SEVERAL OF OUR DIPLOMATIC COLLEAGUES, INCLUDING THE BRITISH, SAY THEY HAVE SPOKEN WITH PERSONS WHO HAVE REPORTED SEEING IRAQI TANK UNITS MOVING IN THE DIRECTION OF THE FRONTIER. WE DO NOT HOWEVER HAVE A COMPREHENSIVE ENOUGH PICTURE OF IRAQI TROOPS DISPOSITION AND MOVEMENTS TO DRAW ANY CONCLUSIONS. IT IS OUR ASSUMPTION THAT THE IRAQIS HAVE SUFFICIENT FORCES ALREADY POSITIONED ON THE FRONTIER TO HANDLE THE KIND OF BORDER FIGHTING WE HAVE SEEN IN RECENT WEEKS BUT PROBABLY NOT ENOUGH FOR A MAJOR OFFENSIVE OR PERHAPS EVEN ENOUGH TO FEEL SECURE SHOULD THE IRANIANS MAKE A LARGE SCALE MOVE.
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 698

INFO COMIDEASTFOR PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BAGHDAD 2554E.O. 12065: ~~SDS 9/18/86~~ (EAGLETON, WM. L.) OR-M

TAGS: PEPR, ASEC, MOPS, IZ, IR

SUBJ: PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSAIN ABROGATES 1975 IRAQ-IRAN
AGREEMENT

REF: BAGHDAD 2536 ✓

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PAGE 02 BAGHDA 02554 181542Z

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: EVENING SEPT. 17 IRAQI PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSAIN ANNOUNCED THE ABROGATION OF THE MARCH 1975 IRAQ-IRAN AGREEMENT AND SAID THE SHATT AL-ARAB WOULD RETURN TO FULL IRAQI SOVEREIGNTY. HIS JUSTIFICATION WAS THAT IRAN HAD VIOLATED THE AGREEMENT BY FAILING TO RETURN BORDER TERRITORIES AND BY CONTINUING TO SUPPORT SUBVERSION IN IRAQI KURDISTAN. SINCE IT IS UNLIKELY THAT IRANIAN

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SHIPPING WILL SUBMIT TO IRAQI JURISDICTION IN THE SHATT, THE MAKINGS OF A MAJOR CONFRONTATION ARE AT HAND. END SUMMARY

3. READING FROM A TEXT AT A SPECIAL SESSION OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, IRAQ'S PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSAIN ANNOUNCED EVENING SEPT. 17, THAT IN VIEW OF IRANIAN VIOLATIONS OF THE 1975 IRAQ-IRAN AGREEMENT THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMAND COUNCIL HAD DECIDED THAT IRAQ WOULD ABROGATE IT. HE ADDED THAT THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE SHATT AL-ARAB WOULD RETURN TO ITS POSITION BEFORE MARCH 6, 1975 WITH FULL IRAQI SOVEREIGNTY OVER IT.

4. SADDAM HUSSAIN BEGAN BY WRAPPING IRAQ IN A MANTLE OF ARABISM. HE THEN TRACED THE HISTORIC IMPERIALIST-ZIONIST ATTEMPT TO SPLIT OFF IRAQ FROM THE ARAB FRONT THROUGH COLUSION WITH IRAN IN FORMENTING A REBELLION IN THE KURDISH REGION OF NORTHERN IRAQ. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT DURING THE BATTLES OF 1974-75, THE IRAQI ARMY SUFFERED 16,000 DEAD AND WOUNDED.

5. SADDAM HUSSAIN THEN EXPLAINED THAT IRAQ HAD BEEN OBLIGED TO CONCLUDE THE 1975 AGREEMENT BECAUSE THE
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PAGE 03 BAGHDA 02554 181542Z

IRAQI ARMY, WHICH DEPENDED PRIMARILY ON THE SOVIET UNION FOR ITS ARMAMENTS, HAD RUN OUT OF AMMUNITION. THUS UNDER THE ALGIERS AGREEMENT IRAQ RECOVERED A GREAT DEAL OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT FROM THE "MUTINEERS" AND WAS TO REOCCUPY TERRITORY OF ITS LAND BORDERS, WHILE THE IRANIAN SIDE BENEFITTED ON THE RIVER BORDER (THELWEG) IN THE SHATT AL-ARAB. ALTHOUGH "BARZANI DIED AMONG HIS AMERICAN BENEFACTORS," HIS SONS RETURNED TO IRAN WHERE THEY THREATEN IRAQ'S SECURITY. HENCE THE NEW RULERS OF IRAN ARE "DELIBERATELY INTERVENING IN IRAQ'S DOMESTIC AFFAIRS BY BACKING THE LEADERS OF THE MUTINY WHICH IS BACKED BY AMERICA AND ZIONISM". THIS, ALONG WITH IRANIAN REFUSAL TO RETURN THE IRAQI TERRITORIES, CAUSED IRAQ TO ABROGATE THE AGREEMENT.

6. IN CONCLUSION SADDAM HUSSAIN CLAIMED IRAQ "HAS NO AMBITIONS ON IRANIAN TERRITORY". HE CALLED UPON THE IRANIAN LEADERSHIP TO BENEFIT FROM THE LESSON OF RECENT FIGHTING AND HE REFERRED TO THE IRANIAN RETENTION OF THE ARAB ISLANDS ABU MUSA AND TWO TUNBS AND THEIR "RENEWED EXPANSIONIST CALLS" (IN THE GULF). RE KHUZISTAN HE SAID: "WE WARMLY GREET OUR BROTHERS THE ARABS OF AHWAZ WHO ARE SUFFERING FROM SUPPRESSION AND TYRANNY UNDER THE KHOMEINI REGIME". HE ALSO GREETED THE "HONORABLE KURDISH MILITANTS AND OTHER IRANIAN FRIENDLY PEOPLE" AND ASSURED THEM IRAQ HAD NO AMBITIONS

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RE THEIR TERRITORIES.

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7. COMMENT: SADDAM'S SPEECH WAS AN ATTEMPT TO JUSTIFY, PARTICULARLY IN THE ARAB WORLD, THE DRAMATIC AND POSSIBLY DANGEROUS STEP HE WAS TAKING IN REASSERTING IRAQI SOVEREIGNTY ON THE SHATT AL-ARAB. THIS MOVE WAS WELL PLANNED WITH THE PREVIOUS DISPATCH OF MEMBERS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMAND COUNCIL BEARING MESSAGES FOR THE RULERS OF THE GULF STATES AND SAUDI ARABIA. CURIOUSLY, THE ONLY DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVE

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PAGE 04 BAGHDA 02554 181542Z

SINGLED OUT FOR A BRIEFING BY SADDAM HUSSAIN WAS FRENCH AMBASSADOR ROCALVE WHO WAS GIVEN AN ORAL MESSAGE FOR PRESIDENT GICARD D'ESTAING. ANOTHER ORAL MESSAGE WAS GIVEN TO A PLO REPRESENTATIVE FOR YASSAR ARAFAT WHO IS BELIEVED TO WISH TO MEDIATE BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN.

8. FROM SADDAM HUSSAIN'S SPEECH WE BELIEVE IRAQ IS SERIOUS ABOUT ASSERTING ITS AUTHORITY OVER THE SHATT AL-ARAB. THIS COULD INVOLVE INSISTING THAT SHIPS BOUND FOR IRANIAN PORTS CARRY IRAQI PILOTS. IT SEEMS UNLIKELY THAT IRAN WOULD SUBMIT TO SUCH A PROCEDURE. IRAQ MIGHT ALSO INTERFERE WITH IRANIAN WARSHIPS WISHING TO ENTER THE SHATT. THE IRAQIS MUST KNOW THIS AND BE PREPARING MILITARILY FOR WHAT MIGHT FOLLOW. THE MORALE OF IRAQI FORCES IS REPORTEDLY HIGH AND SADDAM'S "RECOVERY OF IRAQI RIGHTS" SEEMS TO HAVE CONSIDERABLE POPULAR SUPPORT.
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PAGE 01 BAGHDA 02496 141254Z
ACTION NEA-11

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INFO COMIDEASTFOR
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QMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 2786
AMEMBASSY LONDON
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E.O. 12065: GDS 9/14/86 (EAGLETON, WM. L.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, ASEC, IZ, IR
SUBJ: IRAQ-IRAN BORDER CLASHES CONTINUE

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PAGE 02 BAGHDA 02496 141254Z

REF: BAGHDAD 2464 ✓

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SINCE OUR SEPTEMBER 11 REPORT ON IRAQ-IRAN FRONTIER
FIGHTING (REFTEL) BOTH SIDES HAVE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT DAILY
ARTILLERY, GROUND AND AIR ENGAGEMENTS ARE CONTINUING.
IRAQI MEDIA, WHICH HAD PREVIOUSLY IGNORED OR MINIMIZED

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TEXT OF TELEGRAM 80BAGHDA002496

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PAGE 01 BAGHDA 02519 161521Z
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INFO COMIDEASTFOR

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AMEMBASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMEMBSSSY CAIRO

AMEMBSSSY DAMASCUS

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MANAMA

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E.O. 12065: GDS 9/16/96 (EAGLETON, WM. L) OR-M

TAGS: PEPR, ASEC, IZ, IR, MOPS

SUBJ: IRAQ-IRAN BORDER FIGHTING

REF: BAGHDAD 2496 ✓

1. (X-ENTIRE TEXT)

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PAGE 02 BAGHDA 02519 161521Z

2. DURING PAST TWO DAYS IRAQ-IRAN BORDER FIGHTING HAS CONTINUED AT A "ROUTINE" LEVEL APPARENTLY WITHOUT ANY ADDITIONAL TERRITORIAL ACQUISITIONS BY IRAQ. FOCUS OF ARTILLERY AVIATION, GROUND, AND NOW RIVER BOAT ACTION HAS SHIFTED TO THE SOUTHERN SECTOR OF THE BORDER NEAR BASRA. MEANWHILE IRAQI PRESS HAS GIVEN THREE DAYS OF EXTENSIVE COVERAGE TO "ACTION ON THE FIGHTING FRONTS", FROM "OUR SPECIAL CORRESPONDENTS". PAGES OF BATTLE REPORTS AND PHOTOS REPRESENT A BIG CHANGE FROM THE TERSE COMMUNIQUE

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WHICH PREVIOUSLY CHARACTERIZED IRAQI COVERAGE.

3. IT IS NOT YET CLEAR WHETHER THE IRAQIS INTEND TO A) MAINTAIN ABOUT THE SAME LEVEL OF FIGHTING AND TENSION ON THE FRONTIER, B) SEIZE OTHER DISPUTED TERRITORY, PUT THE SQUEEZE ON THE SHATT AL-ARAB (CONTRARY TO THE 1975 AGREEMENT) OR OTHERWISE ESCALATE OR, C) WELCOME MEDIATION AND SETTLEMENT BASED ON WHAT THEY HAVE ACHIEVED THUS FAR.

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PAGE 01 BAGHDA 02531 171900Z
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AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
GAMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 2170
AMEMBASSY DOHA
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MANAMA
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E.O. 12065: ~~GDS 9/17/86~~ (EAGLETON, WM. L) OR-
5-& : PEPR, ASEC, MOPS, IZ, IR
SUBJ: IRAQ-IRAN BORDER SITUATION

REF: BAGHDAD 2519/
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PAGE 02 BAGHDA 02531 171900Z

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. THERE HAS BEEN NO LET UP IN MILITARY ACTIVITY ON THE IRAQ-IRAN FRONTIER. SEPT. 17 MEDIA REPORT THE OCCUPATION OF FIVE BORDER POSTS SOUTH OF THE FHANAQIN AREA, INCLUDING A NARROW STRIP DUE EAST OF AMARAH. REPORTS ON THESE NEW MOVES HAVE NOT REFERRED TO THE 1975 ALGIERS AGREEMENT.

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3. A NUMBER OF OBSERVERS HERE BELIEVE THAT THE RECENT MILITARY ACTION IN THE BASRA REGION WAS INITIATED BY THE IRANIANS. THE ASSUMPTION IS THAT THE IRAQIS DO NOT WISH TO ENLARGE THE CONFLICT IN AN AREA WHERE THEY HAVE MORE TO LOSE (ALL OF THEIR PORT FACILITIES AND MUCH OF THEIR NEW INDUSTRY) THAN THE IRANIANS. FROM COMMUNIQUE IT IS DIFFICULT TO TELL WHAT IS HAPPENING OTHER THAN FIRING ON EACH OTHER'S FRONTIER POSTS. IT IS SAID THAT GUNFIRE HAS BEEN HEARD FROM THE BASRA TOWN.

4. AT A DIPLOMATIC RECEPTION SEPT. 16 FRONTIER FIGHTING DOMINATED ALL CONVERSATIONS WITH FEW HARD FACTS BEYOND MEDIA REPORTS. EAST BLOC DIPLOMATS HAVE GIVEN THE IMPRESSION THEY ARE CONFUSED REGARDING THE BORDER FIGHTING AND NOT VERY HAPPY ABOUT IT. ALTHOUGH THERE HAVE BEEN RUMORS OF POSSIBLE MEDIATION BY THE HLO OR ALGERIANS, THE ALGERIAN AMBASSADOR CLAIMED THAT AHMED TALEB IBRAHIM, WHO CARRIED A PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM CHADLI BENDJEDID TO SADDAM HUSSAIN ON SEPT. 13, WAS NOT CHARGED TO DISCUSS THE FRONTIER. THE VISIT HE SAID, HAD BEEN SET UP SOME TIME AGO AND CONCERNED OPEC MATTERS. WE HAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT, ALTHOUGH PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE WAS THE GODFATHER OF THE 1975 AGREEMENT, THE ALGERIANS ARE NOT EAGER TO GET INTO THE MIDDLE OF AN ARAB VERSUS IRANIAN SQUABBLE RIGHT NOW. WE HAVE ALSO HEARD DENIALS THAT A RECENT VISIT BY PLO REPRESENTATIVE, HANI AL-HASAN, HAD ANYTHING TO DO WITH FRONTIER MEDIATION. MORE LIKELY IT

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CONCERNED DEVELOPMENTS IN LEBANON AND SYRIA.

5. SHAIKH SAQR OF RAS AL-KHAYMAH LEFT BAGHDAD SEPT. 16, AFTER HAVING SEEN SADDAM HUSSAIN, WITHOUT MAKING A PUBLIC STATEMENT. WHEN HE WAS HERE IN EARLY JUNE HE HAD EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR IRAQI SUPPORT OF THE ARAB CLAIM TO THE THREE GULF ISLANDS SEIZED BY IRAN, TWO OF WHICH, GREATER AND LESSER TUNB, 6 BELONGED TO RAS AL-KHAYMAH. NOW THAT THE IRAQIS HAVE RECOVERED (OR ARE STILL RECOVERING) ARAB TERRITORY (USURPED BY THE IRANIANS ON THEIR FRONTIER THEY MIGHT WELL RAISE THE ISSUE OF THE THREE ISLANDS. HERETOFORE THEY HAVE BEEN DISAPPOINTED BY THE LACK OF GULF ARAB ZEAL TO RECOVER THE ISLANDS.

6. WE STILL BELIEVE THAT ALTHOUGH THE IRAQI LEADERSHIP WISHES TO TAKE ADVANTAGES OF IRANIAN MILITARY WEAKNESS THEY DO NOT SEEK A WIDER CONFLICT WITH IRAN. NEVERTHELESS, THERE HAS BEEN SOME CREEPING ESCALATION AND MORE COULD FOLLOW. THIS WOULD BE PARTICULARLY DANGEROUS FOR THE IRAQIS IN THE BASRA REGION. THE IRAQIS HAVE NOT YET MADE ANY PARTICULARLY OMINOUS STATEMENTS CONCERNING THE SHATT AL-ARAB. THEY HAVE HOWEVER GIVEN PUBLICITY TO IRANIAN GENERAL FALLAHI'S DENUNCIATION OF THE 1975 AGREEMENT AND ARE NOW IN A POSITION TO RENOUNCE THE PART OF IT THAT RECOGNIZED IRANIAN RIGHTS IN THE SHATT AL-ARAB. AN IRAQI ENFORCEMENT OF ITS SOVEREIGNTY IN THE SHATT MIGHT PLACE HER IN A TACTICALLY INFERIOR POSITION BECAUSE OF HER LIMITED NAVAL POWER AND EXPOSED ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE AREA.

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PAGE 01 BAGHDA 02449 101607Z
ACTION NEA-11

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E.O. 12065: GDS 9/10/86 (EAGLETON, WM. L.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, ASEC, IZ, IR
SUBJ: IRAQ SEIZES STRIP OF IRANIAN TERRITORY

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PAGE 02 BAGHDA 02449 101607Z

REF: BAGHDAD 2429 (NOTAL)✓

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. IRAQI T V EVENING SEPT 9 AND PRESS SEPT 10 ANNOUNCED THAT
IRAQI FORCES HAD "LIBERATED" A STRIP OF TERRITORY 17 KILOMETERS
LONG AND BETWEEN 4-5 KILOMETERS WIDE. THIS OPERATION APPARENTLY
OCCURRED SEPT 6 AT A TIME WHEN BOTH COUNTRIES WERE REPORTING

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ARTILLERY AND AIR DUELS IN THE KHANIQIN QASR-I-SHIRIN AREA JUST TO THE NORTH OF THE NEWLY OCCUPIED STRIP.

3. IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT THE STRIP IN QUESTION WAS HELD BY IRAQ UNTIL THE 1975 AGREEMENT CEDED IT TO IRAN. IT CONSISTS OF ONE-HALF OF A PACKET JUTTING INTO IRAN JUST SOUTHEAST OF THE TOWN OF KHANIQIN. IN 1975 THE SHAH WANTED THE WHOLE POCKET AND THE IRAQIS FINALLY GAVE UP HALF OF IT RUNNING ALONG A LINE CONNECTING THE POSTS OF ZAIN AL-QAWS, SHAGRA, TEPE TEL, BIR-ALI AND SARING. THE 1975 AGREEMENT WAS RENOUNCED BY IRAQ EARLIER THIS YEAR.

4. ON SEPT 9 IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER HAMMADI CALLED IN THE ARAB DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES AND, SEPARATELY, THE CHIEFS OF MISSION OF THE SOVIET UNION, FRANCE, CHINA, YUGOSLAVIA AND CUBA. THIS APPARENTLY WAS TO MAKE THE IRAQI CASE TO THE ARAB BROTHERS, LEADING REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT AND PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL MINUS THE BRITISH WHO WERE PERHAPS OMITTED BECAUSE OF THE CURRENT FROST IN IRAQ-UK RELATIONS.

5. ACCORDING TO THE CHINESE CHARGE, FOMIN HAMMADI CLAIMED THAT IRAQ HAD ACTED DEFENSIVELY IN THE FACE OF IRANIAN ATTACKS. HE DID NOT, APPARENTLY, ARGUE THE LEGAL CASE FOR THE "LIBERATION" OF TERRITORY.

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6. BOTH IRAQ AND IRAN HAVE REPORTED ARTILLERY AND AIR ENGAGEMENTS AND WE THINK IT IS LIKELY THESE WILL CONTINUE, WITH IRAN SHELLING ANY POSITIONS THE IRAQIS SET UP IN THE NEWLY-OCCUPIED STRIP. NEXT MOVES WILL PROBABLY DEPEND ON WHETHER THE IRANIANS TRY TO RETAKE THE TERRITORY (WHICH OUR MAPS-PRE 1975-SHOW ON THE IRAQI SIDE OF THE FRONTIER).

7. WE HAVE NOT YET CHECKED WITH ARAB REPRESENTATIVES, BUT ASSUME THE IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER MADE THE POINT THAT IRAQ IS DEFENDING THE ARAB NATION ON THE IRANIAN FRONTIER. ARAB STATES IN THE GULF ARE IN FACT BENEFITTING FROM IRAQ'S ACTIONS WHICH DIVERT IRANIAN ATTENTION FROM THE GULF WHERE IRAN MIGHT OTHERWISE POSE A SERIOUS THREAT. IRAQ'S PRESSURES ON THE FRONTIER SHOULD ALSO, IF LOGIC PREVAILED, CAUSE THE IRANIAN LEADERSHIP TO SEEK FRIENDS WHO MIGHT BE OF ASSISTANCE.
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PAGE 01 BAGHDA 02464 111351Z
ACTION NEA-11

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INFO COMIDEASTFOR PRIORITY

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AMEMBASSY ANKARA 589

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AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

AMEMBASSY DOHA

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MANAMA

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY MUSCAT

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY RABAT

AMEMBASSY SANA

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIVS

AMEMBASSY TUNIS

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E.O. 12065: GDS 9/11/86 (EAGLETON, WM. L) OR-M

TAGS: PEPR, ASEC,; IZ, IR

SUBJ: MORE ON IRAQ SEIZURE OF FRONTIER STRIPS

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PAGE 02 BAGHDA 02464 111351Z

REF: BAGHDAD 2449

1. (G-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. AS IRAQI OFFICIALS

EFINE THEIR LEGAL POSITION ON THE SEIZURE

OF IRANIAN-HELD TERRITORY ON THE FRONTIER WE ARE OBLIGED TO PLACE

A QUESTION MARK ON THE INFORMATION WE REPORTED PARA 3 REFTL

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TO THE EFFECT THAT THE IRAQIS WERE MOVING CONTRARY TO THE 1975 AGREEMENT. ON SEPT. 10 FOREIGN MINISTER HAMMADI CALLED IN ALL THE DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES WHOM HE DID NOT SEE ON THE 9TH (USINT NOT INCLUDED). HIS PRESENTATION, WHICH WAS REPORTED IN SEPT. 11 PRESS (FBIS JN102149), BASED IRAQ'S CASE ON THE 1975 AGREEMENT WITH IRAN (THOUGH IRAQI STATEMENTS EARLIER THIS YEAR HAD AT LEAST INFORMALLY CAST DOUBT ON IRAQ'S CONTINUED RESPECT FOR THE AGREEMENT.)

3. ACCORDING TO THE IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER, NEW FRONTIER POSTS WERE PUT IN PLACE BY IRAQI-IRANIAN TEAMS AFTER 1975, BUT THE IRANIANS IN SOME SECTORS HAD NOT WITHDRAWN TO THEIR SIDE OF THE POSTS. THE IRAQI MOVEMENT INTO THE ZAIN AL-QAW STRIP WAS, ACCORDING TO THE IRAQI EXPLANATION, MERELY AN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 1975 AGREEMENT. HAMMADI SAID THAT SINCE THE NEI IRANIAN LEADERS WERE NOT FAMILIAR WITH THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT THEY HAD BEEN GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY TO CHECK ON THE MATTER AND WITHDRAW PEACEFULLY BUT HAD NOT DONE SO.

4. SEPT. 11 MEDIA REPORT IRAQI OCCUPATION OF A SECOND STRIP OF TERRITORY 8-15 KILOMETERS SOUTH OF THE ONE REPORTED SEPT. 10. THIS

IS SHOWN AS A SALIENT INTO IRANIAN TERRITORY (DUE EAST OF SALMAN FARSI ON OUR MAP) AND INCLUDES THE "KHIDER" FRONTIER POST.

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PAGE 03 BAGHDA 02464 111351Z

ACCORDING TO THE PRESS, "A 4TH MILITARY COMMUNIQUE SAID THE LIBERATION OF THE TERRITORIES OCCUPIED BY THE PERSIAN RACIST REGIME IN VIOLATION OF THE 1975 AGREEMENT HAVE BEEN COMPLETED. "

5. WE HAVE CHECKED WITH A NUMBER OF DIPLOMATIC COLLEAGUES, INCLUDING THE BRITISH AND FRENCH AMBASSADORS, AND ALL OF THEM ASSUME THAT FOREIGN MINISTER HAMMADI'S CONTENTION THAT IRAQ IS ACTING IN ACCORD WITH THE 1975 AGREEMENT WITH IRAN IS ACCURATE. HOWEVER, NO ONE, OURSELVES INCLUDED, HAS DETAILED INFORMATION ON THE 1975 TERRITORIAL SETTLEMENT. HENCE WE RESERVE OUR POSITION UNTIL WE HEAR SOMETHING FROM THE IRANIAN SIDE.

6. BOTH PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN AND FOREIGN MINISTER HAMMADI IN THEIR MOST RECENT STATEMENTS HAVE EMPHASIZED THAT IRAQ DOES NOT WISH TO WAGE A FULL-SCALE WAR WITH IRAN. THIS IS PROBABLY THE CASE. THERE IS NO INDICATION THAT THE IRAQI PUBLIC IS BEING PREPARED FOR ANYTHING BEYOND THE "RECOVERY OF IRAQI TERRITORY" ALONG THE FRONTIER. IF THIS HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED BY THE MOST RECENT MILITARY ACTION, IRAQI FORCES WILL PROBABLY NOT MOVE FURTHER. IF HOWEVER THE IRANIAN ARMY SHOULD RETALIATE BY MOVING INTO ANY AREAS CLAIMED BY IRAQ, IRAQI RETALIATION THERE AND ELSEWHERE CANNOT BE EXCLUDED. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT IRAQI MOVES ON THE FRONTIER ARE COORDINATED WITH A LARGER PLAN DESIGNED TO ACHIEVE THEIR ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE OF BRINGING DOWN THE KHOMEINI REGIME. WE SEE NO SIGN OF THIS HOWEVER.

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PAGE 01 BAGHDA 02376 031031Z
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E.O. 12065: RDS-3 9/2/90 (EAGLETON, WM. L.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, IZ
SUBJ: THE KURDISH ROAD TO IRAN

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. ON AUGUST 29 I DROVE FROM SHAKLAWA (A TOURIST-FREQUENTED VILLAGE ON THE MAIN ROAD TO THE KURDISH MOUNTAINS) UP THE GALI ALI GBEG GORGE PAST ROWANDUZ AND RAYAT TO THE IRANIAN FRONTIER AT HAJUMRAN. THIS IS THE MAIN NORTHERN ACCESS ROUTE BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN. ON AUGUST 26 I HAD TRAVERSED MOST OF THE CENTRAL ROAD FROM BAGHDAD TO THE FRONTIER TURNING NORTH AT JALAUULA JUST WEST OF THE KHANAGIN-QASRI SHIRIN AREA WHERE BORDER CLASHES HAVE BEEN TAKING PLACE. ON NEITHER ROAD WERE THERE SIGNS OF MAJOR MILITARY MOVEMENTS. ON THE

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HAJUMRAN ROUTE HOWEVER MILITARY PATROLS AND CHECKPOINTS ABOUND.

3. ALTHOUGH THERE IS TALK OF A MAJOR UPGRADING OF THE HAJUMRAN ROUTE, AND SOME EVIDENCE OF WORK UNDERWAY, THIS ROAD HAS OVER THE YEARS FALLEN INTO A STATE OF DISREPAIR WHICH CONTRASTS WITH THE EXCELLENT HIGHWAYS THAT NOW LINK MAJOR TOWNS OF IRAQI KURDISTAN WITH EACH OTHER AND WITH THE CITIES OF THE PLAIN. IT IS IRONIC THAT THE

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IRAQI GOVERNMENT'S LATERAL MILITARY HIGHWAY PROGRAM HAS SERVED TO UNITE IRAQI KURDISTAN WHICH WAS PREVIOUSLY FRAGMENTED BY THE MOUNTAIN RIDGES WHICH MADE IT NECESSARY TO DESCEND ONTO THE PLAIN AND TURN UP ANOTHER VALLEY TO GET FROM ONE ADJACENT AREA TO ANOTHER.

4. THE SMALL VILLAGE OF HAJUMRAN WHERE THE LAST MILITARY CHECKPOINT EXISTS BEFORE THE PHYSICAL FRONTIER A SHORT DISTANCE FURTHER AT THE TOP OF THE RIDGE IS A DECEPTIVELY QUIET VILLAGE. THE 5-10 KILOMETER DEEP ZONE ALONG THE FRONTIER FROM WHICH VILLAGERS HAVE BEEN REMOVED AND IN WHICH ANYTHING MOVING IS FIRED UPON BY THE IRAQI MILITARY HAS LEFT ONLY HAJUMRAN ITSELF AND A NEARBY VILLAGE, ZENO, OCCUPIED.

5. AT HAJUMRAN WE FOUND IT PRUDENT TO INVITE A CIVILIAN INTELLIGENCE TYPE, WHO OFFERED TO GUIDE US, TO LUNCH AND A LATER CALL ON SHAIKH OMAR AT ZENO VILLAGE. THE INFORMATION WE OBTAINED MADE IT CLEAR WHY THERE ARE NO IRAQI-IRANIAN BORDER CLASHES IN THE NORTHERN KURDISH AREA. THE IRANIAN ARMY IS NOT PRESENT ANYWHERE NEAR THE FRONTIER. THEREFORE TO SOME EXTENT IRAQI KURDISTAN NOW EXTENDS DOWN INTO IRAN TO THE POINT WHERE THE IRANIAN ARMY IS ENCOUNTERED. WE WERE TOLD BY THE IRAQI

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SECURITY OFFICIAL THAT THERE ARE NO IRANIAN ARMY PERSONNEL IN THE FORTIFIED CAMPS OF USHNUVEH, KHANEH, AND NAQADEH. A LATER, PROBABLY BETTER INFORMED, KURDISH SOURCE SAID THAT THEY WERE PRESENT IN THE CAMPS BUT DID NOT VENTURE OUT INTO THE COUNTRYSIDE.

6. THUS THE BORDER AT HAJUMRAN IS OPEN AS FAR AS MAHABAL AND FROM THERE TO OTHER PARTS OF IRAN. AFTER LEAVING HAJUMRAN WE WERE OVERTAKEN BY A RANGE ROVER WITH TEHERAN PLATES WITH A DISTINGUISHED LOOKING GRAY-HAIRED NON-KURD IN THE BACKSEAT. IT STOPPED AT AN ARMY POST IN THE FIRST VILLAGE SOUTH OF HAJUMRAN. WE WERE TOLD BY THE SECURITY OFFICIAL THAT THOUSANDS OF REFUGEES FROM IRAN HAVE COME OVER THE FRONTIER AT THIS POINT. NEAR ROWANDUZ WE TOOK A WRONG FORK AND MET A MILITARY CHECKPOINT WHERE THE SOLDIER TOLD US HE COULD GUARANTEE WE WOULD BE SHOT IF WE CONTINUED ON THAT ROAD (WHICH SEEMED TO HEAD TOWARD THE AREA WHERE WE HAD BEEN TOLD THE PESHMERGA WERE ACTIVE).

7. AS WE GOT TO THE LAST CHECKPOINT TWO IRAQI JEEPS CARRYING ARMY OFFICERS CAME FROM THE DIRECTION OF THE FRONTIER. ONE OF THE OFFICERS, A CAPTAIN, ADDRESSED ME AS "TOVARICH" AND WAS TAKEN ABACK BY MY FAILURE TO REPLY IN RUSSIAN.

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8. WHAT THIS BRIEF EXCURSION TO THE FRONTIER REVEALED MOST CLEARLY WAS THAT THE IRAQIS HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO OPERATE DEEPLY INTO IRANIAN TERRITORY. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THEIR OPERATION WOULD DEPEND ON WHOM THEY CHOOSE AS KURDISH ALLIES AND HOW FAR THE TWO SIDES ARE PREPARED TO TRUST EACH OTHER. THE IRAQIS COULD, IF THEY WISHED, CREATEA WELL ARMED KURDISH FORCE THAT COULD HOLD MOST OF IRANIAN KURDISTAN AND AT SOME POINT OPERATE FURTHER EAST. THEY MAY BE ENGAGED IN SOME SUCH EFFORT NOW BUT THERE ARE GOOD REASONS WHY THEY WOULD NOT WISH TO

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CREATE TOO POWERFUL A KURDISH MILITARY FORCE GIVEN THEIR OWN PROBLEM IN IRAQI KURDISTAN WHICH THE IRANIANS ARE TO SOME EXTENT FOMENTING. HENCE, THE IRAQI POSITION IS BOTH DEFENSIVE, KEEPING ENOUGH GOING WITH THE KURDS TO COUNTER ANTI IRAQI KURDISH FACTIONS, AND OFFENSIVE BY HARASSING THE KHOMEINI REGIME AND LAYING THE GROUNDWORK FOR POSSIBLE LATER INTERVENTION IN AN IRANIAN POLITICAL-MILITARY SHAKEDOWN.
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E.O. 12065: ~~GD 9/8/86~~ (EAGLETON, WM.L.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, ASEC, IZ, IR
SUBJ: CLASHES ON THE IRAQ-IRAN BORDER

1. ~~(C)~~ ENTIRE TEXT)

2. DURING THE PAST WEEK FBIS HAS CARRIED A LARGER THAN USUAL VOLUME OF IRANIAN MEDIA FOQINGS OF MILITARY CLASHES ON THE IRAQ-IRAN FRONTIER FROM POINTS AS FAR NORTH AS THE SARDASHT REGION IN KURDISTAN (OPPOSITE QALA DIZA IN IRAQ) AND SOUTH TO THE ILAM PROVINCE. IRAQI MEDIA HAVE AS USUAL BEEN MUCH MORE RESTRAINED, THOUGH SEVERAL ITEMS HAVE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT ARTILLERY DUELS AND SMALL SCALE OPERATIONS ARE TAKING PLACE. THE BORDER POSTS AND VILLAGES MENTIONED IN THE COMMUNIQUEES ARE SO SMALL THAT WE CAN LOCATE FEW OF THEM ON AVAILABLE MAPS. BOTH SIDES REPORT DESTRUCTION

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OF ENEMY POSITIONS AND EQUIPMENT AND THE IRANIANS SOMETIMES ADMIT TO A FEW MARTYRS.

3. OUR IMPRESSION CONTINUES TO BE THAT NEITHER SIDE DESIRES, OR IS PREPARING FOR A LARGE SCALE MILITARY OPERATION AGAINST THE OTHER BUT THAT BOTH HAVE SOLID DOMESTIC POLITICAL REASONS FOR MAINTAINING TENSION ON THE FRONTIER. FURTHERMORE EACH SIDE IS PRESUMABLY ENGAGED IN SENDING AGENTS ACROSS TO STIR UP TROUBLE

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IN THE NEIGHBORING COUNTRY. THIS ACTIVITY IS PARTICULARLY HEAVY IN THE KURDISH REGION DURING THE TRADITIONAL SUMMER/AUTUMN PERIOD FOR OPERATIONS THERE.

4. FROM THE COMMUNIQUE IT IS DIFFICULT TO GET AN ACCURATE PICTURE OF WHAT IS HAPPENING, WHO IS TAKING THE INITIATIVE AND WHO IS COMING OUT ON TOP. IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT THE FRONTIER DUELS ARE VERY LIMITED IN SCOPE, THOUGH IRANIAN MEDIA HAVE REFERRED TO IRAQI AIR SORTIES AGAINST QASR-I-SHIRIN. WE ARE PREPARED TO BELIEVE THAT MORE OFTEN THAN NOT THE INITIATIVE LIES WITH THE IRAQIS. PERHAPS THEY CALCULATE THAT, WITH IRAN DEPRIVED OF U.S. SUPPLIES, THE IRANIANS SUFFER MORE FROM EXPENDITURE OF AMMUNITION THAN THEY DO. WHAT IS GOING ON IN KURDISTAN IS MORE COMPLICATED DACK SIDE HAS ASSETS ACROSS THE BORDER. EACH KNOWS ITS ABILITY TO RALLY SUPPORT CAN BE GREATLY ENHANCED BY PLAYING UP TO KURDISH NATIONALIST ASPIRATIONS.

NEITHER SIDE WISHES TO PLAY THIS CARD FOR FEAR OF WIDER REPERCUSSIONS. THE IRAQI ARMY IS DEPLOYED AT STRATEGIC POINTS ALL ALONG ITS FRONTIER WITH IRAN, WHILE THE IRANIAN ARMY IS NOT USUALLY PRESENT ON THE FRONTIER NORTH OF THE QASR-I-SHIRIN KHANIQIN AREA.

5. WE WILL CONTINUE TO WATCH COMMUNIQUE FOR EVIDENCE THAT

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THE IRAQ-IRAN FRONTIER BATTLES ARE ANYTHING MORE THAN ROUTINE. OTHER LOCAL OBSERVERS, INCLUDING DIPLOMATS AND MILITARY ATTACHES, HAVE A FEW BUT NOT MANY, ADDITIONAL SOURCES, AND THEIR ASSESSMENTS AGREE WITH OURS. SINCE END USERS HAVE ACCESS TO THE SAME COMMUNIQUE AND MEDIA MATERIAL WE DO, WE WILL CONTINUE TO REFRAIN FROM REPORTING ON INDIVIDUAL REPORTS OF FRONTIER DISTURBANCES.
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BAGHDAD 2104~~EXDIS~~**DECAPTIONED**E.O. 12065: ~~RDS-1-8/5/90~~ (EAGLETON, WM. L.) OR-M
TAGS: MASS, PEPR, IZ, IT
SUBJ: (C) ARMS SALES TO IRAQREF: A) STATE 204538, B) ROME 19317 ^N

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. PARA 6 OF STATE REFTTEL REFERS TO IRAQ'S "INORDINATELY AMBITIOUS ARMS BUILDUP" AND LAST PARAGRAPH OF ROME REFTTEL REQUESTS GUIDANCE ON HOW WE SHOULD DEAL WITH THE INCREASING SIGNIFICANCE OF IRAQ'S MILITARY SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP WITH ITALY. ONE ASPECT OF THIS QUESTION IS WHETHER IT IS DESIRABLE TO PUSH COUNTRIES WITH WHOM WE HAVE MANY DIFFERENCES, SUCH AS IRAQ, INTO AN EXCLUSIVE SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP WITH THE USSR OR WHETHER IT IS IN OUR INTEREST TO PERMIT OUR WESTERN ALLIES TO FILL PART OF THE GAP, THUS PROVIDING SOME ARMS, AND HOPEFULLY POLITICAL, DIVERSIFICATION.

3. BEFORE WE DEBATE THIS QUESTION WITH REGARD TO IRAQ, IT WOULD BE USEFUL FIRST TO HAVE A CLEARER IDEA OF THE EXTENT OF THE IRAQI ARMS BUILDUP. IRAQ IS NOW FACING WHAT IT CONSIDERS TO BE A SERIOUS THREAT FROM AN UNSTABLE REGIME IN IRAN TO THE EAST WHICH IS APPEALING

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TO THE IRAQI POPULATION TO OVERTHROW A SECULAR GOVERNMENT AND INSTITUTE AN ISLAMIC REPUBLIC. TO THE WEST IS AN UNSTABLE RIVAL BAATHI REGIME IN DAMASCUS WHICH IRAQ PERCEIVES AS ALSO ACTIVELY SEEKING A CHANGE IN IRAQ. OVER THE HORIZON IS THE SOVIET UNION MOVING INTO AFGHANISTAN AND PERHAPS THREATENING IRAN, SITUATIONS WITH WHICH IRAQ IS MOST UNHAPPY. TO THE SOUTH IS THE GULF IN WHICH IRAQ HAS IMPORTANT INTERESTS AND CLAIMS MAJOR RESPONSIBILITY.

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4. IT IS WITHIN THIS CONTEXT THAT WE SHOULD CONSIDER WHETHER IRAQ'S ARMS BUILDUP IS APPROPRIATE TO ITS INTERESTS AND NEEDS OR IS "INORDINATELY AMBITIOUS". WE DO NOT HAVE ENOUGH OF THE FACTS HERE IN BAGHDAD TO REACH CONCLUSIONS IN THIS REGARD. IF A STUDY OF THIS QUESTION HAS NOT ALREADY BEEN UNDERTAKEN WITHIN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IN WASHINGTON, WE SUGGEST IT SHOULD BE.
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E.O. 12065: ~~RDS-16/16/00~~ (EAGLETON, WM. L.) OR-M
TAGS: PINT, IZ, PINR, PEPR, US
SUBJECT: INITIAL CALLS AT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY

1. ~~(C)~~ - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. THE PROTOCOL DEPARTMENT AT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY BEGAN MY SCHEDULE OF OFFICIAL CALLS WITH THREE SESSIONS JUNE 15 ON THE CHIEFS OF THE MULTILATERAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS DEPARTMENT, THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES DEPARTMENT AND THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT. THE FIRST OF THESE ON HUNAM SHAMAH AND NIZAR ADEEB RESPECTIVELY WERE LARGELY PROTOCOLAR. SHAMAH, RECENTLY A PROFESSOR OF ECONOMICS AT BAGHDAD UNIVERSITY, DID HOWEVER EXPRESS CONCERN ABOUT "THE RIGID U.S. POSITION" ON THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE (COW) NEGOTIATIONS COMING UP IN NEW YORK WHICH HE AND MG. PACHACHI OF HIS OFFICE WILL ATTEND. I SUGGESTED

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HE CONTACT OUR DELEGATION IN NEW YORK RE THE U.S. POSITION.

3. NIZAR ABEED, ACTING CHIEF OF THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DEPARTMENT IS A FRIENDLY OLD-LINE DIPLOMAT WHO EXPRESSED REGRET THAT OUR POLICY ON ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIANS WAS AN IMPEDIMENT TO A NORMALIZATION OF U.S.-IRAQI RELATIONS.

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4. THE MEETING WITH ZUHAIR BIRQADAR, ACTING CHIEF OF THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT (WHICH HAS RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE INDUSTRIALIZED NATIONS), PRODUCED AN HOUR AND A HALF REVIEW OF U.S. AND IRAQI POSITIONS ON A NUMBER OF ISSUES ON MOST OF WHICH BIRQADAR MANAGED TO INTRODUCE A PALESTINIAN ASPECT. FOR EXAMPLE HE IMPLIED THAT A MAJOR REASON WHY OUR EXPANDED MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE GULF AND INDIAN OCEAN WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE TO COUNTRIES IN THE AREA WAS OUR STAND ON THE ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE. HE WAS NOT CONFRONTATIONAL ON THIS ISSUE BUT EXPRESSED REGRET THAT OUR MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN OMAN MADE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR IRAQ TO GET THE SOVIETS OUT OF ADEN, WHICH CONTINUED TO BE ONE OF THEIR MAJOR OBJECTIVES.

5. ALTHOUGH BIRQADAR, WHO WAS RECENTLY IRAQ'S AMBASSADOR IN BONN, HAS NO INFLUENCE IN HIS OWN RIGHT, HE PROBABLY ACCURATELY REFLECTS HIGH LEVEL IRAQI THINKING. WHEN HE REFERRED IN PASSING TO THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE MAKING IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR IRAQ TO RENEW DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE U.S., I REPLIED BY EXPLAINING HOW WE HAD DEVELOPED A USEFUL RELATIONSHIP AND HIGH LEVEL DIALOGUE WITH ALGERIA PRIOR TO THE FORMAL RENEWAL OF RELATIONS. HE SEEMED INTERESTED IN DETAILS OF THIS PROCESS BUT EMPHASIZED THAT IRAQ DID NOT HAVE TWO POLICIES, ON IN

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PRIVATE AND ONE FOR THE PUBLIC. HE SAID THAT THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT WOULD DO WHAT IT THOUGHT WAS RIGHT AND NOT CONCEAL CONTACTS THAT WERE TAKING PLACE WITH AMERICANS IF IT FELT IT WAS IN ITS INTEREST TO HAVE SUCH CONTACTS. THIS WAS IN THE CONTEXT OF MY SUGGESTION THAT IRAQI CONCERNS REGARDING OUR MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AREA COULD PERHAPS BEST BE DISCUSSED AT A HIGHER LEVEL BY SOMEONE FROM WASHINGTON WHO IS MORE DIRECTLY INVOLVED. BIRQADAR WAS NON-COMMITAL ON THE QUESTION OF ENLARGING THE DIALOGUE. I DID NOT PRESS THE POINT, WHICH WE BELIEVE IRAQI AUTHORITIES WILL BE STUDYING CAREFULLY AND CAUTIOUSLY.

6. ON THE QUESTION OF IRAN, OUR ANALYSES OF THE PROBLEMS FACED IN DEALING WITH THE FRAGMENTED AUTHORITY IN TEHRAN WERE IDENTICAL. KNOWING OF THE IRAQI TENDENCY TO BE TAKEN IN BY CONSPIRACY THEORIES I MENTIONED THAT SOME IRAQIS SEEMED TO BELIEVE WE WERE COLLABORATING WITH KHOMEINI IN SOME BYZANTINE MANNER WITH RESPECT TO THE HOSTAGES (ONE LOCAL BELIEF BEING THAT THE ISSUE IS A PRETEXT TO BRING AMERICAN MILITARY POWER INTO THE AREA). HE SAID HE DID NOT HOLD SUCH VIEWS, BUT "PEOPLE IN EUROPE ARE ASKING WHY THE U.S. KEPT PERSONNEL IN THE TEHRAN EMBASSY AFTER BAZARGAN HAD WARNED DR. BRZEZINSKI IN ALGIERS THAT THEY WOULD NOT BE SAFE IF THE SHAH CAME TO THE U.S.." (I REPLIED THAT I UNDERSTOOD BAZARGAN'S GOVERNMENT HAD,

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ON THE CONTRARY, GIVEN US ASSURANCES RE THE SAFETY OF
OUR PERSONNEL.)

7. IN DISCUSSING SOVIET MOVES IN AFGHANISTAN, SOUTH
YEMEN AND ETHIOPIA BIRQADAR MADE IT CLEAR THAT IRAQ
SHARES OUR CONCERN. HIS ADVICE HOWEVER WAS FOR U.S.
PRESSURE ISRAEL AND JUSTICE FOR THE PALESTINIANS (NO
DETAILS) AS A MEANS OF REDUCING SOVIET INFLUENCE AND
ENHANCING THE ACCEPTABILITY OF THE U.S. IN THE REGION.

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AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BAGHDAD 1425

E.O. 12065: ~~GD~~S-6/3/86 (JONES A ELIZABETH) OR-P
TAGS: PEPR, MOPS, IZ, IR
SUBJ: IRAN-IRAQ BORDER CLASHES

REF: BAGHDAD 1315 ⁿ

1. (~~Q~~-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. ON JUNE 3, THE GOI BROKE ITS SEVERAL DAYS OF MEDIA SILENCE OVER THIS WEEK'S SERIES OF CLASHES ON THE IRAQ-IRAN BORDER. LAST PREVIOUS OFFICIAL COMMENTARY FROM GOI ON BORDER INCIDENTS CAME MAY 28 WHEN INA CHARGED IRANIANS WITH "BLATANT AGRESSION" AGAINST THE ARAB NATION FOLLOWING MAY 26 INCURSION AND ALLEGED CAPTURE OF EIGHT IRAQIS AT MAYSAN. TEHRAN RADIO CLAIMS OF SUBSEQUENT IRAQI ATTACKS ALONG BORDER HAD BEEN OFFICIALLY IGNORED BY BAGHDAD, SESPITE ADDITIONAL PUBLICITY BEING ACCORDED THESE

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REPORTS BY INTERNATIONAL NEWS PROGRAMS BROADCAST BY VOA AND BBC.

3. COMMENT: FROM WHAT BITS OF INFORMATION WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO PICK UP HERE, WE UNDERSTAND THAT IRAQI FORCES STRUCK ACROSS THE BORDER IN RESPONSE TO IRAN'S MAYSAN ATTACK WITH APPROXIMATELY EQUAL FORCE. OTHER BORDOR SKIRMISHES ARE PROBABLY CONTINUING AT ABOUT THE SAME LOW LEVEL AS THEY HAVE BEEN OVER THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS. THE ONLY DIFFERENCE IN THE SITUATION WAS THE LACK OF RESPONSE FOR SEVERAL DAYS FROM THE GOI TO THE TYPICALLY

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HYSTERICAL TEHRAN RADIO BROADCASTS ON THE FIGHTING. ALTHOUGH WE DO NOT KNOW WHY THE GOI DECIDED TO EASE ITS PUBLIC RHETORIC, WE BELIEVE IT POSSIBLE THAT THE GOI DID SO TO FURTHER EMPHASIZE THAT IRAN, NOT IRAQ, IS THE AGGRESSOR. THE GOI MAY HAVE BEEN CONCERNED THAT THIS POINT SEEMED SOMEWHAT UNCLEAR TO MEMBERS OF THE ISLAMIC GROUP DURING LAST MONTH'S ISLAMABAD MEETING, AND, AS WE HAVE SEEN REPEATEDLY, IRAQ WILL TAKE CONSCIOUS STEPS TO PRESERVE ITS IMAGE AMONG THE NONALIGNED OF RESPONSIBLE INTERNATIONAL LEADERSHIP. AT THE SAME TIME, THE GOI WILL NOT PERMIT THE IRANIANS TO ATTACK-ON THE GROUND OR IN THE AIR-WITHOUT AN APPROPRIATE RESPONSE, BUT THE IRAQIS DO APPEAR DETERMINED TO PRACTICE RESTRAINT. IT IS THE CONSENSUS OF MANY OF OUR DIPLOMATIC COLLEAGUES THAT SADDAM, INDEED, IS STRIKING A DELIBERATELY RESTRAINED POSTURE AND THAT EVEN ON THE GROUND, IRAQI FORCES ARE ENGAGING IN BATTLE ONLY WHEN ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY.

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PAGE 01 BAGHDA 01107 070706Z
ACTION NEA-11

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NSC-05 SS-15 CEA-01 L-03 PA-01 HA-05 IDCA-02
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INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI *
AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY DOHA
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY MANAMA
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BAGHDAD 1107

E.O. 12065: GDS 4/6/86 (PECK, EDWARD L.) OR-M
TAGS: ETRD, PINS, PEPR, IR, IZ
SUBJ: EVASION OF IRAN SANCTIONS

REF: STATTE 114782^N1. ~~(C)~~-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. EXTREMELY BAD BILATERAL RELATIONS PLUS PERVASIVE GOVERNMENT CONTROLS OVER INTERNATIONAL TRADE MAKE IT HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT THERE IS ANY SIGNIFICANT TRANSFER OF GOODS FROM IRAQ TO IRAN. A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF SMUGGLING UNDOUBTEDLY TAKES PLACE, BUT ACTIVE GOVERNMENT OPPOSITION AND HIGH RISKS PRECLUDE LARGE SCALE DIVERSIONS.

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PAGE 02 BAGHDA 01107 070706Z

3. ALTHOUGH THE GOI WOULD SHUDDER AT ANY SUGGESTION OF COMMON INTEREST WITH THE U.S. IRAQ HAS EFFECTIVELY IMPOSED A COMPLETE EMBARGO ON DEALINGS WITH IRAN. FOR EXAMPLE, WE UNDERSTAND THAT REMITTANCES TO IRAN BY THE RELATIVELY FEW IRANIAN WORKERS WHO HAVE NOT BEEN DEPORTED OR INCARCERATED ARE NOW BANNED. BY COMPARISON, REMITTANCES TO EGYPT ARE UNOBSTRUCTED.
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EXCISE

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R 061200Z MAY 80
FM USINT BAGHDAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1114
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BAGHDAD 1114E.C. 12065: GDS 5/5/86 (PECK, EDWMRE L.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, IR, IZ, US
SUBJECT: CRACK IN THE FACADE: IRAQI OFFICIAL DEVIATES FROM
PARTY LINE

REF: BAGHDAD 1101 N

1. (X) ENTIRE TEXT

2. REPTTEL REFERRED TO SOME RATHER INTERESTING SHIFTS IN THE
DISCERNABLE INTERNAL SITUATION, AT LEAST AMONG THAT VERY SMALL
SEGMENT OF THE POPULATION WITH WHICH WE ARE ALLOWED TO DEAL.
THE SUBJECT LINE OF THIS CABLE, IN THE IRAQI CONTEXT, IS
NOTEWORTHY: NO OFFICIAL EVER PUBLICLY STEPS ASIDE FROM
STATED POLICY. IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE, THE DEVIATION WAS
VOICED IN A MEETING

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3. THE SUBJECT ITSELF WAS INTERESTING. WHETHER IRAQI REALLY
BELIEVED THAT THE HOSTAGE SITUATION IN TEHRAN, AND ALL THE
RELATED DIFFICULTIES, WERE ACTUALLY THE RESULTS OF
U.S.-IRANIAN COLLUSION. THE RESPONSE WAS PROMPT,
PREDICTABLE AND A REPETITION OF THE STANDARD GOV RHETORIC.
AFTER MAKING THAT PRESENTATION, HOWEVER, THE OFFICIAL
ADMITTED THAT NOBODY REALLY BELIEVED IT AND THAT MANY

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WERE, IN FACT, EMBARRASSED AT THE REQUIREMENT TO PARROT SUCH EVIDENT STUPIDITY.

4.

[REDACTED] HE ADDS THAT IN DISCUSSING THIS WITH OTHER WESTARNERS, HE HAS LEARNED THAT ONE OR TWO HAVE HAD SIMILAR EXPERIENCES RECENTLY. ALL OF THEM AGREE THAT THIS DEVELOPMENT, WHICH WOULD NOT BE WORTHY OF COMMENTARY IN MOST OTHER PLACES IN THE WORLD IS EXTREMELY INTERESTING IN BAGHDAD.

5. COMMENT: WE AGREE, AND ALSO ARE UNABLE TO DETERMINE WHAT THIS REALLY MEANS. IT COULD BE MERELY THE GROWTH OF PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] OR IT COULD BE A SIGN OF THE GROWING UNEASINESS MENTIONED IN REFTTEL. ONE THING IT IS NOT, IS A CHANGE INSGOVERNMENTAL POLICY PERMITTING OFFICIALS TO SPEAK THEIR PERSONALBIEWS IN PUBLIC. IRAQ HAS NOT YET COME TO THAT STAGE. PECK

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PAGE 01 BAGHDA 01232 01 OF 02 220600Z
ACTION NEA-11

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 ICA-11 EB-08 TRSE-00 ACDA-12 /097 W
 -----129353 220703Z /10

R 190911Z MAY 80
 FM USINT BAGHDAD
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC 021
 INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
 AMEMBASSY AMMAN
 AMEMBASSY CAIRO
 AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
 AMEMBASSY JIDDA
 AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
 AMEMBASSY LONDON

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 BAGHDAD 1232

E.O. 12065: GDS 5/19/86 (PECK, EDWARD L.) OR-M
 TAGS: PEPR, IZ, KU, IR
 SUBJ: VISIT TO IRAQ OF KUWAITI PRIME MINISTER

1. (~~C~~-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND KUWAIT AMBASSADOR IN BAGHDAD
 INSIST THAT ECONOMIC MATTERS TOOK UP MAJOR PORTION OF TALKS

DURING MAY 6-10 VISIT OF KUWAITI PRIME MINISTER, BUT MOST
 OF OUR COLLEAGUES SPECULATE THAT REVERBERATIONS OF IRAQ-IRAN
 WRANGLING ON GULF ARABS WERE CENTRAL TO DISCUSSIONS. SPECULA-
 TION HERE EVEN INCLUDES POSSIBILITY OF KUWAIT MEDIATION IN IRAQ
 IRAN DISPUTE (BUT NEITHER SIDE SEEMS TO US AS YET READY TO MAKE
 ADEQUATE CONCESSIONS.) PERHAPS TOPIC OF CONVENING A TAIR-LFKE
 MEETING ON GULF SECURITY (THIS TIME INCLUDING IRAQ) WAS BROACHED
 BY IRAQIS AS WELL. PUBLIC COVERAGE OF VISIT INCLUDES ONLY
 AMBIGUOUS REFERENCE TO SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN AND GIVES

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ONLY VAGUE CLUES ON ATTITUDES OF TWO STATES ON EVE OF ISLAMIC
 CONFERENCE. END SUMMARY

3. EARLY MAY VISIT OF KUWAIT PM SAAD AL ABDULLHH HAS GENERATED
 CONSIDERABLE SPECULATION IN BAGHDAD BUT, AS USUAL, VERY LITTLE
 HARD INFORMATION. PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENTS (SEE FBIS JN 101529)
 AND KUWAITI AMBASSADOR STRESS ECONOMIC CONTENT OF TALKS, BUT
 LARGELY BECAUSE OF RECENT VISIT TO KUWAIT OF IRANIAN PM
 GHOTBZADEH, MOST ASSUME THAT DISCUSSION WAS CENTERED AROUND

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EFFECTS OF IRAQ-IRAN RELATIONSHIP ON GULF ARABS. WHETHER OR NOT THE KUWAITIS, WHO ARE ANXIOUS TO RESOLVE OUTSTANDING BORDER PROBLEMS WITH BAGHDAD, HAD THE TEMERITY TO RAISE THE QUESTION OF THE IRAQI-ROL IN THE COMIC-OPERA ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT ON GHOTBZADEH, IS AN OPEN QUESTION. CERTAINLY, NO WORD OF SUCH DELICATE DISCUSSIONS HAS BEEN VOICED HERE.

4. ONE IDEA OUR DIPLOMATIC COLLEAGUES HAVE FOUND INTERESTING IS THAT, BECAUSE KUWAITIS ARE PRESUMABLY MOST UNCOMFORTABLE WITH THE STATE OF IRAQI-IRANIAN RELATIONS, THEY ARE CONSIDERING POSSIBILITY OF OFFERING TO MEDIATE BETWEEN THE TWO. ALTHOUGH WE DO NOT KNOW WHETHER GOK INDEED HAS THIS IN MIND, THERE ARE SEVERAL FACTORS MILITATING AGAINST ACCEPTANCE OF SUCH AN OFFER BY EITHER SIDE. GOI TRADITIONALLY IS NOT GIVEN TO ACCEPTING OUTSIDE (EVEN IF ARAB) MEDIATION OF ITS DISPUTES UNLESS IT RECEIVES FIRM PRIOR ASSURANCES OF OPPONENT'S GOOD FAITH (E.G. 1975 INSTANCE OF ALGERIAN MEDIATION WITH IRAN). SO FAR THERE IS NO APPARENT IRANIAN INCLINATION TOWARDS A COMPROMISE WITH IRAQ, OR VICE VERSA, SO A BASIC CONDITION FOR A MEDIATED SETTLEMENT APPEARS NON-EXISTENT. CESSATION (OR REDUCTION) OF ANTI-IRAQ RADION BROADCASTS WOULD BE CONSIDERED BY THE GOI AS INDICATION OF IRANEAN SERIOUSNESS AND TEHRAN HAS SHOWN NO SLACKENING IN DETERMINATION TO EXPORT THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION VIA RADTO TO THE IRAQI SHIA. THERE IS LITTLE DOUBT THAT IRAQ HAS EXPLOITED IRANIAN

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ATTEMPTS AT SUBVERSION AMONG IRAQI SHIA TO CRACK DOWN HARD AGAINST SHIA DISSIENCE CLAIMING THAT TROUBLEMAKERS REPRESENT A PERSIAN FIFTH COLUMN RATHER THAN AN INDIGINOUS RELIGIOUS PROTEST MOVEMENT. ALTHOUGH GOI HAS EXPLOITED TRADITIONAL

ARAB PREJUDICES AGAINST PERSIANS IN AN ATTEMPT TO MINIMIZE THE APPEAL TO IRAQI SHIA OF THE NEW ISLAMIC STATE NEXT DOOR, IT IS PROBABLY TRUE THAT BAGHDAD WOULD PREFER A GENUINE DETENTE WITH IRAN, UNDER WHICH IRANIAN INCITEMENT OF IRAQI KURDS AND SHIA WOULD CEASE, IN RETURN FOR IRAQI DE-EMPHASIS OF IRANIAN KURDISH AND KHUZISTAN QUESTIONS. THE IRAQIS FEEL, HOWEVER, PROBABLY FAIRLY ACCURATELY THAT KHOMEINI IS SO EMBITTERED BY HIS EXPULSION FROM IRAQ IN 1978 THAT NO SERIOUS RECONCILIATION CAN TAKE PLACE UNTIL THE AYATOLLAH LEAVES THE SCENE.

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FM USINT BAGHDAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 022
INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 BAGHDAD 1232

5. THERE IS SPECULATION THAT ANOTHER GULF SECURITY MEETING IS IN THE OFFING, SUCH AS THE ONE HELD IN TAIF LAST FALL, FROM WHICH IRAQ WAS POINTEDLY EXCLUDED. THE GOI HAS DOGGEDLY CULTIVATED RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE GULF AFABS TO ENSURE AN INVITATION TO THE NEXT SUCH MEETING. PART OF THIS CULTIVATION HAS TAKEN THE FORM OF HOSTING MEETINGS OF GULF MINISTERS (INFORMATION MINISTERS AND HEALTH MINISTERS HAVE BEEN CONVENED HERE SEPARATELY RECENTLY), IN A BID TO ACCUSTOM GULF ARABS TO IRAQI MEMBERSHIP IN THEIR CLUB. ALTHOUGH SOME COLLEAGUES ASSUME ANOTHER GULF SECURITY MEETING WAS DISCUSSED DURING KUWAIT PM'S VISIT, WE QUESTION WHETHER GULF ARABS, WHO SO FAR HAVE REMAINED CAREFULLY NEUTRAL IN IRAN-IRAQ DISPUTE, WOULD WISH TO SCHEDULE A MEETING (INCLUDING IRAQ) THAT SO EASILY COULD BE CONSTRUED BY IRAN AS CONFRONTATIONAL. WE HAVE NO WAY OF KNOWING WHETHER THE SUBJECT CAME UP DURING THE GOK-GOI TALKS, BUT IRAQ MIGHT WELL HAVE TAKEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO ARGUE FOR NECESSITY OF BEING INCLUDED IN GULF SECURITY MEETINGS, WHENEVER-AND WHEREEVER-EHEY OCCUR.

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6. ALTHOUGH IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THE TIMING OF SHAYKH SA'DS VISIT WAS DICTATED BY UPCOMING ISLAMIC FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING, MANY OF OUR COLLEAGUES AGREE THAT IT MUST HAVE BEEN A SUBJECT OF DISCUSSION. IT IS ALSO PROBABLE THAT SOME DISCUSSION OCCURRED ON HOW IRAN, THE THREE ARAB ISLANDS AND EXPORTATION OF ISLAMIC REVOLUTION SHOULD BE DEALT WITH IN THE CONFERENCE. PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENTS ISSUED IN CONNECTION WITH VISIT MENTION NEED TO "KEEP THE REGION AWAY FROM ANY FORM OF SUPER-POWER STRUGGLE", BUT ARE NOT AS SPECIFIC AS IN THE PAST ON AFGHANISTAN. IRAQ AND KUWAIT "

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DENOUNCE ALL TYPES OF FOREIGN INTERVENTION AND USE OF ANY SORT OF FORCE" (POSSIBLE REFERENCE TO US RESCUE ATTEMPT IN IRAN) OR IMPOSITION OF INTERNATIONAL HEGEMONY", WHICH SOUNDS TO US LIKE A PAGE FROM THE PRC BOOK.

7. COMMENT: THE KUWAITI AMBASSADOR, WHO PARTICIPATED IN MOST OF THE TALKS, REPEATEDLY INSISTS TO HIS DIPLOMATIC COLLEAGUES THAT WATER, BORDERS, RAILROADS AND INDUSTRIAL AND AGRICULTURAL COOPERATION WERE ONLY ITEMS ON THE AGENDA. BAGHDAD'S RUMOR MONGERING DIPLOMATIC CORPS SCOFFS AT THIS AND JUST AS ADAMANTLY INSISTS THAT SUCH A VISIT COULD NOT HAVE OCCURRED IN PRESENT REGIONAL ATMOSPHERE WITHOUT WEIGHTY

POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS.
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INFO AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
USINT HAVANA
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 906
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
USIN NEW YORK

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E.O. 12065: GDS 4/28/86 (PECK, EDWARD L.)OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, IZ, NAM
SUBJ: (U) IRAQ AND IRAN IN THE NONALIGNED CONTEXT

1. (~~S~~-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. A REASONABLY RELIABLE IRAQI SOURCE HAS INFORMED US THAT A BRAIN-STORMING SESSION TOOK PLACE DURING THE EVENING OF APRIL 27, AT THE DOCUMENTATION AND RESEARCH CENTER OF THE RCC, ROUGHLY EQUIVALENT TO INR, ON THE QUESTION OF HOW TO DEAL WITH IRAN'S CALL FOR NAM CONDEMNATION OF THE U.S. OVER THE ABORTED RESCUE OPERATION. THE MEETING WAS CHAIRED BY RCC MEMBER AND

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DEPUTY PM TARIQ AZIZ. BEFORE THE RESUCE MISSION, IRAQ HAD BEEN HOPING TO ISOLATE IRAN WITHIN THE NAM BY TABLING A RESOLUTION CALLING FOR EXPULSION FROM TH MOVEMENT, IN PART OVER THE ISLANDS ISSUE. BAGHDAD SUDDENLY SAW THE IRANIANS ALSO APPEALING TO THE NAM, NOW CLOAKED IN THE EVER-POPULAR MANTLE OF ANTI-AMERICANISM. THE GOI REPORTEDLY FEARED THAT NAM OPINION MIGHT SHIFT IN FAVOR OF IRAN, OR AT LEAST CLOUD THE ISSUES INVOLVED IN THE IRAQI-IRANIAN CONFRONTATION.

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3. WHILE NO FIRM DECISIONS WERE TAKEN DURING THEIR SESSION, MANY PRESENT VOICED CONCERN THAT A NAM SESSION AT THIS TIME, PARTICULARLY AMIDST THE CONFUSION GENERATED BY IRANIAN CLAIMS THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN WAS ASSASSINATED IN A COUP D'ETAT (SEPTTEL), WOULDNOT BE IN IRAQ'S INTEREST. THE OPINION WAS VOICED THAT IRAQ SHOULD, OVER THE COMING MONTHS, MAKE MORE OF AN EFFORT TO RALLY THE SUPPORT OF THE MAJOR NONALIGNED STATES AND TO CONCENTRATE LESS ON wooing THE MINI-MEMBERS (E.G. THE PRIME MINISTER OF THE SEYCHELLE ISLANDS, CURRENTLY VISITING BAGHDAD). THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT IRAQ HAS MADE LARGE ADVANCES WITHIN THE NAM SINCE THE HAVANA SUMMIT, BUT MANY OF THE CONFEREES WERE FEARFUL THAT CASTRO MIGHT NOT SUPPORT IRAQ'S POSITION IN A SHOWDOWN WITH IRAN, AND OTHERS MIGHT FOLLOW HIM.

4 IT WAS THUS SUGGESTED THAT, AT LEAST IN THE NEAR FUTURE, IRAQ SHOULD ATTEMPT TO SMOOTH OUT RELATIONS WITH THE USSR'S EASTERN EUROPEAN ALLIES, IN AN ATTEMPT TO REASSURE THE SOCIALIST CAMP (AND INDIRECTLY MOSCOW) THAT IRAQ IS STILL A FRIEND. OUR SOURCE REPEATED THAT NO DECISION ON THIS SUBJECT HAD YET BEEN TAKEN AND CONCEDED THAT IT WOULD BE HARD FOR IRAQ TO OPPOSE TAKING A SHOT AT THE USG IN THE NAM EVEN IF IT DID NOT SUIT BAGHDAD'S INTERESTS AT PRESENT.

5. COMMENT: WHILE IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO CONFIRM THAT SUCH A

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MEETING WAS HELD, THERE IS LITTLE QUESTION THAT THEGOI DOES FEEL IN AN UNCOMFORTABLE POSITION VIS -A-VIS IRAN AFTER THE ABORTED RESCUE. RADIO TEHRAN HAS REPEATEDLY CLAIMED THAT SADDAM WAS THE HAND-MAIDEN OF AMERICAN IMPERIALISM, AND IRAQI HESITATION TO CONDEMN THE AMERICAN RESCUE EFFORT MIGHT MAKE IRAQ LOSE FACE AMONG THE NONALIGNED MEMBERSHIP. ON THE OTHER HAND, AND IF THERE IS A NAM MEETING TO CONDEMN THE U.S. RESCUE IN THE SAME MANNER AS SOVIET INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN, REGIONAL FOCUS ON SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN AFGHANISTAN WOULD BE BLURRED AND IRAQ'S JUSTIFICATION FOR ITS CONFRONTATION WITH THE "INSANE" REGIME IN TEHRAN WILL BE BADLY UNDERCUT. IT IS THUS NOT UNLIKELY THAT IRAQ WOULD TRY AT THE MOMENT TO KEEP ALL QUESTIONS INVOLVING IRAN OUT OF THE NAM CONTEXT UNTIL THE MEMORY OF THE RESCUE EFFORT RECEDES. THERE ARE ALSO INDICATIONS (E.G. FRONT-PAGE BLAST AT SYRIA IN THE APRIL 28 AL-THAWRA AND THE ARRIVAL IN BAGHDAD OF PDRY EXILE LEADER MOHAMED ALI HYTHAM) OF AN INCREASINGLY CONFRONTATIONAL STANCE TOWARD THE STEADFASTNESS FRONT. THIS MIGHT WELL CALL INTO QUESTION MOSCOW'S, AND THUS CUBA'S SUPPORT FOR IRAQ AGAINST IRAN IN THE NAM.

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ACTION SS-30

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FM USINT BAGHDAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 9923

INFO AMEMBASSY KUWAIT NIACT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

AMEMBASSY DOHA

AMEMBASSY MANAMA

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E.O. 12065: XDS 4/30/00 (PECK, EDWARD L.)OR-M

TAGS: PEPR, IR, KU

SUBJ: ATTEMPT ON GHOTBZADEH:IRAQI INVOLVEMENT?

1. (~~S~~-ENTIRE TEXT).

2. SOURCE WITH PROVEN ACCESS TO IRAQI SECURITY HAS TOLD US THAT THE ATTEMPT ON GHOTBZADEH IN KUWAIT WAS INSTIGATED BY IRAQ. HE MAINTAINS THAT GUNFIRE WAS NOT ITSELF DESIGNED TO KILL THE FOREIGN MINISTER BUT MERELY AN ATTEMPT TO SLOW DOWN OR STOP THE MOTORCADE NEAR A PARKED CAR IN FRONT OF THE AMIRI HOSPITAL WHICH WAS WIRED WITH EXPLOSIVES. THE TRIGGER-MEN DID THEIR PART, BUT THE BOMBS FAILED TO GO OFF.

3. SOURCE CLAIMS THAT DECISION TO ASSASSINATE GHOTBZADEH RESULTED FROM A SERIES OF HIGH-LEVEL STRATEGY SESSIONS ON THE IRANIAN PROBLEM. BAGHDAD'S LEADERSHIP DECIDED THAT THE CRISIS HAD ESCALATED TO THE POINT WHERE AN EXTREMELY STRONG WARNING HAD TO BE DELIVERED TO TEHRAN TO DESIST FROM ITS ANTI-IRAQ CAMPAIGN. GHOTBZADEH WAS SELECTED AS A TARGET SINCE HE IS VIEWED

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PAGE 02 BAGHDA 01057 301455Z

AS A HIGHLY-VISIBLE BUT SECOND ECHELON (I.E. NON-REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL) FIGURE. SOURCE STATED THAT DECISION-MAKERS FELT THAT ASSASSINATION OF ONE OF IRAN'S REAL LEADERS WOULD RUN THE RISK OF TOPPLING THE GOVERNMENT, RESULTING IN CHAOS POTENTIALLY WORSE THAN THE CURRENT SITUATION.

4. COMMENT: WE PASS THE ABOVE ALONG FOR WHAT IT IS WORTH.

4. COMMENT: SOURCE HAS GENERALLY BEEN RELIABLE, BUT WE ARE NOT

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IN A POSITION TO EVALUATE THE ACCURACY OF THIS ACCOUNT. IT SEEMS SURPRISING, TO SAY THE LEAST, THAT IT WOULD BE RELAYED TO US, BUT THE STORY ITSELF IS NOT TOTALLY IMPLAUSIBLE. AS ADDRESSEES ARE AWARE, IRAQI-SPONSORED ASSASSINATIONS OF POLITICAL FIGURES OCCUR WITH SOME REGULARITY, AND THE GOI HAS NOT ATTEMPTED TO CONCEAL ITS WILLING TO STRIKE OUT AT FOES.

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PAGE 01 BAGHDA 01113 071616Z
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R 061500Z MAY 80
FM USINT BAGHDAD
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INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAND
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AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
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AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
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~~SECRET~~ BAGHDAD 1113E.O. 12065: GDS 4/6/86 (PECK, EDWARD L.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, PORG, IZ, IR
SUBJ: (S) RESCUE ATTEMPT AND THE IRANIAN CALL FOR NAM MEETING
IRAQI VIEWS

REF: A) KUWAIT 2196; B) BAGHDAD 1101; C) STATE 113511

1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. IN A BRIEF SOCIAL CONVERSATION WITH A SENIOR MFA OFFICIAL,
WE ASKED ABOUT GOI'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS REPORTED IRANIAN INTENTION
TO CALL FOR NAM MEETING AS THE RESULT OF THE HOSTAGE RELEASE
ATTEMPT. OFFICIAL REPLIED THAT IRAQ WOULD HAVE NO OPTION BUT TO
ATTEND SUCH A MEETING IF IT WERE HELD. IN THE MEANTIME, HOWEVER,
HE FELT QUITE CERTAIN THAT GOI WOULD DO EVERYTHING IT COULD TO
MAKE SURE THAT THE SESSION NEVER TAKES PLACE.

3. HE ADDED THAT UNDER NORMAL CIRCUMSTANCES, IRAQ WOULD HAVE

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PAGE 02 BAGHDA 01113 071616Z

SHARPLY CONDEMNED THE U.S. RESCUE ATTEMPT SINCE IT WAS BLATANT
INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF ANOTHER COUNTRY. GIVEN
IRAN'S PUBLIC EFFORTS TO INVOLVE ITSELF IN IRAQI INTERNAL AFFAIRS,
HOWEVER, AND THE DETERIORATING RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES
IRAQ'S HIGHER INTERESTS WERE SERVED BY REMAINING SILENT. IT WAS
FOR THE SAME REASONS THAT IRAQ WAS NOT INTERESTED IN SUPPORTING
OR ATTENDING A SESSION CALLED BY IRAN FOR THE PURPOSES OF CONDEMNING
AMERICAN ACTION.

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4. COMMENT: AS WE HAVE REPORTED ELSEWHERE, IRAQI MEDIA HAVE BEEN ALMOST COMPLETELY SILENT ABOUT THE FACT THAT A RESCUE ATTEMPT WAS MADE. IN THE ABOVE CONVERSATION, THE MFA OFFICIAL REVEALED A PERSONAL REACTION WHICH INDICATED RATHER CLEARLY THAT HE WISHED AMERICANS HAD SUCCEEDED. HE ALSO STATED OPENLY THAT IRAQ IS DOING ITS BEST TO CREATE DIFFICULTIES FOR THE "KHOMEINI RACIST REGIME", AND ONLY PARTLY IN RETALIATION FOR THE IRANIAN EFFORTS AT DE-STABILIZING IRAQ.

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ACTION NEA-11

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FM USINT BAGHDAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9915
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/AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 2306
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AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT PRIORITY
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~~SECRET~~ BAGHDAD 1036

E.O. 12065: GDS 4/28/86 (PECK, EDWARD L.) OR-M
TAGS: PINT, PEPR, IZ, IR, XF
SUBJ: (S) SADDAM'S ASSASSINATION

1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. AS EVERYONE IS NOW AWARE, SADDAM HUSSEIN WAS NOT ASSASSINATED
APRIL 27, DESPITE REPEATED IRANIAN CLAIMS TO THE CONTRARY.

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PAGE 02 BAGHDA 01036 290724Z

AS FAR AS WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO DETERMINE FROM ALL AVAILABLE
SOURCES, INCLUDING ONE WITH PROVEN ACCESS TO IRAQI SECURITY,
THERE WAS NOT EVEN AN ATTEMPT.

3. THERE IS ALWAYS THE POSSIBILITY THAT A PREMATURE ANNOUNCEMENT
WAS MADE OF AN EFFORT THAT ABORTED OR FAILED. DETAILS RELEASED
BY TEHRAN RADIO, I.E. THE USE OF HAND GRENADES AND THE LOSS OF
2/3 MATYRS, MIGHT HAVE BEEN CONNECTED TO SOMETHING THAT
WAS PLANNED, BUT THERE ARE NO INDICATIONS THAT SADDAM WAS NEAR

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A MILITARY CAMP ON THE DAY THE STORY BROKE, ALTHOUGH IT IS POSSIBLE HE HAD BEEN SCHEDULED TO VISIT ONE.

4. IT IS EQUALLY LIKELY THAT THE ENTIRE STORY WAS AN INTENTIONAL FABRICATION, DESIGNED TO GET THE THUS-FAR RELUCTANT SHIA, A AND PERHAPS OTHERS, OUT INTO THE STREETS. IRAN HAS AS YET BEEN UNABLE TO GENERATE THE MASS UNREST THAT IT EXPECTS TO RESULT FROM THE URGINGS OF KHOMEINI, AND MAY HAVE CONSIDERED THAT A CLAIM OF SADDAM'S DEATH MIGHT ACTUALLY TRIGGER THE UPRISING THAT WOULD ACTUALLY LEAD TO IT.

5. COMMENT: EXCEPT FOR OBVIOUSLY WORSENING THE ALREADY POOR RELATIONS WITH IRAQ, AND FURTHER ERODING ITS RESIDUAL CREDIBILITY, IRAN DOES NOT APPEAR TO HAVE GAINED MUCH FROM PUBLICITY OF THE REAL OR IMAGINED ATTACK, PERHAPS BECAUSE IT WAS NOT TRUE, AND PERHAPS BECAUSE IT MIGHT NOT HAVE HAD AN IMMEDIATE EFFECT EVEN IF IT HAD BEEN. THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF SADDAM'S ASSASSINATION HAD LITTLE DISCERNIBLE EFFECT PRIOR TO ITS REFUTATION. THE EXTENT AND DEPTH OF THE GOI'S CONTROL, EVEN WITHOUT SADDAM, MAY BE SO PERVASIVE THT EVEN THOSE INCLINED TO TAKE TO THE STREETS FOLLOWING AN ASSASSINATION WOULD PREFER TO ASSESS THE IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH CAREFULLY BEFORE DETERMINING WHETHER MOB ACTION HAD ANY LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS.

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ICA-11 TRSE-00 OMB-01 /078 W

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R 221800Z APR 80
FM USINT BAGHDAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9881
INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
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AMEMBASSY DOHA
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KABUL
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
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AMEMBASSY MANAMA
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
AMEMBASSY PARIS

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 PA Exemptions _____ ☐ DOWNGRADE TS to ☐ S or ☐ C

~~SECRET~~ BAGHDAD 0967 ✓

CORRECTED COPY (TEXT PARA 3A)

E.O. 12065: GDS 4/22/86 (PECK, EDWARD L.) OR-M
TAGS: PINT, PEPR, IZ
SUBJ: (S) IRAQ'S INTERNAL PROBLEMS: THE SHI'A

1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT).
2. WITH A LONG AND TURBULENT HISTORY OF FACTIONAL STRIFE, IRAQ WAS CONSIDERED BY SOME OBSERVERS TO BE A PRIME CANDIDATE

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FOR SEVERE DISRUPTIONS AS THE RESULT OF ITS MAJORITY SHI'A POPULATION AND THE EMERGENCE OF A MESSIANIC LEADER OF THE SAME PERSUASION IN NEIGHBORING IRAN. LIKE ALMOST EVERYTHING ELSE IN THIS OPAQUE AND SECRETIVE COUNTRY, THE ATTITUDES AND BELIEFS OF THE SHI'A WITH RESPECT TO THE EFFECT OF THE FALL OF THE SHAH COULD ONLY BE GUESSED AT. GENERALLY SPEAKING, DIPLOMATS IN BAGHDAD AGREED WITH USINT'S EARLIER PREDICTIONS THAT A NUMBER OF FACTORS WOULD OFFSET THE ASSUMED BUT UNMEASURABLE AFFINITY BETWEEN IRAQ'S ARAB SHI'A AND THEIR PERSIAN CORELIGIONISTS.

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3. OPINIONS VARIED, BUT IN GENERAL TERMS THE FACTORS WERE ESSENTIALLY THE FOLLOWING, WITH DIFFERENT ASSESSMENT WEIGHTS:

A: REASONABLY EXTENSIVE AMALGAMATION OF THE SHI'A INTO THE REST OF THE POPULATION PARTICULARLY IN RECENT YEARS. WHILE THIS WAS, OF COURSE, NEITHER COMPLETE NOR PERHAPS WITHOUT ITS PROBLEMS, THE URBANIZATION OF THE COUNTRY AND THE GOI'S OUTREACH IN EDUCATION, AGRICULTURE, MEDICINE, TRANSPORTATION, ETC., TENDED REDUCE THE SEPARATION AND ISOLATION OF THOSE PORTIONS OF THE COUNTRY WHICH ARE MAINLY SHI'A, I.E. THE SOUTHERN HALF.

B. THE ECONOMIC AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNTRY, RELATED TO THE FACTORS MENTIONED ABOVE, AND THE RESULTANT INCREASE IN THE STANDARD OF LIVING IN BOTH MONETARY AND NON-MONETARY TERMS.

C: THE SECULAR NATURE OF THE BAAATH REGIME, WHICH OFFERED INCREASED RELIGIOUS FREEDOM TO ALL OF IRAQ'S GROUPINGS AS WELL AS PROVIDING THEM WITH FINANCIAL SUPPORT.

D: THE ARAB NATURE OF THE BAAATH PARTY, WHICH GAVE SHI'A EXPANDED OPPORTUNITIES TO RISE IN THE HIERARCHY (ALTHOUGH PERHAPS LESS THAN THEIR SUNNI COMPATRIOTS).

E: LINGUISTIC AND ETHNIC DIFFERENCES BETWEEN IRAQ'S SHIA AND IRAN'S WITH A HISTORY OF CONFLICT BETWEEN THE TWO PEOPLES

F. WITH THE PASSAGE OF TIME, A LACK OF DESIRE TO EMULATE THE VERY EVIDENT DISRUPTION, CHAOS, AND OTHER CATASTROPHIES RESULTING FROM THE REVOLUTION IN IRAN.

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G. LAST, BUT MOST CERTAINLY NOT LEAST, THE IRAQI GOVERNMENTS PERVASIVE, TIGHT, AND BRUTAL CONTROL OF THE ENTIRE SOCIETY.

4. ATTEMPTING TO DETERMINE WHICH COMBINATION OF THE ABOVE HAS BEEN OF THE GREATEST SIGNIFICANCE IN THE FACT THAT THUS FAR THERE HAS BEEN NO MAJOR UPRISING AMONG THE SHI'IS IS PROBABLY IMPOSSIBLE. THE GOI APPEARS TO BELIEVE (OR AT LEAST INCESSANTLY INSISTS) THAT IT IS THE TOTAL COMMITMENT OF ALL THE PEOPLE OF IRAQ TO THEIR LEADERS AND TO THE POLICY OF THE PARTY THAT HAS MADE ALL OF IRAQ TO THEIR LEADERS AND TO THE POLICY OF THE PARTY THAT HAS MADE ALL OF KHOMEINI'S RHETORIC INEFFECTIVE. THIS IS PROBABLY NOT THE CASE, BUT IT IS CLEAR THAT--FOR WHATEVER REASONS--THE STRIDENT AND BELLICOSE CALLS ISSUING DAILY FROM TEHRAN FOR THE OUSTING OF SADDAM HUSSIN AND HIS ALL-TIKRITI BAND HAVE HAD NO DISCERNIBLE SIGNIFICANT RESULTS.

5. AS WE HAVE NOTED, SADDAM ET AL ARE PRAGMATISTS ENOUGH TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT ACTS OF TERRORISM AND/OR GROUPS OF TERRORISTS CAN EXIST IN ALMOST ANY SOCIETY AND CAN PROBABLY NEVER BE TOTALLY ELIMINATED. THIS IS THE PERSPECTIVE IN WHICH THEY HAVE PUBLICLY CHOSEN TO PLACE THE RECENT SERIES OF ASSASSINATIONS/ BOMBINGS. THEIR POSITION IS CLEARLY THAT THE EXISTENCE OF "CRAZIES" WHICH IN THEIR DEFINITION INCLUDES TERRORISTS ORGANIZED AND FINANCED BY OTHERS (FROM A LIST WHICH WOULD INCLUDE, PERHAPS, SYRIANS, ISRAELIS, AMERICANS, PALESTINIAN FACTIONS, THE CPI, KURDS, AS WELL AS SHI'IS OF IRAN OR IRAQI NATIONALITY) MUST BE ACCEPTED, BUT IS IN NO WAY RELATED TO THE STRENGTH AND STABILITY OF THE REGIME, PARTICULARLY IN TERMS OF THE ATTITUDE OF THE PEOPLE.

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6. HOWEVER TRUE THIS MAY BE IN FACT, IN APPEARANCE IT GIVES EVERY INDICATION OF BEING AN ACCURATE REPRESENTATION OF THE NOW, AND A REASONABLE PROGNOSIS OF THE NEAR-TERM FUTURE. IN A COUNTRY SUCH AS IRAQ, A MODERN-DAY PARADOX: RICH AND UNDERDEVELOPED, THINGS CAN CHANGE RELATIVELY QUICKLY AND RELATIVELY SIGNIFICANTLY. ON THE BASIS OF THE PAST YEAR'S EXPERIENCE, HOWEVER, WE TEND TO THINK THAT SADDAM'S RULE WILL PROBABLY NOT BE SERIOUSLY

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CHALLENGED BY THESHI'A. WE THINK THAT THE CONTROL OF THE COUNTRY BY THE PARTY IS PROBABLY THE SINGLE MOST IMPORTANT FACTOR FROM ALL ANGLES. (IN ADDITION TO THE SHI'A, THE GOI FACES INTERNAL CHALLENGES FROM KURDS, COMMUNISTS, OUTSIDE FORCES, AND THOSE WHO ARE JUST PLAIN UNHAPPY WITH THE REGIME.) FROM A PURELY SHI'A PERSPECTIVE, HOWEVER, WE TEND TO BELIEVE THAT VERY FEW OF IRAQ'S SIX MILLION PLUS SHI'A ARE INTERESTED IN SEEING THEIR COUNTRY GO DOWN THE SAME PATH AS IRAN. PEACE, SAFETY AND ALL THE OTHER BENEFITS OF STABILITY APPEAR TO OUTWEIGH THE SIGNIFICANCE OF AYATOLLAH KHO-MEINI'S RELIGIOUS/ POLITICAL URGINGS, EVEN WHEN COMBINED WITH OTHER SHORTCOMING OF THEIR EXISTENCE HERE.

7. THE VIRTUAL CERTAINTY THAT AYATOLLAH BAQR AL SADR HAS BEEN EXECUTED O/A APRIL 7, WOULD APPEAR TO INDICATE THAT THE GOI, ON BALANCE, BELIEVED THT THE POTENTIAL DAMAGE FROM HIS DEATH WAS LESS THAN THE POTENTIAL DANGER FROM HIS ALIVE. EVEN IN IRAQ, THIS EVENT CANNOT BE KEPT SECRET, AND SADDAM MUST BELIEVE THAT ANY ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES FROM THE SHI'A WILL EITH NOT BE SERIOUS OR CAN BE CONTROLLED. (THERE ARE ADDITIONAL POSSIBLE CONSIDERATIONS: AN OPPORTUNITY TO REMOVE A SHI'A RALLYING POINT BY CLAIMING IRANIAN PRESSURES DROVE SADR TO TREASON IS PROBABLY ONE OF THEM.)

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ACTION NEA-11

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ADS-00 CIAE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00 PM-05
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FM USINT BAGHDAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9897
INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI

AMEMBASSY AMMAN
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AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
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AMEMBASSY KABUL
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AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BAGHDAD 1003

E.O. 12065: ~~SDS~~ 4/24/86 (PECKEDWARD L.) OR-M
TAGS: PINT, IZ
SUBJ: (U) THE PUZZLING CASE OF AYATOLLAH BAQR SADR: CONFLICTING
TESTIMONY

REF: BAGHDAD 967 ✓

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT).
2. THE PUZZLING CONTROVERSY OVER THE WELFARE AND WHEREABOUTS OF THE ACTIVIST SHI'I AYATOLLAH BAQR SADR CONTINUES. USINT WAS PREPARING AN ANALYSIS WHICH ESSENTIALLY CONCLUDED THAT

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THE GOI WOULD NOT WISH TO RISK INCITING ITS SHI'A POPULATION, IN THE FACE OF CONTINUING AND ESCALATING PROVOCATION FROM IRAN, AND HAD LITTLE TO GAIN BY EXECUTING A RELIGIOUS LEADER OF BAQR SADR'S STANDING. JUST AS WE HAD FINISHED THIS REASONABLE ANALYSIS, SEEMINGLY INCONTROVERTIBLE EVIDENCE TURNED UP INDICATING THAT BAQR SADR HAD INDEED BEEN EXECUTED, IN EARLY APRIL, AFTER A SECRET TRIAL IN WHICH HE WAS DULY CONVICTED AND SENTENCED. THE EXPLANATION BEGAN TO CIRCULATE IN BAGHDAD THAT THE IRAQIS,

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MINDFUL OF HOW AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI IN EXILE HAD BEEN A FOCAL POINT FOR THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION, DECIDED THAT A DEAD BAQR SADR WAS LESS OF A MENACE, HIS MARTYRDOM NOTWITHSTANDING, THAN A LIVE ONE IN NAJAF OR IN EXILE.

3. WE HAVE NOW HEARD FROM A SOURCE WITH GOOD CONTACTS [REDACTED] THAT THE GOI SENTENCED BAQR SADR TO DEATH, BUT HAS NOT YET CARRIED OUT THE EXECUTION. OUR SOURCE INSISTS THAT THIS IS TYPICAL IRAQI PRACTICE: SEND UP A TRIAL BALLOON, AND TEST THE REACTIONS. IF THERE WERE ALARMING LEVELS OF PROTEST, THE GOI COULD PRODUCE BAQR SADR ON TELEVISION. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF THE GOI PERCEIVES THAT THE REPORTED EXECUTION PRODUCES NO MORE THAN INCREASED DIATRIBES FROM TEHRAN, BAQR SADR, WHO MAY WELL CONSTITUTE A DOMESTIC DANGER TO THE GOI, COULD THEN BE QUIETLY EXECUTED AND BURIED, IF NECESSARY. IF THERE HAD BEEN A DANGEROUS OUTCRY, THE IRAQIS COULD ALSO HAVE SCORED PROPAGANDA POINTS AGAINST IRANIANS BY PRODUCING A LIVE AYATOLLAH AND CHARGING TEHRAN WITH HYSTERICAL CALUMNY.

4. OUR SOURCE MAINTAINS THAT IRAQI SECURITY OFFICIALS ARE QUITE CONFIDENT AT PRESENT THAT EARLIER TURBULENCE IN KERBALA, NAJAF, AND EVEN BAGHDAD, HAS BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY

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REDUCED. THE SHI'A AREAS ARE RELATIVELY QUIET AT THE MOMENT, NOW THAT THE GOI HAS MADE IT VERY CLEAR THAT THEY INTEND TO CRACK DOWN ON ANY ACTIVITY EVEN MORE BRUTALLY THAN IS THE NORM. OUR SOURCE CONCLUDED THAT, IF THIS QUIET IN THE SHI'A AREAS CONTINUES MUCH LONGER, BAQR SADR'S LIFE IS INDEED IN JEOPARDY.

5. COMMENT: WE ARE FACED WITH A TYPICAL BAGHDAD DILEMMA. THERE IS NO WAY TO DETERMINE, IN FACT, WHETHER BAQR SADR IS PRESENTLY ALIVE OR DEAD, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE ABSF IS INTENTIONALLY CIRCULATING THE STORY THAT HE HAS BEEN EXECUTED. THE EXECUTION IS ACCEPTED AS A FAIT ACCOMPLI BY THE BAGHDAD DIPLOMATIC COMMUNITY, BUT OUR SOURCE SWEARS THAT SENIOR COUNSELORS WITHIN THE RCC AND ABSF SPECIALIZED BUREAUS STRONGLY DENY THAT IT HAS BEEN CARRIED OUT YET.

6. THE IRAQIS ARE REASONABLY PRAGMATIC, AND UNLESS BAQR SADR POSED A MORE DIRECT AND ACTIVE THREAT THAN OUTSIDERS ARE ABLE TO PERCEIVE, THERE WAS NO PRESSING REASON TO DO AWAY WITH HIM. HIS DEATH, INDEED, COULD HAVE SERVED AS THE SPARK TO IGNITE THE WIDESPREAD SHI'A CONFLAGRATION THAT KHOMEINI HAS THUS FAR FAILED TO PROVOKE.

7. IF THE IRAQIS HAVE MISHANDLED THE BAQR SADR AFFAIR, THE RESULTS COULD BE OF SIGNIFICANT IMPORTANCE TO

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SADDAM'S REGIME AND COUNTRIES IN THE GENERAL AREA. WE
ARE NONETHELESS REDUCED TO REPORTING, ESSENTIALLY, A
SET OF MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE POSSIBILITIES.
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9859
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AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
UQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 1923
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS

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MR Cases Only:
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BAGHDAD 935E.O. 12065: GDS 4/17/86 (PECK, EDWARD L.) ORM
TAGS: PINS, IZ, ASEC
SUBJ: ATTACKS ON IRAQI OFFICES IN BEIRUT

REF, A) FBIS JN161951; B) FBIS JN 140935

1. (U) FBIS ITEMS REPORT ATTACKS IN BEIRUT ON IRAQI EMBASSY AND

COMMERCIAL CENTER, IRAQI AIR OFFICE, BAAATH PARTY OFFICE AND GOI-SUPPORTED ARAB LIBERATION FRONT (ALF) OFFICE ON APRIL 14 AND 16. CREDIT FOR ATTACKS CLAIMED BY "IRAQI MKJAHIDIN" AND "AMAL MOVEMENT" THE LATTER IS DESCRIBED BY THE IRAQI NEWS AGENCY AS A PERSIAN GANG.

2. (C) GOI IS WELL-KNOWN FOR ITS FIRM POLICY OF RETALIATION,

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PARTICULARLY FOR ATTACKS ON ITS EMBASSIES, (9**8:8-) 94 3VEN CITIZENS. WHETHER MEMBERS OF PERSIAN GANG ARE IRANISANS OR MERELY LEWANESE SHI'A, GOI WILL PROBABLY NOT LET BEIRUT INCIDENTS GO BY WITHOUT SOME FORM OF RECIPROCAL ACTION: ONLY VNUW SEEMS THE MOST UNCERTAIN. WE ASSUME GOI WILL AVOID EMBASSY RASSING THE GULF, TURKEY AND MOST NAM MEMBERS WITH AN ATTACK. AN ATTACK ON IRANIAN OFFICES IN BEIRUT ITSELF IS PROBABLY THE EASIEST TO CARRY OUT, BUT, WITH SO MANY INCIDENTS IN BEIRUT, WILL NOT AT PRESENT LESSEN ITS IMPACT AS TEACHING IRAN A LESSON.

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DAMASCUS MAKES AN ATTRACTIVE SITE, BUT MAY BE RATHER DIFFICULT TO CARRY OUT, THE GOI MAY TARGET IRANIAN OFFICES IND A EURPEAN NAQITAL, FOR HIGH-PROFILE AND EELATIV EASE OF EXECUTIN. DEPARTMENT WLL BE BEST ABLE TO DETERMINE WHHCH EUROPEAN CAPITALS ARE MOST VULNERABLE.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BAGHDAD 931
E.O. 12065: GDS 4/18/86 (PECK, EDWARD L) OR-M
TAGS: MARR, IR, SO, US, IZ, XF
SUBBJ: SADDAM HUSSEIN'S SPEECH XSPRING RALLY

REF: GF 151730 APR 80 (M)

1. (U) PRESIDENZ SADDAM HUSSEIN DELIVERED LONG DIATRIBE AGAINST KHOMEINI-'LED IRAN AT MASS RALLY CELEBRATING MOSUL'S SPRING FESTIVAL APRIL 15. HE REPEATEDLY RIDICULED THREATS OF IRANIAN LEADERS, LISTENED HISTORIC PERSIAN WRONGS AGAINST ARABS, IND WARNE IRAN THAT ARAB TERRITORY IS SACRED AND WILL BE DEFENDED "TO THE DEATH". SADDAT REFERRED TO KPOMEININ VARIOUSLY AS " "TURBANEDFSHAH", "ROTTEN", A "PUPPET" AND AS ILLITERATE, UNEDUCATED AND UNINQFORMED. (U) SADDAM MENTIONS SUPER-POWER INTERFERENCE AT VARIOUS POINTS DURING THE SPEECH, BUT DWELLS

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ON IT ONLY IN A CLOSING BLAST AT THE U.S. FOR PURSUADING SOMALIA TO PROVIDE MILITARY FACILITIES. HE COMPLAINS IN PASSING THAT "CERTAIN ARAB RULERN" ARE ?UNDERMINING2 THE EIGHT-POINT CHARTER, AND THAT CERTAIN OTHER ARABS HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE INCREASINGLY BAD RELATIONS BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ.

3. (C) COMMENT: SADDAM LAYS MOST OF THE BLAME ON KHOMEINI FOR THE CURRENT IRAN/IRAQ DISPUTE AND APPLIES FOR CONCILIATION TO THE IRANIAN PEOPLE OVER THE HEADS OF THEIR LEADERS. AT THE SAME

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TIME, BY INSISTING THAT IRAQ'S RECENT INTERNAL DIFFICULTIES ARE OF PERSIAN MAKING, HE HOPES TO DE-EMPHASIZE IMPLICATIONS OF RECENT BOMB ATTACKS.

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P R 141024Z APR 80
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BAGHDAD 891E.O./ 12165: GDS 4/14/86 (PECK, EDWARD L.) GR-/.
5-& : PEPR, MILI, IZ, IR
SUBJ: (U) IRAQ-IRAN: MILITARY SITUATION

REF: BAGHDAD 849 (NOTAL)✓

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT).

2. SOMALI ARMY DAY RECEPTION APRIL 12 PROVIDED AN
OPPORTUNITY TO SPEAK WITH ALMOST THE ENTIRE ATTACH CORPS
ON THE SUBJECT OF THE IRAQI-IRANIAN CRISIS, PARTICULARLY THE
THREAT OF WAR. THEIR CONSENSUS: IRAQ IS NOT EXPECTING WAR,
IS NOT SEEKING WAR, AND IS NOT DOING ANYTHING EXTRAORDINARY
TO PREPARE FOR THE POSSIBILITY. THE UNANIMOUS OPINION WAS~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
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THAT IRAN IS SPENDING A GREAT DEAL OF TIME AND EFFORT ON
PROPAGANDA PROGRAMS DESIGNED FOR DOMESTIC IRANIAN CONSUMPTION
AND WHICH HAVE NOT GENERATED ANY NOTICEABLE EXCITEMENT ON THIS
SIDE OF THE FRONTIER.3. THIS VIEW WAS SHARED BY THE ENTOURAGE OF IRAQI COS SHAMSHAL,
WHO ATTENDED THE RECEPTION. HIS AIDE, A COLONEL, STRESSED THAT
THE GOI IS AWARE THERE WILL BE BORDER CLASHES FROM TIME TO TIME,
AND THAT THERE IS THEREFORE A POTENTIAL FOR MORE WIDESPREAD

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HOSTILITIES, BUT IRAQ DOES NOT WANT TO FIGHT AND IRAN CANNOT.
SO NOTHING SERIOUS IS ANTICIPATED.

4. COMMENT: THE ATTACHES COULD BE WRONG, BUT THEIR VIEWS
COINCIDE EXACTLY WITH THOSE OF EVERYONE ELSE AROUND. BAGHDAD,
AT LEAST, NO LONGER HAS EVEN THE VERY LOW-LEVEL OF CONCERN OVER
POSSIBLE MAJOR CLASHES THAT EXISTED A WEEK AGO. THIS MAY BE
THE SAME ELSEWHERE, NOW THAT THE SITUATION HAS BECOME SOMEWHAT
CLEARER, AND IS PROBABLY ENTIRELY JUSTIFIED.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BAGHDAD 854E.O. 12055: GDS 4/10/86 (PECK, EDWARD L.) OR-M
TAGS: PINT, PEPR, PINS, IZ, IR
SUBJ: IRAQ CALLS FOR IRANIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM THE GULF ISLANDSREF: FBIS JN061059^M

1. (~~C~~-ENTIRE TEXT).
2. ON APRIL 6, IRAQ'S FOREIGN MINISTER SENT A LETTER TO THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL CALLING ON IRAN TO WITHDRAW FROM THE THREE GULF ISLANDS IT OCCUPIED IN 1971. GOI MESSAGE CHARGES IRAN WITH PURSUING EXPANSIONIST POLICIES AND INTERFERING IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF ARAB GULF STATES.

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3. AN IRANIAN AYATOLLAH'S REMARKS LAST FALL, THAT BAHRAIN RIGHTLY BELONGED TO IRAN, GAVE SADDAM HIS INITIAL OPENING IN THIS INSTANCE FOR PROMOTING IRAQ'S POSITION AS PROTECTOR OF THE GULF. HE WAS FIRST OFF THE MARK--VERBALLY-- IN BAHRAIN'S DEFENSE, LEAVING THE OTHER GULF LEADERS TO APPEAR TO BE ECHOING BAGHDAD IN CONDEMNING THE IRANIANS. SADDAM WAS ALSO HANDED THE OPPORTUNITY FOR FIRST REFUSAL ON OMAN'S GULF SECURITY PLAN: THE VEHEMENCE OF HIS DENUNCIATION OF FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT IMPLIED IN THIS PLAN (PARTICULARLY U.S.), AGAIN LEFT THE REST OF THE GULF NO CHOICE

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BUT TO TRAIL ALONG BEHIND, AT LEAST PUBLICLY. THE THREE ISLANDS ARE ONE OF THE MORE DANGEROUS ISSUES IN THE AREA, BUT IRAQ HAS TAKEN NO AGGRESSIVE STEPS ALTHOUGH SADDAM HAS MADE REPEATED REFERENCE TO THE UNACCEPTABILITY OF CONTINUED IRANIAN OCCUPATION. EVEN BANI SADR'S BLUSTERING STATEMENTS ON THE ISLANDS, GIVEN IN A MARCH INTERVIEW, PROVOKED NO IMMEDIATE REACTION FROM BAGHDAD. WE UNDERSTAND, IN FACT, THAT SADDAM REALIZES THAT ON THE ISLANDS ISSUE HE DOES NOT HAVE AN MUCH FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT. AS ON OTHER GULF ISSUES- SAUDI ARABIA IS STILL SEEN AS CALLING THE SHOTS ON THIS ONE.

4. WE HAVE THEREFORE CONCLUDED THAT, JUST AS WAS INTIMATED IN THE TEXT OF THE GOI LETTER TO THE UN, THE TIMING OF IRAQ'S ANNOUNCEMENT ON THE ISLANDS WAS TO SOME EXTENT DICTATED BY THE EARLY APRIL GRENADE ATTACKS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR IRAQ'S INTERNAL STABILITY. WHETHER OR NOT IRAN WAS INVOLVED, SADDAM APPARENTLY HAS DECIDED TO USE UN CALL ON ISLANDS AS PART OF HIS EFFORTS TO KEEP PRESSURE ON TEHRAN, IN PARTICULARLY ON AN ISSUE IN WHICH HE HAD SOME HOPES OF LINING UP SUPPORT FROM OTHER ARABS, AND FOCUS INTERNAL ATTENTION ON AN EXTERNAL THREAT.

5. GULF AMBASSADORS IN BAGHDAD BELIEVE THAT GOI'S CALL FOR RETURN OF ISLANDS WAS MEANT ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY FOR DOMESTIC

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CONSUMPTION. THE GULF DIPLOMATS DO NOT EXPECT A MEANINGFUL RESPONSE FROM THEIR GOVERNMENTS ON THIS ISSUE. THEY FURTHERMORE SHARE OUR ASSESSMENT THAT SADDAM'S AMBITIONS FOR IRAQ TO TAKE OVER FROM IRAN AS THE REGION'S PARAMOUNT POWER ARE NOT SO GRANDIOSE AS TO TEMPT HIM INTO PROVING SUPERIORITY IN THE BATTLEFIELD. HIS AMBITIONS ARE TEMPERED WITH REALISM AND PRACTICALLY -- HE CAN PURSUE HIS EFFORTS TO FORGE IRAQ INTO A COUNTRY TO BE RECKONED WITH INTERNATIONALLY WITHOUT HAVING TO RISK WAR. THUS, BAGHDAD IS PLAYING DOWN THREATENING NOISES COMING FROM TEHRAN: IT INSISTS THAT IRAN IS OVER-RACTING AND RIDICULES ARMED FORCES ALERT (FBIS JN 072044 APRIL), IMPLYING THAT IT DOES NOT INTEND TO RESPOND IN KIND. REPORTS FROM TEHRAN OF BORDER SKIRMISHES ARE BEING REGARDED HERE AS RATHER INSIGNIFICANT BUT INEVITABLE WHEN TWO ARMIES ARE EYEBALLING EACH OTHER ACROSS A BORDER AREA.
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 BAGHDAD 837E.O. 12065: ~~ADS~~ 4/8/86 (PECK, EDWARD L.) OR-M
TAGS: PINT, PINS, IZ, IR, ASEC
SUBJ: APRIL 5 GRENADE ATTACK AND ITS AFTERMATHREF: A) BAGHDAD 787 (NOTAL); B) BAGHDA 820; C) FBIS JNO22135
APRIL 80; D) FBIS LDO41626 APRIL 801. ~~(C-ENTIRE TEXT)~~.

2. SUMMARY: DETAILS OF THE BOMBING INCIDENT OF APRIL 5 HAVE

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BECOME CLEARER AND THE BLAME IS PLACED SQUARELY ON IRAN.
THE LARGER QUESTION OF OVERALL INTERNAL STABILITY DOES NOT YET
APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN SERIOUSLY ALTERED, BUT THE GOI IS REPORTEDLY
WORRIED OVER THE IMPLICATIONS OF A COORDINATED THREAT. END SUMMARY.3. RUMORS OF A SECOND BOMB ATTACK ON APRIL 5 DURING FUNERAL
PROCESSION FOR STUDENTS KILLED IN APRIL 1 ATTACK HAVE NOW
BEEN CONFIRMED. AS WE UNDERSTAND THE DETAILS, A GRENADE WAS LOBBED
FROM THE BALCONY OF THE IRANIAN EMBASSY SCHOOL JUST AS FUNERAL

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CORTEGE APPROACHED. ONE PERSON WAS KILLED INSTANTLY AND MANY WOUNDED BY SHRAPNEL. PERPETRATORS APPARENTLY ASSUMED THAT SENIOR OFFICIALS LEADING THE FUNERAL AND MANY OF THE 2000 MARCHERS WOULD RUSH TO THE SCENE OF THE FIRST GRENADE, AND WOULD THEREFORE PROVIDE PERFECT TARGET FOR ANOTHER ONE INSTEAD, MARCHERS APPARENTLY NOTED SOURCE OF THE GRENADE AND STAMPEDED INTO THE SCHOOL BUILDING AND INTO ANY NEARBY HOUSE KNOWN TO BE THE HOME OF EXPATRIATE IRANIANS. SECURITY AUTHORITIES, WITH GREAT DIFFICULTY, DISPERSED THE MOB INSIDE THE BUILDING SUFFICIENTLY TO PERMIT OFFICERS TO GET TO ARREST SUSPECTS. WE ARE TOLD THAT VIRTUALLY ANY IRANIAN WHO WAS EITHER IN THE SCHOOL OR HAS ANY CONNECTION WITH IT WERE TAKEN INTO CUSTODY: WE HAVE NO DETAILS ON NUMBERS.

4. LOCAL PRESS ACCOUNTS OF THE TWO INCIDENTS NOW LIST THREE DEATHS FROM THE APRIL 1 ATTACK AND NONE FROM THE APRIL 5 ATTACK, BUT WE HAVE HEARD THAT SIX OR SEVEN HAVE NOW DIED OF INJURIES SUSTAINED APRIL 1, WITH A POSSIBLE SEVEN OR EIGHT KILLED APRIL 5. THERE FLOORS OF BAGHDAD'S MEDICAL CITY HOSPITAL ARE SAID TO BE FILLED WITH THE INJURED AND THE KARKH EMERGENCY HOSPITAL IS HAVING TO PUT TWO TO A BED. MANY OF THOSE HOSPITALIZED APRIL 5 ARE SUFFERING FROM INJURIES SUSTAINED DURING THE STAMPEDE THAT FOLLOWED THE EXPLOSION. MUHAMMAD DIBDIB, THE PRESIDENT OF THE IRAQI STUDENT UNION, WHO WAS WOUNDED APRIL 1, WAS INJURED AGAIN APRIL

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SAS HE LED THE FUNERAL CORTEGE.

5. GOI SECURITY, IN INVESTIGATING APRIL 1 ATTACK, HAS A CONFESSION FROM AN ACCOMPLICE OF SAMIR ALI GHULAM, WHO ADMITTED TO HAVING PROCURED THE GRENADE FROM A RECENTLY-DISCHARGED IRAQI SOLDIER. SECURITY HAS ALSO REPORTEDLY DISCOVERED THAT GHULAM'S SISTER IS A MEMBER OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY. IN ADDITION, CONSIDERABLE EVIDENCE WAS FOUND IN GHULAM'S APARTMENT LINKING HIM TO MARXIST MOVEMENTS AND TO THE DEMOCRATIC AND POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (DPFLP). SECURITY FORCES HAVE JAILED TWO EXPLOSIVES EXPERTS FROM DPFLP WHO THEY BELIEVE PROVIDED TRAINING TO GHULAM AND POSSIBLY TO OTHERS.

6. WE UNDERSTAND THAT GOI ANNOUNCEMENT ON APRIL 4 THAT BAGHDAD OFFICE OF DPFLP HAS BEEN CLOSED AND PERSONNEL EXPELLED ON SEVEN HOURS NOTICE WAS DIRECT RESULT OF THESE DISCOVERIES (FEF D). GOI HAS NOT PUBLICLY LINKED DPFLP EXPULSION WITH GRENADE ATTACK, AND IS SO FAR MAINTAINING LINE THAT ATTACKER WAS AN IRANIAN AGENT. NONETHELESS, SECURITY APPARENTLY DROPPED ITS FOCUS ON GHULAM'S POSSIBLE IRANIAN TIES AFTER HIS DPFLP LINKS WERE DISCOVERED. FACT THAT SECURITY SERVICES ALLOWED APRIL 5 FUNERAL CORTEGE TO PASS THROUGH NEIGHBORHOOD HEAVILY POPULATED WITH IRANIANS TENDS TO SUPPORT THIS THESIS, ALTHOUGH A MISCALCULATION OF THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM IS EQUALLY POSSIBLE.

7. THESE EVENTS HAVE GIVEN GOI ANOTHER STRONG REASON TO KEEP

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A CLOSE WATCH ON ITS IANIAN ETHNIC-PERSIAN POPULATION WE HAVE NO YET BEEN ABLE TO CONFIRM REPORTS THAT GOI IS ROUNDING UP "IRANIANS" AND BUSSING THEM TO THE BORDER, BUT SUCH A REACTION WOULD BE QUITE PLAUSIBLE. IT IS UNLIKELY, HOWEVER, THAT SADDAM WOULD RISK UNNECESSARILY OFFENDING THE SHI'ITE MAJORITY BY DEALING HIGH-HANDEDLY WITH IRAQI SHI'ITES WHO HAVE NO OBVIOUS OR SUSPECTED CONNECTION TO IRAN. IN FACT, SHI'ITE RELIGIOUS LEADERS HAVE VOICED OPEN SUPPORT OF IRAQI ACTIONS AND CONDEMNED THE PERPETRATORS OF THE ATTACKS.

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8. PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN HAS TAKEN AN AGGRESSIVE PUBLIC ATTITUDE WITH RESPECT TO THE TWO GRENADE ATTACKS. THE DAY AFTER THE APRIL 1 INCIDENT, SADDAM PAID A SURPRISE VISIT TO MUSTANSIRIYAH UNIVERSITY (THE SITE OF THE ATTACK) TO MAKE A DEFIANT SPEECH PUBLICLY LINKING GHULAM TO IRAN, SWERING VENGEANCE FOR SPILT IRAQI BLOOD, AND EXHORTING IRAQIS TO UNITE AGAINST THIS FOREIGN THREAT. HIS SPEECH WAS EMOTIONALLY POWERFUL: SEVERAL VIEWERS HAVE TOLD US THEY WERE IMPRESSED WITH AND CONVINCED OF HIS ANGER AS HE WIPED TEARS FROM HIS EYES DURING THE SPEECH. SADDAM'S SEVERAL TRIPS TO HOSPITALS TO VISIT THE WOUNDED HAVE

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BEEN COVERED FULLY BY TV AND THE PRESS, AND AGAIN VIEWERS SAW THEIR PRESIDENT IN A TOWERING RAGE OVER THE INCIDENTS.

9. COMMENT: IRAQIS WHOM WE HAVE SPOKEN DESCRIBE THE WEEK'S EVENTS AS A "CRISIS". THEY ARE DISTURBED BY THE INDISCRIMINATE NATURE OF THE GRENADE ATTACKS, PARTICULARLY BECAUSE SO MANY CHILDREN AND "INNOCENT PEOPLE" WERE INJURED. THIS ATTITUDE CONTRASTS WITH THE REACTION TO THE MANY STORIES OF POLITICALLY-

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INSPIRED MURDERS THAT HAD SWIRLED THROUGH BAGHDAD OVER THE PAST TWO MONTHS. THESE INCIDENTS WERE REGARDED WITH SOME DETACHMENT, SINCE THEY WERE AIMED AT SPECIFIC (AND IMPLICITLY LESS INNOCENT) INDIVIDUALS-LOCALLY PARTY LEADERS AND SECURITY CHIEFS. GRENADE ATTACKS ARE PERCEIVED AS ANTI-IRAQI RATHER THAN ANTI-BAATH OR GOVERNMENT, AND AT LEAST FOR THE MOMENT APPEAR TO HAVE HAD THE EFFECT OF UNITING THE PEOPLE AGAINST THIS MENACE.

10. ALTHOUGH THE BLAME IS BEING LAID SOLELY AT IRAN'S DOORSTEP FOR PUBLIC CONSUMPTION, WE UNDERSTAND THE GOI IS CONSIDERABLY WORRIED OVER GHULAM'S CLOSE ASSOCIATION WITH MARXISTS/COMMUNISTS AND THE PDFLP AND THE POSSIBILITY THAT WHAT HAD EARLIER BEEN ASSUMED TO BE LOOSELY ORGANIZED ANTI-REGIME ACTIVITIES FROM IRAQI SHI'ITES AND KHOMEININ SUPPORTERS IS NOW BEING COORDINATED BY THE COMMUNIST PARTY WITH HELP FROM A RADICAL PALESTINIAN ORGANIZATION. TEHRAN RADIO'S REPORT THAT AN IRAQI OPPOSITIONISTS GROUP IN SYRIA HAS TAKEN RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE TWO ATTACKS, WHETHER OR NOT TRUE, WILL FURTHER UNSETTLE THE REGIME AND GIVE IT A FURTHER REASON FOR EXHORTING IRAQIS TO BEWARE FOREIGN THREATS. PECK

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PA Exemptions			

~~SECRET~~ BAGHDAD 849

E.O. 12065: GDS 4/9/86 (PECK, EDWARD L.) OR-M
TAGS PEPR, PINT, IZ, IR
SUBJ: (U) IRAQ-IRAN: LIKELIHOOD OF WAR

REF: BAGHDAD 837 ✓

1. ~~(S)~~-ENTIRE TEXT)
2. BARRING SERIOUS MISCALCULATIONS BY THE PARTIES,

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PAGE 02 BAGHDA 00849 121119Z

(ALWAYS A POSSIBILITY) WE TEND TO DOUBT THAT THERE WILL BE AN OUTBREAK OF WAR BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN UNLESS INTERNAL SITUATIONS IN EITHER OR BOTH OF THE TWO COUNTRIES DETERIORATE MARKEDLY. WE BASE THIS JUDGMENT ON AN ANALYSIS OF IRAQ'S POLICIES AND POLITICS AND AN ATTEMPT TO GUESS AT IRAN'S .

3.OBSERVERS HERE WERE GENERALLY AGREED THAT IRAQ WAS NOT ACTIVELY SEEKING AND DID NOT DESIRE WIDESPREAD, SERIOUS HOSTILITIES WITH IRAN, PREFERRING INSTEAD TO CONCENTRATE ON OTHER IMPORTANT ISSUES-

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AN ATTITUDE BELIEVED SHARED TO A CONSIDERABLE DEGREE IN TEHRAN. IRAQ WAS EVIDENTLY CONTENT TO DEAL WITH THE SHORT-TERM ASPECTS OF THE PERCEIVED IRANIAN THREAT BY ACTIVELY SUPPORTING KURDISH AND ARAB DISSIDENTS WHO WERE KEEPING THE AYATOLLAH'S REGIME OFF BALANCE AND DISTRACTED (AS WELL AS EMPLOYING THE OCCASIONAL MINOR BORDER INCUSION). THIS APPROACH DID NOTHING TOWARD RESOLVING THE BASIC PROBLEMS, AND OF COURSE DRAMATICALLY ADDED TO THEM, BUT IT APPEARED TO SATISFY THE GOI AS LONG AS THE BALANCE REMAINED IN IRAQ'S FAVOR.

4. THIS WAS CLEARLY THE CASE UNTIL RECENTLY, SINCE BAGHDAD WAS ABLE TO GENERATE FAR MORE DIFFICULTIES FOR TEHRAN THAN WAS TRUE IN THE REVERSE. ON THIS SIDE OF THE BORDER, THE INTERNAL UNREST THAT HAD BEEN ANTICIPATED, ESPECIALLY AMONG THE SHI'A, FOLLOWING THE FALL OF THE SHAH FAILED TO DEVELOP--AT LEAST AS SOON AS OR TO THE EXTENT THAT MANY EXPECTED.

5. THE RECENT UPSURGE IN URBAN INCIDENTS, BOTH TERRORIST BOMBINGS AND TARGETED ASSASSINATIONS, IS A NEW AND IMPORTANT FACTOR IN ANY ASSESSMENT OF WHAT IRAQ IS LIKELY TO DO VIS-A-VIS IRAN. THERE HAS BEEN A MARKED TIGHTENING OF SECURITY AND A PRESUMED HEIGHTENING OF CONCERN, BUT OUR ESTIMATE--WHICH APPEARS TO BE SHARED BY THE MAJORITY OF OUR COLLEAGUES IS THAT THE IRAQIS REMAIN UNLIKELY TO MOVE TO ARMED CONFRONTATION WITH IRAN AT THIS TIME.

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PAGE 03 BAGHDA 00849 121119Z

6. EVERYONE AGREES THAT THE PRIMARY CONCERN OF IRAQ'S LEADERSHIP IS TO REMAIN IN POWER. INTERNAL DISSENT, THE MAJOR THREAT, HAS TRADITIONALLY BEEN DEALT WITH SWIFTLY AND VICIOUSLY, A PATTERN THAT WILL UNDOUBTEDLY BE FOLLOWED NOW. THE BAAATH IS ACCUSTOMED TO SUCH PROCEDURES AND RECOGNIZES THAT EVEN IN A SOLIDLY-UNIFIED AND TOTALLY-SUPPORTIVE POPULATION IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO RULE OUT THE OCCASIONAL HOSTILE ACTION. THIS HAS LONG BEEN PUBLICLY ACKNOWLEDGED AS BEING THE CASE IN IRAQI KURDISTAN, HAS NOW BEEN ACCEPTED AS A FACT IN THE REST OF THE COUNTRY AS WELL, AND IS SEEN AS BAD BUT NOT SERIOUS.

7. THERE ARE MANY OTHER FACTORS THAT WOULD ACT TO RESTRAIN BAGHDAD, NOT THE LEAST OF WHICH IS FEAR OF EVENTUALLY HAVING TO ENGAGE IN A TWO-FRONT WAR, THE LONG-STANDING PHOBIA WHICH THE SUDDENLY INCREASED TENSIONS ON THE EASTERN BORDER HAVE PROBABLY MAGNIFIED TO A CONSIDERABLE DEGREE. THE LEADERSHIP, IN OUR OPINION, HAS FAR TOO MANY MAJOR PROBLEMS, ACTIVITIES, AND OBJECTIVES WHICH OCCUPY ITS ATTENTION TO BE PREPARED TO TAKE ON AN ARMED CONFLICT WITH IRAN. YET, AND BECAUSE OF THE NATURE OF THE TWO REGIMES, IT CAN BE ANTICIPATED THAT EACH SIDE WILL ATTEMPT TO STEP UP ITS EFFORTS TO GENERATE INTERNAL PROBLEMS FOR THE OTHER. SHOULD THE GOI REACH THE CONCLUSION THAT TEHRAN'S ACTIVITIES CONSTITUTE A CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER TO ITS SURVIVAL THEN ALL BETS ARE OFF. WE ESTIMATE THAT THIS SITUATION HAS NOT YET BEEN CREATED, IS RELATIVELY UNLIKELY, ESPECIALLY IN THE SHORT-RUN

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AND THAT IF NO ONE BLUNDERS, THE CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS
WILL CONTINUE MORE OR LESS AS IT IS.
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PAGE 01 BAGHDA 00064 142157Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ADS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-01
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ICA-11 SSN-02 SES-01 SSM-03 SPH-01 ACDA-12 DCT-02
IO-14 HA-05 /117 W

-----076718 142237Z /20

R 130908Z JAN 80
FM USINT BAGHDAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9383
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BAGHDAD 0064

E.O. 12065: GDS 1/13/86 (PECK, EDWARD L.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, IZ, IR
SUBJECT: (U) RELATIONS WITH IRAN

1. (C) IRAQIS HAVE GIVEN CONSIDERABLE PRESS COVERAGE TO A BAGHDAD MEETING OF THE FOUNDING CONFERENCE OF THE ARABISTAN STUDENTS LEAGUE (IRAQ BRANCH), HELD FOR TWO DAYS UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE NATIONAL UNION OF IRAQI STUDENTS. ATTENDEES STOOD IN SILENCE FOR ONE MINUTE IN HONOR OF ARABISTAN MARTYRS AND LISTENED TO SPEAKERS OF THE NUIS AND THE BAATH PARTY'S NATIONAL YOUTH AND STUDENT BUREAU CONDEMN THE RACIST AND CHAUVINISTIC DOMINATION OF THE ARAB PEOPLES OF IRAN BY THE NEW DICTATORIAL REGIME.

2. (C) COMMENT: ARABISTAN CONFERENCE MAY BE ONE OF IRAQ'S ANSWERS TO THE CONFERENCE OF NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS IN TEHRAN. PRESS COVERAGE HAD BEEN RELATIVELY LOW-KEY DURING THE CONFERENCE SESSIONS, BUT EH ARABISTAN STUDENTS' TELEGRAM TO SADDAM HUSSEIN UPON ADJOURNMENT, PLEDGING THEIR CONTINUED STRUGGLE FOR THEIR LEGAL

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NATIONAL RIGHTS, WAS PROMINENTLY FEATURED ON THE FRONT PAGE OF JUMHURIYA JANUARY 12.

3. (C) WHY IRAQ CHOSE TO BREAK THE RECENT LULL IN ANTI-IRAN POLEMICS (NEWS STORIES ON CLASHES IN IRAN WERE PLAYED RELATIVELY STRAIGHT, BY IRAQI STANDARDS) IS HARD TO DETERMINE, ALTHOUGH WE UNDERSTAND THAT TEHRAN HAS CONTINUED ITS RHETORICAL ATTACKS ON IRAQ. FOUNDING OF THE ARABISTAN LEAGUE,

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AT A TIME WHEN IRANIAN AMBASSADOR DOAI HAS
REPORTEDLY JUST NEGOTIATED ANOTHER TRUCE WITH IRAQ,
ONLY SERVES TO ILLUSTRATE HOW VISCERAL THE FEELINGS
HAVE BECOME ON BOTH SIDES OF THE FRONTIER, AND HOW
DIFFICULT IT HAS BECOME TO MAINTAIN EVEN A SHORT
RESPITE.
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PAGE 01 BAGHDA 00265 01 OF 02 102027Z
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 SSO-00 /031 W

-----015841 102048Z /64

R 071151Z FEB 80
FM USINT BAGHDAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9491
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY DOHA
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY MANAMA
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
AMEMBASSY SANA
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 0265~~EXDIS~~

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E.O. 12065: XDS-4 2/6/00 (PECK, EDWARD L.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, IZ, US, XF
SUBJECT: (U) MEETING WITH MFA OFFICIAL: U.S. CONCERNS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

1. (~~SECRET~~-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. ON FEBRUARY 5 I HAD A ONE HOUR CONVERSATION WITH WISSAM ZAHAWI, COUNSELLOR TO FINMIN HAMMADI AND FORMERLY DIRECTOR OF THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT (DEVELOPED WORLD). ZAHAWI WAS AS USUAL VERY OPEN AND DIRECT. HIS POSITION, AND THE FACT THAT HE IS BASICALLY A GOOD FRIEND OF THE U.S. MAKE HIS COMMENTS WORTHY OF NOTE.

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3. ISLAMIC CONFERENCE. ZAHAWI ACCOMPANIED FONMIN HAMMADI TO ISLAMABAD, WHICH HE REPORTS IRAQI CONSIDERS TO HAVE BEEN A SUCCESS. THE GOI'S PUBLIC POSITION ON THE SOVIET INTERVENTION WAS REFLECTED IN THE DECISIONS, AS WERE IRAQ'S DESIRES TO ENSURE THAT ATTENTION WAS NOT EXCESSIVELY DIVERTED FROM MIDDLE EAST ISSUES WHICH SHOULD BE GREATER CONCERN ARABS: ISRAEL, THE CDA, U.S. INTERVENTION IN THE AREA.

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-ZAHAWI SAID HE HOPED THAT WE ARE NOW ABLE TO UNDERSTAND THAT THE ARAB NATIONS, AS A GROUP, ARE FAR MORE CONCERNED ABOUT THE ACTUALITY OF U.S.-SUPPORTED ZIONIST INTRUSIONS (AND THE POSSIBILITY OF THE U.S. ON ITS OWN MOVING INTO THE AREA) THAN THEY ARE ABOUT SOVIET INVOLVEMENT ON THEIR PERIPHERY. ZIONISM HAS LONG POSED A MUCH LARGER THREAT, AND THE COSTS OF CONTINUING TO SUPPORT IT SHOULD BECOME INCREASINGLY CLEAR TO THE U.S. WITH THE PASSAGE OF TIME.

4. IRAN AND THE HOSTAGES. ZAHAWI WANTED TO BE SURE THE U.S. WAS AWARE OF IRAQ'S KEY ROLE IN RAISING THE HOSTAGE QUESTION, DESPITE THE UNWILLINGNESS OF THE MAJORITY OF DELEGATES TO HAVE THE SUBJECT COME UP. HAMMADI HAD MADE A FORCEFUL PRESENTATION, STRESSING THAT TAKING AND KEEPING THE HOSTAGES GROSSLY VIOLATED THE LAWS OF ISLAM AND GENERATED HIGHLY ADVERSE PUBLIC REACTIONS. (ZAHAWI DREW CAREFUL ATTENTION TO THIS

J
POINT, AND APPEARED TO BE INDICATING THAT OUR EARLIER DEMARCHES ON THIS SUBJECT HAD REACHED THE UPPER LEVELS OF THE MFA.) THE WELL-KNOWN IRAQI POSITION - AND FEAR - THAT RETENTION OF THE HOSTAGES ALSO CREATES AND

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STRENGTHENS CIRCUMSTANCES THAT WILL LEAD TO FURTHER SUPER-POWER INVOLVEMENT WAS ALSO A POINT THAT HAMMADI STRONGLY STRESSED.

5. RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. ZAHAWI CALLED ATTENTION TO SADDAM HUSSEIN'S AL-WATAN SPEECH (BAGHDAD 246) IN WHICH THE LATTER UNDERLINED THAT THE LACK OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WAS STILL THE BEST MEANS AT IRAQ'S DISPOSAL FOR INDICATING ITS TOTAL AND CONTINUED REJECTION OF AMERICAN SUPPORT OF ISRAEL. ZAHAWI PERSONALLY SAW NO NEED FOR OPENING CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION, SINCE THE U.S. IS PERFECTLY AWARE OF IRAQI VIEWS. ANY FUTURE DIALOGUES WERE LIKELY TO BE AS STERILE AND UNPRODUCTIVE AS THOSE OF THE PAST. NOTHING, HE ADDED, HAD CHANGED SINCE THE VANCE-HAMMADI MEETING IN 1977, AT WHICH ALL OF THE ESSENTIAL POINTS HAD BEEN MADE.

6. CONTINUING ON THE SAME GENERAL SUBJECT, ZAHAWI SAID THAT HE WAS CONTINUALLY AMAZED AT THE INABILITY OF SUCCESSIVE U.S. ADMINISTRATIONS - APPARENTLY REFLECTING A TOTAL LACK OF UNDERSTANDING BY THE AMERICAN PUBLIC - TO RECOGNIZE HOW MUCH OF WHAT AMERICAN SANCTIMONIOUSLY SAYS IT STANDS FOR HAS BEEN DESTROYED BY BLIND SUPPORT OF ISRAEL. HE ADDED THAT HE HAD THE IMPRESSION OTHER ARABS, INCLUDING BHOSE

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PAGE 01 BAGHDA 00265 02 OF 02 102028Z
ACTION SS-30

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-----015842 102048Z /66

R 071151Z FEB 80
FM USINT BAGHDAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9492
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY DOHA
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY MANAMA
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
AMEMBASSY SANA
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 BAGHDAD 0265

~~EXDIS~~

WHO HAVE TRADITIONALLY BEEN REGARDED AS AMERICA'S
CLOSE FRIENDS, HAVE BEEN MAKING THIS POINT IN MUCH
STRONGER AND CLEARER TERMS IN RECENT MONTHS. THE GROWING
REJECTION OF THE ENTIRE U.S. POLICY, AND PARTICULARLY
THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS, MAY NOW SUCCEED IN DRIVING THIS
POINT HOME IN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL TERMS, WHERE EARLIER
APPEALS TO REASON, JUSTICE AND HUMANITY HAVE FAILED.

--THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT CANNOT REALLY EXPECT
PUBLIC OPINION, ESPECIALLY IN ARAB/MUSLIM COUNTRIES, TO
BE IMPRESSED BY THE FACT THAT 104 NATIONS VOTED TO
CONDEMN SOVIET INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN, WHEN THE
U.S. HAS CONSISTENTLY BEEN ABLE TO IGNORE FAR MORE
DECISIVE VOTES ON THE SUBJECT OF THE ISRAELI OCCUPATION

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OF PALESTINE. ZAHAWI SUGGESTED THAT ONCE A POLICY THAT
HAS BEEN LABELED AS MORAL IS ALTERED TO FIT OTHER
CIRCUMSTANCES, IT IS NO LONGER MORAL BUT POLITICAL:
THERE CAN BE NO SUCH THING AS SELECTIVE MORALITY. THUS,
WHILE AMERICAN PROUDLY PROCLAIMS CONCERN FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
AS ONE OF THE BASIC PRECEPTS OF ITS FOREIGN POLICY,
IT BALNDLY IGNORES TH PLIGHT OF THE PALESTINIANS
AND EXPECTS THE REST OF THE WORLD TO SEETHAT AS BEING
SOMEHOW DIFFERENT.

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--THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS, MANUFACTURED BY AMERICA, DO NOT EVEN CONCERN THEMSELVES WITH THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEES OUTSIDE THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. THEY ARE EVIDENTLY TO BE BANISHED FROM THEIR HOMELAND FOREVER, YET THE U.S. EXPECTS ARABS TO BE CONCERNED ABOUT REFUGEES ELSEWHERE THAT THE U.S. CONSIDERS IMPORTANT.

--AMERICA EXPECTS THE ARABS, AND THE WORLD, TO BE CONVINCED THAT BY EXPRESSING REGRET, OR RESTATING THAT IT IS ILLEGAL AND NOT HELPFUL, THE U.S. IS EFFECTIVELY ACTING TO PREVENT IMPLEMENTATION OF ISRAELI SETTLEMENT POLICIES IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, UNDERTAKEN WITH U.S. FINANCIAL SUPPORT.

--AFTER PUBLICLY CASTIGATING OTHERS (INCLUDING IRAQ) FOR PAST EFFORTS TO EXPRESS CONCERNS OVER VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THE OLYMPIC GAMES, E.G. SOUTH AFRICAN PARTICIPATION, THE U.S. NOW EXPECTS OTHERS TO BOYCOTT THE OLYMPICS IN MOSCOW.

7. COMMENT: ZAHAWI HAS HAD CONSIDERABLE EXPERIENCE IN THE U.S., BOTH AS AN UNDERGRADUATE AND AS A DIPLOMAT, AND HAS ALWAYS BEEN CONSIDERED A FRIEND. ALTHOUGH HE

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FLATLY REJECTED EXPLANATIONS OF OUR POLICIES, HIS PRESENTATION WAS MADE IN A RATIONAL AND NON-EMOTIONAL MANNER. THE COMMENTS APPEAR TO REFLECT SOME OF THE SAME FRUSTRATIONS WITH U.S. POLICY THAT WE HAVE NOTED IN MESSAGES FROM OTHER EMBASSIES IN THE AREA. THEY ARE REPORTED HERE PRINCIPALLY BECAUSE OF OUR LIMITED DIRECT ACCESS TO THE VIEWS OF SENIOR GOI OFFICIALS.
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PAGE 01 BAGHDA 00055 101135Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ADS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-01
INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 SP-02 SS-15
ICA-11 DCT-02 SY-05 SSN-02 SSM-03 SES-01 SPH-01
IO-14 /105 W

-----047192 101143Z /20

P R 100745Z JAN 80
FM USINT BAGHDAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9374
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON

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E.O. 12065: GDS 1/10/86 (PECK, EDWARD L.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, IZ, IR, XF
SUBJ: (U) RELATIONS WITH IRAN AND THE HOSTAGE QUESTION
REF: A) STATE 02094; B) BAGHDAD 049 ✓

1. (X-ENTIRE TEXT).
2. IN FURTHER RESPONSE TO REF A, WE OBTAINED A MEETING JANUARY 9 WITH TAHA AL-QAYSI, THE NEW (AND TEMPORARY), HEAD OF THE MFA'S FIRST INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT. REQUESTED AS A COURTESY CALL, THE MEETING QUICKLY GOT DOWN TO IRAQI-IRANIAN RELATIONS AND THE AMERICAN HOSTAGES.

3. QAYSI IS EVIDENTLY ANOTHER FIRM BELIEVER IN THE THESIS THAT THE EVENTS IN TEHRAN HAVE BEEN MANUFACTURED, AND ARE MERELY

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A MEANS OF FACILITATING ACCESS TO THE AREA BY THE USG, SOMETHING WE HAVE LONG BEEN SEEKING TO ACCOMPLISH. AFTER HE HAD GONE ON AT SOME LENGTH IN THIS VEIN, WE ASKED HIM HOW HE COULD EXPLAIN THE LACK OF ACTION ON AMERICA'S PART. IF THE HOSTAGES WERE THE SOUGHT-AFTER EXCUSE, WHY IS IT THAT WE DID NOT IMMEDIATELY ACT THE DAY AFTER THEY WERE TAKEN?

4. WE STRESSED THAT THE 66 DAYS THAT HAD ALREADY PASSED WERE POSITIVE PROOF THAT THE U.S. DID NOT WISH TO TAKE HOSTILE

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MEASURES. PRESIDENT CARTER HAD MADE ABUNDANTLY CLEAR THAT OUR ONLY OBJECTIVE AT THIS TIME WAS TO GET THE HOSTAGES OUT, THEREBY REMOVING THE NECESSITY OF RESORTING TO HARSH ACTS. THE PATIENCE OF THE AMERICAN PUBLIC, WHICH IS SOLIDLY BEHIND THE PRESIDENT IN HIS RESOLVE NOT TO SURRENDER TO BLACKMAIL, WAS NEVERTHELESS BEGINNING TO WEAR THIN. THE PEOPLE ARE BEGINNING TO BECOME SOMEWHAT RESTIVE, AS THE IRAQIS THEMSELVES HAD BEEN WHEN SOME OF THEIR OWN TEACHERS WERE HELD IN IRAN.

5. THE USG THEREFORE WISHED TO SECURE THE HELP OF EVERY COUNTRY IN SECURING THE PROMPT RELEASE OF THE AMERICAN PRISONERS. CERTAINLY THE GOI, WHICH BELIEVED THE THEIR CONTINUED DETENTION WAS CLEARLY NOT IN ANYONE'S BEST INTERESTS, COULD ASSIST IN THIS REGARD. (WE ALSO HEAVILY UNDERLINED THE OTHER POINTS IN REF A, BUT THE MAIN FOCUS WAS ON IRAQI CONCERNS OVER POSSIBLE U.S. INTERVENTION WHICH PREOCCUPIES THE LEADERSHIP.)

6. NORTH AMERICAN DESK OFFICER IBRAHIM, WHO WAS PRESENT, WAS INSTRUCTED TO TAKE NOTES OF THE MEETING. QAYSI LISTENED CAREFULLY AND DESCRIBED RELATIONS WITH IRAN AND THE OBSTACLES TO ANY IRAQI ACTION IN THE SAME GENERAL TERMS AS HAD ZAHAWI (REF B). HE STATED HE WOULD CONVEY THE SUBSTANCE OF THE DEMARCHE TO HIS SUPERIORS.

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7. COMMENT: HE PROBABLY WILL, BUT WE CANNOT BE TOO HOPEFUL THAT IT WILL HAVE MUCH EFFECT. EVEN ALLOWING FOR THE RHETORIC, IRAQ APPEARS CONVINCED THAT WE HAVE STAGED THE EVENTS IN TEHRAN FOR OUR OWN PURPOSES. AS FOR HELPING WITH THE HOSTAGES, THE GOI SEEMS TO BELIEVE THAT THERE IS LITTLE IT CAN DO.
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PAGE 01 BAGHDA 00062 140347Z
ACTION NEA-11

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INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 SP-02 SS-15
ICA-11 /077 W

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R 111147Z JAN 80
FM USINT BAGHDAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9380
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE 9204489 IS, FPC/CDR 1186 Date 9/20/96

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FOIA Exemptions		() CLASSIFY as () S or () C
PA Exemptions		() DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () C

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E.O. 12065: GDS 1/11/80 (PECK, EDWARD L.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, IZ, SY
SUBJECT: (C) IRAQI-SYRIAN RELATIONS: THERE ARE NONE

REF: DAMASCUS 182 AND PREVIOUS

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT).

2. IRAQI MEDIA CONTINUE TO IGNORE THE EXISTENCE OF SYRIA, A BLACKOUT SO COMPLETE THAT NOT EVEN SECTARIAN VIOLENCE ATTRIBUTED TO INTERNATIONAL PRESS SOURCES IS REPORTED. THE RECENT BAATH CONGRESS AS WELL AS THE NAMING OF A NEW PRIME MINISTER (REFTTEL) HAVE NOT BEEN MENTIONED. SYRIA IS SIMPLY NOT THERE.

3. COMMENT: IRAQ DOES NOT NORMALLY SPARE ITS REAL OR IMAGINED ENEMIES, AS MANY COUNTRIES HAVE REASON TO KNOW, AND CAN GENERALLY BE RELIED UPON TO HEAP VILIFICATION AND CALUMNY UPON ANY GOVERNMENT WITH WHICH IT DOES NOT AGREE ON A GIVEN ISSUE. ARABS HAVE NOT BEEN EXEMPT

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FROM THIS TREATMENT, AND COUNTRIES SUCH AS OMAN, OR LIBYA, O THE SUDAN HAVE BEEN THE TARGET OF PUBLIC INSULT IN RECENT TIMES. IN THE SAME MANNER, THE EXISTENCE OF A SERIOUS DIRECT THREAT, E.G. IRAN, DOES NOT DETER A HOSTILE PRESS. IT IS IN THIS CONTEXT THAT THE SILENCE OF SYRIA IS SOMEWHAT SURPRISING.

4. IT APPEARS TO REFLECT A QUITE PROFOUND EMOTION. SADDAM IS REPORTEDLY TO HAVE FELT PERSONALLY BETRAYED BY

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ASSAD'S ALLEGED INVOLVEMENT IN LAST JULY'S CONSPIRACY. WE UNDERSTAND THAT HE HAS TOTALLY IGNORED ASSAD EVERY TIME THEY HAVE BEEN IN THE SAME PLACE, AS AT THE TUNIS SUMMIT, AND HAS FLATLY REJECTED EVERY OFFER OF MEDIATION. HE SEEMS TO BE IN A SUSTAINED, DEEP AND COLD RAGE.

5. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE SILENCE RESULTS FROM GOI PREOCCUPATION WITH IRAN, SINCE IT PREDATES THE MOST RECENT ESCALATION OF TENSIONS, NOR IS IT LIKELY TO REFLECT A DESIRE TO AVOID WEAKENING THE ANTI-CAMP DAVID BLOC, SINCE THE BIG DAMAGE HAS ALREADY BEEN DONE AND IS BEING MAINTAINED. THERE IS LITTLE EVIDENCE THAT INTERNAL DIVISIONS ARE THE CAUSE. SADDAM, IN THE ONLY METAPHOR THAT SEEMS TO APPLY, HAS SIMPLY TURNED ASSAD'S PICTURE TO THE WALL.

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PAGE 01 BAGHDA 00030 071344Z
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DEPARTMENT

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E.O. 12065: GDS 1/7/86 (PECK, EDWARD L.) OR-M

TAGS: PEPR, IR, IZ

SUBJ: (U) MEDIA COVERAGE ON IRAN

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REF: STATE 02094 N

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT).

2. THERE IS VERY LITTLE LIKELIHOOD THAT USINT WILL BE ABLE TO MAKE ANY DIRECT INPUTS INTO MEDIA COVERAGE OF EVENTS IN IRAN. THERE ARE NO ICA PROGRAMS IN OPERATION, NOR ARE ANY USICA PERSONNEL PRESENTLY AT POST, AND OUR CONTACTS WITH IRAQI RADIO/PRESS PEOPLE ARE AS SHARPLY LIMITED AS THOSE IN THE REST OF THE GOVERNMENT.

3. WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO ARRANGE MEETINGS WITH MID-LEVEL MFA OFFICIALS AND WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN'S TRANSLATOR (ZAHAWI, FORMERLY WITH MININFO) THUS FAR WITHOUT SUCCESS, TO CONTINUE THE DIALOGUE ON IRAN AND RAISE THE SPECIFIC POINTS CONTAINED REFTTEL. PECK

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PAGE 01 BAGHDA 00049 091708Z
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INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
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AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON

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E.O. 12065: GDS 1/9/86 (PECK, EDWARD L.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, IZ, IR, XF
SUBJ: (U) RELATIONS WITH IRAN AND MEDIA COVERAGE

REFS: A) STATE 02094; B) BAGHDAD 030 (NOTAL)

1. ~~S~~-ENTIRE TEXT).

2. MAZEN ZAHAWI (PROTECT FULLY) FORMERLY WITH MININFO AND NOW SADDAM HUSSEIN'S TRANSLATOR, CAME BY USINT JANUARY 8 AS A RESULT OF OUR EFFORTS TO CONTACT HIM, REF B, FOR A DISCUSSION OF INTENSIFIED MEDIA COVERAGE ON IRAN AS REQUESTED REF A. DURING COURSE OF THE CALL, ZAHAWI MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:
-IRAQ IS SERIOUSLY DESIROUS OF IMPROVING ITS RELATIONS WITH IRAN. IN HIS JANUARY 6 ARMY DAY SPEECH, SADDAM CLEARLY STATED THIS FACT, AND EMPHASIZED THAT THE REQUIREMENTS HAD BEEN CAREFULLY EXPLAINED TO THEIRANIAN AMBASSADOR "A FEW DAYS EARLIER".

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THE GOI IS NOW HOPEFUL THAT THE SITUATION WILL IMPROVE ACROSS THE BOARD.
-IRAQ IS HAVING EXACTLY THE SORTS OF DIFFICULTIES THAT WALDHEIM ENCOUNTERED IN TEHRAN, I.E. NO ONE SEEMS TO SPEAK FOR THE COUNTRY AS A WHOLE. THIS HAS MADE THE SITUATION MORE DIFFICULT.
-IRAQ FULLY AGREES THAT THE AMERICAN HOSTAGES MUST BE RELEASED BOTH FOR REASONS OF INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE AND BECAUSE PERHAPS MORE IMPORTANTLY) OF THE FEAR THAT CONTINUED DETENTION WILL LEAD TO AMERICAN INTERVENTION.

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-BECAUSE OF THE CURRENT STATE OF RELATIONS, AND PARTICULARLY BECAUSE OF THE CONSTANT CHARGES THAT IRAQ IS AN AMERICAN LACKEY, THE GOI HAS HESITATED TO DIRECTLY ADDRESS THE QUESTION OF THE AMERICAN HOSTAGES, PREFERRING INSTEAD TO STRESS IN GENERAL TERMS THE ILLEGALITY OF VIOLATING DIPLOMATIC PREMISES AND PRACTICES. IRAQ HAS THEREFORE CONCENTRATED ON THE TREATMENT ACCORDED ITS OWN PERSONNEL IN IRAN, BUT BY EXTENSION THESE PROTESTATIONS ALSO APPLY TO THE AMERICAN EMBASSY.

-IN CONCERT "WITH THE OTHER GULF COUNTRIES" IRAQ HOPES TO UNDERTAKE A POLICY TO LET THE IRANIANS KNOW THAT THEIR BEHAVIOR IS REFLECTING ADVERSELY ON ISLAM. THIS IS SOMETHING OF WHICH ALL MUSLIMS ARE ACCUTELY AWARE, BUT THE APPROACH MUST BE CAREFULLY HANDLED SO AS NOT TO PROVOKE MORE PROBLEMS THAN IT IS INTENDED TO RESOLVE.

3. (C) COMMENT: ZAHAWI IS ONE OF ONLY TWO IRAQI OFFICIALS WHO HAVE SET FOOT IN THE BUILDING IN THE PAST TWO YEARS. (THE OTHER IS A COUSIN OF SADDAM HUSSEIN.) BECAUSE OF WHERE HE WORKS, WE ARE CERTAIN THAT HIS VISIT TO USINT WAS APPROVED, BUT WE ARE NOT SO SURE THAT THE INFORMATION HE CONVEYED IS CLEARED GOI POLICY: HE PROBABLY CAME MORE TO LISTEN THAN TO TALK.

4. (C) NONETHELESS, VIRTUALLY EVERYTHING THAT HE SAID ACCORDS
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WITH IMPRESSIONS AND JUDGMENTS ESTABLISHED BY OBSERVERS HERE. THE IRAQIS ARE CAUGHT IN A SITUATION WHICH IS BOTH COMPLICATED AND DANGEROUS INsofar AS RELATIONS WITH IRAN ARE CONCERNED. IN A SENSE, THE ENTIRE COUNTRY IS HOSTAGE TO THE IRANIAN FANATICS BOTH BECAUSE OF THE POTENTIAL THREAT FROM THE INTERNAL SHIA POPULATION AND BECAUSE OF A POSSIBLY MILITARY CONFRONTATION. THUS, WHILE THE GOI PROBABLY SHARES AN APPRECIATION OF THE POINTS CONTAINED REF A, AND MAY EVEN HAVE A WILLINGNESS TO DIRECTLY SUPPORT OUR EFFORTS TO SECURE RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES, THEY WOULD PROBABLY CONCLUDE THAT THEY ARE UNABLE TO DO SO BECAUSE OF POSSIBLE ADVERSE EFFECTS ON THEMSELVES.

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WASHINGTON

October 2, 1989 3922880

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NATIONAL SECURITY DIRECTIVE 26

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
THE DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
THE DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY

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OCT - 4 1989

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SUBJECT: U.S. Policy toward the Persian Gulf (U)

Access to Persian Gulf oil and the security of key friendly states in the area are vital to U.S. national security. The United States remains committed to defend its vital interests in the region, if necessary and appropriate through the use of U.S. military force, against the Soviet Union or any other regional power with interests inimical to our own. The United States also remains committed to support the individual and collective self-defense of friendly countries in the area to enable them to play a more active role in their own defense and thereby reduce the necessity for unilateral U.S. military intervention. The United States also will encourage the effective support and participation of our western allies and Japan to promote our mutual interests in the Persian Gulf region. (U)

Force Levels

I endorse the Secretary of Defense's decision to reduce the U.S. naval presence in the Indian Ocean to the deployment of either a Carrier Battle Group (CVBG) or a Battleship Battle Group (BBBG) for six months annually. Whenever the U.S. naval presence is "gapped", the Department of Defense will designate a CVBG or BBBG to respond to contingencies in the region on short notice. The Department of Defense also should attempt to schedule other military deployments or activities in the region during such

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periods. Any future major force reductions or adjustments in the Indian Ocean or Persian Gulf will be undertaken only after appropriate interagency consultations. The Director of Central Intelligence should increase collection on early warning indicators in the Gulf area, particularly when there is a "gap" in the U.S. Indian Ocean presence. (S)

It is important for the United States to continue to nurture the mutually beneficial and enduring cooperative security relationships with the GCC states that grew out of the Iran/Iraq war. The Department of Defense should seek to maintain and, if possible, increase its peacetime and contingency access to friendly regional states, and to broaden the scope of security cooperation through military exercises, prepositioning arrangements and contingency planning. (S)

Arms Sales

The United States will sell U.S. military equipment to help friendly regional states meet their legitimate defense requirements, so long as such sales do not present a security threat to Israel. (C)

The Secretaries of State and Defense should develop a strategy for a long-term program of arms sales to Saudi Arabia and the other GCC states that serves our national interest but does not increase Israel's security burden. This strategy should focus on those sales likely to be requested that might be controversial, such as main battle tanks and advanced fighter aircraft, and outline actions for the Administration to undertake in order to obtain congressional and domestic support for such sales. (S)

Iraq

Normal relations between the United States and Iraq would serve our longer-term interests and promote stability in both the Gulf and the Middle East. The United States Government should propose economic and political incentives for Iraq to moderate its behavior and to increase our influence with Iraq. At the same time, the Iraqi leadership must understand that any illegal use of chemical and/or biological weapons will lead to economic and political sanctions, for which we would seek the broadest possible support from our allies and friends. Any breach by Iraq of IAEA safeguards in its nuclear program will result in a similar response. Human rights considerations should continue to be an important element in our policy toward Iraq. In addition, Iraq should be urged to cease its meddling in external affairs, such as in Lebanon, and be encouraged to play a constructive role in negotiating a settlement with Iran and cooperating in the Middle East peace process. (S)

We should pursue, and seek to facilitate, opportunities for U.S. firms to participate in the reconstruction of the Iraqi economy, particularly in the energy area, where they do not conflict with

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our non-proliferation and other significant objectives. Also, as a means of developing access to and influence with the Iraqi defense establishment, the United States should consider sales of non-lethal forms of military assistance, e.g., training courses and medical exchanges, on a case by case basis. (S)

Iran

The United States should continue to be prepared for a normal relationship with Iran on the basis of strict reciprocity. A process of normalization must begin with Iranian action to cease its support for international terrorism and help obtain the release of all American hostages, which will not be a matter for bargaining or blackmail. Other criteria Iran must meet before full normalization of U.S.-Iranian relations include halting its subversive activities and improving relations with its neighbors, making a good faith effort toward a peace treaty with Iraq, and improving its human rights practices. (C)

It is critical that the United States continue to speak with one voice regarding Iran. The Department of State should be the conduit for all contacts with Iran, keeping other National Security Council members informed. Except for authorized U.S. Government officials meeting with any potential source who may have information that could help obtain release of our hostages in Lebanon, our dealings should be with Iranian government officials, not with factions or intermediaries. (C)

The Soviet Union

The United States should continue to engage the Soviets in a dialogue on regional issues, doing what we can to discourage arms sales and potential meddling in Iran and elsewhere in the region. (S)

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89-40

October 3, 1989

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Jerry Nisenson

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Mary Knox, Agency for International Development

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Kerry Reynolds, Department of Agriculture
Amy Brooksbank
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NAC MEETING 89-40
October 3, 1988
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1. DEBT ARREARAGES REPORT

The Eximbank representative stated that her agency was withholding any lending to the public sector in Colombia until all public sector arrears were cleared. The Agriculture representative said that USDA was treating Iraq as being current on all obligations. He added that Iraq was reported as owing a nominal arrearage but that this represented a penalty interest payment under dispute. Arrears reported due from Jamaica had been cleared through a rescheduling agreement.

2. AGRICULTURAL EXPORT CREDIT SALES

- (a) Iraq - \$1,000 million - GSM-102 (FY 1990 program)
(NAC Doc. 89-74)

The Agriculture representative said that USDA had dropped its request (NAC Doc. 89-113) for \$30 million in additional guarantee authority for Iraq for FY 1989, action on which had been deferred in response to the NAC agencies' concerns regarding the Banca Nazionale Del Lavoro (BNL) banking scandal (see minutes of NAC meeting 89-37, September 12, 1989).

He indicated, however, that his agency was requesting action on the current proposal, first advanced in a letter to the NAC from USDA dated August 10, 1989 (NAC Doc. 89-74), for one billion dollars in GSM-102 guarantees for Iraq in FY 1990. He contended that action was now needed because: 1) a number of U.S. exporters had valid contracts and were waiting to register with the CCC; 2) a high-level Iraqi delegation would be coming to Washington in the following week to discuss agricultural purchases for the coming year; and 3) the CCC auditor in Atlanta had not found any evidence of wrongdoing by the Iraqis in the BNL scandal. The Agriculture representative summed up by stating that his agency felt that one billion dollars was an appropriate level of guarantee authority for Iraq; Iraq had thus far shown itself to be a good risk; and lack of timely, positive action on this program would induce the Iraqis to make their agricultural purchases elsewhere.

The Federal Reserve representative said that, in addition to concerns regarding the BNL scandal, the Fed had reservations with regard to Iraq's overall creditworthiness. In this connection, he noted that Iraq had continued undertaking selective, unilateral reschedulings with its official creditors. Moreover, despite increases in oil revenues since the end of the Iran-Iraq war, Iraq's foreign exchange earnings were still insufficient for

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it to service its external debts promptly and fully. He also raised the issue of whether the CCC should commit such a large proportion of its guarantee authority to one buyer. He contended that these questions, together with the still-unfolding BNL scandal, suggested that USDA should adopt a "wait and see" attitude before going ahead with a program of the magnitude proposed.

Regarding the BNL affair, the Federal Reserve representative mentioned several allegations which had emerged from investigations into it to the effect that: 1) certain contracts issued on BNL letters of credit with CCC guarantees contained prices that were two to three times greater than market prices; 2) some contracts were for volumes of seed greater than the country as a whole could utilize; 3) in some cases, prices were so low as to indicate the grain involved was not of U.S. origin; and 4) Iraqi-BNL kickbacks might have occurred. He concluded by stating that, given these allegations, the Federal Reserve could neither endorse nor approve a CCC guarantee program for Iraq.

The Treasury representative stated that she, too, was aware of some of these allegations and asked what safeguards USDA would take to ensure that 1) items shipped under CCC guarantees were of U.S. origin and 2) sales were not made at inflated prices. She then questioned whether USDA had adequate knowledge of the progress of the Federal Reserve and Justice Department BNL investigations and whether USDA was taking any other steps to safeguard the integrity of the CCC guarantee program in light of the BNL revelations. Finally, she asked if CCC was concerned that parties under suspicion in the BNL investigations would benefit from any further CCC guarantees.

The Agriculture representative stated that some of the questions raised were peripheral to the general NAC review and the topic of Iraq's creditworthiness in particular. He noted that the CCC only guaranteed payments by foreign banks, and was not involved in individual contract negotiations. Thus, the two principal issues, as he saw them, involved overpricing and U.S. content. On the first, he said that his agency assumed that a buyer got the best price it could; Iraq paid higher than market prices as a result of its restricted access to credit, generally tight markets, and the high quality of U.S. products.

Regarding the second question, he stated that the CCC required that all commodities covered under its guarantee programs be 100 percent U.S.-origin. He said that several product lines that might have included goods with foreign content

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had been declared ineligible for coverage under the guarantee programs -- even though this action penalized U.S. exporters. He agreed that there had been occasional problems regarding U.S. content in the Iraqi guarantee program, but noted that USDA had added to the CCC's compliance and oversight staff in this area. Finally, he said that, for technical reasons, there was a "gray area" with regard to U.S. content and gave the example of seed exports to illustrate this.

The State representative said that he had reserved his position on the earlier Iraq proposal out of deference to the concerns of the Federal Reserve and Treasury. However, he said that Iraq had great strategic importance to the U.S. -- as the size of the proposed FY 1990 program would indicate. He added that, while he understood the concerns about Iraq's medium-term creditworthiness, he did not see any financial difficulties looming where CCC guarantees would be called, and therefore recommended going ahead with a CCC program for Iraq at this time.

The Federal Reserve representative stated that BNL, by not honoring fraudulently issued letters of credit, could cause financing problems for Iraq, putting at risk Iraq's debt to the CCC.

The Agriculture representative said that the CCC felt that Iraq would repay its outstanding loans with BNL as scheduled. The risk, he said, was that BNL would not pay the U.S. exporters, in which case Iraq would have done nothing wrong. The Federal Reserve representative responded that, because money is fungible, if Iraq lost its BNL lines of credit, it would automatically become less creditworthy.

In response to a question from the Treasury representative, the Agriculture representative said that the Iraqis had said that BNL would not be involved in a FY 1990 CCC program.

The Treasury desk officer for Iraq, noting that the CCC and the U.S. and U.K. export financing agencies were the only official credit institutions open in Iraq, said that Iraq's international creditworthiness was very low. (The Eximbank representative interjected that, despite short-term repayment problems, Eximbank considered Iraq creditworthy.) The Treasury desk officer stated that although Iraq's oil earnings had risen from \$12 billion in 1988 to a projected \$14 billion in 1989, its military expenditures had also increased. He added that Iraqi demands that BNL honor its fraudulently issued letters of credit

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were evidence of how desperate Iraq was for foreign exchange or credit. He continued by saying that it was well known in the international financial community that Iraq only paid those creditors from which it received new credits and, viewed in this manner, the CCC could be contributing to a "Ponzi-type" scheme. Finally, he said that Iraq's refusal to accept an IMF program or to reschedule its debts within the framework of the Paris Club meant that if Iraq did default on its CCC guarantees, the CCC could not reschedule them because the U.S. Government did not engage in reschedulings outside of a multilateral framework.

The Treasury representative, noting that Iraq had \$700 million in principal and \$60-70 million in interest due on CCC-guaranteed loans in FY 1990, asked the State representative for his assessment of the political risk of Iraq's non-payment. The State representative responded that his agency would not be arguing for a large program for Iraq if it felt that there was a substantial political risk of Iraqi non-payment. He added that it was unrealistic to wait for an extended period, until the legal case involving BNL had been settled, before approving any new credits for Iraq, and that a program should be approved in the near future to take care of both domestic exporters and Iraq's import needs.

The Federal Reserve representative stated that it would be risky to approve new loans in order to protect the repayment of old loans. He urged that agencies have their legal counsels contact the U.S. Attorney's office in Atlanta to get the current status of the investigation prior to making any decision.

The Treasury attorney stated that she had spoken at length with the Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) in Atlanta who is in charge of the BNL investigation. From the AUSA, the Treasury attorney understood that indictments relating to the BNL affair would definitely be sought. The AUSA believed that the Iraqis must have known that the BNL letters of credit were improperly issued, as they lacked proper authorizing signatures and were at rates close to LIBOR, which would be inconsistent with Iraq's general lack of creditworthiness. The AUSA had also advised that there was evidence -- although it was only preliminary at this time -- of Iraqi knowledge of, or complicity with, kickback schemes. In response to an Agriculture representative's statement that the Iraqis took the best rates available, the Federal Reserve representative said they should have been more suspicious if the rates were too good.

The Eximbank representative stated that her agency had done

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\$50 million in business with BNL in the past, and that, while Eximbank was closely monitoring the program, it had not suspended dealings with BNL and would continue to do business with them.

The State representative, noting that the sense of the group was against immediate approval of the proposed \$1 billion program, asked if USDA had an alternate proposal. The Agriculture representative responded that he was willing to ask for a first tranche of \$400 million for Iraq's FY 1990 GSM-102 program.

In response to a question from the Treasury desk officer regarding the feasibility of the Iraqis delaying their buying mission, the Agriculture representative said that Iraq had to make some buying decisions in the near future. He noted further that there was no certainty as to when the BNL situation would finally be resolved and that Iraq could go elsewhere to meet its food import needs.

The State representative suggested that the following conditions be attached to the request for \$400 million: 1) the \$400 million program should not rule out additional programs for FY 1990; 2) the NAC should receive assurances that USDA has enhanced its monitoring of the Iraq program; and 3) USDA should inform the NAC if sufficient evidence of wrongdoing was discovered.

In response to a question from the Treasury representative regarding program monitoring, the Agriculture representative again said that USDA had increased its compliance staff and the GAO was also closely monitoring the program.

The Commerce representative said he was inclined to give the benefit of the doubt to U.S. exporters and was in favor of the proposed \$400 million program. However, he stated concerns with regard to Iraq's creditworthiness, its large external debt, and the fact that for the past several years 20 percent of USDA GSM-102 guarantee authority had been committed to one country. Finally, he requested, so as to avoid any appearances of impropriety, assurances from the CCC that BNL would not be involved in any new guarantees.

The Agriculture representative, in response to a question from the USTR representative, said that the product coverage under the FY 1990 program would be similar to that for FY 1989, except for those commodities which had been identified as having difficulties meeting the 100 percent U.S. content rule, i.e.,

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juice concentrates, sugar, and tobacco. The terms would be 12 months for plywood, 720 days for leather, and up to three years for all other commodities.

In response to a further question from the USTR representative regarding malfeasance on the part of U.S. exporters, the Agriculture representative said that if it could be proved that U.S. exporters had been engaged in improprieties they would be barred from the program and the case forwarded to the Commerce Department for prosecution under the Corrupt Practices Act.

The Commerce representative reiterated his view that USDA was courting disaster if it did not ban BNL from the FY 1990 program. The Agriculture representative replied that his agency had already asked Iraq for assurances that BNL would not be used in conjunction with the FY 1990 program. He pointed out, however, that financing agreements are ultimately worked out between the foreign and financing banks.

The Federal Reserve representative suggested that the question of a \$400 million FY 1990 program be brought to the attention of the NAC Alternates so that political-level officials could be sensitized to the possible problems associated with it, and that agencies should inquire from their Alternates whether they would want to call a NAC Alternates meeting to discuss this matter further.

In a roundtable discussion of the proposed \$400 million GSM-102 FY 1990 program:

- The AID representative stated that since AID was not involved in Iraq, her agency would associate itself with the foreign policy position of the State Department.
- The Eximbank representative, noting that Eximbank does have a small line of credit open in Iraq, said that her agency was not opposed to a CCC line in Iraq, given the proposed reduction in its size.
- The USTR representative said that he, too, would wish to err on the side of the U.S. exporters and felt his agency could support a smaller program, given assurances that BNL would not be involved.

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- The Treasury representative said that she could not support any size program in Iraq at the present time unless assurances were given that the problems brought to light by the BNL affair were being addressed.
- The Federal Reserve representative said that, although he thought any decision on this matter should be cleared at the political level, he would not demand an Alternates meeting but would abide by a NAC consensus on the need for such a meeting. He indicated that he wished to reserve his agency's position on the \$400 million proposal.

The Agriculture representative stated he would resubmit a letter reflecting the consensus of the meeting and requesting NAC advice on a \$400 million FY 1990 GSM-102 guarantee program for Iraq. The letter would contain a description of the "state-of-play" in the BNL situation. He said the \$400 million would be a discrete amount but withheld the option of proposing additional guarantees at a later date.

Note: After the meeting, USDA submitted a proposal for \$400 million in credit guarantees for Iraq in FY 1990 (NAC Doc. 89-131).

Council approval of the program was obtained (Treasury and the Federal Reserve opposed) on the basis of votes cast by Staff Committee members on behalf of their principals in a telephone poll (NAC Action 89-188, October 3, 1989). None of the agencies polled expressed support for a NAC Alternates meeting on this issue.

Subsequently, the Treasury representative requested that the following comment be added to the minutes: 'In reviewing USDA's revised proposal, Treasury is concerned that waiting for "definitive proof" may be waiting too long, and suggests that it might be appropriate to take steps to maintain the integrity of USDA's export credit guarantee programs before "definitive proof" has been obtained.'

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- (b) Hungary - \$25 million - GSM-102 (NAC Doc. 89-127)
- (c) Guyana - \$4 million - PL 480(I) (NAC Doc. 89-128)
- (d) Jamaica - \$27.4 million - PL 480(I) (NAC Doc. 89-129)

Council approval of GSM-102 programs for Hungary and PL 480(I) programs for Guyana and Jamaica was obtained on the basis of votes cast by Staff Committee members on behalf of their principals at, or shortly after, the meeting (NAC Actions 89-189, 89-190, 89-191, October 3, 1989).

3. EXPORT-IMPORT BANK

Colombia - \$127.7 million guarantee (aircraft)
(AP061334)

The Eximbank representative described the proposal as an asset based on lease in line with the OECD agreement on large aircraft financing.

Council approval of the financial guarantee for Colombia was obtained on the basis of votes cast by Staff Committee members on behalf of their principals at, or shortly after, the meeting (NAC Action 89-192, October 3, 1989).

*** END ***

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FOR JOHN HUGHES FROM PA/PRS

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: OPRC, OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P.)
SUBJECT: NYT SUMMARY OF 1/18/84

NO. 5C

1. NEW YORK TIMES. SHULTZ, ECHOING REAGAN, INVITES
RUSSIANS TO NEW TALKS WITH U.S.

SHULTZ SAID TODAY THAT THE US FIRMLY BELIEVED THAT "PRAGMATIC
PROGRESS" COULD BE ACHIEVED ON ARMS CONTROL AND OTHER
EAST-WEST ISSUES. HE CALLED UPON THE SOVIET UNION TO JOIN
THE US IN A NEW, MORE COMPREHENSIVE DIALOGUE.

HIS SPEECH AT THE OPENING ROUND OF THE EAST-WEST CONFER-
ENCE ON SECURITY IN EUROPE WAS CONSISTENT WITH REAGAN'S
CALL ON MONDAY FOR A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE SOVIET-AMERICAN
RELATIONSHIP.

THE ONLY NEW DETAIL OFFERED BY SHULTZ WAS AN ANNOUNCE-
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MENT THAT THE US PLANNED TO OFFER A DRAFT TREATY FOR THE

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COMPLETE AND VERIFIABLE ELIMINATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS ON "A GLOBAL BASIS" AT THE DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE IN GENEVA IN A FEW MONTHS. WORK HAS BEEN PROCEEDING AT THE 40-NATION CONFERENCE IN GENEVA ON BANNING ALL CHEMICAL WEAPONS, ALTHOUGH MR. SHULTZ ACKNOWLEDGED AT A PRESS CONFERENCE AFTER THE SPEECH THAT VERIFICATION MEASURES WILL BE DIFFICULT.

ON THE OTHER ARMS CONTROL ISSUES THAT HAVE DRAWN CONSIDERABLE ATTENTION IN RECENT MONTHS, MR. SHULTZ NOTED THAT MOSCOW HAD "INTERRUPTED" THREE OF THE MAJOR NEGOTIATION BY EITHER QUITTING THEM ALTOGETHER, OR BY REFUSING TO SET A DATE FOR THEIR RESUMPTION.

BUT MR. SHULTZ SAID THAT AS FAR AS THE UNITED STATES WAS CONCERNED, THE DOOR REMAINED OPEN. "WE ARE READY FOR NEGOTIATION WHENEVER THE SOVIET UNION IS PREPARED," HE SAID. HE OFFERED NO CONCESSIONS TO GET THE RUSSIANS BACK TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE, BUT SAID WASHINGTON WOULD WORK "FOR EARLY PROGRESS" ONCE THE NEGOTIATIONS RESUMED.

ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVES ARE PART OF "A BROADER AMERICAN EFFORT TO BUILD A MORE STABLE, CONSISTENT AND CONSTRUCTIVE EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP," HE SAID. "A RELATIONSHIP NOT MARKED BY THE ABRUPT SHIFT, EXAGGERATED EXPECTATIONS AND DASHED HOPES OF THE LAST DECADE."

"LET US THEREFORE EMBARK HERE AND NOW UPON THIS RENEWED OPEN AND COMPREHENSIVE EAST-WEST POLITICAL DIALOGUE," HE SAID. "LET US SO CONDUCT OURSELVES IN OUR DELIBERATIONS THAT HISTORIANS OF THE FUTURE WILL MARK THIS GATHERING AS A TURNING POINT IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS."

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MR. SHULTZ BALANCED HIS CONCILIATORY REMARKS BY CRITICIZING THE SOVIET UNION FOR CREATING SECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEMS BY ERECTING WHAT HE CALLED "AN ARTIFICIAL BARRIER" THAT HAD "CRUELLY DIVIDED THIS GREAT CONTINENT - AND INDEED HEARTLESSLY DIVIDED ONE OF ITS GREAT NATIONS."

IN HIS NEWS CONFERENCE, MR. SHULTZ SAID HE DID NOT MEAN TO IMPLY THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS RENEGING ON ITS DIPLOMATIC TIES WITH EAST GERMANY OR CASTING DOUBT ON THE SOVEREIGNTY OF OTHER SOVIET BLOC NATIONS.

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BUT HE DID SAY IN THE SPEECH THAT THE UNITED STATES "DOES NOT RECOGNIZE THE LEGITIMACY OF THE ARTIFICIALLY IMPOSED DIVISION OF EUROPE," WHICH, HE SAID, HAS PREVENTED THE FREE MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE AND IDEAS THROUGHOUT THAT CONTINENT.

MR. SHULTZ AND FOREIGN MINISTER CLAUDE CHEYSSON OF FRANCE, WHO ALSO SPOKE, OUTLINED THE SIX-POINT PLAN THE WESTERN ALLIES MADE KNOWN IN WASHINGTON LAST WEEK, WHICH IS

AIMING AT SPECIFIC, PRACTICAL AND MEASURED IDEAS INSTEAD OF SWEEPING AGREEMENTS IN PRINCIPLE.

SUMMING UP THE PLAN'S POINTS, MR. SHULTZ SAID, "WE SHOULD LOOK FOR WAYS TO MAKE SURPRISE ATTACK MORE DIFFICULT, TO MAKE MISCALCULATION LESS LIKELY, TO INHIBIT THE USE OF MILITARY MIGHT FOR INTIMIDATION OR COERCION, TO PUT GREATER PREDICTABILITY INTO PEACEFUL MILITARY EXERCISES, IN ORDER TO HIGHLIGHT ANY DEPARTURES THAT COULD THREATEN THE PEACE, AND TO ENHANCE OUR ABILITY TO DEFUSE INCIPIENT CRISES.

"OUR AIM, TO USE THE CURRENT PHRASE," HE SAID, "IS TO INCREASE THE TRANSPARENCY OF MILITARY ACTIVITY IN EUROPE."

FOREIGN MINISTER OF EAST GERMANY AND CZECHOSLAVAKIA
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SHARPLY ATTACKED THE UNITED STATES, GIVING AN EARLY INDICATION OF THE CHILLY RECEPTION THAT MAY AWAIT MR. SHULTZ ON WEDNESDAY WHEN HE MEETS WITH FOREIGN MINISTER ANDREI A. GROMYKO OF THE SOVIET UNION.

THEY PARTICULARLY CRICIZED WASHINGTON FOR GOING AHEAD WITH THE DEPLOYMENT OF NEW MISSILES IN EUROPE, AND FOR SEEKING MODEST AGREEMENTS INSTEAD OF LOOKING TO BROAD PROPOSALS SUCH AS THOSE THE WARSAW PACT HAS OFFERED ON FREEZES ON MILITARY BUDGETS OR CURRENT ARMAMENTS, A NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE IN PARTS OF EUROPE, AND THE REPUDIATION OF THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. MR. SHULTZ SAID THAT THE FOCUS AT THE CONFERENCE "SHOULD BE ON PRACTICAL ACCOMPLISHMENT, AS DISTINGUISHED FROM EMPTY PROMISES OF GOOD INTENT."

"WE FIRMLY BELIEVE PRAGMATIC PROGRESS IN EAST-WEST RELATION

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S POSSIBLE," HE SAID. MR. SHULTZ SAID THE BERLIN AGREEMENT STABILIZING CONDITIONS IN AND AROUND THE DIVIDED CITY WAS AN EXAMPLE OF "LASTING PROGRESS ACHIEVED THROUGH UNITY RESOLVE AND GENUINE NEGOTIATIONS."

MR. SHULTZ SAID THAT, IN ADDITION TO SEEKING ARMS CONTROL PROGRESS, THE UNITED STATES SEEKS "TO ENGAGE THE SOVIET UNION IN A CANDID DIALOGUE ON THOSE REGIONAL CRISES AND CONFLICTS THAT THREATEN PEACE AND POISON OUR RELATIONSHIP".

AT THE SAME TIME, HE SAID, THE UNITED STATES HAS PROPOSED SOME STEPS TO IMPROVE COMMUNICATION WITH THE RUSSIANS "TO BUILD CONFIDENCE AND REDUCE ANY CHANCE OF MISUNDERSTANDING OR MISCALCULATION."

NO. 2. THE NEW YORK TIMES, WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 18, 1984

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"ARMS EXPERT OPPOSES MOVE TO BYPASS TALKS IN GENEVA"
BY STEVEN R. WEISHAN

NITZE SAID TODAY THAT HE OPPOSED BY-PASSING THE REGULAR NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA IN AN EFFORT TO BREAK THE STALEMATE IN THE TALKS WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

SPEAKING TO REPORTERS AT THE WHITE HOUSE AFTER BRIEFING PRESIDENT REAGAN, MR. NITZE SAID THAT "IT IS BETTER THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS BE CONDUCTED" BY HIS OWN DELEGATION OF EXPERTS. "I'D HATE TO SEE THAT TEAM BYPASSED, AND I THINK THE PEWAI\$WNR SHARES MY VIEW." HE ADDED.

MR. NITZE'S REMARKS SEEMED NOTEWORTHY BECAUSE OF WIDESPREAD DISCUSSION IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE POSSIBILITY THAT SHULTZ MIGHT SEEK TO EXPLORE WAYS OF RESUMING THE ARMS TALK WHEN HE MEETS WITH GROMYKO.

ASKED TODAY IF MR. SHULTZ WAS GOING TO SEEK TO NEGOTIATE ON THE ARMS ISSUE WITH MR. GROMYKO AT THEIR MEETING, MR. NITZE SAID, "I THINK THAT HAS BEEN CONSIDERED AND IS NOT FAVORED."

MR. NITZE SAID THAT "A GREAT DEAL OF ATTENTION IS BEING GIVEN" IN THE ADMINISTRATION TO WAYS TO PERSUADE THE

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RUSSIANS TO RETURN TO THE TALKS. HE SAID THE ADMINISTRATION TO WAYS TO PERSUADE THE RUSSIANS TO RETURN TO THE TALKS. HE SAID THE ADMINISTRATION WAS CONSIDERING "ANYTHING WE CAN DO WHICH WOULD NOT BE A CONCESSION, AN IMPROPER CONCESSION, TO THE SOVIETS."

FOR ALL THE TONE OF CONCILIATION IN MR. NITZE'S COMMENTS, THE NEGOTIATOR SAID HE WAS "NOT THAT HOPEFUL" THAT THE ARMS TALKS WOULD RESUME.

HE SAID HE HAD "NO DIRECT INDICATIONS OTHER THAN THAT THEY
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ARE SERIOUS ABOUT HAVING BROKEN THEM OFF." PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS TO BRIDGE THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE SOVIET AND AMERICAN POSITIONS WERE A FAILURE, HE NOTED, ASSERTING THAT THIS FAILURE WAS "99 PERCENT THE FAULT" OF THE SOVIET UNION, NOT OF THE UNITED STATES.

MR. NITZE SAID HE ALSO DID NOT SEE ANY IMPEDIMENT TO THE TALKS IN THE RUSSIANS' PLAN TO ADD TO THEIR OWN NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EASTERN EUROPE AS A RESPONSE TO THE INTRODUCTION OF NEW AMERICAN MISSILES IN WESTERN EUROPE.

HE SAID HE THOUGHT MOSCOW "WOULD BE PREPARED TO MOVE BACK" WHATEVER THEY MOVED FORWARD FROM SOVIET TERRITORY INTO EASTERN EUROPE. HE SAID ALSO THAT HE DIDN'T THINK THE ILLNESS OF ANDROPOV HAD BEEN "AN INHIBITING FACTOR" IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

THE DAY AFTER HIS SPEECH, WHICH WAS BROADCAST FROM THE EAST ROOM TO AUDIENCES IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE, MR. REAGAN TOLD REPORTERS THAT HE THOUGHT THE REACTION TO THE ADDRESS HAD BEEN "REASONABLY ALL RIGHT." THERE WERE CERTAIN CIRCLES," HE ADDED, WHERE "IT WON'T BE APPRECIATED."

3. "MYSTERY OF STOCKHOLM: WHAT'S ON THE AGENDA?" BY J. VINOCUR, NYT, P. 4

STOCKHOLM, JAN. 17 -- THE MANDATE FOR THE CONFERENCE DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR THE DISCUSSION OF NUCLEAR SECURITY. ALL INDICATIONS ARE, HOWEVER, THAT THE SOVIET BLOC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONFERENCE'S GROUND RULES IS COMPLETELY DIFFERENT; THUS, MANY CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS FEEL THAT JOCKEYING AND ATTEMPTS TO INFLUENCE PUBLIC OPINION IN

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EUROPE DURING THE MEETING'S TWO-YEAR RUN ARE LIKELY TO OCCUR.

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"IF NUCLEAR ISSUES WERE TO BE INJECTED INTO THE CONFERENCE," JAMES E. GOODBY, THE CHIEF U.S. DELEGATE, SAID RECENTLY, "IT WOULD BE OVERBURDENED AND WOULD LEAD TO NO RESULT WHATSOEVER."

"THE CONFERENCE," GOODBY SAID, "HAS ONLY ONE TASK: TO REDUCE THE RISK OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION IN EUROPE BY NEGOTIATING MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT, POLITICALLY BINDING, AND VERIFIABLE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES TO COVER THE WHOLE OF EUROPE AS FAR EAST AS THE URALS IN THE SOVIET UNION."

WITH ALL THE OTHER MAIN SOVIET-AMERICAN NEGOTIATIONS ON ARMS REDUCTIONS NOW SUSPENDED OR BROKEN OFF, OFFICIALS OF THE WESTERN ALLIES ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THEY MAY FIND DIFFICULTIES IN TERMS OF PUBLIC OPINION IN ARGUING THAT STOCKHOLM IS NOT A SUITABLE PLACE FOR DISCUSSING NUCLEAR SECURITY.

THE QUESTION OF WHAT WILL BE DISCUSSED HERE IS BASIC TO THE SUCCESS OF THE CONFERENCE, AND IT WAS POSED IN SPEECHES TODAY BY SECRETARY OF STATE GEORGE P. SHULTZ AND FOREIGN MINISTER CLAUDE CHEYSSON OF FRANCE. MR. SHULTZ SAID IT WOULD BE A "CRUEL HOAX" IF THE CONFERENCE SPENT ITS TIME REAFFIRMING OLD NONAGGRESSION PLEDGES, AND MR. CHEYSSON ASKED, "DO WE WANT TO ADOPT PRECISE AND CONCRETE MILITARY MEASURES, OR DEVOTE OURSELVES TO A SIMPLE EXERCISE IN DECLAMATORY DIPLOMACY?"

THE MANDATE FOR THE MEETING HERE, AGREED TO AT THE SECURITY CONFERENCE IN MADRID LAST YEAR, MAKES NO MENTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. RATHER IT DESCRIBES THE CONFERENCE'S FIRST PHASE AS ONE INVOLVING "NEGOTIATION AND ADOPTION OF A SET OF MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES DESIGNED TO REDUCE THE RISK OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION IN EUROPE."

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THE ALLIES HAVE AGREED TO AVOID SWEEPING PROPOSALS AND TO CONCENTRATE ON SPECIFIC ACTIONS THAT THEY FEEL CAN LOWER TENSIONS -- SUCH AS NOTIFICATION WHEN TROOPS LEAVE A REGULAR GARRISON, OR THE POSTING OF OBSERVERS AT ALL MILITARY EXERCISES.

BEFORE THE CONFERENCE BEGAN, THE WEST GERMANS SAID THEY ASSUMED THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD PLAY ON ANOTHER REGISTER, THAT OF WIDE PROPOSALS THAT WOULD SOUND ATTRACTIVE BUT WORK TO NATO'S DISADVANTAGE. BECAUSE OF THE POTENTIAL IMPACT ON PUBLIC OPINION, SOME MEMBERS OF THE PARTIES IN THE BONN GOVERNING COALITION DEBATED WHETHER IT WOULD BE A GOOD IDEA FOR THE WEST TO FORMULATE THE SAME KIND OF VAGUE "PEACE STATEMENT" THAT THE SOVIET BLOC WAS EXPECTED TO OFFER.

IN THE END, THE NOTION WAS DROPPED. THE ALLIANCE'S POSITION IS THAT NATO HAS ALREADY DEFINED ITSELF AS A PURELY DEFENSIVE GROUPING, COMMITTED NOT TO BE THE FIRST TO USE FORCE. MOREOVER, IT IS CONSIDERED THAT ALL OF THE CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS HAVE REPEATEDLY PLEDGED TO MAINTAIN PEACE, AND THAT NEW PLEDGES WOULD WATER DOWN THE OLD ONES, AND AVOID CONCRETE PROGRESS.

GOODBY HAS SAID IT IS IMPORTANT "NOT TO BE SIDETRACKED INTO THINKING THAT THIS CONFERENCE HAS TO BE LIKE OTHER CONFERENCES AND THEREFORE OUGHT TO DEAL WITH REDUCTIONS AND OUGHT TO DEAL WITH NUCLEAR ISSUES AND SO FORTH." HE ADDED, "THOSE THINGS ARE BEING DEALT WITH ELSEWHERE."

THE CONFERENCE MANDATE INCLUDES ANOTHER POSSIBLE POINT OF CONFLICT IN THAT IT REFERS TO THE GEOGRAPHICAL AREA UNDER DISCUSSION AS ALL OF EUROPE, AS WELL AS THE ADJOINING AIR
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AND SEA SPACE.

THE SOVIET BLOC WAS EXPECTED TO PLACE PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON THIS AS IT RELATES TO U.S. NAVAL ACTIVITY IN THE ATLANTIC OCEAN. THE U.S. HAS ASSERTED THAT ITS READING OF THE CONFERENCE MANDATE SEES NO NEED FOR NOTIFICATION CONCERNING "INDEPENDENT AIR OR NAVAL ACTIVITIES." ONLY AIR AND SEA MOVEMENTS RELATING "FUNCTIONALLY, CLOSELY, AND ORGANICALLY"

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TO GROUND FORCE ACTIVITY WOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR DISCUSSION, U.S. OFFICIALS SAID.

4. "FORMER LEADER PROPOSES STATIONING U.S. TROOPS ON GRENADA" BY S. MYDANS, NYT, P. 3

SIR ERIC GAIRY SAID YESTERDAY THAT IF HIS PARTY WON THE COMING ELECTIONS IT WOULD URGE THE U.S. AND BRITAIN TO MAINTAIN A MILITARY PRESENCE ON THE ISLAND.

SIR ERIC MADE THIS STATEMENT IN A TELEPHONE INTERVIEW FROM FALLS CHURCH, VA., AS HE DISCUSSED PLANS TO RETURN TO GRENADA ON SATURDAY TO BECOME HEAVILY INVOLVED IN POLITICS. BUT HE HIMSELF, HE SAID, WILL NOT RUN IN THE ELECTIONS.

SIR ERIC SAID THAT, ON HIS RETURN TO GRENADA, HE EXPECTED, AS A SIGN OF RESPECT, TO BE ESCORTED FROM THE AIRPORT BY THE U.S. TROOPS WHO NOW PATROL THE ISLAND.

"I AM THE LAST ELECTED GOVERNMENT AND THEY'VE GOT TO TREAT ME AS A STATESMAN," THE 61-YEAR OLD SIR ERIC SAID. "I SHOULD BE TREATED WITH RESPECT, AND I WOULD EXPECT THEY WOULD AT LEAST GIVE ME SOME SECURITY."

DESCRIBING THE INVASION AS A RESCUE MISSION THAT WAS "THE ANSWER TO A LOT OF PRAYERS," SIR ERIC SAID HE HAD BEEN URGING A U.S. PRESENCE ON THE ISLAND "FOR THE LAST 18 YEARS, CONSISTENTLY, MAYBE 13 TIMES."

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HE WOULD ALSO LIKE TO SEE THE DISPUTED CUBAN-BUILT AIRPORT AT POINT SALINES COMPLETED, HE SAID, AND NAMED THE RONALD REAGAN INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT.

BUT HE SAID THAT IF HIS PARTY REGAINS POLITICAL CONTROL HE WOULD BE THE POWER BEHIND THE PRIME MINISTER.

"HE WILL CONSULT WITH ME," HE SAID. "THERE IS SCARCELY ANYONE IN THE CARIBBEAN WITH MY POLITICAL EXPERTISE." HE SAID HE WOULD NOT ACCEPT A DRAFT BY HIS PARTY. BUT HE SAID HIS VOICE WOULD BE PROMINENT DURING THE CAMPAIGN BECAUSE "PEOPLE HAVE A LOT OF CONFIDENCE IN ME BECAUSE I DON'T LIE."

HE SAID HE HAD TRIED SIX OR SEVEN TIMES TO TELEPHONE SIR

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PAUL ABOUT HIS RETURN BUT THAT EACH TIME HE WAS TOLD, AFTER A PAUSE, THAT THE GOVERNOR GENERAL WAS NOT IN.

5. "SOVIET IS MANNING NEW MISSILE UNITS -- RUSSIANS REPORT EAST GERMAN BATTERIES ARE A RESPONSE TO NATO DEPLOYMENTS" BY J. F. BURNS, NYT, P. 5

MOSCOW, JAN. 17 -- A SOVIET NEWS DISPATCH SAID TODAY THAT SOVIET TROOPS ARE ALREADY MANNING NEW NUCLEAR MISSILE

BATTARIES IN EAST GERMANY IN RESPONSE TO THE DEPLOYMENT IN WESTERN EUROPE OF AMERICAN PERSHING 2 AND CRUISE MISSILES.

A STORY PREPARED FOR PUBLICATION IN WEDNESDAY'S ISSUE OF KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, THE DEFENSE MINISTRY NEWSPAPER, QUOTED A SOLDIER ASSIGNED TO ONE OF THE MISSILE BATTERIES AS SAYING, THAT THE UNIT HAD BEEN EQUIPPED WITH "FIERCE, MIGHTY WEAPONS" AS A COUNTER TO THE NEW AMERICAN DEPLOYMENTS.

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WESTERN MILITARY EXPERTS HAVE ARGUED THAT THE NEW SOVIET MISSILE DEPLOYMENTS ARE NOT SO MUCH A REACTION TO THE AMERICAN PERSHING 2 AND CRUISE MISSILE DEPLOYMENTS AS THEY ARE A PREVIOUSLY PLANNED UPDATING OF AGING WEAPONS.

BUT THE KREMLIN HAS MAINTAINED THAT THE INTRODUCTION OF THE NEW MISSILES IS DIRECTLY RELATED TO THE AMERICAN DEPLOYMENTS. THE NEWSPAPER SAID THAT THE MISSILE BATTERY VISITED BY ITS CORRESPONDENT HAD BEEN DEPLOYED WITH THE AGREEMENT OF THE EAST GERMAN GOVERNMENT "IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE SOVIET UNION'S REPLY MEASURES TO THE DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. PERSHING AND CRUISE MISSILES IN EUROPE."

THIS APPEARED TO BE AN ALLUSION TO AN AGREEMENT UNDER WHICH THE CZECHOSLOVAK AND EAST GERMAN GOVERNMENTS ARE PAYING A SUBSTANTIAL PORTION OF THE NEW MISSILE BATTERIES' COSTS. THESE ARRANGEMENTS ARE SAID BY SOME WESTERN DIPLOMATS TO HAVE CAUSED STRAINS WITHIN THE WARSAW PACT, DESPITE OFFICIAL STATEMENTS BY THE GOVERNMENTS IN EAST BERLIN AND PRAGUE HAILING THE DEPLOYMENTS.

UNDER SIMILAR AGREEMENTS REACHED BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND THE WESTERN EUROPEAN NATIONS, AMERICAN MISSILES BEING DEPLOYED

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IN THOSE NATIONS WILL BE MANNED AND PAID FOR BY THE U.S., WITH THE EUROPEANS TAKING PART IN THE FINANCING AND CONSTRUCTION OF SUPPORT FACILITIES.

6. "U.N. CHIEF ASKS MAJOR PARLEY ON THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT" BY H. KAHN, NYT, P. 8

CASABLANCA, MOROCCO, JAN. 17 -- SEC. GEN. OF THE UN PROPOSED HERE TODAY THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL AUTHORIZE HIM TO SOUND OUT ALL INTERESTED PARTIES ON THE POSSIBILITY OF CONVENING AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE CONFLICT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND ARAB NATIONS.

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BY MAKING THE MEETING CONDITIONAL ON SECURITY COUNCIL APPROVAL, PEREZ DE CUELLAR APPEARED TO DIPLOMATIC SOURCES TO RECOGNIZE THE DIFFICULTIES FACING HIS PROPOSAL. THE U.S. HAS CONSISTENTLY OPPOSED A DIRECT SOVIET ROLE IN EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A SETTLEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND ITS FOES AND COULD BE EXPECTED TO VETO THE PLAN. MOREOVER, ISRAEL IS CONSIDERED EQUALLY UNLIKELY TO TAKE PART IN SUCH A CONFERENCE IF THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD ATTEND.

7. "ZHAO ADDRESSES M.P.'S IN CANADA -- HE PRAISES TRUDEAU FOR EFFORTS TO END ARMS RACE THAT IS 'BECOMING WHITE HOT'" BY M. T. KAUFMAN, NYT, P. 7

ZHAO ADDRESSED A JOINT SESSION OF CANADA'S PARLIAMENT TODAY AND PRAISED TRUDEAU FOR HIS EFFORTS TO QUELL A NUCLEAR ARMS RACE THAT "IS BECOMING WHITE HOT."

IN HIS SPEECH, THE CHINESE PRIME MINISTER ASSESSED HIS COUNTRY'S RELATIONS WITH CANADA, THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION AND BRITAIN. THE SPEECH, FOR THE MOST PART, REPEATED VIEWS EXPRESSED IN ZHAO'S VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES, BUT IT ALSO INCLUDED REFERENCES TO THE CANADIAN LEADER'S PEACE INITIATIVE IN WHICH TRUDEAU HAS HAD CONSULTATIONS WITH MORE THAN 30 WORLD LEADERS IN THE LAST TWO MONTHS.

ZHAO ALLUDED AT ONE POINT TO TRUDEAU'S ATTEMPT TO STIMULATE ACTION BY NATIONS OTHER THAN THE SUPERPOWERS IN THE FACE OF UNITED STATES-SOVIET STANDOFF ON DISARMAMENT AND MILITARY

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BALANCE.

HE EXPRESSED HIS HOPE THAT ALL "PEACE-LOVING NATIONS GO . .
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INTO ACTION TO URGE THE TWO MAJOR NUCLEAR POWERS, WHO REPRESENT 90 PERCENT OF THE WORLD'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS, TO STOP THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE, RESUME DISARMAMENT TALKS AND AGREE ON MEASURES TO DRASTICALLY REDUCE NUCLEAR ARMS TO CREAT CONDITIONS FOR JOINT DISARMAMENT BY ALL NUCLEAR COUNTRIES."

THERE WAS NO MENTION, HOWEVER, OF A CONFERENCE OF THE FIVE AVOWED NUCLEAR NATIONS, WHICH WAS THE HARDEST ITEM IN TRUDEAU'S PROPOSAL. THE CHINESE LEADERSHIP BRUSHED ASIDE THE PROPOSAL WHEN TRUDEAU RAISED IT ON HIS VISIT TO PEKING IN NOVEMBER.

AFTER PRAISING WHAT HE TERMED THE HISTORIC AND SPECIAL RELATIONS BETWEEN CANADA AND CHINA, ZHAO ASSESSED HIS VISIT TO THE U.S., CHARACTERIZING HIS TALKS WITH REAGAN AS "FRIENDLY, CANDID AND SERIOUS."

HE SAID RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. "HAVE MADE FAIRLY BIG PROGRESS" SINCE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, WITH THE QUESTION OF TAIWAN REMAINING THE OUTSTANDING OBSTACLE.

BY CONTRAST, HE SAID, PEKING'S RELATINS WITH MOSCOW HAVE ONLY "SOMEWHAT IMPROVED" AFTER THREE ROUNDS OF TALKS.

IN THESE MEETINGS, HE SAID, THE SOVIET UNION HAS "EVADED" DISCUSSION OF WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS THE THREE MAJOR OBSTACLES -- MOSCOW'S SUPPORT FOR THE VIETNAMESE IN CAMBODIA, ITS MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN AND ITS DEPLOYMENT OF TROOPS ON THE CHINESE BORDER IN MONGOLIA.

8. "SANDINISTA CLAIMS PILOT-REBEL LINK -- DEFENSE MINISTER ASSERTS U.S. FLIER WAS ON A MISSION FOR INSURGENTS WHEN KILLED" NO BYLINE, NYT, P. 8

MANAGUA, NICARAGUA, JAN. 17 -- NICARAGUA'S DEFENSE MINISTER
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CHARGED TODAY THAT THE AMERICAN HELICOPTER PILOT WHO WAS KILLED ON THE NICARAGUAN-HONDURAS BORDER LAST WEDNESDAY WAS ON A MISSION SUPPORTING ANTI-SANDINISTA INSURGENTS.

THE OFFICIAL, HUMBERTO ORTEGA SAAVEDRA, AND AMERICAN MILITARY UNITS WERE "PARTICIPATING EVER MORE DIRECTLY" IN SUPPORT OF THE INSURGENTS, WHO RECEIVE MONEY FROM WASHINGTON.

STANDING BEFORE DETAILED MAPS OF THE BORDER AREA, ORTEGA SAID U.S. SOLDIERS WERE WORKING WITH INSURGENTS ON A PLAN "TO LIBERATE A PIECE OF OUR TERRITORY AND USE THE SITUATION TO BE ABLE TO INTERVENE AGAINST OUR COUNTRY."

HE SAID THE CURRENT INSURGENT OFFENSIVE, WHICH HAS BEEN UNDER WAY FOR SEVERAL WEEKS, HAD BEEN SUBSTANTIALLY DEFEATED AND THAT MANY REBEL FIGHTERS HAD FLED TO CAMPS IN HONDURAS. THESE DEFEATS, HE SAID, APPARENTLY LED THE U.S. TO INCREASE ITS GROUND AND AIR SUPPORT FOR THE INSURGENTS.

ORTEGA SAID THE THREE-MAN CREW OF THE HELICOPTER INVOLVED IN WEDNESDAY'S EPISODE WAS PROBABLY DOING SURVEILLANCE WORK TO HELP HONDURAN SOLDIERS.

9. "ELECTION PLAN IN NICARAGUA IS CRITICIZED BY OPPOSITION" BY S. KINZER, NYT, P. 3

MANAGUA, NICARAGUA, JAN. 17 -- OPPONENTS OF THE NICARAGUAN GOVERNMENT SAY THEY REMAIN SKEPTICAL THAT NATIONAL ELECTIONS NEXT YEAR WILL BE TRULY FREE DESPITE NEW DETAILS ON THE VOTING MADE PUBLIC BY THE GOVERNMENT.

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SOME LEADERS OF NON-SANDINISTA POLITICAL PARTIES SAID IN INTERVIEWS ON MONDAY THAT THEY WERE PLEASED THAT THERE WOULD BE A DIRECT PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, BUT THERE WAS WIDESPREAD FEAR THAT THE CAMPAIGN LAW WOULD NOT GIVE THE OPPOSITION FULL FREEDOM TO ORGANIZE AND TO DISSEMINATE ITS VIEWS.

UNDER THE SANDINISTA PROPOSAL, THE PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT WOULD BE CHOSEN BY DIRECT NATIONAL ELECTION AND

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THE 90 LEGISLATORS WOULD BE ELECTED FROM DISTRICTS. THE VOTING AGE WOULD BE 18, AND SOLDIERS WHO WANTED TO BE CANDIDATES WOULD HAVE TO RESIGN OR BE GRANTED LEAVE FROM THE ARMED FORCES.

NUNEZ SAID THAT THE AUTHORITIES WOULD NOT PERMIT "THE EXALTATION OF THE VALUES OF THE PAST" AND THAT COMPETING PARTIES SHOULD "RESPOND TO THE REVOLUTIONARY REALITY."

ALL PARTIES WILL BE GUARANTEED ACCESS TO TELEVISION, RADIO AND NEWSPAPERS, NUNEZ SAID. HE SAID THERE WAS NO NEED FOR THE GOVERNMENT TO SUBMIT TO FORMAL INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION OF THE ELECTION SINCE FOREIGNERS WOULD BE WELCOME TO OBSERVE THE VOTING.

SEVERAL GROUPS OF OPPOSITION ACTIVISTS HAVE MET TO ASSESS THE PROPOSAL. SOME SAID THEY HAVE NOT DECIDED WHETHER TO URGE THEIR PARTIES TO PARTICIPATE IN THE ELECTION AND WOULD AWAIT THE ELECTION LAW NEXT MONTH BEFORE DECIDING.

UNDER THE SANDINISTA PROPOSAL, NICARAGUANS WHO HAVE LEFT THE COUNTRY TO JOIN ANTI-SANDINISTA GUERRILLA GROUPS WILL BE INELIGIBLE TO TAKE PART IN THE ELECTION. THIS PROHIBITION APPEARS TO FORECLOSE ANY PROSPECT THAT EDEN PASTORA GOMEZ, THE FORMER SANDINISTA HERO KNOWN AS COMMANDER ZERO, WHO IS THOUGHT TO REMAIN POPULAR IN NICARAGUA, WILL TAKE PART. HE HEADS A REBEL GROUP FIGHTING TO OVERTHROW THE SANDINISTAS.

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10. "SAUDIS' COUNSEL GENERAL IN LEBANON IS KIDNAPPED" BY T. L. FRIEDMAN, NYT, P. 8

BEIRUT, LEBANON, JAN. 17 -- A GROUP OF UNIDENTIFIED GUNMEN KIDNAPPED THE SAUDI ARABIAN CONSUL GENERAL IN BEIRUT TODAY WHILE HE WAS DRIVING TO WORK.

NO DEMANDS WERE MADE AND NO ONE TOOK RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE KIDNAPPING OF THE CONSUL, HUSSEIN FARRASH, 45 YEARS OLD.

A LEBANESE ARMY PATROL THAT HAPPENED TO BE IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD BRIEFLY TRADED MACHINE-GUN FIRE WITH THE ABDUCTORS,

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BUT THE SOLDIERS WERE NOT ABLE TO KEEP THE GUNMEN FROM SPEEDING AWAY WITH THEIR CAPTIVE.

BUT GIVEN THE LARGE NUMBER OF GUNMEN INVOLVED IN THE KIDNAPPING AND THE AMPLE PRECEDENTS FOR SUCH ACTIONS IN BEIRUT, ARAB POLITICAL ANALYSTS SAID IT SEEMED MUCH MORE LIKELY THAT THE ABDUCTION WAS POLITICALLY INSPIRED, POSSIBLY BY PRO-IRANIAN ELEMENTS.

THE ANALYSTS NOTED THAT THE KIDNAPPING OF THE SAUDI DIPLOMAT COINCIDED WITH THE MEETING OF ISLAMIC NATIONS IN CASABLANCA. IT WAS OPENED BY KING FAHD OF SAUDI ARABIA AND IS BEING BOYCOTTED BY IRAN BECAUSE OF ITS DISAPPOINTMENT WITH THE CONFERENCE'S NEUTRALITY IN THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR. THE KIDNAPPERS MAY HAVE WANTED TO EMBARRASS THE SAUDIS, THE ANALYSTS SAID.

ARAB POLITICAL ANALYSTS ALSO SAID THE KIDNAPPING COULD BE INTENDED TO UPSET DELICATE NEGOTIATIONS ON A LARGELY SAUDI-
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CONCEIVED PLAN FOR STOPPING THE SHOOTING AND DISENGAGING THE WARRING FACTIONS AROUND BEIRUT AND IN THE MOUNTAINS NEARBY. SAUDI DIPLOMATS HAVE BEEN ACTIVE IN TRYING TO PERSUADE THE VARIOUS FACTIONS TO ACCEPT THE PLAN.

ACCORDING TO SECURITY SOURCES, A MAN TELEPHONED THE SAUDI EMBASSY LAST MONTH AND THREATENED THE LIVES OF FOUR OF ITS SENIOR DIPLOMATS, INCLUDING THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES AND THE MILITARY ATTACHE BUT NOT FARRASH. THE CALLER SAID HE WAS SPEAKING ON BEHALF OF A SHADOWNY PRO-IRANIAN GROUP KNOWN AS HIZBULLAH, OR PARTY OF GOD. HIZBULLAH IS A LOOSE ASSOCIATION OF SHIITE MOSLEM CLERICS WHO ARE SUSPECTED OF INVOLVEMENT IN SOME OF THE ATTACKS ON THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE.

THE CHRISTIAN PHALANGIST RADIO DECLARED THAT HIZBULLAH WAS ALSO BELIEVED TO BE BEHIND THE KIDNAPPING TODAY, BUT THERE APPEARED TO BE NO SOLID EVIDENCE FOR THIS.

APART FROM TODAY'S KIDNAPPING, BEIRUT WAS RELATIVELY CALM AND THERE WAS NO RESUMPTION OF THE HEAVY SHELLING.

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SHULTZ EXPECTED TO SUGGEST RESUMPTION OF ARMS TALKS USING
CONFIDENTIAL FORUM
BY DAVID IGNATIUS

GEORGE SHULTZ IS EXPECTED TO TELL HIS SOVIET COUNTERPART
TODAY THAT THE US IS READY TO RESUME ARMS CONTROL TALKS IN
A CONFIDENTIAL FORUM WHERE ISSUES COULD BE DISCUSSED WITH-
OUT RHETORIC OR PUBLICITY.

MR. SHULTZ'S MEETING TODAY WITH GROMYKO WILL BE THE FIRST
TEST OF REAGAN'S NEW EFFORT TO DEAL WITH MOSCOW IN A LESS
CONFRONTATIONAL MANNER. AFTER MUCH URGING FROM WEST EUROPE-
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AN ALLIES, THE US VIEW NOW IS THAT BOTH SUPERPOWERS HAVE
DONE ENOUGH GRANDSTANDING AND THAT IT'S TIME FOR QUIET DI-
PLOMACY.

AT A NEWS CONFERENCE, THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THE THRUST
OF HIS MESSAGE TO MR. GROMYKO TODAY WILL BE TO "EXPLORE WHAT
WE CAN DO IN A KIND OF PRACTICAL, OPERATIONAL WAY" TO
REVIVE DIALOGUE ON ARMS CONTROL. HE SAID THAT WHILE
FORMAL ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS ARE NECESSARY, "PRIVATE CON-
VERSATIONS" ARE ALSO NORMAL IN MOST BARGAINING, HINTING
THAT US PREPARATIONS FOR CONFIDENTIAL TALKS COULD BE IN THE
WORKS.

FACED WITH STALEMATE, THE US APPROACH IS TO INVITE THE
SOVIETS TO JOIN IN DISCUSSING A BROAD RANGE OF ISSUES, FROM
NUCLEAR MISSILES TO CHEMICAL WEAPONS, AND FROM THE MIDEAST
TO HUMAN RIGHTS. THE HOPE IS THAT SUCH DISCUSSIONS CAN
HELP STABILIZE US-SOVIET RELATIONS DURING A TIME OF TENSION
AND UNCERTAINTY CAUSED PARTLY BY THE ILLNESS OF ANDROPOV.
SUCH DISCUSSIONS ALSO WOULD HELP MR. REAGAN DIPLOMATICALLY
AND POLITICALLY BY EASING FEARS IN EUROPE AND AMERICA THAT
HIS TOUGH POLICIES TOWARD MOSCOW HAVE RAISE SUPERPOWER
TENSIONS TO A DANGEROUS LEVEL.

THE EMPHASIS ON MAINTAINING US-SOVIET DIALOGUE DESPITE
SHARP DIFFERENCES ON SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES IS AN IMPORTANT
CHANGE IN TONE FOR THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION. WHEN MR.
REAGAN CAMPAIGNED FOR THE PRESIDENCY, AND DURING MUCH OF
HIS FIRST THREE YEARS IN THE WHITE HOUSE, HE CRITICIZED

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THE IDEA OF "DIALOGUE FOR ITS OWN SAKE" IN THE FACE OF SUCH SUBSTANTIVE DISAGREEMENTS.

MR. SHULTZ AND OTHER TOP US OFFICIALS REFUSE TO SPECULATE
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ABOUT HOW MR. GROMYKO WILL REACT TODAY.

IT'S EXPECTED THAT MR. SHULTZ WON'T TRY TO BYPASS THE DEADLOCKED ISSUE OF US MISSILE DEPLOYMENTS IN WESTERN EUROPE BUT THAT HE WON'T OFFER ANY NEW CONCESSIONS ON THIS ISSUE EITHER. HE IS EXPECTED TO OUTLINE THE US POSITION AND RESPOND TO ANY QUESTIONS FROM MR. GROMYKO.

WHILE MR. SHULTZ CLEARLY WANTS TO KEEP THE LEVEL OF RHETORIC DOWN, HE ENGAGED IN A BIT OF HIS OWN YESTERDAY WHEN HE SAID IN HIS SPEECH THAT US "DOESN'T RECOGNIZE THE LEGITIMACY OF THE ARTIFICIALLY IMPOSED DIVISION OF EUROPE" INTO EAST-WEST. HE ADDED LATER AT A NEWS CONFERENCE THAT HE DEPLORES THE "ARTIFICIAL LINE ACROSS EUROPE, ONCE DESCRIBED AS AN IRON CURTAIN." THESE COMMENTS CHALLENGING SOVIET CONTROL OF EASTERN EUROPE MAY UNDERCUT THE NON-CONFRONTATIONAL ATMOSPHERE THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN TRIED TO CREATE IN HIS SPEECH LAST MONDAY FOR TODAY'S SHULTZ-GROMYKO MEETING.

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"KOHL'S GOALS"

BONN CHANCELLOR SEEKS "AN EAST-WEST THAW, KEEPS FINGERS CROSSED"

"SOME GERMANS SAY LEADER NEGLECTS DOMESTIC POLICY FOR PEN PAL DIPLOMACY"

BY ROGER THUROW

FOR THE PAST 15 MONTHS, FROM THE MOMENT HE BECAME CHANCELLOR MR. KOHL HAS BEEN TRYING TO KEEP THE NET OF EAST-WEST DIALOGUE FROM UNRAVELING. AT THE MOMENT, WITH THE ARMS-CONTROL TALKS SILENT AND OTHER COMMUNICATION REDUCED TO A WHISPER, MR. KOHL TRULY FINDS HIMSELF SHACK IN THE POLITICS OF THE MIDDLE. CAUGHT BETWEEN HIS OWN PREOCCUPATION WITH PROMOTING SMOOTH RELATIONS WITH EAST GERMANY AND HIS UNFLAGGING DEVOTION TO THE WESTERN ALLIANCE AND THE US,

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MR. KOHL IS PERHAPS THE PERSON SHIVERING THE MOST DURING THIS FREEZE IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS.

"THERE IS NOT OTHER COUNTRY THAT SUFFERS MORE IN TIMES OF TENSE US-SOVIET RELATIONS THAN US, AND NO LEADER MORE THAN THE WEST GERMAN CHANCELLOR," SAYS PETER BOENISCH, MR. KOHL'S SPOKESMAN.

AS A RESULT, CHANCELLOR KOHL IS KEEPIN HIS FINGERS CROSSED, HOPING THAT SUPERPOWER RELATIONS MAY THAW SOMEWHAT AFTER TODAY'S SCHEDULED MEETING BETWEEN SHULTZ AND GROMYKO. BOTH THE US AND THE SOVIET UNION HAVE WARNED AGAINST HARBORING HIGH HOPES, BUT MR. KOHL SAYS STOCKHOLM PROVIDES A "HISTORIC CHANCE" TO CONTRIBUTE TO INTERNATIONAL STABILITY.

IN AN EFFORT TO RESTORE A LITTLE WARMTH, MR. KOHL IS TURNING TO HIS FAVORITE FORM OF PERSUASION: PEN-PAL DIPLOMACY. NOW HE IS BACK AT THE WRITING TABLE, ADDRESSING "DEAR RON" LETTERS TO THE WHITE HOUSE ALMOST EVERY WEEK AND SENDING LETTERS TO THE KREMLIN OR OTHER EASTERN-BLOC CAPITALS NEARLY ONCE A MONTH.

IF THE ARMS TALKS ARE DOWN, HE ARGUES, THEN LET'S TALK MORE ABOUT TRADE OR AIR POLLUTION. HE HAS BEEN PUSHING FOR A SUMMIT MEETING BETWEEN REAGAN AND ANDROPOV FOR MORE THAN A YEAR. AND HE BELIEVES THAT HIS URGINGS HELPED PAVE THE WAY FOR THE SULTZ-GROMYKO MEETING.

ALTHOUGH HE CAME TO OFFICE AS A RELATIVELY UNKNOWN PLAYER ON THE WORLD STAGE, MR. KOHL'S CONCILIATORY MANNER HAS WON HIM SOME SUCCESSES. HE IS THE ONLY WESTERN LEADER TO HAVE MET AT LENGTH WITH MR. ANDROPOV, AND HE GETS ON FAMOUSLY WITH MR. REAGAN, A RELATIONSHIP THAT PROBABLY
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HELPED PROMOTE GREATER US FLEXIBILITY AT THE ARMS-REDUCTION TALKS IN GENEVA.

BECAUSE OF HIS SOLID FOOTING IN WASHINGTON AND HIS STRONG SUPPORT FOR THE STATIONING OF NEW US NUCLEAR MISSILES HERE, MR. KOHL HAS BEEN ABLE TO KEEP HIS HAND OUTSTRECHED

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TO THE EAST WITHOUT ANGERING THE WHITE HOUSE.

ONE MOTIVE DRIVING MR. KOHL IS HIS DESIRE FOR ONE GERMANY AND ONE EUROPE. EUROPEAN UNIFICATION, HE HAS SAID REPEATEDLY, CAN ONLY BE ACHIEVED THROUGH THE ELIMINATION OF THE DIVISION OF GERMANY, WHICH, IN TURN, CAN ONLY HAPPEN THROUGH EXTENSIVE EAST-WEST COOPERATION.

THE URGE TO BRING GERMANY TOGETHER ONCE AGAIN BURNS DEEP WITHIN MR. KOHL. IN THE EARLY 1970'S HE WAS ONE OF THE FIRST WEST GERMAN POLITICIANS TO RE-POPULARIZE THE USE OF THE EMOTIONALLY CHARGED WORD "FATHERLAND" TO EMBRACE BOTH PARTS OF THE COUNTRY. AND LAST SUMMER HE CALLED HIS STATE-OF-THE-NATION SPEECH "STATE OF THE NATION IN A DIVIDED GERMANY", A TITLE THAT HAD BEEN DROPPED BY HIS TWO IMMEDIATE PREDECESSORS.

"TODAY, WE ARE RETURNING ONCE MORE TO THE TRUE PURPOSE OF THIS ADDRESS," HE EXPLAINED. "IT CONCERNS GERMAN, IT CONCERNS SELF-DETERMINATION, HUMAN RIGHTS, THE UNITY OF OUR DIVIDED NATION."

IS HE OVEROPTIMISTIC? PERHAPS. THAT IS CRITICISM FREQUENTLY LEVELED AGAINST MR. KOHL. WHEN HE INTERPRETED A RECENT LETTER FROM MR. ANDROPOV AS INDICATING SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO REVERSE ITS INTRANSIGENCE AT THE ARMS TALKS, THE SOVIETS ISSUED A STRONG AND HASTY REBUTTAL. NOVOSTI, THE AOCIWR PEWAA AGENCY, CALLED MR. KOHL A "FORTUNE TELLER OF OPTIMISTIC PREDICTIONS" AND SAID HE HAD GONE BEYOND HIS COMPETENCE IN TRYING TO BRING ABOUT A CHANGE IN THE
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CURRENT RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO SUPERPOWERS.
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THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

STOCKHOLM: THE SEARCH FOR SECURITY

"MEETING PLANNED TO REDUCE RISK OF WAR IN EUROPE OFFERS FORUM TO BIG POWERS" BY ELIZABETH POND

COE CONFERENCE'S MOST IMPORTANT ROLE THIS WEEK IS TO PROVIDE A FORUM FOR THE BIG POWERS. ALREADY THE AMERICANS

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AND THE SOVIETS HAVE USED IT TO STRESS THEIR OWN ARMS PROPOSALS, BOTH SIDES CALLING FOR DIFFERENT VERSIONS OF A BAN ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS.

ONCE THAT MEETING HAS PASSED AND THE 35 FOREIGN MINISTERS HAVE ALL HAD THEIR MOMENT OF GLORY, THE REAL WORK OF THE CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE WILL BEGIN NEXT WEEK.

ACTUALLY, NO DISARMEMENT WILL BE DISCUSSED AT THE FIRST PHASE OF THE CONFERENCE DUE TO END IN 1986. THE MANDATE FROM MADRID IN SETTING UP THIS CONFERENCE STIPULATES THAT THE INITIAL STAGE WILL DEAL ONLY WITH "CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES" -- THAT IS, STEPS LIKE MUTUAL NATO/WARSAW PACT NOTIFICATION OF LARGE MILITARY MANEUVERS. THE AIM IS TO HELP PREVENT SURPRISE ATTACK.

IN THE RUN-UP TO THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE, THE WARSAW PACT ALSO RE-PROPOSED A EUROPEWIDE BAN ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS. AND MR. SHULTZ, IN HIS ADDRESS TO THE CONFERENCE TUESDAY, PROMPTLY ANNOUNCED THAT US NEGOTIATORS WOULD IN COMING MON-
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THIS PRESENT IN GENEVA "A DRAFT TREATY FOR THE COMPLETE AND VERIFIABLE ELIMINATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS ON A GLOBAL BASIS."

IN HIS SPEECH TUESDAY MR SHULTZ DID ASSERT THAT HUMAN RIGHTS ARE "CENTRAL TO ANY DISCUSSION OF EUROPEAN SECURITY. BUT THE EMPHASIS OF HIS VERY GENERAL PREVIEW OF THE WESTERN POSITION WAS ON CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES INCLUDING AN OPTIMISTIC CALL FOR "ANNUAL REVIEWS OF MILITARY EXERCISES."

13. "EAST EUROPE HOLDS LITTLE HOPE THAT STOCKHOLM WILL HELP REVIVE DETENTE" BY ERIC BOUME, CSM, P. 10

EAST EUROPEAN LEADERS, WITH SCANT ENCOURAGEMENT FROM MOSCOW OR THE WEST, ARE HOPING FOR SOME REVIVAL OF DETENTE.

AT THIS POINT, THEY ADMIT TO LITTLE OPTIMISM THAT THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE WILL REDUCE THEIR CONCERNS OVER SUPERPOWER TENSION.

"THIS IS AN AMERICAN ELECTION YEAR." A TOP EAST EUROPEAN

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OFFICIAL CLOSE TO THE SUPERPOWER HOT LINE REMARKED,

THE EAST EUROPEANS REALIZE THAT MOSCOW SEES REAGAN'S NEW ATTITUDE AS AIMED AT THE AMERICAN PUBLIC IN AN ELECTION YEAR, AND AT THE WESTERN PEACE MOVEMENT.

EAST EUROPEANS WELCOME THE STOCKHOLM MEETING, JUST AS THEY DID ITS FORERUNNER 8 YEARS AGO IN HELSINKI. THEY ARE RELIEVED THAT THE SOVIET'S PERENNIAL FOR. MIN. GROHYKO WILL HOLD SOME OF TALKS WITH SHULTZ.

TO SOME EXTENT, THEY ARE MORE OPTIMISTIC ABOUT TALKS GROHYKO MAY HAVE WITH WEST EUROPEANS SINCE THESE COULD TAKE THE ROUGH EDGES OFF THE U.S. APPROACH.

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BUT ALL THE EAST EUROPEANS ARE VIEWING THE OUTLOOK GLOOMILY. THE CZECHS AND THE EAST GERMANS MUST EXPLAIN TO THEIR CITIZENS THE INSTALLATION OF NEW SOVIET MISSILES IN RESPONSE TO NATO'S MISSILES. POLAND, HUNGARY, AND BULGARIA -- TO THEIR INFINITE RELIEF -- ARE STILL IMMUNE TO INSTALLATION OF MISSILES BUT MAY NOT REMAIN SO.

THE POLES ABOVE ALL ARE PLANNING TO TAKE A STRONG MUTUAL ARMS REDUCTION LINE IN STOCKHOLM. THEY INDICATED BEFORE CHRISTMAS THAT THEY ARE LIKELY TO REVIVE A PLAN TO MAKE CENTRAL EUROPE A NUCLEAR FREE ZONE. THE VIENNA TALKS ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS REDUCTIONS NOW IN SUSPENSE WERE TO SOME EXTENT A SUBSTITUTE FOR THE GENERAL IDEA OF REDUCED ARMAMENTS IN THE AREA EMBRACING BOTH GERMANY'S, POLAND, AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

IN THE MEANTIME, A NON-CONCESSIONS STATEMENT FROM MOSCOW MONDAY ONLY CONFIRMED A SOVIET BELIEF THAT THE US IS "NOT SERIOUS," DESPITE SOFTER TONES NOW COMING FROM THE WHITE HOUSE.

FURTHERMORE, EAST EUROPEANS THINK THAT WITHOUT A PRIOR U.S. AND WESTERN AGREEMENT TO PULL BACK ON CRUISE AND PERSHING MISSILE INSTALLATION IN WEST EUROPE, THE SOVIETS WILL NOT RETURN TO GENEVA FOR STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS TALKS OR TO VIENNA FOR TALKS ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS.

"WE DON'T WANT AN ESCALATION OF MISSILES IN OUR COUNTRIES,"

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SAID THE EAST EUROPEAN SOURCE BUT WE BELIEVE THERE WAS -
GIVEN A CERTAIN QUID PRO QUO IN THE COUNTING - ENOUGH
PARITY AND BALANCE TO CAUSE NEITHER SIDE ANY SERIOUS MIS-
GIVING.

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"THE RUSSIANS, IT MUST BE ADMITTED, DID MAKE CLEAR THEIR
POSITION BEFORE NATO'S DECISION TO GO AHEAD REGARDLESS WITH
ITS NEW MISSILES," HE SAID.

"THERE CAN BE NO GOING BACK ON THAT. CONCESSIONS, IF WE
ARE TO TALK ABOUT THAT, MUST COME FIRST FROM THE WESTERN
SIDE."

14. "SURINAME CALLED POTENTIAL GRENADA" BY J. N. GOODSSELL,
CSM, P. 10

COULD SURINAME BECOME ANOTHER GRENADA? THREE MONTHS AFTER
THE CONTROVERSIAL U.S. OCCUPATION OF GRENADA, THIS
POSSIBILITY IS WORRYING WASHINGTON.

SURINAMESE OBSERVERS SEE THE FORMER DUTCH COLONY ON SOUTH
AMERICA'S NORTHEAST COAST SLIPPING NEARER TO THE SORT OF
"ANARCHY" THAT PROMPTED THE U.S. TO LAUNCH ITS INTERVENTION
INTO GRENADA.

LABOR ORGANIZATIONS ARE DEMANDING THE RESIGNATION OF THE
COUNTRY'S MILITARY LEADER. BAUXITE MINING HAS BEEN
PARALYZED BY STRIKES FOR NEARLY FOUR WEEKS. WORKERS AT
FIVE BANKS WALKED OUT LAST WEEK - AND THIS WEEK ONLY TWO
OF THEM CLAIM TO BE BACK AT FULL OPERATIONAL SPEED.

OTHER WORKERS RECENTLY CUT ELECTRICITY TO PARTS OF THE
CAPITAL. THE ARMY SUBSEQUENTLY TOOK OVER A KEY POWER PLAN
TO PREVENT A BLACKOUT.

THIS WEEK, UNREST SPREAD AS MOST OF THE PRIVATELY OWNED BUS
LINES WITHDREW SERVICES AND AS SCHOOL CLASSES WERE CAN-
CELLED AFTER PAMPHLETS CIRCULATING OVER THE WEEKEND IN
PARAMARIBO APPEALED FOR SOLIDARITY WITH STRIKING UNIONISTS
AND AN END TO BOUTERSE'S RULE.

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"AN UGLY MOOD IS SETTLING OVER MY COUNTRY," SAYS CHARLO VAN WIT, A SURINAMESE. "THERE IS AN OMINOUS FEAR (OF VIOLENCE) EVERYWHERE. NO ONE IS CERTAIN WHOM TO TRUST AND YET MOST PEOPLE OPPOSE THE GOVERNMENT."

SOME OF THE UNREST WAS SPARKED BY TAX HIKES AND PRICE INCREASES. AND COLONEL BOUTERSE, APPARENTLY CONVINCED THAT THE BEST DEFENSE IS THE COUNTERATTACK, FIRED HIS HAND-PICKED PRIME MINISTER, ERROL ALIBUX, CHARGING HIM WITH FAILING TO CONSULT THE PUBLIC BEFORE IMPOSING THE NEW TAXES. HE ALSO CANCELLED PRICE INCREASES. UNIONS, HOWEVER, ARE NOT SATISFIED.

BOUTERSE HAS SET UP A POWERFUL DICTATORSHIP SINCE THE MILITARY OUSTED DEMOCRATIC LEADERS IN 1980. HE ALSO BUILT A CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH CUBA'S FIDEL CASTRO, BUT BROKE THAT TIE AFTER THE U.S. LANDED IN GRENADA, SAYING HE DID NOT WANT "TO PROVIDE" A SIMILAR INTERVENTION IN SURINAME.

THERE ARE NO INDICATIONS THAT THE U.S. IS PLANNING AN INVASION, BUT WASHINGTON IS CONCERNED WITH SURINAME'S APPARENT INSTABILITY. SOME DIPLOMATIC OBSERVERS SEE PARALLELS BETWEEN THE VIOLENCE IN GRENADA LAST YEAR AND THAT EMERGING IN SURINAME. SPECULATION IS THAT BOUTERSE'S DAYS IN POWER ARE NUMBERED.

15. "REAGAN MOVES TO IMPLEMENT KISSINGER REPORT" BY D. SOUTHERLAND, CSM, P. 1

WASHINGTON -- THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION -- FROM THE PRESIDENT ON DOWN -- IS NOW ADOPTING THE ESSENTIALS OF THE KISSINGER COMMISSION REPORT AS ITS PLAN OF ACTION FOR

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CENTRAL AMERICA.

BY DOING SO, THE ADMINISTRATION SEEMS TO STAND A GOOD CHANCE OF INCREASING THE AMOUNTS OF ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID THAT IT WANTS TO DEVOTE TO CENTRAL AMERICA,

SUCH AID INCREASES, OF COURSE, MAY TURN OUT TO BE CONSIDER-

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ABLY LESS THAN THE ADMINISTRATION DESIRES BUT THE MAKEUP OF THE KISSINGER COMMISSION WAS JUST "BIPARTISAN" ENOUGH TO GIVE THE ADMINISTRATION SOME STRONG ADVANTAGES WHEN IT COMES TO DEALING WITH THE CONGRESS, AT LEAST IN THE SHORT RUN, SAY SPECIALISTS ON EXECUTIVE-CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS.

ADOPTION OF THE COMMISSION REPORT -- WHICH PROPOSES INCREASES IN ALMOST EVERY FORM OF AID -- ALSO ENTAILS RISKS, HOWEVER. IT GIVES THE CONTENTIOUS CENTRAL AMERICA PROBLEM MORE PROMINENCE. IT HELPS TO GUARANTEE THAT CENTRAL AMERICA WILL BE AN ISSUE IN THIS YEAR'S PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN.

MORE OF EVERYTHING IN THE WAY OF AID IS LIKELY TO MEAN MORE DEBATE. "THE KISSINGER REPORT SUBSTANTIALLY ELEVATES THE CENTRAL AMERICA PROBLEM ON BOTH THE FOREIGN POLICY AND POLITICAL AGENDAS," SAID ONE CONGRESSIONAL FOREIGN AFFAIRS SPECIALIST.

THE ADMINISTRATION, MEANWHILE, HAS TAKEN SEVERAL STEPS THAT AMOUNT TO FAIRLY STRONG SUPPORT FOR THE KISSINGER REPORT. OVER THE PAST WEEKEND, PRESIDENT REAGAN, IN HIS REGULAR RADIO ADDRESS, SAID HE WILL SEND CONGRESS A PLAN FOR ENACTING THE REPORT'S RECOMMENDATIONS. AT THE SAME TIME, A SENIOR WHITE HOUSE OFFICIAL SAID REAGAN ENDORSED THE COMMISSION'S PROPOSAL TO MAKE MILITARY AID TO EL SALVADOR CONTINGENT UPON POLITICAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS PROGRESS.

ON MONDAY, M. PETER MCPHERSON, ADMINISTRATION OF THE
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U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, SAID PRESIDENT REAGAN "SUPPORTS THE BASIC ELEMENTS OF THE REPORT," INCLUDING A SUBSTANTIAL ECONOMIC AID PROGRAM. MCPHERSON SAID THAT "NO DOUBT SUCH AN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAM... WILL BE IN THE RANGE OF THE 8.4 BILLION DOLS" FOR A FIVE-YEAR PERIOD WHICH THE 12-MEMBER KISSINGER COMMISSION RECOMMENDED.

MUCH WILL NOW DEPEND ON HOW THE ADMINISTRATION APPROACHES THE CONGRESS AND WHETHER IT TRIES TO GET CONGRESS TO ACCEPT FIVE-YEAR FUNDING -- WHICH SEEMS UNLIKELY GIVEN THE WAY THE SYSTEM WORKS ON CAPITOL HILL -- OR WHETHER IT WILL SUBMIT THE AID PACKAGE IN INCREMENTS. MUCH ALSO DEPENDS

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ON HOW MUCH STRESS THE ADMINISTRATION PLACES ON A PROPOSED INCREASE IN MILITARY AID FOR EL SALVADOR.

SEN. DURENBERGER SAID THAT "UNLESS THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT SIDE OF THIS PROGRAM IS IN PLACE BY EARLY NEXT YEAR, I'M NOT GOING TO SUPPORT THE MILITARY AID. I'M NOT GOING TO WRITE THEM A LARGE MILITARY CHECK UNLESS THEY ARE COMMITTED TO ACHIEVING THAT ECONOMIC GOAL."

LAST YEAR, SEN. DURENBERGER GREW INCREASINGLY CRITICAL OF ADMINISTRATION POLICY IN CENTRAL AMERICA BECAUSE HE FELT IT EMPHASIZED MILITARY SOLUTIONS. AS HE SEES IT, THE KISSINGER REPORT POINTS IN A MORE POSITIVE DIRECTION. IT CALLS FOR A MIX OF ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID, AND ACCORDING TO DURENBERGER, TELLS YOU NOT JUST WHAT THE ADMINISTRATION IS AGAINST IN CENTRAL AMERICA BUT ALSO WHAT IT IS FOR.

BUT THERE IS MUCH SKEPTICISM AMONG SOME CONGRESSIONAL SOURCES THAT AN \$8 BILLION PLUS AID PACKAGE WILL BE ACCEPTED BY THE CONGRESS. SOME CONGRESSMEN WILL OPPOSE THE PACKAGE,

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APPARENTLY, UNLESS THERE IS MORE PROGRESS TOWARD A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT IN THE REGION.

DURENBERGER AND AID ADMINISTRATOR MCPHERSON EMPHASIZED IN THEIR REMARKS THAT THE "ENEMY" WAS MULTIFACETED - BOTH POVERTY AND COMMUNISM, AMONG OTHER THINGS. MCPHERSON PUT IT THIS WAY IN HIS STATEMENT: "POVERTY IS A SEVERE PROBLEM WHICH MUST BE TACKLED." HE SAID THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WAS PROPOSING A "VERY SUBSTANTIAL LITERACY AND EDUCATION PROGRAM AS RECOMMENDED BY THE KISSINGER COMMISSION."

THE FOLLOWING ARTICLES ARE FROM THE BALTIMORE SUN:

16. "SHULTZ IN STOCKHOLM: 'RIGHTS STILL CENTRAL'"
"SECRETARY REAFFIRMS REAGAN'S CALL FOR ACCORD BY HAL PIPER,
P. 1
HUMAN RIGHTS REMAIN ON THE SOVIET-AMERICAN AGENDA, SHULTZ TOLD THE OPENING OF A DISARMEMENT CONFERENCE HERE YESTERDAY.

BUT HE SAID THAT THE HISTORY OF FAILURE IN NEGOTIATIONS TO

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LIMIT ARMS, GOING BACK BEFORE WE REACHES THAT "EFFORTS TO PREVENT WAR OR CONTROL WEAPONRY DO NOT OPERATE IN A VACUUM. THEY ARE A DIMENSION OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND CANNOT BE DIVORCED FROM THE POLITICAL CONTEXT."

"HUMAN RIGHTS REMAIN CENTRAL TO ANY DISCUSSION OF EUROPEAN SECURITY," SHULTZ SAID AND IDENTIFIED THE SOURCE OF EUROPEAN INSECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS TENSION AS THE "ARTIFICIAL BARRIER (THAT) THAT HAS CRUELLY DIVIDED THIS CONTINENT."

QUESTIONED DURING A LATER PRESS CONFERENCE, SHULTZ SAID HE WAS NOT PLUMPING FOR CHANGES IN THE POLITICAL SOVEREIGNTY OF THE 2 GERMANIES, BUT WAS "DEPLORING THE DIVISIONS THAT
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SEPARATE PEOPLE AND FAMILIES FROM EACH OTHER, AND THAT SEPARATE NATIONS.'

SHULTZ PUT THE ONUS FOR THE BREAKDOWN OF TALKS SQUARELY ON MOSCOW. THE SOVIET WALKOUT, HE SAID, "TELLS US A GREAT DEAL ABOUT WHICH SIDE IS EAGER FOR PROGRESS."

"NEVERTHELESS, THE DOOR REMAINS OPEN," THE SECRETARY ADDED. "WE ARE READY FOR NEGOTIATIONS WHEN THE SOVIET UNION IS PREPARED."

MEANWHILE, THE PROBABLE SOVIET REPOSE WAS FORESHADOWED YESTERDAY BY E. GERMANY AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA, WHOSE FOREIGN MINISTERS DELIVERED HARD LINE SPEECHES.

THE RUPTURED NEGOTIATIONS CANNOT BE STARTED UNTIL NATO REMOVES ITS MISSILES, SAID GERMANY.

E. GERMANY AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA OUTLINED A WARSAW PACT PLAN FOR A BINDING INTERNATIONAL TREATY INCORPORATING A FREEZE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS, A FREEZE AND LATER REDUCTION OF MILITARY BUDGETS, A COMMITMENT BY EACH COUNTRY NOT TO BE THE FIRST TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND DESIGNATION OF CERTAIN GEOGRAPHICAL ZONES TO BE KEPT FREE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. AT HIS PRESS CONFERENCE, SHULTZ SAID HE IS GENERALLY UNENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT FREEZE PLANS, PREFERRING OUTRIGHT REDUCTIONS OF WEAPONS - AS PROPOSED, HE ADDED, IN MOST OF THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION OFFERS THE SOVIET BLOC HAS

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SPURNED.

SHULTZ ALSO ONE UPped THE SOVIET BLOC, WHICH IS PUTTING FORWARD A PLAN FOR A BAN ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN EUROPE BY ANNOUNCING THAT THE U.S. WILL PROPOSE AT THE GENEVA DIS-

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ARMAMENT CONFERENCE BANNIGN CHEMICAL WEAPONS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD.

SHULTZ MET PRIVATELY WITH 6 FOREIGN MINISTERS YESTERDAY, IN ADDITION TO HIS CONTACTS AT LUNCHEONS AND EVENING ENTERTAINMENTS ARRAGED FOR THE MINISTERS. HE SAID HE WAS IMPRESSED BY THE SERIOUSNESS OF PURPOSE HE WAS FINDING IN STOCKHOLM.

17. "'CONFIDENCE BUILDING' IS THEME OF MEETINGS", BY HAL PIPER, P. 1

ARMS CONTROLLERS LIKE TO DESCRIBE "CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES AS THE SOFT, WARM PUPPY OF ARMS CONTROL."

WHO COULD BE AGAINST MORE CONFIDENCE? NOBODY AND THAT IS WHY SOME WESTERN DELEGATES WERE HOPEING THAT, AFTER THE POLITICAL HEAVYWEIGHTS GET THROUGH SPEAKING THEIR POLEMICAL PIECES, THERE MIGHT ACTUALLY BE SOME MODEST PROGRESS AT THE CONFERENCE ON CDE.

THE PURPOSE OF "CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES" IS TO LAY DOWN CONSISTENT STANDARDS FRO THE NORMAL PEACE TIME ACTIVITY OF ROTATING AND EXERCISING TROOPS. THEN IT SHOULD BE MUCH HARDER FOR EITHER SIDE TO PLAN A SURPRISE ATTACK OR TO MISINTERPRET THE OTHER SIDE'S MILITARY MANEUVERS, AS ANY DEVIATION FROM STANDARD PRACTICE WOULD CALL ATTENTION TO ITSELF AND REQUIRE AN EXPLANATION.

IN ARMS CONTROL JARGON, CBM INTRODUCE "TRANSPARENCY" INTO MILITARY ACTIVITY.

NATO WANTS TO EXPAND THE CBS, MAKING THE VOLUNTARY ONES MANDATORY AND INTRODUCING NEW PROPOSALS ON BETTER COMMUNICATIONS AND FULLER EXPLANATIONS OF TROOP DEPLOYMENTS AND EXTENDING THE AREA OF COVERAGE TO INCLUDE ALL OF-EUROPE

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FROM THE ATLANTIC TO THE URALS.

IT WOULD BE "A MODEST CONTRIBUTION," A BRITISH OFFICIAL ADMITS, "BUT NEVERTHELESS SIGNIFICANT FOR STABILITY AND SECURITY IN EUROPE."

THERE IS SOME EVIDENCE THAT THE SOVIET BLOC DOES NOT LIKE SOFT WRAM PUPPIES. THE E. GERMAN FOR. MIN. SAID YESTERDAY THAT HE DID NOT THINK NOTIFICATION OF MANEUVERS BY ITSELF CAN CONTRIBUTE TO CONFIDENCE. HE PROPOSED A MUCH GRANDER SET OF IDEAS, INCLUDING MUTUAL PLEDGES NOT TO USE FORCE OR BE THE FIRST TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

THE WESTERN ATTITUDE TO THAT IS THAT THE PROCESS SHOULD BEGIN WITH SMALL STEPS THAT COULD BE TESTED AND MONITORED, PROCEEDING TO HANDSOME DECLARATIONS RESTING ON TRUST ONLY AFTER SOME TRUST IS ESTABLISHED.

"IT IS NOT ONLY THAT EAST AND WEST HAVE DIFFERENT VIEWS ON PARTICULAR ISSUES," SAYS AN AMERICAN ARMS CONTROLLER WHO IS PESSIMISTIC ABOUT STOCKHOLM. "IT'S THAT THEY DON'T EVEN WANT TO TALK ABOUT THE SAME THINGS."

SOVIET BLOC COOLNESS TO CONFIDENCE BUILDING RESTS IN PART ON A HABITUAL SECRECY ABOUT MILITARY MATTERS AND RELUCTANCE TO ACCEPT ANY VERIFICATION MEASURES THAT WOULD PROVIDE SENSITIVE INFORMATION TO NATO.

18. "NITZE SAYS U.S. IS PRESSING ARMS TALKS PLEA TO MOSCOW" BY HANK TREWHITT, P. 2

SHORT OF "IMPROPER CONCESSIONS," A VETERAN ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATOR SAID YESTERDAY, THE ADMINISTRATION WILL TRY TO MAKE IT EASY FOR THE SOVIETS TO REOPEN NEGOTIATIONS OVER
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MISSILE LIMITATIONS IN EUROPE.

MORE BROADLY, PRESIDENT REAGAN'S SPOKESMAN SAID, THE U.S. OFFER IS TO "OPEN A SERIOUS DIALOGUE AND ... GET DOWN TO BUSINESS ON A WIDE RANGE OF ISSUES."

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NITZE SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT IS CONSIDERING INDUCEMENTS THAT MIGHT ENCOURAGE THE SOVIETS TO RETURN TO NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT LIMITING NUCLEAR MISSILES IN EUROPE.

"I BELIEVE THERE ARE THINGS TO MAKE IT EASIER FOR THEM TO RETURN TO NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT OUR MAKING IMPROPER CONCESSIONS," NITZE SAID. OTHER OFFICIALS EXPLAINED THAT HE THAT HE MEANT FACE SAVING GESTURES FOR THE SOVIETS, STEPS THAT WOULD PERMIT THEM TO TALK WITHOUT PUBLICLY REVERSING POSITION.

AT ONE POINT IN THE NEW CONFERENCES AND BRIEFINGS YESTERDAY, SPEAKES INDICATED THAT THE ADMINISTRATION MIGHT CONSIDER TALKING IN SOME FORUM OTHER THAN THE FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS OVER INF IN EUROPE. "IF THERE'S ANOTHER WAY TO DO IT THAT'S MORE EFFECTIVE," HE SAID, "WE HAVE NO OBJECTION TO THAT." THE POSSIBILITY OF FOLDING THE INF NEGOTIATIONS INTO SEPARATE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TALKS -- START, WHICH THE SOVIETS - ALSO HAVE SUSPENDED -- HAS BEEN WIDELY DISCUSSED. BUT NITZE DISCOURAGED THAT IDEA. THE PRESIDENT'S VIEW, HE SAID, "IS THAT IT IS BETTER FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS TO BE CONDUCTED BY THE INF DELEGATION."

MOREOVER, HE SAID, THE ADMINISTRATION HAD CONSIDERED BUT "NOT FAVORED" THE USE OF PRIVATE CHANNELS AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR THE FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS. THE UPSHOT, HE CONCLUDED, - WAS THAT HE COULD NOT PREDICT "NEW MOVEMENT TOWARDS A RESUMPTION OF THE INF TALKS AT THIS TIME."

AS FOR THE OFFICIAL SOVIET RESPONSE, SPEAKES SAID, THAT WILL
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TIME. WHEN IT COMES, IT IS UNLIKELY TO COME VIA NEWS RELEASE ... WE EXPECT THAT THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP WILL GIVE CAREFUL CONSIDERATION TO WHAT THE PRESIDENT SAID."

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Secretary's Remarks on CDE
For After-Dinner Discussion
10:00 PM, January 16, 1984

-- I was extremely pleased that the Alliance was able, in the Madrid conference, to achieve agreement on a mandate for the CDE which met our objectives. The Madrid conference was a model of what can be achieved by Western unity.

-- That same unity will be essential throughout the Stockholm conference. Our objective must be to achieve concrete, meaningful measures of military security, and in the process to ensure that our publics better understand the nature of the security problem in Europe posed both by the forces of the Soviet Union and by its geographic advantages.

-- The Soviet concept of the CDE differs from that of the Alliance. They are likely to advance proposals for broad "political" agreements, to attempt to embarrass the West, and to divide us from the Neutral and Nonaligned by focusing on propagandistic subjects such as nuclear weapons free zones and non-first use pledges.

-- The Soviets may also seek to reopen the question of the zone of application of measures agreed in the conference, returning to arguments which they made unsuccessfully in Madrid.

-- Although such Soviet tactics would be transparent efforts to divert attention from the real issue of the threat of surprise attack posed by massive Soviet forces in Europe, some of the neutrals might be tempted to tolerate them as a gesture of alleged "evenhandedness" between East and West.

-- Clearly, the way to achieve a constructive result from the Stockholm conference will be to insist calmly and patiently that the conference keep its attention focused on the objectives and principles already agreed in the Madrid mandate:

o that measures be militarily significant, and thus eschew propagandistic political pledges;

o that they be politically binding and verifiable, thus ensuring that they cannot be ignored once agreed; and

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o that they pertain to the whole of Europe, thus bringing in the entirety of European Russia, as the Soviets have accepted.

-- NATO has developed a sound package of measures with these purposes and principles in mind. We should work hard for its adoption.

-- I know that there are ideas in the Alliance for additional measures which we might put forward at some point in the CDE. We are willing to consider within the relevant Alliance committees in Brussels such additional proposals as individual Allies wish to raise, to see if a consensus might be developed on any of them.

-- (If needed) I regret that one issue has remained unresolved in the NATO package of measures, namely the question of whether or not the transit of US forces through Europe should be subject to notification.

o As I wrote to you after Christmas, this is a fundamental political and strategic issue for the US, and one of major significance for the security interests of the entire West.

o This common security interest has been discussed with increasing frequency in the Alliance over the past several years, particularly since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war.

-- When the US agreed to support the concept of a CDE mandate, at the beginning of the Reagan Administration -- the Carter administration having fought the idea -- one of our major considerations, which was made clear at the time, was that an eventual conference could in no way give the Soviet Union a handle on activities related to security in other areas.

o This could weaken our ability to deter and defend against Soviet adventurism and other threats, notably in Southwest Asia, and could create political problems within the Alliance.

o The CDE cannot and will not achieve productive results relevant to security in Europe if it attempts to create artificial constraints on activities directed elsewhere. This would only serve Soviet interests.

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Secretary's Remarks at Informal Meeting and Dinner
for NATO Foreign Ministers, Hosted by France,
8:30 PM, January 16, 1984

-- Appreciate French initiative in organizing dinner; this is an important opportunity to share views on East-West relations and the international situation.

-- In acceding to Allied desires that Stockholm opening ceremony be conducted at level of Foreign Ministers, US wanted to underscore commitment to pursuit of constructive East-West relations. This was the theme of NATO communique in December. It was the message of the President's speech on East-West relations last week. And it will be central thrust of bilateral discussion with Gromyko on Wednesday.

-- We will all want to use the meetings here in Stockholm to put forward a positive Western program, and to put the onus on the Soviets to resume the dialogue which they have interrupted.

-- But we cannot allow the Soviets, through their negative actions, to narrow our own sights to a single question of their willingness to talk and to force us to come begging to them. Rather, we must keep our attention focused on all aspects of the international situation which affect our common security and well-being.

The Gromyko Bilateral

-- Beyond the general theme of our interest in reestablishing a dialogue, I intend in my bilateral with Gromyko to concentrate on arms control, regional questions, and human rights.

-- Although the Soviets are publicly dampening expectations that anything can be done on arms control, and are trying to shift blame to the West because of INF deployments, bilateral will nevertheless be an opportunity to explore the prospects for getting the Soviets back into negotiations on START, INF, and MBFR, as well as an occasion to emphasize our serious approach to the CDE.

-- We do not expect any immediate results. The Soviets may not know themselves how they intend to move next. For the moment they seem to be maintaining continuity in policy and keeping their options open, as shown by the Gromyko decision to come to Stockholm.

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-- I am convinced, however, that it is not politically tenable nor in the Soviets' military interest for them to maintain their arms control boycott indefinitely. Thus, they will have to make some decisions. I hope the reestablishment of a dialogue can facilitate that process.

-- For our part, I intend to reaffirm the President's readiness to explore mutual trade-offs in START and to find equitable solution in INF at levels below planned NATO deployment.

-- I will also raise with Gromyko the issue of Soviet compliance with existing arms control agreements. We have informed you of the results of our analysis of this question. It is essential that the Soviet Union understand that it cannot ignore international commitments. It is also essential that in our own efforts to negotiate arms control agreements -- which will continue -- we give full attention to the problem of verifiability. I intend to emphasize that our approach to compliance is constructive: we would welcome additional information or concrete steps to alleviate our concerns.

-- The most important regional issue is, of course, the Middle East. Will underscore to Gromyko our objectives in seeking stability in Lebanon, our continuing concerns about the dangerous implications of the Soviet relationship with Syria, and the risks of Israeli-Syrian conflict inherent in the present situation. Although the Soviets have told us in the past that they had urged restraint on the Syrians, it is not clear what either the Soviet or Syrian longer-term objectives are in the region.

-- Will also press Gromyko on Afghanistan, reiterating our support for the UN efforts and stressing that an agreement must provide for Soviet withdrawal, return of refugees, establishment of an Afghan government responsive to the will of the Afghan people, and guarantees of Afghan independence and non-alignment.

-- On human rights, I will be raising with Gromyko our concern at the Soviet treatment of individual dissidents as well as the overall Soviet obduracy on Jewish emigration, which we have discussed before as an issue for all CSCE participants following Madrid. I will also be noting the case of Raoul Wallenberg, which is particularly appropriate given the venue and timing of our meeting.

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Poland

-- Understand some of you have expressed interest in moving on Poland. We are currently looking closely at the question and hope to be in a position to consult with you in the very near future.

The Middle East

-- The US, along with all members of the Alliance, shares an active interest in peace in the Middle East. Together with the other members of the MNF, we are actively engaged in working toward an agreement in Lebanon which would expand the authority of the central government and permit the withdrawal of all foreign forces. We will continue our efforts in this direction, including maintaining the presence of a US marine force, despite the domestic controversy that has arisen because of Marine casualties.

-- The US is further committed to longer-term progress on the overall issues of Arab-Israeli relations. We believe there are prospects for further positive developments in that area, following Arafat's evacuation from Tripoli and his meeting with Mubarak.

-- We are also very concerned at the implications of the continuing Iran-Iraq conflict, and have been working to prevent the conflict from spreading to other countries in the region or posing a threat to the flow of oil from the Gulf. A parallel aspect of this problem is the increasing threat from Iranian terrorism, which has claimed hundreds of victims in recent months.

China and Japan

-- Turning to another part of the world, we have just completed a very successful visit to the US by Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang. We regard this as a further important step in the development of our relations with China, which we regard as an important contribution to global stability. We expect that President Reagan's return visit in April will further advance our friendly ties.

-- Development of our relations with China parallels the development of relations with Japan, which is of increasing importance as a member of the Western community, not simply as a trading partner but as a political and security ally. The slow transition in Japanese consciousness regarding their international role is continuing and is very welcome.

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The Economic Future

-- As we look to 1984, one of the key reasons for Western optimism must be the general economic recovery. Although it has not started at the same time or pace in all countries, its general spread is unmistakable. The OECD looks to a very healthy 1984.

-- The upturn last year in the US exceeded even the most optimistic expectations. Unemployment is sharply down, production is up, and there is no sign of a return to inflation. The US trade deficit has contributed significantly to transmitting the effects of the US recovery to our trading partners.

-- This should make it possible for all of our governments to build domestic support, to deal constructively with trade problems without further resort to protectionism, and to find the resources necessary for Alliance defense. The Reagan administration has continued to fight protectionism, and to finance a major increase in defense spending, while trimming the budget on the domestic side. This has not been a politically easy course, but it is a realistic one.

Conclusion

-- The irony of 1984 is that, while the Soviet Union is preaching crisis, the prospects for realistic East-West dialogue, for improvement in international security, and for a strengthening Western economies and societies, look very good indeed. We need to work together to translate these healthy prospects into solid achievements.

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STATE BEING REPEATED FOR YOUR INFO:

QUOTE:

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTO 20004

OPCENTER: PASS ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS (IMMEDIATE)

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TIGS: NATO, NAC

SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S 12/11 NAC BRIEFING ON
WASHINGTON SUMMIT

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2. POSTS SHOULD DRAW AS APPROPRIATE ON FOLLOWING ACCOUNT
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OF SECRETARY'S DECEMBER 11 REPORT TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC

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COUNCIL IN BRIEFING HOST GOVERNMENTS ON THE DECEMBER 8-10 WASHINGTON SUMMIT.

3. THE SECRETARY BEGAN BY THANKING SECRETARY GENERAL CARRINGTON AND FOREIGN MINISTER POOS FOR THEIR INTRODUCTORY REMARKS (TO BE REPORTED SEPTEL TO NATO POSTS). IN THE DECEMBER 8-10 WASHINGTON SUMMIT, THE PRESIDENT HAD SET THE PACE -- LOTS OF SUBSTANCE AND ALMOST NO SMALL TALK. THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE INF TREATY SIGNING CEREMONY HAD GONE STRAIGHT FROM THAT TO A "SLEEVES-UP" MEETING ON REGIONAL ISSUES. THE TWO SIDES HAD WORKED ON START AND ABM TREATY ISSUES LITERALLY UP TO THE LAST MINUTE.

4. THE PRESIDENT AND GORBACHEV HAD FIVE WORKING SESSIONS, ALL VERY SUBSTANTIVE. THE FOUR-PART AGENDA WAS FULLY COVERED. THE SUPPORT WORK WAS ORGANIZED IN THE WAY THAT HAD PROVEN PRODUCTIVE IN EARLIER MEETINGS: A SMALL CENTRAL GROUP CHAIRED BY THE TWO MINISTERS, WITH TWO WORKING GROUPS: ONE ON ARMS CONTROL, CHAIRED BY AMB. NITZE AND MARSHAL AKHROMEYEV (CHIEF OF THE SOVIET GENERAL STAFF) AND ONE ON OTHER ISSUES (HUMAN RIGHTS, REGIONAL, AND BILATERAL), CHAIRED BY AMBASSADOR RIDGWAY AND DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER BESSMERTNYKH.

HUMAN RIGHTS

5. HUMAN RIGHTS IS AT THE TOP OF OUR AGENDA. THE PRESIDENT STARTED IN ON IT AT THE BEGINNING OF HIS FIRST MEETING WITH GORBACHEV. THE WORKING GROUP SPENT TWELVE HOURS ON HUMAN RIGHTS. THE U.S. APPROACH IS TO PUSH HARD BUT TO AVOID RAISING THE PUBLIC PROFILE OF PARTICULAR
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CASES. WE FIND THAT GETS BETTER RESULTS. GORBACHEV TOLD THE PRESIDENT HE APPRECIATED THIS APPROACH.

6. WE ARE INCREASINGLY SEEING SOVIET READINESS TO DISCUSS THIS SUBJECT. OUR DISCUSSION HAS BECOME SYSTEMATIZED. WE TALK ABOUT EVERYTHING: NAMES, LISTS OF CASES, SOVIET LAWS. GORBACHEV MADE CLEAR THAT THE SOVIETS WILL DISCUSS HUMAN RIGHTS ONLY ON A TWO-WAY BASIS; WE HAVE NO PROBLEM WITH THAT.

7. WE ARE GETTING A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE SOVIET

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BOTTOM LINE APPROACH. FOR INSTANCE, PAST SERVICE IN THE KGB, NO MATTER HOW LONG AGO, WILL ALWAYS BE A NEGATIVE CRITERION IN SOVIET DECISION-MAKING ON INDIVIDUAL CASES. THE SOVIETS CONTINUE TO APPLY THE STANDARD OF RESTRICTING EMIGRATION OF THOSE WITH ACCESS TO "STATE SECRETS" IN A VERY UNJUSTIFIABLE WAY. WHILE WE SEE CONTINUED PROGRESS ON GERMAN AND ARMENIAN EMIGRATION, WE SEE ONLY MODEST INCREASES IN JEWISH EMIGRATION.

8. THERE HAS BEEN PROGRESS IN INDIVIDUAL CASES, THOUGH MUCH MORE REMAINS TO BE DONE. WE ARE ALERT TO THE DANGER THAT ESTABLISHING A GOOD PROCESS IS NOT ENOUGH; WHAT COUNTS IS THE SUBSTANCE. THE SUMMIT JOINT STATEMENT HAS ONE SENTENCE ON OUR HUMAN RIGHTS EXCHANGES. THIS IS THE FIRST TIME THAT HUMAN RIGHTS AS A SUBJECT OF U.S./SOVIET DIALOGUE HAS BEEN SO ACKNOWLEDGED, DIRECTLY AND OPENLY.

REGIONAL ISSUES

9. SINCE THE 1985 GENEVA SUMMIT, WE HAVE INSTITUTIONALIZED THE DIALOGUE ON REGIONAL ISSUES, WITH FREQUENT DISCUSSIONS AT MANY LEVELS. THERE WAS A LOT OF DISCUSSION WITH GORBACHEV, PARTICULARLY ON AFGHANISTAN AND IRAN/IRAQ, AND SOME TEN HOURS IN THE WORKING GROUP.

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THIS WAS THE MOST PROBING, REALISTIC, AND CANDID REGIONAL DIALOGUE SO FAR. WE ARE READY TO WORK WITH THE SOVIETS IN PRACTICAL WAYS TO HELP THE PARTIES TO REGIONAL CONFLICTS RESOLVE THEIR DIFFERENCES.

. AFGHANISTAN

10. THERE WAS THOROUGH DISCUSSION OF AFGHANISTAN. WE SHALL SEE WHAT HAPPENS IN THE NEXT GENEVA ROUND. THE PRESIDENT REASSURED GORBACHEV THAT THE U.S. WILL STAND BY THE COMMITMENTS IT HAS MADE AT GENEVA. BASICALLY, EVERYTHING HAS BEEN AGREED EXCEPT THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS. THEY HAVE LINKED THIS TO THE IDEA THAT THERE MUST FIRST BE "NATIONAL RECONCILIATION." WE TOLD THEM THIS IS UNREALISTIC; WITH UP TO A THIRD OF THE POPULATION OUT OF THE COUNTRY, AND WITH THE FREEDOM

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FIGHTERS CLEARLY UNWILLING TO ACCEPT THE PRESENT REGIME, THIS SORT OF CONDITION IS A WAY OF SAYING THERE WILL NOT BE A WITHDRAWAL.

11. THE SOVIETS NOW APPEAR TO ACCEPT THE IDEA THAT "NATIONAL RECONCILIATION" IS NOT AN EVENT BUT A PROCESS. IF SO, THIS WILL REMOVE THE LINKAGE THAT HAS BLOCKED THEIR WITHDRAWAL. WE WILL BE WATCHING IN GENEVA TO SEE IF THE SOVIETS PRODUCE A TIMETABLE FOR WITHDRAWING THEIR TROOPS BY THE END OF 1988.

. IRAN/IRAQ
.

12. THIS WEEK, FOREIGN MINISTER AZIZ SAID THAT "IRAQ ACCEPTS RESOLUTION 598 IN ALL ITS PARTS." THIS IS
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UNEQUIVOCAL AND UNAMBIGUOUS. BUT IRAN CONTINUES TO PLAY GAMES WITH THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL. THIS IS A DELIBERATE STRATEGY ON THEIR PART, AND THE SOVIETS RECOGNIZE THAT FACT. WE URGED THE SOVIETS TO START WORK ON A SECOND SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION TO PUT TEETH INTO RES. 598, AND TO MAKE SUCH AN EFFORT PUBLICLY VISIBLE. ALL OTHER MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD DO THE SAME. THE SOVIETS KEPT PUSHING US FOR A UN FORCE IN THE GULF -- AN IDEA WITHOUT A CONCEPT, AS THE SECRETARY HAS TOLD THE NAC EARLIER.

13. THERE WERE INTERESTING AND WORTHWHILE DISCUSSIONS OF OTHER REGIONAL ISSUES, AND THERE WERE A NUMBER OF ACCOMPLISHMENTS IN THE BILATERAL AREA.

ARMS CONTROL

. INF TREATY
.

14. THE SIGNATURE OF THE INF TREATY WAS THE PUBLIC HIGHLIGHT OF THE SUMMIT. THE TREATY IS A MOST IMPRESSIVE DOCUMENT. IT IS THE RESULT OF COHESION, STRENGTH, AND CONSULTATIONS IN: NATO. :IT NOT ONLY REDUCES NUCLEAR WEAPONS, BUT DOES SO ASYMMETRICALLY. IT REPRESENTS A

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BIPARTISAN ACHIEVEMENT FOR THE U.S., SINCE NATO'S 1979 DUAL-TRACK DECISION WAS TAKEN DURING A DEMOCRATIC ADMINISTRATION. THE AGREEMENT ALSO SETS NEW STANDARDS FOR VERIFICATION, GOING BEYOND THE BREAKTHROUGHS OF THE STOCKHOLM CDE AGREEMENT AND SETTING THE STAGE FOR FURTHER BREAKTHROUGHS IN START.

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15. A GREAT DEAL OF PROGRESS WAS MADE. WE CAN NOW SEE THE SHAPE OF AN AGREEMENT. IT IS TOO MUCH TO SAY THAT A START TREATY IS PROBABLE, BUT IT IS NOW CLEARLY POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE ONE.

16. AT REYKJAVIK IN 1986, THE PRESIDENT AND GORBACHEV HAD BUILT ON THEIR EARLIER GOAL OF A FIFTY PER CENT REDUCTION BY AGREEING TO A CEILING OF 6000 WARHEADS ON 1600 DELIVERY VEHICLES. THEY ALSO AGREED ON A BomBER COUNTING RULE. SUBSEQUENTLY, A REDUCTION TO 1540 WARHEADS OF 154 HEAVY MISSILES WAS AGREED.

17. AT THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT, THE SIDES NAILED DOWN AN EARLIER, MORE GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT SOVIET THROW-WEIGHT WOULD BE REDUCED BY FIFTY PER CENT, AND THAT NEITHER SIDE WOULD THEN EXCEED THE REDUCED LEVEL. MOREOVER, THE SIDES AGREED ON A CEILING OF 4900 BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS WITHIN THE OVERALL 6000 CEILING. THE REMAINING WARHEADS WOULD BE ON SLOWER-FLYING BOMBERS AND CRUISE MISSILES.

18. THE TWO SIDES DID NOT AGREE ON MOBILE MISSILES, BUT THE U.S. HAS SAID THAT IT IS READY TO ALLOW THEM IF AGREEMENT CAN BE REACHED ON EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION. MOBILE MISSILES ADD TO STABILITY. THE SIDES AGREED TO FIND A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION TO LIMITING SEA-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES (SLCMs), OUTSIDE THE CENTRAL 1600/6000 LIMITS. THE SOVIETS PROPOSED SOME TECHNOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO SLCM VERIFICATION; IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER THEY WOULD BE EFFECTIVE. THE U.S. APPROACH AT REYKJAVIK WAS FOR THE SIDES SIMPLY TO DECLARE THEIR SLCM PROGRAMS, RATHER THAN TO INCLUDE IN-A-TREATY LIMITS THAT COULD NOT BE EFFECTIVELY VERIFIED. : : : : : :

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19. THERE WAS A LOT OF DISCUSSION OF COUNTING RULES. THESE ARE ESSENTIAL SINCE THEY GIVE MEANING TO THE CENTRAL NUMERICAL LIMITS. THE SIDES AGREED ON COUNTING RULES FOR ALL BALLISTIC MISSILES. TOGETHER WITH THE BOMBER COUNTING RULE FROM REYKJAVIK, THIS IS AN IMPORTANT ADVANCE. HOW TO COUNT AIR-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES WAS DISCUSSED BUT NOT RESOLVED.

20. BUILDING ON INF, THERE WERE MAJOR ADVANCES IN START VERIFICATION. THE JOINT STATEMENT LISTS EIGHT ELEMENTS:

- . - EXTENSIVE DATA EXCHANGES;
- . - BASELINE INSPECTIONS TO VERIFY THESE DATA;
- . - ON-SITE OBSERVATION OF THE ELIMINATION OF STRATEGIC SYSTEMS;
- . - CONTINUOUS ON-SITE MONITORING OF CRITICAL PRODUCTION AND SUPPORT FACILITIES;
- . - SHORT-NOTICE ON-SITE INSPECTION OF LOCATIONS WHERE LIMITED SYSTEMS ARE OR HAVE BEEN;
- . - SHORT-NOTICE INSPECTIONS OF LOCATIONS WHERE A SIDE CONSIDERS COVERT DEPLOYMENT, STORAGE, PRODUCTION, OR REPAIR COULD BE OCCURRING;
- . - BAN ON CONCEALMENT MEASURES, INCLUDING TELEMETRY ENCRYPTION; AND
- . - MEASURES TO ENHANCE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS, INCLUDING ON-DEMAND OPEN DISPLAYS OF TREATY-LIMITED ITEMS AT BASES.

21. OUR INF EXPERIENCE HAS MADE CLEAR THAT THE NEGOTIATORS HAVE THEIR WORK CUT OUT FOR THEM TO TRANSLATE THESE PRINCIPLES INTO MUTUALLY-AGREED TREATY LANGUAGE.

DEFENSE AND SPACE

22. THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE DISCUSSION OF D&S AND ABM
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TREATY ISSUES. THE SOVIETS SAID THEY DISAGREE WITH SOI.

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AND CALLED IT A WASTE OF MONEY. WE COUNTERED BY NOTING THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS INVESTING SUBSTANTIAL RESOURCES IN ITS OWN EQUIVALENT TO THE SDI PROGRAM. IN THE END, THE SIDES AGREED TO DISAGREE ON THE U.S. PROGRAM.

23. THE SIDES TURNED TO CONSIDERING WHAT KIND OF LANGUAGE MIGHT BE USED TO SUPPLEMENT THE ABM TREATY. THE FORMULATION AGREED IS RECORDED IN THE JOINT STATEMENT.

24. THIS FORMULATION STATES THAT THE SIDES CAN CARRY OUT RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND TESTING AS REQUIRED. THIS MEANS EXACTLY WHAT IT SAYS. THE ADMINISTRATION WILL SEEK FUNDING FOR SPECIFIC EXPERIMENTS AS IT IS REQUIRED TO MEET THE OBJECTIVES OF THE PROGRAM. THIS WILL BE FULLY CONSISTENT WITH THE ABM TREATY, RECOGNIZING THAT THERE IS SOME CONTENTION OVER PRECISELY WHAT THAT SIGNIFIES.

25. THE SIDES AGREE ON THE CONCEPT OF A PERIOD OF NON-WITHDRAWAL FROM THE TREATY, BUT NOT ON THE LENGTH OF THAT PERIOD. THE SECRETARY'S PERSONAL CONVICTION IS THAT THIS PROBLEM CAN BE SOLVED.

26. THE LANGUAGE OF THE STATEMENT MAKES CLEAR THAT AT THE END OF THE NON-WITHDRAWAL PERIOD, EITHER SIDE WILL BE FREE TO DECIDE ITS COURSE OF ACTION. THUS, IF A SIDE WISHES TO DEPLOY DEFENSES AT THAT TIME, IT IS FREE AND CLEAR TO DO SO.

27. WITH THE PROGRESS ON IMPLEMENTING THE COMMITMENT TO A FIFTY PER CENT START CUT, AND THE NARROWING OF DIFFERENCES ON D&S ISSUES, THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT HAS TAKEN US A GIGANTIC STEP FORWARD. THE U.S. OBJECTIVE IS
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TO HAVE A NEW TREATY COMPLETED IN TIME FOR THE MOSCOW SUMMIT NEXT YEAR. AS WITH INF, THE PRESIDENT IS DETERMINED TO GET RESULTS BY THOROUGHNESS, PATIENCE, AND RESOLVE. IF A TREATY DOES NOT MEET THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE U.S. AND ITS ALLIES, OR IS NOT EFFECTIVELY VERIFIABLE, HE WILL NOT SIGN IT.

. OTHER NUCLEAR ISSUES
.

28. HEADWAY WAS MADE ON NUCLEAR TESTING. THERE WILL BE

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AN EXCHANGE OF EXPERIMENTS THAT WILL HELP REACH AGREEMENT ON THE VERIFICATION MEASURES ESSENTIAL TO MOVE FORWARD WITH RATIFICATION OF EXISTING TREATIES. THE SIDES REAFFIRMED THE IMPORTANCE OF THEIR NON-PROLIFERATION OBJECTIVES, AND WELCOMED THE AGREEMENT TO ESTABLISH NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION CENTERS.

. CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW)

.

29. THE SOVIETS ARE PUSHING VERY HARD ON CW. WE SHARED CONCERNS ON CW PROLIFERATION, AND THE FACT THAT THE GENERAL CONSTRAINT AGAINST THE USE OF CW HAS BEGUN TO BREAK DOWN. VERIFICATION WILL BE VERY DIFFICULT.

30. THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT WE MUST THINK CAREFULLY ABOUT HOW TO PROCEED. A CW BAN IS NOT WORTH CONCLUDING UNLESS THERE IS A LOT OF INTRUSIVE VERIFICATION AND VAST NUMBERS OF STATES PARTIES. IT WOULD MAKE NO SENSE AT ALL, FOR INSTANCE, TO HAVE A CSCE-WIDE CW BAN.

. CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL

.

31. THE U.S. AND USSR AGREED CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL
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IS A VERY IMPORTANT TASK. AT WASHINGTON, THE U.S. MADE THE POINT THAT IT COULD NOT NEGOTIATE THIS ISSUE WITH THE SOVIETS BILATERALLY. MOST OF THE FORCES ON OUR SIDE WERE ALLIED, NOT AMERICAN. WE RAISED THE IMPORTANCE OF KEEPING THE CONVENTIONAL MANDATE QUESTION LINKED TO A SATISFACTORY OUTCOME OF THE VIENNA CSCE CONFERENCE. THE SOVIETS TALKED FREELY OF THE NEED FOR ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES. THEY TRIED TO APPLY THIS PRINCIPLE TO U.S. AIRCRAFT CARRIERS; WE FIRMLY REJECTED THAT.

32. THE SECRETARY EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE CONVENTIONAL MANDATE CAN BE CONCLUDED EARLY NEXT YEAR. HE SECONDED CARRINGTON'S EARLIER COMMENT THAT THE ALLIANCE NEEDS TO REACH AGREEMENT ON A COMMON APPROACH TO CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE. IT CLEARLY MAKES SENSE TO FOCUS ON REDUCING ITEMS LIKE TANKS

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AND ARTILLERY RATHER THAN FOLLOWING THE MBFR APPROACH.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

33. THE SECRETARY LISTED SEVERAL KEY POINTS FOR U.S./SOVIET RELATIONS THAT HE HAD HIGHLIGHTED IN HIS TOAST AT THE LUNCHEON HE HAD GIVEN FOR GORBACHEV:

. - THE RELATIONSHIP IS IMPORTANT BECAUSE OF THE BURDEN OF LEADERSHIP EACH COUNTRY BEARS, AND UNIQUE BECAUSE OF THE NEED IN THE NUCLEAR ERA TO ENGAGE EACH OTHER DESPITE PROFOUND DIFFERENCES.

. - THE RELATIONSHIP WILL CONTINUE TO BE DIFFICULT TO MANAGE, DUE TO CONTRASTING PHILOSOPHIES, POLITICAL
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SYSTEMS, AND NATIONAL INTERESTS.

. - WE MUST BE REALISTIC, AVOIDING EXTREMES EITHER OF HOSTILITY OR EUPHORIA THROUGH THE INEVITABLE UPS AND DOWNS. HE NOTED TO THE NAC THAT, SUCCESSFUL AS THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT HAD BEEN, THE ADMINISTRATION IS DELIBERATELY BEING LESS EUPHORIC THAN ANYONE ELSE.

. - WE MUST SPEAK WITH CLARITY AND CANDOR ABOUT OUR DIFFERENCES. THE U.S. WOULD CONTINUE TO STRESS THE FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS -- A CONCERN ALSO REFLECTED IN THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, AND THE EC DECEMBER 5 SUMMIT STATEMENT. THE U.S. WILL ALSO SPEAK CANDIDLY ON REGIONAL ISSUES.

. - IT IS ESSENTIAL TO LOOK TO THE FUTURE WITHOUT NEGLECTING THE LESSONS OF THE PAST. THE WORLD WILL BE VASTLY DIFFERENT IN FIVE TO TEN YEARS. WE MUST NOT FACE THE PAST AND BACK INTO THE FUTURE.

. - OPENNESS TO IDEAS, INFORMATION, AND CONTACTS IS THE KEY TO FUTURE SUCCESS. THE INF TREATY'S UNPRECEDENTED VERIFICATION PROVISIONS ARE AN EXAMPLE OF THE POWERFUL PULL OF OPENNESS.

34. MUCH IS HAPPENING ACROSS THE RANGE OF THE

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U.S./SOVIET AGENDA. IT IS TOO SOON TO TELL WHETHER THIS PREFIGURES A PROFOUND CHANGE IN THE NATURE OF THE SOVIET UNION AND HOW IT DEALS WITH THE WORLD. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE WEST TAKE ADVANTAGE OF NEW OPPORTUNITIES WHILE REMEMBERING THAT IT MUST DO SO FROM A POSITION OF STRENGTH. IF THE ALLIANCE DOES NOT LOOK TO ITS OWN MILITARY CAPABILITIES, IT WILL DESERVE THE CONSEQUENCES OF THIS DERELICTION.

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35. NATO'S FUNDAMENTAL APPROACH, CONTAINED IN THE 1967 HARMEL REPORT, REMAINS VALID: STAY STRONG AND REALISTIC, WHILE SEEKING OPPORTUNITIES FOR DIALOGUE AND ENGAGEMENT.

KEEL UNQUOTE WHITEHEAD

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THE SECRETARY'S MEETING
WITH SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE
IN HELSINKI

July 31, 1985

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BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

S/S

TO: The Secretary

THROUGH: P - Michael H. Armacost

FROM: EUR - Rozanne L. Ridgway

SUBJECT: Scope Paper for Your July 31 Meeting with Shevardnadze

SETTING

Your meeting in Helsinki with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze comes at a time of a new Soviet dynamism at home and abroad. The fact that you will have a new interlocutor in Helsinki underscores Gorbachev's confident and relatively rapid consolidation of power. Further, Soviet diplomacy has become more energetic recently, although there have been no major policy departures. While working towards a summit with us, the Soviets are playing up common interests with European and Asian countries and taking the same line as we towards our bilateral relationship (difficult but capable of being improved) and the summit (unrealistic to expect breakthroughs, but small steps forward are possible). In Geneva, they recently presented ambiguous but interesting new ideas on cuts in strategic forces.

Thus, your meeting with Shevardnadze should differ markedly in style and substance from your sessions with Gromyko over the last few years. On substance, both sides have the discipline of preparing a summit to give sharper focus to the meeting. Based on reports of Shevardnadze's sense of humor and ability to turn a phrase, you should have a livelier interlocutor, one more attuned to give-and-take than Gromyko (although it might take another session or two for this to become fully apparent). When Art Hartman met with him on Monday, he came across as low-key, businesslike and affable, but he broke no new ground on substance.

Shevardnadze will be operating under practical limits in Helsinki. He will be making his diplomatic debut with less than a month to master the mechanics and substance of his new job. He told Art he would have a lot of meetings with other foreign

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ministers in Helsinki. The Soviets appear to see the session as largely introductory -- Shevardnadze referred to "discussing the outlines" of our problems -- with more detailed discussions to be held at the UNGA in the fall. The Soviet decision to decline an informal lunch and follow-on session August 1 probably reflects a desire to carefully manage their new man's time and his exposure to unstructured substantive discussions.

Accordingly, your objectives should be to:

- begin the process of setting up the summit meeting;
- establish a good working relationship with Shevardnadze
- impress on Shevardnadze personally that the President and you are ready to work with the new Soviet leadership to resolve outstanding problems.

AGENDA

You will be the host in Helsinki. After making a few welcoming remarks, you should offer to turn the floor over to Shevardnadze (he said he does not like long speeches, and you may have a bit more time than usual). After he has spoken (or if he insists that you take the lead), you should briefly review developments since Vienna and then move quickly to discussion of the summit, particularly issues where movement before November is possible. You will also want to reserve time at the end for a discussion of the logistics of the summit, based on decisions arising from the Advance Team's visit to Geneva.

Recent Developments

You should underline, as fresh evidence of our ability to do business, the agreement on the summit, the conclusion of two new understandings in the SCC, and the effort to revitalize agricultural cooperation. You should also stress that the President's decision on interim restraint reflects our commitment to progress in arms control.

On the negative side, you will want to note a number of continuing problems and obstacles to progress beyond small steps: lack of movement in the Geneva talks; aggressive Soviet actions in the Third World, particularly the occupation of Afghanistan and Soviet pressures on Pakistan; the bleak human rights picture; the Nicholson case, other incidents involving the MLM, and the Berlin air corridors; and Soviet buzzing of Americans in the Bering Sea. In raising Nicholson and more recent incidents in the GDR and the Bering Sea, you could repeat the points we have made earlier about the seeming Soviet

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propensity to resort to force rather than diplomacy, either as a government preference or through lack of adequate political control over the military. As an example of mixed and unnecessarily ambiguous behavior, you could cite the combination during the TWA hijacking of welcome Soviet statements against terrorism with inflammatory propaganda about US intentions.

The Summit - General Remarks

The Soviets have said, and we have agreed, that the period leading up to the summit should be used to make progress where possible. You should stress that we see the summit as an opportunity for the President and Gorbachev to get to know each other and discuss the entire range of issues in the bilateral relationship. Reaching concrete agreements is not essential, but certainly desirable; if there is a possibility for progress in any part of our relations, we will be prepared to seize it.

Specific Issues

Shevardnadze may not be prepared to address individual issues in detail, and you may wish to use the "headline" approach to cover much material quickly. Consistent with EUR's summit strategy memo, I suggest you take the following approach:

A. Arms Control - Geneva Talks: The second round has closed with the Soviets maintaining their tight linkage of an agreement on offensive arms to US renunciation of SDI, and zero flexibility on INF. However, they have presented some new ideas in the START group (informal suggestions about the possibility of percentage reductions and limits on strategic arms -- an idea in the direction of the "common framework" concept). Both their linkages and tactic of refusing to discuss specifics are hampering progress, and you should chide Shevardnadze for his negotiators' tactics. If the occasion presents itself, you could probe Shevardnadze on the new Soviet START "model" with specific questions designed to clarify the impact Soviet proposals would have on strategic forces. Similarly, you should be alert for hints at a softening in Soviet opposition to SDI research.

B. Other Arms Control: Four topics are worth touching on:

-- On the Stockholm CDE, Ambassador Goodby has accepted his counterpart's invitation to visit Moscow at the beginning of September, and that would be the time to explore how to proceed when the CDE reconvenes later in September.

-- On nuclear non-proliferation, you should ask whether the Soviets are prepared to make a joint statement as Dick Kennedy proposed in April. Oleg Sokolov was generally

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positive when Rick Burt raised this on July 15, but time is running out if we are to issue a statement before the NPT review conference beginning August 27.

-- On chemical weapons, it would be useful to try out again with the new Soviet leadership our proposals: to observe the destruction of our CW stockpiles and to send a team to Moscow to discuss the use of CW in Iran-Iraq and the more general question of CW proliferation.

-- On nuclear testing, you will want to ask Shevardnadze for a response to the President's unilateral offer to send a team to the Nevada Test Site to measure a nuclear test.

C. Regional Dialogue: You should say that we found the recent regional talks on southern Africa and Afghanistan useful for clarifying positions, but were disappointed at the lack of Soviet readiness to tackle central issues. With respect to Afghanistan, you might say that, while we continue to seek a settlement in which Soviet interests are respected and are prepared to discuss guarantees of an eventual solution, the Soviets are at war with the Afghan people and that pressure on Pakistan is thus both inappropriate and unacceptable to us.

D. Human Rights: Shevardnadze may take the Gorbachev approach (hit back hard when the subject comes up) rather than Gromyko's (refusal to discuss it at all). While we don't want to get into sterile polemics, you may be able to turn his willingness to talk into a dialogue on our concerns.

You should explain our overall approach on human rights: no desire to intervene in Soviet internal affairs or to do anything against their laws, but there are practical steps they could take. Progress on human rights should be part of the preparatory work for the summit, and that steps by the Soviet side leading up to the summit will improve the atmosphere for the meeting. You can also refer to your Helsinki speech, in which you mention other prominent cases such as the Sakharovs and Shcharanskiy.

E. Bilateral Issues: This is the area where progress seems most likely. The key issues are:

-- Steps in Economic Relations: You should refer to Baldrige visit follow-up, noting our efforts to lift furskin embargo and need for Soviets to give US firms a better break in contracts, and encourage him to focus on further steps. You should also point out importance of Soviets fulfilling wheat purchase obligations.

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-- Pacific Air Safety Measures: If this month's third round in Tokyo produces basic agreement, you should urge rapid conclusion that would permit us to move on civil aviation agreement (see below). If not, you should make clear to Shevardnadze that we see this as a major lost opportunity, and the sort of issue that should not be stymied by petty bureaucraties as we move to the summit.

-- Civil Aviation: Reiterate that once we reach a basic Pacific air safety agreement, we should move quickly to renewed discussions on a civil aviation agreement.

-- Consulates in Kiev and New York: You should suggest both sides prepare to announce this at the summit.

-- Maritime Boundary Talks. You should tell Shevardnadze we are prepared for another round of discussions on maritime boundaries off Alaska.

-- Exchange Agreement Negotiations: This is something to wrap up in the next few weeks for signature at the summit. You stressed to Dobrynin July 3 that TV appearances are important and exhibits at least at previous levels are essential. You should make the same points to Shevardnadze, and invite him to agree that negotiators should move promptly through remaining issues.

-- Reinvigorating bilateral agreements: You can note that we have had joint commission meetings on trade and agriculture and our satisfaction that HUD Secretary Pierce, Agriculture Secretary Brock, and EPA Administrator Thomas will visit Moscow in the coming months. You may also suggest renewal of our maritime boundary talks.

-- Space Cooperation. You should propose bilateral discussions on space cooperation; we would like to talk about space rescue but are prepared to renegotiate our general space agreement.

F. Summit Modalities: You will want to get Shevardnadze's agreement to a neutral meeting site for the President and Gorbachev (our Advance Team found both the U.S. and Soviet missions unsatisfactory). The Soviets are more likely to cooperate in this if you cast the idea for a neutral site as a Swiss suggestion. In addition, you will want to nail down our preferred schedule of social events -- that the US and Soviets each host a small dinner and the Swiss a large reception for both delegations at the conclusion of the meetings. You should also propose an early meeting between U.S. and Soviet officials to begin logistical preparations for the summit.

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FACT SHEET: THE GENEVA TALKS

I. STATUS

- o Progress has been slow, but about where expected, given only second round, and complexity/importance of talks.
- o No consensus, but there is better understanding of other side, with more dialogue and less polemics.
- o We have explained US approach. Delegation has great flexibility in pursuing significant reductions.
- o Hope Soviets will be more forthcoming next round.

II. SOVIET OBJECTIVES

- o No movement on Soviets' formal positions. Continue to emphasize banning so-called "space strike arms." Have repeated moratoria proposals, while continuing to precondition progress in offensive arms reductions on U.S. acceptance of unrealistic, unverifiable constraints on SDI research.
- o Continue to insist on unequal INF agreement, with Soviet forces matching UK and French, with no US systems allowed.
- o Soviets did reveal a few details: START agreement would have two aggregates, one on SNDVs, second on weapons; reductions greater than 25 % might be possible. Broached idea of percentage sublimit; i.e., largest leg of triad on each side could not exceed certain percent of total force. Impact remains unclear, since Soviets failed to provide details or numbers.

III. U.S. OBJECTIVES

- o Primary goal significant, equitable and verifiable reductions in nuclear arsenals.
- o On START, aiming for reductions to 5000 ballistic missile RVs. Prepared to limit bomber/ALCM force in trade-off that would take account of asymmetries in sides' force structures.
- o On INF, ultimate goal remains elimination of entire class of LRINF missiles, but delegation authorized to pursue interim agreement resulting in equal U.S. and Soviet global limits at lowest possible level.
- o On Defense and Space, we are prepared for detailed exchanges on implications of possible new defenses, including possible transition to more defense-reliant world. Explained that ABM is "living document," and research clearly permitted.

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FACT SHEET: INTERIM RESTRAINT

I. US has adopted new policy toward observance of SALT

- o US will continue to refrain from undercutting existing strategic arms agreements, to extent Soviets do the same.
- o US will dismantle a Poseidon SSBN in accordance with agreed procedures when 7th Trident SSBN goes to sea.
- o In interest of securing the stable environment we seek and despite some cases of Soviet noncompliance, President is prepared to go the "extra mile" in trying to establish an interim framework of truly mutual restraint.
- o US will review Soviet response and adopt appropriate and proportionate response, including military measures to compensate for Soviet noncompliance, to provide for the national security of the US and its Allies.
- o US reserves right to respond to irreversible Soviet violation of SALT II Treaty provision prohibiting more than one new type of ICBM. This could include small ICBM.
- o Policy is subject to continuous review. There is no deadline for Soviet response.

II. US policy based on several considerations

- o Remains in the interest of US and Allies to maintain an interim framework of truly mutual restraint.
- o Such a framework should be conducive to pursuing vigorously significant reductions in existing nuclear arsenals, as well as putting arms control process on more constructive footing.
- o Provides incentives for Soviets to improve compliance since US will take appropriate and proportionate military steps to counter Soviet noncompliance.
- o Policy reflects the views of Allies and Congress.

III. Continuance of policy requires positive actions by Soviets

- o Must take concrete steps to resolve noncompliance and reverse or substantially reduce their unparalleled military build-up.
- o Must demonstrate in Geneva that they are actively pursuing arms reduction agreements.

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FACT SHEET: NON-PROLIFERATION
(U.S.-SOVIET CONSULTATIONS, NPT REVCON, ISRAEL)

I. STATUS

o U.S.-Soviet non-proliferation consultations have been productive, businesslike, and remarkably free of polemic. Five rounds have been completed, with the latest held in Helsinki in April. The Soviets have agreed to meet twice-yearly, with the next meeting in Washington this fall.

o The NPT Review Conference is scheduled to begin on August 27. The U.S. and USSR both support the NPT, encourage adherence by all countries, and are attempting to prevent RevCon discussion from becoming an attack on super power arms control efforts.

o On Israel, the Soviets continue to express concern to us regarding Israeli nuclear capabilities and the possibility of a nuclear flare-up stemming from Israeli nuclear action.

II. SOVIET OBJECTIVES

o The Soviets agree with the U.S. generally on measures for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. However, the Soviets have pushed for resumption of London Suppliers Group Meetings for coordinating export controls. The Soviets also accuse the U.S. of encouraging Pakistan's nuclear explosives efforts by continuing our security assistance program.

o The Soviets have accused the U.S. publicly of bearing responsibility for non-progress on arms control. If followed by similar charges at the NPT RevCon, it would hinder successful Article VI review. (Article VI commits nuclear weapons states to pursue arms reduction measures in good faith).

o The Soviets reiterate interest in further clarification of Israel's policy beyond the standard Israeli formulation of "no introduction of nuclear weapons into the region". The Soviets press us to seek an Israeli statement that Israel has no nuclear weapons, nor intends to have them.

III. U.S. OBJECTIVES

o U.S. looks forward to next round of non-proliferation consultations this fall. We also welcome multilateral discussions on non-proliferation. However, London Suppliers Group meetings now would touch off G-77 criticism.

o U.S. has made clear to Soviets that U.S. restraint on arms reduction issues at the NPT Revcon depends on similar Soviet restraint. Restraint serves our mutual interests.

o Unsafeguarded nuclear activities in Israel have always caused us concern. We have periodically reiterated to the Israelis that regional stability would be served if all states in the region accepted comprehensive safeguards and adhered to the NPT.

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FACT SHEET: CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW)

I. STATUS

- o CW negotiations at the Geneva CD are at a standstill due to Soviet intransigence.
- o Other US/Soviet CW discussions have made little progress toward agreement.
- o The Soviets rejected your invitation to inspect US CW destruction and verification techniques and to have experts' exchanges on the Iran-Iraq CW situation.

II. SOVIET OBJECTIVES

- o The Soviets are still trying to keep the CD from getting into the real issues (e.g., verifying destruction and non-production of CW, challenge inspection) by focussing on lesser issues (e.g., consultation procedures and schedules for destruction), while hinting to us privately that going back to negotiating a treaty bilaterally first might be better.
- o Clearly, their interest in CW arms control has more to do with the political and propaganda value of engaging in the negotiating process than with any genuine intent of concluding a CW ban.
- o The Soviets are also still using CW binaries/modernization issues to drive a wedge between us and the Allies and to influence Hill decisions and actions on binaries.

III. US OBJECTIVES

- o Our primary goal is a comprehensive and verifiable global CW ban that will eliminate CW and, thus help prevent their further use and proliferation.
- o We would like to see more progress and constructive Soviet movement in the CD negotiations and agreement, at least in principle, on the overall approach in our draft.
- o We remain ready to discuss different specifics of basic treaty provisions provided the same level of confidence in compliance can be achieved as from ours.
- o Until we have an effective ban, the US will maintain CW stocks and proceed with modernization to have an effective CW deterrent to ensure US/Western security.

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FACT SHEET: OTHER ARMS CONTROL TALKS (MBFR, CDE)

I. STATUS

o In MBFR, the West continued to probe the details of the Soviet February 14 proposal on initial US-USSR reductions and subsequent freeze of each side's forces, which mainly rehashes 1983 proposals with no substantive movement on key data and verification issues. Most allies, including the UK and FRG, are looking for a new Western move for the fall round, starting September 26, which adopts the Soviets' proposed focus on a first phase agreement.

o In CDE, the Soviets continue to press the West to negotiate on non-use of force. In the sixth round, which ended July 5, they tabled drafts calling for notification of independent air and naval exercises and transits of troops. The West continued to call on the Soviets to negotiate seriously on NATO's package of concrete confidence building measures.

II. SOVIET OBJECTIVES

o The Soviets continued to hint at the "negotiability" of their recent MBFR move, but refused to elaborate on details or discuss issues of substance such as verification until the West accepted the proposal in principle. They also continued to press for a Western counter-proposal.

o The Soviets hope to pressure Alliance members into negotiating among themselves to produce non-use of force language and a military constraint acceptable to the East.

III. US OBJECTIVES

o We are in the process of completing the IG review of basic MBFR goals. We will carefully consider how best to move the talks forward, taking into account the recent Soviet move, allied thinking on next steps, and other broader factors. But flexibility on our side will require same from the Soviets.

o We continue to urge the Alliance to show patience and unity in order to force Soviets to negotiate seriously with us. We are prepared to discuss non-use of force with the Soviets if they will negotiate concrete Confidence and Security Building Measures.

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FACT SHEET: BERLIN AIR CORRIDORS

I. STATUS

o As result of Allied pressure in Berlin Air Safety Center (BASC) and high level diplomatic approaches, including your demarche to Gromyko in Vienna in mid-May, Soviets have become more cooperative on day to day corridor management and have given back more reservation-free airspace. Reservations were numerous during recent military exercises, but not excessive for such times.

o Still have insufficient reservations free area at Berlin end of corridors. Following Soviet's increase of area in mid-May to 10.5 miles, Allies lowered demands to 17 miles. Although Soviets showed temporary flexibility in June on reservation free zone during reservations for a higher than usual altitude, situation has remained unchanged since late May.

II. SOVIET OBJECTIVES

o Soviets want to prevent Berlin issues from interfering with larger questions in US-Soviet relations, but unwilling to grant, in their eyes, substantial concessions in short run. Probably calculate Allies will tire of corridor problems.

III. US OBJECTIVES

o More reservations-free area to remove potential safety hazards. Soviet cooperation in BASC good at present, but must watch carefully whether it holds up through periods of stress generated by military exercises.

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FACT SHEET: MILITARY LIAISON MISSION INCIDENTS

I. STATUS

- o Despite repeated demands for apology and compensation for Major Nicholson's killing, Soviets have not moved beyond grudging public statements of April. Staff level CINC to CINC talks have found limited Soviet willingness to reduce restricted areas, but insistence on US observance of remaining areas and any Soviet sentry's command to halt. Would severely reduce MLM's ability to collect intelligence.
- o Unprovoked ramming of a USMLM vehicle July 13 is another example of Soviet failure to restrain their troops' response to MLMs. Ramming is not unusual Soviet response to MLMs' jockeying for observation of Soviet military, but several have occurred recently.

II. SOVIET OBJECTIVES

- o Having made an initial half apology on Nicholson, since withdrawn, Soviets do not want to be seen as caving to US demands on apology and compensation.
- o Do not want MLM incidents such as ramming, to cause political problems, but military taking firm line on blocking MLM intelligence gathering.

III. US OBJECTIVES

- o Keep up pressure for compensation and apology to Nicholson family. Convey continuing US concern over Nicholson's killing.
- o On latest ramming, get assent that CINC to CINC talks become more effective in preventing use of force against MLMs.

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FACT SHEET: SOVIET HUMAN RIGHTS OVERVIEW

I. CURRENT SITUATION

o No improvement in Soviet human rights performance since Gorbachev took power. Emigration continues at rock bottom levels. Crackdown on Jewish cultural activists intensified in June. Sixteen arrests since last July. Three this June. Arrests of Baptists, Pentecostals and members of other unregistered religious groups even more numerous. Ten Chuguevka Pentecostals convicted since January. Registered religious groups also under intense pressure. Sakharovs remain isolated. Sakharov may be hospitalized. No movement on Shcharanskiy, Orlov. Begun recently transferred from labor camp to prison. Dual national Abe Stolar still waiting exit permission for his daughter-in-law. Separated spouse Yuriy Balovlenkov ended prolonged hunger strike on July 4.

II. SOVIET POSITION

o Gorbachev has introduced more aggressive approach on human rights. Recent article by KGB head Chebrikov signaled uncompromisingly hard line against internal dissent and attacked West as major violators of human rights. Gorbachev appears to regard our human rights criticisms as condescending. New Soviet approach represents move away from claim that criticisms constitute internal interference. Tactic now is to meet our criticisms with attacks on our alleged violations of social and economic rights, e.g. unemployment, the homeless, racism and women's rights. This tactic clearly evident during Shcherbitskiy visit and at Ottawa CSCE Human Rights Experts Meeting. Soviets also pushed idea of "cooperation" on human rights, i.e., don't attack us, we won't attack you. Embassy Moscow believes Shevardnadze may criticize us on social and economic issues in his speech at Helsinki.

III. US POSITION

o We continue to insist that Soviet human rights abuses constitute a serious obstacle to the improved relations we seek with Soviet Union. Department issued Press Statement June 14 condemning crackdown on Jewish cultural activists. At Ottawa CSCE Human Rights Experts Meeting in May we strongly criticized Soviet human rights abuses and met Soviet attacks on social and economic issues with detailed critique of failings of Soviet socio-economic system, e.g., shortages, alcoholism, cramped housing, increasing mortality rates, privilege, etc.

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FACT SHEET: SOVIET JEWRY

I. THE PROBLEM

- o Jewish emigration remains at abysmally low level; crackdown on Jewish cultural activists continues, as does officially sponsored "anti-Zionist" campaign.
- o No prospect for significant improvement in situation.

II. THE FACTS

- o Peak year 1979 51,320 Jews emigrated; 1984, only 896.
- o Totals for first half 1985 almost identical to 1984, with curious variations. Through April a steady rising trend encouraged Western optimism. But May and June figures plummeted well below 1984 norm. Expect second half 1985 to remain down around 1984 level.
- o Soviets want Jackson-Vanik repealed, consider direct linkage between emigration and trade unacceptable. Have made low-key approach to US Jewish community, which has indicated flexibility. In June 19 meeting, NCSJ chairman Morris Abram told Dobrynin he had sounded Jewish community and there would be "step by step" response to any Soviet changes in emigration policy, without specific linkage.
- o Since July 1984 at least 16 Jewish activists arrested, including 9 Hebrew teachers. Crackdown has intensified recently with three arrests in June following three month hiatus. 12 convictions to date. Five of arrests were on trumped up criminal charges and three of those arrested were severely beaten while in custody.
- o Anti-Semitic (officially described as "anti-Zionist") campaign in Soviet media continues.

III. OUR RESPONSE

- o We remain deeply concerned at crackdown on Hebrew teachers and Jewish cultural activists, manifestations of official anti-Semitism and the continuing low level of Jewish emigration. These practices present a serious obstacle to the improved relations with the Soviet Union that the United States seeks.

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FACT SHEET: REPRESENTATION LISTS

I. BACKGROUND

o We maintain four representation lists of Soviets denied permission to emigrate. Dual nationals, separated spouses, divided families and Soviet Jews. Lists presented periodically at high-level bilaterals, most recently at last year's UNGA.

II. AMERICAN CITIZEN LIST

o Twenty two American citizens on list. Bernard Lamport case was resolved this spring. Some movement on Abe Stolar case but no resolution. Stolar, wife and son granted exit permission, but not son's wife, without whom family refuses to leave. Family's exit permission expires September. No movement on other cases, of which Aaron Milman and Vytautas Skuodis of particular humanitarian interest.

III. SEPARATED SPOUSES LIST

o Twenty six Soviet spouses of U.S. citizens currently on list. Only one case resolved since UNGA, that of Naum Orishter, who was granted exit permission in mid-July. Soviet separated spouse Yuriy Balovlenkov began life-threatening hunger strike March 25 to protest lack of exit permission. Ended strike July 4 after repeated pleas from wife. Soviets now considering his latest request for exit permission.

IV. DIVIDED FAMILIES LIST

o 136 families currently on list. Only two cases resolved since UNGA. One longtime case involves sister of former Soviet Georgian human rights activist Valeriy Chalidze. Chalidze was recent recipient of MacArthur Award. Others include wife and son of Peter Jachno, a Korean War veteran, and wife and son of Alexander Kostomarov, a Baltimore resident who went on prolonged hunger strike last fall.

V. SOVIET JEWISH LIST

o Contains the names of over 3400 Soviet Jewish families who have been refused permission to emigrate to Israel. Last two times we have presented this list, Soviets have returned it to us. Among oldest cases are Aleksandr Lerner, a Moscow scientist, and brothers Isai and Grigory Goldshtein, Georgian scientists from Tbilisi.

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FACT SHEET: SAKHAROV AND SHCHARANSKIY

I. SAKHAROV

o Sakharov and his wife Yelenna Bonner remain isolated in Gor'kiy; recent films released by Victor Louis show Sakharov in a hospital where he may have been sent following another attempted hunger strike; Sakharov appears to be in poor health; other information indicates Bonner is also in poor health.

o Victor Louis recently approached Bonner's children in the U.S. proposing that Bonner's mother be allowed to visit the Sakharovs in Gor'kiy and return to the U.S.; family is interested but want permission for one of the grand-children to accompany her, given her age and poor health. Family first wants Soviets to permit telephone communication with the Sakharovs in Gor'kiy.

o Gorbachev has given no sign that he is willing to deal on Sakharov; in a bizarre statement Soviet Academy of Science President Aleksandrov recently told visiting Senator Paul Simon that allowing Sakharov to emigrate would be a violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty, since Sakharov was privy to all nuclear secrets. He also charged that when Soviets let Bonner go to Italy for medical treatment, she had secretly traveled to the United States.

o While our ultimate objective is to get Soviets to allow Bonner and Sakharov to emigrate to a neutral country, an intermediate objective would be for Bonner to travel abroad for medical care. At the very least we want Soviets to improve their living conditions and health care, restore direct telephone contact, and permit Bonner's mother to visit them in Gor'kiy, escorted by a family member.

II. SHCHARANSKIY

o Shcharanskiy in Labor Camp 35 in the Urals. Family visits cancelled remainder of 1985, and he may write only one letter every two months, indicating he may be in internal labor camp prison, where rules on visits and letters are stricter.

o After hospitalizing Shcharanskiy for several months last fall to get him in shape for Western attention, Soviets permitted family visit timed to coincide with conclusion of January talks in Geneva. Subsequent harsh treatment reveals grant of visit in January as cynical manipulation.

o Shcharanskiy has served over half his sentence on what were palpably false charges of espionage and treason.

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FACT SHEET: Civil Aviation

I. Status

- o Afghan, Poland and KAL sanctions cut all scheduled Aeroflot service to US and virtually all ties between Aeroflot and US travel industry.
- o Agreement to improve North Pacific Air Safety is a precondition for renewed Aeroflot landing rights, as is better terms for US carrier flying to Moscow. Two rounds of discussions were held and a third is in the works.
- o Soviets have linked Aeroflot service to opening of new consulates in Kiev and New York, and more loosely to new exchanges agreement.

II. The Facts

- o Soviets have pressed hard on resumption of Aeroflot service, even attempting to enlist PanAm to lobby USG. Loss of service has hard currency, prestige, convenience and intelligence collection costs for them.
- o From 1978 to 1982, Aeroflot had de facto monopoly on direct air service. PanAm unable to make profit on the Moscow run and pulled out in 1978. An important factor was Moscow's competitive advantage: its ability to control its citizenry and the tourism market in the USSR through Intourist/Aeroflot.
- o PanAm mildly interested in resumption of scheduled service and overflight rights; some tour operators want US charter flights. To make USSR service profitable, PanAm would need operating flexibility and effective access to the Soviet market including agreement to fly wide-bodies, and permission to sell tickets in rubles or comparable arrangements.

III. US Objectives

- o Resolution of North Pacific Air Safety question essential to progress in other areas of our civil aviation relationship, but any new civil air agreement must have a true balance of economic benefits.
- o We have rejected linkage of Aeroflot with new consulates and exchanges agreement, and believe we should get on with all these issues on their merits.
- o We have mentioned but not stressed issue of KAL claims.

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FACT SHEET: ECONOMIC ISSUES

I. STATUS

- o A realistic but generally upbeat Joint Commercial Commission (JCC) meeting held in May has modestly improved prospects for developing US-Soviet non-strategic trade. US firms already have reported a better atmosphere in Moscow and several small to medium sized contracts have been signed.
- o At the JCC the Soviets assured Secretary Baldrige that U.S. firms would be treated on the same basis as companies from other Western countries and would receive an equal opportunity to bid on major contracts.
- o Baldrige was able to ease Soviet concerns somewhat on contract sanctity, informed them of our intention to resume official trade promotion programs and committed the Administration to try to remove the 30 year old ban on certain Soviet fur skins.
- o The USG has not discussed cooperation on oil and gas development or modification of our unilateral export controls in this area. Despite this lack of encouragement, the Soviets remain very interested in doing business with US energy firms and several high level contacts with US companies have taken place.
- o Agricultural sales to the Soviets during the current marketing year have already reached a record 18.6 million mt, but the Soviets have purchased only 2.9 mt. of the 4 million mt. of wheat required by our Long Term Agreement. The prospect for a better Soviet harvest this year and intense competition from foreign producers reduce possibilities for US sales in 1985-86.
- o We are actively discussing a North Pacific Air Safety Agreement (NOPAC), a precondition for talks on resuming bilateral air service; and fisheries relations, which have been complicated by Soviet whaling practices. We also expect to start talks on a new maritime agreement this fall.
- o Our maritime boundary dispute with the Soviets over the interpretation of the 1867 Convention Line in the Bering Sea

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remains unsettled. The Soviets have recently stepped up harassment activities in the area including buzzing rigs and helicopters connected with oil exploration activity in what is undisputedly the US Exclusive Economic Zone.

II. SOVIET OBJECTIVES

- o To the extent they bring up economic issues, the Soviets are likely to raise the need for a resumption of Aeroflot landing rights in the US and repeat their linkage between such rights and an agreement to open new consulates and sign an exchanges agreement.

- o Soviets may complain about the lack of MFN and US government credits, but they do not realistically expect changes in US policies at this time. They may also criticize US export controls, especially those imposed for foreign policy reasons, and stress that US firms will have to re-establish reputations as reliable suppliers to compete in the Soviet market.

III. US OBJECTIVES

- o Reaffirm the Administration's interest in further development of non-strategic trade and our belief that trade and economic relations can make a useful contribution to our bilateral relationship. Express satisfaction with Secretary Baldrige's May visit to Moscow and the outcome of the JCC.

- o Reiterate that we see little prospect for a removal of long standing obstacles to our economic/commercial relationship, such as MFN, unless there is a substantial improvement in Soviet human rights and emigration practices.

- o Note our readiness to resume civil aviation discussions once a NOPAC agreement has been reached. Remind the Soviets that any arrangement which would allow Aeroflot to resume service to the US must have a balance of economic concessions for US air carriers.

- o Express our overall satisfaction with our agricultural relations, including our recently concluded exchange program and Secretary Block's upcoming visit to the USSR. At the same time, point out that the Soviets have not yet

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fulfilled their 4 million mt. wheat purchase obligation under our long term grains agreement and that we expect them to do so before the end of the current marketing year on September 30.

o Cite our interest in developing a mutually beneficial fishing relationship. Say that we are encouraged by recent Soviet announcement that USSR is prepared to phase out whaling operations and are ready to have an experts' meeting on this question to obtain more details. Express hope that this development will make it possible to remove a serious obstacle to better cooperation in the area of fishing.

o Point out Soviet harassment of US drilling operations in the US Exclusive Economic Zone in the Navarin Basin is totally unacceptable, poses the risk of an extremely serious bilateral incident which could severely damage our relations, and must cease immediately.

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FACT SHEET: AFGHANISTAN/SOUTH ASIA

I. MILITARY SITUATION

- o Mujahidin have seized initiative throughout Afghanistan, including rocket attacks in Kabul
- o Masood has hit Soviets hard in the Panjsher, ambushing convoys; Soviets reinforcing and major battle is now going on; Soviets may be planning a massive counterstroke
- o Mujahidin have moved back into positions in the eastern Konar valley as Soviets have pulled back

II. DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS

- o US-Soviet talks on Afghanistan, June 18 and 19, produced no substantive progress; Soviet position was unyielding, although relatively non-polemical tone indicated they came more to listen than to talk
- o US underscored strength of US resolve, commitment to Pakistan, our view that war/international opinion running against Soviets, and tried to focus on practical steps to move UN process forward
- o Geneva IV, fourth round of UN indirect talks on Afghanistan held June 20-25; Cordovez announced another round for August 27
- o We have indications Soviets will make major effort at UN to undermine support for the UNGA Afghanistan resolution; we and Pakistanis will counter
- o We believe enough progress was made to keep talks going, but without a real change in the Soviet position; both sides wish to continue the talks for reasons unconnected with a settlement
- o Yaqub Khan's July 16-19 Washington visit emphasized GOP commitment to remain firm on Afghanistan in the face of Soviet attempts to intimidate Pakistan
- o GOP and USG agree on raising political costs to Soviets; held recent discussions on ways to promote effective international presence for the new resistance alliance and greater media coverage
- o India's willingness to be more involved with seeking an Afghanistan settlement, manifest in Rajiv Gandhi's visit and Bhandari's Moscow trip, is a welcome development

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FACT SHEET: MIDDLE EAST

I. STATUS

- o On July 19 Israeli and Soviet Ambassadors met in Paris, reportedly at the request of the Soviets. The Soviets suggested improved relations with Israel and increased emigration of Soviet Jews in return for a Soviet role in the peace process and a territorial settlement on the Golan Heights. This initiative may reflect a renewed Soviet effort to offset its inability to talk with both sides in Middle East diplomacy.
- o Iran is pursuing a conservative strategy of in its war with Iraq, but still intends to overthrow Saddam Hussein. It is reaching out diplomatically, including to the Soviets. Iraq remains willing to negotiate.
- o Beirut International Airport is a haven for hijackers. President Reagan has called for closing it until security can be assured. We have been in touch with Lebanese officials and other governments on this subject.
- o US is working with Arab nations on the issue of the seven hostages remaining in Lebanon.
- o UNIFIL could play a useful role in south Lebanon if Lebanon would agree to discuss security arrangements with Israel.

II. SOVIET OBJECTIVES

- o USSR seeks improved ties in the Middle East and is intensifying efforts to cultivate Arab moderates such as Egypt and Jordan. In recent months there have been increasing signs of Soviet interest in improving relations with Israel as a means of entre into the peace process.
- o Soviets criticized the February 11 agreement between Jordan and the PLO, having hoped to reconcile the PLO and Syria. They are now waiting to see where the peace process is going.
- o Soviets would like a mediated or negotiated settlement to the Iran/Iraq war.

III. U.S. OBJECTIVES

- o We want to prevent any increase in Soviet influence in the Middle East, but share some parallel objectives -- e.g., an end to the Gulf war. USSR should use its influence to halt Warsaw Pact and other arms shipments to Iran.
- o We urge other countries to cooperate with us to control international terrorism and are working for an early release of the hostages.

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FACT SHEET: MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

I. U.S. POLICY

- Based on UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338, Camp David Framework and President's September 1 initiative
- Ultimate objective just and lasting peace between Israel and all its neighbors
- Essential next step direct negotiations between Israel and Jordan, with Palestinian participation

II. CURRENT SITUATION

- Hussein and Peres seeking to develop negotiating process
 - o Take advantage of 1985 "window of opportunity"
 - o Focus is on process, rather than outcome
- Hussein visit to Washington step forward; we disagree on PLO role and international conference
- Peres June 10 statement serious effort to suggest acceptable alternatives, especially on international "umbrella"
- No Israeli government will enter negotiations if PLO present
- We understand Jordan's desire for broad international support and will actively seek to encourage it; oppose international conference
- U.S. prepared to meet with Jordanian-Palestinian group if we can agree on arrangements and it would clearly point to direct negotiations
- France and Italy met with Jordanian-PLO delegation to show support for Jordanian-PLO agreement; UK will soon meet with "Jordanian" delegation which will include PLO officials
- Soviets oppose current peace process efforts; insists on being involved; no evidence Soviets prepared to play constructive role
- Syria opposed to Jordanian effort to move to negotiations; we will work with Jordan to deal with problems it may face
- Improved Egyptian-Israeli relationship important; cornerstone of broader peace process

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FACT SHEET: EAST ASIA

I. JAPAN

o Tokyo has four basic objectives as it looks toward the Soviets: improved and upgraded Japan-Soviet dialogue; return of the northern territories (which we support); diminution of the Soviet military threat to Japan; and relaxation of tensions in Northeast Asia.

o Movement toward achieving these objectives will be slow.

o Due to limited involvement in arms control and regional stability issues, Japan pursues its objectives in these areas through its relationship with the US.

II. CHINA

o Trade and S&T relations with USSR improving significantly; 1984 trade was \$1.2 billion, 60% higher than 1983. Recently signed 5-year trade agreement, estimated to total \$14 billion.

o Despite economic progress and improved atmospherics, Chinese differences with the USSR on major issues (Cambodia, Afghanistan, border troops) appear irreconcilable in short term.

III. THE PHILIPPINES

o Soviets maintain low-key pressure to expand presence; Philippine response polite, non-substantive.

o U.S. aid keyed to assisting economic reform measures; economic aid and military assistance needed to deal with growing communist insurgency.

IV. CAMBODIA

o Vietnam's intransigence main block to settlement; still seeks imposed military solution.

o U.S. continues to support ASEAN; only negotiated settlement can lead to long-term stability.

o Massive Soviet aid underwrites Hanoi's tough line. Soviet interests better served by influencing Hanoi to negotiate seriously.

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FACT SHEET: CENTRAL AMERICA

I. SOVIET POLICY

- o Insure Sandinista survival. Avoid confrontation. Harass U.S. and divert resources from other areas.
- o Significant arms deliveries in 1984, including direct deliveries for first time; Mi-24 HINDs; oil supply after Ortega visit.
- o 200-300 Soviet mil/civil advisers in Nicaragua.
- o Public support of Contadora; condemnations of U.S. support for resistance, insistence on Sandinista dialogue with resistance.
- o Ortega visited Moscow late April.

II. PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS

- o Repeated U.S. warnings on jet fighter aircraft, most recently last Sep and Nov; also on combat units.
- o Warnings also about massive weapons shipments.
- o U.S. looking for greater Soviet, Soviet surrogate restraint in region.

III. U.S. POSITION

- o Congressional renewal of resistance funding shows President's Nicaragua policy has support, that we will stay course.
- o Sandinista dialogue with armed resistance, serious negotiation in Contadora are key to broader progress.
- o Soviet support for aggressive Nicaraguan/Cuban activities, increased Soviet bloc presence are destabilizing, negative elements in our relations.

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FACT SHEET: SOUTHERN AFRICA

I. ANGOLA/NAMIBIA

- o USG remains committed to negotiated settlement between Angola and the SAG providing: 1) early independence for Namibia under UNSCR 435, and 2) withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola.
- o Angolans have "suspended" participation in negotiations due to the May 21 SADF commando raid in Cabinda and U.S. congressional action to repeal the Clark Amendment.
- o However, public and private statements by both Angolans and the SAG leave door open to negotiated settlement.
- o Neither side has responded fully to USG negotiating ideas of last March - we are urging both to respond flexibly to negotiating ideas on table - pointing out high costs of failure.

II. MOZAMBIQUE

- o Increased RENAMO violence and poor army morale threaten Machel's stability - put pressure on him to turn back to Soviets.
- o Congress not cooperating with our efforts to support Machel with economic and nonlethal military aid - outcome on our aid proposals not yet clear.
- o Congressional aid cutoff could reverse our improving bilateral relations with Mozambique.
- o SAG and our allies agree Machel must not fall - alternative is chaos and Soviet opportunities in Mozambique.

III. SOUTH AFRICA

- o USG policy same as elsewhere in region - create stable security climate essential to obtaining internal reforms.
- o Despite serious violence/repression, Botha government retains intention to reform. USG urges dialogue with black majority.
- o USG policy remains firm: against apartheid and homelands - for common citizenship for all South Africans.
- o Sanctions will have negative effect - we continue to oppose.
- o USG has \$10 million aid program to black community.
- o Black expectations increasing - Sullivan principles have improved the lot of black workers - U.S. firms have spent over \$100 million to improve housing and education.

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USSR -- AT A GLANCE

0 Growth continues at slow pace.

-- While some industrial sectors did fairly well in 1983-84, growth in real GNP for 1984 was only about 2%. Industrial output (as a component of estimated GNP) rose only about 1% in the first quarter of 1985, compared with the same period last year.

-- Agriculture remains a major weakness, but the harvest outlook is somewhat brighter. In the absence of drought, the harvest should surpass last years' disastrous 170 MMT.

-- Oil and coal production continues to falter. In 1984 oil production decline for the first time since World War II. Thus far in 1985, production is about 3.5% below peak 1983 levels.

Hard currency position continues to be relatively strong despite plummeting exports in 1985.

-- High arms sales in 1984 overshadowed the deficit in non-arms trade, but first quarter arms sales are down in 1985.

-- Inability to maintain oil exports to West Europeans and record level grain imports combined to produce a first quarter trade deficit, excluding arms sales, of about \$1.7 billion. The ability to increase natural gas exports to offset declining oil exports is somewhat limited by demand level in Western Europe.

-- Modest net-debt continues to make the USSR attractive to Western banks.

Gorbachev continues to emphasize economic reform and makes personnel changes to reflect his approach.

-- Gorbachev has replaced the ministers of Light Industry, Ferrous Metallurgy, and Construction Materials. He has chastized others and continues to press for increased discipline and elimination of heavy drinking.

-- In agriculture emphasis continues on the brigade system of labor and the regional agro-industrial organizations (RAPO).

-- Hard decisions continue to confront the regime on the allocation of resources among competing sectors as well as final claimants of investment, consumption, and defense. Gorbachev favors increased investment in retooling existing plants at the expense of new construction. Thus far, there are no signs of fundamental economic reforms.

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ECONOMIC DATA CHART -- USSR

Revised 7/18/85

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1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 E

1. ECONOMIC INDICATORS:

1a. Population (mid-year, million)	267.7	270.0	272.5	275.0	277.6
1b. Gross National Product [(1984) billion]	1,880	1,923	1,989	2,035	
1c. GNP per Capita (\$)	7,023	7,122	7,299	7,400	
1d. Real GNP (% change based on ruble value)	1.9	2.6	3.6	2.0	
1e. Investment/GNP ratio (%)	33.0	34.0	34.0	34.0	
1f. Defense/GNP ratio (%)	13-14	13-14	13-14	13-14	

2. AGRICULTURE (July - June Marketing Year)

2a. Grain Harvest (million metric tons)	160	180	195	170	
2b. Grain Imports (mmt)	46	32	33	55	
2c. Grain Imports from US (mmt)	15	6	10	22	

3. ENERGY

3a. Oil Production (million bbls/day)	12.18	12.26	12.32	12.23	12.90*
3b. Oil Exports (mbd)	3.22	3.39	3.59	3.77	
3c. Oil Exports to Non-Communist C. (mbd)	1.22	1.56	1.75	1.80	
3d. Natural Gas Production (mil. cu.met./d)	1,274	1,374	1,467	1,603	1,729*
3e. Natural Gas Exports (mcm/d)	170	167	173	183	
3f. Natural Gas Exports to W. Eur. (mcm/d)	78	78	70	74	

4. FOREIGN TRADE AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS

4a. Total Exports (\$ million)	79,337	87,168	91,652	91,491	97,500*
4b. Exports to US (\$ million)	255	214	446	376	84.1*
4c. Total Imports (\$ million)	73,158	77,847	80,445	80,353	18,900*
4d. Imports from US (\$ million)	2,310	2,882	2,119	3,480	1,100*
4e. Hard Currency Exports (\$mil, ex. arms)	23,672	26,447	26,418	26,014	3,800*
4f. Hard Currency Imports (\$mil, ex. arms)	27,778	27,501	27,707	27,439	6,400*
4g. Trade Balance (\$ mil., excluding arms)	-4,106	-1,054	-1,289	-1,425	-1,700*
4h. Arms Exports (\$ million)	4,300	5,500	6,000	6,000	850*
4i. Current Account Balance	-175	4,333	4,663	4,700	N.A.


EXTERNAL HARD CURRENCY DEBT

5a. Gross Debt (\$ billion)	20.9	20.0	20.5	20.7	
5b. Net Debt (\$ billion)	12.5	10.0	9.5	10.4	
5c. Debt-service ratio (%)	17	16	17	16	

*Preliminary statistics for First Quarter

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SECTO 15021

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P.) CSCE

SUBJECT: THE SECRETARY'S BREAKFAST FOR NNA FOREIGN
MINISTERS, JULY 31, 1985

1. (C) - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THE SECRETARY, AT HIS JULY 31 BREAKFAST FOR NEUTRAL
AND NONALIGNED FOREIGN MINISTERS, MADE THE FOLLOWING
COMMENTS ABOUT OUR APPROACH TO RELATIONS WITH THE
SOVIET UNION.

3. IT IS IMPORTANT TO GUARD AGAINST THE TENDENCY
TOWARD WISHFUL THINKING IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS. THE US
APPROACH UNDER PRESIDENT REAGAN IS CONSTANT AND
CONSISTENT; THIS WILL CONTINUE TO BE THE CASE. IT IS
BASED ON REALISM, PARTICULARLY WITH REGARD TO A CLEAR
UNDERSTANDING OF OUR OWN INTERESTS AND OF THE POWER
WHICH HAS BEEN ACCUMULATED BY THE SOVIET UNION.

4. WE HAVE TO BE IN A POSITION TO DEFEND OUR VALUES
AND INTERESTS. WITHOUT APPROPRIATE MILITARY
CAPABILITIES, THIS WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE. BUT THIS WENT
BEYOND JUST MILITARY STRENGTH. WE ALSO HAVE TO DEVOTE
ATTENTION TO OUR ECONOMIES. THE ADMINISTRATION HAS
GOTTEN INFLATION UNDER CONTROL AND HAS ESTABLISHED THE
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BASIS FOR A RENEWAL OF A STRONG PATTERN OF INVESTMENT.

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AT THE SAME TIME, WE MUST GET THE BUDGET DEFICIT UNDER CONTROL AND REALIZE THAT THE MASSIVE INFLUX OF MONEY INTO THE UNITED STATES HAS PUSHED THE VALUE OF THE DOLLAR ARTIFICIALLY HIGH AND BROUGHT AN ENORMOUS TRADE DEFICIT. OUR DEFICIT HAS MEANT SURPLUSES FOR OTHERS, AND THIS HAS HELPED THEIR ECONOMIES. BUT THIS SITUATION CANNOT CONTINUE.

5. WE PUT GREAT STORE BY OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES. WE HAVE FORMAL ALLIANCES IN EUROPE AND ASIA. BUT WE ALSO HAVE OTHER FRIENDS WHO ARE NOT NECESSARILY ALIGNED WITH US BUT WHO SHARE OUR VALUES AND OUR APPROACH TO MANY INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS. WE VALUE OPPORTUNITIES SUCH AS THIS TO EXCHANGE IDEAS WITH SUCH FRIENDS. THE STRENGTH OF A COUNTRY COMES FROM THE STRENGTH OF PURPOSE OF ITS PEOPLE. THIS OBVIOUSLY IS THE CASE WITH THE UNITED STATES AND WITH ALL OF THE COUNTRIES REPRESENTED HERE. AFTER THE EXPERIENCES OF VIETNAM AND WATERGATE, YOU CAN BE ASSURED THAT THE TRADITIONAL AMERICAN OPTIMISM AND CAN-DO SPIRIT ARE BACK.

6. THE PRESIDENT ALSO HAS EMPHASIZED THAT WE MUST BE PREPARED TO WORK OUT OUR PROBLEMS WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND CHINA. WITH CHINA, A COUNTRY WITH A VERY DIFFERENT POLITICAL SYSTEM AND HISTORY, WE HAVE MADE CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS IN FASHIONING A CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP. THE PRESIDENT IS COMMITTED TO DOING THE SAME WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND THE COUNTRIES OF EASTERN EUROPE. AGREEMENTS WOULD OF COURSE HAVE TO BE MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL.

7. WE HAVE AN AGENDA THAT HAS BEEN IN PLACE FOR SOME
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TIME. THERE IS A TENDENCY ON THE PART OF THE SOVIETS TO SEE ARMS CONTROL AS THE DOMINANT FACTOR IN THAT AGENDA. ARMS CONTROL CLEARLY IS IMPORTANT AND WE ARE WORKING HARD IN GENEVA AND ELSEWHERE TO REACH AGREEMENTS. WE ARE THERE IN A SPIRIT OF GIVE-AND-TAKE. THERE HAS NOT BEEN MUCH PROGRESS IN GENEVA, BUT THE SECOND ROUND WAS SOMEWHAT MORE PRODUCTIVE THAN THE FIRST. AND, OF COURSE, THERE ARE ALSO OTHER NEGOTIATIONS, SUCH AS THE STOCKHOLM CDE AND THE CD NEGOTIATIONS ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN GENEVA. I

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PERSONALLY FEEL THAT CW ARMS CONTROL NEEDS SPECIAL EMPHASIS. THE IRAQ-IRAN WAR IS ESPECIALLY WORRISOME IN THIS REGARD, BECAUSE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF ESCALATING USE OF CW.

8. PROGRESS IN ARMS CONTROL HAD BEEN DERAILED IN GOOD MEASURE BY SOVIET CONDUCT IN OTHER REGIONS OF THE WORLD. THE INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN CAUSED PRESIDENT CARTER TO WITHDRAW THE SALT II TREATY FROM SENATE CONSIDERATION. THE SOVIETS ARE, OF COURSE, STILL IN AFGHANISTAN AND THEIR SURROGATES ARE IN CAMBODIA; THEIR EFFORTS IN CENTRAL AMERICA ARE PROVOCATIVE. LAST YEAR AT THE UN, THE PRESIDENT PROPOSED DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION ON SUCH REGIONAL ISSUES. THE PURPOSE IS NOT THE ACHIEVEMENT OF SOME SORT OF CONDOMINIUM, BUT RATHER, AT A MINIMUM, TO LIMIT DAMAGE. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE SOVIETS KNOW AND UNDERSTAND OUR VIEWS. WE HAVE HAD DISCUSSIONS ON AFGHANISTAN, THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTHERN AFRICA. THEY HAVE NOT PRODUCED ANY SPECTACULAR RESULTS, BUT THEY PROVIDE FOR A USEFUL EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION.

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0544

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 SECTO 15021

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P.) CSCE

SUBJECT: THE SECRETARY'S BREAKFAST FOR NNA FOREIGN

9. TURNING TO HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES, WE PUT GREAT STORE IN THE WAY HUMAN BEINGS ARE TREATED AND THIS IS A PARTICULAR PROBLEM WITH THE SOVIETS. AS MY SPEECH IN FINLANDIA HALL YESTERDAY DEMONSTRATED, WE FEEL IT IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT ON THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE HELSINKI ACCORDS TO TALK ABOUT INDIVIDUAL HUMAN BEINGS. BENEATH ALL OF THE PHYSICAL ATTRIBUTES OF RELATIONS AMONG STATES, IF BASIC CIVIL RIGHTS ARE SYSTEMATICALLY VIOLATED, THIS CREATES FUNDAMENTAL TENSIONS IN INTER-STATE RELATIONS. UNFORTUNATELY THERE ARE NOT MANY POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS IN THIS AREA TO ENCOURAGE US.

10. THERE HAS, HOWEVER, BEEN REASONABLY GOOD PROGRESS ON BILATERAL US-SOVIET ISSUES. THESE INCLUDE: DEVELOPMENT OF NON-STRATEGIC TRADE; PROGRESS ON CULTURAL EXCHANGES; TALKS ON CONSULATES; AND AVIATION ISSUES ARE BACK ON TRACK. THUS, THERE ARE AREAS WHERE IT IS POSSIBLE TO WORK THINGS OUT AND WE WILL CONTINUE TO ADDRESS THESE, PARTICULARLY AS PART OF THE PREPARATIONS FOR THE NOVEMBER MEETING BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV. IN
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CONCLUSION, I WOULD NOTE THAT WHILE EVERYONE EXPECTS CONTINUITY IN MOSCOW'S POLICIES, SOME OF THE NEW

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LEADERS "CAME OUT OF THE COUNTRY" AND THUS MIGHT NOT BE CAPTIVES OF THE PAST. WE WILL DO WHAT WE CAN TO MOVE FORWARD IN THE RELATIONSHIP.

11. THOSE ATTENDING THE BREAKFAST WERE: GRATZ (AUSTRIA), IACOVU (CYPRUS), VAYRYNEN (FINLAND), BRUNHART (LIECHTENSTEIN), SCEBERRAS TRIGONA (MALTA), HERLY (MONACO), REFFI (SAN MARINO), BODSTROM (SWEDEN), AUBERT (SWITZERLAND), SILVERSTRINI (VATICAN), AND DIZDAREVIC (YUGOSLAVIA). SHULTZ

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YOUR MEETING WITH SHEVARDNADZE: SUMMARY TALKING POINTS

INTRODUCTION

- CONGRATULATIONS ON YOUR APPOINTMENT. LOOK FORWARD TO DEVELOPING CANDID, CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH YOU. PLEASE SEND BEST WISHES TO GROMYKO.
- PRESIDENT BELIEVES OUR RELATIONS NEED NOT REMAIN STRAINED. PREPARED TO WORK WITH YOU TO RESOLVE PROBLEMS IN ALL AREAS.
- OUR SPECIFIC GOAL NOW SHOULD BE TO PREPARE WELL FOR OUR LEADERS' MEETING -- ADDRESS OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS AND NARROW DIFFERENCES.
- WE HAVE MUCH WORK TO DO BETWEEN NOW AND NOVEMBER. OBVIOUSLY, MOST CRITICAL AREA FOR PROGRESS BEFORE NOVEMBER IS GENEVA ARMS CONTROL TALKS.
- HOPE BETWEEN NOW AND NEXT ROUND WE BOTH WILL BE LOOKING HARD AT WHAT CAN BE DONE. DO YOU HAVE ANY CONCRETE SUGGESTIONS TODAY?
- GIVEN LIMITED TIME FOR TODAY'S MEETING, PROPOSE BRIEF OPENING COMMENTS FOLLOWED BY DISCUSSION OF INDIVIDUAL ISSUES. WILL BE INTERESTED IN HEARING YOUR PRIORITIES FOR OUR LEADERS' MEETING. SHOULD RESERVE TIME AT END TO TALK ABOUT MODALITIES OF THE NOVEMBER MEETING.
- CAN PURSUE SPECIFICS THROUGH HARTMAN AND DOBRYNIN, AS WELL AS IN NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON IN FALL. (OFFER FLOOR TO SHEVARDNADZE FOR HIS INITIAL TALK -- HE MAY SUGGEST THAT YOU GO FIRST.)

INITIAL PRESENTATION

- PRESIDENT APPROACHING PROCESS OVER NEXT FEW MONTHS AND THE NOVEMBER MEETING ITSELF WITH OBJECTIVE OF CHARTING THE FUTURE. FACT YOUR LEADERSHIP HAS CHANGED OFFERS LOGICAL CONTEXT FOR BROAD EXCHANGE ON HOW EACH SIDE VIEWS ITS INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES AND THE THREATS TO THEIR INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE INTERESTS POSED BY THE OTHER SIDE.
- THIS COULD DEVOLVE INTO A DISCUSSION OF THE SEVERAL AREAS OF THE RELATIONSHIP (ARMS CONTROL, REGIONAL, HUMAN RIGHTS,

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BILATERAL) IN THE CONTEXT OF SUMMARIZING HOW WE VIEW THE ISSUES AND WHERE PRIORITY ATTENTION OUGHT TO BE FOCUSED TOWARD RESOLVING SOME OF THE DISAGREEMENTS.

-- WE DO NOT REQUIRE CONCRETE AGREEMENTS AT NOVEMBER MEETING, BUT WE WILL BE READY TO SEIZE ANY OPPORTUNITIES FOR PROGRESS IF THEY ARISE.

-- WE CAN BEGIN THIS PROCESS HERE IN HELSINKI TODAY: CONTINUE IT DURING YOUR VISITS TO NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON AND THROUGH OTHER CHANNELS INCLUDING OUR AMBASSADORS: AIMING TOWARDS ANALOGOUS DIALOGUE BETWEEN PRESIDENT REAGAN AND GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV IN GENEVA IN NOVEMBER.

-- GIVEN LIMITED TIME THIS AFTERNOON WILL NOT ATTEMPT TO GIVE YOU OUR VIEW OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES WE EACH BEAR AND THE DIFFICULTIES THAT ARISE AS WE EACH ACT TO MEET THEM. I AGREE WITH POINT YOU CONVEYED TO ME EARLIER THIS MONTH THAT THERE WILL BE TIME IN NEW YORK FOR SUCH BROAD EXCHANGES.

-- JUST SAY HERE WE SEEK WORLD BASED ON RESPECT FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW. WE WANT PEACE AND HUMAN PROGRESS AS MUCH AS ANY PEOPLE. WE DO NOT SEEK GEOPOLITICAL DOMINANCE, DO NOT THREATEN LEGITIMATE SOVIET INTERESTS AND DO NOT WANT MILITARY SUPERIORITY.

-- WE BELIEVE IN STRENGTH OF OUR IDEAS AND VALUES AND ARE QUITE PREPARED TO ENGAGE IN PEACEFUL COMPETITION; WE DO NOT BELIEVE USE OF FORCE NECESSARY FOR HISTORY TO INDICATE STRENGTH OF DEMOCRACY.

-- TO BE FRANK WE ARE NOT CERTAIN SOVIET UNION IS WILLING TO RELY UPON PEACEFUL MEANS OF COMPETITION. WE ARE DISTURBED BY YOUR CONTINUING MILITARY BUILDUP AND PROPENSITY TO ENCOURAGE AND RESORT TO FORCE.

-- NOR ARE WE CERTAIN OF YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT IS REQUIRED FOR A STABLE AND MORE COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH REST OF WORLD. AGGRESSIVE SOVIET BEHAVIOR IN VARIOUS REGIONS, ESPECIALLY AFGHANISTAN; LACK OF CONCRETE NEGOTIATION IN ARMS CONTROL; BLEAK HUMAN RIGHTS PICTURE ARE OBSTACLES TO PROGRESS.

-- WE ARE ESPECIALLY CONCERNED ABOUT SOVIET ACTIVITIES WHICH ENDANGER AMERICAN LIVES (NICHOLSON CASE AND OTHER TROUBLES WITH MLM, BERLIN AIR CORRIDORS, INFLAMMATORY PROPAGANDA DURING TWA HIJACKING, BUZZING OF AMERICANS AND AMERICAN COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES IN BERING SEA).

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-- CONTINUING PROCLIVITY TO USE FORCE RATHER THAN DIPLOMACY, EITHER AS GOVERNMENT PREFERENCE OR LACK OF CONTROL OVER MILITARY, THREATENS POSITIVE WORK WE CAN DO.

-- BUT GIVEN LIMITED TIME, LET ME TURN NOW TO SPECIFIC ISSUES.

SPECIFIC ISSUES

ARMS CONTROL - GENEVA TALKS

-- GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE MAJOR ITEM AT NOVEMBER MEETING. WE BOTH SHOULD THINK HARD ABOUT HOW TO GIVE IMPETUS TO THE TALKS.

-- U.S. COMMITTED TO PRODUCTIVE NEGOTIATING PROCESS IN GENEVA. PRESIDENT HAS GIVEN U.S. NEGOTIATORS CONSIDERABLE FLEXIBILITY ON ACHIEVING OBJECTIVES. HIS DIFFICULT DECISION ON INTERIM RESTRAINT ALSO REFLECTS THAT COMMITMENT.

-- YOU SHOULD NOW BEGIN TO MOVE ON BOTH SCORES -- GET DOWN TO SERIOUS BUSINESS IN GENEVA, AND RESOLVE U.S. COMPLIANCE CONCERNS.

-- PLEASED THAT SCC COMPLETED TWO AGREEMENTS, BUT MORE EFFORT IS NEEDED, PARTICULARLY TO RESOLVE KRASNOYARSK.

-- SOME STIRRINGS IN GENEVA IN LAST ROUND, BUT NO REAL PROGRESS:

-- ON SUBSTANCE, YOUR NEGOTIATORS SIMPLY REASSERT POSITIONS YOU KNOW ARE UNACCEPTABLE TO US, OR THEY WON'T GO INTO SPECIFICS EITHER ON OUR IDEAS OR EVEN YOUR OWN. SOME SLIGHT BREAK IN THE ICE IN START GROUP LAST ROUND, BUT WE CAN'T EVALUATE YOUR IDEAS WITHOUT DETAILS.

-- ON TACTICS, YOUR PEOPLE INSIST ON LINKAGES THAT BLOCK SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS. IT WAS AGREED IN JANUARY TO CONSIDER AND RESOLVE NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS ISSUES IN THEIR INTERRELATIONSHIP. THIS DOES NOT MEAN TO PRECONDITION PROGRESS ON OFFENSIVE ARMS REDUCTIONS ON ACCEPTANCE OF YOUR POSITION ON SO-CALLED "SPACE-STRIKE" ARMS.

-- IN OTHER WORDS, NOT SURPRISING WE'RE FAR APART ON MANY ISSUES, BUT DISAPPOINTING YOUR NEGOTIATORS WON'T ENGAGE IN THE KIND OF GIVE-AND-TAKE THAT COULD NARROW DIFFERENCES.

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-- ON START: THE END RESULT -- DEEP CUTS IN EFFECTIVE POWER OF OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR ARMS -- IS WHAT COUNTS. WE'RE FLEXIBLE ON MEANS TO ACHIEVE THAT GOAL AND WILLING TO DISCUSS SOVIET ALTERNATIVES, SUCH AS "MODEL" YOUR NEGOTIATORS DISCUSSED LAST ROUND FOR PERCENTAGE REDUCTIONS AND LIMITS. IN RIGHT CONTEXT, THIS IDEA COULD BE A BRIDGE BETWEEN YOUR "MODEL" AND OUR IDEAS THAT WOULD BE WORTH EXPLORING. THUS FAR, YOUR SIDE HAS NO CONCRETE PROPOSAL NOR HAS IT EXPLAINED HOW STABILITY WOULD BE ACHIEVED. HOPE YOU WILL OFFER DETAILS ON NUMERICAL OUTCOMES EARLY IN ROUND III SO WE CAN EVALUATE.

-- AMONG DETAILS WE NEED TO EVALUATE THIS IDEA:

-- THE AMOUNT OF REDUCTIONS OF MISSILE WARHEADS AND SNDVS AND THEIR RESIDUAL LEVELS?

-- THE PERCENTAGE SUB-LIMITS YOU ENVISION?

-- WHETHER HEAVY ICBMs WOULD BE LIMITED AND REDUCED?

-- I REPEAT, THE END RESULT MUST BE DEEP REDUCTIONS IN THE EFFECTIVE POWER OF OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR ARMS.

-- ON INF, IF YOUR NEGOTIATORS CAN'T ADVANCE NEW IDEAS WHICH WOULD ACHIEVE A BALANCED OUTCOME, THEY SHOULD AT LEAST BEGIN TO EXPLORE THE U.S. POSITION, WHICH HAS BUILT-IN FLEXIBILITY.

-- ON DEFENSE/SPACE, YOU HAVE MASSIVE SPACE/DEFENSE RESEARCH PROGRAM. WHY CONTINUE TO INSIST ON ONE-SIDED BAN ON U.S. RESEARCH, PARTICULARLY WHEN YOU HAVE IN THE PAST AGREED WITH US THAT BLANKET LIMITS ON RESEARCH ARE NEITHER VERIFIABLE NOR DESIRABLE? WOULD SEEM TO BE IN YOUR INTEREST TO BEGIN REAL DISCUSSION OF OFFENSE-DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP AND HOW WE MIGHT STRENGTHEN STABILITY OF STRATEGIC BALANCE.

OTHER ARMS CONTROL

STOCKHOLM CDE:

-- CDE MEETING AN AREA FOR EARLY PROGRESS. WOULD LIKE TO HAVE SOMETHING FOR THE SUMMIT.

-- SHOULD BEGIN DRAFTING CONCLUDING DOCUMENT WITH CONCRETE CBMS AND POLITICAL UNDERSTANDINGS ON NON-USE OF FORCE.

-- AMBASSADOR GOODBY'S SEPTEMBER VISIT TO MOSCOW IS OPPORTUNITY TO TALK IN DETAIL ABOUT HOW TO PROCEED.

NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION:

-- IN VIENNA, I URGED GROMYKO TO CONSIDER REFERRING TO NON-PROLIFERATION IN GENEVA COMMUNIQUE. AMBASSADOR KENNEDY GAVE DRAFT TEXT TO AMB. PETROVSKIY IN APRIL.

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-- NOW BELIEVE IT USEFUL TO ISSUE JOINT STATEMENT BY TWO GOVERNMENTS BEFORE AUGUST NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE, THEN BUILD ON THIS STATEMENT IN THE SUMMIT COMMUNIQUE.

-- ON JULY 26, GAVE SOKOLOV A NEW DRAFT OF JOINT STATEMENT FOR NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE. HOPE YOU ARE PREPARED TO MOVE AHEAD.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS:

-- BELIEVE WE SHOULD TAKE TWO STEPS TOWARDS BETTER UNDERSTANDING ON CONCERNS ABOUT CHEMICAL WEAPONS.

-- WANT TO REAFFIRM OFFER FOR SOVIET EXPERTS TO VISIT U.S. TO VIEW DESTRUCTION PROCEDURES AND TECHNOLOGY RELATED TO A CW BAN. THIS COULD GIVE US BOTH A BETTER PICTURE OF EACH OTHER'S CONCERNS ON TECHNICAL ASPECTS AND PROBLEMS OF AN AGREEMENT.

-- WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS MORE FULLY CW PROLIFERATION, PARTICULARLY USE OF CW IN IRAN-IRAQ WAR, IN OUR VIEW THE MOST PRESSING CASE. WOULD SEND A TEAM TO MOSCOW IF YOU WISHED. MIGHT HAVE SOMETHING ON PROLIFERATION IN SUMMIT COMMUNIQUE.

NUCLEAR TESTING:

-- DO YOU HAVE ANY REACTION YET TO THE PROPOSAL IN THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER OF JULY 27 TO GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV THAT YOU SEND OBSERVERS TO OUR NEVADA TEST SITE TO MONITOR A US NUCLEAR TEST?

-- THE PURPOSE OF THIS OFFER IS TO ALLOW US TO MOVE FORWARD ON THE NUCLEAR TESTING ISSUES ON A VERIFIABLE, AGREED AND THEREFORE DURABLE BASIS.

-- THE PROBLEM WE HAVE WITH A MORATORIUM IS THAT IT IS NOT VERIFIABLE AND IN THE PAST HAS PROVEN NOT DURABLE; AS KHRUSCHEV'S DECISION IN 1961 UNILATERALLY TO BREAK OUT OF AN EARLIER MORITORIUM DEMONSTRATED.

-- INSTEAD, LET US PROCEED TO FIND A WAY TO PLACE VERIFIABLE AND MUTUAL LIMITS ON NUCLEAR TESTING. YOU HAVE LONG URGED US TO RATIFY THE TTBT AND PNET. WE HAVE SERIOUS VERIFICATION CONCERNS WITH THEM.

-- AS I HAVE TOLD BOTH GROMYKO AND DOBRYNIN WE ENVISAGE AN EXCHANGE OF OBSERVERS, AND PARTICULARLY RECIPROCAL CALIBRATION TESTS AT OUR RESPECTIVE TEST SITES, AS A MEANS OF RESOLVING THOSE CONCERNS AND MOVING TOWARD RATIFICATION OF TTBT AND PNET.

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REGIONAL ISSUES

-- REGIONAL TALKS ON MIDDLE EAST, SOUTHERN AFRICA AND AFGHANISTAN USEFUL IN CLARIFYING POSITIONS.

-- BELIEVE NEXT TALKS SHOULD BE ON EAST ASIA. PREPARED TO HAVE ASSISTANT SECRETARY PAUL WOLFOWITZ GO TO MOSCOW SOMETIME DURING THE FIRST TWO WEEKS IN SEPTEMBER FOR THE TALKS, IF YOU AGREE.

-- BELIEVE SUCH DISCUSSIONS AT ALL LEVELS IMPORTANT TO AVOID MISUNDERSTANDINGS, PARTICULARLY AT TIMES OF CRISIS.

-- AT SAME TIME, DISAPPOINTED AT LACK OF SOVIET READINESS TO JOIN IN EFFORTS TO RESOLVE PROBLEMS, ESPECIALLY AFGHANISTAN.

AFGHANISTAN

-- FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM CONTINUES TO BE YOUR INVASION AND OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN. TIME IS RIPE TO SOLVE PROBLEM.

-- HOPE YOU WILL TAKE NEW LOOK AT PROBLEM. WE ARE READY TO DISCUSS GUARANTEES OF NON-INTERFERENCE IN AN AFGHAN POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, IF YOU ARE PREPARED TO DISCUSS TIMETABLE FOR ORDERLY TROOP WITHDRAWAL.

-- URGE YOU TO BE MORE FLEXIBLE IN UN TALKS.

-- PRESSURES ON PAKISTAN ARE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE; WE ARE COMMITTED TO PAKISTAN'S SECURITY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY.

EAST ASIA

-- CONFIRMED AGAIN IN MY RECENT TRIP DYNAMISM OF ASIAN REGION.

-- IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, VIETNAM'S OCCUPATION IS CENTRAL PROBLEM IN CAMBODIA; ASEAN PRINCIPLES OFFER BEST FORMULA FOR POLITICAL SOLUTION.

-- US STRONGLY OPPOSED TO SETTLEMENT RESTORING KHMER ROUGE CONTROL, BUT FREE ELECTIONS WOULD NOT PRODUCE THAT.

-- USE YOUR INFLUENCE TO CONVINCE VIETNAM THAT POLITICAL SETTLEMENT RESTORING INDEPENDENT, NEUTRAL CAMBODIA IS IN THEIR INTEREST AS WELL.

-- IN NORTHEAST ASIA, FAVOR EFFORTS TO EXPAND DIALOGUE BETWEEN TWO KOREAS, AND THINK DIRECT TALKS BEST WAY. ALSO READY FOR CROSS RECOGNITION.

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HUMAN RIGHTS

-- HAVE NO DESIRE TO INTERFERE IN YOUR INTERNAL AFFAIRS OR FOR YOU TO CONTRAVENE YOUR LAWS.

-- HOWEVER, HUMAN RIGHTS PROGRESS PART OF OUR DEFINITION OF SUCCESSFUL MEETING IN NOVEMBER. USSR DOES HAVE COMMITMENTS, INCLUDING FINAL ACT. HUMAN RIGHTS SHOULD BE PART OF PREPARATORY WORK FOR GENEVA MEETING, AND WILL IMPROVE ATMOSPHERE.

-- ESPECIALLY URGE YOU TO FOCUS ON CLEARING DECKS OF LONGSTANDING DIVIDED-SPOUSE AND DUAL-NATIONAL CASES, AS WELL AS MAKING HEADWAY ON JEWISH EMIGRATION.

-- MY SPEECH REFLECTS GREAT IMPORTANCE ALL AMERICANS ATTACH TO THIS ISSUE, ALSO MENTIONS CASES OF SPECIAL IMPORTANCE TO US.

-- LITTLE PROSPECT FOR RESOLVING LONGSTANDING PROBLEMS SUCH AS MFN WITHOUT SUBSTANTIAL IMPROVEMENT IN SOVIET HUMAN RIGHTS POLICIES AND EMIGRATION PRACTICES.

BILATERAL ISSUES

-- WE BOTH AGREE THAT IN PREPARATION FOR MEETING BETWEEN OUR LEADERS WE NEED TO FOCUS HIGHEST-LEVEL ATTENTION ON CRITICAL AREAS AND CHART A COURSE FOR THE FUTURE.

-- AT SAME TIME IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT THERE IS A MUTUAL DESIRE TO MAKE AS MUCH PROGRESS AS POSSIBLE IN A NUMBER OF MORE MODEST BILATERAL AREAS.

-- AS YOUR SIDE HAS SUGGESTED, IT WOULD BE GOOD TO SEE WHAT CAN BE DONE BEFORE NOVEMBER MEETING.

-- MAC BALDRIGE'S MAY VISIT TO MOSCOW MADE USEFUL CONTRIBUTION TO ECONOMIC/COMMERCIAL RELATIONSHIP. URGE YOU TO GIVE U.S. FIRMS EQUAL ACCESS. IMPORTANT YOU FULFILL WHEAT PURCHASE OBLIGATIONS UNDER GRAIN AGREEMENT.

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-- PLEASED WE HAVE REACHED AGREEMENT ON NORTHERN PACIFIC AIR SAFETY. NEED TO WORK ON IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES, HOPE THEY CAN BE AGREED WITHOUT DELAY.

-- ASSUMING THESE TALKS GO SMOOTHLY AND IT IS CLEAR AGREEMENT WILL WORK, U.S. READY TO BEGIN BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS ON RESUMPTION OF DIRECT AIR SERVICE

-- SUGGEST TALKS BE HELD IN WASHINGTON IN EARLY SEPTEMBER. ANY AGREEMENT MUST CONTAIN EQUITABLE BALANCE OF ECONOMIC CONCESSIONS FOR U.S. AIR CARRIERS SERVING USSR.

-- BOTH SIDES SHOULD BE PREPARED TO ANNOUNCE ESTABLISHMENT OF CONSULATES IN KIEV AND NEW YORK AT GENEVA MEETING.

-- URGE YOU TO TAKE DECISIONS TO RESOLVE FINAL ISSUES IN EXCHANGE AGREEMENT NEGOTIATIONS BEFORE SUMMIT: TV APPEARANCES IMPORTANT, EXHIBITS AT LEAST AT PREVIOUS LEVELS ESSENTIAL.

-- MAKING PROGRESS ON REINVIGORATING BILATERAL AGREEMENTS. HAVE HAD JOINT MEETINGS ON TRADE/AGRICULTURE. AGRICULTURE SECRETARY BROCK, HOUSING SECRETARY PIERCE AND EPA ADMINISTRATOR THOMAS ARE TO GO TO MOSCOW IN AUGUST, SEPTEMBER AND NOVEMBER RESPECTIVELY.

-- PROPOSE ANOTHER ROUND OF DISCUSSIONS ON U.S.-SOVIET MARITIME BOUNDARY DIFFERENCE TAKE PLACE IN WASHINGTON IN EARLY FALL.

-- WOULD ALSO LIKE TO OPEN DISCUSSIONS ON IMPROVING PEACEFUL SPACE COOPERATION:

-- REMAIN INTERESTED IN JOINT SIMULATED SPACE RESCUE MISSION PROPOSED BY PRESIDENT;

-- IN DISCUSSING INTER-GOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENT, WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS SCIENTIFIC SUBJECTS SUCH AS PLANETARY EXPLORATION, ASTROPHYSICS AND THE LIKE;

-- U.S. PREPARED TO BEGIN TALKS AT ANY MUTUALLY CONVENIENT TIME FROM MID-AUGUST 1985 TO EXPLORE POSSIBILITY OF NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION IN SPACE ACTIVITIES.

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MODALITIES OF NOVEMBER MEETING

-- SITES FOR THE MEETINGS SHOULD FOSTER OUR MUTUAL OBJECTIVES FOR THE SUMMIT -- LET OUR TWO LEADERS GET TO KNOW EACH OTHER IN AS RELAXED A SETTING AS POSSIBLE, AND TO HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR CANDID DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES.

-- SWISS HAVE SUGGESTED, AND WE AGREE, THAT A NEUTRAL SITE WOULD BEST PROVIDE THIS KIND OF ATMOSPHERE.

-- OUR ADVANCE TEAM SAW SEVERAL PLACES SUGGESTED BY THE SWISS AND FOUND THEM IDEAL FOR THE MEETINGS. WE HOPE THEY'LL BE ACCEPTABLE TO YOU.

-- SWISS HAVE ALSO OFFERED TO HOST A LARGE RECEPTION FOR BOTH DELEGATIONS. NOVEMBER 20 MIGHT BE A GOOD DATE FOR THIS. AS FOR OTHER SOCIAL ACTIVITIES, WE WOULD LIKE TO SUGGEST THAT THE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL SECRETARY HOST DINNERS FOR EACH OTHER ON THE EVENINGS OF NOVEMBER 19 AND 20. OUR PREFERENCE IS TO KEEP THESE AFFAIRS SMALL.

-- WE UNDERSTAND YOU HAVE ALSO HAD A TEAM IN GENEVA. IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING THE SWISS WOULD LIKE TO GET TOGETHER WITH BOTH SIDES AT AN EARLY DATE IN GENEVA. WE AGREE. THE WEEK OF SEPTEMBER 9 WOULD BE PARTICULARLY GOOD FOR US.

[If possible, in private -- might do this entire subject of Summit modalities in private aside at end of meeting]

-- FIRST LADY PLANS TO TRAVEL WITH THE PRESIDENT AND HOPES THAT MRS. GORBACHEVA WILL BE COMING. IF MRS. GORBACHEVA IS INTERESTED, MRS. REAGAN WOULD LIKE TO PLAN SOME JOINT ACTIVITIES. COULD YOU LET US KNOW HOW MRS. GORBACHEVA FEELS ABOUT THIS?

MEETINGS IN NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON

-- I LOOK FORWARD TO OUR MEETINGS IN NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON THIS FALL.

-- IF YOU BRING MRS. SHEVARNADZE WITH YOU WHEN YOU COME TO THE UNITED STATES THIS FALL, WE WILL BE HAPPY TO SEE HER.

-- MRS. SHULTZ WOULD WANT TO HOST A LUNCHEON OR SOME OTHER ACTIVITY FOR HER.

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~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~Regional Issues14. Middle East/Persian Gulf

Background: The Soviet Middle East conference proposal continues to be the centerpiece of their declared policy on the resolution of the Arab-Israeli dispute, but Moscow has not pushed the plan vigorously for some months. Although the Soviets have maintained their public support for the PLO, they have also continued to criticize the Jordan-PLO Agreement as the path to a separate deal. Differences with Damascus over the PLO and Nabih Berri's war on the camps created a contentious atmosphere for Assad's first meeting with Gorbachev in June. That meeting ended with no written communiqué. Despite Syrian-Soviet differences, Moscow is still nervous and unhappy with Arafat's course.

There have been a number of signs over the past few months that the Soviets are rethinking how they should manage the absence of full relations with Israel. The conditions raised by the Soviets at the recent meeting in Paris between their respective Ambassadors to France may indicate that the leadership feels it must have a sweetener for Syria (progress on the Golan Heights) before it can move toward resumed relations.

The Soviets profess a desire to see an end to the Iran-Iraq War, although they continue to be Iraq's main arms supplier, and East Bloc countries and North Korea provide the bulk of Iranian arms. We believe the Scud missiles used against Baghdad were transferred from Libya to Iran without Soviet permission, and that Moscow has on occasion stopped transactions between Eastern Europe and Iran for major systems, e.g. tanks.

The Iranian regime, pressed by its war needs and its diplomatic isolation, has recently moved to improve its ties with Moscow. The USSR's response has apparently been cautious and it may be that Iran is resistant to Soviet demands for a reduction in Iranian opposition to the Soviet presence in Afghanistan.

Iran remains intransigently opposed to negotiations, refusing to discuss peace unless the Iraqi regime is replaced. After the heavy losses from Iran's March offensive and with signs rising internal dissent, Tehran has indicated it is switching for an indefinite period (as it did also in past years) to a more defensive strategy of small attacks.

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Iran probably now has a small CW capacity in this offensive, and Iraq, if pressed in battle, will probably continue to employ its substantial CW capability. We believe that the Soviets, like us, regret this. We have provided separate talking points for your use on Chemical Weapons non-proliferation.

Talking Points: US-Soviet Middle East/Persian Gulf Talks

-- As I told Mr. Gromyko last May, we believe the discussions which were held in Vienna between Assistant Secretary Murphy and Ambassador Polyakov were useful, although nothing new or dramatic emerged from them.

-- We believe a continuing exchange of views on this vital area is an important way to prevent misunderstandings and miscalculations.

-- In our view, it is still too soon to have another round of experts talks, but as events in the region unfold we might want to consider intensifying our own dialogue.

We might begin this more thorough exchange when we meet in New York this September at the UNGA.

Contingency Points

[If Shevardnadze raises the Gulf War:]

-- An early end to the Iran-Iraq War, with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of both sides intact, is the United States' goal and is in our mutual interest.

-- It is important that both our countries support Perez de Cuellar's and others' efforts to arrange a negotiated settlement.

-- Since Iran continues intransigently to refuse to negotiate a general ceasefire, the best means of bringing about a peace settlement is to cut off Iran's arms supplies.

-- The Soviet Union should exert its influence with its friends in the Warsaw Pact and with Libya, Syria, and North Korea to stop supplying arms to Iran.

[If Shevardnadze raises the Peace Process:]

-- The US is committed to working with the parties to achieve a just and lasting settlement. The only realistic path to peace is direct negotiations based on UNSC Resolution 242.

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-- The positions we will support in negotiations are contained in the President's September 1, 1982 peace initiative. We support a two-stage process in which negotiation of transitional arrangements, and implementation of those agreements in the West Bank and Gaza, precede negotiations on the final status of those territories.

-- Should Jordan and the Palestinians enter into direct negotiations with Israel, they should receive the support of all states seeking to further Arab-Israeli peace.

-- We would expect that neither Syria nor any other state would use or support violence to prevent a broadening of negotiations.

-- The Soviet Union has excluded itself from playing a positive role in the Middle East, but Soviet actions make it difficult for us and for Israel to take such protestations seriously.

-- Lack of Soviet diplomatic relations with Israel raises questions regarding your ability to play a balanced role, as does Soviet anti-semitic and anti-zionist propaganda and Soviet treatment of Jews in the Soviet Union.

[If Shevardnadze raises recent Soviet-Israeli exchanges:]

-- As I told Mr. Gromyko on several occasions, we believe that resumption of full relations between the Soviet Union and Israel would be a constructive step.

-- The impact of such action by the Soviet Union would be increased if it was accompanied by positive movement on Jewish emigration.

[If Shevardnadze raises the Soviet July 29 Peace Proposal:]

-- The Soviet July 29 proposals do not refer to UNSC resolutions 242 and 338. Your effort to introduce new proposals does not facilitate negotiations between the parties but only widens the gap between them. Moreover, an international conference would not be productive.

[If Shevardnadze presses for another round of Middle East experts talks:]

-- Another round of experts talks is one possibility we might want to consider at an appropriate time.

-- As I said, we believe it is too soon for another round of experts talks.

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Arms Control

4. Chemical Weapons

Background: On June 21 the Soviets rejected the invitation you conveyed to the Gromyko in Vienna for Soviet representatives to observe destruction of US chemical weapons. They also replied negatively to our suggestion that US and Soviet experts meet in Moscow to discuss the use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq War. Instead, the Soviets suggested that such a discussion be held within the framework of regional experts' talks on the Middle East. While we cannot be optimistic the Soviets will respond favorably, we suggest you reiterate the invitation and urge Shevardnadze to take a personal look at the prospects of doing something together on CW proliferation.

We have also not made any progress with the Soviets in our bilaterals on the margins of the CD -- stalemate continues on the issue of a CW ban. You may wish to reemphasize the US commitment to a comprehensive and verifiable CW ban, reaffirm the US intention that such a ban be entirely equitable, and press Shevardnadze for a serious Soviet approach.

In discussing the topic, it is essential to avoid any suggestion that:

- o our concern about Soviet compliance has lessened;
- o we are inviting the Soviets to criticize the CW track record of our allies; or that
- o we are inviting the Soviets to play a political role in the regions where CW proliferation is of concern.

Talking Points

A. Reiterate New Proposals

-- Believe that the proliferation of chemical weapons is an issue that we should be working together to avoid. It is in the interest of both our countries.

-- We were disappointed that you did not respond positively to our suggestions for preliminary discussions of the CW problem: to observe the destruction of our CW stockpiles and to send a team to Moscow to discuss the use of CW in Iran-Iraq and the more general question of CW proliferation.

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-- We invited Soviet officials to the United States this summer to view destruction procedures and technology related to a chemical weapons ban, because we believe a "seminar" of this sort could be useful in assessing the technical aspects and problems of an agreement.

-- We suggested talks on the urgent problem of chemical weapons use in the Iran-Iraq war as a means of exchanging information the Iran-Iraq chemical weapons situation and also of examining ways in which we might jointly express our concern about the use of these weapons to Teheran and Baghdad.

-- I urge you in your new position to take a personal look at these proposals; this is a problem we can and should be addressing jointly.

B. CD

-- We remain committed to achieving a complete and verifiable ban on chemical weapons, and believe it's time the USSR began negotiating seriously. Frankly, we have not been encouraged by Soviet attitude, and believe this is an area where progress could be made, if the USSR adopts a realistic approach.

-- Our draft text is effective and workable. I know, for example, that your negotiators have expressed concern that our inspection provisions would unfairly affect the USSR, given our different economic systems.

-- But we expect treaty constraints to apply equally to all parties, and we have sought to take account of Soviet concerns on this and other provisions.

-- Although our bilateral meetings on chemical weapons have not yielded any results, they have been useful as a means of dialogue. I suggest that we consider expanding our bilateral contacts so as to facilitate progress within the CD itself.

Contingency Talking Points on Chemical Weapons

[If Gromyko alleges that the US inspection provisions are biased against socialist economies:]

-- We are mindful of need to take our different systems into account; our draft treaty has accomplished this. As we have told your negotiators, US is prepared as part of CW ban to grant access to nongovernmental chemical as well as facilities controlled by government.

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[If Gromyko argues that NTM provides sufficient verification for a CW ban:]

-- Unfortunately that is not the case. The difficulty in differentiating among allowed and prohibited activities and the ease with which CW can be stockpiled and transferred demand more acute means of verification if we are to have confidence in the agreement.

[If Gromyko claims that responsibility for CW proliferation lies with the US and its allies:]

-- Proliferation is a global problem, and we are considering how we might best approach the international community about this. We recognize that nations of all ideological stripes must participate in effort. Should not allow our efforts to degenerate into propaganda war.

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BRIEFING MEMORANDUM
S/S

TO: The Secretary

THROUGH: P - Michael H. Armacost

FROM: EUR - Rozanne L. Ridgway *RLR*

SUBJECT: Scope Paper for Your July 31 Meeting with Shevardnadze

SETTING

Your meeting in Helsinki with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze comes at a time of a new Soviet dynamism at home and abroad. The fact that you will have a new interlocutor in Helsinki underscores Gorbachev's confident and relatively rapid consolidation of power. Further, Soviet diplomacy has become more energetic recently, although there have been no major policy departures. While working towards a summit with us, the Soviets are playing up common interests with European and Asian countries and taking the same line as we towards our bilateral relationship (difficult but capable of being improved) and the summit (unrealistic to expect breakthroughs, but small steps forward are possible). In Geneva, they recently presented ambiguous but interesting new ideas on cuts in strategic forces.

Thus, your meeting with Shevardnadze should differ markedly in style and substance from your sessions with Gromyko over the last few years. On substance, both sides have the discipline of preparing a summit to give sharper focus to the meeting. Based on reports of Shevardnadze's sense of humor and ability to turn a phrase, you should have a livelier interlocutor, one more attuned to give-and-take than Gromyko (although it might take another session or two for this to become fully apparent). When Art Hartman met with him on July 22, he came across as low-key, businesslike and affable, but he broke no new ground on substance.

Shevardnadze will be operating under practical limits in Helsinki. He will be making his diplomatic debut with less than a month to master the mechanics and substance of his new job. He told Art he would have a lot of meetings with other foreign

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ministers in Helsinki. The Soviets appear to see the session as largely introductory -- Shevardnadze referred to "discussing the outlines" of our problems -- with more detailed discussions to be held at the UNGA in the fall. The Soviet decision to decline an informal lunch and follow-on session August 1 probably reflects a desire to carefully manage their new man's time and his exposure to unstructured substantive discussions.

Accordingly, your objectives should be to:

- begin the process of setting up the summit meeting;
- establish a good working relationship with Shevardnadze
- impress on Shevardnadze personally that the President and you are ready to work with the new Soviet leadership to resolve outstanding problems.

AGENDA

Shevardnadze told Art that he envisions arms control, Asia and Central America will come up in Helsinki; he is bringing two top members of his Geneva negotiating team (Ambassador Kvitsinskiy and General Detinov) to Helsinki. He also indicated that bilateral issues are the field where progress seems most likely in the near term. Otherwise, we have not received a formal response from the Soviets to the issues you outlined to Dobrynin on July 3 for discussion at Helsinki and possible progress by the summit.

You will be the host in Helsinki. After making a few welcoming remarks, you should offer to turn the floor over to Shevardnadze (he said he does not like long speeches, and you may have a bit more time than usual). After he has spoken (or if he insists that you take the lead), you should briefly review developments since Vienna and then move quickly to discussion of the summit, particularly issues where movement before November is possible. You will also want to reserve time at the end for a discussion of the logistics of the summit, based on decisions arising from the Advance Team's visit to Geneva.

Recent Developments

You should underline, as fresh evidence of our ability to do business, the agreement on the November meeting, the conclusion of two new understandings in the SCC, and the effort to revitalize agricultural cooperation. You should also stress that the President's decision on interim restraint reflects our commitment to progress in arms control.

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On the negative side, you will want to note a number of continuing problems and obstacles to progress beyond small steps: lack of movement in the Geneva talks; aggressive Soviet actions in the Third World, particularly the occupation of Afghanistan and Soviet pressures on Pakistan; the bleak human rights picture; the Nicholson case, other incidents involving the MLM, and the Berlin air corridors; and Soviet buzzing of Americans in the Bering Sea. In raising Nicholson and more recent incidents in the GDR and the Bering Sea, you could repeat the points we have made earlier about the seeming Soviet propensity to resort to force rather than diplomacy, either as a government preference or through lack of adequate political control over the military. As an example of mixed and unnecessarily ambiguous behavior, you could cite the combination during the TWA hijacking of welcome Soviet statements against terrorism with inflammatory propaganda about US intentions.

The Summit - General Remarks

The Soviets have said, and we have agreed, that the period leading up to the summit should be used to make progress where possible. Shevardnadze also made this point to Art. You should stress that we see the summit as an opportunity for the President and Gorbachev to get to know each other and discuss the entire range of issues in the bilateral relationship. Reaching concrete agreements is not essential, but certainly desirable; if there is a possibility for progress in any part of our relations, we will be prepared to seize it.

Specific Issues

Shevardnadze may not be prepared to address individual issues in detail, and you may wish to use the "headline" approach to cover much material quickly. Consistent with EUR's summit strategy memo, I suggest you take the following approach:

A. Arms Control - Geneva Talks: The second round has closed with the Soviets maintaining their tight linkage of an agreement on offensive arms to US renunciation of SDI, and zero flexibility on INF. However, they have presented some new ideas in the START group (informal suggestions about the possibility of percentage reductions and limits on strategic arms -- an idea in the direction of the "common framework" concept). Both their linkages and tactic of refusing to discuss specifics are hampering progress, and you should chide Shevardnadze for his negotiators' tactics. If the occasion presents itself, you could probe Shevardnadze on the new Soviet START "model" with specific questions designed to clarify the impact Soviet proposals would have on strategic forces. Similarly, you should be alert for hints at a softening in Soviet opposition to SDI research.

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B. Other Arms Control: Four topics are worth touching on:

-- On the Stockholm CDE, you should reiterate the point you made to Dobrynin that we should begin drafting a concluding document combining concrete CBMs with political understandings on non-use of force. We would also want to try for agreed elements to put in a summit communique. Goodby has accepted his counterpart's invitation to visit Moscow at the beginning of September, and that would be the time to explore how to proceed when the CDE reconvenes later in September.

-- On nuclear non-proliferation, you should ask whether the Soviets are prepared to make a joint statement as Dick Kennedy proposed in April. On July 26, I gave Oleg Sokolov a draft statement (prepared by Dick Kennedy and ACDA) and said you would ask for Shevardnadze's agreement to two procedures -- a joint statement to be issued with the Soviets before the NPT Review Conference on August 27, and a reference in the summit communique to US-Soviet cooperation on non-proliferation.

-- On chemical weapons, it would be useful to try out again with the new Soviet leadership our proposals: to observe the destruction of our CW stockpiles and to send a team to Moscow to discuss the use of CW in Iran-Iraq and the more general question of CW proliferation.

-- On nuclear testing: As of July 27, it is still up in the air whether the President's letter to Gorbachev (which includes his unilateral offer to send a team to the Nevada Test Site to measure a nuclear test) will be sent before your meeting with Shevardnadze. If it is sent, you will want to ask Shevardnadze for a response to the President's unilateral offer. If it is not sent, it might be available for you to hand over or you may to tender the invitation orally in Helsinki. In any event, you can renew your earlier proposal to Dobrynin and Gromyko for a side understanding involving reciprocal calibration tests which would allow us to move towards ratification of the TTBT and the PNE Treaty.

C. Regional Dialogue: You should say that we found the recent regional talks on southern Africa and Afghanistan useful for clarifying positions, but were disappointed at the lack of Soviet readiness to tackle central issues. With respect to Afghanistan, you might say that, while we continue to seek a settlement in which Soviet interests are respected and are prepared to discuss guarantees of an eventual solution, the Soviets are at war with the Afghan people and that pressure on

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Pakistan is thus both inappropriate and unacceptable to us. You told Dobrynin July 3 that your meeting in Helsinki might well be the time to agree to a round on East Asia. You will also want to raise Cambodia, Vietnam and any other issues you have promised our friends in the region that you will discuss with Shevardnadze.

D. Human Rights: Shevardnadze may take the Gorbachev approach (hit back hard when the subject comes up) rather than Gromyko's (refusal to discuss it at all). While we don't want to get into sterile polemics, you may be able to turn his willingness to talk into a dialogue on our concerns. And you should stress that some steps on human rights are a key element for us in the summit.

You should explain our overall approach on human rights: no desire to intervene in Soviet internal affairs or to do anything against their laws, but there are practical steps they could take. Progress on human rights should be part of the preparatory work for the summit, and that steps by the Soviet side leading up to the summit will improve the atmosphere for the meeting. You should focus on clearing the decks of longstanding divided-spouse and dual-national cases and making headway on Jewish emigration. You can also refer to your Helsinki speech, in which you mention other prominent cases such as the Sakharovs and Shcharanskiy.

E. Bilateral Issues: This is the area where progress, even if modest, seems most likely. The key issues are:

-- Steps in Economic Relations: You should refer to Baldrige visit follow-up, noting our efforts to lift furskin embargo and need for Soviets to give US firms a better break in contracts, and encourage him to focus on further steps. You should also point out importance of Soviets fulfilling wheat purchase obligations.

-- Pacific Air Safety Measures and Civil Aviation: We reached agreement over the weekend on language for the Northern Pacific Air Safety talks in the third round of talks at Tokyo. You should suggest that, in light of this agreement and the status of the Aeroflot-Pan Am talks, discussions on resumption of direct air service begin in Washington in early September.

-- Consulates in Kiev and New York: You should suggest both sides prepare to announce this at the summit.

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-- Maritime Boundary Talks. You should tell Shevardnadze we are prepared for another round of discussions on maritime boundaries off Alaska.

-- Exchange Agreement Negotiations: This is something to wrap up in the next few weeks for signature at the summit. You stressed to Dobrynin July 3 that TV appearances are important (at Charlie Wick's request, the NSC has asked you to raise this with Shevardnadze). Exhibits at least at previous levels are essential. You should urge Shevardnadze to get his negotiators to move promptly through remaining issues.

-- Reinvigorating bilateral agreements: You can note that we have had joint commission meetings on trade and agriculture and our satisfaction that HUD Secretary Pierce, Agriculture Secretary Brock, and EPA Administrator Thomas will visit Moscow in the coming months. You may also suggest renewal of our maritime boundary talks.

-- Space Cooperation. You should propose bilateral discussions on space cooperation; we would like to talk about space rescue but are prepared to renegotiate our general space agreement.

-- Terrorism: If time and circumstances permit, you could attempt a dialogue with Shevardnadze on this subject. Contingency talking points are at Tab 15, but are not in the summary talking points.

F. Summit Modalities: You will want to get Shevardnadze's agreement to a neutral meeting site for the President and Gorbachev (our Advance Team found both the U.S. and Soviet missions unsatisfactory). The Soviets are more likely to cooperate in this if you cast the idea for a neutral site as a Swiss suggestion. In addition, you will want to nail down our preferred schedule of social events -- that the US and Soviets each host a small dinner and the Swiss a large reception for both delegations at the conclusion of the meetings. You should also propose an early meeting between U.S. and Soviet officials to begin logistical preparations for the summit.

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SUBJECT: CODEL LOWERY: MEETING WITH PRESIDENT ORTEGA

1. SUMMARY: CODEL LOWERY MET WITH PRESIDENT DANIEL ORTEGA ON AUGUST 28. THE MEETING FOCUSED ON THE ISSUES OF CONTADORA AND INTERNAL DIALOGUE AND ALSO TOUCHED ON THE CODEL'S CONCERNS ABOUT THE NICARAGUAN EDUCATION SYSTEM AND THE DEFINITION OF NON-ALIGNMENT. THE TENOR OF THE MEETING WAS FRIENDLY; ORTEGA WAS RELAXED AND ACTUALLY LAUGHED A FEW TIMES. STILL, HE DID NOT RELAX TO THE POINT OF DEVIATING FROM HIS BASIC THEME OF U.S. AGGRESSION AS THE CAUSE OF ALL NICARAGUA'S WOES. END SUMMARY

2. CODEL LOWERY MET WITH PRESIDENT DANIEL ORTEGA IN A ONE AND ONE-HALF HOUR SESSION THAT INCLUDED VICE MINISTER NORA ASTORGA AND SAUL ARANA OF THE NORTH AMERICA DESK, BOTH FROM THE FOREIGN MINISTRY; AND REP. WILLIAM LOWERY (R-CA), REP. VIC FAZIO (D-CA), AND SIX MEMBERS OF THE CODEL GROUP. ORTEGA WAS UNUSUALLY RELAXED AND HUMOROUS. HE RESPONDED TO THE CONGRESSMEN'S PROMPTING ABOUT HIS POLITICAL ROOTS BY TELLING OF THE POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE IN HIS HOME

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WHEN HE WAS A CHILD, HOW HIS PARENTS HAD ALWAYS OPPOSED SOMOZA AND

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ADMIRER SANDINO. HE SAID THAT HE HAD PARTICIPATED IN DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST SOMOZA EVEN AS A YOUTH AND HAD LEARNED TO HATE ALL AMERICANS EXCEPT BASEBALL PLAYERS; "THEY WERE THE ONLY ONES I LIKED" ONCE HE WAS INVOLVED IN A DEMONSTRATION NEAR THE MAIN CATHEDRAL WHEN THE NATIONAL GUARD CAME AND BROKE UP THE GROUP WITH TEAR GAS AND RIOT BATONS. THEY STARTED SHOOTING, ORTEGA SAID, AND SOME OF THE DEMONSTRATORS FLED INTO THE CATHEDRAL. THERE THEY INTERRUPTED A WEDDING BETWEEN A NICARAGUAN GIRL AND AN AMERICAN. "HE MUST HAVE BEEN A CADET IN ONE OF THESE AMERICAN MILITARY SCHOOLS," ORTEGA SAID. "BECAUSE HE WAS WEARING ONE OF THOSE UNIFORMS. WE SHOUTED, 'YOU'RE A MARINE*' AND ALL OF US JUMPED HIM'." WITH A NOSTALGIC SMILE ORTEGA NOTED THAT THE GENERAL ANTI-AMERICAN SENTIMENT IN NICARAGUA HAS DISAPPEARED AND HAS BECOME FOCUSED ON THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT INSTEAD. "(NICARAGUANS) HAVE LEARNED TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE," HE SAID.

3. THE REVOLUTIONARIES INITIALLY HAD HIGH EXPECTATIONS FOR QUICK MOVEMENT TO SOLVE PRESSING SOCIAL PROBLEMS, ORTEGA SAID, TURNING SERIOUS. THE THEN GRN TRIED TO COMBINE ALL SECTORS OF THE SOCIETY TO WORK TO ACHIEVE THE INITIAL GOALS. THE REVOLUTION'S IDEOLOGY WAS BASED ON NICARAGUA'S HISTORIC ROOTS. ITS LEADERS SOUGHT AN HISTORIC RECONCILIATION WITH THE U.S. AND WITH CARTER AS PRESIDENT THE GOAL OF AMERICAN-NICARAGUAN COOPERATION SEEMED POSSIBLE. "MAYBE OUR VISION WAS TOO ROMANTIC," ORTEGA SAID. WHEN THE SANDINISTAS ANNOUNCED ON AUGUST 22, 1980 THAT ELECTIONS WOULD BE HELD IN 1985, "WE EXPECTED TO HAVE ACHIEVED ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVITALIZATION" BY THAT TIME. UNFORTUNATELY, ORTEGA CONTINUED, SOME SECTORS OF THE SOCIETY REFUSED TO COOPERATE. HOWEVER, HE CLAIMED THAT "CRITICISM WAS ALWAYS CIVILIZED" UNTIL THE ADVENT OF THE ARMED OPPOSITION.

4. ORTEGA STRESSED THE GON'S WILLINGNESS TO CONTINUE THE EFFORTS

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AT INTERNAL DIALOGUE. HE REFERRED TO THE TELEVISED MEETING WITH COSEP AND OTHER OPPOSITION GROUPS IN FEBRUARY AS A STEP ON THE GOVERNMENT'S PART TOWARDS RECONCILIATION. HOWEVER, HE HARSHLY CRITICIZED THE OPPOSITION FOR REFUSING TO PARTICIPATE FULLY IN THE CONSTITUTION-WRITING PROCESS. ALL THESE MEETINGS FAIL, ORTEGA CLAIMED BECAUSE THE U.S. IS FUNDING THE COUNTERREVOLUTIONARIES

UNTIL THE INTERNAL OPPOSITION IS CONVINCED THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT CANNOT DEFEAT THE REVOLUTION, IT WILL CONTINUE TO WAIT FOR THE BIG CHANGE INSTEAD OF PARTICIPATING IN REAL EFFORTS TO

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SOLVE NICARAGUA'S PROBLEMS. THUS, ORTEGA MAINTAINED, THE GON LABORS UNDER A SET OF ARTIFICIAL CONDITIONS. "THE CONTRA IS AN ARTIFICIAL FORCE," HE SAID. HE STATED THAT IT IS NOW CLEAR THAT THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WAS VIOLATING THE BOLAND AMENDMENT AND THAT THE CONTRAS NEVER STOPPED RECEIVING OUTSIDE FUNDS. THE CONTINUED POLITICAL SUPPORT OF THE USG WAS FAR MORE IMPORTANT TO THEM THAN ANY AMOUNT OF MONEY, ORTEGA INSISTED.

5. PRESIDENT ORTEGA EXPRESSED HOPE FOR MOVEMENT ON CONTADORA NOW THAT FOUR ADDITIONAL LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES HAVE JOINED THE GROUP. HE REITERATED THE WHOLE TALE OF NEGOTIATIONS, ACCEPTANCES, AND REFUSALS IN CONTADORA AND ACCUSED THE U.S. OF BLOCKING PROGRESS. CARTEGENA, HE SAID, "HAS TO MAKE THE U.S. REFLECT" ON ITS POSITION. HE CLAIMED THAT THE SEPTEMBER DRAFT ACCEPTED BY THE GON ALREADY CONTAINS VERIFICATION PROCEDURES. WHEN CHALLENGED ON THE ISSUE OF ARMS TO EL SALVADOR AND SUBSEQUENT FEARS ON THE PART OF NEIGHBORING GOVERNMENTS, ORTEGA STATED THAT "REVOLUTION CAN NOT BE EXPORTED." THE CONDITIONS FOR REVOLUTION MUST EXIST IN ORDER FOR REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS TO FORM. IF THE U.S. HAD PROMOTED DEMOCRATIC REGIMES IN CENTRAL AMERICA, HE ADDED, NICARAGUA WOULD NEVER HAVE HAD A REVOLUTION. IN CONCLUSION ORTEGA REPEATED THE GON'S DESIRE TO WORK WITH ALL LATIN AMERICA FOR A NEW RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES.

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6. SEVERAL OF THE MEMBERS OF THE CODEL ASKED ORTEGA ABOUT THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM IN NICARAGUA. THEIR CONCERNS INCLUDED THE STRICT GOVERNMENT CURRICULUM AND PARTICULARLY CONTROLS ON RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS. ORTEGA RESPONDED THAT NICARAGUA'S EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM HAD BEEN INSPIRED BY THE EXPERIENCE OF MEXICO AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL LEADERS. HE DENIED THAT THE GON PLACED ANY RESTRICTIONS ON CHILDREN'S EDUCATION AND NOTED THAT MANY YOUNG PEOPLE STUDY ABROAD, JUST AS THEY DID BEFORE THE REVOLUTION. IF IN TODAY'S CLASSROOMS SOMOZA IS A BANDIT AND SANDINO IS A SAINT, HE SAID, THAT IS NO WORSE THAN WHEN SOMOZA'S TEXTBOOKS CHARACTERIZED SANDINO AS A BANDIT AND SOMOZA AS A SAINT. OTHER CONCERNS HE EXCUSED AS A FUNCTION OF THE "DIFFICULT SITUATION" AND THE NEED FOR EXCEPTIONAL MEASURES IN THE FACE OF THE U.S. AGGRESSION.

7. ANOTHER POINT THE CODEL EMPHASIZED WAS THE GON'S CLAIM TO NO-ALIGNMENT. ORTEGA LISTED CANADA, SPAIN, SWEDEN, AND FRANCE AS AMONG THE MANY WESTERN NATIONS HAVING GOOD RELATIONS WITH NICARAGUA. HE CITED DONATIONS AND TRADE WITH THESE AND OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES AS EVIDENCE THAT THE GON IS SEEKING A TRULY BALANCED INTERNATIONAL POLICY. "WE ALSO WANT GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE U.S.," HE

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SAID, NOTING THAT THE U.S. IS THE NEAREST BIG MARKET FOR NICARAGUA'S TRADITIONAL EXPORTS. FURTHERMORE, HE SAID, IF NICARAGUA WERE REALLY

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ALIGNED WITH THE SOVIET BLOC, THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT DARE TO INTERVENE AS IT HAS OR SUPPORT THE COUNTERREVOLUTIONARIES. ORTEGA DISMISSED THE U.S. TRADE EMBARGO, SAYING THAT NICARAGUA HAD EASILY SUCCEEDED IN REROUTING ITS EXPORTS TO OTHER COUNTRIES. HE SPECIFICALLY CITED SALES OF BANANAS TO BELGIUM AND AN UPCOMING SALE OF SUGAR TO IRAN.

8. THE MEETING CLOSED ON A CORDIAL NOTE.
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, EAID, OREP, NU

SUBJ: CODEL LEAHY'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT ORTEGA

1. ~~(S)~~ SUMMARY: SENATORS LEAHY, LEVIN AND BINGAMAN HELD A WIDE RANGING MEETING APRIL 15 WITH NICARAGUAN PRESIDENT DANIEL ORTEGA. THE MEETING TOUCHED ON THE GON'S RESPONSE TO REAGAN'S PEACE PLAN, GON SUPPORT FOR THE SALVADORAN GUERRILLAS, THE GON'S INCREASING RELIANCE ON THE EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES FOR AID AND ORTEGA'S VIEWS OF THE FUTURE OF US/GON RELATIONS. ORTEGA REJECTED THE PRESIDENT'S PEACE PLAN AND GAVE A LONG DISCOURSE ON THE HISTORY OF THE MANZANILLO TALKS. ORTEGA STATED SEVERAL TIMES THAT THE GON DID NOT GIVE AID AND SUPPORT TO THE SALVADORAN GUERRILLAS AND SAID THAT THERE WERE NO GUERRILLA LEADERS, COMMAND AND CONTROL CENTERS OR REBEL RADIO STATIONS IN NICARAGUA. HE ADMITTED THAT IN THE PAST THERE HAD BEEN A "FEW ISOLATED INCIDENTS" OF SALVADORAN GUERRILLA USE OF NICARAGUAN TERRITORY BUT CLAIMED THAT THE GON HAD NOT BEEN INVOLVED AND WORKED TO HALT SUCH INCIDENTS. ORTEGA SPOKE OF NICARAGUA'S WORSENING ECONOMY AND SAID AMERICAN BLOCKING OF THE USDOLS 58 MILLION IDB LOAN WOULD REQUIRE THE GON TO LOOK ELSEWHERE

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FOR ASSISTANCE. ORTEGA SAID THAT THE CONGRESSIONAL VOTE REGARDING THE 14 MILLION DOLLARS IN AID FOR THE CONTRAS WOULD BE AN IMPORTANT DETERMINANT IN THE FUTURE OF US/NICARAGUAN RELATIONS. END SUMMARY

2. ~~(S)~~ A CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION COMPOSED OF SENATORS LEAHY, LEVIN AND BINGAMAN HELD A WIDE RANGING TALK WITH NICARAGUAN PRESIDENT DANIEL ORTEGA APRIL 15. THE SENATORS ASKED ORTEGA HOW HE VIEWED PRESIDENT REAGAN'S

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PEACE PROPOSAL. ORTEGA RESPONDED THAT IT WAS NOT A PROPOSAL BUT RATHER AN ULTIMATUM, "DIRECTED NOT TO THE PROBLEMS OF LATIN AMERICA BUT MORE TO THE U.S. CONGRESS." ORTEGA SAID THAT HE BELIEVED THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN "STILL CLINGS TO THE IDEA OF A MILITARY SOLUTION" IN NICARAGUA. WHEN ASKED IF HE THOUGHT THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION WAS INTERESTED IN A NEGOTIATED POLITICAL SOLUTION, ORTEGA REPLIED WITH A LENGTHY DISCOURSE ON THE GON'S VERSION OF THE HISTORY OF THE MANZANILLO TALKS. ORTEGA SAID THAT THROUGHOUT THE FIRST SIX MEETINGS IN MANZANILLO THE USG MAINTAINED THAT THE TALKS SHOULD SUPPORT THE CONTADORA PROCESS WHILE THE GON BELIEVED THAT IF THERE WERE PROGRESS IN THE BILATERAL TALKS, THEN THAT PROGRESS WOULD BE BENEFICIAL TO CONTADORA. ORTEGA SAID THAT AFTER THE SIXTH MEETING, AFTER THE GON STATED THAT IT WOULD ACCEPT THE CONTADORA DRAFT AS IT WAS, THE USG POSITION CHANGED, "BECAUSE AMBASSADOR SHLAUDEMAN HAD BEEN SURPRISED" BY THE GON'S MOVE. ORTEGA SAID THAT THE USG THEN BEGAN TO DISCUSS SPECIFIC DEFENSE MATTERS SUCH AS THE REMOVAL OF FOREIGN MILITARY ADVISORS AND ARMS CONTROL. ORTEGA STATED THAT THE GON WAS AND CONTINUED TO BE INTERESTED MORE IN MUTUAL SECURITY.

3. (A) ORTEGA CLAIMED THAT IF THERE HAD BEEN EVEN "MINIMAL
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PROGRESS" AT MANZANILLO, THE GON WOULD HAVE THEN PRESENTED THAT TO THE CONTADORA GROUP. HE STATED THAT THE USG WAS THEREFORE CONTINUING TO "SABOTAGE" THE CONTADORA PROCESS. HE SAID THAT AT THE CONTADORA MEETING IN PANAMA APRIL 11-12 THE GON HAD SAID THAT IT WOULD ACCEPT THE VERIFICATION AND CONTROL PROPOSALS. HE SAID THAT THEN THE REPRESENTATIVES OF COSTA RICA, EL SALVADOR AND HONDURAS "CYNICALLY PRESENTED THEIR PROPOSAL" SAYING THAT THEY AGREED WITH THE GON. HE IMPLIED THAT THIS SHOWED THAT THE USG WAS NOT INTERESTED IN SEEING PROGRESS IN CONTADORA. HE MAINTAINED THAT GON APPROVAL OF THE CONTADORA ACTA WOULD PLACE THE GON IN A "PRECARIOUS POSITION" SINCE THE OTHER CENTRAL AMERICAN STATES WOULD STILL

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BE ABLE TO CALL ON THE USG FOR MILITARY SUPPORT WHILE
THE GON WOULD HAVE TO RELY ON "THE GOOD FAITH OF ITS
NEIGHBORS FOR ITS SECURITY."

4. (C) SENATOR LEAHY ASKED ORTEGA WHAT THE GON WOULD OFFER
AS A COUNTER-PROPOSAL TO THE REAGAN PLAN. ORTEGA
RESPONDED THAT THE GON "WAS WILLING TO TALK ABOUT ANY-
THING" BUT THAT ITS MAIN CONCERN WAS FOR ITS SECURITY.
ORTEGA STATED THAT THE GON "MAY BE WILLING TO DISCUSS
THE SUPPORT THAT SOME CENTRAL AMERICAN COUNTRIES MAY
BE GIVING TO GUERRILLA GROUPS." SENATOR LEAHY ASKED WHAT
THE GOVERNMENTS OF NICARAGUA, THE SOVIET UNION AND CUBA WOULD
DO IF THE USG TOOK A "HANDS OFF" POSITION REGARDING
NICARAGUA. ORTEGA RESTATED THE GON'S WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS
ALL MATTERS AND MENTIONED THE POSSIBLE REMOVAL OF FOREIGN
MILITARY ADVISORS.

5. (C) SENATOR LEVIN ASKED ORTEGA WHETHER NICARAGUAN AID
WAS NECESSARY FOR THE SALVADORAN GUERRILLAS. ORTEGA
SAID THAT IN HIS OPINION THERE WOULD STILL BE A SALVADORAN
CONFLICT EVEN IF THERE WERE NO REVOLUTION IN NICARAGUA.
HE SAID THAT THE "BEST WEAPON WE HAVE SUPPLIED THE SALVADORANS
HAS BEEN THE EXAMPLE OF OUR REVOLUTION." HE ASSURED
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THE SENATORS THAT "THE SALVADORAN GUERRILLAS HAVE NOT
DEPENDED UPON NICARAGUAN LOGISTICAL SUPPORT." HE
CLAIMED THAT GON SUPPORT OF THE SALVADORAN GUERRILLAS
DID NOT EXIST, ADDING THAT THE GULF OF FONSECA WAS
COMPLETELY BLOCKADED. HE STATED THAT NO BOATS LEAVE
NICARAGUA FOR EL SALVADOR AND THAT THE GON WAS NOT
INVOLVED IN THE TRAINING OR SUPPORT OF THE SALVADORAN
GUERRILLAS. HE SAID THAT THERE WERE NO SALVADORAN
GUERRILLA MILITARY OR POLITICAL LEADERS IN NICARAGUA AND

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THAT THERE WERE NO COMMAND AND CONTROL CENTERS OR REBEL RADIO STATIONS IN THE COUNTRY. HE SAID AT TIMES SOME GUERRILLA LEADERS TRANSIT NICARAGUA, THE SAME AS THEY DO IN COSTA RICA AND PANAMA, AMONG OTHERS." ORTEGA DID SAY THAT "IN THE PAST THERE WERE SOME ISOLATED INCIDENTS IN WHICH SALVADORAN GUERRILLAS HAD USED NICARAGUAN TERRITORY BUT THAT IT HAD BEEN WITHOUT THE GON'S KNOWLEDGE OR ASSISTANCE." HE CLAIMED THAT THE GON HAD STOPPED SUCH INCIDENTS. LATER ORTEGA MODIFIED THIS STATEMENT A BIT UPON FURTHER QUESTIONING WHEN HE SAID THAT "THERE MAY STILL BE SOME ISOLATED CASES OF SALVADORAN GUERRILLA USE OF NICARAGUAN TERRITORY BUT THERE IS NOTHING ORGANIZED BY THE GON, NOTHING SIGNIFICANT, NOTHING WHICH COMPARES TO THE USG AID TO THE CONTRAS." ORTEGA SAID THAT HE "COMPLETELY OPPOSED" THE USE OF NICARAGUAN TERRITORY BY SALVADORAN GUERRILLAS. HE SAID THE USG NO LONGER RAISED THE ISSUE OF NICARAGUAN SUPPORT FOR THE SALVADORAN GUERRILLAS, MENTIONING ASSISTANT SECRETARY MOTLEY AND AMBASSADOR SHLAUDEMAN AS TWO WHO WERE QUIET ON THIS ISSUE.

6. (C) SENATOR BINGAMAN ASKED ORTEGA ABOUT NICARAGUA'S WORSENING ECONOMY, NOTING THAT THE GON APPEARED TO BE INCREASINGLY DEPENDENT UPON SOVIET AND EASTERN EUROPEAN
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ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE. ORTEGA ADMITTED THAT THE COUNTRY FACED SERIOUS ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, MANY OF WHICH ALSO CONFRONTED OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES. HE NOTED THAT INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AUSTERITY MEASURES HAD CAUSED A NUMBER OF DEATHS AND CONSIDERABLE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS IN SEVERAL COUNTRIES RECENTLY. ORTEGA EXPLAINED THAT TO THESE REGIONAL ECONOMIC PROBLEMS FACING NICARAGUA, MILITARY AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS HAD BEEN ADDED. ORTEGA SAID THE GON WAS GRATEFUL TO THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER NATIONS WHO WERE ASSISTING NICARAGUA IN ITS TIME OF NEED. HE SAID THAT WHEN THE U.S. SUGAR QUOTA WAS REDUCED THE GON WAS ABLE TO SELL THE DIFFERENCE TO IRAN AND ALGERIA. HE SAID THE USSR RESPONDED TO GON NEEDS WHEN THE U.S. CUT OFF WHEAT AND COOKING OIL ASSISTANCE, AND THAT THE USSR HAD REPLACED THE OIL DESTROYED BY CONTRA ATTACKS. ORTEGA SAID HIS GOVERNMENT WAS GRATEFUL FOR THIS ASSISTANCE, BUT COULD NOT BE GRATEFUL TO THE USG FOR ITS LACK OF ASSISTANCE. ORTEGA SAID THAT THE BLOCKING OF THE

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58 MILLION DOLLAR IDB LOAN WOULD REQUIRE THE GON TO ONCE AGAIN SEEK ALTERNATIVE ASSISTANCE, BUT HE HOPED THAT ONE DAY THERE WOULD BE NORMAL TRADE RELATIONS BETWEEN HIS COUNTRY AND THE UNITED STATES AND PERHAPS EVEN ASSISTANCE.

7. (C) ORTEGA WAS ASKED IF HE WAS A MARXIST-LENINIST. HE REPLIED THAT THE FSLN'S IDEOLOGY WAS BASED PRIMARILY ON NICARAGUA'S HISTORY BUT ADDED THAT "HISTORY IS NOT ISOLATED FROM WORLD THOUGHT." HE SAID THAT THE FSLN HAD TAKEN THINGS FROM THE AMERICAN, FRENCH AND SOVIET REVOLUTIONS. HE SAID THAT THE FSLN'S IDEOLOGY MIXED "MODERN CHRISTIANITY AND MARXISM-LENINISM WITH SANDINO'S IDEAS."

8. (C) IN CONCLUDING THE MEETING SENATOR BINGAMAN ASKED ORTEGA HOW HE VIEWED US/GON RELATIONS TWO YEARS HENCE. ORTEGA SAID THAT IT WAS A VERY DIFFICULT QUESTION TO ANSWER BUT SAID THAT THE CONGRESSIONAL VOTE ON THE 14 MILLION DOLLARS TO THE CONTRAS WOULD BE IMPORTANT. HE SAID THAT IF THE FUNDING WERE DENIED THEN PRESIDENT REAGAN WOULD HAVE TO "SEARCH FOR JUST AND REASONABLE SOLUTIONS" TO THE AREA'S PROBLEMS. IF THE MONEY WERE APPROVED THEN "THE DOOR WOULD BE OPENED FOR A DIRECT U.S.

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MILITARY INTERVENTION." HE SAID THAT THE GON HAD, SINCE 1979, BEEN LOOKING FOR PEACEFUL SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS CONFRONTING THE USG AND THE GON AND THAT THE GON WOULD STILL LIKE TO HAVE GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE USG. HE STATED THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO CHANGE U.S. POLICY TOWARD LATIN AMERICA BUT SEEMED TO WANT TO RATIFY AND CONTINUE ALL OF THE "OLD U.S. POLICIES IN THE AREA."
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MESSAGE TO THE AMERICAN AND SOVIET PEOPLES

Good Evening:

Today in Washington General Secretary Gorbachev and I began meetings with two purposes in mind: to sign the agreement we have reached eliminating intermediate-range nuclear missiles, and to discuss the broad range of other issues that face our two nations.

I would like to reflect for a moment on how far we have come and where we are headed, because we are at an important turning point. It has taken us a long time to reach the agreement we signed earlier today. There are reasons for this. A Russian proverb says, "measure seven times, but cut the cloth just once."

The people of my generation have seen an amazing parade of changes in our lifetime. Airplanes -- once held together with thin metal wire -- have given way to huge, graceful ships of the air which can carry hundreds of people in comfort. Great spaceships have spanned the solar system and taken some members of our global community to the moon. As I speak, the tiny Voyager spacecraft carries our global message to distant galaxies while cosmonauts set new standards of human endurance.

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When you reach my age, you find you have seen so much change that nothing seems outside the realm of possibility -- given the will of the human spirit to move forward.

The people of my generation have also seen changes for the worse. The human species has applied its technical and innovative energy to human conflict as well. Wars are raging right now in distant lands -- Angola, Cambodia, Afghanistan. The violence and horror increase with each passing year. While babies starve in Ethiopia, the very food that would save their lives is destroyed by internal divisions and continuing strife.

Indeed, our capacity to destroy each other now spans the globe. We all live under a threat of nuclear destruction that is too terrible to contemplate and too real to ignore. Must we accept this state of affairs indefinitely?

Surely the human species, which has developed these awesome weapons, can apply its intellect and collective wisdom to eliminating this threat. I think we can. I think we must.

The United States and the Soviet Union have different histories, social and legal systems, religions, and world-views. We have political differences that are not changed by the signing of any agreement. But in today's world, our two nations, and all others, have to learn to live together as harmoniously as we can on the one planet we share.

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We are all members of a remarkable, talented species: humankind. Our common heritage includes the poetry of Pushkin and Walt Whitman, the music of Tchaikovsky and Gershwin, the dance artistry of Nijinsky and Martha Graham. The same creative energy that produced this heritage should be able to find ways of preserving it.

Our two great and talented nations together wield great power: power that can be used for constructive purposes and power that can be unleashed to destroy. Today we have agreed to put aside a small portion of the power we have to destroy. It is only a small step, but it points in the direction of further steps toward the goal of a safer and more stable world.

When the General Secretary and I signed our names, committing our nations to comply with the terms of the Treaty on Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces, we took a step in this direction.

We signed an historic agreement to eliminate an entire class of nuclear missiles. This agreement is the first in human history that actually reduces the nuclear threat. All the agreements of the past decades -- well-intentioned as they were -- were flawed because, without exception, they simply limited future increases in the numbers of nuclear weapons.

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As we have seen over the decades this approach held little promise for major change. It did not stop the arms race; it did not reduce the threat; it did not make our world safer. With each successive agreement, more and more weapons were deployed and the threat grew larger.

No agreement does everything. But we have now embarked in a new direction. Today General Secretary Gorbachev and I took an historic step that points the way to the vital task that must follow -- deep, stabilizing reductions in the enormous long-range nuclear arsenals that could destroy life on this planet.

The Treaty on intermediate-range forces, then, is not an end, but a beginning. The United States and the Soviet Union will begin to dismantle the huge nuclear arsenals we have amassed over the last forty years -- the forty years that have gone by since we were allies in the struggle against Fascism. There are many weapons, so the process will not be a rapid one. Indeed, we must proceed with the greatest of caution when dealing with weapons that are at the heart of our security.

The Treaty eliminates a whole class of weapons -- and this is good. What it does not, indeed cannot, eliminate is the fundamental mistrust that led to the creation of those weapons.

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Many basic differences separate the Soviet Union from the democratic societies of this world. These cannot be wished away and will not disappear merely because a treaty has been signed.

To Soviet listeners, I want to say that, in recent months, we Americans have heard much about the changes we understand have been taking place in the Soviet Union. We have heard about the word -- "glasnost" -- that you use to describe greater public openness.

Does "glasnost" mean openness to the free flow of ideas, information, and people? These are worthwhile goals and we would welcome their becoming a part of Soviet society. They are not goals that are easily achieved and, once gained, they will have to be jealously protected, as they are in this country. We hope, for the sake of the peoples of the Soviet Union that such goals can be realized. We hope so for our own sake as well. True "openness" in the Soviet Union would not only benefit Soviet citizens but could lead to further positive developments in U.S.- Soviet relations and in the East-West political climate. "po-zhi-VYOM, oo-VEE-dyem" -- We shall see.

In the remaining days of his visit, General Secretary Gorbachev and I will review the entire, broad spectrum of

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U.S.-Soviet relations. Many issues are on the agenda in addition to arms control, and on some of them, unfortunately, we have not made as much progress as we would like. Our relationship needs greater trust and cooperation across the board in order to improve.

So we will talk about human rights: issues such as the freedom to travel and emigrate; about regional conflicts: Afghanistan, Iran-Iraq, southern Africa and Cambodia; and about our bilateral relations: exchanges of people and cultural values. We will also take time to discuss the world in a broader sense: the global developments that are transforming economic, political and security relations as we approach the next century. As President I plan to convey to the General Secretary the sincere goodwill of the American people toward the many nationalities and peoples of the Soviet Union.

The task before us will require determination and patience. We have many years of history to learn from. I do not suggest that that history be forgotten: it is instructive. There will no doubt be some setbacks along the way. But with unity of purpose and one eye on the future, I am confident we can make the world a better place.

Thank you and "dah-svee-DAH-nya vuh mosk-VYEH (see you in Moscow).

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DURING THE REAGAN-GORBACHEV SUMMIT ON REGIONAL ISSUES.

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ARE MEANT TO SUPPLEMENT THE OVERALL BRIEFING MATERIALS PROVIDED IN REFTEL. THESE TALKING POINTS REFLECT EXCHANGES BETWEEN THE TWO LEADERS, AS WELL AS DISCUSSIONS IN THE REGIONAL WORKING GROUP, CHAIRED BY S/P DIRECTOR RICHARD SOLOMON AND SOVIET IMEMO INSTITUTE DIRECTOR YEYGENNIY PRIMAKOV. EMBASSIES SHOULD DRAW ON THESE MATERIALS IN BRIEFING SENIOR HOST GOVERNMENTS ON THE HANDLING OF THE REGIONAL ASPECT OF THE U.S.-SOVIET AGENDA DURING THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT.

3. BEGIN TALKING POINTS:

REGIONAL ISSUES OVERVIEW

-- SINCE THE GENEVA SUMMIT, WE HAVE REGULARIZED THE DIALOGUE ON REGIONAL ISSUES, WITH FREQUENT DISCUSSIONS AT MANY LEVELS.

-- THERE WAS A LOT OF DISCUSSION WITH GORBACHEV, PARTICULARLY ON AFGHANISTAN AND IRAN/IRAQ; THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS, CAMBODIA, KOREA, SOUTHERN AFRICA, CENTRAL AMERICA WERE ALSO DISCUSSED BOTH BY LEADERS AND DURING SOME SIX HOURS OF DISCUSSIONS IN THE WORKING GROUP.

-- THIS WAS THE MOST REALISTIC AND CANDID REGIONAL DIALOGUE SO FAR.

-- WE ARE READY TO WORK WITH THE SOVIETS IN PRACTICAL WAYS TO HELP THE PARTIES TO REGIONAL CONFLICTS RESOLVE THEIR DIFFERENCES.

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AFGHANISTAN

-- THERE WAS A THOROUGH DISCUSSION OF AFGHANISTAN.

-- GORBACHEV INSISTED THAT A WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS FR AFGHANISTAN SHOULD BE LINKED TO A CESSATION OF "OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE." THE PRESIDENT, NOTING THAT THIS QUESTION HAS BEEN DEALT WITH IN THE GENEVA ACCORDS, REASSURED GORBACHEV THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL STAND BY THE COMMITMENTS IT HAS MADE CONNECTION WITH THE GENEVA PROCESS, PROVIDED THERE IS A

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SATISFACTORY TIMETABLE.

-- BASICALLY, EVERYTHING AT GENEVA HAS BEEN AGREED TO EXCEPT THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS. THIS REMAINS THE KEY TO A SUCCESSFUL SETTLEMENT.

-- THE SOVIETS MENTIONED NAJIBULLAH'S PROPOSAL FOR A TWELVE MONTH WITHDRAWAL TIMETABLE BUT DID NOT GET INTO DETAILS.

-- IT IS NOTEWORTHY THAT GORBACHEV STATED THAT FROM DAY ONE WITHDRAWAL, SOVIET TROOPS WOULD NO LONGER ENGAGE IN MILITARY OPERATIONS, EXCEPT IN SELF-DEFENSE.

-- EARLY IN HIS DISCUSSION WITH THE PRESIDENT, GORBACHEV HINTED THAT THERE STILL EXISTED LINKAGE OF SOVIET TROOP WITHDRAWAL TO NATIONAL RECONCILIATION.

-- WHEN PRESSED BY THE U.S. SIDE ON THIS ISSUE, THE SOVIETS FELL OFF SUCH A LINKAGE, AGREEING THAT TROOP WITHDRAWALS COULD START WITHOUT NATIONAL RECONCILIATION, SINCE THE LATTER WAS NOT AN EVENT BUT A PROCESS.

-- ALL IN ALL, THE SOVIETS DID NOT OFFER NEW IDEAS ON RESOLVING THE AFGHANISTAN CONFLICT DURING THE SUMMIT.

-- BUT THE NEXT GENEVA ROUND COULD BE CRITICAL IN DETERMINING
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HOW SERIOUS GORBACHEV IS ABOUT REACHING AN EARLY SETTLEMENT THAT WOULD IMPLEMENT THE DECISION, WHICH THE SOVIETS SAY HAS ALREADY BEEN TAKEN, TO WITHDRAW FROM AFGHANISTAN. WE WOULD LIKE THIS TO BE THE FINAL ROUND, BUT THAT DEPENDS ON THE SOVIETS.

-- WE WILL BE WATCHING IN GENEVA TO SEE IF THE SOVIETS PRODUCE A SATISFACTORY TIMETABLE FOR WITHDRAWING THEIR TROOPS DURING 1988.

IRAN/IRAQ

-- THIS WEEK, FOREIGN MINISTER AZIZ SAID THAT "IRAQ ACCEPTS RESOLUTION 598 IN ALL ITS PARTS."

-- THIS IS UNEQUIVOCAL AND UNAMBIGUOUS.

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-- BUT IRAN CONTINUES TO PLAY GAMES WITH THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL. THIS IS A DELIBERATE STRATEGY ON TEHRAN'S PART, AND THE SOVIETS SEEM TO RECOGNIZE THAT FACT.

-- DURING THE SUMMIT, THE SOVIETS AGAIN PUSHED US TO SUPPORT ESTABLISHMENT OF A UN FORCE IN THE GULF, WITHOUT PROVIDING A CONVINCING EXPLANATION OF THE PURPOSE OF SUCH A FORCE OR HOW ONE COULD OVERCOME THE MANY PRACTICAL AND POLITICAL OBSTACLE TO ITS CREATION.

-- THE PRESIDENT URGED GORBACHEV TO START WORK ON A SECOND SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION TO PUT TEETH INTO RESOLUTION 598 AND TO MAKE SUCH AN EFFORT PUBLICLY VISIBLE.

-- ALTHOUGH GORBACHEV STATED THAT THE POSSIBILITIES OF RESOLUTION 598 HAD NOT YET BEEN EXHAUSTED, THERE WERE SOME
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INDICATIONS THAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT BE WILLING TO START WORK SOON ON PREPARING AN ENFORCEMENT RESOLUTION.

-- WE WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR THIS. THE SECRETARY GENERAL SEEMED TO BE CALLING FOR THIS WHEN HE ASKED THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL GIVE A FRESH AND RESOLUTE IMPULSE TO IMPLEMENTATION 598.

-- THE SOVIETS WILL BE CHAIRING THE SECURITY COUNCIL THROUGH DECEMBER. THIS WILL GIVE THEM A UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY TO PLAY CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE AND SHOULD PROVIDE A REAL TEST OF SOVIET INTENTIONS.

MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

-- THE PEACE PROCESS WAS DISCUSSED BOTH BY THE TWO LEADERS IN THE REGIONAL WORKING GROUP.

-- AGAIN, VIGOROUS DISCUSSION BUT NOTHING NEW IN THE SOVIET POSITION.

-- BOTH SIDES AGREE THAT CONFLICT REMAINS DANGEROUS, AND THAT THERE ARE NEW THREATS TO REGIONAL STABILITY POSED BY THE RISE OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM, INCREASING DESTRUCTIVENESS OF MODERN WEAPONRY.

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-- BUT FUNDAMENTAL DISAGREEMENTS REMAIN ON PROCESS, CENTERING ON CONTINUING SOVIET OPPOSITION TO DIRECT BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS UNLESS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF A PLURIPARTY INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE.

-- THE SOVIETS ARGUED THAT EVEN SHOULD BILATERAL AGREEMENTS REACHED OUTSIDE THE CONTEXT OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, INSTANCE BETWEEN JORDAN AND ISRAEL, THEY WOULD BE "BLOWN UP" LIKE THE 1983 LEBANESE-ISRAELI AGREEMENT, BY THE PALESTINIANS, THE SYRIANS, "BY EVERYONE."

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-- THE U.S. STRESSED OUR WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER ALL OPTIONS BUT THAT AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE IS NOT AN END IN ITSELF ANY SUCH CONFERENCE MUST NOT HINDER BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS OR BE ALLOWED TO EXERCISE VETO POWER OVER BILATERAL AGREEMENTS.

-- THE U.S. URGED THAT BOTH SIDES WORK WITH THE REGIONAL PARTIES TO CREATE THE PROPER POLITICAL CONDITIONS TO MAKE NEGOTIATIONS POSSIBLE.

-- THE U.S. SIDE SPECIFICALLY ENCOURAGED MOSCOW TO RESTORE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL AND ADDRESS THE RELATED QUESTION OF JEWISH EMIGRATION.

-- THE SOVIET SIDE SAID THE SOVIET CONSULAR GROUP CURRENTLY ISRAEL MAINTAINS REGULAR POLITICAL CONTACTS WITH TEL AVIV AND THE SOVIETS INDICATED THAT THE ABSENCE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS SHOULD NOT CONTINUE INDEFINITELY, BUT GAVE NO FURTHER SPECIFICS.

KOREAN PENINSULA

-- THE U.S. EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF A SUCCESSFUL OLYMPICS IN 1988.

-- WHILE CONTINUING TO SUPPORT THE NORTH'S PROPOSALS ON EVENT-SHARING, THE SOVIETS AGREED ON THE IMPORTANCE OF SUPPORTING THE OLYMPIC MOVEMENT AND HINTED THEY ARE "95% READY TO ATTEND SEOUL GAMES. THEY SAID THE DECISION WILL BE MADE IN JANUARY, 1988, WHEN RESPONSES TO OLYMPIC INVITATIONS ARE DUE.

-- GORBACHEV TURNED ASIDE PRESIDENT REAGAN'S SUGGESTION THAT

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THE TWO SIDES INCLUDE AN EXPRESSION OF SUPPORT FOR THE OLYMPICS
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MOVEMENT IN THEIR JOINT STATEMENT.

-- THE U.S. EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER THE POSSIBILITY OF NORTH KOREAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE BOMBING OF THE KAL FLIGHT OVER THE THAI-BURMA BORDER. WE NOTED THAT THE EVIDENCE IS NOT DEFINITIVE, BUT ASKED THAT SOVIETS USE THEIR INFLUENCE TO URGE NORTH KOREAN RESTRAINT.

-- WHILE POINTING TO THE NORTH'S STATEMENT DENYING INVOLVEMENT, THE SOVIETS TOOK THE U.S. MESSAGE ON BOARD AND HINTED THAT SOVIET INFLUENCE WITH THE NORTH IS LIMITED.

CAMBODIA/VIETNAM

-- CAMBODIA WAS DISCUSSED BOTH BY PRESIDENT REAGAN AND GORBACHEV, AND WITHIN THE WORKING GROUP.

-- THE PRESIDENT STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF VIETNAMESE TROOP WITHDRAWAL FROM CAMBODIA TO POLITICAL SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT THERE.

-- HE ALSO TOLD GORBACHEV SOVIET SUPPORT FOR HANOI ALLOWED VIETNAM'S OCCUPATION OF CAMBODIA TO CONTINUE, AND URGED THAT MOSCOW USE ITS INFLUENCE WITH HANOI TO GET IT TO WITHDRAW ITS TROOPS.

-- GORBACHEV RESPONDED THAT VIETNAM HAD GIVEN THE SOVIETS ASSURANCES IT WILL WITHDRAW ITS FORCES FROM CAMBODIA BY 1990.

-- HE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF U.S. AND SOVIET SUPPORT IN PRINCIPLE FOR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT THERE.

-- GORBACHEV ALSO NOTED THAT CONTACTS HAD BEGUN BETWEEN PRINCE SIHANOUK AND "THE PEOPLE IN POWER" IN CAMBODIA; THEY HAD TALKS AND OTHER FORCES SHOULD BE BROUGHT IN.

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-- DURING THE SUMMIT, THE SOVIETS ALSO RAISED FAMILIAR

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CONCERNS OVER PREVENTING A RETURN TO POWER OF THE KHMER ROUGE AND SUGGESTED THAT THIS ISSUE MIGHT COMPLICATE VIETNAMESE IMPLEMENTATION OF THEIR PLEDGE TO WITHDRAW FROM CAMBODIA BY 1990.

-- THE SOVIETS ACKNOWLEDGED THEY ARE TALKING TO VIETNAM ABOUT A CAMBODIAN SETTLEMENT, AND CLAIMED THE NEW LEADERSHIP IN HANOI HAD REACHED "A NEW UNDERSTANDING" ON THE PROBLEM.

-- THE U.S. STRONGLY REAFFIRMED OUR SUPPORT FOR ASEAN'S POSITION ON CAMBODIA.

-- IN APPARENT ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF VIETNAMESE CONCERNS OVER SINO-SOVIET NORMALIZATION, THE SOVIETS SAID THEY KEEP HANOI INFORMED OF "ALL STEPS" TAKEN IN MOSCOW'S RELATIONSHIP WITH CHINA.

-- OVERALL, THE EXCHANGES REVEALED LITTLE NEW IN THE BASIC SOVIET POSITION; DESPITE AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE ON ACHIEVING POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, THE SOVIETS SHOWED NO GREATER SENSE OF URGENCY OVER PUSHING VIETNAM TO WITHDRAW ITS TROOPS AND TO TALK TO PRINCE SIHANOUK.

JAPAN

-- THE U.S. BRIEFLY NOTED THE DECEMBER 8 PENETRATION OF JAPANESE AIRSPACE BY SOVIET RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHT AS NOT CONDUCTIVE TO REDUCTION OF TENSIONS; THE SOVIETS DID NOT RESPOND.

-- THE U.S. ALSO URGED THAT THE SOVIETS DISCUSS WITH TOKYO JAPANESE CONCERNS OVER THE NORTHERN TERRITORIES; THE SOVIETS BRUSHED THE REQUEST ASIDE, CALLING THIS A BILATERAL

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SOVIET-JAPANESE MATTER.

SOUTHERN AFRICA

-- SOUTHERN AFRICA WAS RAISED DURING THE SUMMIT TALKS AND DISCUSSED EXTENSIVELY IN PRESUMMIT PREPARATIONS.

-- GORBACHEV DID NOT GET INTO DETAILS ON SOUTHERN AFRICA, OTHER THAN TO NOTE THAT THERE WERE NOW "GOOD OPPORTUNITIES" ACHIEVE A POLITICAL RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT.

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-- THE U.S. STRESSED THE URGENCY OF A COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT TO FACILITATE THE INDEPENDENCE OF NAMIBIA IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 435 AND THE RETURN OF ALL FOREIGN MILITARY FORCES IN NAMIBIA AND ANGOLA TO THEIR HOME COUNTRIES.

CENTRAL AMERICA

-- BOTH LEADERS EXPRESSED THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE GUATEMALA AGREEMENT.

-- GORBACHEV HINTED AMBIGUOUSLY AT SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO CEASE SUPPLY OF HEAVY MILITARY HARDWARE, AS A PRACTICAL MEASURE IN SUPPORT OF THE GUATEMALA AGREEMENT.

-- WHEN PRESIDENT REAGAN PRESSED HIM TO INCLUDE SUCH A PLEDGE IN THE JOINT U.S.-SOVIET STATEMENT, GORBACHEV DEMURRED.

-- THERE IS SIGNIFICANT VARIANCE BETWEEN GORBACHEV'S STATEMENTS AND SUBSEQUENT REVELATIONS BY MAJOR MIRANDA CONCERNING A PLAN CONCEIVED IN 1980 FOR AN UNPRECEDENTED NICARAGUAN MILITARY BUILD-UP.

-- THE U.S. WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS THE SOVIETS TO FOLLOW UP GORBACHEV'S COMMENTS WITH CONCRETE STEPS TO REDUCE THE SOVIET
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CONTRIBUTION TO THE SANDINISTA MILITARY BUILD UP.

-- THE U.S. ALSO STRESSED ITS SUPPORT FOR PEACE AND DEMOCRACY IN NICARAGUA, WHICH WILL ONLY BE POSSIBLE ONCE THE SANDINISTA EXTEND FULL POLITICAL RIGHTS TO THOSE WHO DISAGREE WITH THEM.

BERLIN

-- THE PRESIDENT URGED U.S.-SOVIET COOPERATION IN TAKING SMALL, PRACTICAL STEPS TO AMELIORATE THE DIVISION OF THE CITY AND TO SYMBOLIZE THE TWO SIDES' MUTUAL DESIRE TO OVERCOME THE DIVISION OF EUROPE IN A HUMANE AND STABILIZING WAY. HE SAID THE U.S., UK AND FRENCH WOULD BE SPELLING THIS PROPOSAL OUT IN GREATER DETAIL IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

-- GORBACHEV DID NOT RESPOND.

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SOUTH ASIAN NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

-- IN THE REGIONAL WORKING GROUP, THE U.S. BRIEFLY RAISED ITS CONCERNS OVER SOUTH ASIAN NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION. THERE WAS NOTHING NEW FROM THE SOVIET SIDE.

END TALKING POINTS.

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FOLLOWING SECTO 20004 DTD DEC 11, 1987 SENT ACTION
STATE BEING REPEATED FOR YOUR INFO:
QUOTE:
CONFIDENTIAL SECTO 20004

OPCENTER: PASS ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS (IMMEDIATE)

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
T/GS: NATO, NAC
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S 12/11 NAC BRIEFING ON
WASHINGTON SUMMIT

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. POSTS SHOULD DRAW AS APPROPRIATE ON FOLLOWING ACCOUNT
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OF SECRETARY'S DECEMBER 11 REPORT TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC

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COUNCIL IN BRIEFING HOST GOVERNMENTS ON THE DECEMBER 8-10 WASHINGTON SUMMIT.

3. THE SECRETARY BEGAN BY THANKING SECRETARY GENERAL CARRINGTON AND FOREIGN MINISTER POOS FOR THEIR INTRODUCTORY REMARKS (TO BE REPORTED SEPTEL TO NATO POSTS). IN THE DECEMBER 8-10 WASHINGTON SUMMIT, THE PRESIDENT HAD SET THE PACE -- LOTS OF SUBSTANCE AND ALMOST NO SMALL TALK. THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE INF TREATY SIGNING CEREMONY HAD GONE STRAIGHT FROM THAT TO A "SLEEVES-UP" MEETING ON REGIONAL ISSUES. THE TWO SIDES HAD WORKED ON START AND ABM TREATY ISSUES LITERALLY UP TO THE LAST MINUTE.

4. THE PRESIDENT AND GORBACHEV HAD FIVE WORKING SESSIONS, ALL VERY SUBSTANTIVE. THE FOUR-PART AGENDA WAS FULLY COVERED. THE SUPPORT WORK WAS ORGANIZED IN THE WAY THAT HAD PROVEN PRODUCTIVE IN EARLIER MEETINGS: A SMALL CENTRAL GROUP CHAIRED BY THE TWO MINISTERS, WITH TWO WORKING GROUPS: ONE ON ARMS CONTROL, CHAIRED BY AMB. NITZE AND MARSHAL AKHROMEYEV (CHIEF OF THE SOVIET GENERAL STAFF) AND ONE ON OTHER ISSUES (HUMAN RIGHTS, REGIONAL, AND BILATERAL), CHAIRED BY AMBASSADOR RIDGWAY AND DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER BESSMERTNYKH.

HUMAN RIGHTS

5. HUMAN RIGHTS IS AT THE TOP OF OUR AGENDA. THE PRESIDENT STARTED IN ON IT AT THE BEGINNING OF HIS FIRST MEETING WITH GORBACHEV. THE WORKING GROUP SPENT TWELVE HOURS ON HUMAN RIGHTS. THE U.S. APPROACH IS TO PUSH HARD BUT TO AVOID RAISING THE PUBLIC PROFILE OF PARTICULAR
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CASES. WE FIND THAT GETS BETTER RESULTS. GORBACHEV TOLD THE PRESIDENT HE APPRECIATED THIS APPROACH.

6. WE ARE INCREASINGLY SEEING SOVIET READINESS TO DISCUSS THIS SUBJECT. OUR DISCUSSION HAS BECOME SYSTEMATIZED. WE TALK ABOUT EVERYTHING: NAMES, LISTS OF CASES, SOVIET LAWS. GORBACHEV MADE CLEAR THAT THE SOVIETS WILL DISCUSS HUMAN RIGHTS ONLY ON A TWO-WAY BASIS: WE HAVE NO PROBLEM WITH THAT.

7. WE ARE GETTING A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE SOVIET

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BOTTOM LINE APPROACH. FOR INSTANCE, PAST SERVICE IN THE KGB, NO MATTER HOW LONG AGO, WILL ALWAYS BE A NEGATIVE CRITERION IN SOVIET DECISION-MAKING ON INDIVIDUAL CASES. THE SOVIETS CONTINUE TO APPLY THE STANDARD OF RESTRICTING EMIGRATION OF THOSE WITH ACCESS TO "STATE SECRETS" IN A VERY UNJUSTIFIABLE WAY. WHILE WE SEE CONTINUED PROGRESS ON GERMAN AND ARMENIAN EMIGRATION, WE SEE ONLY MODEST INCREASES IN JEWISH EMIGRATION.

8. THERE HAS BEEN PROGRESS IN INDIVIDUAL CASES, THOUGH MUCH MORE REMAINS TO BE DONE. WE ARE ALERT TO THE DANGER THAT ESTABLISHING A GOOD PROCESS IS NOT ENOUGH; WHAT COUNTS IS THE SUBSTANCE. THE SUMMIT JOINT STATEMENT HAS ONE SENTENCE ON OUR HUMAN RIGHTS EXCHANGES. THIS IS THE FIRST TIME THAT HUMAN RIGHTS AS A SUBJECT OF U.S./SOVIET DIALOGUE HAS BEEN SO ACKNOWLEDGED, DIRECTLY AND OPENLY.

REGIONAL ISSUES

9. SINCE THE 1985 GENEVA SUMMIT, WE HAVE INSTITUTIONALIZED THE DIALOGUE ON REGIONAL ISSUES, WITH FREQUENT DISCUSSIONS AT MANY LEVELS. THERE WAS A LOT OF DISCUSSION WITH GORBACHEV, PARTICULARLY ON AFGHANISTAN AND IRAN/IRAQ, AND SOME TEN HOURS IN THE WORKING GROUP.

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THIS WAS THE MOST PROBING, REALISTIC, AND CANDID REGIONAL DIALOGUE SO FAR. WE ARE READY TO WORK WITH THE SOVIETS IN PRACTICAL WAYS TO HELP THE PARTIES TO REGIONAL CONFLICTS RESOLVE THEIR DIFFERENCES.

. AFGHANISTAN

10. THERE WAS THOROUGH DISCUSSION OF AFGHANISTAN. WE SHALL SEE WHAT HAPPENS IN THE NEXT GENEVA ROUND. THE PRESIDENT REASSURED GORBACHEV THAT THE U.S. WILL STAND BY THE COMMITMENTS IT HAS MADE AT GENEVA. BASICALLY, EVERYTHING HAS BEEN AGREED EXCEPT THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS. THEY HAVE LINKED THIS TO THE IDEA THAT THERE MUST FIRST BE "NATIONAL RECONCILIATION." WE TOLD THEM THIS IS UNREALISTIC. WITH UP TO A THIRD OF THE POPULATION OUT OF THE COUNTRY, AND WITH THE FREEDOM

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FIGHTERS CLEARLY UNWILLING TO ACCEPT THE PRESENT REGIME. THIS SORT OF CONDITION IS A WAY OF SAYING THERE WILL NOT BE A WITHDRAWAL.

11. THE SOVIETS NOW APPEAR TO ACCEPT THE IDEA THAT "NATIONAL RECONCILIATION" IS NOT AN EVENT BUT A PROCESS. IF SO, THIS WILL REMOVE THE LINKAGE THAT HAS BLOCKED THEIR WITHDRAWAL. WE WILL BE WATCHING IN GENEVA TO SEE IF THE SOVIETS PRODUCE A TIMETABLE FOR WITHDRAWING THEIR TROOPS BY THE END OF 1988.

. IRAN/IRAQ
.

12. THIS WEEK, FOREIGN MINISTER AZIZ SAID THAT "IRAQ ACCEPTS RESOLUTION 598 IN ALL ITS PARTS." THIS IS
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UNEQUIVOCAL AND UNAMBIGUOUS. BUT IRAN CONTINUES TO PLAY GAMES WITH THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL. THIS IS A DELIBERATE STRATEGY ON THEIR PART, AND THE SOVIETS RECOGNIZE THAT FACT. WE URGED THE SOVIETS TO START WORK ON A SECOND SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION TO PUT TEETH INTO RES. 598, AND TO MAKE SUCH AN EFFORT PUBLICLY VISIBLE. ALL OTHER MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD DO THE SAME. THE SOVIETS KEPT PUSHING US FOR A UN FORCE IN THE GULF -- AN IDEA WITHOUT A CONCEPT, AS THE SECRETARY HAS TOLD THE NAC EARLIER.

13. THERE WERE INTERESTING AND WORTHWHILE DISCUSSIONS OF OTHER REGIONAL ISSUES, AND THERE WERE A NUMBER OF ACCOMPLISHMENTS IN THE BILATERAL AREA.

ARMS CONTROL

. INF TREATY
.

14. THE SIGNATURE OF THE INF TREATY WAS THE PUBLIC HIGHLIGHT OF THE SUMMIT. THE TREATY IS A MOST IMPRESSIVE DOCUMENT. IT IS THE RESULT OF COHESION, STRENGTH, AND CONSULTATIONS IN NATO. IT NOT ONLY REDUCES NUCLEAR WEAPONS, BUT DOES SO ASYMMETRICALLY. IT REPRESENTS A

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BIPARTISAN ACHIEVEMENT FOR THE U.S., SINCE NATO'S 1979 DUAL-TRACK DECISION WAS TAKEN DURING A DEMOCRATIC ADMINISTRATION. THE AGREEMENT ALSO SETS NEW STANDARDS FOR VERIFICATION, GOING BEYOND THE BREAKTHROUGHS OF THE STOCKHOLM CDE AGREEMENT AND SETTING THE STAGE FOR FURTHER BREAKTHROUGHS IN START.

. START
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15. A GREAT DEAL OF PROGRESS WAS MADE. WE CAN NOW SEE THE SHAPE OF AN AGREEMENT. IT IS TOO MUCH TO SAY THAT A START TREATY IS PROBABLE, BUT IT IS NOW CLEARLY POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE ONE.

16. AT REYKJAVIK IN 1986, THE PRESIDENT AND GORBACHEV HAD BUILT ON THEIR EARLIER GOAL OF A FIFTY PER CENT REDUCTION BY AGREEING TO A CEILING OF 6000 WARHEADS ON 1600 DELIVERY VEHICLES. THEY ALSO AGREED ON A BOMBER COUNTING RULE. SUBSEQUENTLY, A REDUCTION TO 1540 WARHEADS OF 154 HEAVY MISSILES WAS AGREED.

17. AT THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT, THE SIDES NAILED DOWN AN EARLIER, MORE GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT SOVIET THROW-WEIGHT WOULD BE REDUCED BY FIFTY PER CENT, AND THAT NEITHER SIDE WOULD THEN EXCEED THE REDUCED LEVEL. MOREOVER, THE SIDES AGREED ON A CEILING OF 4900 BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS WITHIN THE OVERALL 6000 CEILING. THE REMAINING WARHEADS WOULD BE ON SLOWER-FLYING BOMBERS AND CRUISE MISSILES.

18. THE TWO SIDES DID NOT AGREE ON MOBILE MISSILES, BUT THE U.S. HAS SAID THAT IT IS READY TO ALLOW THEM IF AGREEMENT CAN BE REACHED ON EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION. MOBILE MISSILES ADD TO STABILITY. THE SIDES AGREED TO FIND A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION TO LIMITING SEA-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES (SLCMs), OUTSIDE THE CENTRAL 1600/6000 LIMITS. THE SOVIETS PROPOSED SOME TECHNOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO SLCM VERIFICATION; IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER THEY WOULD BE EFFECTIVE. THE U.S. APPROACH AT REYKJAVIK WAS FOR THE SIDES SIMPLY TO DECLARE THEIR SLCM PROGRAMS, RATHER THAN TO INCLUDE IN A TREATY LIMITS THAT COULD NOT BE EFFECTIVELY VERIFIED. : : : : :

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19. THERE WAS A LOT OF DISCUSSION OF COUNTING RULES. THESE ARE ESSENTIAL SINCE THEY GIVE MEANING TO THE CENTRAL NUMERICAL LIMITS. THE SIDES AGREED ON COUNTING RULES FOR ALL BALLISTIC MISSILES. TOGETHER WITH THE BOMBER COUNTING RULE FROM REYKJAVIK, THIS IS AN IMPORTANT ADVANCE. HOW TO COUNT AIR-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES WAS DISCUSSED BUT NOT RESOLVED.

20. BUILDING ON INF, THERE WERE MAJOR ADVANCES IN START VERIFICATION. THE JOINT STATEMENT LISTS EIGHT ELEMENTS:

- . - EXTENSIVE DATA EXCHANGES;
- . - BASELINE INSPECTIONS TO VERIFY THESE DATA;
- . - ON-SITE OBSERVATION OF THE ELIMINATION OF STRATEGIC SYSTEMS;
- . - CONTINUOUS ON-SITE MONITORING OF CRITICAL PRODUCTION AND SUPPORT FACILITIES;
- . - SHORT-NOTICE ON-SITE INSPECTION OF LOCATIONS WHERE LIMITED SYSTEMS ARE OR HAVE BEEN;
- . - SHORT-NOTICE INSPECTIONS OF LOCATIONS WHERE A SIDE CONSIDERS COVERT DEPLOYMENT, STORAGE, PRODUCTION, OR REPAIR COULD BE OCCURRING;
- . - BAN ON CONCEALMENT MEASURES, INCLUDING TELEMETRY ENCRYPTION; AND
- . - MEASURES TO ENHANCE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS, INCLUDING ON-DEMAND OPEN DISPLAYS OF TREATY-LIMITED ITEMS AT BASES.

21. OUR INF EXPERIENCE HAS MADE CLEAR THAT THE NEGOTIATORS HAVE THEIR WORK CUT OUT FOR THEM TO TRANSLATE THESE PRINCIPLES INTO MUTUALLY-AGREED TREATY LANGUAGE.

DEFENSE AND SPACE

22. THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE DISCUSSION OF D&S AND ABM
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TREATY ISSUES. THE SOVIETS SAID THEY DISAGREE WITH SDI.

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AND CALLED IT A WASTE OF MONEY. WE COUNTERED BY NOTING THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS INVESTING SUBSTANTIAL RESOURCES IN ITS OWN EQUIVALENT TO THE SOI PROGRAM. IN THE END, THE SIDES AGREED TO DISAGREE ON THE U.S. PROGRAM.

23. THE SIDES TURNED TO CONSIDERING WHAT KIND OF LANGUAGE MIGHT BE USED TO SUPPLEMENT THE ABM TREATY. THE FORMULATION AGREED IS RECORDED IN THE JOINT STATEMENT.

24. THIS FORMULATION STATES THAT THE SIDES CAN CARRY OUT RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND TESTING AS REQUIRED. THIS MEANS EXACTLY WHAT IT SAYS. THE ADMINISTRATION WILL SEEK FUNDING FOR SPECIFIC EXPERIMENTS AS IT IS REQUIRED TO MEET THE OBJECTIVES OF THE PROGRAM. THIS WILL BE FULLY CONSISTENT WITH THE ABM TREATY, RECOGNIZING THAT THERE IS SOME CONTENTION OVER PRECISELY WHAT THAT SIGNIFIES.

25. THE SIDES AGREE ON THE CONCEPT OF A PERIOD OF NON-WITHDRAWAL FROM THE TREATY, BUT NOT ON THE LENGTH OF THAT PERIOD. THE SECRETARY'S PERSONAL CONVICTION IS THAT THIS PROBLEM CAN BE SOLVED.

26. THE LANGUAGE OF THE STATEMENT MAKES CLEAR THAT AT THE END OF THE NON-WITHDRAWAL PERIOD, EITHER SIDE WILL BE FREE TO DECIDE ITS COURSE OF ACTION. THUS, IF A SIDE WISHES TO DEPLOY DEFENSES AT THAT TIME, IT IS FREE AND CLEAR TO DO SO.

27. WITH THE PROGRESS ON IMPLEMENTING THE COMMITMENT TO A FIFTY PER CENT START CUT, AND THE NARROWING OF DIFFERENCES ON D&S ISSUES, THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT HAS TAKEN US A GIGANTIC STEP FORWARD. THE U.S. OBJECTIVE IS
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TO HAVE A NEW TREATY COMPLETED IN TIME FOR THE MOSCOW SUMMIT NEXT YEAR. AS WITH INF, THE PRESIDENT IS DETERMINED TO GET RESULTS BY THOROUGHNESS, PATIENCE, AND RESOLVE. IF A TREATY DOES NOT MEET THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE U.S. AND ITS ALLIES, OR IS NOT EFFECTIVELY VERIFIABLE, HE WILL NOT SIGN IT.

. OTHER NUCLEAR ISSUES
.

28. HEADWAY WAS MADE ON NUCLEAR TESTING. THERE WILL BE

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AN EXCHANGE OF EXPERIMENTS THAT WILL HELP REACH AGREEMENT ON THE VERIFICATION MEASURES ESSENTIAL TO MOVE FORWARD WITH RATIFICATION OF EXISTING TREATIES. THE SIDES REAFFIRMED THE IMPORTANCE OF THEIR NON-PROLIFERATION OBJECTIVES, AND WELCOMED THE AGREEMENT TO ESTABLISH NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION CENTERS.

. CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW)
.

29. THE SOVIETS ARE PUSHING VERY HARD ON CW. WE SHARED CONCERNS ON CW PROLIFERATION, AND THE FACT THAT THE GENERAL CONSTRAINT AGAINST THE USE OF CW HAS BEGUN TO BREAK DOWN. VERIFICATION WILL BE VERY DIFFICULT.

30. THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT WE MUST THINK CAREFULLY ABOUT HOW TO PROCEED. A CW BAN IS NOT WORTH CONCLUDING UNLESS THERE IS A LOT OF INTRUSIVE VERIFICATION AND VAST NUMBERS OF STATES PARTIES. IT WOULD MAKE NO SENSE AT ALL, FOR INSTANCE, TO HAVE A CSCE-WIDE CW BAN.

. CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL
.

31. THE U.S. AND USSR AGREED CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL
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IS A VERY IMPORTANT TASK. AT WASHINGTON, THE U.S. MADE THE POINT THAT IT COULD NOT NEGOTIATE THIS ISSUE WITH THE SOVIETS BILATERALLY. MOST OF THE FORCES ON OUR SIDE WERE ALLIED, NOT AMERICAN. WE RAISED THE IMPORTANCE OF KEEPING THE CONVENTIONAL MANDATE QUESTION LINKED TO A SATISFACTORY OUTCOME OF THE VIENNA CSCE CONFERENCE. THE SOVIETS TALKED FREELY OF THE NEED FOR ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES. THEY TRIED TO APPLY THIS PRINCIPLE TO U.S. AIRCRAFT CARRIERS; WE FIRMLY REJECTED THAT.

32. THE SECRETARY EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE CONVENTIONAL MANDATE CAN BE CONCLUDED EARLY NEXT YEAR. HE SECONDED CARRINGTON'S EARLIER COMMENT THAT THE ALLIANCE NEEDS TO REACH AGREEMENT ON A COMMON APPROACH TO CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE. IT CLEARLY MAKES SENSE TO FOCUS ON REDUCING ITEMS LIKE TANKS

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AND ARTILLERY RATHER THAN FOLLOWING THE MBFR APPROACH.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

33. THE SECRETARY LISTED SEVERAL KEY POINTS FOR U.S./SOVIET RELATIONS THAT HE HAD HIGHLIGHTED IN HIS TOAST AT THE LUNCHEON HE HAD GIVEN FOR GORBACHEV:

. - THE RELATIONSHIP IS IMPORTANT BECAUSE OF THE BURDEN OF LEADERSHIP EACH COUNTRY BEARS, AND UNIQUE BECAUSE OF THE NEED IN THE NUCLEAR ERA TO ENGAGE EACH OTHER DESPITE PROFOUND DIFFERENCES.

. - THE RELATIONSHIP WILL CONTINUE TO BE DIFFICULT TO MANAGE, DUE TO CONTRASTING PHILOSOPHIES, POLITICAL
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SYSTEMS, AND NATIONAL INTERESTS.

. - WE MUST BE REALISTIC, AVOIDING EXTREMES EITHER OF HOSTILITY OR EUPHORIA THROUGH THE INEVITABLE UPS AND DOWNS. HE NOTED TO THE NAC THAT, SUCCESSFUL AS THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT HAD BEEN, THE ADMINISTRATION IS DELIBERATELY BEING LESS EUPHORIC THAN ANYONE ELSE.

. - WE MUST SPEAK WITH CLARITY AND CANDOR ABOUT OUR DIFFERENCES. THE U.S. WOULD CONTINUE TO STRESS THE FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS -- A CONCERN ALSO REFLECTED IN THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, AND THE EC DECEMBER 5 SUMMIT STATEMENT. THE U.S. WILL ALSO SPEAK CANDIDLY ON REGIONAL ISSUES.

. - IT IS ESSENTIAL TO LOOK TO THE FUTURE WITHOUT NEGLECTING THE LESSONS OF THE PAST. THE WORLD WILL BE VASTLY DIFFERENT IN FIVE TO TEN YEARS. WE MUST NOT FACE THE PAST AND BACK INTO THE FUTURE.

. - OPENNESS TO IDEAS, INFORMATION, AND CONTACTS IS THE KEY TO FUTURE SUCCESS. THE INF TREATY'S UNPRECEDENTED VERIFICATION PROVISIONS ARE AN EXAMPLE OF THE POWERFUL PULL OF OPENNESS.

34. MUCH IS HAPPENING ACROSS THE BOARD OF THE

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U.S./SOVIET AGENDA. IT IS TOO SOON TO TELL WHETHER THIS PREFIGURES A PROFOUND CHANGE IN THE NATURE OF THE SOVIET UNION AND HOW IT DEALS WITH THE WORLD. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE WEST TAKE ADVANTAGE OF NEW OPPORTUNITIES WHILE REMEMBERING THAT IT MUST DO SO FROM A POSITION OF STRENGTH. IF THE ALLIANCE DOES NOT LOOK TO ITS OWN MILITARY CAPABILITIES, IT WILL DESERVE THE CONSEQUENCES OF THIS DERELICTION.

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35. NATO'S FUNDAMENTAL APPROACH, CONTAINED IN THE 1967 HARMEL REPORT, REMAINS VALID: STAY STRONG AND REALISTIC, WHILE SEEKING OPPORTUNITIES FOR DIALOGUE AND ENGAGEMENT.

KEEL UNQUOTE WHITEHEAD

NOTE: POUCH ADDRESSEES PROTECTED BY OC/T

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and determined that it is unclassified.**

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FOLLOWING OTTAWA 10466 DTD 11DEC87 SENT ACTION SECSTATE
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QUOTE

UNCLAS OTTAWA 10466

GENEVA FOR USDEL NST

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PARM, NST, INF, CA

SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER MULRONEY'S STATEMENT ON THE
REAGAN-GORBACHEV SUMMIT

REF: A) STATE 366467, B) OTTAWA 10296

1. A LENGTHY STATEMENT ON THE SUMMIT WAS ISSUED BY THE
PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE ON DECEMBER 10, 1987. EXCERPTS
ARE QUOTED BELOW. THE SECTION ENTITLED "THE CANADIAN
CONTRIBUTION" IS QUOTED IN FULL. THE COMPLETE TEXT OF
THE STATEMENT HAS BEEN FAXED TO EUR/CAN.

2. QUOTE: ON TUESDAY DECEMBER 8, PRESIDENT REAGAN AND
GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV SIGNED AN HISTORIC
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AGREEMENT TO ELIMINATE INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR

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1987

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MISSILES. I AM SURE THAT ALL CANADIANS APPLAUD THIS TREATY AS A PRAGMATIC STEP TOWARDS A BETTER AND SANER WORLD. IT IS A CELEBRATION OF COMMON SENSE OVER ADVERSITY.

... PRESIDENT REAGAN CAN JUSTIFIABLY CLAIM GREAT SUCCESS. IT WAS HE WHO PROVIDED THE VISION IN HIS ZERO OPTION PROPOSAL OF 1981. IT WAS HE WHO HELD FIRM AGAINST THOSE WHO WANTED TO FREEZE THESE WEAPONS AT LEVELS STILL THREATENING TO THE WEST. IT IS HE WHO HAS HAD THE COURAGE TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN FIRMNESS AND INTRANSIGENCE.

HOWEVER, WE MUST NOT HESITATE TO GIVE MR. GORBACHEV HIS FULL SHARE OF THE CREDIT. IT TOOK A NEW KIND OF SOVIET LEADER TO UNDO HIS PREDECESSORS' DECISION TO INTRODUCE THOSE MISSILES IN THE FIRST PLACE. AND IT HAS TAKEN A NEW SOVIET LEADER TO REALIZE THAT A MORE STABLE WORLD IS POSSIBLE THROUGH MUTUAL REDUCTIONS IN MILITARY MIGHT.

WE WELCOME THE NEW SPIRIT AS WELL AS THE TANGIBLE ACHIEVEMENTS.

... THE FEAR THAT REMOVING THESE MISSILES MIGHT SOMEHOW SPLIT EUROPE FROM NORTH AMERICA IS UNFOUNDED. THE LINKS WERE STRONG BEFORE THE MISSILES WERE INTRODUCED. THEY WILL REMAIN STRONG AFTER THEY ARE REMOVED. THE PRESENCE OF AMERICAN AND CANADIAN FORCES IN EUROPE IS COMPELLING EVIDENCE OF THE NORTH AMERICAN COMMITMENT TO EUROPE.

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INTERMEDIATE RANGE WEAPONS BENEFITS ALL WESTERN COUNTRIES. BUT THE WEAPONS THAT DIRECTLY THREATEN CANADA -- DESTABILIZING INTERCONTINENTAL MISSILES, AS WELL AS NUCLEAR-ARMED SUBMARINES AND BOMBERS -- ARE NOT AFFECTED BY THIS AGREEMENT. WE THEREFORE ESPECIALLY WELCOME THE PROGRESS THAT HAS BEEN MADE ON STRATEGIC WEAPONS AT THIS SUMMIT. CANADA HOPES THAT THE INF TREATY WILL NOW PROVIDE THE MOMENTUM FOR REDUCING THE HUGE NUMBER OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS THAT REMAIN, AND LEAD TO AN AGREEMENT IN MOSCOW NEXT SPRING. THIS WOULD MEET

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THE FUNDAMENTAL CANADIAN PRIORITY -- STABLE SECURITY AT MUCH LOWER LEVELS OF ARMAMENTS.

THE INF TREATY TELLS US MUCH ABOUT THE MEANING AND IMPORTANCE OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY. IN 1979, THE WESTERN ALLIANCE DECIDED TO DEPLOY A LIMITED NUMBER OF THESE MISSILES. AT THE SAME TIME, WE OFFERED TO NEGOTIATE REDUCTIONS WITH THE USSR.

SOME WEST EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS CAME UNDER STRONG PUBLIC PRESSURE NOT TO PROVIDE BASES FOR THESE MISSILES. OUR WEST EUROPEAN ALLIES HELD FIRM. WHEN THEY SAW THAT THE ALLIANCE COULD NOT BE DIVIDED, THE SOVIETS RETURNED TO THE TABLE THEY LEFT IN 1983. THE TREATY JUST SIGNED IS A CLEAR VINDICATION OF NATO'S POLICY OF COMBINING DETERRENCE AND DIALOGUE. WE ABANDON EITHER ELEMENT AT OUR PERIL.

... THE NEED FOR WESTERN COHESION REMAINS AS NECESSARY AS EVER. ANTAGONISM BETWEEN EAST AND WEST WILL NOT EVAPORATE OVERNIGHT. THOUGH WE HOPE THE WALLS WILL BECOME LOWER, EUROPE REMAINS DIVIDED. THE SOVIET MILITARY FORCES REMAIN WELL IN EXCESS OF WHAT ANYONE IN THE WEST WOULD CONSIDER REASONABLE AND SUFFICIENT. GLASNOST, WELCOME AS IT MAY BE, WILL NOT BE ABLE TO TRANSFORM QUICKLY A SOVIET UNION THAT HAS ROOTS IN
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CENTURIES OF RUSSIAN (#)
MAINS. FREEDOM WILL CONTINUE TO NEED A STRONG DEFENCE. NEITHER WESTERN EUROPE NOR NORTH AMERICA NOR BOTH TOGETHER CAN MAINTAIN AN EFFECTIVE AND STABLE MILITARY BALANCE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST BY CONVENTIONAL MEANS ALONE. THUS THE WEST AS A WHOLE WILL CONTINUE TO RELY UPON NUCLEAR DETERRENCE UNTIL OUR SECURITY CAN BE GUARANTEED IN OTHER WAYS.

... IN THE SOVIET UNION MR. GORBACHEV IS COURAGEOUSLY TRYING TO ARREST SOCIAL DECAY, TO TURN AROUND THE ECONOMY AND IMPROVE THE STANDARD OF LIVING. IF THIS MEANS THAT ORDINARY SOVIET CITIZENS WILL HAVE GREATER INITIATIVE AND SELF-EXPRESSION, THIS EVOLUTION IS DECIDEDLY IN OUR INTEREST, AS WELL AS THEIR OWN. WE SHOULD NOT HESITATE TO ENCOURAGE A SOVIET LEADER WHO IS

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TRYING TO LOOSEN THE SHACKLES OF THE PAST, REPUDIATING SOME OF THE ERRORS AND EXCESSES OF THE PAST.

EXTERNALLY, THE SOVIET LEADERS ARE COMING TO RECOGNIZE THE PRICE OF GOING IT ALONE AND THE CHALLENGE OF INTERDEPENDENCE. THE SOVIET UNION WILL NEVER BE SECURE BY MAKING OTHER COUNTRIES FEEL INSECURE.

... SOVIET TROOPS HAVE BROUGHT DEATH AND DESTRUCTION TO AFGHANISTAN FOR EIGHT YEARS. UP TO NOW, SOVIET LEADERS HAVE IGNORED THE DEMANDS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY FOR A TOTAL AND IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL. TO COMPLY NOW, TO ALLOW THE AFGHAN PEOPLE BY THEMSELVES TO DETERMINE THEIR FUTURE, WOULD GREATLY BOLSTER CONFIDENCE IN SOVIET INTENTIONS.

IN THE SOVIET UNION AND IN EASTERN EUROPE, DISSIDENTS
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HAVE BEEN RELEASED, DIVIDED FAMILIES ALLOWED TO REUNITE, EMIGRANTS ALLOWED TO LEAVE. WE CERTAINLY WELCOME THOSE DEVELOPMENTS. BUT THERE ARE STILL FAR TOO MANY PEOPLE WHO ARE PENALIZED FOR SEEKING TO EXERCISE RIGHTS GUARANTEED THEM IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS ACCORDS. WE ASK ONLY THAT SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN LEADERS KEEP THE HUMAN RIGHTS PROMISES THEY FREELY MADE IN THOSE ACCORDS.

MR. GORBACHEV'S INTEREST IN THE WORLD ECONOMY IS UNDERSTANDABLE. HE CANNOT IGNORE THE INFORMATION REVOLUTION, GLOBAL TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS OR THE IMPACT OF CURRENCY FLUCTUATIONS AND COMMODITY PRICES. CLOSER INTEGRATION OF THE SOVIET UNION INTO THE WORLD ECONOMY IS ALSO IN THE WEST'S LONG-TERM INTEREST. IT IS WELL TO REMEMBER, HOWEVER, THAT IT IS THE GLOBAL ECONOMY THAT IS OPEN AND THE SOVIET ECONOMY THAT IS CLOSED. WE CALL UPON THE SOVIET UNION TO ADJUST ITS ECONOMIC PRACTICES SO THAT IT MAY TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE MANY OPPORTUNITIES THAT ARE OPEN TO IT IN CANADA AND ELSEWHERE.

THE CANADIAN CONTRIBUTION

I BELIEVE THERE ARE FIVE ESSENTIAL PRINCIPLES BY WHICH

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CANADA SHOULD BE GUIDED AS WE ENTER THIS NEW AND PATH-BREAKING PHASE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS.

FIRST, WE MUST DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO PROMOTE GREATER COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE PEOPLES OF EAST AND WEST. THROUGH VISITS, THROUGH COOPERATION IN THE ARCTIC AND IN CULTURAL EXCHANGES, THROUGH TRADE, WE CAN DO MUCH TO BREAK DOWN THE WALLS OF DISTRUST AND SUSPICION.

SECOND, WE MUST CONTINUE TO MAKE A FULL AND EFFECTIVE
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CONTRIBUTION TO COLLECTIVE DEFENCE, ALONGSIDE OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES. WORKING TOGETHER AND MAINTAINING A STRONG DETERRENT, IN CONJUNCTION WITH DIALOGUE, HAS BROUGHT US THIS FAR; IT CAN TAKE US EVEN FARTHER. CANADA IS DOING ITS PART, AS THE DEFENCE WHITE PAPER SHOWS.

THIRD, I REAFFIRM OUR GOAL OF VIGOROUSLY PROMOTING PROGRESS IN ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT. THE OBJECTIVES IN THE NUCLEAR, SPACE, CHEMICAL AND CONVENTIONAL FIELD THAT I SET OUT IN 1985 ARE AS VALID TODAY AS THEY WERE THEN. WE WILL CONTINUE TO WORK IN EVERY FORUM AVAILABLE TO US -- IN NATO, IN THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT, IN CONVENTIONAL ARMS TALKS -- TO ACHIEVE THIS PURPOSE. WE MAY NOT BE AT EVERY NEGOTIATING TABLE, BUT OUR COMMITMENT AND EXPERTISE WILL BE BROUGHT TO BEAR WHEREVER THEY CAN CONTRIBUTE EFFECTIVELY.

THE GOAL IN ALL THESE AREAS IS STABILITY; STABILITY AT LOWER LEVELS OF ARMS, AND STABILITY IN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OFFENCE AND DEFENCE.

AN ENDURING SECURITY STRUCTURE, HOWEVER, REQUIRES A BROADER BASIS OF CONFIDENCE THAN WE HAVE HAD IN THE PAST.

CANADA'S FOURTH PRINCIPLE, THEREFORE, IS TO ENCOURAGE A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE SOVIET ROLE INTERNATIONALLY. WE WELCOME A WORLD IN WHICH THE SOVIET UNION IS A COMMITTED, RESPONSIBLE PARTNER, WHETHER IN POLITICAL OR

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ECONOMIC MATTERS. WE ENCOURAGE THIS, AND LOOK TO THE SOVIET UNION TO MATCH ITS WORDS WITH ACTION.

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FIFTH, WE WILL CONTINUE TO STRESS THE HUMAN SIDE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS. CANADIANS BELIEVE DEEPLY THAT FAMILIES WISHING TO BE REUNITED SHOULD BE PERMITTED TO DO SO. WE BELIEVE IN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, THE RIGHT TO EMIGRATE AND THE RIGHT TO DISSENT. WE WILL CONTINUE TO RAISE OUR VOICE ON THESE MATTERS AT THE VIENNA MEETING ON EUROPEAN SECURITY AND COOPERATION. AND WE WILL NOT CEASE UNTIL WE ARE SATISFIED THAT INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ARE BEING MET.

CANADA REJOICES IN THE AGREEMENT SIGNED IN WASHINGTON ON TUESDAY. WE SALUTE THE LEADERS WHO HAD THE COURAGE TO TAKE THIS STEP. WE COMMIT OURSELVES TO WORK TO REDUCE BARRIERS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST, TO CREATE A SAFER, SANER WORLD FOR OURSELVES AND THOSE WHO WILL COME AFTER, AND TO ESTABLISH HABITS OF COOPERATION INSTEAD OF CONFRONTATION.

BUT A WORLD WHICH MUST CONTEND WITH PRESSING ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS WILL NOT WAIT FOREVER FOR US TO SUCCEED. THE TREATY SIGNED ON TUESDAY IN WASHINGTON SHOWS THAT WITH HARD WORK, RESOLVE, AND COMMON SENSE AND PURPOSE, WE CAN PREVAIL.

IT IS A GRAND BEGINNING, BUT A BEGINNING NONETHELESS. LET US GET ON WITH THE CHALLENGE AHEAD.

END QUOTE.

NILES UNQUOTE WHITEHEAD

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INFORM CONSULS, ALSO FOR USEC/USOECDD/USIAEA

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: UR, US, PARM, PREL, MNUC

SUBJECT: JOINT U.S.-SOVIET SUMMIT STATEMENT

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1. TRANSMITTED BELOW IS THE JOINT STATEMENT ISSUED BY

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PRESIDENT REAGAN AND GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV ON DECEMBER 10, 1987 AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE GENERAL SECRETARY'S VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES (DECEMBER 7-10). POSTS SHOULD DRAW ON IT FULLY IN BRIEFING HOST GOVERNMENTS AND PUBLIC AUDIENCES. ADDITIONAL POINTS FOR BRIEFING THE MEDIA AND HOST GOVERNMENTS WILL BE TRANSMITTED SEPTELS.

2. BEGIN TEXT OF JOINT STATEMENT.

RONALD W. REAGAN, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, AND MIKHAIL S. GORBACHEV, GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION, MET IN WASHINGTON ON DECEMBER 7-10, 1987.

ATTENDING THE MEETING ON THE U.S. SIDE WERE VICE PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH; SECRETARY OF STATE GEORGE P. SHULTZ; SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FRANK C. CARLUCCI; CHIEF OF STAFF HOWARD H. BAKER, JR.; ACTING ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT LIEUTENANT GENERAL COLIN L. POWELL; COUNSELOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE AMBASSADOR MAX M. KAMPelman; AMBASSADOR-AT-LARGE AND SPECIAL ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY OF STATE ON ARMS CONTROL MATTERS PAUL H. NITZE; SPECIAL ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY OF STATE ON ARMS CONTROL MATTERS AMBASSADOR EDWARD T. ROWNY; CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ADMIRAL WILLIAM J. CROWE, JR.; AMBASSADOR OF THE U.S. TO THE USSR JACK F. MATLOCK; AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EUROPEAN AND CANADIAN AFFAIRS ROZANNE L. RIDGWAY.

ATTENDING ON THE SOVIET SIDE WERE MEMBER OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE, MINISTER OF FOREIGN
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AFFAIRS OF THE USSR EDUARD A. SHEVARDNADZE; MEMBER OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE, SECRETARY OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE ALEXANDER N. YAKOVLEV; SECRETARY OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE ANATOLY F. DOBRYNIN; DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE USSR COUNCIL OF MINISTERS VLADIMIR M. KAMENTSEV; CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE USSR ARMED FORCES AND FIRST DEPUTY MINISTER OF DEFENSE OF THE USSR, MARSHAL OF THE SOVIET UNION SERGEI F. AKHROMEYEV; ASSISTANT TO THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE ANATOLY S. CHERNYAEV; HEAD OF THE GENERAL

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DEPARTMENT OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE VALERIY I. BOLOIN; DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR ALEKSANDR A. BESSMERTNYKH; AMBASSADOR OF THE USSR TO THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA YURI V. DUBININ; MEMBER OF THE COLLEGIUM OF THE USSR MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS VICTOR P. KARPOV; AND AMBASSADOR-AT-LARGE ALEKSEY A. OBUKHOV.

DURING THE COURSE OF THE OFFICIAL VISIT, WHICH HAD BEEN AGREED DURING THE TWO LEADERS' NOVEMBER 1985 MEETING IN GENEVA, THE PRESIDENT AND THE GENERAL SECRETARY HELD COMPREHENSIVE AND DETAILED DISCUSSIONS ON THE FULL RANGE OF ISSUES BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES, INCLUDING ARMS REDUCTIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN ISSUES, SETTLEMENT OF REGIONAL CONFLICTS, AND BILATERAL RELATIONS. THE TALKS WERE CANDID AND CONSTRUCTIVE, REFLECTING BOTH THE CONTINUING DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES, AND THEIR UNDERSTANDING THAT THESE DIFFERENCES ARE NOT INSURMOUNTABLE OBSTACLES TO PROGRESS IN AREAS OF MUTUAL INTEREST.

THEY REAFFIRMED THEIR STRONG COMMITMENT TO A VIGOROUS DIALOGUE ENCOMPASSING THE WHOLE OF THE RELATIONSHIP.

THE LEADERS REVIEWED PROGRESS TO DATE IN FULFILLING THE BROAD AGENDA THEY AGREED AT GENEVA AND ADVANCED AT REYKJAVIK. THEY TOOK PARTICULAR SATISFACTION IN THE CONCLUSION OVER
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AGREEMENTS IN SOME AREAS OF THIS AGENDA.

THE PRESIDENT AND THE GENERAL SECRETARY AFFIRMED THE FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE OF THEIR MEETINGS IN GENEVA AND REYKJAVIK, WHICH LAID THE BASIS FOR CONCRETE STEPS IN A PROCESS INTENDED TO IMPROVE STRATEGIC STABILITY AND REDUCE THE RISK OF CONFLICT. THEY WILL CONTINUE TO BE GUIDED BY THEIR SOLEMN CONVICTION THAT A NUCLEAR WAR CANNOT BE WON AND MUST NEVER BE FOUGHT. THEY ARE DETERMINED TO PREVENT ANY WAR BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION, WHETHER NUCLEAR OR CONVENTIONAL. THEY WILL NOT SEEK TO ACHIEVE MILITARY SUPERIORITY.

THE TWO LEADERS RECOGNIZED THE SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION TO SEARCH FOR REALISTIC WAYS TO PREVENT CONFRONTATION AND TO PROMOTE A

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MORE SUSTAINABLE AND STABLE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THEIR COUNTRIES. TO THIS END, THEY AGREED TO INTENSIFY DIALOGUE AND TO ENCOURAGE EMERGING TRENDS TOWARD CONSTRUCTIVE COOPERATION IN ALL AREAS OF THEIR RELATIONS. THEY ARE CONVINCED THAT IN SO DOING THEY WILL ALSO CONTRIBUTE, WITH OTHER NATIONS, TO THE BUILDING OF A SAFER WORLD AS HUMANITY ENTERS THE THIRD MILLENNIUM.

I. ARMS CONTROL

THE INF TREATY

THE TWO LEADERS SIGNED THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST
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REPUBLICS ON THE ELIMINATION OF THEIR INTERMEDIATE-RANGE AND SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES. THIS TREATY IS HISTORIC BOTH FOR ITS OBJECTIVE -- THE COMPLETE ELIMINATION OF AN ENTIRE CLASS OF U.S. AND SOVIET NUCLEAR ARMS -- AND FOR THE INNOVATIVE CHARACTER AND SCOPE OF ITS VERIFICATION PROVISIONS. THIS MUTUAL ACCOMPLISHMENT MAKES A VITAL CONTRIBUTION TO GREATER STABILITY.

NUCLEAR AND SPACE TALKS

THE PRESIDENT AND THE GENERAL SECRETARY DISCUSSED THE NEGOTIATIONS ON REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. THEY NOTED THE CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS WHICH HAS BEEN MADE TOWARD CONCLUSION OF A TREATY IMPLEMENTING THE PRINCIPLE OF 50-PERCENT REDUCTIONS. THEY AGREED TO INSTRUCT THEIR

NEGOTIATORS IN GENEVA TO WORK TOWARD THE COMPLETION OF THE TREATY ON THE REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AND ALL INTEGRAL DOCUMENTS AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE, PREFERABLY IN TIME FOR SIGNATURE OF THE TREATY DURING THE NEXT MEETING OF LEADERS OF STATE IN THE FIRST HALF OF 1988. RECOGNIZING THAT AREAS OF AGREEMENT AND DISAGREEMENT ARE RECORDED IN DETAIL IN THE JOINT DRAFT TREATY TEXT, THEY AGREED TO INSTRUCT THEIR

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NEGOTIATORS TO ACCELERATE RESOLUTION OF ISSUES WITHIN THE JOINT DRAFT TREATY TEXT INCLUDING EARLY AGREEMENT ON PROVISIONS FOR EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION.

IN SO DOING, THE NEGOTIATORS SHOULD BUILD UPON THE AGREEMENTS ON 50-PERCENT REDUCTIONS ACHIEVED AT REYKJAVIK AS SUBSEQUENTLY DEVELOPED AND NOW REFLECTED IN THE AGREED PORTIONS OF THE JOINT DRAFT START TREATY TEXT BEING DEVELOPED IN GENEVA, INCLUDING AGREEMENT ON CEILINGS OF NO MORE THAN 1600 STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE DELIVERY SYSTEMS, 6000 WARHEADS, 1540 WARHEADS ON 154 HEAVY MISSILES; THE
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AGREED RULE OF ACCOUNT FOR HEAVY BOMBERS AND THEIR NUCLEAR ARMAMENT; AND AN AGREEMENT THAT AS A RESULT OF THE REDUCTIONS THE AGGREGATE THROW-WEIGHT OF THE SOVIET UNION'S ICBMS AND SLBMS WILL BE REDUCED TO A LEVEL APPROXIMATELY 50-PERCENT BELOW THE EXISTING LEVEL, AND THIS LEVEL WILL NOT BE EXCEEDED BY EITHER SIDE. SUCH AN AGREEMENT WILL BE RECORDED IN A MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY MANNER.

AS PRIORITY TASKS, THEY SHOULD FOCUS ON THE FOLLOWING ISSUES:

(A) THE ADDITIONAL STEPS NECESSARY TO ENSURE THAT THE REDUCTIONS ENHANCE STRATEGIC STABILITY. THIS WILL INCLUDE A CEILING OF 4900 ON THE AGGREGATE NUMBER OF ICBM PLUS SLBM WARHEADS WITHIN THE 6000 TOTAL.

(B) THE COUNTING RULES GOVERNING THE NUMBER OF LONG-RANGE, NUCLEAR-ARMED AIR-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES (ALCMS) TO BE ATTRIBUTED TO EACH TYPE OF HEAVY BomBER. THE DELEGATIONS SHALL DEFINE CONCRETE RULES IN THIS AREA.

(C) THE COUNTING RULES WITH RESPECT TO EXISTING BALLISTIC MISSILES. THE SIDES PROCEED FROM THE ASSUMPTION THAT EXISTING TYPES OF BALLISTIC MISSILES ARE DEPLOYED WITH THE FOLLOWING NUMBERS OF WARHEADS. IN THE UNITED STATES: PEACEKEEPER (MX):10, MINUTEMAN III:3, MINUTEMAN II:1, TRIDENT I:8, TRIDENT II:8, POSEIDON:10. IN THE SOVIET UNION: SS-17:4, SS-19:6, SS-18:10, SS-24:10, SS-25:1, SS-11:1, SS-13:1, SS-N-6:1, SS-N-8:1, SS-N-17:1, SS-N-18:7, SS-N-20:10 AND SS-N-23:4.

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PROCEDURES WILL BE DEVELOPED THAT ENABLE VERIFICATION OF
THE NUMBER OF WARHEADS ON DEPLOYED BALLISTIC MISSILES OF
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EACH SPECIFIC TYPE. IN THE EVENT EITHER SIDE CHANGES THE
NUMBER OF WARHEADS DECLARED FOR A TYPE OF DEPLOYED
BALLISTIC MISSILE, THE SIDES SHALL NOTIFY EACH OTHER IN
ADVANCE. THERE SHALL ALSO BE AGREEMENT ON HOW TO ACCOUNT
FOR WARHEADS ON FUTURE TYPES OF BALLISTIC MISSILES
COVERED BY THE TREATY ON THE REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

(D) THE SIDES SHALL FIND A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION
TO THE QUESTION OF LIMITING THE DEPLOYMENT OF LONG-RANGE,
NUCLEAR-ARMED SLCHMS. SUCH LIMITATIONS WILL NOT INVOLVE
COUNTING LONG-RANGE, NUCLEAR-ARMED SLCHMS WITHIN THE 6000
WARHEAD AND 1600 STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE DELIVERY SYSTEMS
LIMITS. THE SIDES COMMITTED THEMSELVES TO ESTABLISH
CEILINGS ON SUCH MISSILES, AND TO SEEK MUTUALLY
ACCEPTABLE AND EFFECTIVE METHODS OF VERIFICATION OF SUCH
LIMITATIONS, WHICH COULD INCLUDE THE EMPLOYMENT OF
NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS, COOPERATIVE MEASURES AND
ON-SITE INSPECTION.

(E) BUILDING UPON THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY ON THE
ELIMINATION OF THEIR INTERMEDIATE-RANGE AND SHORTER-RANGE
MISSILES, THE MEASURES BY WHICH THE PROVISIONS OF THE
TREATY ON THE REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC
OFFENSIVE ARMS CAN BE VERIFIED WILL, AT A MINIMUM,
INCLUDE:

1. DATA EXCHANGES, TO INCLUDE DECLARATIONS BY EACH SIDE
OF THE NUMBER AND LOCATION OF WEAPON SYSTEMS LIMITED BY
THE TREATY AND OF FACILITIES AT WHICH SUCH SYSTEMS ARE
LOCATED AND APPROPRIATE NOTIFICATIONS. THESE FACILITIES
WILL INCLUDE LOCATIONS AND FACILITIES FOR PRODUCTION AND
FINAL ASSEMBLY, STORAGE, TESTING, AND DEPLOYMENT OF
SYSTEMS COVERED BY THIS TREATY. SUCH DECLARATIONS WILL
BE EXCHANGED BETWEEN THE SIDES BEFORE THE TREATY IS
SIGNED AND UPDATED PERIODICALLY AFTER ENTRY INTO FORCE.
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2. BASELINE INSPECTION TO VERIFY THE ACCURACY OF THESE DECLARATIONS PROMPTLY AFTER ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE TREATY.

3. ON-SITE OBSERVATION OF THE ELIMINATION OF STRATEGIC SYSTEMS NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE THE AGREED LIMITS.

4. CONTINUOUS ON-SITE MONITORING OF THE PERIMETER AND PORTALS OF CRITICAL PRODUCTION AND SUPPORT FACILITIES TO CONFIRM THE OUTPUT OF THESE FACILITIES.

5. SHORT-NOTICE ON-SITE INSPECTION OF:

(I) DECLARED LOCATIONS DURING THE PROCESS OF REDUCING TO AGREED LIMITS;

(II) LOCATIONS WHERE SYSTEMS COVERED BY THIS TREATY REMAIN AFTER ACHIEVING THE AGREED LIMITS; AND

(III) LOCATIONS WHERE SUCH SYSTEMS HAVE BEEN LOCATED (FORMERLY DECLARED FACILITIES).

6. THE RIGHT TO IMPLEMENT, IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGREED-UPON PROCEDURES, SHORT-NOTICE INSPECTIONS AT LOCATIONS WHERE EITHER SIDE CONSIDERS COVERT DEPLOYMENT, PRODUCTION, STORAGE OR REPAIR OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS COULD BE OCCURRING.

7. PROVISIONS PROHIBITING THE USE OF CONCEALMENT OR OTHER ACTIVITIES WHICH IMPEDE VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. SUCH PROVISIONS WOULD INCLUDE A BAN ON
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TELEMETRY ENCRYPTION AND WOULD ALLOW FOR FULL ACCESS TO ALL TELEMETRIC INFORMATION BROADCAST DURING MISSILE FLIGHT.

8. MEASURES DESIGNED TO ENHANCE OBSERVATION OF ACTIVITIES RELATED TO REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. THESE WOULD INCLUDE OPEN DISPLAYS OF TREATY-LIMITED ITEMS

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AT MISSILE BASES, BOMBER BASES, AND SUBMARINE PORTS AT LOCATIONS AND TIMES CHOSEN BY THE INSPECTING PARTY.

TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE PREPARATION OF THE TREATY ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, THE LEADERS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES ALSO INSTRUCTED THEIR DELEGATIONS IN GENEVA TO WORK OUT AN AGREEMENT THAT WOULD COMMIT THE SIDES TO OBSERVE THE ABM TREATY, AS SIGNED IN 1972, WHILE CONDUCTING THEIR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND TESTING AS REQUIRED, WHICH ARE PERMITTED BY THE ABM TREATY, AND NOT TO WITHDRAW FROM THE ABM TREATY, FOR A SPECIFIED PERIOD OF TIME. INTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS OF STRATEGIC STABILITY SHALL BEGIN NOT LATER THAN THREE YEARS BEFORE THE END OF

HAVE NOT AGREED OTHERWISE, EACH SIDE WILL BE FREE TO DECIDE ITS COURSE OF ACTION. SUCH AN AGREEMENT MUST HAVE THE SAME LEGAL STATUS AS THE TREATY ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, THE ABM TREATY, AND OTHER SIMILAR, LEGALLY BINDING AGREEMENTS. THIS AGREEMENT WILL BE

RECORDED IN A MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY MANNER. THEREFORE, THEY DIRECT THEIR DELEGATIONS TO ADDRESS THESE ISSUES ON A PRIORITY BASIS.

THE SIDES SHALL DISCUSS WAYS TO ENSURE PREDICTABILITY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE U.S.-SOVIET STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP UNDER CONDITIONS OF STRATEGIC STABILITY, TO REDUCE THE RISK OF NUCLEAR WAR.

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OTHER ARMS CONTROL ISSUES

THE PRESIDENT AND THE GENERAL SECRETARY REVIEWED A BROAD RANGE OF OTHER ISSUES CONCERNING ARMS LIMITATION AND REDUCTION. THE SIDES EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF PRODUCTIVE NEGOTIATIONS ON SECURITY MATTERS AND ADVANCING IN THE MAIN AREAS OF ARMS LIMITATION AND REDUCTION THROUGH EQUITABLE, VERIFIABLE AGREEMENTS THAT ENHANCE SECURITY AND STABILITY.

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THE TWO LEADERS WELCOMED THE OPENING ON NOVEMBER 9, 1987, OF FULL-SCALE, STEP-BY-STEP NEGOTIATIONS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE JOINT STATEMENT ADOPTED IN WASHINGTON ON SEPTEMBER 17, 1987, BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR:

"THE U.S. AND SOVIET SIDES HAVE AGREED TO BEGIN BEFORE DECEMBER 1, 1987, FULL-SCALE STAGE-BY-STAGE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH WILL BE CONDUCTED IN A SINGLE FORUM. IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS THE SIDES AS THE FIRST STEP WILL AGREE UPON EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION MEASURES WHICH WILL MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO RATIFY THE U.S.-USSR THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY OF 1974 AND PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS TREATY OF 1976, AND PROCEED TO NEGOTIATING FURTHER INTERMEDIATE LIMITATIONS ON NUCLEAR TESTING LEADING TO THE ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE OF THE COMPLETE CESSATION OF NUCLEAR TESTING AS PART OF AN EFFECTIVE DISARMAMENT PROCESS. THIS PROCESS,
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AMONG OTHER THINGS, WOULD PURSUE, AS THE FIRST PRIORITY, THE GOAL OF THE REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND, ULTIMATELY, THEIR ELIMINATION. FOR THE PURPOSE OF THE ELABORATION OF IMPROVED VERIFICATION MEASURES FOR THE U.S.-USSR TREATIES OF 1974 AND 1976 THE SIDES INTEND TO DESIGN AND CONDUCT JOINT VERIFICATION EXPERIMENTS AT EACH OTHER'S TEST SITES. THESE VERIFICATION MEASURES WILL, TO THE EXTENT APPROPRIATE, BE USED IN FURTHER NUCLEAR TEST

LIMITATION AGREEMENTS WHICH MAY SUBSEQUENTLY BE REACHED."

THE LEADERS ALSO WELCOMED THE PROMPT AGREEMENT BY THE SIDES TO EXCHANGE EXPERTS VISITS TO EACH OTHER'S NUCLEAR TESTING SITES IN JANUARY 1988 AND TO DESIGN AND SUBSEQUENTLY TO CONDUCT A JOINT VERIFICATION EXPERIMENT AT EACH OTHER'S TEST SITE. THE TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE EXPERIMENT ARE SET FORTH IN THE STATEMENT ISSUED ON DECEMBER 9, 1987, BY THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION. THE LEADERS NOTED THE VALUE OF THESE AGREEMENTS FOR DEVELOPING MORE EFFECTIVE MEASURES TO VERIFY COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE 1974 THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY AND THE 1976 PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS TREATY.

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NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION

THE PRESIDENT AND THE GENERAL SECRETARY REAFFIRMED THE CONTINUED COMMITMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION TO THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND IN PARTICULAR TO STRENGTHENING THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE TWO LEADERS EXPRESSED SATISFACTION AT THE ADHERENCE SINCE THEIR LAST MEETING OF ADDITIONAL PARTIES TO THE TREATY, AND CONFIRMED THEIR INTENT TO MAKE, TOGETHER WITH OTHER STATES, ADDITIONAL EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE UNIVERSAL ADHERENCE
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TO THE TREATY.

THE PRESIDENT AND THE GENERAL SECRETARY EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN NUCLEAR SAFETY AND FOR EFFORTS TO PROMOTE THE PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY, UNDER FURTHER STRENGTHENED IAEA SAFEGUARDS AND APPROPRIATE EXPORT CONTROLS FOR NUCLEAR MATERIALS, EQUIPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY. THE LEADERS AGREED THAT BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS ON NON-PROLIFERATION WERE CONSTRUCTIVE AND USEFUL, AND SHOULD CONTINUE.

NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION CENTERS

THE LEADERS WELCOMED THE SIGNING ON SEPTEMBER 15, 1987, IN WASHINGTON OF THE AGREEMENT TO ESTABLISH NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION CENTERS IN THEIR CAPITALS. THE AGREEMENT WILL BE IMPLEMENTED PROMPTLY.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS

THE LEADERS EXPRESSED THEIR COMMITMENT TO NEGOTIATION OF A VERIFIABLE, COMPREHENSIVE AND EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION AND DESTRUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. THEY WELCOMED PROGRESS TO DATE AND REAFFIRMED THE NEED FOR INTENSIFIED NEGOTIATIONS TOWARD CONCLUSION OF A TRULY GLOBAL AND VERIFIABLE CONVENTION ENCOMPASSING ALL CHEMICAL WEAPONS-CAPABLE STATES. THE UNITED STATES

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AND THE SOVIET UNION ARE IN FAVOR OF GREATER OPENNESS AND
INTENSIFIED CONFIDENCE-BUILDING WITH RESPECT TO CHEMICAL
WEAPONS BOTH ON A BILATERAL AND A MULTILATERAL BASIS.
THEY AGREED TO CONTINUE PERIODIC DISCUSSIONS BY EXPERTS
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ON THE GROWING PROBLEM OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS PROLIFERATION
AND USE.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES

THE PRESIDENT AND THE GENERAL SECRETARY DISCUSSED THE
IMPORTANCE OF THE TASK OF REDUCING THE LEVEL OF MILITARY
CONFRONTATION IN EUROPE IN THE AREA OF ARMED FORCES AND
CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS. THE TWO LEADERS SPOKE IN FAVOR
OF EARLY COMPLETION OF THE WORK IN VIENNA ON THE MANDATE
FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON THIS ISSUE, SO THAT SUBSTANTIVE
NEGOTIATIONS MAY BE STARTED AT THE EARLIEST TIME WITH A
VIEW TO ELABORATING CONCRETE MEASURES. THEY ALSO NOTED
THAT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE
STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING
MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE IS AN IMPORTANT FACTOR
IN STRENGTHENING MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND ENHANCING
STABILITY, AND SPOKE IN FAVOR OF CONTINUING AND
CONSOLIDATING THIS PROCESS. THE PRESIDENT AND THE
GENERAL SECRETARY AGREED TO INSTRUCT THEIR APPROPRIATE
REPRESENTATIVES TO INTENSIFY EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE SOLUTIONS
TO OUTSTANDING ISSUES.

THEY ALSO DISCUSSED THE VIENNA (MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE
REDUCTION) NEGOTIATIONS.

FOLLOW-UP MEETING OF THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND

COOPERATION IN EUROPE

THEY EXPRESSED THEIR DETERMINATION, TOGETHER WITH THE
OTHER 33 PARTICIPANTS IN THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND
COOPERATION IN EUROPE, TO BRING THE VIENNA CSCE FOLLOW-UP
CONFERENCE TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION, BASED ON BALANCED
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PROGRESS IN ALL PRINCIPAL AREAS OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT
AND MADRID CONCLUDING DOCUMENT.

II. HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS

THE LEADERS HELD A THOROUGH AND CANDID DISCUSSION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN QUESTIONS AND THEIR PLACE
IN THE U.S.-SOVIET DIALOGUE.

III. REGIONAL ISSUES

THE PRESIDENT AND THE GENERAL SECRETARY ENGAGED IN A
WIDE-RANGING, FRANK AND BUSINESSLIKE DISCUSSION OF
REGIONAL QUESTIONS, INCLUDING AFGHANISTAN, THE IRAN-IRAQ
WAR, THE MIDDLE EAST, CAMBODIA, SOUTHERN AFRICA, CENTRAL
AMERICA AND OTHER ISSUES. THEY ACKNOWLEDGED SERIOUS
DIFFERENCES BUT AGREED ON THE IMPORTANCE OF THEIR REGULAR
EXCHANGE OF VIEWS. THE TWO LEADERS NOTED THE INCREASING
IMPORTANCE OF SETTLING REGIONAL CONFLICTS TO REDUCE
INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS AND TO IMPROVE EAST-WEST
RELATIONS. THEY AGREED THAT THE GOAL OF THE DIALOGUE
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION ON THESE
ISSUES SHOULD BE TO HELP THE PARTIES TO REGIONAL
CONFLICTS FIND PEACEFUL SOLUTIONS THAT ADVANCE THEIR
INDEPENDENCE, FREEDOM AND SECURITY. BOTH LEADERS
EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF ENHANCING THE CAPACITY OF
THE UNITED NATIONS AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE RESOLUTION OF REGIONAL CONFLICTS.

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IV. BILATERAL AFFAIRS

THE PRESIDENT AND THE GENERAL SECRETARY REVIEWED IN
DETAIL THE STATE OF U.S.-SOVIET BILATERAL RELATIONS.

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THEY RECOGNIZED THE UTILITY OF FURTHER EXPANDING AND STRENGTHENING BILATERAL CONTACTS, EXCHANGES AND COOPERATION.

BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS

HAVING REVIEWED THE STATE OF ONGOING U.S.-SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS ON A NUMBER OF SPECIFIC BILATERAL ISSUES, THE TWO LEADERS CALLED FOR INTENSIFIED EFFORTS BY THEIR REPRESENTATIVES, AIMED AT REACHING MUTUALLY ADVANTAGEOUS AGREEMENTS ON: COMMERCIAL MARITIME ISSUES;

FISHING; MARINE SEARCH AND RESCUE; RADIO NAVIGATIONAL SYSTEMS; THE U.S.-USSR MARITIME BOUNDARY; AND COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF TRANSPORTATION AND OTHER AREAS.

THEY NOTED WITH SATISFACTION AGREEMENT ON THE EXPANSION, WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE U.S.-SOVIET AIR TRANSPORT AGREEMENT, OF DIRECT AIR PASSENGER SERVICE, INCLUDING JOINT OPERATION OF THE NEW YORK-MOSCOW ROUTE BY PAN AMERICAN AIRWAYS AND AEROFLOT, AND ON THE RENEWAL OF THE U.S.-SOVIET WORLD OCEAN AGREEMENT.

PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE CONTACTS AND EXCHANGES

THE TWO LEADERS TOOK NOTE OF PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING THE U.S.-SOVIET GENERAL EXCHANGES AGREEMENT IN THE AREAS OF EDUCATION, SCIENCE, CULTURE AND SPORTS, SIGNED AT THEIR
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NOVEMBER 1985 GENEVA MEETING, AND AGREED TO CONTINUE EFFORTS TO ELIMINATE OBSTACLES TO FURTHER PROGRESS IN THESE AREAS. THEY EXPRESSED SATISFACTION WITH PLANS TO CELEBRATE JOINTLY THE 30TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE FIRST EXCHANGES AGREEMENT IN JANUARY 1988.

THE TWO LEADERS REAFFIRMED THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTACTS AND EXCHANGES IN BROADENING UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THEIR PEOPLES. THEY NOTED WITH PARTICULAR SATISFACTION THE PROGRESS MADE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE CONTACTS UNDER THE INITIATIVE THEY LAUNCHED AT THEIR 1985 MEETING IN GENEVA -- A PROCESS WHICH HAS INVOLVED TENS OF

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THOUSANDS OF U.S. AND SOVIET CITIZENS OVER THE PAST TWO YEARS. THE LEADERS REAFFIRMED THEIR STRONG COMMITMENT FURTHER TO EXPAND SUCH CONTACTS, INCLUDING AMONG THE YOUNG.

GLOBAL CLIMATE AND ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE INITIATIVE

WITH REFERENCE TO THEIR NOVEMBER 1985 AGREEMENT IN GENEVA TO COOPERATE IN THE PRESERVATION OF THE ENVIRONMENT, THE TWO LEADERS APPROVED A BILATERAL INITIATIVE TO PURSUE JOINT STUDIES IN GLOBAL CLIMATE AND ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE THROUGH COOPERATION IN AREAS OF MUTUAL CONCERN, SUCH AS PROTECTION AND CONSERVATION OF STRATOSPHERIC OZONE, AND THROUGH INCREASED DATA EXCHANGES PURSUANT TO THE U.S.-SOVIET ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGREEMENT AND THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS CONCERNING COOPERATION IN THE EXPLORATION AND USE OF OUTER SPACE FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES. IN THIS CONTEXT, THERE WILL BE A

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DETAILED STUDY ON THE CLIMATE OF THE FUTURE. THE TWO SIDES WILL CONTINUE TO PROMOTE BROAD INTERNATIONAL AND BILATERAL COOPERATION IN THE INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT AREA OF GLOBAL CLIMATE AND ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE.

COOPERATIVE ACTIVITIES

THE PRESIDENT AND THE GENERAL SECRETARY SUPPORTED FURTHER COOPERATION AMONG SCIENTISTS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER COUNTRIES IN UTILIZING CONTROLLED THERMONUCLEAR FUSION FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES. THEY AFFIRMED THE INTENTION OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE USSR TO COOPERATE WITH THE EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY (EURATOM) AND JAPAN, UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, IN THE QUADRIPARTITE CONCEPTUAL DESIGN OF A FUSION TEST REACTOR.

THE TWO LEADERS NOTED WITH SATISFACTION PROGRESS UNDER THE BILATERAL AGREEMENT ON PEACEFUL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY TOWARDS ESTABLISHING A PERMANENT WORKING GROUP IN THE

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FIELD OF NUCLEAR REACTOR SAFETY, AND EXPRESSED THEIR READINESS TO DEVELOP FURTHER COOPERATION IN THIS AREA.

THE PRESIDENT AND THE GENERAL SECRETARY AGREED TO DEVELOP BILATERAL COOPERATION IN COMBATTING INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING. THEY AGREED THAT APPROPRIATE INITIAL CONSULTATIONS WOULD BE HELD FOR THESE PURPOSES IN EARLY 1988.

THEY ALSO AGREED TO BUILD ON RECENT CONTACTS TO DEVELOP MORE EFFECTIVE COOPERATION IN ENSURING THE SECURITY OF AIR AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION.

THE TWO LEADERS EXCHANGED VIEWS ON MEANS OF ENCOURAGING EXPANDED CONTACTS AND COOPERATION ON ISSUES RELATING TO UNCLASSIFIED
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THE ARCTIC. THEY EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF BILATERAL AND REGIONAL COOPERATION AMONG THE ARCTIC COUNTRIES ON THESE MATTERS, INCLUDING COORDINATION OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH AND PROTECTION OF THE REGION'S ENVIRONMENT.

THE TWO LEADERS WELCOMED THE CONCLUSION OF NEGOTIATIONS TO INSTITUTIONALIZE THE COSPAS/SARSAT SPACE-BASED GLOBAL SEARCH AND RESCUE SYSTEM, OPERATED JOINTLY BY THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, FRANCE AND CANADA.

TRADE

THE TWO SIDES STATED THEIR STRONG SUPPORT FOR THE EXPANSION OF MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL TRADE AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS. THEY INSTRUCTED THEIR TRADE MINISTERS TO CONVENE THE U.S.-USSR JOINT COMMERCIAL COMMISSION IN ORDER TO DEVELOP CONCRETE PROPOSALS TO ACHIEVE THAT OBJECTIVE, INCLUDING WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE LONG-TERM AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS TO FACILITATE ECONOMIC, INDUSTRIAL, AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION. THEY AGREED THAT COMMERCIALLY VIABLE JOINT VENTURES COMPLYING WITH THE LAWS AND REGULATIONS OF BOTH COUNTRIES COULD PLAY A ROLE IN THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF COMMERCIAL RELATIONS.

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DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS

BOTH SIDES AGREED ON THE IMPORTANCE OF ADEQUATE, SECURE
FACILITIES FOR THEIR RESPECTIVE DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR
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ESTABLISHMENTS, AND EMPHASIZED THE NEED TO APPROACH
PROBLEMS RELATING TO THE FUNCTIONING OF EMBASSIES AND
CONSULATES GENERAL CONSTRUCTIVELY AND ON THE BASIS OF
RECIPROCITY.

V. FURTHER MEETINGS

THE PRESIDENT AND THE GENERAL SECRETARY AGREED THAT
OFFICIAL CONTACTS AT ALL LEVELS SHOULD BE FURTHER
EXPANDED AND INTENSIFIED, WITH THE GOAL OF ACHIEVING
PRACTICAL AND CONCRETE RESULTS IN ALL AREAS OF THE
U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP.

GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV RENEWED THE INVITATION HE
EXTENDED DURING THE GENEVA SUMMIT FOR PRESIDENT REAGAN TO
VISIT THE SOVIET UNION. THE PRESIDENT ACCEPTED WITH
PLEASURE. THE VISIT WILL TAKE PLACE IN THE FIRST HALF OF
1988.

END TEXT OF JOINT STATEMENT.

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SUBJECT: HIGHLIGHTS OF TV EVENING NEWSCASTS, THURSDAY 12/10

A. ABC WORLD NEWS TONIGHT

1. SUMMIT - THE SUMMIT MEETING BETWEEN MR. GORBACHEV AND PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS ENDED WITH BOTH MEN SAYING THERE HAS BEEN CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS ON ISSUES WHICH DIVIDE THEM, AND BOTH MEN SAYING THERE IS MUCH WORK TO BE DONE. IT IS NOT BY ANY MEANS A DRAMATIC CONCLUSION TO THIS SERIES OF MEETINGS IN WASHINGTON, THE FIRST IMPRESSIONS ARE THAT BOTH MEN ARE COMMITTED TO KEEPING THE MOMENTUM GOING. THERE IS AN IMPRESSION PUT OUT BY THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION THAT MR. GORBACHEV MAY HAVE GIVEN UP SOME OF HIS INSISTENCE ABOUT THE TESTING OF THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE OR STAR WARS. BUT THE IMPRESSION FROM MR. GORBACHEV'S NEWS CONFERENCE HERE TODAY IS THAT HE SAID EXACTLY THE OPPOSITE. IT MAY TAKE SOME TIME TO FIGURE THAT OUT. (PETER JENNINGS)

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THE WASHINGTON SUPERPOWER SUMMIT ENDED IN THE RAIN ON THE

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WHITE HOUSE SOUTH LAWN, BUT THE TWO PRINCIPALS, PARTICULARLY THE PRESIDENT, TRIED TO PORTRAY A SUNNY

CONCLUSION. REAGAN: "I AM PLEASED TO REPORT THAT UPON THE COMPLETION OF OUR BUSINESS, THAT THIS SUMMIT HAS BEEN A CLEAR SUCCESS." GORBACHEV: "WE NOTE WITH SATISFACTION THAT THE VISIT TO WASHINGTON HAS ON THE WHOLE JUSTIFIED OUR HOPES." THE SIGNIFICANT EVENT OF THE WEEK, OF COURSE, WAS THE SIGNING OF THE NEW TREATY TO ELIMINATE MEDIUM-RANGE AND SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES. SINCE THAT NOTABLE ACHIEVEMENT HAD ALREADY BEEN NEGOTIATED, THE EMPHASIS FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE SUMMIT HAS BEEN ON WHAT ELSE WOULD BE ACCOMPLISHED.

THE SCORE CARD LOOKS LIKE THIS. ON THE CENTRAL ISSUE OF THE NEXT STEP ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT TO REDUCE LONG-RANGE STRATEGIC MISSILES BY FIFTY PERCENT, SOME HEADWAY WAS MADE, BUT NO BIG BREAKTHROUGH. ON AFGHANISTAN, THERE WAS VIGOROUS, SOMETIMES HEATED DEBATE, BUT THE SOVIETS SET NO NEW TIMETABLE FOR THEIR WITHDRAWAL. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, MORE HEATED DEBATES BUT STILL FUNDAMENTAL, STRONG DISAGREEMENT. BUT ON THE LEVEL OF PERSONAL HARMONY, UNDERSTANDING AND TRUST BETWEEN THE TWO LEADERS, BOTH SIDES POINTED TO REAL ACCOMPLISHMENT.

ON CAPITOL HILL, SECRETARY OF STATE SHULTZ BRIEFING CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS SAID HE HAS THE FEELING THAT SOMETHING VERY IMPORTANT HAD TAKEN PLACE, AN ASSESSMENT THAT DREW QUICK AGREEMENT. SENATOR METZENBAUM: "I THINK THEY HAVE MADE A MAJOR STEP FORWARD WITH RESPECT TO DISARMAMENT, AND WITH RESPECT TO WORLD PEACE." PATRICK BUCHANAN: "THE QUESTION IS WHETHER WE HAVE A CHANGE OF
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HEART THAT IS COMMENSURATE WITH A CHANGE OF FACE, AND I HAVEN'T SEEN THE EVIDENCE OF IT YET. THE PRESIDENT BELIEVES WE DO. I DON'T THINK SO."

IN ANY EVENT AS THE TWO MEN SAID GOODBYE, THE PRESIDENT'S SPOKESMAN CONFIDENTLY PREDICTED THEY WOULD MEET AGAIN WITHIN THE NEXT SIX MONTHS. FITZWATER: "THEY HAVE AGREED THAT A SUMMIT WILL BE HELD IN MOSCOW. THAT IS THE INTENTION. OF COURSE, YOU WILL RECALL THAT THEY AGREED TO THAT ORIGINALLY IN GENEVA."

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THE LAST SUMMIT BETWEEN THESE TWO MEN IN REYKJAVIK BROKE UP OVER GORBACHEV'S OPPOSITION TO THE PRESIDENT'S STAR WARS STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE. NOW GORBACHEV APPEARS TO HAVE EASED THAT OPPOSITION SOMEWHAT OR AT LEAST DELINKED IT FROM THE CAUSE OF CUTTING STRATEGIC ARMS. SO THE ROAD APPEARS TO BE OPEN TO PROGRESS IN THAT AREA, BUT WHETHER THAT ROAD WILL LEAD TO MOSCOW BY THE END OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S TERM HAS YET TO BE DETERMINED. (SAM DONALDSON, WHITE HOUSE)

2. GORBACHEV NEWS CONFERENCE - THIS NEWS CONFERENCE WAS MR. GORBACHEV'S LAST SCHEDULED EVENT IN WASHINGTON. HE SEEMED TO SUGGEST THAT THE WORST IN SOVIET-AMERICANS RELATIONS IS BEHIND US. GORBACHEV: "I WOULD SAY THAT AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL OF OUR TWO STATES IT HAS BEEN RECOGNIZED THAT THEY ARE NOW EMERGING FROM THE LONG, DRAWN OUT CONFRONTATION, THAT THEY ARE PREPARED TO LEAVE IT BEHIND US." (WALTER RODGERS)

3. STRATEGIC ARMS - THREE SOLID DAYS OF WORKING GROUPS SESSIONS STILL LEAVE MUCH TO BE DONE. MOST PROGRESS IN RECENT DAYS HAS COME IN THE AREA OF SUB-LIMITS OR CEILINGS ON VARIOUS TYPES OF NUCLEAR FORCES. FOR EXAMPLE, ON BIG, LAND-BASED MISSILES THE SOVIETS HAVE AGREED TO CUT IN HALF THEIR FORCE OF MULTIPLE WARHEAD
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SSLB'S, THEREBY REDUCING SOMEWHAT THE FIRST-STRIKE THREAT TO THE SMALLER FORCE OF AMERICAN LAND-BASED MISSILES.

ON MOBILE MISSILES, PENTAGON SOURCES SAY THE U.S. IS RETREATING FROM ITS INSISTENCE THAT MOBILES BE BANNED BECAUSE THEY ARE TOUGH TO VERIFY. THE U.S. WOULD NOW ALLOW MOBILES IN RESTRICTED AREAS. THESE KINDS OF QUESTIONS INCLUDING TOUGH VERIFICATION PROBLEMS, CAN BE SOLVED. THE BIGGEST OBSTACLE REMAINS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT'S SDI PROGRAM AND A 1972 TREATY WHICH BANS ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS IN SPACE.

THE AGREEMENT REACHED TODAY COMMITS BOTH PARTIES TO ABIDE BY THE ABM TREATY AS SIGNED IN 1972. IT'S BEING INTERPRETED BY THE RUSSIANS AS PREVENTING THE TESTING OF SDI COMPONENTS IN SPACE AND THUS FORESTALLING THE DAY

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WHEN THE U.S. CAN DEPLOY ITS DEFENSE AGAINST A SOVIET MISSILE FORCE THINNED OUT BY A START AGREEMENT. THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION STILL ADHERES TO ITS BROAD ABM INTERPRETATION WHICH COULD PERMIT SDI TESTS IN SPACE. IT'S STILL NOT CLEAR WHETHER NEGOTIATORS MUST RESOLVE THIS DISPUTE BEFORE A START AGREEMENT IS SIGNED, OR WHETHER THE RUSSIANS WOULD USE SDI TESTING BY THE U.S. AS AN ESCAPE HATCH FROM THE START MISSILE CUTS.

BUILDING ON THE MOMENTUM OF THE INF ACCORD, THE TWO LEADERS PLEDGED TO CONTINUE THEIR SEARCH FOR A START AGREEMENT, TOO. BUT ADMINISTRATION SOURCES SAY THE ODDS OF ACHIEVING ONE NEXT YEAR ARE NO BETTER THAN FIFTY-FIFTY. THE SOVIETS STILL SEEM TO BE TELLING MR. REAGAN HE CAN HAVE SDI OR DEEP CUTS IN OFFENSIVE MISSILES, BUT NOT BOTH. (BOB ZELNICK, PENTAGON)

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SAM DONALDSON: IT IS STILL A LITTLE MURKY, BUT I SUSPECT, PETER, THEY LEAVE THIS SUMMIT BOTH OF THEM BELIEVING THAT THEY ACHIEVED WHAT THEY WANTED. IN OTHER WORDS THEY BOTH CAN SAY THEY HAD THEIR WAY. WHETHER THIS LEADS TO AGREEMENT THOUGH, WE WON'T KNOW FOR SEVERAL MONTHS.

JOHN MCWETHY: I THINK THE WAY THEY WERE ABLE TO LEAVE IT IS AMBIGUOUS, PETER. BOTH SIDES HAVE SAID THEY WILL STICK BY THE AGREEMENT AS WRITTEN AND SIGNED IN 1972, BUT BOTH SIDES FREELY ADMIT THAT THEY HAVE DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF WHAT THAT MEANS.

WALTER RODGERS: MR. GORBACHEV CAN GO HOME, PETER, PLEASED WITH A VERY GOOD SUMMIT, AND I THINK HE CAN SELL HIS ACCOMPLISHMENTS. HE CAN SELL THE FACT THAT HE HAS SHOWN HE CAN DO BUSINESS WITH THE AMERICANS, AND NOT CONFRONTATION. HE IS STARTING TO REIN IN THE BIG REAGAN MILITARY BUILDUP, AND HE HAS ALSO MADE THE MOTHERLAND SAFER.

B. NBC NIGHTLY NEWS

1. SUMMIT - PRESIDENT REAGAN AND SOVIET LEADER MIKHAIL GORBACHEV ENDED THEIR THREE DAY SUMMIT WITHOUT A

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BREAKTHROUGH ON REDUCING LONG-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS; WITHOUT A BREAKTHROUGH ON STAR WARS; WITHOUT A BREAKTHROUGH ON AFGHANISTAN; OR A MEETING OF THE MINDS ON HUMAN RIGHTS. BUT THEY EMPHASIZED THEY DID MAKE PROGRESS, AND THEY AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO MEET AGAIN NEXT YEAR, THIS TIME IN MOSCOW. HOWEVER, THERE IS NO ASSURANCE TONIGHT THAT THEY WILL HAVE A TREATY ON LONG-RANGE MISSILES IN PLACE BY THEN. THEY WILL CONTINUE TO NEGOTIATE BUT THOSE NEGOTIATIONS ARE EXPECTED TO BE DIFFICULT. (TOM BROKAW)

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THE TWO LEADERS CAME OUT OF THE WHITE HOUSE THIS AFTERNOON TALKING OF SUCCESS, BUT THEIR CONTINUING DIFFERENCES SEEMED JUST AS THREATENING AS THE WEATHER. ON THE CENTRAL ISSUE OF ARMS CONTROL, THE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL SECRETARY BOTH PRAISED THE MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILE TREATY THEY SIGNED TUESDAY, BUT THEY HAD NO SPECIFICS ABOUT MAKING A NEW DEAL TO REDUCE LONG-RANGE WEAPONS. REAGAN: "I AM PLEASED SOME PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE TOWARD A STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATY OVER THE LAST THREE DAYS." GORBACHEV: "IN OUR TALKS WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN SOME HEADWAY HAS BEEN MADE ON THE CENTRAL ISSUE OF THAT PROCESS, ALTHOUGH WE STILL HAVE A LOT OF WORK TO DO.

THE TWO SIDES MAY SOME PROGRESS ON LONG-RANGE ARMS AGREEING EACH SIDE SHOULD BE LIMITED TO 4900 WARHEADS ON LAND AND SEA-BASED BALLISTIC MISSILES. THAT IS ABOUT A FIFTY PERCENT CUT. BUT STAR WARS IS STILL A PROBLEM. WHILE THE LEADERS CALL FOR AN AGREEMENT ON HOW TO LIMIT SPACE DEFENSE, THEY DID NOT SETTLE THEIR SHARP DIFFERENCES. IT WAS THE SAME WITH TALKS ON WORLD TROUBLE SPOTS. ALL MR. REAGAN AND GORBACHEV COULD SAY WAS THAT AT LEAST THEY WERE DISCUSSING THEIR DIFFERENCES.

U.S. OFFICIALS SAY GORBACHEV TALKED ABOUT PULLING SOVIET TROOPS FROM AFGHANISTAN IN ONE YEAR, BUT DIDN'T SAY WHEN HE WOULD START AND DEMANDED THE U.S. CUT OFF AID TO AFGHAN REBELS FIRST. THERE WERE SIGNS ALL DAY THE TALKS WERE PRODUCING NO BREAKTHROUGHS. AT A MEETING WITH VICE PRESIDENT BUSH THIS MORNING, GORBACHEV WAS ASKED IF THERE WAS ANY PROGRESS ON AFGHANISTAN. HE SAID WHAT YOU NEED ARE TWO PEOPLE TO AGREE. SOVIET MARSHAL ACREMAYEV (SP)

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ON A VISIT TO THE PENTAGON WAS JUST AS DOWNBEAT ABOUT
ARMS TALKS: "THE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE BEEN GOING ON. THEY
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ARE NOT YET COMPLETED. THEY ARE GOING ON WITH
DIFFICULTIES, NOT EASILY." THE TALKS WENT SO BADLY THAT
AT 10:30 WHEN GORBACHEV WAS DUE TO MEET THE PRESIDENT IN
THE OVAL OFFICE, HE STAYED AT THE SOVIET EMBASSY. THE
U.S. SIDE PUT OUT A STORY THAT THIS HAD BEEN PREARRANGED,
BUT IN FACT, OFFICIALS TELL NBC NEWS THAT GORBACHEV WAS
SO UPSET WITH CONTINUING DIFFERENCES OVER STAR WARS, THAT
HE DID NOT EVEN INFORM MR. REAGAN THAT HE WASN'T COMING.
WHEN GORBACHEV FINALLY ARRIVED NINETY MINUTES LATE, THE
PRESIDENT JOKED ABOUT BEING ABANDONED. REAGAN: "I
THOUGHT YOU HAD GONE HOME."

AS ANY MAJOR DEAL SLIPPED AWAY, WHITE HOUSE OFFICIALS
PLAYED UP PERSONAL RELATIONS, LETTING CAMERAS PHOTOGRAPH
THE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL SECRETARY WALKING ON THE SOUTH
GROUNDS. AND WHILE THE TWO LEADERS WENT TO LUNCH,
SECRETARY OF STATE SHULTZ WAS STILL NEGOTIATING IN THE
CABINET ROOM, LESS THAN HALF-AN-HOUR BEFORE THE DEPARTURE
CEREMONY.

AND, SO, IT TURNS OUT THE HIGHLIGHT OF THIS SUMMIT CAME
THE FIRST DAY WITH THE SIGNING OF A MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILE
TREATY. U.S. OFFICIALS HAD BILLED THIS AS A FIRST STEP,
BUT THERE WERE NO OTHER BIG STEPS TO ANNOUNCE. AS TO A
SUMMIT NEXT YEAR IN MOSCOW, THERE IS AN INTENTION, BUT NO
FIRM COMMITMENT. AT DAY'S END SOME OBSERVERS SAID
GORBACHEV USED THIS SUMMIT NOT ONLY TO NEGOTIATE WITH MR.
REAGAN BUT TO START DEALING WITH THE AMERICAN LEADERS WHO

WILL FOLLOW HIM. BRENT SCOWCROFT: "I BELIEVE THIS WAS
CLEARLY GORBACHEV'S SUMMIT. PRESIDENT REAGAN DID VERY
WELL, BUT GORBACHEV WAS THE CENTER OF ATTENTION." IT
SEEMS CLEAR THEN THAT GORBACHEV IS READY TO DEAL WITH THE
U.S. BUT ONLY ON HIS OWN TERMS AND AT HIS OWN PACE. FOR
A PRESIDENT WITH JUST A YEAR LEFT IN OFFICE, THAT MAY
MEAN STEADY PROGRESS BUT NOT THE BIG FINISH HE HAD HOPED
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FOR. (CHRIS WALLACE, WHITE HOUSE)

. CHANCELLOR COMMENTARY - IT'S USEFUL TO ASK AT THE END OF A SUMMIT CONFERENCE, WHAT DID THE SUMMITEERS GET OUT OF IT? AND MORE IMPORTANT, WHAT DID THE REST OF US GET OUT OF IT? RONALD REAGAN CERTAINLY DIDN'T GET EVERYTHING HE WANTED, BUT HE DID VERY WELL AND WE WILL BE HEARING A LOT ABOUT THAT IN THE DAYS TO COME. AND IT WAS BETTER FOR HIM BY FAR THAN THE SUMMIT IN ICELAND LAST YEAR WHEN HE LOOKED CONFUSED AND UNPREPARED. REMEMBER THE ANGRY BREAKUP OF THAT SUMMIT IN THE DARK OF NIGHT. THIS WEEK IN WASHINGTON, MR. REAGAN SHOWED THAT AT 76 HE COULD DEAL EFFECTIVELY WITH AN AGGRESSIVE FOREIGN LEADER TWENTY YEARS HIS JUNIOR. MIKHAIL GORBACHEV DIDN'T GET ALL HE WANTED, BUT HE STILL GOT QUITE A LOT. HE GOT ENOUGH VIDEOTAPES OF HIS MEETINGS WITH INFLUENTIAL AMERICANS TO MOUNT A MEDIA BLITZ AT HOME WHICH IS APPARENTLY HIS PLAN. HE WAS VERY IMPRESSIVE IN THOSE MEETINGS AND THAT DIDN'T HURT HIM IN THIS COUNTRY. HIS REPUTATION AS A SERIOUS WORLD LEADER WAS IMPROVED BY THIS VISIT AND THAT SHOULDN'T HURT HIM AT HOME.

AND THE REST OF US -- WE HAVE A TREATY WHICH ELIMINATES A CATEGORY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS -- FIRST TIME THAT HAS EVER HAPPENED. WE HAVE AGREED ON PROCEDURES OF VERIFICATION THAT ARE UNPRECEDENTED. THE VERIFICATION REGIME THAT HAS BEEN WORKED OUT HAS ALL KINDS OF HOPEFUL IMPLICATIONS FOR ARMS CONTROL. YOU TAKE WHAT YOU CAN GET FROM SUMMIT CONFERENCES. NONE OF THEM HAS LED MANKIND IN TO THE SUNLIT UPLANDS OF WORLD PEACE, AND SOME HAVE BEEN DISASTERS. AGAINST THAT BACKGROUND, THIS ONE WAS PRETTY GOOD. (JOHN CHANCELLOR)

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C. CBS EVENING NEWS

1. SUMMIT - BOTH SIDES SAY THERE COULD BE A NEW DEAL ON STAR WARS. THEY SAY IT'S PERHAPS A DEAL THAT COULD GIVE PRESIDENT REAGAN MUCH OF WHAT HE WANTS IN THE WAY OF STAR WARS TECHNOLOGY TESTING. THIS COULD BE INTERPRETED AS A WIN FOR PRESIDENT REAGAN. BUT THERE IS NO FIRM DEAL YET. ALSO, THIS SUMMIT ENDS WITH NO DEAL ON

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SIGNIFICANTLY CUTTING SUPERPOWER LONG-RANGE NUCLEAR MISSILES. HOWEVER, GORBACHEV HAS JUST SAID IN A NEWS CONFERENCE THAT SOME AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED ON SUBLIMITS FOR THE LONG-RANGE MISSILES. NO DEAL ON AFGHANISTAN. BOTH SIDES ARE STRESSING THE UPSIDE OF WHAT HAPPENED AT THIS SUMMIT.

GORBACHEV KEPT ON PRESSING AND SELLING TO THE VERY END -- PRESSING PRESIDENT REAGAN TO BACK DOWN ON STAR WARS, TO BACK OFF ON AFGHANISTAN. WHEN HE WASN'T PRESSING PRESIDENT REAGAN, HE WAS OUT PRESSING THE FLESH. GORBACHEV MADE AN IMPROMPTU STOP AT A WASHINGTON STREET TO GREET AN AMERICAN LUNCHTIME CROWD. (DAN RATHER)

A SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL SAYS TONIGHT THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN AND SOVIET LEADER GORBACHEV HAVE AGREED ON AN INTERPRETATION OF THE ABM TREATY WHICH WILL ALLOW THE U.S. TO TEST WHATEVER ELEMENTS OF THE PRESIDENT'S STAR WARS PROGRAM IT WISHES. WHITE HOUSE STAFF MEMBERS SEE THAT AS A MAJOR VICTORY FOR THE U.S. OFFICIALS SAY THE PRESIDENT AND MR. GORBACHEV HAVE AGREED TO MEET AGAIN IN MOSCOW IN THE FIRST HALF OF 1988, WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS A NEW TREATY TO SIGN.

THE TWO LEADERS EMERGED AT THE END OF THEIR MEETING TODAY TO DECLARE THE SUMMIT A SUCCESS. (REAGAN: "I BELIEVE BOTH THE GENERAL SECRETARY AND I CAN WALK AWAY FROM OUR
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MEETINGS WITH A SENSE OF ACCOMPLISHMENT.") (GORBACHEV: "THE VISIT TO WASHINGTON HAS, ON THE WHOLE, JUSTIFIED OUR HOPES.") THE INF TREATY WAS THE ONLY CONCRETE DEAL. STILL, THE TWO SIDES REPORTED PROGRESS TOWARD THE AGREEMENT ON THE NUMBERS AND TYPES OF WEAPONS TO BE ALLOWED UNDER A FUTURE DEAL CUTTING LONG-RANGE NUCLEAR MISSILES BY HALF. AS FOR AFGHANISTAN, MR. GORBACHEV WOULD NOT COMMIT TO A SPECIFIC DATE FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS, NOR THE PRESIDENT TO ENDING AID TO THE REBELS THERE. (REAGAN: "THE GENERAL SECRETARY AND I EXPRESSED DIFFERENT POINTS OF VIEW; WE DID SO BLUNTLY. THE DOOR HAS BEEN OPENED, AND IT WILL STAY OPEN TO SERIOUS DISCUSSION OF ENDING THESE REGIONAL CONFLICTS.") BUT, UNLIKE THEIR MEETING IN ICELAND, THE FAILURE TO

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RESOLVE CONFLICTS PRODUCED, NOT A BREAKDOWN, BUT AN AGREEMENT TO WORK AROUND THEM AND BUILD A FRAMEWORK TOWARD FUTURE PROGRESS.

LATE TODAY, THE SECRETARY OF STATE WORKED TO SELL THE SUMMIT RESULTS ON CAPITOL HILL. (SEN. LEAHY: "I SEE THE MOST BIPARTISAN SUPPORT FOR THE ADMINISTRATION ON FOREIGN POLICY THAT I'VE SEEN IN YEARS AND YEARS.")

THE WHITE HOUSE IS DELIGHTED, BECAUSE, FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE BEFORE THE IRAN-CONTRA SCANDAL, THE POLLS SHOW MR. REAGAN'S POPULARITY AT OVER 60 PERCENT, AND THAT WAS A BIG PART FOR THEM OF WHAT THIS SUMMIT WAS ALL ABOUT. (BILL PLANTE - WASHINGTON)

IN A MEETING WITH AMERICAN BUSINESS LEADERS, GORBACHEV LOBBIED FOR JOINT VENTURES TO HELP HIS ECONOMY GET WESTERN TECHNOLOGY AND MANAGERIAL KNOW-HOW. (GORBACHEV: "WE MUST, I AM SURE, LOOK AT EACH OTHER AS PARTNERS AND
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NOT AS ADVERSARIES.") THE NEW AND UNLIKELY RAPPORT LED GORBACHEV TO CONCLUDE THAT THE SUMMIT HAD BEEN A SUCCESS. HE MADE HIS CASE EFFECTIVELY TO A BROAD SPECTRUM OF AMERICANS, DESPITE HIS LACK OF HEADWAY WITH THE PRESIDENT.

GORBACHEV HAS APPARENTLY AGREED TO PERMIT SOME STAR WARS TESTING. (GORBACHEV: "THE PRESIDENT AND I, WITH DUE REGARD FOR PREPARING THE TREATY ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, HAVE INSTRUCTED THE DELEGATIONS IN GENEVA TO ELABORATE AN AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD MAKE IT INCUMBENT UPON BOTH THE SOVIET AND THE AMERICAN SIDES TO COMPLY WITH THE ABM TREATY IN THE FORM IN WHICH IT WAS SIGNED IN 1972, AND THAT INCLUDES THE PROCESS OF RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND, IF NECESSARY, TESTS.") "...IF NECESSARY, TESTS." -- THAT'S THE KEY THING THAT GORBACHEV SAID TODAY THAT HE HAS NEVER SAID BEFORE. THERE'S APPARENTLY A VERY SEMANTIC, BUT IMPORTANT COMPROMISE BEING REACHED HERE BY WHICH MR. GORBACHEV WILL GIVE MR. REAGAN TESTING, AND, IN RETURN, BE ABLE TO CLAIM THAT THE ORIGINAL ABM TREATY WILL BE UPHELD. (WYATT ANDREWS - WASHINGTON)

2. SDI PROGRESS - SOME OF THE TECHNOLOGY FOR A STAR WARS

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DEFENSE ALREADY EXISTS. BUT THE JUMP FROM LABORATORY TO SPACE WILL BE STAGGERINGLY COMPLEX. EVEN A RUDIMENTARY DEFENSE AGAINST SOVIET MISSILES WOULD REQUIRE HUNDREDS OF SATELLITES IN ORBIT. HUNDREDS, PROBABLY THOUSANDS OF SOVIET WARHEADS WOULD STILL GET THROUGH. BUT ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS SAY STAR WARS DOESN'T HAVE TO BE PERFECT, JUST GOOD ENOUGH TO DISCOURAGE THE SOVIETS. (SDI DIRECTOR LT. GEN. JAMES ABRAHAMSON: "YOU WANT TO HAVE SUCH A SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON THAT FORCE OF THOUSANDS SO THAT, IN FACT, THEY HAVE TO MAKE VERY DIFFICULT CHOICES AND THEY CANNOT CONDUCT THEIR MILITARY CAMPAIGN.")

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IT WILL BE THE 1990S AT THE EARLIEST BEFORE ANYONE CAN TELL WHETHER A STAR WARS DEFENSE IS PRACTICAL -- NOT JUST

WHETHER THE TECHNOLOGY WILL WORK, BUT HOW MUCH IT WILL COST. THE ANSWER COULD DETERMINE THE COURSE OF THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE LONG AFTER MIKHAIL GORBACHEV AND RONALD REAGAN ARE GONE. (DAVID MARTIN - WASHINGTON)

D. MACNEIL-LEHRER

1. RICHARD PERLE: THE INF AGREEMENT WAS A SIGNIFICANT ACHIEVEMENT THAT TOOK A LONG TIME TO BRING ABOUT. IT REQUIRED PERSISTENCE ON THE PART OF THE PRESIDENT. BUT I THINK IT IS A MISTAKE TO OVERSTATE THE EXTENT TO WHICH PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE, AND TO ASSUME THAT WE CAN NOW ACHIEVE LOTS OF OTHER ACHIEVEMENTS IN RAPID SUCCESSION. WHERE I'M AFRAID THERE WAS VERY LITTLE PROGRESS, ALTHOUGH I DIDN'T EXPECT MUCH, IS WITH RESPECT TO AFGHANISTAN AND HUMAN RIGHTS, AND A NUMBER OF OTHER REGIONAL ISSUES. THE CONFLICT ON THE ABM TREATY IS BETWEEN TWO PROVISIONS OF IT: ONE THAT APPEARS TO BAN THE TESTING OF STRATEGIC DEFENSES IN SPACE; AND ANOTHER THAT APPEARS TO PERMIT THE TESTING OF STRATEGIC DEFENSES, PROVIDED THE TECHNOLOGIES ARE NEW TECHNOLOGIES. THEY DECIDED NOT TO SETTLE THAT ISSUE AT THIS MEETING. WE NEED TO BE SURE THAT THE SOVIETS UNDERSTAND THAT WHEN WE SAY WE ARE COMMITTED TO ADHERE TO THE TREATY, WE MEAN THE INTERPRETATION THAT WOULD PERMIT TESTING AND DEVELOPMENT OF SYSTEMS BASED ON NEW TECHNOLOGY. IN THE LONG-RUN, GORBACHEV HAS GOT TO

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DIMINISH THE TREMENDOUS FLOW OF RESOURCES INTO THEIR
MILITARY SECTOR. AND THAT, TOGETHER WITH THE ATMOSPHERE
AT THE SUMMIT, PROVIDES SOME BASIS FOR HOPE THAT WE MAY
BE ABLE TO CONCLUDE AGREEMENTS THAT REALLY DO DIMINISH
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THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE SOVIETS ARE BUILDING MILITARY
POWER.

GARY HART: ASIDE FROM THE VERY IMPORTANT INF AGREEMENT,
I SUSPECT THE HISTORY OF THIS SUMMIT IS THAT THE U.S. GOT
TO SEE THE FIRST MODERN SOVIET LEADER -- NOT AN
INCONSIDERABLE ACHIEVEMENT. I WAS DISAPPOINTED IN THE
TWO LEADERS' INABILITY TO BE MORE FIRM IN THEIR
COMMITMENT TO INSTRUCT THEIR NEGOTIATORS IN GENEVA TO
FORGE AHEAD ON 50 PERCENT REDUCTIONS. THAT WAS THE MORE
IMPORTANT ITEM ON THE AGENDA FOR THE SUMMIT. MY OWN VIEW
ON AFGHANISTAN IS THAT GORBACHEV WANTS OUT OF THERE.

E. ABC'S NIGHTLINE WILL FOCUS ON THE SUMMIT. A
VIDEOTAPE OF THE PROGRAM WILL BE REVIEWED IN THE MORNING
AND A SUMMARY OF IT MAY BE INCLUDED IN THE FRIDAY MORNING
TV HIGHLIGHTS. WHITEHEAD

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IRAN-IRAQ WAR

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U.S. Policy

U.S. policy toward the Iran-Iraq war aims at achieving a negotiated comprehensive ceasefire and peace without victor or vanquished. Iraq has called for a ceasefire, and accepted UN Security Council Resolution 598 which calls for ceasefire, withdrawal to international boundaries, exchange of prisoners, and negotiation leading to a peace settlement. Iran has not accepted the Resolution.

The U.S. therefore follows three tracks in its policy toward the war:

- Diplomatic: We sponsored UNSCR 598, and pursue every path to support the UN Secretary General in his efforts to implement it. We believe in starting to draft a follow-up resolution incorporating enforcement measures, as envisioned in UNSCR 598, to generate pressure to abide by it.
- Military: Our naval presence in the Persian Gulf aims at preserving freedom of navigation for neutral shipping and deterring Iranian intimidation and aggression of neutral Gulf states.
- Operation Staunch: We attempt to keep weapons from flowing to Iran, the party which seeks to continue the war, by means of a combined intelligence-sharing and diplomatic effort.

Recent Soviet Moves in the Gulf

In July, the Soviets joined in the unanimous adoption of UNSCR 598. They agreed with other permanent Security Council members September 25 to intensify the UN Secretary General's efforts to engage both sides to implement a ceasefire and, if needed, to move on to enforcement measures.

But since then the Soviets have declined to join with us in the Security Council to prepare an enforcement resolution against the recalcitrant party, and have raised an impractical proposal for a UN naval force in the Gulf as a substitute for the Western naval presence there.

Soviet Principal Deputy Foreign Minister Vorontsov visited Baghdad, Kuwait, and Tehran October 30-November 1. The much publicized visit to "mediate" produced disappointing results for the Soviets. Vorontsov attempted to portray the U.S.

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presence -- and the war itself -- as the underlying cause of tensions in the Gulf, and to promote the Soviet UN Task Force proposal. He was rebuffed in both Kuwait and Baghdad. Naturally, the Iranians shared the Soviet dislike for the U.S. naval presence in the Gulf. But the pointed lack of any reference to the Soviet proposal in Iranian official statements on Vorontsov's visit shows the Iranians were equally suspicious of Soviet aims.

Meanwhile, Soviet warships continue to escort their merchant shipping in the Gulf and through the Straits of Hormuz. Although it is known that some Soviet merchantmen carry arms bound for Iraq, Iranian warships have studiously left them alone. The Soviets continue their charter of Soviet-flagged tankers to Kuwait.

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REGIONAL DIALOGUE

In a September 1984 speech to the UN General Assembly, President Reagan proposed that the U.S. and USSR conduct periodic exchanges of view by senior experts on regional affairs, in order to help avoid miscalculation, reduce the risk of U.S.-Soviet confrontation, and help find peaceful solutions to regional conflicts.

The Soviet Union accepted the offer and, beginning in early 1985, a series of meetings was held at the level of Assistant Secretary of State to review policies and issues regarding Afghanistan, the Middle East, southern Africa, Central America and the Caribbean, and East Asia and the Pacific. At the Geneva summit, the President and General Secretary Gorbachev agreed that this dialogue should be regularized.

Since then, we have continued the dialogue through an annual cycle of senior experts meetings in 1986 and 1987, and have expanded it to include comprehensive, global reviews between U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Michael H. Armacost and his Soviet counterparts. The most recent of these took place November 17, 1987, in Geneva, where Under Secretary Armacost met with Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister Yuliy Vorontsov.

These meetings have not entailed negotiations on regional conflicts but rather have provided an important means for making clear to senior Soviet policymakers our concerns, and those of our friends and allies, about Soviet policies and actions in the Third World. Topics at these sessions have included, for example, the Middle East peace process, the Iran-Iraq war, stability in the Korean peninsula, and the status of efforts to achieve peace in southern Africa and Central America.

We have urged the Soviet Union to make concrete contributions to peaceful settlements of regional conflicts, and have emphasized the need for rapid withdrawal of foreign troops -- e.g., Soviet forces from Afghanistan, Vietnamese forces from Cambodia, and Cuban forces from Angola -- that would facilitate efforts by the indigenous parties to achieve settlements based on genuine self-determination and national reconciliation. Based on the President's 1985 regional initiative at the UN General Assembly, we have stressed U.S. willingness to contribute appropriately to the peaceful settlement of regional conflicts and to economic reconstruction of war-torn societies. We have also made clear that until the achievement of peaceful settlements of regional conflicts, we will continue our support for resistance movements against the imposition of Marxist-Leninist regimes.

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AFGHANISTAN

U.S. Policy

U.S. policy toward Afghanistan aims at achieving a comprehensive political settlement based on four elements that have been embodied in UN resolutions on Afghanistan over the last eight years:

- The prompt and complete withdrawal of Soviet troops;
- Restoration of Afghanistan's independent, neutral and non-aligned status;
- Return of the three-five million Afghan refugees with safety and honor;
- Self-determination for the Afghan people.

The United States supports the UN-sponsored negotiations led by Under Secretary General Diego Cordovez. We have expressed our willingness to serve an appropriate role as guarantor of a comprehensive and balanced settlement. To date, three of the four instruments that will comprise a settlement are substantially resolved. The remaining obstacle to a settlement is Soviet refusal to present a realistic timetable for the complete and permanent withdrawal of the approximately 120,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan.

The United States provides considerable material and political support for the Afghan resistance. Despite more aggressive Soviet tactics, the Afghan resistance fighters (mujahidin) continue to develop both militarily and politically.

Recent Developments

The Soviets appear frustrated at their failure to win a military victory over the Afghan resistance and have intensified both political and military efforts. The political process has included a "national reconciliation" program and cease-fire offer announced by the Kabul regime last January, and an offer at the most recent round of UN proximity talks in September 1987 for a 16-month withdrawal timetable (down from 18 months proposed in March 1987).

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As described by the Kabul regime, "national reconciliation" would involve some devolution of power to tribal and local leaders and would allow for participation by resistance leaders in a "coalition" government. In elaborating what "national reconciliation" means, the Soviet Union has tacitly recognized that the nature of the Kabul regime must be addressed if there is to be peace in Afghanistan.

However, despite some Soviet diplomatic movement and repeated assertions by Moscow that it has already made the decision to leave Afghanistan, the Soviet Union has not taken the necessary actions to achieve a solution. Notwithstanding the "cease-fire" offer, Soviet and Afghan military activity has continued, both against the Afghan resistance and against neighboring Pakistan. The Kabul regime's plan for "national reconciliation" would ensure continued domination by the Afghan communists, the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA); the plan has not attracted credible support from the Afghan people at home or abroad, and has failed to reverse the net outflow of Afghan refugees into Pakistan and Iran this year. The offer to withdraw troops in 16 months, while moving in the right direction, still seems intended to allow the Soviets and PDPA time to gain a military victory over the resistance.

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Washington, D.C. 20520

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November 20, 1987
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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. FRANK C. CARLUCCI
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Summit Press Book

The following material is provided per request for use in the Summit Press Book. The Department requests that copies of the final book be passed to EUR/SOV and State/PA for distribution.

I. GENERAL INFORMATION

- A. History of U.S.-Soviet Summits, 1943-1986 (Draft being worked with NSC staff; will be provided directly upon completion)
- B. President's Meetings with Soviet Leaders (Update attached)

II. SOVIET UNION

- A. USSR Background Notes (Department suggests use of current publication)
- B. List of Major Soviet Leaders (Update attached)
- C. Bios of Mr. and Mrs. Gorbachev (Attached)
- D. Soviet Government Structure (Attached)
- E. Fact Sheet on Soviet Economy (Update attached)

III. PRESIDENT ON U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS

Provided by White House

IV. SUMMIT AGENDA

A. Human Rights

- 1. Overview of U.S. Human Rights Policy (Update attached)
- 2. Overview of Soviet Human Rights Situation (Update attached)
- 3. Freedom of Emigration/Related issues (Update attached)
- 4. CSCE Process (Attached)

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B. Regional Issues

1. Overview (Update attached)
2. One page Fact Sheets (updates attached)
 - a. Afghanistan
 - b. Iran-Iraq
 - c. Middle East
 - d. Central America
 - e. East Asia
 - f. Soviet policies in Africa
 - g. Eastern Europe
 - h. President's Berlin Initiative

C. Bilateral Issues

1. One page Fact Sheets (Updates attached)
 - a. Exchanges (Tasked to USIA)
 - b. S&T Agreements
 - c. U.S.-Soviet trade and grain sales
 - d. Other Bilateral Issues

D. Security and Arms Control

Already tasked via Arms Control Public Diplomacy IG

Melvyn Levitsky
Melvyn Levitsky
Executive Secretary

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REGIONAL ISSUES

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INTRODUCTION

- As we set out to do at Geneva, we have expanded our regional dialogue. This has been useful.
- I propose that we affirm that this dialogue is a permanent fixture, and that we begin another cycle of expert talks early next year.
- But in itself, this dialogue is no longer enough. Progress on regional issues has lagged behind that in other areas of our agenda.
- My concern is twofold.
 - o Regional crises constantly risk drawing us into direct conflict. We all remember Berlin, Korea and Cuba.
 - o Second, even when they aren't major East-West confrontations, they can significantly affect our relations. The conflicts from the 1970s, such as Afghanistan or Angola, are still with us. And Nicaragua and Iran-Iraq have joined the list.
- The bottom line in a number of these conflicts is to focus on political settlement among the indigenous parties.
- Failure to end these conflicts -- especially where Soviet forces or the forces you support are involved -- will undermine the effort to promote cooperation on other issues.
- So, we should explore ways to resolve key regional issues. At the top of the list are Afghanistan, Iran-Iraq, southern Africa, and Cambodia.

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AFGHANISTAN

- I hardly need to emphasize to you the positive impact of ending the Afghan conflict during the coming year.
- While we seek a rapid political settlement, our support for those striving to restore Afghan independence will continue until a settlement has been reached.
- We have listened with hope to statements that you have already decided to withdraw.
- There seems to be a greater measure of agreement on key concepts than ever before:
 - o That a short timetable for withdrawal of Soviet troops is essential;
 - o That this timetable should not be linked to prior agreement on an interim government in Kabul.
 - o That Afghanistan's future political course should be left to the Afghan people to decide.
 - o That there should be guarantees for the neutrality of Afghanistan, following the Austrian model.
- You have indicated a willingness to resume your dialogue with Pakistan. You will find Islamabad positive if you have constructive proposals; in the face of intimidation or pressure, you will find the Pakistanis tough and resilient.
- The essential step is for the Soviet Union to commit to a specific timetable, including provisions for the early removal of a substantial body of your forces.
- This would permit signature of the Geneva accords and the start of troop withdrawals early in the new year.
- I propose as our objective this week: announcement of a date certain before the end of 1988 by which time all Soviet troops will have returned home.
- A successful settlement in Afghanistan would contribute significantly to the better relationship we both seek.

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AFGHANISTAN (CONTINGENCY)

Pakistan

- The U.S. is committed to supporting Pakistan. We are deeply concerned with efforts in the past year to intimidate Pakistan.
- A test of Soviet sincerity is your willingness to replace the pressure with diplomatic dialogue.
- You will find Pakistan ready to make a constructive contribution to a political settlement.

U.S. Support for the Resistance

- We want a political settlement and are prepared to be helpful.
- But, U.S. support for the Afghan resistance will continue until this conflict can be set on the road to a solution with the signature of the Geneva accords.

Peacekeeping Forces:

- We would be prepared to discuss creation of an international peacekeeping presence as a means of enhancing stability in Afghanistan during a transitional period.
- However, the record of such peacekeeping forces in situations of acute civil strife is not promising.
- Another issue to be addressed is economic reconstruction.

Interim Arrangements:

- We favor a government of genuine national reconciliation. This cannot be accomplished in the shadow of foreign troops. Only the Afghan people themselves can decide their own future.
- The announcement of a date certain timetable will provide a strong impulse to Afghan resolution of interim arrangements.
- We agree with you that the former King could play an important role in the process of forming an interim government.
- However, he can only play this role if the PDPA drops its current insistence that it be accorded the central role in this process.

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AFGHANISTAN (CONTINGENCY)

Neutrality:

- Permanent Afghan neutrality could be agreed to by the guarantors as part of the Geneva instruments, or in some other way.
- The guarantors would undertake obligations including to form no alliance or security arrangement with Afghanistan, and to neither introduce foreign military personnel nor establish military bases or facilities there.
- Afghanistan would undertake similar obligations in line with its acceptance of neutrality status, but would remain free to determine its political orientation and to participate in regional or international organizations.

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IRAN-IRAQ WAR

- Our exchange of letters last summer helped lead to cooperation in the Security Council.
- That cooperation last July seemed to say that there are shared interests between us on regional conflicts, and that this could be translated into unified action.
- Frankly, the promise of that moment is wearing thin. Unity in the Security Council is becoming an alibi for inaction. Inaction won't end the war.
- Both of us have said that Resolution 598 remains the best basis for a negotiated settlement and that Iran's unwillingness to negotiate is the main problem. At its recent summit, the Arab world reached exactly the same conclusion.
- Yet the Soviet Union keeps saying "wait" and has consistently resisted any effort to put muscle behind the UN effort to end the war.
 - o When we agreed on Resolution 598, we knew that sanctions would probably be required.
 - o Continued inaction undermines the prestige and effectiveness of the UN.
 - o It also encourages Iran to persevere in its intransigent policy toward Iraq, shipping in the Gulf, and the UNSC.
 - o Perez de Cuellar has indicated he could use the Council's help in pushing Iran to the negotiating table.
- An arms embargo won't end the war by itself. But it will increase Iran's isolation and put pressure on Tehran to negotiate.
- It may also have an effect on the countries which are supplying Iran with weapons, including China.
- You assume Security Council Presidency in December. I hope in this position you will provide leadership to the Council in moving forward on Resolution 598.
- Let us instruct our people in New York to get together this week to begin work on a second resolution.

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IRAN-IRAQ WAR (CONTINGENCY)

The U.S. Naval Presence:

- We have had a naval presence in the Gulf since 1949.
 - o We expanded our presence earlier this year in response to a rising threat to freedom of navigation.
 - o We acted at the request of Kuwait and with the agreement of the other Gulf Arab states.
- We have no hidden agenda. As tensions go down, we will reduce our naval presence to its traditional levels.
- The best way to reduce tensions is to end the war.

Creation of a UN Force in the Gulf:

- This idea is impractical. While there may be an eventual role for the UN in implementing 598, we should not be sidetracked.
- If we can't agree on carrying through what we started last July, it is pointless to discuss a UN force.
- In any case, a UN naval force could never substitute for our naval presence in the Gulf.

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SOUTHERN AFRICA

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- The U.S. has made some progress in our efforts with the Angolans to achieve a negotiated settlement involving Namibian independence and departure of all foreign forces, including Cubans and South Africans, from Namibia and Angola.
- The next step is for Angola to make an acceptable proposal on Cuban withdrawal. We hope this will occur at our next meeting with the Angolans in mid-December.
- If they make a serious proposal, we will put our full weight behind it with South Africa.
- Kaunda and Chissano have told me how much they want this effort to succeed. We will give it our best shot.
- If the Soviet Union is serious about support for political solutions in southern Africa, you should use your influence in Luanda to encourage an acceptable MPLA proposal on Cuban withdrawal.
- If a settlement is achieved, the U.S. and the USSR ought to be able to reduce their involvement in the Angolan conflict and let Angolans themselves, including UNITA, decide their futures.
- If we can decide genuinely to work together on this, that agreement should be registered at the end of our meeting as an incentive to regional parties to come to terms.

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CAMBODIA

- The key to a political settlement is the prompt withdrawal of all Vietnamese troops from Cambodia.
- This should not be linked to national reconciliation, which must be left to the Khmer people themselves. Nor should the withdrawal be postponed to 1990.
- Vietnam counts on massive Soviet aid to finance its occupation of Cambodia. This gives you a lever. We would like to see you use it.
- There is growing international consensus that Prince Sihanouk should play a key role in a political settlement; we believe your government shares this view.
- We urge that the opportunity offered by his efforts to open a dialogue not be squandered.

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- Both our nations share an interest in reducing tensions on the Korean peninsula; the goal should be a better, more stable, political environment.
- The political dialogue between north and south is critical. We should use our influence to encourage our respective partners to work toward its speedy resumption.
- The Seoul Olympics will soon be upon us. It is in everybody's interest that it be a celebration, not a source of friction. We hope to see you there.

North Korean proposals for the Olympics (contingency)

- The International Olympic Committee has made fair proposals for North Korean participation in the games. Pyongyang should accept these and plan to attend.

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MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

- Over past two years, we have conducted an intensive process of consultation with the parties.
- They want peace and are actively searching for the proper framework to bring it about.
- There is some common ground on how to proceed:
 - o Direct negotiations.
 - o Renunciation of violence.
 - o Peace based on UN Resolutions 242 and 338.
- You have advocated an international conference, and we do not rule one out. But we would first have to define its terms.
- Israel has some concerns about accepting a greater Soviet role in the peace process, and so do we. Among them:
 - o Your continued close identification with parties which refuse to renounce violence and seem to share little real interest in achieving a peace acceptable to all.
 - o Your refusal to resume normal diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv, underscored by your recent UNGA vote to deny Israel its rightful place in that body.
 - o There is also the continuing problem of Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union.
- If the Soviet Union is willing to help achieve peace in the Middle East, we would welcome that -- but we remain to be convinced you are ready to do that.

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SOUTH ASIAN NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

- We are very concerned that a nuclear arms race could develop between India and Pakistan. This would damage the worldwide nuclear nonproliferation system we both support, and raise the risk of nuclear conflict.
- We hope the Soviet Union can work with us to encourage India and Pakistan to engage in serious discussion of steps to limit nuclear arms in South Asia. Pakistan has put forward several far-reaching proposals.
- In an effort to move this process along, I have written to Rajiv Gandhi, following up on our discussions when he was here. We have also been in touch with the Pakistanis.

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CENTRAL AMERICA

- The United States supports genuine democracy throughout Central America. Toward that end, we strongly support the Guatemala Agreement.
- Full pursuit of democratic ideals in Nicaragua, as elsewhere in the region, must be an integral part of any lasting settlement.
- The massive transfer of Soviet arms to Nicaragua has not contributed to the search for peace. You can clearly demonstrate your commitment to the Arias plan by stopping the flow of arms.

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COMPREHENSIVE SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
(CONTINGENCY)

- We have looked at your proposal carefully and have serious problems with it.
 - o First, it poses a direct challenge to the UN Charter.
 - o Second, it seems aimed at unnecessarily duplicating existing UN bureaucracies.
- We remain prepared to consider individual elements of the package in the appropriate UN bodies.
- We do welcome your recognition of the importance of the UN to international peace and security and stand ready to work together to make the current system function better.
- One way to strengthen the United Nation's prestige would be to extend increased support for existing UN efforts to end regional conflicts in Afghanistan, Iran-Iraq and southern Africa.

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POINT PAPER REGIONAL ISSUES

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OVERVIEW

- We want to explore recent Soviet hints of flexibility on Afghanistan, Iran-Iraq, southern Africa, and push Gorbachev to take concrete steps. In other areas -- particularly Cambodia -- briefly lay down markers.
- Soviets likely to raise Middle East peace process, Central America.
- You should stress that if regional affairs continue to lag behind other areas of the agenda, it will have serious repercussions for overall health of U.S.-Soviet relations. You could cite the negative experience of 1970's.
- Key in most areas is to get foreign troops out, turn issue over to indigenous population for negotiated settlement.
- You might also encourage forward movement in UN mediation on Afghanistan, Iran-Iraq, stress utility of UN Resolutions on southern Africa, Middle East peace process, Cambodia.

AFGHANISTAN

- Soviets have said Gorbachev would have "something to say" during summit about withdrawal timetable, but have remained vague on details.
- They indicated final plan would emerge only at next UN round in early 1988.
- We should suggest that Gorbachev announce all Soviet troops will leave Afghanistan before end of 1988.
- Stress that this would be consistent with recent public and private Soviet statements on getting out.
- Impress upon Soviets importance of an early resumption to their suspended dialogue with Pakistan.

IRAN-IRAQ WAR

- Soviets should be called to task for continued stalling in the UN Security Council on work toward second resolution.
- In the interests of ending the war as soon as possible, you should propose to Gorbachev that our experts in New York get down to work immediately.

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-- You might hint that we plan to move ahead soon on this in the Security Council, with or without the Soviets.

-- If Gorbachev raises his proposal for a UN naval force in the Gulf, you should point out its impracticality at present, but signal some flexibility on means of enforcement of second resolution, once passed.

ANGOLA/NAMIBIA

-- You should reiterate our interest in exploring further possibility of cooperation with Soviets on Resolution 435.

-- In this connection, reemphasize importance of agreement on withdrawal of all foreign forces from Angola and Namibia.

-- Agreement genuinely to work together on this might be registered at the end of the meeting as an incentive to regional parties to come to terms.

CAMBODIA

-- You have promised our friends and allies in Asia you would raise this with the General Secretary.

-- This can be done briefly -- Soviets should urge Hanoi to get troops out, promote prompt settlement.

MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

-- The process remains stalled, partly due to continued Soviet encouragement of intransigent positions by their friends in the region (e.g. Syria, PLO, Libya).

-- If Gorbachev raises this, tell him burden remains on Moscow to prove its willingness to play constructive role.

OTHER ISSUES

-- Would be useful to touch on other issues -- Korea; south Asian nuclear proliferation; Central America; be prepared to respond if Gorbachev raises proposal for a Comprehensive System of International Security.

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 - 3. Iran-Iraq War
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 - 6. Korea
 - 7. Middle East Peace Process
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- D. Gorbachev's Murmansk Speech
- E. Confidence Building Measures in Asia

VII. BIOGRAPHIC MATERIAL

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GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON
December 7-10, 1987

Annotated Agenda

MONDAY, DECEMBER 7

4:40- General Secretary and Mrs. Gorbachev arrive
5:05 p.m. Andrews Air Force Base. Met by Secretary of
State and Mrs. Shultz; on arrival at hotel,
Gorbachevs host tea for Secretary and Mrs. Shultz.

Evening Working Groups may meet.

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 8

10:00 a.m. White House arrival ceremony (South Lawn).

— Your welcoming remarks will set the tone for
the visit.

10:30 a.m.- First Meeting (Oval Office).
12:00 p.m.

— Opportunity for a broad discussion of where
the relationship stands.

— Gorbachev may stress arms control: START,
Defense and Space, chemical and conventional
weapons, tactical nuclear weapons.

— You should emphasize importance of rapid
progress on a verifiable START Treaty, and
reiterate your commitment to SDI.

— If Gorbachev lays out the Soviet NST position,
you can give an initial reaction and might
suggest that working groups immediately begin
(or, if they have begun Monday evening, continue)
work on START/Defense and Space instructions.

At conclusion, Gorbachev returns to
hotel/residence for lunch.

NOTE: Mrs. Reagan hosts coffee on State Floor for
Mrs. Gorbachev; attended by spouses of U.S. and Soviet
officials. Mrs. Gorbachev departs on separate
schedule at 11:00 a.m.

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1:45 p.m.

INF Signing Ceremony (East Room)

-- Your remarks should stress historic nature of agreement to remove entire class of nuclear weapons, highlight key concepts of the treaty: verification, openness, security for all.

TBD

Broadcast messages to Soviet, American people from State Dining Room.

-- You can focus on your concept of the broader U.S.-Soviet relationship, your hopes for the future.

2:45-

Second Meeting (Oval Office)

4:30 p.m.

-- In a brief one-on-one, point out that only sustained Soviet progress on human rights will overcome suspicions and open the way for more normal relations.

-- Gorbachev may have new ideas on compliance issues. You should stress that, for INF ratification to be assured, compliance problems (particularly Krasnoyarsk) must be dealt with.

-- You and Gorbachev could also survey other arms control related issues: nuclear testing, nuclear non-proliferation.

(5:00 p.m.

Gorbachev meeting with U.S. intellectuals at the Soviet Embassy.)

7:00-

State Dinner (The White House)

10:00 p.m.

-- You want to underscore that relationship you have sought to build goes beyond arms control. Still room for improvement in regional, human rights fields.

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 9

(Morning

General Secretary Gorbachev invites the Senate and House leadership to the Soviet Embassy.)

10:30 a.m.-

Third Meeting (Oval Office)

12:30 p.m.

-- Possible additional guidance to the working groups on START, Defense and Space instructions.

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-- Gorbachev may describe the Soviet human rights agenda (unemployment, racial injustice, etc.) and press for a clearer U.S. stand on his proposed Moscow CSCE human rights conference.

-- You can stress that what counts is progress in the lives of individual people. This will be an important basis of our decision on the Moscow conference.

-- On regional issues, you can probe for details on Afghanistan withdrawal and Southern Africa, push for UN action on Iran-Iraq. Our basic pitch: regional affairs have lagged behind progress in other areas of the dialogue.

-- If time permits, you and Gorbachev can briefly review accomplishments in the bilateral field.

(1:00- Secretary and Mrs. Shultz host lunch at State
3:00 p.m. Department for Gorbachevs.)

4:30- Fourth Meeting (Oval office).
5:15 p.m.

-- Address issues identified by working groups.

NOTE: At 3:45 p.m., Mrs. Reagan hosts Mrs. Gorbachev for private tea in Residence. At end of meeting, President and General Secretary join Mrs. Reagan and Mrs. Gorbachev, after which Gorbachevs depart.

7:00- Dinner at Soviet Embassy.
9:00 p.m.

-- You can review discussions with Gorbachev to this point and draw some preliminary conclusions.

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 10

9:00- Gorbachev meets privately with Vice President Bush
10:15 a.m. (Soviet Embassy), has subsequent breakfast meeting with Vice President, intellectual and academic community. Theme: The future of U.S.-Soviet relations.

10:30 a.m.- Fifth meeting (Oval Office), including working
2:00 p.m. lunch.

-- Take stock of discussions and activities of working groups. Tie up loose ends on START instructions, and review and approve any statements to be issued.

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-- Provide your preliminary view of the Moscow summit.

Departure activities TBD.

-- The departure ceremony would be your first opportunity publicly to offer your assessment of the visit.

OFFICIAL VISIT ENDS

4:00 p.m. General Secretary Gorbachev hosts meeting with industry and business community; cocktails.

5:30 p.m. General Secretary holds press conference.

8:00 p.m. Departure from Andrews Air Force Base.

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SUBJECT= UK PRESS REPORT OF "F-5" EXPORT TO IRAN

REFERENCE= 84 KUWAIT 4076, 84 MADRID 7010, 84 STATE 187992

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CONCEPTS= n/a

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(C) STATE 187992 AND PREVIOUS

1. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. REFS (A) AND (B) REPORTED LOCAL PRESS REPLAYS OF LONDON OBSERVER ARTICLE OF JULY 22 ALLEGING EXPORT TO IRAN OF 25 F-5 RPT F-5 AIRCRAFT FROM THE U.S. TO IRAN VIA TURKEY. ON JULY 23, [] ADVISED THAT ON JULY 22 LONDON DAILY TELEGRAPH REPORTED THAT 20 F-5S ARE BEING SHIPPED TO IRAN IN CRATES FROM FRG VIA TURKEY. []

3. THE SPANISH AND KUWAITI REPLAYS OF THE LONDON OBSERVER ARTICLE AND THE IRAQIS' VERSION OF THE DAILY TELEGRAPH REPORT (TO BE TRANSMITTED VIA FBIS CHANNELS IF AVAILABLE) STRONGLY PARALLEL A JUNE 3 DAILY TELEGRAPH ARTICLE AND EARLIER [] INFORMATION ON AN ALLEGED F-4 RPT F-4 SALE BY THE UK FIRM SPARTEN PEAK. THIS DEAL ALLEGEDLY INVOLVED TWO SHIPMENTS OF 20 UNITS EACH OF CRATED F-4S FROM VARIOUS ORIGINS TO IRAN VIA TURKEY AND/OR CYPRUS. []

4. ACTION REQUESTED: LONDON: PLEASE TRY TO LOCATE THE DAILY TELEGRAPH REPORT [] AND PROVIDE WHAT FURTHER BACKGROUND MAY BE AVAILABLE ON IT AND ON THE OBSERVER ARTICLE. []

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6. MADRID, KUWAIT: EMBASSIES MAY DRAW ON GUIDANCE BELOW. USED BY THE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN AT JULY 23 NOON BRIEFING. IN DISCUSSIONS WITH HOST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. IF USEFUL OR APPROPRIATE. YOU MAY ALSO DRAW ON BACKGROUND CITED ABOVE REGARDING EARLIER PRESS REPORTS OF A SIMILAR NATURE.

7. FOLLOWING GUIDANCE WAS USED BY THE DEPARTMENT'S SPOKESMAN ON JULY 23:

Q. DO YOU HAVE ANY COMMENT ON THE LONDON OBSERVER REPORT THAT 25 U.S. F-5 FIGHTER AIRCRAFT ARE BEING SHIPPED TO IRAN VIA TURKEY?

A. THERE IS NO FACTUAL BASIS TO THE STORY. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAS NOT APPROVED OR LICENSED UNDER THE EXPORT CONTROL ACT THE SALE OF MUNITIONS TO IRAN SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR. WE HAVE NO KNOWLEDGE OF THE PURPORTED F-5 "DEAL" REPORTED IN THE LONDON OBSERVER. AND WE ARE AWARE OF ONLY ONE PENDING SHIPMENT OF F-5 AIRCRAFT FROM THE U.S. TO TURKEY. FOUR MILITARY

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ASSISTANCE PROGRAM F-5B AIRCRAFT ARE TO BE SHIPPED TO
TURKEY IN SEPTEMBER OR OCTOBER OF THIS YEAR IN
CONJUNCTION WITH APPROPRIATE OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE LETTERS
EXECUTED EARLIER THIS YEAR. AS IN ALL TRANSFERS OF THIS
SORT, THE GOVERNMENT OF TURKEY HAS PROVIDED US ASSURANCES
THAT THE AIRCRAFT WILL NOT BE TRANSFERRED TO A THIRD
NATION WITHOUT U.S. GOVERNMENT CONCURRENCE.

8. KUWAIT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. SHULTZ

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 8471
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
AMEMBASSY DOHA
AMEMBASSY MANAMA
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
USINT BAGHDAD
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 RIYADH 01024

~~EXDIS~~

DECAPTIONED

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MARR, SA, ZP, UK, TU, IR, IZ
SUBJ: STAUNCHING THE FLOW OF ARMS TO IRAN

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: I TOLD ME FEB 23 THAT
TURKISH PRESIDENT HAD ASSURED SAUDIS NO ARMS WERE
REACHING IRAN THROUGH TURKEY.

UNCLASSIFIED

I EMPHASIZED THAT WE
HAD APPROACHED MANY COUNTRIES TO CURTAIL ARMS SHIPMENTS.

UNCLASSIFIED

I EXPRESSED
CONCERN THAT IRAQ'S RESORTING TO SUCH DESPERATE MEANS
AS CHEMICAL WARFARE WOULD CAUSE US GREAT CONCERN

END SUMMARY.

3.

PRESIDENT EVREN HAD
AFFIRMED THAT NO MILITARY EQUIPMENT IS REACHING IRAN
THROUGH TURKISH TERRITORY

4.

I RESPONDED THAT MOST MILITARY CONSUMABLES
SUCH AS AMMUNITION REACH IRAN FROM COMMUNIST COUNTRIES.

ASKED AGAIN, I TOLD
WE HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH THE BRITISH AS WE HAD BEEN
WITH SOME 20 TO 30 COUNTRIES TO STAUNCH THE FLOW OF
ARMS TO IRAN. THE DESIGNATION OF AMBASSADOR FAIRBANKS
TO SPEARHEAD THIS WORLDWIDE EFFORT ILLUSTRATES USG
SERIOUSNESS.

UNCLASSIFIED

7

UNCLASSIFIED

I EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT THE IRAQIS
MIGHT RESORT IN DESPERATION TO CHEMICAL WARFARE WHICH
NOT ONLY CONTRAVENES INTERNATIONAL LAW BUT WOULD LOWER
IRAQ'S STANDING AND CAUSE US GREAT CONCERN. {

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PAGE 01 RIYADH 01024 02 OF 02 231814Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 SSO-00 /026 W
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O 231807Z FEB 84 ZFF4
FM USELO RIYADH
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 8472
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY JIDDA

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AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
AMEMBASSY DOHA
AMEMBASSY MANAMA
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
USINT BAGHDAD
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 RIYADH 01024

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MARR, SA, ZP, UK, TU, IR, IZ
SUBJ: STAUNCHING THE FLOW OF ARMS TO IRAN:

9. KUWAIT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

SUDDARTH

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PAGE 02 RIYADH 01024 02 OF 02 231814Z

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UNCLASSIFIED

E2

*** Current Classification *** ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

EXCISE

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 80ANKARA08466

FILM= D800560-0795

DATE= 21 NOV 80

TYPE= TE

FROM= ANKARA
OR-E

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION EUR

TO= STATE
ADANA

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= CONFIDENTIAL

ORIGPCLASS= n/a

EO= GS 19861121 NETTLES, G

SUBJECT= BACK UP OF TRANSSHIPMENT CARGOS FOR IRAQ

REFERENCE= 80 ADANA 315

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= INFORMATION EXCHANGE, ARMS, MILITARY ASSISTANCE

TAGS= ETRD, ETRN, MASS, PINR, IR, IS, IZ, TU

UNCLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

IS/FPC/CDR

Date:

11/29/96

() RELEASE () DECLASSIFY
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FOIA Exemptions B1

Min Cases Only:
EO Citations

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PAGE 01 ANKARA 08466 222328Z
ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 NEA-06 EB-08 COME-00 TRSE-00 OMB-01
AGRE-00 STR-10 DOE-17 OES-09 PM-07 NSC-05 SP-02
SS-15 CIAE-00 DODE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00 PA-01
SPRS-02 ICA-11 /117 W

-----061804 230250Z /21

R 211136Z NOV 80
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4656
INFO AMCONSUL ADANA

CONFIDENTIAL ANKARA 08466

E.O. 12065 GDS (11/21/7#) (NETTLES, G. ?)-6/OR-E)
TAGS: ETRD, ETRN, IR, IS, IZ, MASS, YINR, TU
SUBJ: BACK UP OF TRANSSHIPMENT CARGOS FOR IRAQ

REF: ADANA 315

1. THIS IS AN INFO MESSAGE WHICH REPEATS ADANA 315 TO THE DEPARTMENT.
2. BEGIN TEXT: SUMMARY: LOCAL PORTS OF MERSIN AND ISKENDERUN ARE RECEIVING MORE GOODS FOR TRANSSHIPMENT TO IRAQ, BUT TRUCKDRIVERS' FEARS OF WAR ZONE HAVE GREATLY CUT TRANSSHIPMENT, CAUSING SEVERE PORT BACKUPS. GOT REPORTEDLY IS NOT INTERFERING WITH ONWARD FLOW OF GOODS EXCEPT TO PREVENT ARMS SHIPMENT. SUBSTANTIAL QUANTITIES OF IRAELI GOODS ALSO TRANSIT TURKEY FOR ISLAMIC BELLIGERENTS. END SUMMARY.
3. OBSERVED BACKUP: WE HAVE RECENTLY OBSERVED MANY MORE SHIPS THAN USUAL (APPARENTLY FULLY-LADEN TO JUDGE BY THEIR WATERLINES) RIDING AT ANCHOR OFF ISKENDERUN AND MERSIN. THOUGH WE HAD OFTEN HAD OCCASION TO NOTICE, RECENTLY FOR THE FIRST TIME WE HAVE SEEN OFFLOADING

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PAGE 02 ANKARA 08466 222328Z

OPERATIONS TAKING PLACE IN MERSIN IN DARKNESS OF A SUNDAY EVENING. OUTDOOR STORAGE YARDS AT MERSIN HAVE GREATLY EXPANDED AND ARE FULLER THAN USUAL, MOSTLY

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WITH BUILDING MATERIALS (WIRE, LUMBER, CONCRETE-TYPE SACKS) AND OTHER NON-OBSERVABLE CRATED AND CONTAINERIZED GOODS. THOUGH IMPOSSIBLE TO QUANTIFY, IN THE PAST MONTH OR SO WE HAVE NOTED A DEFINITE DECREASE IN T.I.R. TRUCK TRAFFIC HEADING EAST ON HIGH E-5 (MAIN EUROPE-IRAQ ROUTE VIA ADANA). OF THOSE THAT CONTINUE TO MAKE THE RUN PERHAPS A SOMEWHAT HICHER PERCENTAGE THAN FORMERLY ARE RUMANIAN AND BULGARIAN TRUCKS.

4. SOURCE CONFIRMATION:

AS A PRECAUTION, THE DRIVERS THAT DO ENTER IRAQ REPORTEDLY LEAVE THE MAIN HIGHWAY TO SCATTER OVER THE PLAINS AT NIGHT IN ORDER TO AVOID AIR ATTACK. ACCORDING TO SOURCE, TURKISH AUTHORITIES "CAN AND DO OPEN ANY PIECE THEY WISH, INCLUDING CONTAINERS SEALED

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PAGE 03 ANKARA 08466 222328Z

AT POINT OF ORIGIN, WHICH THEY ARE NOT ENTITLED TO OPEN," IN ORDER TO PREVENT ARMS TRANSSHIPMENTS, BUT THEY HAVE NOT GENERALLY INTERFERED WITH THE FLOW OF NON-MILITARY GOODS TO IRAQ OR IRAN. (REFTEL REPORTS SIMILAR ASSERTIONS BY AN ISKENDERUN SHIPPER.) SOURCE SAID TURKISH AUTHORITIES ARE VERY NERVOUS ABOUT TURKISH NEUTRALITY AND THUS STRICTLY ENSURE ARMS SHIPMENTS DO NOT TRANSIT TURKEY. HE SAID DRIVERS ARE NOT RISKING JAIL AND CONFISCATION OF THEIR TRUCKS NO MATTER HOW LUCRATIVE THE POTENTIAL PAYOFFS FOR SHIPPING MILITARY EQUIPMENT. (COMMENT: WHILE SOURCE HAS PROVED RELIABLE IN THE PAST AND HIS PRESENT REPORTING FITS OBSERVABLE FACT, HIS ASSERTIONS REGARDING THE "DEFINITE IMPOSSIBILITY" OF ARMS SHIPMENTS SEEMED RATHER MORE EMPHATIC THAN STRICTLY REQUIRED. FND COMMENT.)

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5. ISRAELI GOODS:

HE ADMIRER ISRAELI BUSINESS ACUMEN IN SELLING TO
BOTH SIDES. END TEXT OF ADANA 315.
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NNN

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

*** Current Classification *** CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

EXCISE

E22

*** Current Classification *** ~~SECRET~~

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 84ANKARA06741

FILM= D840473-0634

DATE= 24 JUL 84

TYPE= TE

FROM= ANKARA

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION EUR

TO= SECSTATE WASHDC
BAGHDAD
JIDDA
USELO RIYADH
ABU DHABI
KUWAIT
TEL AVIV

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= SECRET

ORIGPCLASS= n/a

EO= (OADR)

SUBJECT= MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER HALEFOGLU

REFERENCE= n/a

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

IS/FPC/CDR TTSB Date: 11/29/96

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FOIA Exemptions (S)
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MR Cases Only:

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TS authority to.

() CLASSIFY as () S or

() DOWNGRADE TS to () S or

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CONCEPTS= MEETING, MINISTER, DISCUSSION, POLICY, REPORT, VISIT

TAGS= PREL, TU, SA, IZ, IR, OIC, (HALEFOGLU, VAHIT)

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 01 ANKARA 06741 01 OF 02 241919Z
ACTION EUR-00

INFO OCT-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00
NEA-06 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 PM-10 INRE-00 SSN-01
USIE-00 SP-02 SSA-02 /032 W
—————144276 241926Z /51

O 241811Z JUL 84
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5456
INFO USINT BAGHDAD IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
USELO RIYADH IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

SECRET SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 06741

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, TU, SA, IZ, IR, OIC
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER HALEFOGLU

1. (S) ENTIRE TEXT.
2. I MET FOR AN HOUR WITH FOREIGN MINISTER VAHIT HALEFOGLU ON THE AFTERNOON OF JULY 24 TO DISCUSS SEVERAL POLICY ISSUES AFFECTING OUR BILATERAL MILITARY PROGRAMS HERE (SEPTTEL). AT THE SAME TIME, THE MINISTER FAVORED ME WITH THE FOLLOWING DETAILED READOUT OF HIS JUST-CONCLUDED VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA FOR THE MEETING OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE PEACE COMMITTEE.
3. AT THE OUTSET OF OUR MEETING, I ASKED THE FOREIGN MINISTER IF HE WOULD ELABORATE ON HIS STATEMENT TO THE PRESS, ON RETURNING FROM JIDDA, THAT THE OIC HAD AGREED ON A SERIES OF "OFFICIAL OR SEMI-OFFICIAL" CONTACTS BETWEEN THE PEACE COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN PLUS "ONE OR TWO

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SUITABLE COMMITTEE MEMBERS" AND OFFICIALS OF THE IRANIAN AND IRAQI GOVERNMENTS. THESE CONTACTS WERE TO HAVE AS THEIR PURPOSE THE TAKING OF SOUNDINGS TOWARD POSSIBLE EFFORTS TO END THE GULF CONFLICT. I THEN INQUIRED WHETHER TURKEY MIGHT NOT BE CONSIDERED ONE SUCH "SUITABLE" COMMITTEE MEMBER, IN VIEW OF ITS PAST EFFORTS ON BEHALF OF THE OIC MEDIATION EFFORT, AND ASKED FOR THE MINISTER'S ASSESSMENT OF THE LIKELIHOOD THAT THIS EFFORT WOULD SUCCEED.

4. IN RESPONSE, THE MINISTER FIRST SUMMARIZED THE OVERALL STATE OF TURKEY'S RELATIONS WITH IRAN AND IRAQ. NOTING THAT BOTH HE AND PRIME MINISTER OZAL HAVE

5. THE MINISTER EMPHASIZED THAT TURKEY DOES NOT SELL ARMS OR MILITARY SUPPLIES TO EITHER IRAN OR IRAQ, NOR DOES IT PERMIT TRANSFERS OF SUCH MILITARY GOODS

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PAGE 03 ANKARA 06741 01 OF 02 241919Z

THROUGH ITS TERRITORY TO THE TWO BELLIGERENTS. HE NOTED WITH PARTICULAR INDIGNATION A REPORT RECEIVED TODAY FROM HIS EMBASSY IN JIDDA, PROVIDING THE TEXT OF AN ARTICLE APPEARING IN THE SAUDI ARABIAN NEWSPAPER "AL-MAJALLAH" WHICH CLAIMED THAT THE UNITED STATES, AT SOVIET INSISTENCE, HAD PRESSURED TURKEY INTO ALLOWING SOVIET ARMS SHIPMENTS TO IRAQ TO TRANSIT TURKISH TERRITORY. THE ARMS IN QUESTION WERE DESCRIBED AS BEING "FOR DEFENSIVE PURPOSES ONLY." HALEFOGLU NOTED HOW SUCH ARTICLES AID THE SOVIET GOAL OF INCREASING ITS INFLUENCE IN THE REGION, BY USING DISINFORMA-

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TION TO BOTH INDICATE TO IRAN THAT TURKEY IS UNDER U.S. INFLUENCE AND CONTROL, WHILE SIMULTANEOUSLY HINTING TO THE IRANIANS THEY TOO MIGHT EVENTUALLY GAIN ACCESS TO SOVIET MILITARY AID.

6. THE MINISTER THEN WENT ON TO DESCRIBE HIS PARTICIPATION IN THE JIDDA MEETINGS.

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PAGE 01 ANKARA 06741 02 OF 02 241920Z
ACTION EUR-00

INFO OCT-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00
NEA-06 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 PM-10 INRE-00 SSN-01
USIE-00 SP-02 SSA-02 /032 W
-----144304 241926Z /44

O 241811Z JUL 84

FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5457

UNCLASSIFIED

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INFO USINT BAGHDAD IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
USELO RIYADH IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 ANKARA 06741

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, TU, SA, IZ, IR, OIC
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER HALEFOGLU

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9. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED FOR KUWAIT.

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PAGE 03 ANKARA 06741 02 OF 02 241920Z

STRAUSZ-HUPE

E37

UNCLASSIFIED

*** Current Classification *** UNCLASSIFIED
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<*** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ***>>>

DOC_NBR= 88ANKARA03326

FILM= D880208-0567

DATE= 10 MAR 88

TYPE= TE

FROM= ANKARA

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION EUR

TO= STATE
ICA

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= UNCLASSIFIED

ORIGPCCLASS= n/a

EO= N/A

SUBJECT= TURKISH PRESS REVIEW: MARCH 10, 1988

REFERENCE= n/a

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

UNCLASSIFIED

CONCEPTS= REVIEW, ALLIANCE, MODERNIZATION, ARMED FORCES, SIGNATORY, PROTOCOL,
FOREIGN RELATIONS

TAGS= PREL, PGOV, SCOM, PHUM, TU, ZP, GR, BU, UR, NATO, (GALVIN, JOHN) 94

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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FOIA Exemptions

IS/FOC/CDR TRS

Date: 11/29/94

MR Cases Only:
EO Classifications

TS authority to:

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PAGE 01 ANKARA 03326 01 OF 03 101408Z
ACTION EUR-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSAE-00 HA-09
AMAD-01 PM-10 PA-02 INRE-00 SP-02 PRS-01 SDEL-03
/038 W

-----071300 101424Z/38

O 101402Z MAR 88
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6126
INFO USINFO WASHDC PRIORITY
AMCONSUL ADANA
AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMCONSUL ISTANBUL
AMCONSUL IZMIR
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
USMISSION USNATO
AMEMBASSY SOFIA
USDOC WASHDC
HQ16THAF TORREJON AB SP//CCE//
USDELMC BRUSSELS BE
39TACG INCIRLIK TU//CC/PA//RM//TN//
TUSLOG DET 33-3 ISKENDERUN
CDRSETAF/5TH VICENZA IT//AESE-JIC//
AFOSI DET 6901 INCIRLIK AB TU//CC//
USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES IT
628MAS INCIRLIK TU
HQUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE//XP//PA//
USNMR SHAPE BE//P10//
CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE//POLAD//
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//POLAD//
USDOC06ATAF IZMIR TU
USDOCOLSE IZMIR TU

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 03326

USINFO FOR B/BNEA/EU

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PAGE 02 ANKARA 03326 01 OF 03 101408Z

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, SCOM, NATO, PHUM, ZP, GR, BU, UR, TU
SUBJECT: TURKISH PRESS REVIEW: MARCH 10, 1988

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.....
1. NATO

GALVIN: NATO DEFENSE PLANS COVER AEGEAN: ALL DAILIES REPORT THAT NATO EUROPEAN SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER JOHN GALVIN DEFENDED THE "DELTA ENSURE" PLAN, WHICH INCLUDES THE DEFENSE OF LIMNOS AND OTHER AEGEAN ISLANDS AS PART OF HIS RESPONSIBILITY TO DEFEND ALL ALLIED TERRITORY FROM NORTHERN NORWAY TO EASTERN TURKEY. ACCORDING TO THE DAILIES, IN AN INTERVIEW IN BRUSSELS WITH THE SEMI-OFFICIAL ANATOLIAN NEWS AGENCY, GALVIN ALSO SAID THE DEFENSE OF TURKEY WAS OF VITAL IMPORTANCE TO THE ALLIANCE AND ADDED IT WAS IN NATO'S INTEREST THAT TURKEY MAINTAIN ITS POSITION VIS-A-VIS THE STRAITS. HE ALSO SUPPORTED TURKISH MILITARY MODERNIZATION AND NOTED THAT NATO IS SEEKING AID FOR TURKEY FROM ALLIES OTHER THAN THE U.S. AND THE FRG.

.....
2. GREECE

YILMAZ: NO CONCESSIONS ON AEGEAN AND VAROSHA: "HURRIYET" QUOTES FONMIN MESUT YILMAZ AS SAYING THAT TURKEY WOULD NOT MAKE CONCESSIONS CONCERNING THE AEGEAN AND VAROSHA. YILMAZ, IN AN INTERVIEW WITH THE DAILY, STRESSED THAT THE AEGEAN ARMY WOULD NOT BE DISSOLVED, AND TURKEY WOULD NOT RETURN VAROSHA TO THE GREEK CYPRIOTS.
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.....
3. BULGARIA

SOFIA USES FRIENDSHIP PROTOCOL WITH TURKEY FOR PROPAGANDA PURPOSES: "MILLIYET" CLAIMS THAT SOFIA IS USING THE RECENTLY SIGNED TURKISH-BULGARIAN FRIENDSHIP PROTOCOL FOR PROPAGANDA PURPOSES IN INTERNATIONAL FORA, AND IS ASKING THAT THIRD COUNTRIES NOT INTERFERE IN THE MINORITY ISSUE. "MILLIYET" CORRESPONDENT NILUFER YALCIN, QUOTING TURKISH OFFICIALS, WRITES THAT IN AN EFFORT TO COUNTER THE BULGARIAN INITIATIVE, THE MFA CALLED FOREIGN ENVOYS TO THE MINISTRY AND ASKED THEIR COUNTRIES' CONTINUED SUPPORT FOR THE TURKISH

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MINORITY IN BULGARIA.

UNCLASSIFIED

4. U.S.S.R.

SOVIETS, TURKS OPTIMISTIC ABOUT UPCOMING ANKARA-MOSCOW DISCUSSIONS: "HURRIYET," NOTING HEAVY DIPLOMATIC TRAFFIC BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND TURKEY, REPORTS THAT SOVIET FONMIN EDUARD SHEVARDNADZE WILL VISIT TURKEY IN THE NEAR FUTURE AND THAT HIS AIDE YULI VORONTSOV IS EXPECTED IN ANKARA SOON TO PREPARE FOR THE VISIT. THE DAILY QUOTES SOVIET EMBASSY PRESS SECRETARY YEVGENY UTKIN AS SAYING THAT SOVIET DISCUSSIONS IN ANKARA WOULD ALSO INCLUDE A DELEGATION ARRIVING MARCH 16 ON CIVIL AVIATION AND THE BLACK SEA FIR LINE, THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMMISSION AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL ON MARCH

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PAGE 01 ANKARA 03326 02 OF 03 101409Z
ACTION EUR-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSAE-00 HA-09
AMAD-01 PM-10 PA-02 INRE-00 SP-02 PRS-01 SDEL-03
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-----071307 101425Z /38

O 101402Z MAR 88
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6127
INFO USINFO WASHDC PRIORITY
AMCONSUL ADANA
AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMCONSUL ISTANBUL

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

AMCONSUL IZMIR
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
USMISSION USNATO
AMEMBASSY SOFIA
USDOC WASHDC
HQ16THAF TORREJON AB SP//CCE//
USDELMC BRUSSELS BE
39TACG INCIRLIK TU//CC/PA//RM//TN//
TUSLOG DET 33-3 ISKENDERUN
CDRSETAF/5TH VICENZA IT//AESE-JIC//
AFOSI DET 6901 INCIRLIK AB TU//CC//
USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES IT
628MAS INCIRLIK TU
HQUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE//XP//PA//
USNMR SHAPE BE//P10//
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USDOC06ATAF IZMIR TU
USDOCOLSE IZMIR TU

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 03 ANKARA 03326

USINFO FOR B/BNEA/EU

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UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 ANKARA 03326 02 OF 03 101409Z

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, SCOM, NATO, PHUM, ZP, GR, BU, UR, TU

SUBJECT: TURKISH PRESS REVIEW: MARCH 10, 1988

23, AND BORDER ISSUES STARTING ON MARCH 30.

.....
5. GULF

OZAL CALLS FOR CEASE-FIRE IN "WAR OF CITIES":
DAILIES REPORT THAT PM TURGUT OZAL APPEALED TO IRAN
AND IRAQ TO CEASE THE BOMBING OF CITIES AND ADOPT A
POLICY OF RESTRAINT. A WRITTEN ANNOUNCEMENT BY OZAL
SAID THE "WAR OF CITIES" HAD HAMPERED EFFORTS AIMED
AT ESTABLISHING AN HONORABLE PEACE BETWEEN THE TWO
COUNTRIES.

SAMSUN-GURBULAK ROUTE FOR ARMS SHIPMENT:
"CUMHURIYET" REPORTS THAT AN INVESTIGATION LAUNCHED
BY IT BASED ON CLAIMS OF FRENCH AND BELGIAN
JOURNALISTS IN A BOOK ENTITLED "ARMS FOR IRAN" SHOWS

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UNCLASSIFIED

THAT WEAPONS PURCHASED IN EUROPE WERE SHIPPED TO IRAN VIA TURKEY. THE DAILY ADDS THAT THE SHIP "PETER WESHE" MENTIONED IN THE BOOK UNLOADED 129 CONTAINERS OF TRANSIT GOODS AT THE SAMSUN PORT ON 10 MARCH 1983, AND THE CONTAINERS WERE TRANSPORTED TO IRAN BY TURKISH TRUCKS THROUGH THE GURBULAK BORDER CROSSING.

.....
6. DOMESTIC AFFAIRS

EVREN WARNS AGAINST ATTACKS ON MILITARY,
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 ANKARA 03326 02 OF 03 101409Z

ANTI-ATATURK SENTIMENT: ALL DAILIES COVER PRESIDENT KENAN EVREN'S ADDRESS AT INCIRLIOVA, AYDIN, SAYING THAT THE AIM BEHIND AN ANTI-ATATURK CAMPAIGN BY SOME PERSONS WAS TO ENCOURAGE CIVILIAN-MILITARY SEPARATISM. HE ADDED THAT THOSE WHO WISH TO DIVIDE THE NATION WERE TRYING TO "SLING MUD AT THE MILITARY."

STATE OF EMERGENCY EXTENDED FOR ANOTHER FOUR MONTHS: "CUMHURIYET" REPORTS THAT PARLIAMENT HAS EXTENDED THE STATE OF EMERGENCY LAW FOR ANOTHER 4 MONTHS IN 9 PROVINCES: HAKKARI, VAN, DIYARBAKIR, SIIRT, MARDIN, BINGOL, ELAZIG, TUNCELI AND ISTANBUL.

ANAP DEPUTY UNDER INVESTIGATION: ACCORDING TO "CUMHURIYET," THE ISTANBUL PUBLIC PROSECUTOR HAS LAUNCHED AN INVESTIGATION OF MOTHERLAND PARTY (ANAP) DEPUTY FROM BITLIS, FAIK TARIMCIOGLU, ON CHARGES OF TORTURE COMMITTED WHILE HE SERVED AS ISTANBUL MILITARY COURT PROSECUTOR IN 1981.

STUDENT ASSOCIATION LEADERS IN CUSTODY: "CUMHURIYET" ALSO REPORTS THAT SEVEN UNIVERSITY STUDENTS, INCLUDING LEADERS FROM MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY AND HACETTEPE UNIVERSITY STUDENT ASSOCIATIONS, WERE CHARGED WITH BEING MEMBERS OF THE ILLEGAL COMMUNIST "DEV-SOL" ORGANIZATION, AND WERE TAKEN INTO CUSTODY IN ANKARA.

SHP'S TARGET IS TO UNDERMINE DSP: "HURRIYET" REPORTS THAT A CONFIDENTIAL STUDY PREPARED BY THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC POPULIST PARTY (SHP) STATES THAT THE FIRST

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REQUIREMENT FOR THEIR ORGANIZATION'S COMING TO POWER

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PAGE 01 ANKARA 03326 03 OF 03 101410Z
ACTION EUR-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSAE-00 HA-09
AMAD-01 PM-10 PA-02 INRE-00 SP-02 PRS-01 SDEL-03
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O 101402Z MAR 88
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6128
INFO USINFO WASHDC PRIORITY
AMCONSUL ADANA
AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMCONSUL ISTANBUL
AMCONSUL IZMIR
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
USMISSION USNATO
AMEMBASSY SOFIA
USDOC WASHDC
HQ16THAF TORREJON AB SP//CCE//
USDELMC BRUSSELS BE
39TACG INCIRLIK TU//CC/PA//RM//TN//
TUSLOG DET 33-3 ISKENDERUN
CDRSETAF/5TH VICENZA IT//AESE-JIC//
AFOSI DET 6901 INCIRLIK AB TU//CC//
USDOSOUTH NAPLES IT
628MAS INCIRLIK TU
HQUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE//XP//PA//
USNMR SHAPE BE//P1O//
CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE//POLAD//
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USDOSOUTH NAPLES IT

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UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 03 ANKARA 03326

USINFO FOR B/BNEA/EU

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PAGE 02 ANKARA 03326 03 OF 03 101410Z

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, SCOM, NATO, PHUM, ZP, GR, BU, UR, TU
SUBJECT: TURKISH PRESS REVIEW: MARCH 10, 1988

IS TO SECURE THE VOTES OF DEMOCRATIC LEFT PARTY
(DSP) SUPPORTERS.

"TISK" AGAINST "TURK-IS" BOYCOTT: "CUMHURIYET"
REPORTS THAT THE TURKISH EMPLOYERS UNION
CONFEDERATION (TISK) CLAIMS THAT LUNCH BOYCOTTS
PLANNED AT WORKSITES BY THE TURKISH LABOR UNIONS
CONFEDERATION (TURK-IS) ARE ILLEGAL.

CONSERVATIVE WING LEADS IN ANAP: A REPORT IN
"GUNES" STATES THAT THE CONSERVATIVE WING OF ANAP,
HEADED BY PARTY VICE-CHAIRMAN MEHMET KECECILER,
LEADS IN 28 OF 39 PROVINCIAL CONGRESSES. STRAUZ-HUPE

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*** Current Classification *** UNCLASSIFIED

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<*** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ***>>>

DOC_NBR= 87ANKARA14660

FILM= D870967-0122

DATE= 24 NOV 87

TYPE= TE

FROM= ANKARA

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION EUR

TO= STATE

ICA

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= UNCLASSIFIED

ORIGPCCLASS= n/a

EO= N/A

SUBJECT= TURKISH PRESS REVIEW: NOVEMBER 24, 1987 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED

REFERENCE= n/a

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= PRESS SUMMARY, PRIME MINISTER, ARMS, SHIPMENT

TAGS= PREL, PGOV, SCOM, TU, (OZAL, TURGUT)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

IS/FPC/CDR

Date: 11/29/91

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PAGE 01 ANKARA 14660 01 OF 02 241447Z
ACTION EUR-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSAE-00 AMAD-01
PM-10 PA-02 INRE-00 SP-02 PRS-01 SDEL-03 /029 W
-----057674 241448Z /38

P 241441Z NOV 87
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3628
INFO USINFO WASHDC PRIORITY
AMCONSUL ADANA
AMEMBASSY ATHENS
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USNMR SHAPE BE//P1O//
CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE//POLAD//
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//POLAD//
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USDOCOLSE IZMIR TU

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 14660

USINFO FOR B/BNEA/EU

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, SCOM, TU
SUBJECT: TURKISH PRESS REVIEW: NOVEMBER 24, 1987
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1. TURKEY - U.S.

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IRANGATE: PRESS CONTINUED COVERAGE OF THE IRANGATE ISSUE. "CUMHURIYET" REPORTED THAT PM TURGUT OZAL SAID WHEN TURKEY'S SUSPICIONS THAT ARMS WERE BEING SHIPPED TO IRAN WERE CONFIRMED BY THE IRANIAN PM, THE GOT PROTESTED TO THE U. S. "HURRIYET" REPORTED THAT COLONEL NORTH ASSURED NSC CHEIF POINDEXTER THAT ARRANGEMENTS HAD BEEN MADE WITH TURKISH AIR CONTROL PERSONNEL FOR PASSAGE THROUGH TURKISH AIRSPACE OF PLANES CARRYING ARMS TO IRAN. "GUNES," SPECULATING THAT BRIBES WERE PAID, ASKED "WHO RECEIVED THE 147 THOUSAND DOLLARS (SIC)"?

"CUMHURIYET" SAID THAT THE IRANGATE SCANDAL REVEALED THE EXISTENCE OF A SECRET U.S. PROJECT NAMED THE "KURDISH INSURRECTION PROGRAM." THE DAILY GAVE NO DETAILS OF THE PROJECT.

ACCORDING TO "HURRIYET," THE CIA SOUGHT TURKEY'S HELP IN CONTAINING THE SOVIETS ONCE IT BECAME APPARENT THAT THE KHOMEINI GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT FOLLOW THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE SHAH. THE CIA OFFICER RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH EAST ASIA, GRAHAM FULLER, SUGGESTED IN A 1985 REPORT THAT ARMS SALES TO IRAN BY THE ALLIED COUNTRIES MIGHT FORESTALL AN INCREASE IN SOVIET INFLUENCE IN THE REGION. FULLER REPORTEDLY SPECULATED THAT IF THE SOVIETS

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INCREASED THEIR INFLUENCE IN IRAN, THE U.S. WOULD BE FORCED TO BOLSTER THE REGIMES IN TURKEY AND PAKISTAN IN ORDER TO PREVENT THOSE COUNTRIES FROM SUCCUMBING TO SOVIET PRESSURE.

.....
2. CYPRUS
.....

EVREN VISIT: "CUMHURYET" REPORTED THAT U.S. DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO STOP THE PLANNED STATE VISIT OF PRESIDENT KENAN EVREN TO THE "TRNC" HAVE BEEN UNSUCCESSFUL.

U.S. PRESSURE: AN ARTICLE IN "HURRIYET" SPECULATED THAT THE U.S. WILL INCREASE PRESSURE

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ON TURKEY OVER CYPRUS AFTER THE ELECTION. THE
SAME ARTICLE DISCUSSED A REAGAN ADMINISTRATION
PROPOSAL (SIC) FOR U.N. CONTROLS ON THE INCREASE
OF ARMS ON THE ISLAND.

.....
3. GREECE

.....
"DETENTE:" "MILLIYET" REPORTED THAT GREEK PM
PAPANDREOU SAID IN A PUBLIC STATEMENT ON
NOVEMBER 23 THAT HE HOPED THAT A "DETENTE"
PERIOD COULD START WITH TURKEY. "HURRIYET"
INTERPRETED THE STATEMENT AS A SIGNAL FOR A
SUMMIT BETWEEN OZAL AND PAPNDREOU.

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ACTION EUR-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSAE-00 AMAD-01
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P 241441Z NOV 87
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3629
INFO USINFO WASHDC PRIORITY
AMCONSUL ADANA
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USMISSION USNATO
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UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 ANKARA 14660

USINFO FOR B/BNEA/EU

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, SCOM, TU
SUBJECT: TURKISH PRESS REVIEW: NOVEMBER 24, 1987
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4. ALBANIA

HIGH LEVEL TALKS: ALL DAILIES REPORTED THAT OFFICIAL TALKS BETWEEN TURKEY AND ALBANIA OPENED IN ANKARA NOVEMBER 23. ALBANIAN DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER SOKRAT PLATA AND MFA UNDERSECRETARY NUZHET KANDEMIR WILL DISCUSS BILATERAL RELATIONS AND THE UPCOMING MEETING OF THE BALKAN NATIONS.

5. DOMESTIC AFFAIRS

EUROPARLIAMENTARIANS: "MILLIYET" REPORTED THAT 10 MEMBERS OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT WILL COME TO ANKARA TO OBSERVE THE GENERAL ELECTIONS.

COMMUNISTS: ACCORDING TO "MILLIYET", STATE

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SECURITY COURT PROSECUTOR NUSRET DEMIRAL HAS
EXTENDED THE INTERREGOTION PERIOD OF TURKISH
COMMUNISTS HAYDAR KUTLU AND NIHAT SARGIN UNTIL
NOVEMBER 30. DEMIRAL REPORTEDLY SAID THAT IF
NECESSARY KUTLU AND SARGIN WILL STAY IN CUSTODY
FOR ANOTHER 60 DAYS. STRAUSS-HUPE

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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a
*** Current Classification *** UNCLASSIFIED

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*** Current Classification *** UNCLASSIFIED
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

DOC_NBR= 87ANKARA14607

FILM= D870963-0349

DATE= 23 NOV 87

TYPE= TE

FROM= ANKARA

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION EUR

TO= STATE
ICA

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= UNCLASSIFIED

ORIGPCCLASS= n/a

EO= N/A

SUBJECT= TURKISH PRESS REVIEW: NOVEMBER 21-23, 1987

TURKEY'S INVOLVEMENT IN IRANGATE AFFAIR ANKARA

REFERENCE= n/a

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= PRESS SUMMARY, GOVERNMENT REACTION, ALLEGATION, INTERVENTION,
GOVERNMENT AGENCY, AIRSPACE

TAGS= PREL, PGOV 3COM, US, TU, CIA

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PAGE 01 ANKARA 14607 01 OF 03 231554Z
ACTION EUR-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSCE-00
NSAE-00 AMAD-01 PM-10 PA-02 INRE-00 ACDA-12 SP-02
C-01 PRS-01 SDEL-03 SART-01 /043 W
-----374147 231624Z /38

P 231548Z NOV 87
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3612
INFO USINFO WASHDC PRIORITY
AMCONSUL ADANA
AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMCONSUL ISTANBUL
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AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
USMISSION USNATO
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USDELMC BRUSSELS BE
39TACG INCIRLIK TU//CC/PA/RM//IN//
TUSLOG DET 33-3 ISKENDERUN
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AFOSI DET 6901 INCIRLIK AB TU//CC//
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USDOC06ATAF IZMIR TU
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 14607

USINFO FOR B/BNEA/EU
BONN FOR LABCOUNS MEAGHER

E.O. 12356: N/A
UNCLASSIFIED

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PAGE 02 ANKARA 14607 01 OF 03 231554Z

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, SCOM, TU
SUBJECT: TURKISH PRESS REVIEW: NOVEMBER 21-23, 1987

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.....
TURKEY'S INVOLVEMENT IN IRANGATE AFFAIR, ANKARA
REACTS; TURKEY CONSIDERS U.S. GULF POLICY
DANGEROUS; AIR FORCE PUBLICATION: INCIRLIK
UNEASINESS; 500 NUCLEAR BOMBS EXIST IN TURKEY;
.....

1. WEEKEND ISSUES OF "MILLIYET," "HURRIYET" AND
"CUMHURİYET" DEALT AT LENGTH WITH CONGRESSIONAL
IRANGATE" REPORT ALLEGATIONS OF CIA INVOLVEMENT IN
USG USE OF TURKISH AIRSPACE DURING THE "IRANGATE"
AFFAIR.

SEPARATELY NOVEMBER 22 "CUMHURİYET" ALLEGES THE
U.S. EMBASSY IN ANKARA REQUESTED OVERFLIGHT
PRIVILEGES IN FEBRUARY 1987 FOR TWO CIVILIAN
AIRCRAFT, ENROUTE FROM TORREJON, SPAIN, TO TEHERAN,
IRAN, WITH A DECLARED CARGO OF MEDICINE. THE PAPER
QUESTIONS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THESE FLIGHTS AND
EARLIER CLANDESTINE ARMS SALES.

2. "CUMHURİYET" OF NOVEMBER 22 ALSO CLAIMED THAT
THE CIA "STATION CHIEF" IN ANKARA AT THE TIME OF THE
ARMS SHIPMENT TO IRAN WAS FORMER EMBASSY POLITICAL
COUNSELOR, WILLIAM MEAGHER. MEAGHER, NOW STATIONED
IN BONN, DENIED THE ALLEGATION.

3. ALL PAPERS REPORTED MFA SPOKESMAN INAL BATU'S
STATEMENT THAT TURKEY WAS NEUTRAL IN THE GULF WAR
AND HAD NOT BEEN INVOLVED IN ANY ATTEMPT TO CHANGE
THE IRAN-IRAQ BALANCE OF POWER. BATU EMPHASIZED
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PAGE 03 . ANKARA 14607 01 OF 03 231554Z

THAT TURKEY HAD IMPARTIALLY APPLIED INTERNATIONAL
CIVIL AVIATION REGULATIONS IN HER NATIONAL
AIRSPACE. IN A SPECIAL INTERVIEW IN NOVEMBER 22
"MILLIYET," PM OZAL NOTED THAT CIVIL OR MILITARY
PLANES OVERFLYING TURKEY NOTIFIED THE TURKISH
AUTHORITIES OF THEIR CARGO, AND THAT THE SAME
PROCEDURE WAS FOLLOWED FOR LIBYAN AIRCRAFT
OVERFLYING TURKEY TO IRAN. OZAL CONTINUED THAT AS A
PRACTICAL MATTER, TURKEY CANNOT SEARCH SUCH AIRCRAFT.

4. QUOTING A HIGH LEVEL GOT OFFICIAL, "MILLIYET" OF
NOVEMBER 21 ASSERTED THAT TURKEY REGARDS U.S. GULF
POLICY AS A DANGEROUS MISTAKE WHICH COULD ESCALATE
THE GULF CRISIS AND INCREASE THE RISK OF AN ACTUAL

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WAR WITH IRAN.

5. "CUMHURIYET" REPORTED THAT THE OCTOBER EDITION OF THE TURKISH AIR FORCE MONTHLY MAGAZINE DISCUSSED ALLEGED GOT CONCERN OVER THE INCIRLIK BASE. THE MAGAZINE SAID THAT IF THE U.S INTERVENES IN THE GULF WAR, INCIRLIK IS LIKELY TO BE INVOLVED DESPITE TURKEY'S WISH THAT THE BASE NOT BE USED IN OPERATIONS OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THE NATO PACT.

6. "MILLIYET" OF NOVEMBER 23 REPORTED THAT THE 500 NUCLEAR WARHEADS REPORTEDLY PRESENT IN TURKEY WILL BE DISCUSSED AT THE REAGAN-GORBACHEV SUMMIT.

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ACTION EUR-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSCE-00
NSAE-00 AMAD-01 PM-10 PA-02 INRE-00 ACDA-12 SP-02
C-01 PRS-01 SDEL-03 SART-01 /043 W
-----374210 231625Z /38

P 231548Z NOV 87
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3613
INFO USINFO WASHDC PRIORITY
AMCONSUL ADANA
AMEMBASSY ATHENS

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AMCONSUL ISTANBUL
AMCONSUL IZMIR
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
USMISSION USNATO
HQ16THAF TORREJON AB SP//CCE//
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USDOC06ATAF IZMIR TU
USDOCOLSE IZMIR TU

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 03 ANKARA 14607

USINFO FOR B/BNEA/EU
BONN FOR LABCOUNS MEAGHER

E.O. 12356: N/A
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 ANKARA 14607 02 OF 03 231555Z

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, SCOM, TU
SUBJECT: TURKISH PRESS REVIEW: NOVEMBER 21-23, 1987

.....
NATO: INF TO INCREASE DEFENSE EXPENSES
.....

7. "CUMHURIYET" OF NOVEMBER 21 REPORTED THAT
EDWARD ROWNY, ADVISOR TO PRESIDENT RONALD REAGAN
ON ARMS CONTROL, SUGGESTED THAT NATO COUNTRIES
INCREASE THEIR DEFENSE EXPENDITURE IN ORDER TO
MAINTAIN THE CONVENTIONAL ARMS BALANCE BETWEEN
NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT.

.....
EEC: OBSTACLES TO EC MEMBERSHIP
.....

8. "CUMHURIYET" OF NOVEMBER 22 QUOTED FRG MFA
SOURCES AS SAYING THAT THE TIMING OF THE TURKISH

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APPLICATION FOR EEC MEMBERSHIP, TURKEY'S
FINANCIAL PROBLEMS AND LACK OF FOREIGN
INVESTMENT, AND PROBLEMS IN THE APPLICATION OF
CUSTOMS DUTIES NUMBER AMONG THE REASONS THAT FRG
DIPLOMATS ARE PESSIMISTIC ABOUT TURKEY'S
EVENTUAL ACCEPTANCE INTO THE EEC.

.....
CYPRUS: GREEK CYPRIOT WOMEN ENTER TRNC DURING
DEMONSTRATIONS
.....

9. PRESS REPORTS OF NOVEMBER 23 SAID THAT
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HUNDREDS OF GREEK CYPRIOT WOMEN PROTESTING THE
CAPTURE OF THEIR HOMELAND IN NORTHERN CYPRUS
MANAGED TO CROSS 40 METERS INTO THE "TRNC." THE
DEMONSTRATORS WERE REPORTEDLY PREVENTED FROM
FURTHER INCURSION INTO TURKISH CYPRIOT TERRITORY
BY UN PEACE KEEPING FORCES.

.....
DOMESTIC AFFAIRS: SHP MARDIN DEPUTY TURK
RELEASED FROM JAIL; DETENTION OF SARGIN AND
KUTLU TO BE EXTENDED; LEADERS'S TV PERFORMANCES;
OZAL TO U.S.A.; PIAR SURVEY ON COMMUNIST PARTY
.....

10. PRESS REPORTS OF NOVEMBER 21 SAID THAT
AHMET TURK, AN SHP PARLIAMENTARY DEPUTY
CANDIDATE FROM MARDIN, WAS RELEASED FROM CUSTODY
ON NOVEMBER 20. TURK WAS BEING HELD AT THE
STATE SECURITY COURT ON CHARGES OF ASSISTING PKK
MILITANTS AND DISTRIBUTING KURDISH PROPAGANDA
TURK WAS ELECTED DEPUTY TWICE PRIOR TO 1980.

11. "MILLIYET" OF NOVEMBER 21 REPORTED THAT THE
INTERROGATIONS OF TURKISH COMMUNISTS HAYDAR
KUTLU AND NIHAT SARGIN WILL BE COMPLETED AFTER
THE ELECTIONS. THE TWO MEN WILL THEN BE SENT TO
THE STATE SECURITY COURT FOR TRIAL.

12. "MILLIYET" OF NOVEMBER 23 EVALUATED THE TV
PERFORMANCES GIVEN BY POLITICAL PARTY LEADERS ON

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PAGE 01 ANKARA 14607 03 OF 03 231557Z
ACTION EUR-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSAE-00 AMAD-01
PM-10 PA-02 INRE-00 SP-02 PRS-01 SDEL-03 /029 W
-----374217 231625Z /38

P 231548Z NOV 87
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3614
INFO USINFO WASHDC PRIORITY
AMCONSUL ADANA
AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMCONSUL ISTANBUL
AMCONSUL IZMIR
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
USMISSION USNATO
HQ16THAF TORREJON AB SP//CCE//
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39TACG INCIRLIK TU//CC/PA//RM//IN//
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CDRSETAF/5TH VICENZA IT//AESE-JIC//
AFOSI DET 6901 INCIRLIK AB TU//CC//
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628MAS INCIRLIK TU
HQUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE//XP//PA//
USNMR SHAPE BE//P10//
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USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//POLAD//
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UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 03 ANKARA 14607

USINFO FOR B/BNEA/EU
BONN FOR LABCOUNS MEAGHER

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, SCOM, TU
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PAGE 02 ANKARA 14607 03 OF 03 231557Z

SUBJECT: TURKISH PRESS REVIEW: NOVEMBER 21-23, 1987

THE OPENING NIGHT OF THE CAMPAIGN "PROPAGANDA"
PERIOD. ON A SCALE OF TEN, INONU RECEIVED 7.1
POINTS WHILE PM TURGUT OZAL RECEIVED 6.6.

13. "MILLIYET" OF NOVEMBER 21 REPORTED THAT PM
TURGUT OZAL WOULD FLY TO HOUSTON ON NOVEMBER 30
(SIC) FOR A ROUTINE HEART AND EYE CHECK-UP.

14. A POLL CONDUCTED BY "SABAH" AND THE "PIAR"
RESEARCH COMPANY INDICATES THAT 61 PERCENT OF
THE TURKISH PEOPLE ARE AGAINST THE ESTABLISHMENT
OF A LEGAL COMMUNIST PARTY HERE.

.....
INSURGENCY: PKK ATTACKS SCHOOLS
.....

15. A REPORT IN NOVEMBER 22 "MILLIYET" SAID
THAT THE PKK IS TARGETING SCHOOLS IN SOUTH-EAST
ANATOLIA. IN THE LAST TWO MONTHS, THE PKK HAS
SET FIRE TO 7 VILLAGE SCHOOLS, KILLED ONE
TEACHER AND ABDUCTED ANOTHER.

.....
ARMENIAN ISSUE: ARMENIAN PATRIARCH IN USSR
CALLS ARMENIANS TO MEET
.....

16. "HURRIYETT" OF NOVEMBER 23 REPORTED THAT
PATRIARCH VASKEN-1 OF THE EJMIYAZIN CHURCH IN
THE USSR HAS CALLED FOR ALL ARMENIANS TO RETURN
TO THEIR "MOTHERLAND." VASKEN-1 SAID THAT
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SOMEDAY ARMENIANS WILL MEET VICTORIOUSLY AT THE
FOOT OF MOUNT ARARAT. VASKEN-I ALSO CALLED ON
THE UNITED NATIONS TO RECOGNIZE THE SO-CALLED
1915 GENOCIDE. THE PATRIARCH MADE HIS REMARKS
ON A RECENT TOUR OF THE THE U.S. AND CANADA.
STRAUSZ-HUPE

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FILM= D870957-0057

DATE= 20 NOV 87

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SUBJECT: TURKISH PRESS REVIEW: NOVEMBER 21, 1987
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.....
DOUBLE STANDARD IN AID TO TURKEY; NORTH'S
ACTIVITIES IN TURKEY; CIA DECEIVED TURKEY ON

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ARMS SHIPMENT TO IRAN

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1. "CUMHURIYET" AND "TERCUMAN" REPORTED THAT THE RULES COMMITTEE OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AFFIRMED A PROPOSAL TO ALLOW GREECE TO HAVE U.S.-MADE ARMS IN SOUTHERN CYPRUS. THE COMMITTEE ALSO AFFIRMED A RESOLUTION LINKING MILITARY AID TO TURKEY WITH THE SUCCESS OF TURKISH EFFORTS TO CONTROL OPIUM CULTIVATION.
2. A FRONT PAGE STORY IN "CUMHURIYET" REPORTED THAT ACCORDING TO DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED TO THE IRANGATE INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE, LT COLONEL OLIVER NORTH WAS ACTIVE IN TURKEY. NORTH ALLEGEDLY VISITED A U.S. BASE IN EASTERN ANATOLIA TO OBSERVE A HOSTAGE RESCUE OPERATION DIRECTED AGAINST IRAN, KIDNAPPED AN IRANIAN FROM ISTANBUL AND SEARCHED THE SITE OF AN ARGENTINIAN PLANE CRASH NEAR THE TURKISH-IRANIAN BORDER.
3. UNDER THE HEADLINE, "CIA DECEIVED TURKEY," TWO DAILIES CLAIMED THAT THE IRANGATE INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE REPORT SHOWS THAT THREE U.S. PLANES CARRYING ARMS FLEW OVER TURKEY EN ROUTE TO IRAN FROM PORTUGAL IN 1985. THE CIA STATION CHIEF IN ANKARA OBTAINED PERMISSION FROM TURKISH AUTHORITIES FOR THESE FLIGHTS BY MISREPRESENTING THE PLANES' CARGO.

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.....
GREECE: GREEK PRESIDENT SAYS TURKEY'S REAL PURPOSE IS TO CAPTURE ALL OF CYPRUS; GOG SPOKESMAN: NO TURKISH MONORITY IN GREECE; OZAL-PAPANDREOU SUMMIT NEXT YEAR
.....

4. "TERCUMAN" QUOTED GREEK PRESIDENT CRISTOS SARTZETAKIS AS SAYING THAT TURKEY'S REAL PURPOSE IS TO CAPTURE ALL OF CYPRUS. SARTZETAKIS EMPHASIZED THAT GREECE WANTS PEACEFUL RELATIONS WITH TURKEY BUT ADDED THAT GREECE WILL NOT GIVE UP RIGHTS RECOGNIZED BY INTERNATIONAL LAWS OR TREATIES.
5. "TERCUMAN" AND "MILLIYET" REPORTED THAT A GREEK GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN, REACTING TO A

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STATEMENT BY MFA SPOKESMAN ENAL BATU THAT GREECE OPPRESSES THE TURKISH MINORITY IN WESTERN THRACE, SAID "THERE IS NO TURKISH MINORITY IN GREECE, ONLY AN ISLAMIC MINORITY."

6. "MILLIYET" FOREIGN CORRESPONDENT NILUFER YALCIN STATED THAT ACCORDING TO GOT SOURCES, BOTH TURKEY AND GREECE DESIRE AN OZAL-PAPANDREOU SUMMIT. THEREFORE, IF ANAP WINS THE FORTHCOMING ELECTIONS, THE TWO LEADERS MIGHT MEET IN EARLY 1988.

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UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 ANKARA 14518

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SUBJECT: TURKISH PRESS REVIEW: NOVEMBER 21, 1987

7. ACCORDING TO AN ARTICLE IN "CUMHURIYET," THE RECENT NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ASSOCIATION MEETING HELD IN ISTANBUL REVEALED DIFFERENCES OF OPINION BETWEEN TURKEY AND OTHER NATO MEMBERS ON THE ASSUMPTION OF ADDITIONAL NUCLEAR RESPONSIBILITIES.

.....
DOMESTIC AFFAIRS: EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT PASSES RESOLUTION ON KUTLU AND SARGIN; SHP'S PHONES TAPPED; OZAL TO REST UNTIL NOVEMBER 25; DYP DEPUTY RESIGNS; TURK-IS DIVIDED; CYPRUS EXCITED ABOUT EVREN VISIT
.....

8. THE PRESS REPORTED THAT THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RATIFIED A MOTION DEMANDING THE RELEASE OF TURKISH COMMUNISTS, HAYDAR KUTLU AND NIHAT SARGIN, BY A VOTE OF 123 TO 76.

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9. "SABAH" CARRIED A REPORT CLAIMING THAT SHP'S TELEPHONES IN IZMIR WERE TAPPED BY ANAP. THE MAYOR OF IZMIR'S KONAK DISTRICT, A FORMER ANAP PARTY MEMBER NOW AFFILIATED WITH SHP, HAS ASKED THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE TO TAKE ACTION ON THE MATTER.

10. PRESS REPORTS REVEALED THAT PM TURGUT OZAL WILL ABIDE BY HIS DOCTORS' RECOMMENDATIONS AND LIMIT CAMPAIGNING UNTIL NOVEMBER 25.

11. ALL DAILIES REPORTED THAT DYP DEPUTY FROM UNCLASSIFIED

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KONYA, SALIM EREL, HAS RESIGNED FROM HIS PARTY.

12. "MILLIYET" REPORTED THAT THE TURK-IS (TURKISH TRADE UNIONS CONFEDERATION) ELECTION STRATEGY HAS CAUSED DISAGREEMENT AMONG ITS CENTRAL OFFICE ADMINISTRATORS.

13. ACCORDING TO "HURRIYET," THE "TRNC" IS EXCITEDLY PREPARING TO WELCOME PRESIDENT KENAN DURING HIS PROPOSED VISIT NEXT MONTH. REPORTS ALSO CLAIM THAT THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION TO VISIT THE "TRNC" HAS UPSET THE GREEK CYPRIOTS.

14. "CUMHURİYET" SAID THAT TURKEY AND U.S.A. VOTED AGAINST THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION CONCERNING RATIFICATION OF THE LAW OF THE SEA AGREEMENT.

INSURGENCY: 37 MILITANTS CAUGHT

15. ALL PAPERS REPORTED THAT 37 PEOPLE HAVE BEEN ARRESTED IN DIYARBAKIR FOR ALLEGEDLY SUPPORTING THE PKK. STRAUZ-HUPE

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SUBJECT= PRESIDENT EVREN ON RELATIONS WITH . U.S., ARMS TO IRAN, GULF WAR,
IRAN, SYRIA

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CONCEPTS= PRESIDENT, INTERVIEW, FOREIGN RELATIONS, ARMS, SHIPMENT, WAR

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Date: 11/29/96

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TAGS: PREL, PGOV, TU, IR, SY

SUBJECT: PRESIDENT EVREN ON RELATIONS WITH
U.S., ARMS TO IRAN, GULF WAR, IRAN, SYRIA

1. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY: AN INTERVIEW OF PRESIDENT EVREN BY A VISITING CBS TELEVISION JOURNALIST, JEFF FAGER, APPEARED IN "BAKIS," THE WEEKEND MAGAZINE OF THE LIBERAL DAILY "MILLIYET" ON MARCH 1. IN THE INTERVIEW, EVREN WAS CRITICAL OF THE U.S. BECAUSE A CONGRESS, "INFLUENCED BY LOBBIES," HOLDS UP AGREEMENTS CONCLUDED BY THE ADMINISTRATION. "WE DO NOT EXPERIENCE SUCH DIFFICULTIES WITH OTHER COUNTRIES," HE CLAIMED. EVREN SAID HE APPRECIATED THE ADMINISTRATION'S DESIRE TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH IRAN. HOWEVER, A SUPERPOWER INTERVENTION IN THE GULF MIGHT PROVOKE THE OTHER SUPERPOWER AND CARRY A LOT OF RISK, THE PRESIDENT SAID. ISLAMIC CLERGY WHO SEEK TO REGAIN STATUS LOST UNDER THE REPUBLIC, ALONG WITH
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EXTERNAL FORCES, ARE BEHIND FUNDAMENTALIST ACTIVITIES, EVREN CONTINUED. THESE EXTERNAL FORCES ARE NOT ONLY FUNDAMENTALISTS BUT COMMUNISTS AS WELL.

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THE PRESIDENT SAID IRANIAN BROADCASTS DIRECTED AGAINST TURKEY CONSTITUTE INTERVENTION IN ITS INTERNAL AFFAIRS. THE INTERVIEW CONCLUDED WITH EVREN SAYING THAT TURKEY WILL PROVIDE SYRIA WITH ENOUGH WATER TO MEET ITS NEEDS. END INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY.

2. OUR SLIGHTLY EDITED VERSION OF THE ENGLISH TEXT PREPARED BY THE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE AND PROVIDED THROUGH THE MFA FOLLOWS:

U.S.-TURKISH RELATIONS

Q. IS TURKEY SATISFIED WITH U.S. POLICY IN THE REGION?

A. TURKEY IS A MEMBER OF NATO AND AN INTEGRAL PART OF EUROPE AIMING AT FULL MEMBERSHIP IN THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY. TURKEY, AT THE SAME TIME, OCCUPIES A STRATEGIC POSITION IN THE MIDDLE EAST. IT THEREFORE WOULD BE IN THE INTEREST OF BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND TURKEY THAT THEY PURSUE SIMILAR POLICIES. HOWEVER, IT IS ALSO UNDERSTANDABLE THAT ONE MIGHT OBSERVE FROM TIME TO TIME CERTAIN DIFFERENCES OF APPROACH IN THESE POLICIES. THE UNITED STATES IS A SUPERPOWER WITH GLOBAL INTERESTS. EVEN IN TURKEY WE WITNESS DIFFERENCES OF OPINION ON THE POLICIES TO BE PURSUED.

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3. NOW I WISH TO RAISE SOME SPECIFIC POINTS WITH REGARD TO YOUR QUESTION:

TURKEY IS LOCATED IN A CRITICAL REGION WHICH MIGHT BE DESCRIBED AS A POWDERKEG. THIS BEING THE CASE, THE UNITED STATES COULD BASE ITS POLICIES ON A BETTER ASSESSMENT OF THE REGION IF IT CONDUCTS TIMELY CONSULTATIONS WITH TURKEY AND MAINTAINS AN EFFECTIVE DIALOGUE.

ANOTHER POINT WHICH I WISH TO MENTION IS THE FOLLOWING: THE AGREEMENTS CONCLUDED BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF TURKEY AND THE UNITED STATES FACE DIFFICULTIES IN THE CONGRESS. WE DO NOT EXPERIENCE SUCH DIFFICULTIES WITH OTHER COUNTRIES. THE

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AGREEMENTS WE REACH WITH THEM EASILY WIN THE APPROVAL OF THEIR PARLIAMENTS. WE KNOW, ON THE OTHER HAND, THAT THE CONGRESS IS INFLUENCED BY CERTAIN LOBBIES. WE ALSO KNOW THAT THESE LOBBIES ARE FIGHTING TURKISH INTERESTS. I AM OF THE OPINION THAT THE CONGRESS SHOULD NOT, UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF THESE LOBBIES, PROVIDE GROUNDS FOR ACTIONS DIRECTED AGAINST TURKEY WHICH HAS ALWAYS BEEN A PART OF THE WESTERN ALLIANCE. OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES HAS ALWAYS ADVANCED ON THE RIGHT PATH AND ADDITIONAL EFFORTS SHOULD BE DEPLOYED TO FURTHER DEVELOP OUR GOOD RELATIONS.

YOU MAY NOW TELL ME THAT TURKEY SHOULD ALSO LOBBY FOR HERSELF. HOWEVER, WE DO NOT HAVE ENOUGH PEOPLE THERE

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AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

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E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, TU, IR, SY

SUBJECT: PRESIDENT EVREN ON RELATIONS WITH

TO DO THAT. SHOULD A LARGER NUMBER OF TURKS HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO IMMIGRATE TO THE UNITED STATES, THIS COULD HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE.

4. U.S.-IRAN

Q. TOP U.S. OFFICIALS HAVE SHOWN AN INTEREST IN OPENING RELATIONS WITH THE SO-CALLED IRANIAN MODERATES. WHAT DOES TURKEY THINK OF THIS?

A. TURKISH POLICY AIMS AT GOOD RELATIONS WITH NEIGHBORS. ALTHOUGH WE ENCOUNTER DIFFICULTIES WITH THESE COUNTRIES FROM TIME TO TIME, WE ALWAYS SEEK THEIR ELIMINATION THROUGH DIALOGUE. NATURALLY, IT IS UNCLASSIFIED

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ALSO TO OUR INTEREST THAT OUR ALLY AND LONGSTANDING FRIEND, THE UNITED STATES, SHOULD ENJOY GOOD RELATIONS WITH OUR NEIGHBORS. I, THEREFORE, APPRECIATE WHY THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION WISHES TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH IRAN. SINCE TURKEY HAS GOOD RELATIONS WITH IRAN, BOTH TURKEY AND THE REGION WOULD BENEFIT FROM THE NORMALIZATION OF U.S.-IRANIAN RELATIONS.

5. ARMS TO IRAN

Q. IF I MAY JUST FOLLOW ON THAT QUESTION, DOES TRADING OF ARMS FOR HOSTAGES DISTURB YOU?

A. WE HAVE SPARED NO EFFORT UP TO THE PRESENT TO BRING AN END TO THE WAR BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ. WE BELIEVE THAT IF ALL THE COUNTRIES CEASE THEIR ARMS SHIPMENTS TO THE BELLIGERENTS, THIS WAR MAY COME TO AN END SOON. I AM, THEREFORE, OF THE OPINION THAT COUNTRIES SHOULD ACT WITH GREAT CAUTION ON THE

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QUESTION OF ARMS SALES TO IRAN AND IRAQ AND THAT THEY SHOULD REFRAIN, AS WE DO, FROM PROVIDING THEM WITH SUCH MATERIAL.

6. IRAN-IRAQ WAR

Q. IS THE INTENSIFICATION OF THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR A THREAT TO TURKISH SECURITY AND THE SECURITY OF THE AREA?

A. OF COURSE, IT CONSTITUTES A THREAT. THIS IS LIKE YOUR NEIGHBOR HAVING A FIRE. YOU ARE CONCERNED

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THAT IT MAY SPREAD OVER TO YOUR HOUSE.

A WAR BETWEEN TWO NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES, THEREFORE, CAUSES US CONCERN. THE WAR RAISES THE FOLLOWING PROBLEMS AND RISKS FOR TURKEY:

IN THE FIRST PLACE, BORDER SECURITY HAS BECOME A TURKISH RESPONSIBILITY. ON OUR BORDERS WITH BOTH IRAN AND IRAQ, ONLY TURKISH AUTHORITIES MAINTAIN SECURITY WITH LITTLE SUPPORT FROM THE OTHER SIDE. THIS CAUSES PROBLEMS.

SECONDLY, WE FACE CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTIES IN OUR OIL IMPORTS FROM THE GULF. MORE THAN TEN TURKISH SAILORS HAVE LOST THEIR LIVES DURING ATTACKS ON OUR TANKERS. FURTHERMORE, THE ESCALATION OF THE WAR BRINGS OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF AN EXTERNAL INTERVENTION WHICH WOULD FURTHER COMPLICATE THE SITUATION AND THUS AFFECT TURKEY TO A GREATER EXTENT. THIS IS WHY WE NOT ONLY DEPLOY EVERY EFFORT TO BRING A RAPID END TO THE WAR, BUT ALSO WISH THAT ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD BE ABLE TO ADOPT A RESOLUTION WHICH WOULD BE MORE EFFECTIVE AND WHICH WOULD SATISFY THE TWO PARTIES.

ON THE OTHER HAND, WE ARE PURSUING OUR EFFORTS BOTH AS TURKEY, A NEIGHBORING COUNTRY, AND AS A MEMBER OF THE PEACE COMMITTEE OF THE ORGANIZATION OF THE

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SUBJECT: PRESIDENT EVREN ON RELATIONS WITH

ISLAMIC CONFERENCE. HOWEVER WE DO HOPE THAT THE
UNITED NATIONS WOULD BE ABLE TO PLAY A MORE EFFECTIVE
ROLE.

I WISH TO RAISE AN IMPORTANT POINT IN THIS CONTEXT.
WAR SHOULD NO LONGER BE A MEANS OF ELIMINATING
PROBLEMS. WAR SHOULD ONLY BE THE VERY LAST RESORT
WHEN TRULY JUSTIFIED BY VITAL CIRCUMSTANCES. THIS IS
WHAT ATATURK HAS TOLD US. IN OTHER WORDS, IT IS

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EVIDENT THAT WARS DO NOT LEAD TO ANYTHING POSITIVE. THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THIS WAR SERVES NEITHER IRAN NOR IRAQ. ALL OTHER COUNTRIES AGREE ON THAT. IN THE CASE OF PROTRACTED WARS, IT BECOMES IMPOSSIBLE TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN THE VICTORS AND THE LOSERS. IF WE CAST A GLANCE AT THE AFTERMATH OF THE SECOND WORLD UNCLASSIFIED

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WAR, WE SEE THAT SOME OF THE COUNTRIES WHICH LOST THE WAR HAVE EVENTUALLY REACHED A BETTER ECONOMIC POSITION. LOOK AT JAPAN AND GERMANY.

7. INTERVENTION IN GULF WAR

Q. YOU REFERRED TO AN EXTERNAL INTERVENTION. WOULD YOU ELABORATE ON THAT POINT?

A. THE GULF PROVIDES A CONSIDERABLE PORTION OF WORLD OIL PRODUCTION. INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES SUCH AS JAPAN DEPEND ON GULF OIL. THEREFORE, FREE NAVIGATION IN THE GULF IS IMPORTANT AND ITS CLOSURE WOULD CREATE ENORMOUS DIFFICULTIES. THIS MIGHT LEAD ONE SUPERPOWER TO INTERVENE. IF THIS HAPPENS THE OTHER SUPERPOWER MIGHT BE PROVOKED. ALL THIS WOULD CARRY A LOT OF RISK.

8. ISLAM IN TURKEY

Q. WHAT ABOUT THE THREAT OF EMERGENCE OF ISLAM IN TURKEY?

A. THE EXPRESSION "EMERGENCE OF ISLAM IN TURKEY" IS NOT A GOOD ONE SINCE 98 PERCENT OF OUR POPULATION IS ALREADY MUSLIM. IN SUCH A COUNTRY, EVERYONE IS FREE TO OBSERVE THE REQUIREMENTS OF ISLAM. IN FACT, ARTICLE 24 OF OUR CONSTITUTION PROVIDES FOR FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE AND RELIGIOUS BELIEF. EVERYONE IS FREE TO PRACTICE HIS RELIGION. OF COURSE, THERE IS A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ONE'S PRACTICING HIS RELIGION AND UNCLASSIFIED

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TRYING TO ESTABLISH THE RULE OF SHARIA IN A SECULAR COUNTRY. ASPIRATIONS TO GO BACK EXISTED EVEN AT THE TIME OF ATATURK. HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE THAT TURKEY HAS TAKEN SUCH A DIRECTION AND SO MANY GENERATIONS OF YOUNG PEOPLE EMERGED SINCE THE EARLY 1920'S THAT NO ONE MAY REVERSE THAT COURSE. ON THE OTHER HAND, WE CONTINUE TO FOLLOW VERY CLOSELY SUCH TENDENCIES EVEN WHEN THEY REPRESENT A SMALL, MINOR THREAT, AND WHO REMAIN DETERMINED NOT TO TOLERATE THEM.

9. WHO'S BEHIND FUNDAMENTALISM?

Q. WHO IS BEHIND THESE ACTIVITIES?

A. THE FUNDAMENTALISTS. AT THE TIME OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE, WHEN SHARIA WAS THE RULE, THE CLERGY ENJOYED CERTAIN POWERS IN THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS. THEY WERE CONSULTED BEFORE THE ADOPTION OF CERTAIN DECISIONS.

FOLLOWING THE FOUNDING OF OUR SECULAR REPUBLIC, THEY LOST THEIR POWERS BUT NOT THEIR ASPIRATIONS. IN OTHER WORDS, THESE FORCES CONSIST OF THOSE CIRCLES WHICH SEEK TO REGAIN THEIR STATUS IN THE ADMINISTRATION.

THEY HAVE VARIOUS SECTS. EXTERNAL FORCES MAY ALSO BE BEHIND THEM. IN FACT, THEY MAY BE GETTING SUPPORT NOT ONLY FROM THE FUNDAMENTALISTS BUT EQUALLY FROM

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PAGE 01 ANKARA 02400 04 OF 04 031603Z
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7668
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AMCONSUL ISTANBUL
AMCONSUL IZMIR
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

UNCLAS SECTION 04 OF 04 ANKARA 02400

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, TU, IR, SY
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT EVREN ON RELATIONS WITH

COMMUNIST ORGANIZATIONS.

10. COMMUNISTS

Q. COMMUNIST ORGANIZATIONS?

A. DESTABILIZATION OF TURKEY MAKES THEM HAPPY. BE IT FROM THE RIGHT OR FROM THE LEFT, DESTABILIZING EVENTS SERVE THEIR INTEREST AND AIMS. THERE IS AN ORGANIZATION, (PKK), SUPPORTED BY COMMUNISTS, WHICH UNDERTAKES, FROM TIME TO TIME, SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES IN OUR SOUTHEASTERN REGIONS. THE MEMBERS OF THIS ORGANIZATION ARE INSTRUCTED TO ATTEND MOSQUES, TO APPEAR FIRM IN THEIR RELIGIOUS BELIEFS AND TO
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MAINTAIN GOOD RELATIONS WITH RELIGIOUS CIRCLES.

11. IRAN

Q. WHAT ABOUT THE PROPAGANDA BEING DIRECTED AGAINST THIS COUNTRY BY IRAN? RADIO BROADCASTS?

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A. OF COURSE I DO NOT APPROVE OF THEM. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO APPROVE. IT IS INTERVENTION IN OUR INTERNAL AFFAIRS. HOWEVER, WHEN WE APPROACH IRAN, THEY TELL US THAT SUCH BROADCASTS REFLECT THE VIEWS OF THE RADIO COMPANY AND NOT THE GOVERNMENT. IT WOULD BE BETTER IF SUCH BROADCASTS ARE NOT MADE AT ALL.

12. SYRIA

Q. SYRIA HAS COMPLAINED THAT HER INTERESTS ARE BEING DAMAGED BY THE DAM YOU ARE BUILDING ON THE EUPHRATES. WHAT DO YOU THINK ON THIS POINT?

A. NATURALLY, IT IS NOT POSSIBLE FOR US, ACCORDING TO INTERNATIONAL RULES, TO COMPLETELY STOP THE FLOW OF WATER TO SYRIA. ON THE OTHER HAND, WE HAVE AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES UNDER WHICH WE ARE EXPECTED TO PROVIDE SYRIA WITH A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF WATER. THE SYRIANS MAY NOT BE SATISFIED WITH IT, BUT THEY HAVE ALSO CONSTRUCTED A DAM ON THE EUPHRATES. THE RIVER ORIGINATES IN OUR TERRITORY AND WE CERTAINLY HAVE THE RIGHT TO CONSTRUCT DAMS. OF COURSE, THERE IS NO QUESTION OF COMPLETELY STOPPING THE FLOW OF WATER. SYRIA WOULD BE PROVIDED WITH

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ENOUGH WATER TO MEET ITS NEEDS. END TEXT.
STRAUSZ-HUPE

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*** Current Classification *** UNCLASSIFIED

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

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DATE= 28 NOV 86

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DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION EUR

TO= STATE
USIA

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

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ORIGCLASS= UNCLASSIFIED

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EO= N/A

SUBJECT= TURKISH PRESS REVIEW: NOVEMBER 27-28, 1986

REFERENCE= n/a

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= PRESS SUMMARY, FOREIGN RELATIONS, ARMS, SHIPMENT

TAGS= PREL, PGOV, SCOM, PTER, ELAB, OPRC, TU, EC, IR, SY, BU

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Date: 11/29/92

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E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, SCOM, PTER, ELAB, EC, IR, SY, BU, TU
SUBJECT: TURKISH PRESS REVIEW: NOVEMBER 27-28, 1986

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1. SUMMARY: THE TURKISH PRESS COVERED THE FOLLOWING NEWS ITEMS:

- TURKISH-IRANIAN RELATIONS: REACTION TO REVELATIONS IN U.S., PM'S STATEMENT ON ARMS SHIPMENT, IRANIAN AMBASSADOR'S PRESS CONFERENCE, IRANIAN HIT TEAM
- PRIME MINISTER ON DECA;
- TERRORISTS: ARREST IN ABSENTIA OF SYRIAN DIPLOMAT BALADI, MFA COMMUNIQUE ON AMERIN'S DIPLOMATIC STATUS;
- TURKEY-EC: EC AID TO TURKEY, BONN CONCERNED REGARDING TURKISH JUSTICE COURT;
- COE TO DISCUSS ARMENIAN ATROCITY STORY;
- BOMBING OF TURKISH CONSULATE IN MELBOURNE: EIGHT ARMENIANS HELD;
- TURKISH-BULGARIAN RELATIONS;
- LISTENING DEVICES FOUND IN "TURKISH HOUSE" IN NEW YORK;
- CONSTITUTIONAL COURT CANCELS TWO POLICE LAW ARTICLES;
- SHP-DSP: WARMER RELATIONS BETWEEN LEFTIST PARTIES;
- LABOR: LOCK-OUT IN TURKISH METAL INDUSTRY;
- SEPARATIST ACTIVITIES: GENDARME KILLED IN SIIRT, SHP COMMITTEE INVESTIGATES ACTIVITIES IN MARDIN; AND
- MORE SENTENCES IN KAPIKULE. END SUMMARY.

2. TURKISH-IRANIAN RELATIONS: LEFTIST "CUMHURIYET" AND LIBERAL "MILLIYET," COVERING DEVELOPMENTS IN U.S. SALES OF ARMS TO IRAN, WROTE THAT THE ISSUE HAD REACHED THE DIMENSIONS OF A U.S. DOMESTIC POLITICAL CRISIS. "CUMHURIYET" OF NOV. 27 REPORTED THAT ISRAEL HAD OFFICIALLY ACCEPTED THAT IT HAD SHIPPED ARMS TO IRAN, UNCLASSIFIED

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BUT REJECTED PASSING ON THE MONEY PAID FOR THE ARMS. "MILLIYET" OF NOV. 28 STATED THAT ISRAEL HAD INITIATED ARMS SALES TO IRAN, THE VALUE OF WHICH WAS TWENTY MILLION DOLLARS. MEANWHILE, PRIMIN OZAL TOLD THE PRESS ON NOV. 27 THAT TURKEY WAS NOT INVOLVED IN ARMS SHIPMENT TO IRAN, AND THAT TURKISH BASES HAD NOT BEEN USED FOR THIS PURPOSE. OZAL ADDED THAT TURKEY DID NOT CONTROL THE CARGOES OF U.S. TRANSIT PLANES FLYING OVER TURKEY. "CUMHURIYET" OF NOV. 27 REPORTED THAT IRANIAN AMBASSADOR IN ANKARA, MANUCHER MOTTAKI, IN A NOV. 26 PRESS CONFERENCE, SAID THAT SUCH STORIES WERE LEAKED BY "ANARCHIST REAGAN," AND THE ATTITUDE OF THE WHITE HOUSE INDICATED THE DEFEAT OF U.S. DIPLOMACY. MOTTAKI ALSO SAID THAT ALLEGATIONS OF IRAN'S SUPPORT OF RECENT TERRORIST ACTIVITIES WERE PUT FORTH BY THE U.S., WHICH WAS TRYING TO SPOIL TURKISH-IRANIAN RELATIONS.

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ACCORDING TO "MILLIYET" AND "CUMHURİYET" OF NOV. 27, MOTTAKI ALSO SAID THAT IRAN HAS THE RIGHT TO HIT ANY TARGET WITHIN IRAQI BORDERS, INCLUDING THE PIPELINES. HE ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT IRAN HAD NO INTENTION OF GOING AGAINST TURKISH INTERESTS.

3. PM ON DECA: "CUMHURİYET" AND "MILLIYET" OF NOV. 28 REPORTED THAT PRİMİN OZAL, REPLYING TO A QUESTION ON TURCO-U.S. RELATIONS, TOLD THE PRESS THAT TURKEY HAD ASKED THE U.S. FOR EXPANSION OF THE TRADE VOLUME BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES, INSTEAD OF INCREASING THE AID AMOUNT. "WE HAVE COVERED CONSIDERABLE DISTANCE IN THIS RESPECT," OZAL SAID, ADDING THAT TURKEY DID NOT WANT TO USE THE DECA AS A TRUMP CARD.

4. TERRORISTS: ALL DAILIES OF NOV. 27 REPORTED THAT

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E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, SCOM, PTER, ELAB, EC, IR, SY, BU, TU
THE STATE SECURITY COURT OF ANKARA ISSUED AN ABSENTEE
WARRANT FOR THE ARREST OF SYRIAN SECOND SECRETARY
MOHAMMAD DARVISH BALADI, WHO HAS ALREADY LEFT TURKEY.
THE MFA STATED THAT SYRIAN EMBASSY OFFICIAL ADNAN MUSA
SULEYMAN AMERIN ENJOYED "B" STATUS DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY,
AND, ACCORDING TO THE VIENNA ACCORD, HE WILL NOT BE
TRIED FOR HIS PART IN THE ASSASSINATION OF JORDANIAN
DIPLOMAT ZAIT SATI. HOWEVER, THE MFA WILL LET THE COURT
DECIDE WHETHER AMERIN SHOULD BE TRIED ON CHARGES OF
ESPIONAGE.

5. TURKEY-EC: "MILLIYET" OF NOV. 27 REPORTED THAT THE
BUDGET COMMITTEE HAD APPROVED A USD 46 MILLION CREDIT TO
TURKEY FOR 1987. "MILLIYET," QUOTING "DIE WELT," WROTE
THAT IF ANKARA REJECTS THE DECISIONS OF THE EC
MINISTERIAL COUNCIL, MANY TURKISH WORKERS LIVING IN
TURKEY AND IN EUROPE MAY APPLY TO THE EC JUSTICE COURT.
THE DAILY STATED THAT BONN IS VERY MUCH CONCERNED ABOUT
THIS PROSPECT, AND ITS CONCERN IS SHARED BY OTHER EC
GOVERNMENTS.

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6. COE TO DISCUSS ARMENIAN ATROCITY STORY:

"CUMHURIYET" AND "MILLIYET" REPORTED THAT THE ARMENIAN ATROCITY REPORT DRAFTED BY BELGIAN PARLIAMENTARIAN VANDEMEULEBROUCKE WILL BE VOTED UPON BY THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE ON DEC. 16-17, 1986.

7. BOMBING OF TURKISH CONSULATE IN MELBOURNE: ALL PAPERS OF NOV. 27 REPORTED THAT EIGHT ARMENIANS ARE BEING HELD IN CONNECTION WITH THE BOMBING OF THE TURKISH CONSULATE BUILDING IN MELBOURNE. AN ARMENIAN RESTAURANT
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OWNER FROM SYDNEY HAS BEEN ARRESTED. POLICE FOUND EXPLOSIVES AND OTHER MATERIALS USED IN THE MANUFACTURE OF BOMBS IN THE RESTAURANT.

8. TURKISH-BULGARIAN RELATIONS: "CUMHURIYET" OF NOV. 27 REPORTED THAT ARGUMENTS ON THE U.N. AGENDA ITEM REGARDING ATROCITIES AGAINST THE TURKISH MINORITY IN BULGARIA CONTINUED. BULGARIA ACCUSED TURKEY OF ARMING EXCESSIVELY, AND TURKEY ACCUSED BULGARIA OF SUPPORTING TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL ARMS SMUGGLING. TURKEY DEMANDED THAT BULGARIA EITHER RESPECT THE MINORITY RIGHTS OF TURKS IN BULGARIA, OR PERMIT THEM TO EMIGRATE.

9. LISTENING DEVICES FOUND IN "TURKISH HOUSE" IN NEW YORK: "HURRIYET" OF NOV. 27 REPORTED THAT MORE THAN A HUNDRED LISTENING DEVICES HAD BEEN FOUND IN "TURKISH HOUSE" IN NEW YORK. SAID DEVICES REPORTEDLY HAD BEEN INSTALLED IN ALL WALLS AND CEILINGS OF THE ELEVEN STORY BUILDING, IN WHICH MANY TURKISH GOVERNMENT OFFICES ARE LOCATED. DEPUTY PERMANENT DELEGATE KORKMAZ HAKTANIR STATED THAT THE LISTENING DEVICES WERE PLACED WHEN IBM OWNED THE BUILDING, BUT ADDED THAT THEY DID NOT KNOW BY WHOM.

10. CONSTITUTIONAL COURT CANCELS TWO POLICE LAW ARTICLES: ALL PAPERS OF NOV. 27 REPORTED THAT THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT HAD ANNULLED TWO ARTICLES OF THE POLICE BILL, PASSED IN JUNE 1985 AFTER EXTENSIVE DEBATES IN THE PARLIAMENT. THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC POPULIST PARTY (SHP) HAD BROUGHT SUIT BEFORE THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT FOR ANNULMENT OF THIS BILL. THE COURT DETERMINED THAT TWO ARTICLES IN THE BILL ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL. THE

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E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, SCOM, PTER, ELAB, EC, IR, SY, BU, TU

ANNULLED ARTICLES PROVIDED FOR POLICE SUPERVISION OF PUBLIC MORALS, AND RE-INTERROGATION OF SUSPECTS FOLLOWING THEIR RELEASE AFTER AN INITIAL 15-DAY DETENTION PERIOD. (SEE SEPTTEL)

11. SHP-DSP: "MILLIYET" OF NOV. 27 REPORTED THAT THE REASON WHY SHP PRESIDENT ERDAL INONU GAVE THE DRAFT BILL REGARDING LIFTING OF THE POLITICAL BANS TO THE PARLIAMENT CHAIRMANSHIP BOARD WAS TO OPEN A WAY TO BULENT ECEVIT. ACCORDING TO PARTY QUARTERS, THE STORY SAID SHP-DSP (DEMOCRATIC LEFT PARTY) UNITY GOALS PRIOR TO THE 1988 GENERAL ELECTIONS LIE BEHIND THIS ACTION.

12. LABOR: "MILLIYET" OF NOV. 27 REPORTED THAT THE TURKISH METAL INDUSTRIALISTS UNION (MESS) HAD DECLARED A LOCK-OUT IN 101 WORK BRANCHES IN REACTION TO THE STRIKE DECISION OF OTOMOBIL-IS UNION.

13. SEPARATIST ACTIVITIES: ALL PAPERS OF NOV. 27 REPORTED THAT A GENDARME SOLDIER WAS KILLED AT SIRNAK, SIIRT IN A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN SEPARATIST PKK GUERRILLAS AND SECURITY FORCES. HOWEVER, "MILLIYET" REPORTS THAT TWO SOLDIERS AND A VILLAGE GUARD HAD BEEN KILLED BY SEPARATISTS DURING SAID CLASH. MEANWHILE, "HURRIYET" OF NOV. 28 REPORTED THAT THE SHP HAD SENT A COMMITTEE TO MARDIN TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGED PRESSURES IN CERTAIN VILLAGES DURING SEARCHES CONDUCTED BY SECURITY FORCES.

14. MORE SENTENCES IN KAPIKULE: ALL PAPERS OF NOV. 27
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REPORTED THAT 27 DEFENDANTS OF THE KAPIKULE TRIAL, WHICH

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BEGAN IN 1984, WERE GIVEN PRISON SENTENCES RANGING FROM TWO TO SIXTEEN YEARS. THE CORRUPTION CHARGES RESULTED IN THE FALL OF TWO CABINET MINISTERS IN 1984.
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*** Current Classification *** ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

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SUBJECT= ALLEGED SHIPMENT OF F-5'S TO IRAN THROUGH TURKEY

REFERENCE= 84 STATE 216610

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= ALLEGATION, SHIPMENT, COMBAT, AIRCRAFT, REEXPORT

TAGS= MARR, PREL, US, IZ, IR, TU, GE

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MARR PREL US IZ IR TU GE
SUBJECT: ALLEGED SHIPMENT OF F-5'S TO IRAN THROUGH
TURKEY

REF: STATE 216610

(C) DURING MEETING ON JULY 25, FOREIGN MINISTER
SHAIKH MOHAMMED BIN MUBARAK AL-KHALIFA ASKED
AMBASSADOR IF THERE WERE ANY TRUTH TO LONDON
OBSERVER ARTICLE OF JULY 22 ALLEGING EXPORT TO IRAN OF
F-5 AIRCRAFT FROM THE U.S. VIA TURKEY.
AMBASSADOR FOLLOWED DEPARTMENT'S GUIDANCE PROVIDED
IN REFTTEL. THE FOREIGN MINISTER APPEARED TOTALLY
SATISFIED WITH AMBASSADOR'S RESPONSE AND DID NOT
PURSUE THE ISSUE. LEIDEL

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*** Current Classification *** UNCLASSIFIED

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

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DATE= 25 NOV 86

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CHANNEL= n/a

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ORIGCLASS= UNCLASSIFIED

ORIGPCCLASS= n/a

EO= N/A

SUBJECT= TURKISH PRESS REVIEW: NOVEMBER 25, 1986

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ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= PRESS SUMMARY, ARMS, SHIPMENT, DENIAL

TAGS= PREL, PGOV, SCOM, PHUM, PTER, EC, IR, SY, TU

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PAGE 02 ANKARA 12248 01 OF 02 251423Z

SUBJECT: TURKISH PRESS REVIEW: NOVEMBER 25, 1986

1. SUMMARY: THE FOLLOWING NEWS ITEMS WERE AMONG THE MOST
IMPORTANT IN THE TURKISH PRESS OF NOVEMBER 25:

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- TURKEY AND THE ECONOMIC COMMUNITY (EC): EC FOREIGN MINISTERS REJECT FREE CIRCULATION, TURKISH WORKERS' SOCIAL RIGHTS APPROVED, HALEFOGLU ASKS WEST GERMANY TO SUPPORT FULL MEMBERSHIP;
- ARMS TO IRAN: FM SPOKESMAN DENIES TURKISH ROLE;
- DETAINED TERRORIST ALI KENT ALLEGES IRANIAN LINK;
- AMERICAN NCO RELEASED INTO CUSTODY;
- OPPOSITION DEPUTY CRITICIZES PATRIARCHATE BUILDING PERMIT;
- COUNCIL OF EUROPE HUMAN RIGHTS DELEGATION IN ANKARA;
- DEMIREL ACQUITTED;
- OPPOSITION LEADERS CRITICIZE OZAL REGARDING POLITICAL BANS;
- MOTHERLAND PARTY (ANAP) CONSULTATIVE CONVENTION CONTINUES; AND
- ABDULLAH OCALAN (APO) RE-ELECTED PKK HEAD. END SUMMARY.

2. TURKEY AND THE EC: ALL DAILIES REPORTED THAT THE EC MINISTERIAL COUNCIL HAD REJECTED TURKEY'S REQUEST THAT FREE CIRCULATION RIGHTS OF TURKISH WORKERS SHOULD START ON DEC. 1, 1986, WHILE APPROVING SOCIAL RIGHTS OF TURKISH WORKERS PERTAINING TO REUNION OF FAMILIES AND LIMITED FREE CIRCULATION RIGHTS OF TURKISH WORKERS ALREADY IN EUROPE. LIBERAL "MILLIYET" REPORTED THAT FONMIN HALEGOGLU, SPEAKING AT A SEMINAR IN ISTANBUL ON "25 YEARS OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RELATIONS OF TURKEY AND FEDERAL GERMANY," SAID THAT, IF WEST GERMANY SUPPORTS TURKEY'S APPLICATION FOR FULL MEMBERSHIP IN THE EC, THE

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TURKISH GOVERNMENT WOULD BE FLEXIBLE WITH REGARD TO FREE CIRCULATION RIGHTS OF TURKISH WORKERS. HALEFOGLU NOTED THAT THE 1.5 MILLION TURKISH WORKERS HAD GONE TO GERMANY UPON THE INVITATION OF THE WEST GERMAN GOVERNMENT.

3. ARMS TO IRAN: FM SPOKESMAN DENIES TURKISH ROLE: "MILLIYET" REPORTED THAT FONMIN SPOKESMAN YALIM ERALP HAD DENIED ANY TURKISH ROLE IN THE UNITED STATES' SALE OF ARMS TO IRAN. ERALP REITERATED THAT TURKEY CAREFULLY MAINTAINS ITS NEUTRALITY IN THE GULF WAR.

4. DETAINED TERRORIST ALI KENT ALLEGES IRANIAN LINK: MASS APPEAL "HURRIYET" REPORTED THAT TERRORIST ALI KENT, ACCOMPLICE OF MUSA SULEYMAN AMERIN (THE MOLE), REPORTEDLY TOLD POLICE THAT IRANIAN PARLIAMENT PRESIDENT RAFSANJANI IS THE TRUE LEADER OF THE TERRORIST ISLAMIC

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JIHAD ORGANIZATION. ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS, KENT SAID THAT RAFSANJANI IS VERY POWERFUL, SECOND ONLY TO KHOMEINI, AND THE ISLAMIC JIHAD HAS OVER 500,000 MILITANTS.

5. AMERICAN NCO RELEASED INTO CUSTODY PENDING SENTENCING: "MILLIYET" REPORTED THAT AN AMERICAN NCO, WHO HAD BEEN ARRESTED IN IZMIR ON CHARGES OF DEBASING THE TURKISH FLAG, HAD BEEN RELEASED INTO POLICE CUSTODY BY THE COURT ON NOV. 24, PENDING SENTENCING.

6. OPPOSITION DEPUTY CRTICIZES PATRIARCHATE BUILDING PERMIT: CONSERVATIVE "SON HAVADIS" REPORTED THAT CORRECT WAY PARTY (DYP) DEPUTY FEYZULLAH YILDIRIR HAD SUBMITTED AN INTERROGATORY MOTION TO THE GRAND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY DEMANDING AN EXPLANATION REGARDING THE ISSUANCE

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PAGE 01 ANKARA 12248 02 OF 02 251424Z
ACTION EUR-00

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AMCONSUL IZMIR

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AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
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UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 ANKARA 12248

USINFO FOR B/BNEA/EU

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, SCOM, PHUM, PTER, EC, IR, SY, TU
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PAGE 02 . ANKARA 12248 02 OF 02 251424Z

SUBJECT: TURKISH PRESS REVIEW: NOVEMBER 25, 1986

OF A BUILDING PERMIT BY THE ISTANBUL MUNICIPALITY TO THE
GREEK ORTHODOX PATRIARCHATE, WHICH REPORTEDLY DOES NOT
HAVE TITLE TO THE PROPERTY.

7. COE HUMAN RIGHTS DELEGATION IN ANKARA: "MILLIYET"
REPORTED THAT A DELEGATION CONSISTING OF THREE MEMBERS
OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE'S HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION HAD
ARRIVED IN ANKARA FOR CONSULTATIONS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACTICES IN TURKEY.

8. DEMIREL ACQUITTED: ALL PAPERS REPORTED THAT FORMER
PRIMIN DEMIREL, TRIED ON CHARGES OF VIOLATING THE
POLITICAL PARTIES LAW IN TWO DISTRICTS OF ANKARA DURING
THE BY-ELECTION CAMPAIGN, HAD BEEN ACQUITTED BY THE
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE IN YENIMAHALLE. (SEE ALSO
SEPTTEL)

9. OPPOSITION LEADERS CRITICIZE OZAL REGARDING
POLITICAL BANS: LEFTIST "CUMHURIYET" REPORTED THAT
SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC POPULIST PARTY (SHP) LEADER ERDAL

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INONU, REACTING TO PM OZAL'S REJECTION CONCERNING LIFTING OF THE POLITICAL BANS, TOLD THE PRESS THAT AS LONG AS OZAL REMAINS PRIME MINISTER, THERE WILL BE NO IMPROVEMENT IN DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS. OZAL WANTS NEITHER THE POLITICAL BANS, NOR THE LIMITATIONS WHICH PREVENT TRADE UNIONS FROM FUNCTIONING PROPERLY, TO BE REMOVED, INONU STATED. DYP CHAIRMAN HUSAMETTIN CINDORUK TOLD THE PRESS THAT THE PM'S SPEECH WAS "INCOHERENT, AND A POLITICAL ABSURDITY FAR FROM LOGICAL."

10. ANAP CONSULTATIVE CONVENTION CONTINUES: ALL PAPERS UNCLASSIFIED


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PAGE 03 ANKARA 12248 02 OF 02 251424Z

REPORTED THAT THE 5TH CONSULTATIVE CONVENTION OF THE MOTHERLAND PARTY (ANAP) HAD TURNED INTO A GREAT SHOW OF FORCE, WITH ANAP CHAIRMAN OZAL CRITICIZING THE DYP IN HIS CLOSING SPEECH. OZAL REPORTEDLY SAID, "DYP IS TRYING TO CREATE PROBLEMS BETWEEN MUNICIPALITIES AND THE ANAP ORGANIZATION. REGARDLESS OF PRESS EFFORTS, DYP CANNOT BECOME A RIVAL FOR ANAP, BECAUSE DYP WAS FOUNDED TO PROMOTE ONE PERSON'S POLITICAL INTENTIONS."

11. ABDULLAH OZALAN RE-ELECTED PKK HEAD: "MILLIYET" REPORTED THAT ABDULLAH OZALAN (APO) WAS RE-ELECTED SECRETARY GENERAL DURING THE FOURTH CONGRESS OF THE CLANDESTINE KURDISH ORGANIZATION (PKK). REPORTEDLY, DIPLOMATS FROM GREECE, BULGARIA, LIBYA AND CUBA, AS WELL AS REPRESENTATIVES OF CERTAIN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS, ATTENDED THE CONGRESS.
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*** Current Classification *** UNCLASSIFIED

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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

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FILM= D840469-0511

DATE= 23 JUL 84

TYPE= TE

FROM= KUWAIT

DRAFTER= n/a

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TO= STATE
GULF WAR COLLECTIVE

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

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ORIGCLASS= CONFIDENTIAL

ORIGPCCLASS= n/a

EO= OA

SUBJECT= IRAN/IRAQ CONFLICT: KUWAITI PRESS PICKS UP "OBSERVER" ARTICLE ON F-5
AIRCRAFT SHIPMENT FROM US TO IRAN

REFERENCE= n/a

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

UNCLASSIFIED

CONCEPTS= OBSERVER, AIRCRAFT, SHIPMENT, WAR, REPORT, REQUEST, CONFLICT, F-5

TAGS= MASS PREL SCUL MOPS IR, US PRESS OBSERVER
IS/FPC/CDR Date: 11/29/96
MR Cases Only
EO Citations

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PAGE 01 KUWAIT 04076 231326Z
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C O N F I D E N T I A L KUWAIT 4076

EO 12356 DECL: OADR
TAGS: MASS, PREL, SCUL, IR, US
SUBJ: IRAN/IRAQ CONFLICT: KUWAITI PRESS PICKS UP "OBSERVER"
ARTICLE ON F-5 AIRCRAFT SHIPMENT FROM US TO IRAN

1. THIS IS AN ACTION MESSAGE, SEE PARA 4.
2. (C) MFA ACTING UNDERSEC KHALED JA'AFAR PHONED CHARGE AT NOON JULY 23 TO REQUEST CLARIFICATION OR COMMENT ON AN ARTICLE WHICH APPEARED IN JULY 22 EDITION OF LONDON "OBSERVER" AND WHICH WAS PROMINENTLY REPORTED (INCLUDING FRONT PAGE HEADLINES IN ONE PAPER), IN KUWAIT'S ARABIC PRESS, JULY 23. THE ARTICLE CLAIMS THAT LLOYDS INSURERS HAVE BEEN REQUESTED TO ARRANGE INSURANCE FOR A SHIPMENT OF TWENTY FIVE F-5 AC FROM THE US TO TURKEY, WHICH THE PAPER SAYS MAY HAVE IRAN AS THEIR FINAL DESTINATION. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF "OBSERVER" STORY FROM WHICH KUWAIT DAILIES MADE THEIR REPORTS:

3. (LOU) BEGIN TEXT: A LLOYDS'S BROKER HAS BEEN ASKED TO ARRANGE

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INSURANCE COVER ON A STRANGE CARGO: 25 F-5 SUPERSONIC FIGHTERS
IN CONTAINERS. THEY ARE ON THEIR WAY TO TURKEY FROM THE US.
REPORTS FROM SEVERAL SOURCES SAY THE FINAL DESTINATION IS IRAN.

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- SINCE THE AYATOLLAH KHOMENI IS SO UNLOVED IN THE WEST, NOBODY WILL ADMIT THE DEAL HAS BEEN STRUCK. IT SEEMS THAT THE US IS WORRIED THAT IRAN FACES HUMILIATION THROUGH THE DEADLOCK IN ITS LONG WAR WITH IRAQ. THIS COULD UPSET THE FRAGILE MIDDLE EAST BALANCE.

- SO THE F-5S MAY BE SEEN AS A MORALE-BOOSTER, WHILE THE SEARCH FOR A NEGOTIATED PEACE GOES ON. THE PLANES ARE ALSO A LOGICAL ADDITION TO THE IRANIAN ARSENAL. UNDER THE SHAH, THE COUNTRY HAD AT LEAST 135 OF THEM; TODAY ONLY A FEW DOZEN REMAIN AIRWORTHY.

- THE CONTAINERS WILL GO ON BY ROAD AFTER BEING LANDED IN TURKEY. THE CARGO MAY RAISE SPIRITS IN TEHRAN, BUT CAN MAKE SCANT DIFFERENCE FOR THE MASSIVE ARMY WAITING AT THE FRONT FOR MARTYRDOM IN IRAN'S LONG-DELAYED OFFENSIVE. END TEXT

4. (C) ACTION REQUESTED: THIS ARTICLE, PRESENTED IN AN AUTHORITATIVE MANNER IN A RESPECTED (AT LEAST LOCALLY) WESTERN NEWSPAPER, WILL BE GIVEN A HIGH DEGREE OF CREDIBILITY BY GULF (AND OTHER) ARABS, INCLUDING EXPERIENCED AND WELL-INFORMED INDIVIDUALS LIKE AL-JA'AFAR, WHO DESPITE OUR DISCLAIMERS REMAIN CONVINCED THAT MILITARY EQUIPMENT THROUGH OFFICIAL CHANNELS OR OTHERWISE CONTINUES TO FIND ITS WAY FROM THE US TO IRAN. WE WOULD APPRECIATE IMMEDIATE GUIDANCE ON HOW WE SHOULD REPLY TO THE ACTING UNDERSECRETARY'S REQUEST FOR CLARIFICATION, AS WELL AS TO QUERIES WE ARE LIKELY TO GET FROM OUR DIPLOMATIC COLLEAGUES AND THE PRESS.

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PAGE 03 KUWAIT 04076 231326Z

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<<<**** OASYS DOCUMENT HEADER ****>>>

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FILM= D800522-0035

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FROM= KUWAIT

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TO= STATE
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CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

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ORIGCLASS= UNCLASSIFIED

ORIGPCCLASS= n/a

EO= N/A

SUBJECT= PRESS REPORT OF US ARMS SUPPLY TO IRAN VIA TURKEY

REFERENCE= 80 KUWAIT 4938, 80 KUWAIT 4961

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

UNCLASSIFIED

CONCEPTS= PRESS COMMENTS, MILITARY ASSISTANCE, ALLEGATIONS, ARMS SHIPMENTS

TAGS= MOPS, MILI, MASS, PEPR, SOPN, KU, US, TU, IR

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IS/FPC/CDP 877 Date: 11/29/91

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UNCLAS KUWAIT 5157

USICA FOR PGM/PPN, NEA

E.O. 12065: N/A

TAGS: MOPS, MILI, MASS, PEPR, SOPN, IZ, IR, US, TU
SUBJECT: PRESS REPORT OF US ARMS SUPPLY TO IRAN VIA TURKEY

REF: A) KUWAIT 4938, B) KUWAIT 4961

1. KUWAIT DAILY AL ANBA REPORTED FROM WASHINGTON NOV 1:
"A SENIOR AMERICAN OFFICIAL DISCLOSED TO AL ANBA
THAT THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT HAS NOT ABIDED BY ITS NEUTRAL
STAND ON THE IRAQ-IRAN WAR. THE US MADE A HUGE SHIPMENT
OF AMERICAN AID TO IRAN FROM TURKEY. THE SHIPMENT WENT BY
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TRUCK FROM AMERICAN BASES IN TURKEY TO TABRIZ. THE OFFICIAL
HINTED THAT THE CARGO MIGHT HAVE INCLUDED WEAPONS AND
AMMUNITION UNDER THE COVER OF MEDICAL AID. THIS,
THE OFFICIAL SAYS, AIMS AT EXPRESSING AMERICA'S GOOD-

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WILL (TO IRAN)."

2. COMMENT: THE AL ANBA STORY IS THE LATEST OF SEVERAL IN THE KUWAITI PRESS (REFTELS) ASSERTING, ASSUMING, OR PREDICTING US ARMS SUPPLY TO IRAN AND DENYING THE US CLAIM OF NEUTRALITY. UNFORTUNATELY, AL ANBAA'S UNDOUBTEDLY FICTITIOUS "DISCLOSURE" HAS BEEN PICKED UP AND REPRINTED PROMINENTLY IN OTHER KUWAITI PAPERS, INCLUDING BOTH ENGLISH-LANGUAGE DAILIES ON NOV 2.

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
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*** Current Classification *** UNCLASSIFIED

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*** Current Classification *** UNCLASSIFIED
*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a



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FILM= D840191-0331

DATE= 23 MAR 84

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DRAFTER= n/a

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TO= STATE
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CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

ORIGPHAND= n/a

ORIGCLASS= UNCLASSIFIED

ORIGPCCLASS= n/a

EO= N/A

SUBJECT= TURKISH PRESS REVIEW: MARCH 22-23, 1984 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED

REFERENCE= n/a


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CONCEPTS= n/a



TAGS= SCOM, PGOV, PREL, AFSI, TU, UK, EG, CY, PRESS

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Date: 11/29/96

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PAGE 01 ANKARA 02905 01 OF 03 231204Z
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AMEMBASSY LONDON
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EUROPEAN POLADS COLLECTIVE
USDOCOLSE IZMIR TU
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CINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 02905

USINFO FOR B/BNEA, EU, B/BXN

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: SCOM, PGOV, PREL AFSI, TU, UK, EG, CY
SUBJ: TURKISH PRESS REVIEW: MARCH 22-23, 1984

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PAGE 02 ANKARA 02905 01 OF 03 231204Z

1. SUMMARY: THE LOCAL ELECTIONS CAMPAIGN CONTINUED
TO DOMINATE THE TURKISH PRESS DURING THIS REPORTING
PERIOD. THE FOLLOWING ARE OTHER STORIES OF DOMESTIC
INTEREST IN TURKEY:

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- CWP CHAIRMAN AVCI QUESTIONED BY POLICE;
- "BIZIM RADYO" COMMUNIST BROADCAST IN SUPPORT OF EXTRA-PARLIAMENTARY PARTIES IN MARCH 25 ELECTION;
- PP DEPUTIES' SUIT

2. THE FOLLOWING ARE STORIES OF INTERNATIONAL INTEREST:

- OZAL INTERVIEW ON FOREIGN POLICY;
- FM SPOKESMAN ON IRAQ-IRAN WAR
- COE CRITICIZES TURKEY FOR CYPRUS AND REFUSESTO SEAT "TRNC" DELEGATION;

- UK FOREIGN OFFICE ON CRUISE AND PERSHING II MISSILES FOR TURKEY
- EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT MUBARAK OFFER TO MEDIATE IN TURKISH-GREEK RELATIONS. END SUMMARY

3. TWO DAYS TO GO BEFORE TURKEY'S MARCH 25 LOCAL ELECTIONS: ALL PAPERS GAVE EXTENSIVE COVERAGE TO THE WIND-DOWN OF THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN FOR THE MARCH 25 LOCAL ELECTIONS. ALL PAPERS CLAIM THAT "POLITICAL TENSION" HAS INCREASED, CITING SEVERAL FIST FIGHTS INVOLVING SUPPORTERS OF VARIOUS POLITICAL PARTIES. PRIME MINISTER TURGUT OZAL MADE HEADLINES WITH HIS PROMISE TO CALL FOR EARLY ELECTIONS SHOULD HIS MOTHERLAND PARTY NOT FINISH IN FIRST PLACE. THE RESULTS OF THREE DIFFERENT POLLS ON THE ELECTION WERE PUBLISHED IN THE PRESS ON MARCH 23. ACCORDING TO "MILLIYET" (LIBERAL) UNCLASSIFIED

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NEWSPAPER'S PIAR POLL, THE MOTHERLAND PARTY (MP) GETS 37.8 PERCENT OF THE VOTE, SODEP GETS 27.9, THE POPULIST PARTY (PP) GETS 10.2, THE CORRECT WAY PARTY GETS 12.1, WHILE THE AFFLUENCE PARTY (AP) GETS 3.3 AND THE NATIONALIST DEMOCRACY PARTY (NDP) GETS 4.7. THE PIAR PUTS THE UNDECIDED VOTE AT 4.0 PERCENT. ACCORDING TO A POLL PUBLISHED BY "HURRIYET" (MASS APPEAL) THE MP GETS 40.5 PERCENT OF THE VOTE, SODEP GETS 26.5, CWP GETS 11.5, PP GETS 5.7, INDEPENDENT CANDIDATES GET 4.7, NDP GETS 4.5, AND AP GETS 2.2. THE "HURRIYET" POLL SETS THE UNDECIDED VOTE AT 4.4. IN "ULUS" (A LOCAL ANKARA PAPER), A POLL FOR ANKARA PROVINCE REVEALS THAT THE MP GETS 51.3 PERCENT OF THE VOTE IN ANKARA, SODEP GETS 30.6, WHILE ALL THE OTHER PARTIES GARNER LESS THAN 6 PERCENT EACH.

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4. CWP CHAIRMAN AVCI QUESTIONED BY POLICE: ALL PAPERS REPORTED ON MARCH 23 THAT CORRECT WAY PARTY (CWP) CHAIRMAN YILDIRIM AVCI WAS QUESTIONED ON MARCH 22 IN BERGAMA BY THE MARTIAL LAW PROSECUTOR. THE PROSECUTOR IN BERGAMA QUESTIONED AVCI ABOUT A STATEMENT HE REPORTEDLY MADE IN MANISA THAT "THERE ARE TWO BLACK PAGES IN TURKISH DEMOCRACY. ONE OF THESE IS THE 1946 ELECTIONS, AND THE OTHER ONE WAS CREATED BY THE HIGH ELECTION COUNCIL ON NOVEMBER 6, 1983." AVCI WAS ALSO QUESTIONED BY THE MILITARY PROSECUTOR OF THE AEGEAN ARMY. AVCI WAS THEN RELEASED.

5. "BIZIM RADIO" BROADCAST IN SUPPORT OF EXTRA-PARLIAMENTARY PARTIES FOR TURKEY'S MARCH 25 LOCAL

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PAGE 01 ANKARA 02905 02 OF 03 231205Z
ACTION EUR-00

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AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMCONSUL ISTANBUL

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AMCONSUL IZMIR
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
AMCONSUL STRASBOURG
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UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 03 ANKARA 02905

USINFO FOR B/BNEA, EU, B/BXN

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: SCOM, PGOV, PREL AFSI, TU, UK, EG, CY

SUBJ: TURKISH PRESS REVIEW: MARCH 22-23, 1984

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PAGE 02 ANKARA 02905 02 OF 03 231205Z

ELECTIONS: "GUNAYDIN" (SENSATIONAL) REPORTED ON MARCH 23 THAT "BIZIM RADIO" AS WELL AS THE VOICE OF THE TURKISH COMMUNIST PARTY, BOTH ILLEGAL RADIO STATIONS BROADCASTING OUTSIDE TURKEY, HAVE IN A RECENT BROADCAST ASKED TURKISH VOTERS TO SUPPORT THE EXTRA-PARLIAMENTARY PARTIES, ESPECIALLY SODEP, IN THE MARCH 25 LOCAL ELECTIONS.

6. PP DEPUTIES' SUIT: "MILLIYET" (LIBERAL) REPORTED ON MARCH 23 THAT TWO ISTANBUL POPULIST PARTY DEPUTIES SAY THEY WILL TAKE THE POLLING-SERVICE, PIAR, TO COURT FOR DELIBERATELY MISREPRESENTING VOTE TOTALS IN PIAR'S PREDICTIONS. THESE TWO DEPUTIES CLAIM THAT PIAR HAS BEEN FAVORING ONE PARTY AT THE EXPENSE OF ANOTHER. (N.B.: THE DEPUTIES IMPLY THAT PIAR HAS BEEN EXAGGERATING SODEP'S VOTE PERCENTAGES WHILE UNDERESTIMATING THE POPULIST PARTY'S SUPPORT.)

7. OZAL INTERVIEW ON FOREIGN POLICY: "GUNES" (POPULAR) PUBLISHED ON MARCH 23 THE TEXT OF AN INTERVIEW WITH TURKISH PRIME MINISTER TURGUT OZAL.

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OZAL ANSWERED QUESTIONS ON CYPRUS, TURKISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS, TURKISH-SOVIET RELATIONS, ISRAEL, AND TURKEY'S MIDDLE EAST POLICIES. (SEPTTEL TO FOLLOW.)

8. FM SPOKESMAN ON THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR: ALL PAPERS REPORTED ON MARCH 23 A PRESS STATEMENT BY TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN NAZMI AKIMAN DENYING THAT THERE WAS ANY TRUTH TO A CLAIM PUBLISHED BY "NEWSWEEK" THAT SAUDI ARABIA HAS ASKED TURKEY TO STOP SHIPMENTS OF ARMS AND FOOD TO IRAN. AKIMAN REPORTEDLY STATED THAT TURKEY HAS NOT SOLD ARMS TO

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EITHER IRAN OR IRAQ AND HAS NOT ALLOWED ARMS SHIPMENTS TO TRANSIT TURKISH TERRITORY.

9. COE CRITICIZES TURKEY OVER CYPRUS AND REFUSES TO SEAT "TRNC" DELEGATES: ALL PAPERS REPORTED ON MARCH 23 A DECISION BY THE PERMANENT COMMISSION OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE (COE) TO REFUSE TO SEAT A PARLIAMENTARY DELEGATION FROM THE "TURKISH REPUBLIC OF NORTHERN CYPRUS (TRNC)". IN THE SAME RESOLUTION, THE PERMANENT COMMISSION ASKED TURKEY TO WITHDRAW HER TROOPS FROM NORTHERN CYPRUS AND CONDEMNED TURKEY FOR ITS RECOGNITION OF THE "TRNC."

10. UK FOREIGN OFFICE ON CRUISE AND PERSHING II MISSILES FOR TURKEY: "GUNES" (POPULAR) REPORTED ON MARCH 23 THAT A SPOKESMAN FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM'S FOREIGN OFFICE STATED THAT THERE ARE NO NATO PLANS TO BASE CRUISE AND PERSHING II MISSILES IN TURKEY. "GUNES" REPORTED THAT THIS UNNAMED SPOKESMAN MADE THE ABOVE DISCLAIMER IN RESPONSE TO PRESS SPECULATION ABOUT THE PURPOSE OF SOVIET DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER GEORGI KORNIENKO'S RECENT VISIT TO ANKARA.

11. EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT MOBARAK OFFER TO MEDIATE IN TURKISH-GREEK RELATIONS: "MILLIYET" (LIBERAL) PUBLISHED ON MARCH 23 PART OF AN ALLEGED LETTER FROM EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT HUSNU MOBARAK TO TURKISH PRESIDENT EVREN, IN WHICH MOBARAK OFFERS TO ACT AS A MEDIATOR BETWEEN TURKEY AND GREECE IN ORDER TO EASE THE TENSION BETWEEN THOSE TWO COUNTRIES. "MILLIYET" ALSO REPORTS THAT, DESPITE STORIES IN THE PRESS TO THE CONTRARY, GREEK PRESIDENT KARAMANLIS DID NOT

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SUBJ: TURKISH PRESS REVIEW: MARCH 22-23, 1984

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PAGE 02 ANKARA 02905 03 OF 03 231205Z

DISCUSS WITH MOBARAK GREEK OPPOSITION TO EGYPT'S
PROPOSED SALE OF 35 F-4'S TO TURKEY. STRAUSSZ-HUPE

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STATEMENT BY

ASSISTANT SECRETARY RICHARD W. MURPHY

BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST

OF THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Date: 11/25/96

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Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee:

I appreciate the opportunity to meet with you today to discuss the Administration's policy toward the continuing war between Iran and Iraq and toward problems related to international shipping in the Gulf.

Our meeting takes place against the background of the attack by Iraqi aircraft on the USS Stark Sunday with tragic loss of life. We extend our deepest condolences to the families of those brave American sailors who died or were injured in the attack. We greatly appreciate the assistance provided by Saudi Arabia and Bahrain in the rescue and evacuation operation.

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Yesterday morning the President expressed his concern and anger over Sunday's tragedy in the Persian Gulf and noted that we had protested the unprovoked attack in the strongest terms to the Government of Iraq. Yesterday afternoon the President of Iraq apologized for the unintended attack and made clear Iraq had no hostile intentions whatsoever towards the United States. He expressed his deepest regrets and profound condolences. We have agreed to an immediate joint investigation of the incident to avoid any future mistakes.

This tragic accident brings home starkly the increasing danger of the Iran-Iraq War and the urgency of bringing the conflict to an end. The United States is actively engaged in seeking this goal.

This Administration, like its predecessors, regards the Gulf as an area of major interest to the United States and is committed to maintaining the free flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz. Consistent with our national heritage, it attaches great importance to the principle of freedom of navigation. The Administration is also firmly committed as a matter of national policy to support the individual and collective self-defense of the Arab Gulf States. These long-standing U.S. undertakings flow from the strategic, economic and political importance of the region to us.

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U.S. Policies Toward the Gulf War

Over the past three months the President has reaffirmed the direction of our long-term policy. Given the increasing dangers in the war with its accompanying violence in the Gulf, we have taken a series of specific decisions designed to ensure our strategic position in the Gulf and reassert the fundamental U.S. stabilizing role. Frankly in the light of the Iran-Contra revelations, we had found that the leaders of the Gulf states were questioning the coherence and seriousness of U.S. policy in the Gulf along with our reliability and staying power. We wanted to be sure the countries with which we have friendly relations -- Iraq and GCC states -- as well as the Soviet Union and Iran understood the firmness of our commitments. On January 23 and again on February 25 President Reagan issued statements reiterating our commitment to the flow of oil through the Strait and U.S. support for the self-defense effort of the Gulf states. He also endorsed Operation Staunch, our effort to reduce the flow of weapons from others to Iran.

While neutral toward the Iran-Iraq War, the U.S. Government views the continuation of this conflict, as well as its potential expansion, as a direct threat to our interests. We are working intensively for the earliest possible end to the conflict, with the territorial integrity and independence of both sides intact. As the President asserted in his February

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25 statement on the war, we believe that "the time to act on this dangerous and destructive war is now." He urged an intensified international effort to seek an end to the war and we have taken a lead in U.N. Security Council consultations to achieve this aim. As we announced May 7 the U.S. is "ready in principle to support the application of appropriate enforcement measures against either party which refuses to cooperate with formal UNSC efforts to end the war".

While there remains much work to be done in New York, I believe that an international consensus is growing that this war has gone on too long -- the suffering of the Iraqi and Iranian peoples has been too great -- and the threat to international interests is so direct that more active measures are required. As you know, Iraq has long shown its willingness to end the fighting; Iran remains recalcitrant.

Operation Staunch has been pursued in recent months with new vigor. I believe its effectiveness has not been seriously impaired, as many expected, by the Iran revelations.

Shipping Problems in Gulf

In addition to the inherent tragedy and suffering in Iraq and Iran, as the fighting drags on, with mounting casualties and drains on the economies of these two nations, so grows the

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threat of the war spilling over to nearby friendly states in the Gulf. The fresh threats to international shipping are one example of such spillover effect.

In the past eighteen months attacks on neutral shipping passing through the Strait of Hormuz have increased in intensity. A total of nearly 100 vessels were hit by Iran and Iraq in 1986; in the first three months of this year, some 30 ships were attacked, including a Soviet merchant ship. Since the first of May Iran has attacked 5 ships of non-belligerent countries, virtually all in commerce with Kuwait. Attacks now occur at night as well as day, by sea as well as air, by small boats armed with light weapons as well as by helicopters launched from Iranian warships. While Iran has yet to sink a ship, most of those attacked have suffered damage, some seriously, and innocent lives have been lost.

The May 17 attack on the USS Stark was the first attack on a U.S. warship in the war. This tragic accident gives emphasis to our caution to both belligerents that the war in the Gulf could lead to mistakes and miscalculations; it must be ended.

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We have increased the state of alert of U.S. Navy ships in the Gulf and warned belligerent states (i.e., Iran and Iraq) that our ships will fire if one of their aircraft should approach in a manner indicating possible hostile intent--as did the Iraqi F-1 which attacked the USS Stark.

The recent Chinese delivery to and testing by Iran of Chinese Silkworm anti-ship missiles at the Strait of Hormuz presents a potentially serious threat to U.S. and other shipping. With their 85 km range and 1100 pound warhead, these missiles can span the Strait at its narrowest point and represent for the first time a realistic Iranian capability to sink large oil tankers. Whatever Iran's motivation for procuring such threatening missiles, their presence gives Iran the ability both to intimidate the Gulf states and Gulf shippers and to cause a real or de facto closure of the Strait. The Chinese decision to sell such weaponry to Iran is most unwelcome and disturbing. We have made clear to both Iran and China the seriousness with which we consider the Silkworm threat. Other concerned governments have done the same. It is our hope that a sustained international diplomatic campaign will convince Iran not to use the Silkworms.

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For the past year Iran has been using a combination of military action, attacks on Gulf shipping and terrorism, as well as shrewd diplomacy, to intimidate the Gulf states not involved in the war. It has tried to impress upon Gulf states the hopelessness of their looking to the U.S. for help and to divide the Gulf states one from the other.

Since last summer, Kuwait has been a particular target of Iranian threats. While not a belligerent, Kuwait's size and location make it highly vulnerable to intimidation. The Iranian regime has inspired terrorist and sabotage incidents within Kuwait, fired missiles on Kuwaiti territory on the eve of the January Islamic summit, and attacked over 24 vessels serving Kuwaiti ports since last September. The most recent example of the active intimidation efforts was the explosion at the TWA office in Kuwait city May 11 which killed one employee. Over the last three years, Iranian-influenced groups have attempted a series of bombings and attacks, including on the ruler of Kuwait himself, in an attempt to liberate terrorists being held in Kuwait who were convicted of bombing the U.S. and French Embassies.

Several months ago Kuwait and other GCC states expressed to us their concern about the continuing attacks by Iran on tankers. Kuwait asked for our assistance, fearing potential damage to its economic lifeline. Consistent with long-standing

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U.S. commitment to the flow of oil through the Gulf and the importance we attach to the freedom of navigation in international waters as well as our determination to assist our friends in the Gulf, the President decided that the United States would help in the protection of Kuwaiti tankers. In the context of these developments, Kuwait asked to register a number of ships in its tanker fleet under U.S. flag. We informed Kuwait that if the vessels in question met ownership and other technical requirements under U.S. laws and regulations, they could be registered under the U.S. flag. This is in accordance with our established position on qualifications for U.S. flag registration of commercial vessels in general. We also informed the Kuwaitis that by virtue of the fact that these vessels would fly the American flag, they would receive the U.S. Navy protection given any U.S.-flag vessel transiting the Gulf. The U.S. Navy has always had the mission to provide appropriate protection for U.S. commercial shipping world-wide within the limits of available resources and consistent with international law.

Kuwait welcomed our response and we have together proceeded with the registry process. The Coast Guard has begun inspection of the vessels in order to determine their conformity with U.S. safety and other technical standards.

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We view the reflagging of Kuwaiti tankers in the U.S. as a unusual measure to meet an extraordinary situation. It would not however set a precedent for the normal conduct of commercial shipping or affect the broad interests of the U.S. maritime industry. U.S. flagging procedures minimally require that only the captain of each vessel be a U.S. citizen. Because these vessels will not be calling at U.S. ports, there is no requirement that they carry U.S. seaman or other U.S. crewmembers. These new U.S. flag vessels will be sailing in areas where other U.S. flag vessels have generally not frequented since the war began.

To date, Iran has been careful to avoid confrontations with U.S.-flag vessels when U.S. Navy vessels have been in the vicinity. U.S. Military Sealift Command and other commercial U.S. flag vessels have transitted the Gulf each month under U.S. Navy escort without incident. We believe that our naval presence will continue to have this deterrent effect. Iran lacks the sophisticated aircraft and weaponry used by Iraq in the mistaken attack on the USS Stark. Moreover, we will make sure in advance that Iran knows which ships have been reflagged and are under U.S. protection.

Our response to Kuwait demonstrates our resolve to protect our interests and those of our friends in the region, and it has been warmly welcomed by those governments with which we

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have had traditionally close ties. Our goal is to deter not provoke; we believe this is understood by the parties in the region -- including Iran. We will pursue our program steadily and with determination.

In providing this protection, our actions will be fully consistent with the applicable rules of international law, which clearly recognize the right of a neutral state to escort and protect ships flying its flag which are not carrying contraband. In this case this includes the fact that U.S. ships will not be carrying oil from Iraq. Neither party to the conflict will have any basis for taking hostile action against U.S. naval ships or the vessels they will protect.

Our judgment is that, in light of all the surrounding circumstances, the protection accorded by U.S. naval vessels to these U.S. flag tankers transitting international waters or Straits does not constitute introduction of our armed forces into a situation where "imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated." The War Powers Resolution accordingly is not implicated by our actions. On the contrary, our actions are such as to make it clear that any prospect of hostilities is neither imminent nor clearly indicated. I repeat that our intention is to deter, not provoke, further military action. We will, however keep the situation under careful review--particularly in light of the May 17 attack on the USS Stark--and keep Congress closely informed.

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Kuwait has also discussed with other maritime powers commercial charter arrangements in the interest of deterring further Iranian attacks on its vessels. We understand that Kuwait broached this issue with all permanent members of the U.N. Security Council and has entered into an agreement with the Soviet Union to charter three long-haul Soviet-flag vessels to transport some of its oil out of the Gulf.

A constant of U.S. policy has for decades been U.S. determination to prevent enhanced Soviet influence and presence in the Gulf. We do not want the Soviet Union to obtain a strategic position from which it could threaten vital free-world interests in the region. We believe our arrangement with Kuwait will limit Soviet advances in the region; they would have welcomed the opportunity to replace us, and used this position to try to expand further their role in the Gulf. We understand that their commercial charter arrangement for long-haul charters out of the Gulf does not necessitate an increase in the Soviet naval presence or establishment of facilities in the Gulf. This we would not welcome and have made our position clear.

I want to be frank to acknowledge, however, that the disturbing trend in the war--its spread in geographic terms and its increasing impact on third parties like Kuwait--creates the circumstances in which the Soviets may find more opportunities

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to insert themselves. The USSR plays a fundamentally different role in the Gulf and is viewed by Iran as directly threatening to Tehran. Aside from the long northern border, Soviets occupy Afghanistan to Iran's east and are Iraq's primary source of arms. The unescorted Soviet ship recently attacked had in the past carried arms to Iraq. The Soviets sent warships into the Gulf for the first time last fall after Iran boarded and searched a Soviet arms carrying vessel. Iran should ponder this development as it maintains its intransigent War policy. We certainly believe the Soviet actions in the Gulf and their attempts to enhance their presence there further emphasize the need to bring this War to an end.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the Administration is following a clear and consistent set of policies in support of our national interests in the Gulf. Our policies are carefully conceived -- and they focus on steps needed to end the war. They are calm and steady in purpose, not provocative in intent; they should help deter Iranian miscalculations and actions that would require a strong response. By supporting the defensive efforts of the moderate Gulf states, including the sale of appropriate defensive arms, we help to enable them to defend the interests we share in the Gulf and to reduce the prospects for closer ties with the Soviet Union as well as any inclination to accommodate Iranian hegemony.

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The reaction of the Gulf states has been extremely favorable -- without exception. In my talks last week in the area they all welcomed the U.S. determination to maintain a position of strength and support in the region. An Arab League delegation visited the U.S. two weeks ago and was encouraged by assurances from the Secretary and President that the U.S. would work hard for a new and effective UN resolution to end the war. The Gulf states hope our efforts will continue, enabling them to resist Iranian and Soviet pressure. They do not see our actions as provocative or dangerous.

We want the Congress to be fully aware of what we are doing. That is why we provided in March and April a number of briefings on our Gulf policy and what we intend to do to help Kuwait, including briefings to HFAC and SFRC. That is why the President has, on several occasions, issued public statements explaining our policy. We have a coherent and effective policy in the Gulf region. We seek your support and that of the U.S. public for our efforts. We believe it is important for the U.S. to work more actively to end the Iran-Iraq war, to be prepared to defend the principle of the free flow of oil and meet our long standing commitment to assist the Gulf Arab states in their self-defense and to continue to work to constrain Soviet designs. We will advise Congress on the evolution of our discussions with Kuwait and the continuing security situation.

With me are representatives of the State Department's Legal Office, the Department of Defense and the U.S. Coast Guard. We will be happy to respond to your questions.

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
Our naval forces in the area have been instructed to assume a higher state of alert readiness in carrying out the standing Rules of Engagement. Ship commanders continue to have the authority to take such steps as may be necessary to protect their vessels from attack. However, we have no reason at this time to believe that Iraqi forces have deliberately targetted U.S. vessels, and no reason to believe that further hostile action will occur.

Our forces are not in a situation of actual hostilities, nor does their continued presence in the area place them in a situation in which imminent involvement in hostilities is indicated, although we are mindful of recent Iranian statements threatening U.S. and other ships under protection. In accordance with his desire to keep the Congress fully informed, the President nonetheless has asked that I provide this account to the Congress of what has transpired, and has directed that the relevant Committees and leadership of Congress be fully briefed on these events.

Quite apart from the Iraqi attack on the USS Stark, Iran continues publicly and privately to threaten shipping in the Gulf. It is this basic Iranian threat to the free flow of oil and to the principle of freedom of navigation which is unacceptable. The frequent and accelerating Iranian attacks on shipping have spread the war geographically to the lower Gulf and have heightened the risk to all littoral states. The Stark incident provides no reason for altering the policy which we have adopted in the Gulf area of being prepared to defend U.S. vessels and U.S. interests when necessary. We intend to proceed with plans to provide protection for ships flying the U.S. flag in the Gulf, including certain Kuwaiti tankers which have applied for U.S. registry. It is not our intention to provoke military action, but to deter it. Sunday's incident, although regrettable and tragic for our courageous seamen aboard the USS Stark, does not suggest that either of the countries involved in the war have decided to attack U.S. vessels in the Gulf.

At the same time that we are taking these steps, we want to assure you that the Administration is actively pressing for comprehensive and effective international action, including at the United Nations, to bring this bloody, wasteful and dangerous war to an end. We will of course keep the Congress fully informed of any further developments in these matters.

Sincerely yours,



George P. Shultz

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MEMO TO THE FILES: ETRD/IZ/Aircraft

SUBJECT: Notification to Congress of licensing of export to Iraq of Hughes helicopters and parts.

DATE: July 17, 1985

FROM: NEA/NGA: FJRicciardone

Today I advised the following congressional staffers of USG approval of licenses for export to Iraq of 24 Hughes model 530F helicopters (ca. \$17 million total) and parts (ca. \$8 million) for those aircraft and others already in Iraq: Greg Garmisa (Sen. Alan Dixon); Brad Gordon (SFRC/Mideast); Mary Ann Spiegel (Rep. Howard Berman); Michael Van Dusen (HFAC/Eur.&Mideast, Majority).

Brad Gordon and Mike Van Dusen expressed appreciation for the notification, and expressed no concerns regarding the exports. Gordon said he would advise Senator Boschwitz. Van Dusen said he would advise the Minority staffer.

Greg Garmisa and Mary Ann Spiegel expressed extreme annoyance and charged that the Administration had not fulfilled its commitment, which Garmisa cited from Powell Moore's letter to Dixon et alia of January 1983, to advise in advance of licensing of significant aircraft sales to Iraq. Spiegel asserted that the commitment specifically was to treat Iraq as if it were a terrorism-supporting country for purposes of aircraft export licensing and congressional notification. I told her this was not the commitment and referred her to the Secretary's June 21 letter to Rep. Berman.

I stated to both Garmisa and Spiegel that I did not wish to debate what constitutes a "significant" sale, and noted that we were advising about the present export despite the fact that the model 530 is normally a G-Dest, i.e. essentially non-licensable export. I explained the temporary control, of which they were unaware, regarding diversion to North Korea, and advised that we had no legal basis on which to deny the exports absent reason to believe Iraq would divert these aircraft to N. Korea. I also noted that the model 530 is far under the 10,000 lb. limit which the Congress had used as a yardstick for "significant" helicopters in the original Fenwick amendment. I asked both whether they found the export to Iraq of these helicopters contrary to U.S. interests. Garmisa said that was not the point. Spiegel said we should not sell helicopters for pilot training to Iraq at a time when we wanted Iran's cooperation in freeing U.S. hostages.

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Spiegel asked for a written explanation of why we had not advised Congress in advance of the present export. I responded that, following public reports of the prospective Hughes sale in late 1984, we had replied in writing to Rep. Berman's letter on the subject, noting our lack of objection to either the Hughes or Bell prospective exports.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

EB/EWT, NEA/NGA, and H should jointly assume continuing responsibility for assuring Department keeps Secretary Shultz' commitment to advise interested members (i.e. Berman and Dixon) and Committees (i.e. SFRC/Mideast and HFAC/Mideast) of "licensing questions regarding significant aircraft exports to Iraq." (The Secretary's letter to Berman containing this commitment was published in the Congressional Record, pp H4918/19, on June 25, 1985. A similar letter went to Dixon.)

For sales of potential controversy (e.g. Bell 214STs, which approach 10,000 lb limit, or aircraft requiring validated licenses) even to staffers who do not oppose aircraft exports to Iraq as a matter of principle, we should advise appropriate staffers in advance of licensing after checking with the exporters. (I told Van Dusen and Bannerman of SFRC about the prospective 214ST sale late last year; Berman was covered in the previously cited letter; I have not mentioned it to Garmisa et alia, and see no need to do so as long as we do not need to license the 214ST sale, which as far as I know has not been concluded due to lack of funds.) EB/EWT, NEA/NGA, and H should work out who will do the notifications in each instance.

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SUBJECT: FOLLOW-UP STEPS ON IRAQ-IRAN

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2. PRESENT MESSAGE RESPONDS TO AMBASSADOR RUMSFELD'S REQUEST (REF A) FOR STATUS REPORT AND PERIODIC UPDATE OF STEPS WE ARE TAKING TOWARD IRAQ. REF (B) REPORTED MEASURES SUGGESTED BY IRAQ AS TRANSMITTED BY MOROCCAN FONMIN.

3. CURTAILING ARMS TO IRAN: THE SECRETARY HAS ASKED AMBASSADOR FAIRBANKS TO OVERSEE THE DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVE WE LAUNCHED LAST MONTH TO CURTAIL THE FLOW OF WESTERN AND PRC ARMS TO IRAN. FOLLOW-UP ACTIONS INCLUDING A SECOND ROUND OF DEMARCHES ARE IN PREPARATION.

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ADDITIONAL OIL EXPORT OUTLET. WE HAVE HAD FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH JORDAN, IRAQ, AND U.S. CONTRACTORS ON

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THIS POSSIBILITY, AND ARE CONSIDERING HOW BEST TO APPROACH THE ISRAELIS TO EXPRESS OUR INTEREST IN THE LINE'S UNHAMPERED CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION.

7. EGYPTIAN TANK SALES: IN THE CONTEXT OF RECOMMENDING WAYS TO IMPROVE OUR RELATIONS WITH IRAQ, EGYPT HAS SUGGESTED THAT WE PROVIDE IT ADDITIONAL M-60 TANKS BEYOND THOSE WE ARE NOW PROVIDING UNDER FMS. EGYPT WOULD USE THE ADDITIONAL M-60S TO REPLACE USED SOVIET T-62S, WHICH IT WOULD SELL TO IRAQ. ASIDE FROM POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS, WE WOULD BE UNABLE TO FINANCE SUCH AN ADDITIONAL SALE TO EGYPT. WE ARE STUDYING THE M-60 PRODUCTION SCHEDULE AND OTHER TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF AN ADDITIONAL M-60 SALE TO EGYPT BEFORE REPLYING.

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PAGE 05 OF 05 STATE 012251

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BRIEFING. WHICH WE INTEND TO PROVIDE BEFORE THE END OF
THIS MONTH. WE EXPECT THEY WILL ESPECIALLY PROBE OUR
CHANGING RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAQ. END FYI.

10. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

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FOR RUMSFELD PARTY ONLY FROM MURPHY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, US, IZ

SUBJECT: FOLLOW-UP STEPS ON IRAQ-IRAN

REF: (A) BEIRUT 0118 (B) RABAT 0041

1. (S) - ENTIRE TEXT.

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10. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. 444

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IS/FPC/CDR 9303165 Date: 9/30/96

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FOR RUMSFELD PARTY ONLY FROM MURPHY

E.O. 12356: ~~DECL: OADR~~
TAGS: PREL, US, 12
SUBJECT: FOLLOW-UP STEPS ON IRAQ-IRAN

REF: (A) BEIRUT 0118 (B) RABAT 0041

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PAGE 02 STATE 012251

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
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 03135

E.O. 12356:DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, ECON IZ, US
SUBJ: US-IRAQ BUSINESS FORUM: MEETING WITH
SADDAM HUSSEIN

1. (R-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: OBSERVERS IN BAGHDAD WERE INTRIGUED
THIS WEEK BY THE HIGHLY PUBLICIZED AND WARM
RECEPTION PROVIDED BY SADDAM HIMSELF TO A
DELEGATION OF POWERFUL U.S. COMPANIES. IN HIS
MEETING WITH THE GROUP, PRESIDENT SADDAM EMPHASIZED
HIS DECISION TO "COOPERATE" WITH THE U.S.
IS NOT VULNERABLE EVEN TO SERIOUS CHALLENGES
(E.G. THE SANCTIONS BILL), SAID IRAQ WANTS THE
USG TO "PRESSURE" IRAN TO MAKE PEACE, HOPES FOR
ENHANCED TRADE AND INVESTMENT WITH THE U.S.
(BUT JOINT VENTURES WOULD BE CONSIDERED ONLY CASE
BY CASE), BUT WILL NOT RESTRUCTURE ITS SHORT TERM
DEBT (TO ENHANCE CREDIT POSSIBILITIES). SADDAM
ALSO PROMISED TO SUPPORT THE "MESOPOTAMIA PROJECT,"
AN IRAQI VERSION OF THE KING TUT EXHIBIT.

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--WHILE SADDAM SAID NOTHING NEW, THE PUBLICITY

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ACCORDED BY BA'THI REGIME TO U.S. "TYCOONS"
(AN MFA OFFICIAL'S WORD) EVOKED CONSIDERABLE
LOCAL INTEREST, AND WAS CERTAINLY PARTLY INTENDED
AS AN EXPRESSION OF IRAQ'S ANGER WITH MOSCOW'S
DECISION TO SELL ARMS TO IRAN.

END SUMMARY.

3. A DELEGATION FROM THE US-IRAQ BUSINESS FORUM,
COMPOSED OF REPRESENTATIVES OF 25 AMERICAN
FIRMS (MANY OF WHOM WERE PRESIDENTS -CEO'S),
MADE THEIR FIRST VISIT TO IRAQ JUNE 6 TO 8.
THE PURPOSE WAS NOT TO SEARCH FOR INDIVIDUAL
BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES, BUT RATHER TO OBTAIN
AN OVERALL VIEW OF THE IRAQI ECONOMIC SCENE
AND TO PROVIDE GOI OFFICIALS WITH OBSERVATIONS
ON HOW THE U.S. BUSINESS COMMUNITY VIEWS THE
TRADE AND INVESTMENT CLIMATE IN IRAQ. AMONG
THOSE IN THE GROUP WERE SENATOR PERCY AND THE
PRESIDENTS OF WESTINGHOUSE, BROWN AND ROOT,
KELLOGG, AND BELL HELICOPTER.

4. THE DELEGATION, WHICH, AS THE CHAIRMAN
POINTED OUT IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE, REPRESENTED
COMPANIES WHICH HAD GROSSED FIVE HUNDRED
BILLION DOLLARS IN SALES IN 1988, WAS
WARMLY RECEIVED, INCLUDING BY ALL SENIOR
ECONOMIC MINISTERS, THE FOREIGN MINISTER,
AND BY THE PRESIDENT. FRONT PAGE PRESS
COVERAGE AND TELEVISION FILM, AND THE CALL
ON THE PRESIDENT CONSTITUTED A DELIBERATE GOI

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SIGNAL OF WILLINGNESS TO DO BUSINESS WITH
AMERICANS, ALTHOUGH NO IRAQI OFFICIAL
REVEALED SUBSTANTIVE SHIFTS FROM PREVIOUS
GOI ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL POLICIES.

5. MEETING WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN

SADDAM, DRESSED IN A BUSINESS SUIT, RECEIVED
THE DELEGATION FOR TWO HOURS ON JUNE 7.
DELEGATION CHAIRMAN ABBOD (FIRST CITY BANK

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OF TEXAS) POINTED OUT THE GROUP REPRESENTED U.S. BANKING, OIL, CONSTRUCTION, AND FOOD PRODUCTION SECTORS, AND THEIR TOTAL WORTH WOULD MAKE THEM THE THIRD LARGEST ECONOMY IN THE FREE WORLD. THE FORUM IS ACCORDINGLY ABLE TO SPEAK DIRECTLY TO SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS AND CONGRESSMEN, AND DID SO AT THE TIME OF THE SANCTIONS LEGISLATION ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN LATE 1988.

6. ABBUD ESTIMATED U.S. EXPORTS TO IRAQ IN 1986 AT SIX HUNDRED MILLION DOLLARS, THE VALUE WAS NOW 1.5 BILLION DOLLARS, AND THE FORUM WISHES TO DOUBLE THAT FIGURE IN TWO YEARS. JOINT VENTURES, HE SAID, ARE ONE WAY TO IMPROVE TRADE, TRANSFER TECHNOLOGY AND GET MORE PEOPLE TO PEOPLE CONTACT. ABBUD VIGOROUSLY SUGGESTED THAT RESTRUCTURING OF THE IRAQI DEBT WOULD BE WISE, AND THE FORUM, WHICH HAS "NOTHING TO GAIN OR COLLECT," BUT WHICH WANTS IRAQ IN A BETTER POSITION TO DO BUSINESS, WOULD BE GLAD TO HELP. MONEY, HE SAID, IS A

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 04 BAGHDAD 03135

E.O. 12356:DECL:DADR
TAGS: PREL, ECON IZ, US
SUBJ: US-IRAQ BUSINESS FORUM: MEETING WITH

COWARD AND NEEDS TO FEEL COMFORTABLE, AND
THEN COULD BE USED FOR DEVELOPMENT.

U.S.-IRAQI RELATIONS

7. SADDAM EXPRESSED HIS PLEASURE AT THE
FORUM'S VISIT TO IRAQ, AND SAID THE GOI IS
DETERMINED TO WORK FOR "MUTUAL BENEFIT IN
ACCORDANCE WITH BOTH OUR LAWS."

8. AS HE HAS DONE IN THE PAST, SADDAM
ASSERTED THAT HE HAD MADE THE DECISION TO RESTORE
RELATIONS WITH THE USG PRIOR TO THE WAR, BUT THE
WAR FORCED A DELAY UNTIL IRAQ COULD SHOW THAT IT
WAS CAPABLE OF DEFENDING ITSELF (E.I. WITHOUT U.S.
HELP), AND TO GIVE TIME TO DEMONSTRATE IRAQ'S
"PEACE-LOVING STAND." NOTING ABBUD HAD MENTIONED

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IRANGATE, SADDAM SAID "WE REMEMBER IRANGATE, BUT

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WE ARE MORE INTERESTED IN LOOKING AHEAD." IMPLICITLY REFERRING TO LAST FALL'S SANCTIONS DEBATE, SADDAM ADDED THAT NO MATTER WHAT MAY OCCUR (A REFERENCE TO THE SANCTIONS ISSUE), HE HAS PERSONALLY MADE A DECISION TO "COOPERATE WITH YOU," AND THIS DECISION "WILL NOT BE SHAKEN." IRANGATE, FOR EXAMPLE, CAUSED A REACTION IN IRAQ, BUT THE DOOR OF CONTINUITY NEVER CLOSED. "OUR DECISION TO COOPERATE WITH YOU IS SOLID," EVEN THOUGH IRAQ RESERVES THE RIGHT TO HAVE DIFFERENT VIEWPOINTS AND EVALUATIONS. IRAQ KNOWS THERE ARE ENEMIES "PUNCHING" AT ENHANCED US-IRAQ RELATIONS.

9. SADDAM THEN REITERATED THE STORY HE HAD TOLD SOME MONTHS AGO ON IRAQI TELEVISION ABOUT AN EFFORT, (SADDAM DOES NOT SAY SO, BUT HE MEANS BY THE CIA), TO OBTAIN A LOOK AT A T-72 TANK BY OFFERING IRAQ 100 175 MM ARTILLERY PIECES AT THE END OF 1981. THE POINT OF THE STORY BEING THAT THE USG (LIKE THE USSR) CAN DEPEND ON IRAQ'S HONOR AND CREDIBILITY. "THE ROAD IS NOW OPEN BEFORE US, AND WE WANT TO COOPERATE."

10. PEACE WITH IRAN

IRAQ HOPES, SADDAM STRESSED, THAT THE CEASEFIRE WILL DEVELOP INTO REAL PEACE. THE PASSAGE OF TIME IS PROVING THAT IT IS POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE A FULL

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SCALE PEACE AGREEMENT, WHICH IS "OUR DESIRE AND OUR DETERMINATION." ON THE OTHER HAND, SADDAM SAID, IF IRAN ACTS AGGRESSIVELY AGAINST IRAQ, "WE WILL NOT STAND IDLY BY."

11. SADDAM, WHO HAD TAKEN NOTES DURING ABBOD'S DISSERTATION, THEN MADE A CURIOUS EXCURSION INTO THE HUMAN RIGHTS FIELD. IRAQ, HE SAID, "DESERVES CREDIT FROM THE WHOLE WORLD FOR ITS HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD." (PRESUMABLY, THIS EXTRAORDINARY ASSERTION WAS A COMMENT ON THE

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PENDING SANCTIONS LEGISLATION.)

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12. THIS HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD, SADDAM CONTINUED, IS ALSO IMPORTANT TO "COMFORT MONEY" AND THUS EXTEND OPPORTUNITIES TO INTERNATIONAL INVESTORS. IRAQ'S DESIRE FOR A PEACE AGREEMENT WITH IRAN BASED ON MUTUAL NON-INTERFERENCE IN DOMESTIC AFFAIRS SHOULD ALSO PROVIDE COMFORT.

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13. BRINGING IRAN TO LISTEN, SADDAM CONTINUED, CANNOT BE DONE BY LOGICAL ARGUMENT, BUT "ONLY BY PRESSURE AND COMPULSION." "THEREFORE, WE MUST WORK TOGETHER TO EXERT PRESSURE ON IRAN, NOT TO RELINQUISH ITS OWN RIGHTS, BUT RATHER TO RESPECT THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS." "THE ISSUES ARE GREATER THAN SOVEREIGNTY AND SELF-DETERMINATION, SINCE INTERNATIONAL STABILITY" IS INVOLVED. IRAN HAS RIGHTS WITHIN ITS BOUNDARIES.

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14. IRAQ IS RECONSTRUCTING FAO AND BASRA WITHIN THE RANGE OF IRANIAN GUNS, WHICH DEMONSTRATES

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INFO GULFWAR COLLECTIVE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 03 OF 04 BAGHDAD 03135

E.O. 12356: ~~DECL: OADR~~
TAGS: PREL, ECON IZ, US
SUBJ: US-IRAQ BUSINESS FORUM: MEETING WITH

IRAQ'S DESIRE FOR PEACE AND SHOULD HELP PERSUADE
IRAN OF IRAQ'S GOOD INTENTIONS, SADDAM
POINTED OUT.

15. COMING TO HIS MAIN POINT, SADDAM SAID:
"YOU HAVE WAYS TO PRESSURE IRAN." IT IS TRUE
THAT WE MUST WAIT TO SEE THE NEW ADMINISTRATION
IN TEHRAN, AND IT IS CERTAIN NO SUCCESSOR WILL BE
ABLE TO REVIVE KHOMEINI'S EVIL, AND EVEN
KHOMEINI FAILED IN WAR. IRAQ IS STILL NOT
SURE IF IRAN WANTS PEACE, BUT "WE ARE
OPTIMISTIC." (COMMENT: WHILE IRAQ DOES NOT
WANT THE FIVE UNSC PERMANENT MEMBERS TO SHIFT
THEIR APPROACH ON THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS,
I.E. IRAQ WANTS THE FIVE TO SUPPORT THE SYG
IN GENERAL, BUT NOT GET INVOLVED IN DETAIL,
IRAQ OBVIOUSLY DOES WANT PRESSURE ON IRAN TO MAKE
PEACE FROM ANY POWERFUL QUARTER.)

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16. U.S. TRADE AND INVESTMENT

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APPARENTLY RESPONDING TO ABBUD'S STRESS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF CAPITAL, SADDAM SAID THAT IRAQ CONCENTRATES ON THE HUMAN FACTOR. SOME RICH STATES HAVE HUNGRY PEOPLE AND SOME POOR STATES ARE ABLE TO PROVIDE MINIMUM SOCIAL WELFARE. WITH THE U.S. IRAQ WANTS ABROAD RELATIONSHIP AND WANTS TO PROVIDE THE OPPORTUNITY FOR IT.

17. URGING U.S. INVESTMENT NOW IN IRAQ, SADDAM RECALLED THAT THE FIRST PIONEER IN THE U.S. PROBABLY HAD MORE IMPACT THAN LATER PIONEERS WHO ER-RONEOUSLY BELIEVED THERE WERE MORE OPPORTUNITIES FOR THEM. ON JOINT VENTURES, FOR EXAMPLE, IRAQ WILL EXAMINE SUGGESTIONS ON A CASE BY CASE BASIS, IF THEY SEEM BENEFICIAL.

18. IRAQI DEBTS

TURNING TO THE DEBT QUESTION, AND REFERRING TO HIS NOTES, SADDAM SAID HE WOULD BE FRANK. COMPARED TO THE "CAPABILITIES" OF SUCH STATES AS THE U.S. AND JAPAN, IRAQ'S VOLUME OF DEBT IS SMALL. IRAQ COULD NOT "MAINTAIN ITSELF IN FRONT OF A BARRAGE OF CREDITORS," ESPECIALLY GIVEN THE LACK OF CONFIDENCE IN IRAQ (SIC). (COMMENT: SADDAM MEANT HE WILL NOT CONSOLIDATE AND RESTRUCTURE HIS SHORT TERM DEBT.)

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19. MESOPOTAMIA PROJECT

FINALLY, RESPONDING TO ABBUD'S DESCRIPTION OF A PLANTO MOUNT AN IRAQI VERSION OF THE KING TUT EXHIBITION IN MAJOR U.S. CITIES, SADDAM SAID HE WAS PLEASED TO HEAR ABOUT THE PROJECT, AND HE WILL SUPPORT IT.

20. COMMENT: THE UNPRECEDENTED PUBLICITY

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AND PRESIDENTIAL AUDIENCE WERE A VIRTUAL ANNOUNCEMENT BY SADDAM THAT TRADE WITH THE U.S. AND, UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS, AMERICAN INVESTMENT IN IRAQ, HAD THE PRESIDENTIAL IMPRIMATUR. ON THE OTHER HAND, NOTHING IN THE PRESIDENT'S REMARKS, OR REMARKS BY OTHER MINISTERS (SEPTEL), SIGNALLED ANY CHANGE IN IRAQI FINANCIAL AND INVESTMENT PLANS. FOR EXAMPLE, IRAQ WILL NOT RESTRUCTURE ITS DEBT AND WILL LOOK AT JOINT VENTURES IN A GINGERLY, CASE BY CASE WAY.

21. PLEASED AS WE WERE, AND PLEASED AS MANY PRIVATE AND PUBLIC IRAQIS WERE (TARIQ AZIZ BEING AMONG THE MOST PLEASED) AT THE SUCCESS OF THE VISIT, WE BELIEVE THAT AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN SADDAM'S DECISION TO ROLL OUT THE BA'ATHI RED CARPET FOR AMERICAN BANKERS AND CAPITALISTS WAS THE GOI'S MOUNTING ANGER AT SOVIET ARMS SALES TO IRAN.

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E.O. 12356:DECL:DADR
TAGS: PREL, ECON IZ, US
SUBJ: US-IRAQ BUSINESS FORUM: MEETING WITH

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AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 03134

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL IR 12, US IS
SUBJ: US/IRAQ BUSINESS FORUM: CALL ON TARIQ AZIZ

1. (X-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: RESPONDING TO QUESTIONS, FM AZIZ TOLD VISITING U.S. BUSINESSMEN JUNE 8 THAT THE USG COULD USEFULLY WORK TO PERSUADE ISRAEL THAT ARAFAT HAS MADE A BASIC POLICY DECISION -- HE IS NEITHER WEAK NOR DISSEMBLING. AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE WILL BE BOURGEOIS, NOT RADICAL, AND THE USG SHOULD URGE ISRAEL TO RAISE ITS CONCERNS WITH THE PLO, EGYPT AND JORDAN. ON LEBANON, THE USG SHOULD SEEK ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL SO AS TO GET SYRIA, THE MOST NEGATIVE OF ALL INTRUDERS, OUT. GDI APPRECIATES USG DEMARCHES TO MOSCOW ON ARMS SALES TO IRAN AND DOES NOT BELIEVE MULLAHS CAN RUN A MODERN ADMINISTRATION. AZIZ SAID THE SYG SHOULD PUSH IRAN HARDER ON POW'S. END SUMMARY.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE 9301813 IS/FPC/CDR SA Date: OCT 8 1996

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3. THE FINAL CALL THAT THE MEMBERS OF THE VISITING US-IRAQ BUSINESS FORUM MADE IN BAGHDAD WAS ON FOREIGN MINISTER AZIZ, ON JUNE 8, THE DAY AFTER THEIR CALL ON THE PRESIDENT. AZIZ EXPRESSED HIS DELIGHT THAT THE FORUM, WHICH HE SAID THAT HE AND NIZAR HAMDUN HAD FOSTERED FROM THE BEGINNING, IS PROSPERING, AND THAT THE VISIT WHICH HE HAD "WORKED FOR" HAD FINALLY MATERIALIZED. HE THEN OFFERED TO ANSWER ANY QUESTIONS.

4. ARAB-ISRAELI ISSUES

ASKED WHAT USG POLICY SHOULD BE, AZIZ COMMENTED THAT HE BELIEVES ISRAEL DOES NOT UNDERSTAND THAT THE PLO HAS MADE A BASIC DECISION, NOT BECAUSE IT IS WEAK, BUT BECAUSE IT HAS MATURED. THE USG CAN HELP EXPLAIN TO ISRAEL THAT THE PLO DECISION MUST BE NURTURED, AND NOT "BETRAYED." THE SECRETARY'S AIPAC SPEECH WAS VERY IMPORTANT -- IRAQ IS VERY GLAD THAT HE WAS SO CLEAR AND SO ACCURATE. GREATER ISRAEL HAS PROVED TO BE AN IMPOSSIBLE DREAM.

5. FURTHER, AZIZ CONTINUED, IT SHOULD BE CLEAR THAT NO SOLUTION IS POSSIBLE THAT DOES NOT INCORPORATE MORE THAN A HOMELAND FOR THE PALESTINIANS. STATISTICS INDICATE THAT AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINE STATE WILL BE A

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DANGER NEITHER TO ISRAEL NOR TO ARAB NEIGHBORS. IF THE ISRAELIS DOUBT THAT, THEY SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO TALK TO THE EGYPTIANS, THE JORDANIANS, AND OTHERS, ABOUT THEIR CONCERNS. WITH THE SOVIETS TALKING TO THE CHINESE AND THE CHINESE LOOKING SERIOUSLY AT KAMPUCHEA

IRAQ WANTS THE USG TO TACKLE DIRECTLY THE MUTUAL ISRAELI-PLO CONCERNS. -- THE WORLD IS CHANGING AND THE TIME IS RIGHT. -- THE

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PRESIDENT OF IRAQ WILL SUPPORT AN AMERICAN INITIATIVE. (COMMENT: OBVIOUSLY, AZIZ MEANT AN AMERICAN INITIATIVE WHICH ADDRESSES THE CONCERNS HE HAD JUST EXPRESSED.)

6. AS FOR IRAQ, AZIZ ASSERTED THAT THE GOI HAS NO DESIRE TO INTERVENE IN SPECIFICS OF ANY INITIATIVE, SUCH AS STRUCTURING OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE. IT IS FOR THE PLO TO TAKE THE ARAB LEAD.

7. ON THE PLO, AZIZ SAID HE WANTED TO STRESS HIS VIEW THAT THE LEADERSHIP'S DECISION IS NOT TACTICAL, NOR IS IT A PRODUCT OF WEAKNESS. ARAFAT IS POLITICALLY STRONGER THAN HE EVER HAS BEEN.

8. SENATOR PERCY ASKED WHAT MECHANISMS MIGHT BE CREATED TO CONTROL THE POSSIBLE RADICALISM WHICH MIGHT WELL EMERGE FROM A SOVEREIGN PALESTINIAN STATE. AZIZ REPEATED THAT THESE ARE THE KINDS OF CONCERNS WHICH

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E.O. 12356: DECLASSIFIED
TAGS: PREL IR IZ, US IS
SUBJ: US/IRAQ BUSINESS FORUM:CALL ON TARIQ AZIZ

EGYPT, JORDAN AND THE PLO ARE READY TO DISCUSS.
AZIZ SUGGESTED THAT THE ISRAELI THEORY THAT
SECURITY BE BASED ON LAND IS
DEMONSTRABLY FOOLISH IN THE MODERN WORLD.
FROM ITS OWN EXPERIENCE WITH IRAN, IRAQ KNOWS
THAT THESE DAYS FOR STRATEGIC DEPTH A
COUNTRY NEEDS A BUFFER THE SIZE OF SIBERIA.

9. FURTHER, AZIZ SUGGESTED, MOST PALESTINIANS
ARE THE MOST MODERATE OF ARABS. THEY ARE BOURGEOIS.
AZIZ'S VISUALIZATION OF A PALESTINIAN STATE WOULD
NOT BE PDRY, BUT SOMETHING MORE LIKE LEBANON IN
THE 1950'S.

10. OVER ALL, AZIZ SUMMARIZED, THE GOI HAS THE
HIGHEST HOPES FOR PEACE NOW, HOPES IMMENSELY
BOLSTERED BY THE EXPERIENCE AND UNDERSTANDING
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OF REGIONAL ISSUES OF PRESIDENT BUSH. OBVIOUSLY, HE
SAID, IF THERE IS NO VIGOROUS AND EFFECTIVE

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U.S. INITIATIVE, THE RAMIFICATIONS IN THE REGION WILL BE BAD FOR EVERYONE. IRAQ, AZIZ VOLUNTEERED, WILL NOT BE THE FIRST PARTY TO RESORT TO FORCE AGAINST ISRAEL. THE POLITICAL AND GEOGRAPHIC REASONS FOR THIS POLICY ARE CLEAR, HE SAID.

11. LEBANON

MOST IMPORTANT, AZIZ SAID, IS THAT CASABLANCA FOR THE FIRST TIME PLACED THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR A LEBANESE SOLUTION WITH THE ARAB SUMMIT. ON IRAN'S INVOLVEMENT, HE CITED APPROVINGLY KING HASAN'S REMARK THAT THOSE WHO BROUGHT IRAN IN MUST TAKE IRAN AWAY. SYRIA IS A MORE NEGATIVE FACTOR THAN ISRAEL, AND ISRAEL IS SYRIA'S PRETEXT FOR STAYING ON. THE USG ROLE SHOULD BE TO HELP OBTAIN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. HE REVIEWED THE INTENTION OF THE THREE ARAB FOREIGN MINISTERS TO VISIT DAMASCUS AND BAGHDAD AND THEN MAKE INDIVIDUAL VISITS TO LONDON, PARIS AND WASHINGTON.

12. SOVIET-IRANIAN RELATIONS

AZIZ SAID THAT ON JUNE 7 VORONTSOV HAD AGAIN TOLD THE IRAQI AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW THAT SOVIET WEAPONS FOR IRAN WOULD NOT

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THREATEN IRAQ, BUT ARE ONLY FOR DEFENSIVE PURPOSES. IRAQ HAS VIGOROUSLY ARGUED OTHERWISE WITH THE SOVIETS AND IS PLEASED TO HAVE USG SUPPORT. THE BARRIER AGAINST IRANIAN ADVENTURISM IS IRAQ'S STRENGTH.

13. WHITHER IRAN?

ASKED ABOUT POST KHOMENI IRAN, AZIZ POSTULATED

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THAT THE ELEVATION OF KHAMENEI REPRESENTS A CHANGE IN THE THEORY OF VELAYAT-E-FAQIH. IN FACT, IF A TEMPORAL POLITICAL DECISION CAN CHANGE THE BASIS OF THE THEORY, THEN THE WHOLE STRUCTURE IS EQUALLY VULNERABLE TO CHANGE. DISOBEDIENCE TO KHOMEINI MEANT THE GUILTY PERSON WAS LITERALLY AN "INFIDEL"; BUT DISOBEDIENCE TO KHAMENEI IS NOT THE SAME.

14. AS FOR KHAMENEI, IRAN HAS HISTORICALLY HAD LEADERS WHO ARE CHARISMATIC AND VERY STRONG. BUT KHAMENEI AFTER EIGHT YEARS IS WELL-KNOWN AS A THIRD-CLASS LEADER. HE IS NOT ENTERING A TIME OF TESTING IN WHICH WE WILL LEARN IF HE HAS WHAT IT TAKES, SINCE HE HAS AMPLY DEMONSTRATED THAT HE DOES NOT.

15. FURTHER, AZIZ SAID, IRAQ DOUBTS THE TECHNICAL CAPACITY OF THE LIKES OF KHAMENEI AND RAFSANJANI TO FORGE MAJORITY SUPPORT

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 BAGHDAD 03134

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL IR IZ, US IS
SUBJ: US/IRAQ BUSINESS FORUM: CALL ON TARIQ AZIZ

AND IMPLEMENT PRACTICAL ADMINISTRATIVE
DECISIONS. WHILE A GROUP OF MULLAHS ARE
IMPRESSIVELY ABLE TO MOBILIZE EMOTIONS, IT
IS UNLIKELY THEY CAN RUN A COUNTRY
EFFECTIVELY.

16. IRAQ WORRIES, AZIZ ENDED, THAT POST
KHOMEINI IRAN MAY PROVIDE A SECURITY THREAT
BUT NOT NECESSARILY THE THREAT OF WAR.

17. AZIZ SAID HE WANTED TO RAISE THE TRAGIC
ISSUE OF POWS. IN IRAQ'S VIEW THE SYG HAS
NOT PRESSED IRAN HARD ENOUGH.

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estimate the potential for U.S. business in Iraq over the next few years in the hundreds of billions of dollars.

Already Iraq is one of our two largest foreign markets for agricultural commodities under the credit guarantee program of the Department of Agriculture. If the sanctions legislation becomes law, even in the present version which excludes agricultural exports and credit guarantees, the Iraqi government will react strongly and will probably shift its purchases of agricultural commodities to other sources. United States farmers would then lose a growing export market of over one billion dollars per year.

In fact, we understand that United States diplomatic contacts with Iraq have yielded positive results on the issues that have arisen between us. If we now start down the path of punitive actions and reactions between our two governments, this promising beginning will be lost as will our ability to exert a positive influence on the Iraqi government on this and other matters.

You have taken a courageous and, we believe, correct stand against economic sanctions in the past on the very valid grounds that unilateral sanctions hurt the United States economy and are not an effective way of coping with the underlying political problems. Sanctions can be effective only if there is international cooperation to control all sources of supply. We urge you to stay firm on your sound policy against sanctions and take a similar stand on any legislation you may now receive from the Congress imposing sanctions on Iraq. Such sanctions would cause a major erosion in our relations with Iraq and

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President Ronald W. Reagan

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might have an even greater negative impact on our national interests than the sanctions you have opposed in the past.

Respectfully yours,

Marshall W. Wiley
Marshall W. Wiley
President
United States-Iraq
Business Forum

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UNITED STATES-IRAQ
BUSINESS FORUM

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November 20, 1986

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Honorable George P. Shultz
Secretary of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Secretary Shultz:

I am writing you in my capacity as Chairman of the Board of Directors of the U.S.-Iraq Business Forum. The restoration of diplomatic relations between our two countries inspired the formation of this organization to facilitate the growth of commercial relations with Iraq. To date, forty American companies have joined the Business Forum and are seeking to expand U.S.-Iraq trade. It is my privilege to send this letter on their behalf, including some specific proposals for your consideration.

The process of opening up commercial relations has been occasionally bumpy because the organization of our two economies is so different. Moreover, the hiatus of seventeen years without diplomatic relations has resulted in the Government of Iraq and its agencies now being unfamiliar with many of our banking and commercial procedures. Financing, for example, is difficult for Iraq in the seventh year of the war, but in the business community we regard this as a cash-flow problem rather than a long-term structural credit problem. Nevertheless, much has been accomplished toward reopening today's Iraqi market. Some recent problems that had developed for Iraq with Export-Import Bank guaranteed credits have been resolved or are very close to resolution. Just this month, twenty-eight American corporations have exhibited in the U.S. Government-organized pavilion of the Baghdad International Trade Fair. The progress being made should be maintained.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE 9301813 IS/FPC/CDR SH Date: OCT 8 1986

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In view of disclosures about secret U.S. Government arms shipments to Iran, we ask that practical, constructive, nonpolitical steps be taken to reassure Iraq of continuing U.S. interest in its development and to preserve the gains that have been so laboriously achieved. Our Board of Directors and the members of the Business Forum are very concerned that we not lose the forward momentum in our trade relations. The following are suggested measures that, if pursued and publicized by the U.S. Government, might provide a timely boost to the process of solidifying the improvements thus far achieved in our trade and overall bilateral relationship:

1) It would be desirable for the Export-Import Bank to extend an invitation to Iraq to send one or two officers from the Ministry of Finance or Central Bank to visit the Export-Import Bank for several weeks to become acquainted with its policies, procedures, and personnel in order to service better Ex-Im credits and guarantees.

2) Despite the cash-flow problems created by the war and the recent decline in oil prices, Iraq is now making a sincere effort to meet its financial commitments to U.S. companies. We hope that the Export-Import Bank will expand the amount and lengthen the term of Ex-Im credits available to finance U.S. exports. Additionally, a medium- or long-term loan from the Export-Import Bank for Iraq would be an important, welcome gesture to be undertaken at an appropriate time in the near future.

3) Iraq wants mechanization and training in the agricultural sector. Indeed, the Minister of Agriculture recently asked for U.S. assistance in research, animal husbandry, agricultural machinery, irrigation equipment, technology transfer, and training. This interest should be addressed, perhaps through USDA's market-development programs; expansion of food-product purchases under the commodities-credit program also might be explored.

4) We are encouraged by the signing of a memorandum of understanding between the Scientific Research Council of Iraq and the Smithsonian Institution on November 13 to strengthen scientific and technical cooperation. There are, however, other agreements that might be completed between governmental and quasi-governmental agencies, including signing the commercial agreement negotiated one year ago.

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
5) A special inter-agency task force under your Department's leadership might review the middle-income country programs that might be applied to Iraq for expanding cultural and scientific exchange programs, scholarships, academic expert and visiting lecturer programs, agricultural training programs, and international development assistance such as child immunization.

6) A group of corporate and banking leaders might be convened under your auspices, along with government officials, to explore areas of commercial ties that might benefit our two countries. If you agree we, as members of the U.S.-Iraq Business Forum, would be prepared to work with your designee.

Iraq, like the United States, has, over the past several years, made significant efforts, first, to normalize and then to expand relations. Recent events may paradoxically have presented the U.S. with a new opportunity to show that it continues to value Iraq as a force for moderation and stability in the region. The actions we have suggested might provide timely and tangible means for such an expression which, we are sure, you have already begun weighing.

The U.S.-Iraq Business Forum, its President, former Ambassador Marshall W. Wiley, and its active Board of Directors, stand ready to work with you and other officials of the executive branch to protect the beneficial commercial relations that have begun to link our two countries. Please let us know if we can be of further assistance.

Sincerely,



A. Robert Abboud
Chairman of the Board

Enclosure: List of Member Companies of the
U.S.-Iraq Business Forum

cc: Honorable Malcolm Baldrige, Secretary of Commerce
Honorable James A. Baker, Secretary of the
Treasury

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USDOC FOR 4500/ITA/IEP/DAS KELLY

DEPARTMENT FOR E EB AND NEA/NGA

USDA FOR TRADE POLICY DIVISION

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: ECON, PREL, IZ

SUBJECT: IRAQI TRADE MINISTER DISCUSSES TRADE WITH
- U.S. AND PRIVATIZATION.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE 9303144

IS/FPC/CDR TRB Date: 9/4/96

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PA Exemptions _____

MR Cases Only:
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1. SUMMARY: DURING CALL BY VISITING U.S.-ARAB RELATIONS
COUNCIL SPONSORED STAFFOEL JANUARY 16, TRADE MINISTER
SALIH HIGHLIGHTED IRAQ'S PRIVATIZATION EFFORTS AND
ECONOMIC REFORM, PARTICULARLY IN THE AGRICULTURAL
SECTOR. HE SAID THAT IF THE U.S. WISHED TO INCREASE
EXPORTS TO IRAQ, IT SHOULD INCREASE EXIM BANK CREDIT
GUARANTEES FROM DOLS 200 TO DOLS 400 MILLION AND MAKE
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THEM MEDIUM TERM. HE IS LIKELY TO REITERATE THIS

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REQUEST STRONGLY DURING USDOC DAS KELLY'S UPCOMING VISIT. END SUMMARY.

2. IN MEETING WITH VISITING U.S.-ARAB RELATIONS COUNCIL SPONSORED STAFFDEL JANUARY 16, IRAQI TRADE MINISTER SALIH STRESSED THE BENEFITS OF IRAQ'S PRIVATIZATION EFFORTS AND THE NEED FOR MORE U.S. CREDITS TO PROMOTE U.S.-IRAQI TRADE. AMBASSADOR AND DCM ACCOMPANIED STAFFDEL.

3. ECONOMIC REFORM AND PRIVATIZATION. AFTER PLEASANTRIES, THE MINISTER EXPLAINED THAT UNDER PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN'S LEADERSHIP THE COUNTRY WAS ENGAGED IN FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES THROUGH ECONOMIC REFORMS AIMED AT INCREASING PRODUCTIVITY. THESE INCLUDED A CHANGED ATTITUDE TOWARDS PRIVATIZATION. THE BA'ATH PARTY NOW CONSIDERS THAT THE PRIVATE SECTOR SHOULD PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN SOCIETY. WHEN THE BA'ATH PARTY CAME TO POWER, THE PRIVATE SECTOR PLAYED A VERY LIMITED ROLE BECAUSE VERY FEW PEOPLE HAD THE FINANCIAL ABILITY TO INVEST. HOWEVER, AFTER THE 1972 NATIONALIZATION OF THE OIL INDUSTRY, NATIONAL REVENUES ROSE AND THERE WAS MORE MONEY TO SPEND ON DEVELOPMENT OF ALL ASPECTS OF THE SOCIETY, PARTICULARLY INFRASTRUCTURE. CONSEQUENTLY, THE POTENTIAL FOR THE PRIVATE SECTOR HAS GROWN BECAUSE OF THE LARGE INVESTMENT IN INFRASTRUCTURE. NOW THE GOVERNMENT CAN FOCUS ON HEAVY INDUSTRY AND VERY LARGE PROJECTS ONLY, LEAVING SMALLER SCALE ONES TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR. THE GOVERNMENT ACCEPTS THE PRINCIPLE OF THE PROFIT MOTIVE AND SPECIFICALLY HAS DECIDED THE AGRICULTURE SECTOR IS TO BE LEFT ENTIRELY TO PRIVATE INITIATIVE. THE GOVERNMENT HAS SOLD OFF ALL INVESTMENT IN

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AGRICULTURE, SPECIFICALLY IN POULTRY, CATTLE BREEDING AND HATCHERIES, TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR. THE AGRICULTURE SECTOR IS NOW COMPLETELY PRIVATIZED. BECAUSE OF LARGE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT INVESTMENT IN AGRICULTURE, WITH SMALL INPUT PRIVATE INVESTORS CAN MAKE SIGNIFICANT RETURNS IN AGRICULTURE.

4. PRICING AND PRODUCTION. THE MINISTER SAID THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAD ABOLISHED PRICE CONTROLS IN AGRICULTURE BECAUSE OTHERWISE THIS SECTOR WOULD NOT BE ATTRACTIVE

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TO PRIVATE INVESTORS. WHILE ONLY SIX MONTHS HAS ELAPSED SINCE THIS EXPERIMENT BEGAN, PRELIMINARY INDICATIONS SHOW SUBSTANTIAL IMPROVEMENT, PARTICULARLY IN THE OUTPUT OF VEGETABLES AND CEREALS. FOR EXAMPLE, THIS YEAR RICE PRODUCTION INCREASED 20-25 PERCENT (THE MINISTER ADMITTED, HOWEVER, THAT RICE PRICES WERE 100 PERCENT GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIZED).

5. AGRICULTURE VS. INDUSTRY. THE MINISTER COMMENTED THAT OBTAINING DRAMATIC RESULTS IN PRIVATIZING INDUSTRY WOULD BE MORE DIFFICULT THAN AGRICULTURE ALL INPUTS IN AGRICULTURE WERE DOMESTIC WHERE AS INDUSTRY REQUIRED IMPORTATION OF FOREIGN MATERIALS, WHICH WERE LIMITED BECAUSE OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE CONSTRAINTS.

6. MORE-AND LONGER-TERM EXIM CREDIT. IN RESPONSE TO STAFFDEL CONSULTANT (AND FORMER NEA/DAS) PLACKE'S QUESTION AS TO HOW U.S. FIRMS COULD BEST INCREASE EXPORTS TO IRAQ, THE MINISTER REPLIED THAT THE SINE QUA NON FOR INCREASED U.S. EXPORTS TO IRAQ WAS ADDITIONAL, MEDIUM-TERM, CREDITS. U.S. AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS TO IRAQ HAVE GREATLY INCREASED -- TO PROJECTED DOLS 960 MILLION FOR FY 88 -- BECAUSE CCC CREDITS HAVE INCREASED. THE SAME WOULD HAPPEN IF EXIM INCREASED ITS PRESENT, LIMITED DOLS 200 MILLION GUARANTEE

[REDACTED]

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FACILITY. IRAQI COMPANIES AND MINISTRIES HAVE ALREADY COMMITTED THE FULL AMOUNT OF THE DOLS 200 MILLION AVAILABLE UNDER EXIM SALIH SAID AND AN ADDITIONAL DOLS 100 MILLION IN ORDERS FROM COMPANIES AND MINISTRIES AWAITS FINANCING. "WE NEED A TOTAL OF 400 MILLION DOLLARS IN EXIM CREDITS," THE MINISTER SAID, AND THIS IS ONLY FOR THIS YEAG. THE ADDITIONAL CREDITS SHOULD BE MEDIUM-TERM. OTHER COUNTRIES PROVIDE MORE AND BETTER CREDIT TERMS. "U.S. TRADE WITH IRAQ WILL DEPEND ENTIRELY ON THE EXTENT AND TYPE OF CREDIT FACILITIES OFFERED," MINISTER EMPHASIZED. HE EXPLAINED THAT BECAUSE OF THE DECLINE OF THE DOLLAR AND THE RISE OF THE COST OF CURRENCIES OF OTHER

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ACTION EB-00

INFO LOG-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 SS-00 CIAE-00
DODE-00 H-01 EXIM-06 NEA-06 NSAE-00 LAB-04 CTME-00
TRSE-00 ITC-01 OPIC-07 OMB-01 STR-17 SVC-00 INRE-00
AGRE-00 FRB-03 USIE-00 JUSE-00 SP-02 C-01 E-01
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R 200858Z JAN 88
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6090
USDOC WASHDC 0301
INFO USDA WASHDC 0025

SECTION 02 OF 02 BAGHDAD 00270

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS EXIM

EXPORTERS, IRAQ WAS PURCHASING LESS FROM NON-DOLLAR COUNTRIES. THE OPPORTUNITIES ARE THERE -- BUT THE U.S. NEEDS TO ACT.

7. IN RESPONSE TO A QUERY FROM A STAFFER FOR A MEMBER WHOSE DISTRICT INCLUDES SIGNIFICANT MACHINE TOOL AND FOOD PROCESSING EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURERS, THE MINISTER SAID THAT THERE WOULD BE A SIGNIFICANT DEMAND FOR THESE PRODUCTS IN IRAQ -- IF CREDIT WERE AVAILABLE. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION, HE SUGGESTED CONTACTING THE MINISTRY OF INDUSTRY.

8. FOREIGN INVESTMENT. ASKED WHETHER THIS WAS POSSIBLE IN IRAQ, THE MINISTER EXPLAINED THAT PRESENT IRAQI LAW DOES NOT NOW PERMIT DIRECT PRIVATE INVESTMENT, BUT PRIVATE COMPANIES COULD BUILD PROJECTS IN IRAQ AND BE REPAID FROM THE PROCEEDS OF THE EXPORTS OF SUCH PROJECTS. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION ABOUT

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EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL EXCHANGE, THE MINISTER SAID THAT PARTICULARLY UNDER THE AGREEMENT RECENTLY SIGNED

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BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES IRAQ WOULD WELCOME EXPANDED EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL EXCHANGE AS WELL AS THE PROVISION OF SERVICES BY AMERICAN FIRMS TO IRAQ. THERE WAS NO PROHIBITION IN IRAQI LAW FOR TRADE WITH ANY COUNTRIES EXCEPT ISRAEL, IRAN AND SOUTH AFRICA.

9. TRANSPORT. THE MINISTER SAID THAT IRAQ HAD SPENT MORE THAN ONE BILLION IRAQI DINARS OR NEARLY DOLLARS 3.25 BILLION AT THE OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE ON A SUPER HIGHWAY LINKING BASRA TO THE SYRIAN AND JORDAN BORDERS VIA BAGHDAD. IRAQ ALSO HAS TRANSPORT ARRANGEMENTS WITH TURKEY AS WELL AS WITH SAUDI ARABIA. WHILE THE TRUCKING INDUSTRY IN IRAQ USED TO BE TOTALLY IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR, IT IS NOW MOVING LARGELY INTO THE PRIVATE SECTOR, AND THIS MOVE HAS BEEN A COMPLETE SUCCESS.

10. TARIFFS. ASKED ABOUT TARIFF AND NON-TARIFF BARRIERS TO TRADE WITH IRAQ, THE MINISTER SAID THAT THERE WERE NO BARRIERS WITH ARAB COUNTRIES AND THE TARIFFS FOR GOODS IMPORTED FROM OTHER COUNTRIES WERE NOT HIGH. "TARIFFS DO NOT HINDER TRADE WITH IRAQ," HE SAID. "LACK OF CREDIT DOES."

11. COMMENT: THE MINISTER'S REMARKS INDICATE THAT IRAQ IS MOVING AWAY FROM STATIST ECONOMY AND EXPANDING THE ROLE OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR. WHILE WE FULLY UNDERSTAND THAT IT IS LIKELY TO BE DIFFICULT FOR EXIM HO CONSIDER THE QUESTION OF MEDIUM-TERM CREDITS UNTIL IRAQ HAS ESTABLISHED ITS RECORD OF PAYMENT FOR SHORT-TERM CREDITS, THE MINISTER: 4

[REDACTED]

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CITATION OF DOLLARS 100 MILLION IN ORDERS WHICH IRAQ GOVT WOULD PLACE RIGHT NOW IF IT HAD THE CREDITS AND HIS REQUEST NOR AN ADDITIONAL DOLLARS 98, 99, 9134 THE PRESENT

520 MILLION AVAILABLE FOR INDICATIVE OF THE TRADE (**) THAT EXISTS

ULD
ADDITIONAL MEDIUM (**) MINISTER IS A SENIOR QATHI, CLOSE TO THE PRESIDENT. HIS POSITIVE COMMENTS ABOUT PRIVATIZATION

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ARE ESPECIALLY SIGNIFICANT AND INDICATIVE OF A PRO-
CESS WHICH WE CAN HELP ALONG -- IF CREDITS ARE
AVAILABLE. IT WAS NOT LONG AGO THAT IRAQ WAS ONE
OF THE MOST MILITANT AND DOCTRINAIRE SOCIALIST
COUNTRIES. WE REALIZE THAT ESTIMATIONS OF REPAY-
MENT CAPABILITY MUST BE PRIMARY IN THE CONSIDERATION
OF EXTENSION OF CREDITS, BUT WE HOPE THAT ENCOURAGE-
MENT OF THE VERY POSITIVE TRENDS WHICH THE MINISTER
DESCRIBES WILL ALSO BE FACTORED IN AS DECISIONS ARE
MADE. MINISTER IS LIKELY TO MAKE A STRONG PITCH FOR
INCREASED, MEDIUM-TERM EXIM CREDITS DURING USDOC
DAS KELLY'S UPCOMING VISIT. BUCK

NOTE BY OC/T: (*) OMISSIONS; CORRECTIONS TO FOLLOW.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE 920393/IS/FPC/CDR PDS Date: 9/18/96

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ACTION L-03

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FM AMEMBASSY BERN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8903

UNCLAS BERN 03508

FOR L/CID - SEAN MURPHY

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL, IR, US, SZ
SUBJECT: IRAN AIR FLIGHT 655

REF: HINSON-MURPHY TELECON 5/30/89

1. CONFIRMING REFTELECON, ON MAY 30, THE FOREIGN INTERESTS SECTION OF THE SWISS FEDERAL DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN BERN DELIVERED TO EMBASSY COPIES OF FOUR MEDIA REFERENCES TO IRAN AIR 655 THAT RECENTLY APPEARED IN TEHRAN, WHICH WERE POUCHED TO BERN BY US INTERESTS SECTION OF SWISS EMBASSY IN TEHRAN.

2. THREE OF THE FOUR ITEMS ARE WIRE SERVICE ITEMS WHICH APPEARED IN THE ENGLISH-LANGUAGE "TEHRAN TIMES" OF MAY 20 (AP FROM THE HAGUE, "IRAN SUES U.S. OVER DOWNED JETLINER); "KAYHAN" OF MAY 20 (FARSI WITH ENGLISH TRANSLATION, VOA FROM WASHINGTON, "US REJECTS PAYMENT OF DAMAGES FOR DOWNING IRANIAN AIRLINER") AND "TEHRAN TIMES" OF MAY 22 (REUTERS FROM ABU DHABI, "FAMILIES OF IRAN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 BERN 03508 010825Z

AIRBUS VICTIMS TO SUE WASHINGTON, REPORT SAYS"). COPIES OF THESE ITEMS HAVE BEEN POUCHED TO L/CID.

3. THE FOURTH ITEM APPEARED IN "AKHBAAR (NEWS)" FOR MAY 23, AND WAS ATTRIBUTED TO "JOMHURI ISLAMI". PER REFTELECON, THIS TEXT IN ENGLISH FOLLOWS BELOW IN FULL: BEGIN QUOTE:

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US MUST PAY IRI FULL DAMAGES FOR DOWNING
IRANIAN AIRLINER

"THE IRI HAS LODGED A NEW COMPLAINT WITH THE
HAGUE COURT IN CONNECTION WITH THE US
WARSHIPS' DOWNING OF ITS AIRBUS PLANE,"
ANNOUNCED AN OFFICIAL AT THE LEGAL SERVICES
OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTRY, IN AN INTERVIEW
WITH OUR REPORTER.

THE NEW CLAIM FOR DAMAGES IS FILED AS THE
PREVIOUS ONE RAN OUT ON MAY 17...THE
PROCEEDING MAY START IN A FEW WEEKS AND A
FINAL DECISION MAY TAKE MONTHS TO COME."

ON US OFFICIALS' CLAIM THAT THE IRANIAN
AUTHORITIES SHOULD NOT BE THE PARTY CONCERNED,
HE SAID: "THE CLAIM IS CONTRARY TO
INTERNATIONAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS. IN FACT
THE DISCUSSION OVER THE EXAMINATION OF THE
DOWNING OF THE IRANIAN AIRCRAFT IN WHICH A
LARGE NUMBER OF FELLOW COUNTRYMEN WERE KILLED
MUST BE DONE BY THE TWO COUNTRIES AND UNDER
THE SUPERVISION OF THE HAGUE COURT AS WELL AS
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ICAO."

HE ADDED: "THE IRI'S POSITION IS THAT THE US
HAS VIOLATED THE AIRSPACE OF OUR ISLAMIC
HOMELAND WITH MISSILES AND ATTACKED A CIVILIAN
AIRLINER. THE US FLEET AND GOVERNMENT HAVE NO
JUSTIFICATION FOR THEIR INHUMAN ACT. THEY
MUST PAY FULL DAMAGES FOR THE MATERIAL AND
IMMATERIAL LOSSES TO THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT AS
THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT IS THE REPRESENTATIVE
OF ITS PEOPLE. THE US CLAIM IS NOT COMPATIBLE
WITH ANY OF THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATIONS."

ON THE AMOUNT OF THE MATERIAL LOSSES ACCORDING
TO THE REGULATIONS GOVERNING INTERNATIONAL
INSURANCE, HE SAID: "UNDER INTERNATIONAL
INSURANCE THE AMOUNT IS USUALLY THE PRICE OF
THE PLANE PLUS USDOLS 20,000 FOR EVERY SEAT.
BUT THE IRI CONSIDERS THE AMOUNT TO BE A LOT
HIGHER THAN THAT BECAUSE THE US HAS INTRUDED
INTO IRI AIRSPACE WITH A MISSILE ATTACKING A
PASSENGER PLANE AND KILLING ALMOST 300
INNOCENT PEOPLE." END QUOTE.
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 ACTION IO-19

FOIA Exemptions

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TS authority to
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 TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2415
 INFO FAA WASHDC
 JCS WASHDC
 SECDEF WASHDC

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FROM USMISSION ICAO

STATE FOR IO, L AND EB/TRA/AVP

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: ICAO, EAIR, AORC, IR
 SUBJECT: UPDATE ON ICAO CONSIDERATION OF IR 655

REF: 88 MONTREAL 4482

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. REFTEL INDICATED VARIOUS STEPS WE RECOMMENDED BE TAKEN
 TO IMPROVE PROSPECTS FOR A FAVORABLE OUTCOME OF ICAO
 CONSIDERATION OF IR 655 SHOOTDOWN. THESE INCLUDED:

-- MODIFICATION OF THE US NOTAM FOR THE GULF AREA TO
 ELIMINATE ANY BASIS FOR THE ASSERTION CONTAINED IN THE
 ICAO REPORT THAT "PROMULGATION OF THE NOTAM WAS NOT IN
 CONFORMITY WITH THE PROVISIONS OF ICAO ANNEX 15" (PARA
 2.2.4 OF THE REPORT);

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PAGE 02 MONTRE 00114 171553Z

-- OBSERVABLE MOVEMENT TOWARD US RATIFICATION OF ARTICLE
 3BIS TO THE CHICAGO CONVENTION; AND

-- DEVELOPMENT OF AN UNCLASSIFIED STATEMENT WHICH CAN BE
 USED IN OPEN MEETINGS TO COUNTER CHARGES THAT THE USS
 VINCENNES WAS IN IRANIAN TERRITORIAL WATERS AT THE TIME
 OF THE INCIDENT.

3. PRESENT PLANNING IS FOR THE AIR NAVIGATION COMMISSION.

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(ANC) TO ESTABLISH AN AD HOC WORKING GROUP CONSISTING OF COMMISSIONERS WITH AIR TRAFFIC BACKGROUNDS TO REVIEW THE RECOMMENDATIONS CONTAINED IN THE INVESTIGATION REPORT AND PRESENT ITS VIEWS TO THE ANC. THE AD HOC WORKING GROUP IS EXPECTED TO MEET FEBRUARY 3 AND 6 SO THAT IT CAN PRESENT ITS VIEWS TO THE ANC ON FEBRUARY 9. THE ANC SHOULD ISSUE A DRAFT REPORT TO COUNCIL BY FEBRUARY 24 AND APPROVE THE REPORT ON MARCH 2. A COUNCIL WORKING PAPER CONTAINING THE REPORT SHOULD BE ISSUED MARCH 10, CLEARING THE WAY TO FINAL COUNCIL DISCUSSION AND ACTION BEFORE THE CURRENT COUNCIL SESSION ENDS ON MARCH 23.

4. MISSION HOPES IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO TAKE THE STEPS RECOMMENDED REFTTEL AND OUTLINED IN PARA 1, ABOVE, BY MARCH 1, AS WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THEY WOULD CONTRIBUTE SIGNIFICANTLY TO PROSPECTS FOR A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME IN COUNCIL. ALSO, AN UNCLASSIFIED STATEMENT WILL BE NEEDED BY THAT TIME TO COUNTER THE POINT MADE BY IRAN AT COUNCIL MEETING ON DECEMBER 5 THAT IR 655 WAS OUTSIDE THE RESTRICTED AREA (OF FIVE NAUTICAL MILES AND 2000 FOOT ALTITUDE) SET FORTH IN THE U.S. INTERNATIONAL NOTICES TO AIRMEN IN EFFECT ON JULY 3. STOHR

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PAGE 01

STATE 099087

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE 920393

IS/FPC/CDR 108 Date. 9/18/96

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DRAFTED BY: L/CID:RJBETTAUER

APPROVED BY: P:RKIMMITT

NEA:PBURLEIGH

L:ADSOFAER

L:MMATHESON

CA/OCS/CCS/NEA: BKIRINCICH

NAVY/CLAIM:MGOLDBERG

HA/M/P:DTELLEEN

L/NEA:PSPIRO

NEA/NGA:RCLARKE

EUR/CE:WMILLAN

DOD/GS:JMCNEILL

S/S-O:BASH S/S:MLEVITSK

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TO AMEMBASSY BERN IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 099087

E.O. 12356: ~~DECLASS~~

TAGS: PREL, IR, SZ, US

SUBJECT: IRAN AIR 655

REF: BERN 927

1. US INTEREST SECTION OF SWISS EMBASSY IN TEHRAN SHOULD BE ASKED TO SEND THE LETTER SET FORTH PARA 2 BELOW, IN RESPONSE TO LETTER TRANSMITTED PARA 7 REFTEL, UNDER COVER OF AN APPROPRIATE NON-SUBSTANTIVE TRANSMITTAL DIPLOMATIC NOTE TO THE MFA.

2. BEGIN TEXT:

MR. AMIR SADEGHI NESHAT

MANAGING DIRECTOR

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PAGE 02

STATE 099087

IRAN INSURANCE COMPANY

TEHRAN, ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN

DEAR MR. NESHAT:

I AM WRITING ON BEHALF OF THE UNITED STATES IN REFERENCE TO YOUR LETTER NO. 1/M/3312, DATED FEBRUARY 6, 1989,

WHICH THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE ISLAMIC

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YOUR LETTER INDICATES THAT YOUR COMPANY HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED BY THE FAMILIES OF THE VICTIMS TO REPRESENT THEM WITH RESPECT TO THEIR INSURED AND NON-INSURED DAMAGES. THE UNITED STATES WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING INFORMATION ON THE STRUCTURE AND MANAGEMENT OF YOUR COMPANY SO THAT WE MAY DETERMINE WHETHER IT IS AN ENTITY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN. WE ALSO REQUEST APPROPRIATE LEGAL DOCUMENTATION DEMONSTRATING THAT YOUR COMPANY HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED BY THE FAMILIES OF THE VICTIMS TO ACT ON THEIR BEHALF IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPENSATION OFFERED BY THE UNITED STATES.

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THE UNITED STATES LOOKS FORWARD TO YOUR RESPONSE.

END TEXT. EAGLEBURGER

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ACTION IO-19

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	CIAE-00	EB-00	NEA-06	NSCE-00	ARA-00	NSAE-00	COME-00
	SSO-00	L-03	AMAD-01	EAP-00	DOTE-00	STR-17	INRE-00
	JUSE-00	DS-01	SCT-02	E-01	P-02	/061.W	

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INFO FAA WASHDC

SECDEF WASHDC

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USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL

FAA BRUSSELS

CJTTFME

AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

AMEMBASSY BEIJING

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMEMBASSY TOKYO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY ACCRA

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

AMEMBASSY JAKARTA

AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD

AMEMBASSY MEXICO

AMEMBASSY LAGOS

AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

AMEMBASSY PANAMA

AMEMBASSY LIMA

AMEMBASSY RIYADH

AMEMBASSY DAKAR

AMEMBASSY MADRID

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE 920393

IS/FPC/CDR

Date. 9/18/96

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PAGE 02 MONTRE 00916 01 OF 06 201742Z

AMEMBASSY BERN

AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM

AMEMBASSY TUNIS

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM

AMEMBASSY CARACAS

IO MISSIONS COLLECTIVE

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TEXT OF TELEGRAM 89MONTRE000916

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FROM USMISSION ICAO

STATE FOR IO AND EB/TRA/AVP

FAA FOR API-1, AIA-100 AND AGC-7

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: AORC, EAIR, ICAO, IR

SUBJECT: ICAO COUNCIL CONCLUDES ACTION ON IRAN AIR 655
SHOOT-DOWN

REF: (A) STATE 70932; (B) MONTREAL 0809

1. SUMMARY: ICAO COUNCIL CONCLUDED ITS DISCUSSION OF THE IR 655 SHOOT-DOWN ON MARCH 17 BY DECISIVELY DEFEATING A SOVIET PROPOSAL TO CONDEMN THE USE OF ARMED FORCE AGAINST IR 655 AND ADOPTING INSTEAD A RESOLUTION "DEEPLY DEPLOR(ING) THE TRAGIC INCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED AS A CONSEQUENCE OF EVENTS AND ERRORS IN IDENTIFICATION OF THE AIRCRAFT WHICH RESULTED IN THE ACCIDENTAL DESTRUCTION OF AN IRAN AIR AIRLINER AND THE LOSS OF 290 LIVES." THIS
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OUTCOME WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE WITHOUT THE ASSISTANCE AND SUPPORT OF A NUMBER OF COUNCIL REPS, PARTICULARLY THE UK REP. TEXT OF RESOLUTION IS AT PARA 11. END SUMMARY.

2. THE SHOOT-DOWN OF IR 655 WAS AGAIN TAKEN UP BY THE COUNCIL OF THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION (ICAO) ON MARCH 13. DISCUSSION WAS CONCLUDED MARCH 17 WITH ADOPTION OF THE RESOLUTION CONTAINED PARA 11. IN ANTICIPATION OF DIFFICULT DISCUSSIONS IN COUNCIL, COMMANDER JOHN MORGAN (JCS) ARRIVED MARCH 8 AND BEGAN A SERIES OF BRIEFINGS TO EXPLAIN TO COUNCIL MEMBERS THE PRECISE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS WHICH RESULTED IN THE MISTAKEN IDENTIFICATION OF IR 655 AND ITS SHOOT-DOWN BY THE VINCENNES ON JULY 3, 1988. WHEN SOME COUNCIL MEMBERS PROVED RELUCTANT TO ATTEND A BRIEFING IN THE U.S. OFFICE, MORGAN WENT TO THEIRS. IN THE END, EVERY COUNCIL MEMBER PRESENT IN MONTREAL EXCEPT ONE WAS BRIEFED. THE FRENCH REP, WHO CHOSE NOT TO BE BRIEFED BY COMMANDER MORGAN, WAS REPRESENTED BY HIS MILITARY ATTACHE FROM OTTAWA. (THE NIGERIAN REP WAS ABSENT FROM MONTREAL. THE SENEGAL REP RECENTLY DIED AND HAS NOT YET BEEN REPLACED.) THE SUCCESS OF THIS EFFORT CAN BE MEASURED BY THE FACT THAT VIRTUALLY ALL COUNCIL MEMBERS, INCLUDING THE SOVIETS, SAID DURING COUNCIL DELIBERATIONS THAT THE SHOOT-DOWN WAS ACCIDENTAL, UNPREMEDITATED OR THE RESULT OF AN ERROR.

3. DISCUSSION OPENED ON MARCH 13 WITH THE IRANIAN OBSERVER DELEGATION URGING ADOPTION OF A RESOLUTION

PAGE NO. 3

UNCLASSIFIED

TEXT OF TELEGRAM 89MONTRE000016

UNCLASSIFIED

CONDEMNING THE SHOOT-DOWN OF IR 655 AND CALLING ON THE
UNITED STATES TO PROVIDE JUST COMPENSATION TO THE VICTIMS.
IRAN REITERATED THAT IR 655 WAS FLYING A DESIGNATED ROUTE
AND WAS SHOT DOWN WHILE IN IRANIAN AIRSPACE BY A U.S.
WARSHIP LOCATED IN IRANIAN TERRITORIAL WATERS. U.S.
STATEMENT REITERATED PROFOUND REGRET OVER THE ACCIDENT,

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PAGE NO: 3

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ADP616

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ACTION IO-19

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	INR-07	EUR-00	SS-00	OIC-02	AF-00
	CIAE-00	EB-00	NEA-06	NSCE-00	ARA-00	NSAE-00	COME-00
	SSO-00	L-03	AMAD-01	EAP-00	DOE-00	STR-17	INRE-00
	JUSE-00	DS-01	SCT-02	E-01	P-02	/061 W	

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O 201721Z MAR 89
FM AMCONSUL MONTREAL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2894
INFO FAA WASHDC
SECDEF WASHDC
JCS WASHDC
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
FAA BRUSSELS
CJTFME
AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
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AMEMBASSY BERN
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY CARACAS
IO MISSIONS COLLECTIVE

031158Z MAR 89
PAGE NO. 4
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FROM USMISSION ICAO

STATE FOR IO AND EB/TRA/AVP

FAA FOR API-1, AIA-100 AND AGC-7

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: AORC, EAIR, ICAO, IR

SUBJECT: ICAO COUNCIL CONCLUDES ACTION ON IRAN AIR 655

RECALLED USG OFFER OF EX GRATIA PAYMENT TO FAMILIES, EMPHASIZED THAT THE ACCIDENT OCCURRED WHILE THE VINCENNES WAS UNDER ATTACK BY IRANIAN BOATS AND THAT THE ACCIDENT WAS THE RESULT OF MISTAKEN IDENTIFICATION OF IR 655 AS A MILITARY AIRCRAFT ABOUT TO ATTACK THE VINCENNES IN SUPPORT OF THE IRANIAN SURFACE ATTACK. U.S. ALSO EMPHASIZED STEPS WE HAVE TAKEN TO DETERMINE THE PRECISE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT AND REDUCE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH INCIDENTS IN THE FUTURE, INCLUDING PUBLIC RELEASE OF OUR INVESTIGATION REPORT AND COOPERATION IN ICAO INVESTIGATION. VIRTUALLY ALL MEMBERS OF COUNCIL THEN SPOKE, MOST (INCLUDING THE

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PAGE 03 MONTRE 00916 02 OF 06 201743Z

SOVIET REP) CHARACTERIZING THE SHOOT-DOWN AS SOMETHING OTHER THAN DELIBERATE. OTHER MAJOR THEMES WERE THE NEED FOR IMPROVED MILITARY/CIVILIAN COORDINATION AND ADOPTION OF A COUNCIL RESOLUTION BY CONSENSUS. ONLY THE SOVIETS, CZECHS AND CUBANS OPENLY CALLED FOR THE SHOOT-DOWN TO BE CONDEMNED. OBVIOUSLY CONCERNED, THE IRANIANS SAID THEY TOO FAVORED IMPROVED CIVIL/MILITARY COORDINATION BUT THAT THE COUNCIL WOULD NOT BE CARRYING OUT ITS DUTY TO PROTECT THE SAFETY OF CIVIL AVIATION IF IT DID NOT CONDEMN THE DESTRUCTION OF A CIVIL AIRCRAFT IN FLIGHT. IN VIEW OF THE BROAD SENTIMENT AMONG COUNCIL MEMBERS FOR A CONSENSUS RESOLUTION, THE COUNCIL PRESIDENT UNDERTOOK TO CONSULT PRIVATELY TO SEE IF A TEXT COULD BE AGREED.

4. NEGOTIATIONS BEGAN ON THE BASIS OF A TEXT INITIALLY PREPARED AT THE INITIATIVE OF THE UKREP AND AGREED BY THE U.S. AND THE WESTERN GROUP (REF B). CONSULTING PRIVATELY WITH THE U.S., USSR AND IRAN, THE COUNCIL PRESIDENT DEVELOPED A MUTUALLY AGREED TEXT EXCEPT THAT DISAGREEMENT REMAINED OVER WHETHER THE COUNCIL SHOULD REGRET THE EVENTS AND ERRORS LEADING TO THE SHOOT-DOWN OR CONDEMN THE SPECIFIC USE OF ARMED FORCE. AT THAT STAGE USDEL HAD AGREED TO THE TEXT THAT WAS EVENTUALLY ADOPTED (PARA 11, BELOW) EXCEPT THAT THE FIFTH PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPH BEGAN WITH "RECALLING," AND THE FIRST OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH BEGAN WITH "DEEPLY REGRETS." THE SOVIETS WERE PRESSING TO REPLACE THE FIRST OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH WITH "CONDEMNS THE USE OF ARMED FORCE AGAINST CIVIL AIRCRAFT, IN PARTICULAR:

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ACTION IO-19

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	INR-07	EUR-00	SS-00	OIC-02	AF-00
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	SSO-00	L-03	AMAD-01	EAP-00	DOTE-00	STR-17	INRE-00
	JUSE-00	DS-01	SCT-02	E-01	P-02	/061 W	

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O 201721Z MAR 89
FM AMCONSUL MONTREAL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2895
INFO FAA WASHDC
SECDEF WASHDC
JCS WASHDC
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
FAA BRUSSELS
CJTfME

AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
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PAGE 02 MONTRE 00916 03 OF 06 201744Z

AMEMBASSY BERN
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IO MISSIONS COLLECTIVE

0311097000 PAGE NO. 7

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FROM USMISSION ICAO

STATE FOR IO AND EB/TRA/AVP

FAA FOR API-1, AIA-100 AND AGC-7

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: AORC, EAIR, ICAO, IR

SUBJECT: ICAO COUNCIL CONCLUDES ACTION ON IRAN AIR 655

IN THE TRAGIC DESTRUCTION OF AN IRAN AIR AIRLINER AND THE LOSS OF 290 LIVES, WHILE NOTING THE ACCIDENTAL SEQUENCE OF EVENTS AND ERRORS IN THE IDENTIFICATION OF THE AIRCRAFT."

5. AT AN URGENTLY CONVENED MEETING IN THE U.K. OFFICE, SEVEN FRIENDLY COUNTRIES (CANADA, FRANCE, FRG, ITALY, JAPAN, SWEDEN AND SWITZERLAND) AGREED TO COSPONSOR AND IMMEDIATELY SUBMIT A FORMAL RESOLUTION. THEIR PROPOSAL WAS THE TEXT ACCEPTABLE TO THE U.S., USING THE DISPUTED "DEEPLY REGRETS THE TRAGIC INCIDENT...." LANGUAGE AS THE

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PAGE 03 MONTRE 00916 03 OF 06 201744Z

FIRST OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH. IT WAS SUBMITTED MINUTES BEFORE A SOVIET DRAFT RESOLUTION, GIVING THE WESTERN TEXT PRIORITY UNDER THE RULES OF PROCEDURE. THE SOVIET PROPOSAL WAS IDENTICAL TO THE WESTERN TEXT EXCEPT THAT IT CONTAINED THE SOVIET VERSION OF THE FIRST OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH. THE WESTERN TEXT WAS CIRCULATED AS A DRAFT RESOLUTION; THE SOVIET TEXT, COSPONSORED BY THE CZECHS, WAS CIRCULATED AS A PROPOSED AMENDMENT. LATER IN THE DAY, SPAIN JOINED THE OTHER WESTERN STATES AS A COSPONSOR. THE MORNING OF MARCH 17 SWEDEN ANNOUNCED ITS WITHDRAWAL AS A COSPONSOR; AUSTRALIA ANNOUNCED IT WAS ADDING ITS NAME TO THE LIST.

6. THROUGHOUT THE PROCESS USDEL HAD COORDINATED CLOSELY WITH THE WESTERN GROUP AND HAD ALSO MET PRIVATELY WITH VIRTUALLY EVERY MEMBER OF COUNCIL. IT WAS APPARENT THAT THE SOVIET AMENDMENT WOULD FAIL IN AN OPEN VOTE IF WE CALLED FOR APPLICATION OF RULE 63 OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE, WHICH PROVIDES THAT AT THE REQUEST OF A COUNCIL MEMBER A MEASURE MAY BE APPROVED ONLY WITH THE AGREEMENT OF A MAJORITY OF THE COUNCIL, I.E. 17 YES VOTES. ABSTENTIONS WOULD COUNT AGAINST THE AMENDMENT. A LARGE NUMBER OF COUNCIL MEMBERS URGED USDEL TO CALL FOR A SO-CALLED STATUTORY MAJORITY UNDER RULE 63 AND TO ALSO REQUEST A SECRET VOTE. IT WAS ARGUED THAT A NUMBER OF LDC REPS WOULD VOTE AGAINST THE SOVIET AMENDMENT IN A SECRET VOTE BUT ABSTAIN IN A PUBLIC VOTE. WHAT WAS MORE IMPORTANT, THE ARGUMENT RAN, WAS THAT IN CALLING FOR A SECRET VOTE USDEL WOULD WIN LDC VOTES FOR A RESOLUTION NOT CONTAINING A

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CONDEMNATION OF THE ACT. FAILURE TO ADOPT ANY RESOLUTION
WOULD RESULT IN CARRYING THE MATTER OVER INTO THE ICAO
ASSEMBLY IN SEPTEMBER, A FORUM MUCH LESS FAVORABLE THAN THE
COUNCIL.

7. WHEN COUNCIL MET THE MORNING OF MARCH 17 THREE THINGS

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PAGE 01 MONTRE 00916 04 OF 06 201745Z
ACTION IO-19

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	INR-07	EUR-00	SS-00	OIC-02	AF-00
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	SSO-00	L-03	AMAD-01	EAP-00	DOTE-00	STR-17	INRE-00
	JUSE-00	DS-01	SCT-02	E-01	P-02	/061 W	

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O 201721Z MAR 89
FM AMCONSUL MONTREAL
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INFO FAA WASHDC
SECDEF WASHDC
JCS WASHDC
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
FAA BRUSSELS
CJTFME
AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
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PAGE 02 MONTRE 00916 04 OF 06 201745Z

AMEMBASSY BERN
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AMEMBASSY CARACAS
IO MISSIONS COLLECTIVE

0311507000 PAGE NO. 10

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BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

STATE FOR IO AND EB/TRA/AVP

E.O. 12356: N/A

SUBJECT: ICAO COUNCIL CONCLUDES ACTION ON IRAN AIR 655

WERE CLEAR:

-- DESIRE TO AVOID VOTING CONTINUED TO RUN HIGH:

-- THERE WAS NO CHANCE OF THE SOVIET AMENDMENT BEING APPROVED IN A PUBLIC VOTE, AND;

-- THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL RESISTANCE TO APPROVING A RESOLUTION WITH THE "DEEPLY REGRETS" FORMULATION.

IT WAS NOT CLEAR THERE WOULD BE A MAJORITY IN FAVOR OF THE
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UNAMENDED RESOLUTION AFTER DEFEAT OF THE SOVIET PROPOSAL.

8. DURING A BREAK CALLED FOR CONSULTATIONS AMONG DELEGATIONS, USDEL AGREED WITH WESTERN GROUP TO REPLACEMENT OF "REAFFIRMING" WITH "RECALLING" IN THE FIFTH PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPH AND REPLACEMENT OF "DEEPLY REGRETS" WITH "DEPLORES" IN THE FIRST OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH. USDEL DECLINED TO ACCEPT ELIMINATION OF THE WORD "ACCIDENTAL," AS WAS BEING URGED BY THE INDIAN, SAUDI ARABIAN AND PERUVIAN REPS. ADDITIONAL CONSULTATIONS CONFIRMED THE PROBABILITY THAT WHAT WAS NOW BEING CALLED THE WESTERN TEXT WOULD BE AMENDED FROM THE FLOOR IN UNPREDICTABLE WAYS UNLESS THE COSPONSORS AGREED IN ADVANCE TO "REAFFIRMING" IN THE PLACE OF "RECALLING" AND "DEEPLY DEPLORES" IN THE PLACE OF "DEEPLY REGRETS."

9. WHEN COUNCIL RESUMED THE UK REP, SPEAKING ON BEHALF OF THE COSPONSORS, SAID THAT FOLLOWING THE VOTE ON THE SOVIET AMENDMENT HE WOULD PROPOSE AMENDME. ... TO THE DRAFT RESOLUTION WHICH HE BELIEVED ON THE BASIS OF CONSULTATIONS TO BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE LARGE MAJORITY OF THE COUNCIL AS THE BASIS FOR A CONSENSUS DECISION. THE PRESIDENT THEN MOVED TO A VOTE ON THE SOVIET AMENDMENT. CZECHOSLOVAKIA, SECONDED BY THE USSR, CALLED FOR A SECRET BALLOT. USREP CALLED FOR A STATUTORY MAJORITY UNDER RULE 63. THE VOTING FOR THE SOVIET AMENDMENT WAS 6 IN FAVOR, 19 AGAINST, AND 6 ABSTENTIONS.

PAGE NO. : 17

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10. MOVING TO THE DRAFT RESOLUTION ITSELF, THE UK REP ANNOUNCED THAT IN THE INTEREST OF ARRIVING AT A CONSENSUS THE COSPONSORS WERE WILLING TO CHANGE "RECALLING" TO "REAFFIRMING" IN THE FIFTH PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPH AND "REGRETS" TO "DEPLORES" IN THE FIRST OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH. THE SOVIET REP SAID HE AGREED TO THE FIRST CHANGE BUT THAT

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ACTION IO-19

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	INR-07	EUR-00	SS-00	OIC-02	AF-00
	CIAE-00	EB-00	NEA-06	NSCE-00	ARA-00	NSAE-00	COME-00
	SSO-00	L-03	AMAD-01	EAP-00	DOIE-00	STR-17	INRE-00
	JUSE-00	DS-01	SCT-02	E-01	P-02	/061 W	

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O 201721Z MAR 89

FM AMCONSUL MONTREAL

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2897

INFO FAA WASHDC

SECDEF WASHDC

JCS WASHDC

USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL

FAA BRUSSELS

CJTfME

AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

AMEMBASSY BEIJING

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMEMBASSY TOKYO

AMEMBASSY BONN

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AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

AMEMBASSY JAKARTA

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PAGE 02 MONTRE 00916 05 OF 06 201746Z

AMEMBASSY BERN

AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM

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AMEMBASSY CARACAS

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FROM USMISSION ICAO

STATE FOR IO AND EB/TRA/AVP

FAA FOR API-1, AIA-100 AND AGC-7

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: AORC, EAIR, ICAO, IR

SUBJECT: ICAO COUNCIL CONCLUDES ACTION ON IRAN AIR 655

THE RECORD SHOULD REFLECT THAT HE CONTINUED TO SUPPORT THE POSITION CONTAINED IN HIS PROPOSAL. THE CZECH REP SAID SUBSTANTIALLY THE SAME, AS DID CUBA AND THE PRC. THE CHAIR DECLARED THE RESOLUTION AS AMENDED BY THE COSPONSORS, ADOPTED. IRAN SAID THE RESOLUTION WAS NOT A PROPER RESPONSE TO THE SHOOT-DOWN OF AN INNOCENT CIVILIAN AIRLINER AND THAT THE COUNCIL HAD FAILED TO CARRY OUT ITS RESPONSIBILITY. USREP SAID THE COUNCIL HAD ONCE AGAIN DEMONSTRATED ITS COLLECTIVE WISDOM AND ABILITY TO SORT THROUGH COMPLEX SITUATIONS TO ARRIVE AT APPROPRIATE CONCLUSIONS.

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11. TEXT OF RESOLUTION FOLLOWS:

THE COUNCIL OF THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION

RECALLING ITS DECISIONS OF 14 JULY AND 7 DECEMBER 1988 CONCERNING THE SHOOTING DOWN, ON 3 JULY 1988, OF IRAN AIR AIRBUS 300 ON FLIGHT IR655 BY A WARSHIP OF THE UNITED STATES;

HAVING CONSIDERED THE REPORT OF THE FACT-FINDING INVESTIGATION INSTITUTED BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL PURSUANT TO THE DECISION OF THE COUNCIL OF 14 JULY 1988 AND THE SUBSEQUENT STUDY BY THE AIR NAVIGATION COMMISSION OF THE SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS PRESENTED IN THAT REPORT;

EXPRESSING APPRECIATION FOR THE FULL CO-OPERATION EXTENDED TO THE FACT-FINDING MISSION BY THE AUTHORITIES OF ALL STATES CONCERNED;

RECALLING THAT THE 25TH SESSION (EXTRAORDINARY) OF THE ASSEMBLY IN 1984 UNANIMOUSLY RECOGNIZED THE DUTY OF STATES TO REFRAIN FROM THE USE OF WEAPONS AGAINST CIVIL AIRCRAFT IN FLIGHT;

REAFFIRMING ITS POLICY TO CONDEMN THE USE OF WEAPONS AGAINST CIVIL AIRCRAFT IN FLIGHT WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE

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TEXT OF TELEGRAM 89MONTRE000915

UNCLASSIFIED

PROVISIONS OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS;

DEEPLY DEPLORES THE TRAGIC INCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED AS A
CONSEQUENCE OF EVENTS AND ERRORS IN IDENTIFICATION OF THE
AIRCRAFT WHICH RESULTED IN THE ACCIDENTAL DESTRUCTION OF
AN IRAN AIR AIRLINER AND THE LOSS OF 290 LIVES;

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PAGE NO. 15
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ADP628

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ACTION IO-19

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	INR-07	EUR-00	SS-00	OIC-02	AF-00
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	SSO-00	L-03	AMAD-01	EAP-00	DOTE-00	STR-17	INRE-00
	JUSE-00	DS-01	SCT-02	E-01	P-02	/061 W	

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O 201721Z MAR 89
FM AMCONSUL MONTREAL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2898
INFO FAA WASHDC
SECDEF WASHDC
JCS WASHDC
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
FAA BRUSSELS
CJTFME

AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
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PAGE 02 MONTRE 00916 06 OF 06 201746Z

AMEMBASSY BERN
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
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AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY CARACAS
IO MISSIONS COLLECTIVE

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PAGE NO. 16

TEXT OF TELEGRAM 89MONTRE000916

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FROM USMISSION ICAO

STATE FOR IO AND EB/TRA/AVP

FAA FOR API-1, AIA-100 AND AGC-7

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: AORC, EAIR, ICAO, IR

SUBJECT: ICAO COUNCIL CONCLUDES ACTION ON IRAN AIR 655

EXPRESSES AGAIN ITS PROFOUND SYMPATHY AND CONDOLENCES TO
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN AND TO THE
BEREAVED FAMILIES;

APPEALS AGAIN URGENTLY TO ALL CONTRACTING STATES WHICH
HAVE NOT YET DONE SO TO RATIFY, AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, THE
PROTOCOL INTRODUCING ARTICLE 3 BIS INTO THE CONVENTION ON
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION;

NOTES THE REPORT OF THE FACT-FINDING INVESTIGATION

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PAGE 03 MONTRE 00916 06 OF 06 201746Z

INSTITUTED BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND ENDORSES THE
CONCLUSIONS OF THE AIR NAVIGATION COMMISSION ON THE
SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS CONTAINED THEREIN;

URGES STATES TO TAKE ALL NECESSARY MEASURES TO SAFEGUARD
THE SAFETY OF AIR NAVIGATION, PARTICULARLY BY ASSURING
EFFECTIVE CO-ORDINATION OF CIVIL AND MILITARY ACTIVITIES
AND THE PROPER IDENTIFICATION OF CIL AIRCRAFT.

END TEXT. STOHR

0311087000 PAGE NO. 17

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TEXT OF TELEGRAM 89STATE 065684

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R (E177)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE 920393

IS/FPC/CDR 108

Date. 9/18/96

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FOIA Exemptions
PA Exemptions

MR Cases Only:
EO Citations

PAGE 01

STATE 065684

ORIGIN IO-19

TS authority to.
() CLASSIFY as () S or ()
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INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-07 EUR-00 SS-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00
EB-00 NEA-06 NSAE-00 COME-00 L-03 PM-10 DOTE-00
STR-17 INRE-00 JUSE-00 E-01 /065 R

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FOR USREP ICAO

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: AORC, EAIR, MOPS, US, IR

SUBJECT: IRAN AIR 655: RULES OF ENGAGEMENT OF THE
USS VINCENNES

1. (LOW) THE U.S. MISSION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL
AVIATION ORGANIZATION (ICAO) IS AUTHORIZED TO USE THE
FOLLOWING STATEMENT DURING ANY ICAO DISCUSSIONS OF THE
DESTRUCTION OF IRAN AIR FLIGHT 655 BY THE USS VINCENNES.
HOWEVER, MISSION SHOULD USE THIS STATEMENT ONLY IN
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS ABOUT THIS SPECIFIC ISSUE, AND ONLY

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PAGE 02

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IF A RESPONSE IS NECESSARY. MISSION SHOULD NOT/NOT
VOLUNTEER THIS STATEMENT.

2. (U) BEGIN TEXT. BEGIN QUOTE.

IT HAS ALWAYS BEEN THE PRACTICE OF U.S. NAVAL FORCES IN
THE GULF TO CONTACT AN APPROACHING AIRCRAFT TO DETERMINE
THE AIRCRAFT'S INTENTIONS LONG BEFORE THE AIRCRAFT WOULD
BE WITHIN FIVE NAUTICAL MILES OF THE NAVAL FORCES.

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PAGE NO. 1

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HOWEVER, WHEN THE THREAT OF POSSIBLE TERRORIST ATTACKS INCREASED, THE U.S. DETERMINED IT WAS NECESSARY TO CREATE A SPECIFIC NOTICE TO WARN AGAINST AIRCRAFT FLYING AT LOW ALTITUDES (2000 FEET ABOVE GROUND LEVEL) AND APPROACHING

U.S. NAVAL VESSELS. THE U.S. ISSUED A NOTICE TO AIRMEN (NOTAM) IN 1984 WHICH, AMONG OTHER THINGS, ADVISED AIRCRAFT APPROACHING U.S. NAVAL FORCES WITHIN FIVE NAUTICAL MILES, AND AT AN ALTITUDE OF LESS THAN 2000 FEET, AND WHOSE INTENTIONS REMAINED UNCLEAR, THAT THEY "MAY BE HELD AT RISK BY U.S. DEFENSIVE MEASURES".

FOLLOWING THE LOSS OF LIFE ABOARD THE USS STARK IN MAY 1987, AS A RESULT OF A MISSILE ATTACK LAUNCHED WELL BEYOND FIVE NAUTICAL MILES FROM THE WARSHIP, THE U.S. ISSUED ANOTHER IN A SERIES OF NOTAMS WHICH REAFFIRMED THE STANDARD U.S. NAVAL FORCES' PRACTICE OF CONTACTING AIRCRAFT APPROACHING U.S. NAVAL FORCES LONG BEFORE DEFENSIVE MEASURES WOULD BE NECESSARY. THE SEPTEMBER 1987 NOTAM ADVISED THAT ALL AIRCRAFT APPROACHING U.S. NAVAL FORCES WOULD BE CONTACTED ON DESIGNATED FREQUENCIES AND ASKED TO IDENTIFY THEMSELVES AND STATE THEIR INTENTIONS. IT WAS SPECIFICALLY NOTED IN THE NOTAM THAT "FAILURE TO RESPOND TO REQUESTS FOR IDENTIFICATION AND INTENTIONS, OR ~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~
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PAGE 03 STATE 065684

TO WARNINGS, AND OPERATING IN A THREATENING MANNER COULD PLACE THE AIRCRAFT AT RISK BY U.S. DEFENSIVE MEASURES." THUS, THE NOTICES OFFERED BY THE U.S. TO REDUCE THE RISK OF PRECIPITATING NECESSARY DEFENSIVE MEASURES BY U.S. NAVAL FORCES CONTAINED TWO DISTINCT ELEMENTS: EITHER A LOW-ALTITUDE, CLOSE-IN APPROACH, OR A STEADY, THREATENING APPROACH WITHOUT RESPONSE TO RADIO INQUIRIES OR WARNINGS COULD RESULT IN U.S. NAVAL FORCES TAKING DEFENSIVE MEASURES WHICH MIGHT PLACE THE APPROACHING AIRCRAFT AT RISK. THE USS VINCENNES WAS UNDER SMALL-BOAT ATTACK WHILE BEING STEADILY APPROACHED BY AN AIRCRAFT WHICH TOOK OFF FROM A MIXED MILITARY-CIVILIAN AIRPORT, AND WHICH DID NOT RESPOND TO CONTINUOUS RADIO INQUIRIES. ACCORDINGLY, THE USS VINCENNES, IN VIEW OF THE ONGOING HOSTILITIES IN THE GULF, TOOK MEASURES NECESSARY TO DEFEND THE LIVES OF ITS CREW FROM THE PERCEIVED IRANIAN AIR THREAT. BAKER

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TEXT OF TELEGRAM 89STATE 065695

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IS/FPC/CDR 128

Date. 9/18/96

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PAGE 01 STATE 065695
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MONTREAL FOR THE U.S. MISSION TO ICAO

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: AORC, EAIR, MOPS, US, IR
SUBJECT: USS VINCENNES IN IRAN'S TERRITORIAL WATERS
REF: A. 88 MONTREAL 04482 B. MONTREAL 0114

1.(LOU) THE U.S. MISSION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL
AVIATION ORGANIZATION (ICAO) IS AUTHORIZED TO USE THE
FOLLOWING STATEMENT DURING ANY ICAO DISCUSSIONS OF THE
DESTRUCTION OF IRAN AIR FLIGHT 655 BY THE USS VINCENNES.
HOWEVER, MISSION SHOULD USE THIS STATEMENT ONLY IN
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS ABOUT THIS SPECIFIC ISSUE, AND ONLY

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PAGE 02 STATE 065695.

IF A RESPONSE IS NECESSARY. MISSION SHOULD NOT/NOT
VOLUNTEER THIS STATEMENT.

2.(U) BEGIN TEXT. BEGIN QUOTE.

AT APPROXIMATELY 0615Z ON JULY 3, 1988, IRANIAN SMALL
BOATS INITIATED AN UNPROVOKED ATTACK ON THE USS VINCENNES'
HELICOPTER, WHICH WAS IN INTERNATIONAL AIRSPACE
APPROXIMATELY FOUR NAUTICAL MILES FROM IRANIAN TERRITORIAL

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IS/FPC/CDR PDS Date. 9/18/96

PAGE 01
ACTION SS-00

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E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: PREL, IR, SZ, US

SUBJECT: IRAN AIR 655

REF: BERN 927

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. FURTHER TO REFTTEL, ACTING CHIEF GRAF OF FEDERAL DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS' FOREIGN INTERESTS SECTION INFORMED POLOFF FEBRUARY 10 THAT US INTERESTS SECTION IN TEHRAN HAD ADVISED THAT THE IRAN INSURANCE COMPANY IS ORGANIZED AS A SHARE COMPANY, BUT THAT ITS ENTIRE SHARE CAPITAL WAS HELD BY THE MINISTRY OF ECONOMICS AND FINANCE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN.

3. GRAF SAID THAT INTERESTS SECTION IS AWAITING US INSTRUCTIONS AS TO HOW TO PROCEED.
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PAGE 02

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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

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FILM= D740243-0236

DATE= 31 AUG 74

TYPE= TE

FROM= BAGHDAD

DRAFTER= n/a

OFFICE= ACTION NEA

TO= STATE

CHANNEL= n/a

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EO= GS

SUBJECT= IRAQI-IRANIAN CONFLICT

REFERENCE= BAGHDAD 0568

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= FOREIGN RELATIONS, MOBILIZATION, MILITARY BUILDUP

TAGS= PFOR, IZ, IR

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ACTION NEA-16

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E.O. 11652: ~~GDS~~

TAGS: PFOR, IZ, IR

SUBJECT: IRAQI-IRANIAN CONFLICT

REF: BAGHDAD 0568

1. ALTHOUGH USINT DID NOT RECEIVE NOTE GIVEN DIPLOMATIC
MISSIONS CONDEMNING RECENT IRANIAN ACTIONS (REFTEL), I
GOT FIRST HAND ACCOUNT OF GOI POSITION FROM FOREIGN MINISTER
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TAQA ON AUGUST 26 DURING MEETING ON OTHER SUBJECT

2. TAQA SAID IRAN HAD CONCENTRATED 3 ARMORED DEVISIONS, 2 INFANTRY DIVISIONS AND 2 INFANTRY BRIGADES ALONG ENTIRE LENGTH OF BORDER. THESE TROOPS AS WELL AS IRANIAN AIR FORCE ARE ON FULL ALERT. HE NOTED THAT IRAN HAD NOT DENIED REPORTS OF ALERT BUT RELATED IT TO IRAQI MILITARY ACTIONS. THIS IS REDICULOUS, HE SAID, SINCE IRAQI FORCES ENGAGED IN INTERNAL ACTION. HE CONTINUED, WITH SOME FEELING, "IF SHAH OR ANYONE ELSE HAS IDEA OF NEW BANGLADESH IN IRAQ HE IS VERY MISTAKEN. BARZANI IS NOT REPRESENTATIVE OF KURDS, HE IS IN LAST DAYS, AND THOSE WHO ARE BETTING ON HIM ARE BETTING ON LOSING HORSE." TAQA SAID THAT ISTANBUL MEETING HAD BEEN RESULT OF IRAQ INITIATIVE AND WAS TO RESOLVE ALL OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS. NEGOTIATIONS WERE PROCEEDING "NOT BADLY" WHEN IRANIAN TROOP CONCENTRATION BEGAN AND ATTACKS HARDENED. IN RESPONSE TO MY QUESTION ABOUT ALLEGED IRAQI INCURSIONS ON AUGUST 4 AND 8, TAQA SAID THERE HAD BEEN NO IRAQI INCURSIONS AND THAT IF THEY OCCURED AT ALL, THEY WERE LIKELY PROVOCATIVE ACTS BY KURDS. KURDS HAD, HE SAID, PREVIOUSLY ENGAGED IN THIS KIND OF ACTIVITY WEARING IRAQI ARMY UNIFORMS ON TURKISH BORDER.

3. COMMENT: THERE IS VIRTUAL UNANIMITY AMONG FOREIGN OBSERVERS IN BAGHDAD THAT IRAQIS ARE NOW SERIOUS ABOUT FULL RAPPROCHMENT WITH IRAN AS PREREQUISITE FOR RESOLVING KURDISH PROBLEM AND THAT IT WOULD BE COUNTER TO IRAQ'S INTEREST TO ANTAGONIZE IRAN WITH BORDER INCURSIONS. VIEW IS ALMOST EQUALLY UNANIMOUS THAT GIVEN HIS COMPLETE DISTRUST OF BAATH REGIME, SHAH IS NOT INTERESTED IN RAPPROCHMENT AND WILL CONTINUE TO ASSIST BARZANI FORCES TO KEEP BAATH PREOCCUPIED. IRAQI EDITORIALISTS ARE ACCUSING NOT ONLY IRAN, BUT U.S. AND SOME ARAB REGIMES OF SAME MOTIVIES BECAUSE OF IRAQ'S DETERMINED STAND "IN THE VANGUARD OF THE ARAB REVOLUTIONARY POWERS OPPOSING CAPITULATION".

4. NO ONE CAN ASSURE IRANIANS OR OTHER ENEMIES OF BAATH REGIME THAT IF KURDISH SETTLEMENT COULD BE FOUND, IRAQ WOULD BEHAVE RESPONSIBLY, FURTHER CURTAIL SOVIET PRESENCE, AND BECOME FORCE FOR REGIONAL STABILITY, HOWEVER THE CONVERSE

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PAGE 03 BAGHDA 00569 030859Z

SEEMS TO ME A VIRTUAL CERTAINTY; I.E. UNTIL KURDISH PROBLEM RESOLVED AND RAPPROCHMENT TAKES PLACE WITH IRAN, IRAQ WILL ENGAGE IN SUBVERSION AGAINST ITS REAL AND IMAGINED ENEMIES, RELY ON NECESSITY ON USSR FOR MILITARY AND

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POLITICAL SUPPORT, AND CONTINUE TO BE CENTER OF INSTABILITY
IN THIS AREA. FROM BAGHDAD VANTAGE POINT, TIME IS RIPE FOR
SERIOUS IRANIAN-IRAQ NEGOTIATIONS AND IRANIANS WOULD APPEAR
TO BE IN POSITION TO OBTAIN MAZIMUM CONCESSIONS. IT IS,
IN MY VIEW, VERY MUCH IN U.S. INTERESTS THAT IRANIANS AT
LEAST MAKE THE EFFORT.

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TEXT OF TELEGRAM 89MONTRE000656

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IS/FPC/CDR 188

Date. 9/8/96

PAGE 01
ACTION IO-19

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FROM USMISSION ICAO

FOR IO

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: EAIR, ICAO, IR
SUBJECT: SHOOTDOWN OF IRAN AIR 655

1. MISSION IS PLANNING TO BRIEF COUNCIL MEMBERS ON THE
SCENARIO SURROUNDING THE SHOOTDOWN OF IRAN AIR 655 ON
MARCH 9 AND 10 IN PREPARATION FOR THE COUNCIL SESSION ON
MARCH 13.

2. WE WOULD APPRECIATE IT IF IO COULD REQUEST THE
PRESENCE OF COMMANDER JOHN MORGAN TO CARRY OUT THESE
BRIEFINGS. WE BELIEVE HIS PRESENCE COULD HAVE AN
EXCELLENT EFFECT ON COUNCIL MEMBERS. STOHR

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